Justice: What's The Right Thing To Do? Episode 02: "PUTTING A PRICE TAG ON LIFE"
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0:04 - 0:07Funding for this program provided by
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0:07 - 0:12Additional funding provided by
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0:33 - 0:35last time we argued about
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0:35 - 0:39the case of the Queen verses Dudley and Stephens
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0:39 - 0:46the lifeboat case, the case of cannibalism
at sea -
0:46 - 0:48and with the arguments about
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0:48 - 0:49the lifeboat
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0:49 - 0:54in mind the arguments for and against
what Dudley and Stephens did in mind, -
0:54 - 0:57let's turn back to the
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0:57 - 0:58philosophy
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0:58 - 1:02the utilitarian philosophy of Jeremy Bentham
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1:02 - 1:06Bentham was born in England in 1748,
at the age of twelve -
1:06 - 1:10he went to Oxford, at fifteen he went to law
school -
1:10 - 1:15he was admitted to the bar at age nineteen
but he never practiced law, -
1:15 - 1:17instead he devoted his life
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1:17 - 1:20to jurisprudence and moral
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1:20 - 1:22philosophy.
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1:22 - 1:28last time we began to consider Bentham's version
of utilitarianism -
1:28 - 1:29the main idea
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1:29 - 1:33is simply stated and it's this,
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1:33 - 1:36the highest principle of morality
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1:36 - 1:39whether personal or political morality
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1:39 - 1:40is
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1:40 - 1:43to maximize
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1:43 - 1:44the general welfare
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1:44 - 1:47or the collective happiness
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1:47 - 1:50or the overall balance of pleasure over
pain -
1:50 - 1:52in a phrase
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1:52 - 1:53maximize
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1:53 - 1:56utility
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1:56 - 2:01Bentham arrives at this principle by the following
line of reasoning -
2:01 - 2:03we're all governed by pain and pleasure
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2:03 - 2:09they are our sovereign masters and so any
moral system has to take account of them. -
2:09 - 2:11How best to take account?
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2:11 - 2:14By maximizing
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2:14 - 2:16and this leads to the principle
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2:16 - 2:19of the greatest good for the greatest
number -
2:19 - 2:23what exactly should we maximize?
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2:23 - 2:25Bentham tells us
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2:25 - 2:26happiness
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2:26 - 2:28or more precisely
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2:28 - 2:29utility.
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2:29 - 2:34Maximizing utility is a principal not only
for individuals but also for communities and -
2:34 - 2:37for legislators
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2:37 - 2:39what after all is a community
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2:39 - 2:41Bentham asks,
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2:41 - 2:45it's the sum of the individuals who comprise it
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2:45 - 2:47and that's why
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2:47 - 2:53in deciding the best policy, in deciding what the
law should be, in deciding what's just, -
2:53 - