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Justice: What's The Right Thing To Do? Episode 02: "PUTTING A PRICE TAG ON LIFE"

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    Chương trình được tài trợ bởi:
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    Tài trợ phụ bởi
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    lần trước chúng ta đã tranh luận
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    về trường hợp vụ Nữ hoàng kiện Dudley và Stephens
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    vụ đắm tàu, vụ ăn thịt người trên biển
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    và với những lập luận về
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    vụ đắm tàu,
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    những lập luận ủng hộ và chống lại những suy nghĩ của Dudley và Stephens,
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    hãy quay trở lại với
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    vấn đề triết học
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    triết học vị lợi của Jeremy Bentham
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    Bentham sinh ra ở Anh năm 1748,
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    12 tuổi ông vào học Oxford, 15 tuổi ông học trường luật.
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    ông được nhận vào đoàn luật sư năm 19 tuổi,
    nhưng anh ta chưa bao giờ hành nghề luật sư,
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    thay vào đó, ông dâng trọn đời mình
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    cho Luật học và
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    Triết học đạo đức.
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    lần trước chúng ta đã bắt đầu xem xét một phiên bản
    về thuyết vị lợi của Bentham
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    ý tưởng chính
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    đơn giản được phát biểu như thế này,
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    nguyên tắc tối cao của đạo đức,
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    cho dù là đạo đức cá nhân hay đạo đức chính trị
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    Đều là
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    tối đa hóa
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    phúc lợi chung
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    hay hạnh phúc của tập thể,
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    hay sự cân bằng tổng thể giữa
    niềm vui và nỗi thống khổ
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    Nói cách khác là
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    tối đa hóa
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    tính có ích
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    Bentham đưa ra nguyên tắc này bằng dòng lập luận rằng,
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    tất cả chúng ta đều bị chi phối bởi nỗi đau và niềm vui
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    chúng là những bậc thầy tối cao của chúng ta,
    và do vậy bất kỳ hệ thống đạo đức nào cũng phải tính đến chúng.
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    Tính như thế nào là tốt nhất?
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    Bằng cách tối đa hóa
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    và điều này dẫn đến nguyên tắc
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    rằng lợi ích lớn nhất cho nhiều người nhất
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    Vậy chính xác chúng ta nên tối đã hóa tiện ích gì?
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    Bentham nói với chúng ta
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    đó là hạnh phúc
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    hay chính xác hơn là tính có ích.
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    tính có ích.
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    Tối đa hóa tiện ích là một nguyên tắc không chỉ cho cá nhân mà còn cho cộng đồng, và
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    Cả đối với các nhà lập pháp,
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    cuối cùng là cho cả mốt cuộc cộng đồng
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    mà Bentham yêu cầu
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    đó là tổng thể các cá nhân bao gồm trong đó,
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    và đó là lý do
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    trong việc quyết định chính sách tốt nhất, trong việc quyết định luật lệ nên như thế nào,
    trong việc quyết định điều gì là công bằng,
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    công dân và các nhà lập pháp nên hỏi chính bản thân họ
    câu hỏi, rằng nếu chúng ta cộng hết,
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    tất cả những lợi ích của chính sách này,
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    rồi trừ đi
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    tất cả các chi phí,
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    việc đúng nên làm
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    là cái mà
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    tối đa hóa được
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    sự cân bằng
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    giữa hạnh phúc
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    và đau khổ.
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    Đó là ý nghĩa của việc tối đa hóa tiện ích
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    Bây giờ, ngày hôm nay
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    tôi muốn xem
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    liệu các bạn đồng ý hay không đồng ý với điều đó,
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    và suy luận vị lợi này thường diễn ra
    dưới cái tên phân tích phí tổn - lợi ích
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    Thường xuyên được sử dụng bởi các công ty
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    và bởi
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    chính phủ
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    Và nó luôn luôn l
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    iên quan đến việc
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    đặt một giá trị - thường là giá trị tiền bạc - để đại diện cho tính có lợi ích
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    Dựa trên chi phí và lợi ích
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    của nhiều đề xuất khác nhau.
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    Mới gần đây, ở Cộng hòa Séc,
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    có một đề xuất tăng thuế tiêu thụ đặc biệt đối với thuốc lá
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    Philip Morris,
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    Một công ty thuốc lá,
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    doanh thu khổng lồ
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    Ở Cộng hòa Séc. Họ đã thực hiện
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    một nghiên cứu về phân tích lợi ích - chi phí
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    Của việc hút thuốc lá
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    ở Cộng hòa Séc.
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    Và phân tích lợi ích chi phí của họ
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    Cho thấy
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    rằng
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    chính phủ sẽ có lợi
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    bằng việc
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    có công dân Séc hút thuốc lá.
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    Bây giờ, hãy xem xem chính phủ đạt được lợi ích như thế nào?
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    Đúng là việc này có những tác động tiêu cực
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    cho tài chính công của chính phủ Séc
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    bởi vì có sự gia tăng chi phí chăm sóc sức khỏe
    cho những người mắc các bệnh liên quan
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    đến hút thuốc
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    Mặc khác, những bệnh tật này lại tạo ra những tác động tích cực
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    và tất cả
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    đã được cộng dồn lại
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    ở phái bên kia sổ cái
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    những tác động tích cực bao gồm, chủ yếu là
    các nguồn thu thuế khác nhau mà chính phủ
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    thu được từ doanh số bán các sản phẩm thuốc lá,
    nhưng còn gồm cả khoản tiết kiệm được
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    từ chi phí chăm sóc sức khỏe chính phủ không phải chi trả
    khi người ta chết sớm
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    tiết kiệm lương hưu,
    bạn không phải trả lương hưu trong thời gian dài, và cả tiết kiệm được
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    tiết kiệm
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    chi phí nhà ở cho người già.
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    Và khi tất cả các chi phí và lợi ích được cộng dồn lại
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    nghiên cứu của Philip Morris
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    cho thấy rằng
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    tài chính công ở Cộng hòa Séc có một khoản thu ròng
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    147 triệu đô la và còn tiết kiệm được
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    và tiết kiệm được
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    chi phí nhà ở, chăm sóc sức khỏe và lương hưu.
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    Chính phủ được hưởng khoản tiết kiệm hơn 1.200 đô la
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    khi mỗi người chết sớm vì hút thuốc.
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    phân tích chi phí - lợi ích,
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    ngay bây giờ, trong số những bạn ủng hộ thuyết vị lợi
    có thể nghĩ rằng đây là một cuộc kiểm tra không công bằng.
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    khảo nghiệm của Philip Morris
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    đã bị báo chí chỉ trích
    và họ đã phải xin lỗi vì phép tính
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    vô nhân đạo này
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    bạn có thể nói rằng
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    điều thiếu sót ở đây là thứ mà
    thuyết vị lợi có thể dễ dàng kết nối lại với nhau
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    chủ yếu là
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    giá trị đối với con người và gia đình của những người đã qua đời
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    vì ung thư phổi.
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    Thế còn giá trị của mạng sống thì sao?
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    Một số phân tích lợi ích - chi phí kết hợp
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    cả thước đo
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    giá trị cuộc sống.
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    Một trong những vụ nổi tiếng nhất trong số đó
    liên quan đến vụ xe Ford Pinto
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    Các bạn đã đọc về vụ đó không? Trở lại vào những năm 1970, chắc các bạn vẫn nhớ
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    mẫu xe Ford Pinto, đó là một loại xe hơi?
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    Có ai còn nhớ không?
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    đó là một mẫu xe nhỏ, xe ô tô nhỏ, rất phổ biến
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    nhưng có một vấn đề
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    là bình xăng nằm phía sau xe
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    và thực tế trong những vụ va chạm từ phía sau, bình xăng đã phát nổ
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    Và, một số người đã thiệt mạng,
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    một số người bị thương nặng.
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    nạn nhân của những vụ tai nạn này đã kiện hãng Ford ra tòa,
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    và trong phiên tòa, hóa ra
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    Ford đã biết
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    từ rất lâu trước đó
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    về bình xăng dễ bị nổ
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    và đã thực hiện phân tích lợi ích - chi phí
    để xác định liệu có đáng
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    để đặt một tấm chắn đặc biệt
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    để bảo vệ bình xăng và ngăn nó phát nổ không.
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    Họ đã làm một phân tích lợi ích - chi phí
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    chi phí cho mỗi phần
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    để tăng độ an toàn
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    của chiếc Pinto,
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    họ đã tính toán ra tầm 11 đô la cho mỗi bộ phận
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    và đây,
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    đây là phân tích - lợi ích chi phí
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    được đưa ra ở phiên xét xử,
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    Mỗi bộ phận 11 đô la
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    cho 12,5 triệu chiếc xe hơi và xe tải
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    nên tổng chi phí
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    là 137 triệu đô la để cải thiện sự an toàn
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    nhưng sau đó họ đã tính toán
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    lợi ích
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    của việc tiêu tất cả số tiền này để có một mẫu xe an toàn hơn
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    và họ đếm được 180 người chết
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    và quy ra giá trị bằng tiền
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    200 nghìn đô la
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    cho mỗi người chết,
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    180 người bị thương
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    nhận 67 nghìn đô la,
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    và tiếp đó là chi phí sửa chữa,
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    thay thế cho 2000 chiếc xe bị phá hủy nếu không có
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    thiết bị an toàn.
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    700 đô la mỗi xe.
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    Như vậy, hóa ra những lợi ích
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    chỉ khoảng 49,5 triệu.
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    Thế nên họ đã
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    không lắp đặt
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    thiết bị an toàn.
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    Không cần phải nói
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    khi bản ghi nhớ
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    về phân tích lợi ích-chi phí của Công ty Ford Motor
    được đưa ra trong buổi xét xử
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    nó khiến bồi thẩm viên kinh hoàng.
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    Và họ đã yêu cầu một khoản phạt khổng lồ
  • 9:16 - 9:22
    Liệu đây có phải là một ví dụ đi ngược lại
    với ý tưởng vị lợi khi tính toán
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    vì Ford đã đưa vào phép tính
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    thước đo giá trị của mạng sống?
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    Bây giờ, bạn nào ở đây muốn bảo vệ
  • 9:31 - 9:33
    phân tích lợi - ích chi phí
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    Từ ví dụ phản đề rõ ràng này,
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    có ai muốn biện hộ không?
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    hay bạn nghĩ nó đã hoàn toàn phá hủy
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    phép tính tính vị lợi?
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    Vâng. Tôi nghĩ rằng,
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    một lần nữa họ lại mắc cùng một sai lầm như ở ví dụ trước
    khi họ đã gán một giá trị bằng tiền
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    cho sinh mạng con người và một lần nữa họ không tính đến những thứ như
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    đau khổ và mất mát về tình cảm gia đình.
    Ý tôi là những gia đình đã bị mất đi nguồn sống
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    nhưng họ cũng mất đi người thân và điều đó
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    còn đáng giá hơn 200 nghìn đô la.
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    Tốt, nhưng chờ đã nào, bạn tên gì?
  • 10:09 - 10:10
    Julie Roto.
  • 10:10 - 10:14
    Vậy nếu là 200 nghìn đô la, Julie,
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    Là một con số quá thấp vì chưa bao gồm sự mất mát của một người thân,
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    và sự mất mát của những năm tháng cuộc đời,
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    Vậy bạn nghĩ con số nào,
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    bạn nghĩ con số bao nhiêu sẽ chính xác hơn?
  • 10:27 - 10:32
    Tôi không tin là mình có thể đưa ra một con số.
    Tôi nghĩ rằng kiểu phân tích này không nên áp dụng cho
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    những vấn đề về sinh mạng con người.
  • 10:34 - 10:36
    Tôi nghĩ rằng không thể dung tiền đối với vấn đề này.
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    Vậy họ không chỉ đưa ra một con số quá thấp
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    Julie nói rằng, họ đã sai khi cố gắng áp đặt bất kỳ một con số nào.
  • 10:45 - 10:50
    được rồi, hãy nghe một ý kiến khác. Ai nào?
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    Phải tính thêm cả điều chỉnh do lạm phát nữa
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    được rồi,
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    thế là công bằng.
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    Vậy bây giờ con số sẽ là bao nhiêu?
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    Đấy là 35 năm trước
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    Hai triệu đô la.
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    Bạn đưa ra con số hai triệu đô la.
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    Và bạn tên gì?
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    Voicheck
  • 11:15 - 11:17
    Voicheck nói rằng chúng ta phải tính thêm cả lạm phát,
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    chúng ta nên hào phóng hơn
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    Nếu vậy các bạn có hài lòng xem
    đây là cách nghĩ đúng cho câu hỏi này không?
  • 11:25 - 11:27
    Thật không may, tôi đoán là.
  • 11:27 - 11:30
    Cần phải
  • 11:30 - 11:33
    đặt ra một con số ở đâu đó
  • 11:33 - 11:37
    Tôi không chắc sẽ là số nào nhưng tôi đồng ý rằng có thể
  • 11:37 - 11:39
    gán cho mạng người
  • 11:39 - 11:41
    một con số.
  • 11:41 - 11:42
    Được rồi,
  • 11:42 - 11:44
    như vậy Voicheck nói,
  • 11:44 - 11:46
    và ở đây cậu ấy không đồng ý với
  • 11:46 - 11:47
    Julie
  • 11:47 - 11:50
    Julie nói rằng chúng ta không thể gán cho mạng người một con số,
  • 11:50 - 11:54
    để phân tích lợi ích - chi phí,
    Voicheck nói rằng chúng ta phải làm như vậy
  • 11:54 - 12:00
    bởi vì bằng cách này hay cách khác, chúng ta phải quyết định
  • 12:00 - 12:05
    những bạn khác nghĩ sao về điều này?
    Có ai sẵn sàng để biện hộ rằng
  • 12:05 - 12:06
    phân tích lợi ích - chi phí ở đây
  • 12:06 - 12:10
    Là chính xác và thỏa đáng không?
  • 12:10 - 12:16
    Tôi nghĩ rằng, nếu Ford và các công ty xe hơi khác không sử dụng phân tích lợi ích - chi phí
    thì cuối cùng họ sẽ bị phá sản
  • 12:16 - 12:19
    vì họ sẽ chẳng thể có lợi nhuận
  • 12:19 - 12:23
    và hàng triệu người sẽ không có ô tô của hãng này để đi làm,
    để có thức ăn trên bàn
  • 12:23 - 12:28
    để nuôi con cái của họ, vì vậy tôi nghĩ rằng nếu
    phân tích lợi ích - chi phí không được sử dụng,
  • 12:28 - 12:30
    thì một lợi ích lớn hơn
  • 12:30 - 12:32
    sẽ mất đi
  • 12:32 - 12:35
    trong trường hợp đó. Được rồi, cho tôi hỏi, bạn tên gì?
  • 12:35 - 12:38
    Raul. Raul.
  • 12:38 - 12:42
    Gần đây đã có một nghiên cứu được thực hiện về việc
    sử dụng điện thoại di động của tài xế khi đang lái
  • 12:42 - 12:43
    một chiếc ô tô,
  • 12:43 - 12:47
    và có một cuộc tranh luận liệu việc đó có nên
    bị cấm hay không
  • 12:47 - 12:49
  • 12:49 - 12:51
    con số là,
  • 12:51 - 12:55
    khoảng hai nghìn người chết
  • 12:55 - 12:57
    vì tai nạn
  • 12:57 - 12:59
    mỗi năm,
  • 12:59 - 13:02
    khi sử dụng điện thoại di động
  • 13:02 - 13:08
    Và phân tích lợi ích - chi phí
    được thực hiện bởi trung tâm phân tích rủi ro ở Harvard
  • 13:08 - 13:11
    found that if you look at the benefits
  • 13:11 - 13:14
    of the cell phone use
  • 13:14 - 13:15
    and you put some
  • 13:15 - 13:19
    value on the life, it comes out about
    the same
  • 13:19 - 13:23
    because of the enormous economic benefit
    of enabling people to take advantage
  • 13:23 - 13:27
    of their time, not waste time, be able to make deals
    and talk to friends and so on
  • 13:27 - 13:30
    while they're driving
  • 13:30 - 13:32
    doesn't that suggest that
  • 13:32 - 13:36
    it's a mistake to try to put monetary figures
    on questions
  • 13:36 - 13:38
    of human life?
  • 13:38 - 13:39
    well I think that if
  • 13:39 - 13:42
    the great majority of people
  • 13:42 - 13:48
    tried to derive maximum utility out of a service
    like using cell phones and the convenience that cell phones
  • 13:48 - 13:48
    provide
  • 13:48 - 13:50
    that sacrifice is necessary
  • 13:50 - 13:52
    for
  • 13:52 - 13:53
    satisfaction to occur.
  • 13:53 - 13:59
    You're an outright utilitarian. In, yes okay.
  • 13:59 - 14:03
    all right then, one last question Raul
  • 14:03 - 14:06
    and I put this to Voicheck,
  • 14:06 - 14:08
    what dollar figure should be put
  • 14:08 - 14:13
    on human life to decide whether to ban the
    use of cell phones
  • 14:13 - 14:15
    well I don't want to
  • 14:15 - 14:16
    arbitrarily
  • 14:16 - 14:18
    calculate a figure, I mean right now
  • 14:18 - 14:19
    I think that
  • 14:21 - 14:24
    you want to take it under advisement.
  • 14:24 - 14:25
    yeah I'll take it under advisement.
  • 14:25 - 14:29
    but what roughly speaking would it be? you've
    got 23 hundred deaths
  • 14:29 - 14:32
    you've got to assign a dollar value to know
    whether you want to prevent those deaths by
  • 14:32 - 14:37
    banning the use of cell phones in cars
  • 14:37 - 14:39
    so what would you're hunch be?
  • 14:39 - 14:40
    how much?
  • 14:40 - 14:41
    million
  • 14:41 - 14:42
    two million
  • 14:42 - 14:44
    two million was Voitech's figure
  • 14:44 - 14:46
    is that about right? maybe a million.
  • 14:46 - 14:50
    a million.?!
  • 14:50 - 14:55
    Alright that's good, thank you
  • 14:55 - 15:00
    So these are some of the controversies that arise
    these days from cost-benefit analysis especially
  • 15:00 - 15:02
    those that involve
  • 15:02 - 15:07
    placing a dollar value on everything to be
    added up.
  • 15:07 - 15:09
    well now I want to turn
  • 15:09 - 15:15
    to your objections, to your objections not necessarily
    to cost benefit analysis specifically,
  • 15:15 - 15:18
    because that's just one version of the
  • 15:18 - 15:22
    utilitarian logic in practice today,
  • 15:22 - 15:27
    but to the theory as a whole, to the idea
  • 15:27 - 15:30
    that the right thing to do,
  • 15:30 - 15:34
    the just basis for policy and law,
  • 15:34 - 15:36
    is to maximize
  • 15:36 - 15:40
    utility.
  • 15:40 - 15:42
    How many disagree
  • 15:42 - 15:43
    with the utilitarian
  • 15:43 - 15:44
    approach
  • 15:44 - 15:46
    to law
  • 15:46 - 15:48
    and to the common good?
  • 15:48 - 15:52
    How many bring with it?
  • 15:52 - 15:55
    so more agree than disagree.
  • 15:55 - 16:00
    so let's hear from the critics
  • 16:00 - 16:02
    my main issue with it is that I feel like
  • 16:02 - 16:06
    you can't say that just because someone's
    in the minority
  • 16:06 - 16:12
    what they want and need is less valuable than
    someone who's in the majority
  • 16:12 - 16:14
    so I guess I have an issue with the idea that
  • 16:14 - 16:16
    the greatest good for the greatest number
  • 16:16 - 16:18
    is okay because
  • 16:18 - 16:21
    there is still what about people who are in
  • 16:21 - 16:25
    the lesser number, like it's not fair to them
    they didn't have a say in where they wanted
  • 16:25 - 16:26
    to be.
  • 16:26 - 16:29
    alright now that's an interesting objection, you're
    worried about
  • 16:29 - 16:32
    the effect on minority. yes.
  • 16:32 - 16:35
    what's your name by the way. Anna.
  • 16:35 - 16:40
    alright who has an answer to Anna's worry about
    the effect on the minority
  • 16:40 - 16:42
    What do you say to Anna?
  • 16:42 - 16:43
    she said that
  • 16:43 - 16:47
    the minorities value less, I don't think that's
    the case because individually the minorities
  • 16:47 - 16:51
    value is just the same as the individual in the majority
    it's just that
  • 16:51 - 16:55
    the numbers outweigh the
  • 16:55 - 16:56
    minority
  • 16:56 - 16:59
    and I mean at a certain point you have to make a
    decision
  • 16:59 - 17:02
    and I'm sorry for the minority but
  • 17:02 - 17:03
    sometimes
  • 17:03 - 17:04
    it's for the general
  • 17:04 - 17:09
    for the greater good. For the greater good, Anna what do you
    say? what's your name? Youngda.
  • 17:09 - 17:11
    What do you say to Youngda?
  • 17:11 - 17:14
    Youngda says you just have to add up people's
    preferences
  • 17:14 - 17:18
    and those in the minority do have their preferences
    weighed.
  • 17:18 - 17:22
    can you give an example of the kind of thing
    you're worried about when you say you're worried
  • 17:22 - 17:25
    about utilitarianism violating
  • 17:25 - 17:28
    the concern or respect due the minority?
  • 17:28 - 17:30
    can you give an example.
  • 17:30 - 17:35
    so well with any of the cases that we've talked
    about, like with the shipwreck one,
  • 17:35 - 17:36
    I think that
  • 17:36 - 17:40
    the boy who was eaten
  • 17:40 - 17:40
    still had
  • 17:40 - 17:44
    just as much of a right to live as the other people
    and
  • 17:44 - 17:45
    just because
  • 17:45 - 17:46
    he was the
  • 17:48 - 17:51
    minority in that case the one who
  • 17:51 - 17:53
    maybe had less of a chance to keep living
  • 17:53 - 17:55
    that doesn't mean
  • 17:55 - 17:58
    that the others automatically have a right
    to eat him
  • 17:58 - 18:00
    just because
  • 18:00 - 18:02
    it would give a greater amount of people
  • 18:02 - 18:03
    the chance to live.
  • 18:03 - 18:06
    so there may be a certain rights
  • 18:06 - 18:08
    that the minority
  • 18:08 - 18:13
    members have that the individual has that
    shouldn't be traded off
  • 18:13 - 18:14
    for the sake of
  • 18:14 - 18:17
    utility?
  • 18:17 - 18:18
    yes Anna?
  • 18:18 - 18:22
    Now this would be a test for you,
  • 18:22 - 18:25
    back in ancient Rome
  • 18:25 - 18:30
    they threw Christians to the lions in the
    coliseum for sport
  • 18:30 - 18:34
    if you think how the utilitarian calculus
    would go
  • 18:34 - 18:39
    yes, the Christian thrown to the lion suffers enormous
    excruciating pain,
  • 18:39 - 18:46
    but look at the collective ecstasy of the Romans.
  • 18:48 - 18:51
    Youngda. Well
  • 18:51 - 18:52
    in that time
  • 18:52 - 18:53
    I don't think
  • 18:55 - 19:02
    in the modern-day of time to value the, um, to given
    a number to the happiness given to the people watching
  • 19:02 - 19:03
    I don't think
  • 19:03 - 19:05
    any
  • 19:05 - 19:07
    policy maker would say
  • 19:07 - 19:11
    the pain of one person, the suffering of one person is
    much much,
  • 19:11 - 19:15
    in comparison to the happiness gained
  • 19:15 - 19:20
    no but you have to admit that if there were
    enough Romans delirious with happiness,
  • 19:20 - 19:25
    it would outweigh even the most excruciating
    pain of a handful of
  • 19:25 - 19:29
    Christians thrown to the lion.
  • 19:29 - 19:34
    so we really have here two different objections
    to utilitarianism
  • 19:34 - 19:35
    one has to do
  • 19:35 - 19:38
    with whether utilitarianism
  • 19:38 - 19:40
    adequately respects
  • 19:40 - 19:41
    individual rights
  • 19:41 - 19:42
    or minority rights
  • 19:42 - 19:45
    and the other has to do
  • 19:45 - 19:47
    with the whole idea
  • 19:47 - 19:49
    of aggregating
  • 19:49 - 19:50
    utility
  • 19:50 - 19:52
    for preferences
  • 19:52 - 19:53
    or values
  • 19:53 - 19:56
    is it possible to aggregate all values
  • 19:56 - 19:58
    to translate them
  • 19:58 - 20:00
    into dollar terms?
  • 20:00 - 20:02
    there was
  • 20:02 - 20:07
    in the 1930's
  • 20:07 - 20:09
    a psychologist
  • 20:09 - 20:11
    who tried
  • 20:11 - 20:12
    to address
  • 20:12 - 20:16
    the second question. He tried to prove
  • 20:16 - 20:19
    what utilitarianism assumes,
  • 20:19 - 20:22
    that it is possible
  • 20:22 - 20:23
    to translate
  • 20:23 - 20:27
    all goods, all values, all human concerns
  • 20:27 - 20:29
    into a single uniform measure
  • 20:29 - 20:30
    and he did this
  • 20:30 - 20:33
    by conducting a survey
  • 20:33 - 20:38
    of the young recipients of relief, this was
    in the 1930's
  • 20:38 - 20:42
    and he asked them, he gave them a list of
    unpleasant experiences
  • 20:42 - 20:45
    and he asked them how much would you have to
    be paid to undergo
  • 20:45 - 20:50
    the following experiences and he kept track
  • 20:50 - 20:51
    for example
  • 20:51 - 20:57
    how much would you have to be paid to have
    one upper front tooth pulled out
  • 20:57 - 21:04
    or how much would you have to be paid to have one little
    one tow cut off?
  • 21:05 - 21:12
    or eat a live earth worm, six inches long
  • 21:12 - 21:19
    or to live the rest of your life on a farm in
    Kansas
  • 21:19 - 21:24
    or to choke a stray cat to death with your bare hands
  • 21:24 - 21:26
    now what do you suppose
  • 21:26 - 21:33
    what do you suppose was the most expensive
    item on that list
  • 21:33 - 21:40
    Kansas?
  • 21:40 - 21:45
    You're right it was Kansas
  • 21:45 - 21:46
    for a Kansas
  • 21:46 - 21:48
    people said they'd have to pay them
  • 21:48 - 21:52
    they have to be paid three hundred
    thousand dollars
  • 21:57 - 22:00
    what do you think
  • 22:00 - 22:03
    what do you think was the next most expensive?
  • 22:03 - 22:06
    not the cat
  • 22:06 - 22:08
    not the tooth
  • 22:08 - 22:11
    not the toe
  • 22:11 - 22:17
    the worm!
  • 22:17 - 22:21
    people said you'd have to pay them a hundred
    thousand dollars
  • 22:21 - 22:23
    to eat the worm
  • 22:23 - 22:28
    what do you think was the least expensive
    item?
  • 22:28 - 22:30
    not the cat
  • 22:30 - 22:31
    the tooth
  • 22:31 - 22:35
    during the depression people were willing
    to have their tooth pulled
  • 22:35 - 22:40
    for only forty five hundred dollars
  • 22:40 - 22:41
    now
  • 22:42 - 22:45
    here's what Thorndike
  • 22:45 - 22:48
    concluded from his study
  • 22:48 - 22:52
    any want or satisfaction which exists, exists
  • 22:52 - 22:55
    in some amount and is therefore measurable
  • 22:55 - 22:56
    the life of a dog
  • 22:56 - 22:57
    or a cat
  • 22:57 - 22:59
    or a chicken consists
  • 22:59 - 23:01
    of appetites
  • 23:01 - 23:02
    cravings
  • 23:02 - 23:04
    desires and their gratifications
  • 23:04 - 23:06
    so does the life
  • 23:06 - 23:07
    of human beings
  • 23:07 - 23:09
    though the appetites and desires
  • 23:09 - 23:12
    are more complicated
  • 23:12 - 23:14
    but what about
  • 23:14 - 23:16
    Thorndike's study?
  • 23:16 - 23:18
    does it support
  • 23:18 - 23:20
    Bentham's idea
  • 23:20 - 23:22
    that all
  • 23:22 - 23:28
    goods all values can be captured according
    to a single uniform measure of value
  • 23:28 - 23:34
    or does the preposterous character of those
    different items on the list
  • 23:34 - 23:37
    suggest the opposite conclusion
  • 23:37 - 23:40
    that may be whether we're talking about life
  • 23:40 - 23:42
    or Kansas
  • 23:42 - 23:44
    or the worm
  • 23:44 - 23:45
    maybe
  • 23:45 - 23:48
    the things we value
  • 23:48 - 23:49
    and cherish
  • 23:49 - 23:51
    can't be captured
  • 23:51 - 23:54
    according to a single uniform measure of value
  • 23:54 - 23:56
    and if they can't
  • 23:56 - 23:58
    what are the consequences
  • 23:58 - 24:01
    for the utilitarian theory
  • 24:01 - 24:02
    of morality
  • 24:02 - 24:09
    that's a question we'll continue with next
    time
  • 24:13 - 24:16
    alright now let's take the other
  • 24:16 - 24:18
    part of the poll
  • 24:18 - 24:19
    which is the
  • 24:19 - 24:21
    the highest
  • 24:21 - 24:23
    experience or pleasure?
  • 24:23 - 24:26
    how many say
  • 24:26 - 24:32
    Shakespeare
  • 24:32 - 24:38
    how many say fear Factor
  • 24:38 - 24:40
    no you can't be serious
  • 24:40 - 24:46
    really?
  • 24:46 - 24:49
    last time
  • 24:49 - 24:54
    last time we began to consider some objections
  • 24:54 - 24:57
    to Jeremy Bentham's version
  • 24:57 - 25:02
    of utilitarianism
  • 25:02 - 25:05
    people raised two objections in the discussion
  • 25:05 - 25:08
    we had
  • 25:08 - 25:11
    the first
  • 25:11 - 25:13
    was the objection, the claim
  • 25:13 - 25:15
    that utilitarianism,
  • 25:15 - 25:17
    by concerning itself
  • 25:17 - 25:20
    with the greatest good for the greatest number
  • 25:20 - 25:23
    fails adequately to respect
  • 25:23 - 25:25
    individual rights.
  • 25:25 - 25:29
    today we have debates
  • 25:29 - 25:30
    about torture
  • 25:30 - 25:34
    and terrorism
  • 25:34 - 25:35
    suppose
  • 25:35 - 25:41
    a suspected terrorists was apprehended
    on September tenth
  • 25:41 - 25:44
    and you had reason to believe
  • 25:44 - 25:46
    that the suspect
  • 25:46 - 25:51
    had crucial information about an impending
    terrorist attack that would kill over three thousand
  • 25:51 - 25:52
    people
  • 25:52 - 25:56
    and you couldn't extract the information
  • 25:56 - 25:58
    would it be just
  • 25:58 - 25:59
    to torture
  • 25:59 - 26:01
    the suspect
  • 26:01 - 26:03
    to get the information
  • 26:03 - 26:06
    or
  • 26:06 - 26:08
    do you say no
  • 26:08 - 26:15
    there is a categorical moral duty of
    respect for individual rights
  • 26:15 - 26:18
    in a way we're back to the questions we started
    with t
  • 26:18 - 26:24
    about trolley cars and organ transplants so that's
    the first issue
  • 26:24 - 26:29
    and you remember we considered some examples of
    cost-benefit analysis
  • 26:29 - 26:34
    but a lot of people were unhappy with cost-benefit
    analysis
  • 26:34 - 26:40
    when it came to placing a dollar value on
    human life
  • 26:40 - 26:42
    and so that led us to the
  • 26:42 - 26:44
    second objection,
  • 26:44 - 26:49
    it questioned whether it's possible to translate
    all values
  • 26:49 - 26:53
    into a single uniform measure of value
  • 26:53 - 26:58
    it asks in other words whether all values
    are commensurable
  • 26:58 - 27:00
    let me give you one other
  • 27:00 - 27:01
    example
  • 27:01 - 27:07
    of an experience, this actually is a true
    story, it comes from personal experience
  • 27:07 - 27:13
    that raises a question at least about whether
    all values can be translated without
  • 27:13 - 27:14
    loss
  • 27:14 - 27:20
    into utilitarian terms
  • 27:20 - 27:22
    some years ago
  • 27:22 - 27:28
    when I was a graduate student I was at Oxford
    in England and they had menâs and women's
  • 27:28 - 27:30
    colleges they weren't yet mixed
  • 27:30 - 27:31
    and the women's colleges had rules
  • 27:31 - 27:34
    against
  • 27:34 - 27:37
    overnight male guests
  • 27:37 - 27:40
    by the nineteen seventies these
  • 27:40 - 27:44
    rules were rarely enforced and easily violated,
  • 27:44 - 27:51
    or so I was told,
  • 27:52 - 27:57
    by the late nineteen seventies when I was there,
    pressure grew to relax these rules and it became
  • 27:57 - 28:01
    the subject of debate among the faculty at St. Anne's College
  • 28:01 - 28:04
    which was one of these all women colleges
  • 28:04 - 28:07
    the older women on the faculty
  • 28:07 - 28:11
    we're traditionalists they were opposed to
    change
  • 28:11 - 28:13
    on conventional moral grounds
  • 28:13 - 28:14
    but times had changed
  • 28:14 - 28:17
    and they were embarrassed
  • 28:17 - 28:20
    to give the true grounds of their objection
  • 28:20 - 28:23
    and so the translated their arguments
  • 28:23 - 28:26
    into utilitarian terms
  • 28:26 - 28:27
    if men stay overnight,
  • 28:27 - 28:32
    they argued, the costs to the college will increase.
  • 28:32 - 28:33
    how you might wonder
  • 28:33 - 28:39
    well they'll want to take baths, and that
    will use up hot water they said
  • 28:39 - 28:41
    furthermore they argued
  • 28:41 - 28:47
    we'll have to replace the mattresses more often
  • 28:47 - 28:48
    the reformers
  • 28:48 - 28:52
    met these arguments by adopting the following
    compromise
  • 28:52 - 28:53
    each woman
  • 28:53 - 29:00
    could have a maximum of three overnight male
    guest each week
  • 29:01 - 29:06
    they didn't say whether it had to be the same
    one, or three different
  • 29:06 - 29:07
    provided
  • 29:07 - 29:09
    and this is the compromise provided
  • 29:09 - 29:10
    the guest
  • 29:10 - 29:15
    paid fifty pence to defray the cost to the college
  • 29:15 - 29:17
    the next day
  • 29:17 - 29:23
    the national headline in the national newspaper
    read St. Anne's girls, fifty pence a night
  • 29:30 - 29:31
    another
  • 29:31 - 29:32
    illustration
  • 29:32 - 29:35
    of the difficulty of translating
  • 29:35 - 29:36
    all values
  • 29:36 - 29:39
    in this case a certain idea of virtue
  • 29:39 - 29:44
    into utilitarian terms
  • 29:44 - 29:47
    so that's all to illustrate
  • 29:47 - 29:49
    the second objection
  • 29:49 - 29:53
    to utilitarianism, at least the
    part of that objection
  • 29:53 - 29:55
    that questions rather
  • 29:55 - 29:57
    the utilitarianism
  • 29:57 - 29:59
    is right to assume
  • 29:59 - 30:01
    that we can
  • 30:01 - 30:02
    assume the uniformity of
  • 30:02 - 30:08
    value, the commensurability of values
    and translate all moral considerations
  • 30:08 - 30:10
    into
  • 30:10 - 30:10
    dollars
  • 30:10 - 30:12
    or money.
  • 30:12 - 30:15
    But there is a second
  • 30:15 - 30:20
    aspect to this worry about aggregating values
    and preferences
  • 30:20 - 30:22
    why should we
  • 30:22 - 30:23
    weigh
  • 30:23 - 30:25
    all preferences
  • 30:25 - 30:27
    that people have
  • 30:27 - 30:33
    without assessing whether they're good preferences
    or bad preferences
  • 30:33 - 30:35
    shouldn't we distinguish
  • 30:35 - 30:36
    between
  • 30:36 - 30:38
    higher
  • 30:38 - 30:38
    pleasures
  • 30:38 - 30:42
    and lower pleasures.
  • 30:42 - 30:44
    Now, part of the appeal of
  • 30:44 - 30:49
    not making any qualitative distinctions about
    the worth of people's preferences, part of the
  • 30:49 - 30:51
    appeal
  • 30:51 - 30:55
    is that it is non-judgmental and egalitarian
  • 30:55 - 30:58
    the Benthamite utilitarian says
  • 30:58 - 31:01
    everybody's preferences count
  • 31:01 - 31:05
    and they count regardless of what people want
  • 31:05 - 31:09
    regardless of what makes it different people
  • 31:09 - 31:10
    happy. For Bentham,
  • 31:10 - 31:11
    all that matters
  • 31:11 - 31:13
    you'll remember
  • 31:13 - 31:16
    are the intensity and the duration
  • 31:16 - 31:18
    of a pleasure or pain
  • 31:18 - 31:24
    the so-called higher pleasures or nobler
    virtues are simply those, according to Bentham
  • 31:24 - 31:25
    that produce
  • 31:25 - 31:26
    stronger,
  • 31:26 - 31:29
    longer, pleasure
  • 31:29 - 31:33
    yet a famous phrase to express this idea
  • 31:33 - 31:36
    the quantity of pleasure being equal
  • 31:36 - 31:37
    pushpin
  • 31:37 - 31:40
    is as good as poetry.
  • 31:40 - 31:42
    What was pushpin?
  • 31:42 - 31:47
    It was some kind of a child's game like to tidily winks
    pushpin is as good as poetry
  • 31:47 - 31:49
    Bentham said
  • 31:49 - 31:51
    and lying behind this idea
  • 31:51 - 31:52
    I think
  • 31:52 - 31:53
    is the claim
  • 31:53 - 31:54
    the intuition
  • 31:54 - 31:56
    that it's a presumption
  • 31:56 - 31:58
    to judge
  • 31:58 - 31:59
    whose pleasures
  • 31:59 - 32:01
    are intrinsically higher
  • 32:01 - 32:04
    or worthier or better
  • 32:04 - 32:07
    and there is something attractive in this
  • 32:07 - 32:10
    refusal to judge, after all some people like
  • 32:10 - 32:12
    Mozart, others
  • 32:12 - 32:13
    Madonna
  • 32:13 - 32:15
    some people like ballet
  • 32:15 - 32:16
    others
  • 32:16 - 32:17
    bowling,
  • 32:17 - 32:19
    who's to say
  • 32:19 - 32:23
    a Benthamite might argue, who's to say which
    of these pleasures
  • 32:23 - 32:24
    whose pleasures
  • 32:24 - 32:25
    are higher
  • 32:25 - 32:26
    worthier
  • 32:26 - 32:28
    nobler
  • 32:28 - 32:32
    than others?
  • 32:32 - 32:36
    But, is that right?
  • 32:36 - 32:40
    this refusal to make qualitative distinctions
  • 32:40 - 32:42
    can we
  • 32:42 - 32:45
    altogether dispense with the idea
  • 32:45 - 32:49
    that certain things we take pleasure in are
  • 32:49 - 32:51
    better or worthier
  • 32:51 - 32:54
    than others
  • 32:54 - 32:59
    think back to the case of the Romans in the coliseum,
    one thing that troubled people about that
  • 32:59 - 32:59
    practice
  • 32:59 - 33:01
    is that it seemed to violate the rights
  • 33:01 - 33:04
    of the Christian
  • 33:04 - 33:07
    another way of objecting to what's going
    on there
  • 33:07 - 33:11
    is that the pleasure that the Romans
    take
  • 33:11 - 33:13
    in this bloody spectacle
  • 33:13 - 33:16
    should that pleasure
  • 33:16 - 33:16
    which is a base,
  • 33:16 - 33:19
    kind of corrupt
  • 33:19 - 33:23
    degrading pleasure, should that even
  • 33:23 - 33:27
    be valorized or weighed in deciding what
    the
  • 33:27 - 33:34
    the general welfare is?
  • 33:34 - 33:39
    so here are the objections to Bentham's
    utilitarianism
  • 33:39 - 33:43
    and now we turn to someone who tried to
  • 33:43 - 33:46
    respond to those objections,
  • 33:46 - 33:48
    a later day utilitarian
  • 33:48 - 33:50
    John Stuart Mill
  • 33:50 - 33:53
    so what we need to
  • 33:53 - 33:55
    examine now
  • 33:55 - 33:59
    is whether John Stuart Mill had a convincing
    reply
  • 33:59 - 34:05
    to these objections to utilitarianism.
  • 34:05 - 34:07
    John Stuart Mill
  • 34:07 - 34:09
    was born in 1806
  • 34:09 - 34:11
    his father James Mill
  • 34:11 - 34:14
    was a disciple of Benthamâs
  • 34:14 - 34:17
    and James Mills set about giving his son
  • 34:17 - 34:20
    John Stuart Mill a model education
  • 34:20 - 34:22
    he was a child prodigy
  • 34:22 - 34:24
    John Stuart Mill
  • 34:24 - 34:28
    the knew Latin, sorry, Greek at the age of three,
    Latin at eight
  • 34:28 - 34:29
    and at age ten
  • 34:29 - 34:34
    he wrote a history of Roman law.
  • 34:34 - 34:36
    At age twenty
  • 34:36 - 34:39
    he had a nervous breakdown
  • 34:39 - 34:44
    this left him in a depression for five years
  • 34:44 - 34:47
    but at age twenty five what helped lift him
    out of this depression
  • 34:47 - 34:50
    is that he met Harriet Taylor
  • 34:50 - 34:53
    she in no doubt married him, they lived happily ever after
  • 34:53 - 34:55
    and it was under her
  • 34:55 - 34:57
    influence
  • 34:57 - 35:00
    the John Stuart Mill try to humanize
  • 35:00 - 35:02
    utilitarianism
  • 35:02 - 35:05
    what Mill tried to do was to see
  • 35:05 - 35:08
    whether the utilitarian calculus could be
  • 35:08 - 35:09
    enlarged
  • 35:09 - 35:11
    and modified
  • 35:11 - 35:14
    to accommodate
  • 35:14 - 35:17
    humanitarian concerns
  • 35:17 - 35:20
    like the concern to respect individual rights
  • 35:20 - 35:25
    and also to address the distinction between
    higher and lower
  • 35:25 - 35:26
    pleasures.
  • 35:26 - 35:30
    In 1859 Mill wrote a famous book
    on liberty
  • 35:30 - 35:35
    the main point of which was the importance
    of defending individual rights and minority
  • 35:35 - 35:36
    rights
  • 35:36 - 35:38
    and in 1861
  • 35:38 - 35:40
    toward the end of his life
  • 35:40 - 35:43
    he wrote the book we read is part of this course
  • 35:43 - 35:45
    Utilitarianism.
  • 35:45 - 35:47
    It makes it clear
  • 35:47 - 35:50
    that utility is the only standard of morality
  • 35:50 - 35:51
    in his view
  • 35:51 - 35:53
    so he's not challenging
  • 35:53 - 35:54
    Bentham's premise,
  • 35:54 - 35:55
    he's affirming it.
  • 35:55 - 35:59
    he says very explicitly the sole evidence,
  • 35:59 - 36:05
    it is possible to produce that anything is
    desirable is that people actually do
  • 36:05 - 36:06
    desire it.
  • 36:06 - 36:12
    so he stays with the idea that our de facto
    actual empirical desires are the only
  • 36:12 - 36:13
    basis
  • 36:13 - 36:16
    for moral judgment.
  • 36:16 - 36:18
    but then
  • 36:18 - 36:19
    page eight
  • 36:19 - 36:25
    also in chapter two, he argues that it is possible
    for a utilitarian to distinguish
  • 36:25 - 36:26
    higher from lower
  • 36:26 - 36:29
    pleasures.
  • 36:29 - 36:31
    now, those of you who've read
  • 36:31 - 36:32
    Mill already
  • 36:32 - 36:33
    how
  • 36:33 - 36:37
    according to him is it possible to draw that
    distinction?
  • 36:37 - 36:40
    How can a utilitarian
  • 36:40 - 36:43
    distinguish qualitatively higher pleasures
  • 36:43 - 36:44
    from
  • 36:44 - 36:49
    lesser ones, base ones, unworthy ones?
  • 36:49 - 36:51
    If you tried both of them
  • 36:51 - 36:55
    and you'll prefer the higher one naturally
    always
  • 36:55 - 37:00
    that's great, that's right. What's your name? John.
  • 37:00 - 37:02
    so as John points out
  • 37:02 - 37:05
    Mill says here's the test,
  • 37:05 - 37:08
    since we can't step outside
  • 37:08 - 37:10
    actual desires, actual preferences
  • 37:10 - 37:12
    that would
  • 37:12 - 37:14
    violate utilitarian premises,
  • 37:14 - 37:17
    the only test
  • 37:17 - 37:18
    of whether
  • 37:18 - 37:20
    a pleasure is higher
  • 37:20 - 37:26
    or lower is whether someone who has experienced
    both
  • 37:26 - 37:28
    would prefer it.
  • 37:28 - 37:29
    And here,
  • 37:29 - 37:31
    in chapter two
  • 37:31 - 37:33
    we see the passage
  • 37:33 - 37:37
    where Mill makes the point that John just described
  • 37:37 - 37:43
    of two pleasures, if there be one to which all
    are almost all who have experience
  • 37:43 - 37:46
    of both give a decided preference,
  • 37:46 - 37:52
    irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to
    prefer it, in other words no outside, no independent
  • 37:52 - 37:53
    standard,
  • 37:53 - 37:58
    then that is the more desirable pleasure.
  • 37:58 - 38:00
    what do people think about that argument.
  • 38:00 - 38:02
    does that
  • 38:02 - 38:03
    does it succeeded?
  • 38:03 - 38:06
    how many think that it does succeed?
  • 38:06 - 38:11
    of arguing within utilitarian terms for a
    distinction between higher and lower pleasures.
  • 38:11 - 38:12
    how many
  • 38:12 - 38:18
    think it doesn't succeed?
  • 38:18 - 38:21
    I want to hear your reasons.
  • 38:21 - 38:22
    but before
  • 38:22 - 38:24
    we give the reasons
  • 38:24 - 38:26
    let's do an experiment
  • 38:26 - 38:29
    of Mills'
  • 38:29 - 38:32
    claim.
  • 38:32 - 38:35
    In order to do this experiment
  • 38:35 - 38:40
    we're going to look that three
  • 38:40 - 38:42
    short excerpts
  • 38:42 - 38:45
    of popular entertainment
  • 38:45 - 38:48
    the first one is a Hamlet soliloquy
  • 38:48 - 38:53
    it'll be followed by two other
  • 38:53 - 38:55
    experiences
  • 38:55 - 38:58
    see what you think.
  • 38:58 - 39:02
    'what a piece of work is a man
  • 39:02 - 39:06
    how noble in reason
  • 39:06 - 39:08
    how infinite in faculties
  • 39:08 - 39:11
    in form and moving, how express and admirable
  • 39:11 - 39:15
    in action how like an angel. In apprehension, how like a god
  • 39:15 - 39:16
    the beauty of the world
  • 39:16 - 39:18
    the paragon of animals
  • 39:18 - 39:21
    and yet, to me
  • 39:21 - 39:25
    what is this quintessence of dust?
  • 39:25 - 39:32
    man delights not me.
  • 39:43 - 39:48
    Imagine a world where your greatest fears become reality
  • 39:48 - 39:53
    each show, six contestants from around the country battle
    each other in three
  • 39:53 - 40:00
    extreme stunts. these stunts are designed to challenge
    these contestants both physically and mentally
  • 40:00 - 40:02
    six contestants, three stunts, one winner.
  • 40:02 - 40:09
    Fear factor.
  • 40:16 - 40:23
    The Simpsons. Well hi diddly-o peddle to the metal o-philes!
    Flanders- since when do you like anything cool.
  • 40:23 - 40:25
    well, I don't care for the speed, but I can't get enough of that
    safety gear
  • 40:25 - 40:29
    helmets, roll bars, caution flags. I like the fresh
    air
  • 40:29 - 40:35
    and looking at the poor people in the infield.
  • 40:35 - 40:41
    Dang Cletus, why you got to park by my parents.
  • 40:41 - 40:43
    Now hunny, it's my parents too.
  • 40:56 - 41:01
    I don't even have to ask which one you like
    most
  • 41:01 - 41:05
    the Simpsons? How many like the Simpson's most?
  • 41:05 - 41:10
    How many Shakespeare?
  • 41:10 - 41:13
    What about fear factor?
  • 41:13 - 41:16
    how many preferred fear factor?
  • 41:16 - 41:22
    really?
  • 41:22 - 41:24
    people overwhelmingly
  • 41:24 - 41:26
    like the Simpsons
  • 41:26 - 41:29
    better
  • 41:29 - 41:32
    than Shakespeare. alright, now let's take the other
  • 41:32 - 41:34
    part of the poll
  • 41:34 - 41:36
    which is the
  • 41:36 - 41:38
    highest
  • 41:38 - 41:39
    experience or pleasure?
  • 41:39 - 41:42
    how many say
  • 41:42 - 41:48
    Shakespeare?
  • 41:48 - 41:50
    how many say
  • 41:50 - 41:54
    fear factor?
  • 41:54 - 41:59
    no you can't be serious
  • 41:59 - 42:01
    really?
  • 42:01 - 42:03
    alright go ahead you can say it.
  • 42:03 - 42:03
    I found that one
  • 42:03 - 42:05
    the most entertaining
  • 42:05 - 42:09
    I know but which do you think was the worthiest,
    the noblest experience, I know you find it
  • 42:09 - 42:11
    the most anything
  • 42:11 - 42:16
    if something is good just because it is pleasurable
    what is the matter if you have some kind of
  • 42:16 - 42:17
    abstract
  • 42:17 - 42:22
    idea of whether it is good by someone else's
    sense or not.
  • 42:22 - 42:25
    Alright so you come down on the straight Benthamite's side
  • 42:25 - 42:26
    whose to judge
  • 42:26 - 42:29
    and why should we judge
  • 42:29 - 42:34
    apart from just registering and aggregating
    de facto preferences, alright fair enough.
  • 42:34 - 42:35
    what's your name?
  • 42:35 - 42:37
    Nate? okay fair enough
  • 42:37 - 42:38
    Alright so
  • 42:38 - 42:41
    how many think that the Simpson's is actually
  • 42:41 - 42:46
    apart from liking is actually the higher experience
  • 42:46 - 42:47
    higher than Shakespeare.
  • 42:47 - 42:49
    Alright let's see the vote for Shakespeare again
  • 42:49 - 42:53
    how many think Shakespeare is higher?
  • 42:53 - 42:54
    alright so
  • 42:54 - 42:56
    why is it
  • 42:56 - 42:59
    ideally I'd like to hear from someone is there
    someone
  • 42:59 - 43:02
    think Shakespeare is highest
  • 43:02 - 43:03
    but who preferred
  • 43:03 - 43:04
    watching
  • 43:04 - 43:09
    the Simpsons
  • 43:09 - 43:14
    Like I guess just sitting and watching the Simpsons, it's entertaining
    because the make jokes, they make us laugh but
  • 43:14 - 43:18
    someone has to tell us that Shakespeare was this great writer
    we had to be taught how to read him, how to
  • 43:18 - 43:21
    understand him, we had to be taught how to
  • 43:21 - 43:23
    take in Rembrandt, how to analyze a painting.
  • 43:23 - 43:26
    well how do, what's your name? Aneesha.
  • 43:26 - 43:28
    Aneesha, when you say someone
  • 43:28 - 43:31
    told you that Shakespeare's better
  • 43:31 - 43:37
    are you accepting it on blind faith you voted that
    Shakespeare's higher only because the culture
  • 43:37 - 43:42
    tells you that our teachers tell you that
    or do you
  • 43:42 - 43:44
    actually agree with that yourself
  • 43:44 - 43:48
    well in the sense that Shakespeare, no, but earlier you made
  • 43:48 - 43:50
    an example of Rembrandt
  • 43:50 - 43:54
    I feel like I would enjoy a reading a comic book
    more than I would enjoy a kind of analyzing
  • 43:54 - 43:58
    Rembrandt because someone told me it was
    great, you know. Right so of some this seems
  • 43:58 - 44:02
    to be, you're suggesting a kind of
  • 44:02 - 44:05
    cultural convention and pressure. We're told
  • 44:05 - 44:12
    what books, what works of art are great. who else?
  • 44:15 - 44:20
    although I enjoyed watching the Simpsons more
    in this particular moment in Justice,
  • 44:20 - 44:23
    if I were to spend the rest of my life
    considering
  • 44:23 - 44:25
    the three different
  • 44:25 - 44:27
    video clips shown
  • 44:27 - 44:29
    I would not want to spend
  • 44:29 - 44:32
    that remainder of my life considering
  • 44:32 - 44:34
    the latter two clips.
  • 44:34 - 44:37
    I think I would derive more pleasure
  • 44:37 - 44:38
    from being able to
  • 44:38 - 44:39
    branch out in my own mind
  • 44:39 - 44:40
    sort of
  • 44:40 - 44:45
    considering more deep pleasures, more
    deep thoughts.
  • 44:45 - 44:49
    and tell me your name
  • 44:49 - 44:50
    Joe.
  • 44:50 - 44:53
    Joe, so if you had to spend the rest of your life
    on
  • 44:53 - 44:55
    on a farm in Kansas with only
  • 44:55 - 44:57
    with only Shakespeare
  • 44:57 - 45:02
    or the collected episodes of the Simpsons
  • 45:02 - 45:04
    you would prefer
  • 45:04 - 45:07
    Shakespeare
  • 45:07 - 45:10
    what do you conclude from that
  • 45:10 - 45:12
    about John Stuart Mill's test
  • 45:12 - 45:15
    but the test of a higher pleasure
  • 45:15 - 45:16
    is whether
  • 45:16 - 45:18
    people who have experienced
  • 45:18 - 45:22
    both prefer it.
  • 45:22 - 45:24
    can I cite another example briefly?
  • 45:24 - 45:25
    in biology
  • 45:25 - 45:29
    in neuro biology last year we were told of a rat who was
    tested
  • 45:29 - 45:31
    a particular center in the brain
  • 45:31 - 45:36
    where the rat was able to stimulate its
    brain and cause itself intense pleasure repeatedly
  • 45:36 - 45:38
    the rat did not eat or drink until it died
  • 45:38 - 45:42
    so the rat was clearly experiencing intense
    pleasure
  • 45:42 - 45:46
    now if you asked me right now if I'd rather
    experience intense pleasure
  • 45:46 - 45:47
    or have
  • 45:47 - 45:53
    a full lifetime of higher pleasure, I would consider
    intense pleasure to be lower pleasure, right
  • 45:53 - 45:56
    now enjoy intense pleasure
  • 45:56 - 46:02
    yes I would
  • 46:02 - 46:03
    but over a lifetime I think
  • 46:03 - 46:04
    I would think
  • 46:04 - 46:07
    almost a complete majority here would agree
  • 46:07 - 46:12
    that they would rather be a human
    with higher pleasure that rat
  • 46:12 - 46:13
    with intense pleasure
  • 46:13 - 46:15
    for a momentary period of time
  • 46:15 - 46:16
    so now
  • 46:16 - 46:19
    in answer to your question, right, I think
  • 46:19 - 46:21
    this proves that, or I won't say proves
  • 46:21 - 46:25
    I think the conclusion
  • 46:25 - 46:29
    is that Mill's theory that when a majority people are
    asked
  • 46:29 - 46:31
    what they would rather do,
  • 46:31 - 46:33
    they will answer
  • 46:33 - 46:35
    that they would rather
  • 46:35 - 46:39
    engage in a higher pleasure. So you think that this
    supports Mills, that Mills was on to something here
  • 46:39 - 46:41
    I do.
  • 46:41 - 46:43
    all right is there anyone
  • 46:43 - 46:47
    who disagrees with Joe who thinks that
    our experiment
  • 46:47 - 46:49
    disproves
  • 46:49 - 46:50
    Mills'
  • 46:50 - 46:51
    test
  • 46:51 - 46:53
    shows that that's not an adequate way
  • 46:53 - 46:58
    that you can't distinguish higher pleasures within
    the utilitarian
  • 46:58 - 47:03
    framework.
  • 47:06 - 47:10
    If whatever is good is truly just whatever
    people prefer it's truly relative and there's
  • 47:10 - 47:12
    no objective definition then
  • 47:12 - 47:15
    there will be some society where people prefer
    Simpsons
  • 47:15 - 47:16
    more
  • 47:16 - 47:21
    anyone can appreciate the Simpsons, but I think
    it does take education to appreciate Shakespeare
  • 47:21 - 47:26
    Alright, you're saying it takes education to appreciate
    higher
  • 47:26 - 47:27
    true thing
  • 47:27 - 47:30
    Mill's point is
  • 47:30 - 47:33
    that the higher pleasures do require
  • 47:33 - 47:35
    cultivation and appreciation and education
  • 47:35 - 47:38
    he doesn't dispute that
  • 47:38 - 47:39
    but
  • 47:39 - 47:42
    once having been cultivated
  • 47:42 - 47:44
    and educated
  • 47:44 - 47:46
    people will see
  • 47:46 - 47:48
    not only see the difference between higher
    lower
  • 47:48 - 47:49
    pleasures
  • 47:49 - 47:52
    but will it actually
  • 47:52 - 47:53
    prefer
  • 47:53 - 47:54
    the higher
  • 47:54 - 47:56
    to the lower.
  • 47:56 - 48:00
    you find this famous passage from John Stuart
    Mill-
  • 48:00 - 48:01
    it is better
  • 48:01 - 48:04
    to be a human being dissatisfied
  • 48:04 - 48:06
    then a pig satisfied.
  • 48:06 - 48:11
    Better to the Socrates dissatisfied than
    a fool satisfied
  • 48:11 - 48:12
    and if the fool
  • 48:12 - 48:13
    or the pig
  • 48:13 - 48:16
    are of a different opinion
  • 48:16 - 48:18
    it is because they only know
  • 48:18 - 48:21
    their side of the question.
  • 48:21 - 48:22
    so here you have
  • 48:22 - 48:23
    an attempt
  • 48:23 - 48:25
    to distinguish
  • 48:25 - 48:27
    higher from lower
  • 48:27 - 48:29
    pleasures
  • 48:29 - 48:33
    so going to an art museum or being a couch
    potato, swilling beer watching television
  • 48:33 - 48:35
    at home
  • 48:35 - 48:38
    sometimes Mill agrees we might succumb
  • 48:38 - 48:41
    to the temptation
  • 48:41 - 48:42
    to do the latter,
  • 48:42 - 48:46
    to be couch potatoes,
  • 48:46 - 48:48
    but even when we do that
  • 48:48 - 48:50
    out of indolence
  • 48:50 - 48:51
    and sloth,
  • 48:51 - 48:52
    we know
  • 48:52 - 48:54
    that the pleasure we get
  • 48:54 - 48:56
    gazing at Rembrandts
  • 48:56 - 48:57
    in the museum
  • 48:57 - 49:00
    is actually higher,
  • 49:00 - 49:03
    because we've experienced both.
  • 49:03 - 49:06
    And is a higher pressure
  • 49:06 - 49:07
    gazing at Rembrandts
  • 49:07 - 49:11
    because of engages our higher human faculties
  • 49:11 - 49:14
    what about Mill's attempt
  • 49:14 - 49:19
    to reply to the objection about individual rights?
  • 49:19 - 49:22
    In a way he uses the same
  • 49:22 - 49:25
    kind of argument
  • 49:25 - 49:28
    and this comes out in chapter five
  • 49:28 - 49:33
    he says while I dispute the pretensions of any
    theory which sets up an imaginary standard
  • 49:33 - 49:35
    of justice
  • 49:35 - 49:40
    not grounded on utility,
  • 49:40 - 49:41
    but still
  • 49:41 - 49:43
    he considers
  • 49:43 - 49:45
    justice
  • 49:45 - 49:49
    grounded on utility to be what he calls the
    chief part
  • 49:49 - 49:53
    and incomparably the most sacred and binding
    part
  • 49:53 - 49:55
    of all morality.
  • 49:55 - 49:57
    so justice is higher
  • 49:57 - 50:00
    individual rights are privileged
  • 50:00 - 50:02
    but not for
  • 50:02 - 50:05
    reasons that depart from utilitarian assumptions.
  • 50:05 - 50:07
    Justice is a name
  • 50:07 - 50:09
    for certain moral requirements
  • 50:09 - 50:11
    which, regarded collectively
  • 50:11 - 50:15
    stand higher in the scale of social utility
  • 50:15 - 50:17
    and are therefore
  • 50:17 - 50:19
    of more
  • 50:19 - 50:21
    paramount obligation
  • 50:21 - 50:23
    than any others
  • 50:23 - 50:29
    so justice is sacred, it's prior, it's privileged,
    it isn't something that can easily be traded
  • 50:29 - 50:31
    off against lesser things
  • 50:31 - 50:32
    but the reason
  • 50:32 - 50:34
    is ultimately
  • 50:34 - 50:36
    Mills Claims
  • 50:36 - 50:38
    a utilitarian reason
  • 50:38 - 50:39
    once you consider
  • 50:39 - 50:41
    the long run interests
  • 50:41 - 50:44
    of humankind,
  • 50:44 - 50:45
    of all of us,
  • 50:45 - 50:46
    as progressive
  • 50:46 - 50:48
    beings.
  • 50:48 - 50:51
    If we do justice and if we respect rights
  • 50:51 - 50:53
    society as a whole
  • 50:53 - 50:56
    will be better off in the long run.
  • 50:56 - 50:58
    Well is that convincing?
  • 50:58 - 50:59
    Or
  • 50:59 - 51:05
    is Mill actually, without admitting it, stepping
    outside
  • 51:05 - 51:06
    utilitarian considerations
  • 51:06 - 51:08
    in arguing
  • 51:08 - 51:11
    for qualitatively higher
  • 51:11 - 51:13
    pleasures
  • 51:13 - 51:14
    and for sacred
  • 51:14 - 51:17
    or specially important
  • 51:17 - 51:18
    individual rights?
  • 51:18 - 51:22
    we haven't fully answered that question
  • 51:22 - 51:24
    because to answer that question
  • 51:24 - 51:26
    in the case of rights and justice
  • 51:26 - 51:29
    will require that we explore
  • 51:29 - 51:30
    other ways,
  • 51:30 - 51:33
    non utilitarian ways
  • 51:33 - 51:35
    of accounting for the basis
  • 51:35 - 51:36
    or rights
  • 51:36 - 51:38
    and then asking
  • 51:38 - 51:40
    whether they succeed
  • 51:40 - 51:43
    as for Jeremy Bentham,
  • 51:43 - 51:45
    who launched
  • 51:45 - 51:46
    utilitarianism
  • 51:46 - 51:47
    as a doctrine
  • 51:47 - 51:50
    in moral and legal philosophy
  • 51:50 - 51:54
    Bentham died in 1832 at the
    age of eighty five
  • 51:54 - 51:58
    but if you go to London you can visit him
    today
  • 51:58 - 51:59
    literally.
  • 51:59 - 52:01
    he provided in his will
  • 52:01 - 52:03
    that his body be preserved,
  • 52:03 - 52:05
    embalmed and displayed
  • 52:05 - 52:08
    in the university of London
  • 52:08 - 52:11
    where he still presides in a glass case
  • 52:11 - 52:13
    with a wax head
  • 52:13 - 52:15
    dressed in his actual clothing.
  • 52:15 - 52:17
    you see before he died,
  • 52:17 - 52:22
    Bentham addressed himself to a question consistent
    with his philosophy,
  • 52:22 - 52:23
    of what use
  • 52:23 - 52:27
    could a dead man be to the living
  • 52:27 - 52:30
    one use, he said, would be to make one's corpse
    available
  • 52:30 - 52:34
    for the study of anatomy
  • 52:34 - 52:37
    in the case of great philosophers, however,
  • 52:37 - 52:38
    better yet
  • 52:38 - 52:45
    to preserve one's physical presence in order
    to inspire future generations of thinkers.
  • 52:45 - 52:48
    You want to see what Bentham looks like stuffed?
  • 52:48 - 52:50
    Here's what he looks like
  • 52:50 - 52:54
    There he is
  • 52:54 - 52:55
    now, if you look closely
  • 52:55 - 52:57
    you'll notice
  • 52:57 - 52:59
    that
  • 52:59 - 53:06
    the embalming up his actual had was not a
    success so they substituted a waxed head
  • 53:07 - 53:10
    and at the bottom for verisimilitude
  • 53:10 - 53:13
    you can actually see his actual had
  • 53:13 - 53:15
    on a plate
  • 53:17 - 53:18
    you see it?
  • 53:18 - 53:23
    right there
  • 53:23 - 53:26
    so, what's the moral of the story?
  • 53:26 - 53:29
    the moral of the story
  • 53:29 - 53:34
    by the way they bring him out during meetings
    of the board at university college London
  • 53:34 - 53:41
    and the minutes record him as present but
    not voting.
  • 53:41 - 53:43
    here is a philosopher
  • 53:43 - 53:45
    in life and in death
  • 53:45 - 53:47
    who adhered
  • 53:47 - 53:48
    to the principles
  • 53:48 - 53:55
    of his philosophy. we'll continue with rights next time.
  • 53:57 - 54:01
    Don't miss the chance to interact online with other viewers of Justice
  • 54:01 - 54:03
    join the conversation, take a pop quiz,
  • 54:03 - 54:08
    watch lectures you've missed, and a lot more. Visit Justiceharvard.org
  • 54:08 - 54:15
    It's the right thing to do.
  • 54:50 - 54:54
    funding for this program is provided by
  • 54:54 - 54:55
    additional funding provided by
Title:
Justice: What's The Right Thing To Do? Episode 02: "PUTTING A PRICE TAG ON LIFE"
Description:

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Video Language:
English
Team:
PACE
Duration:
55:10

Vietnamese subtitles

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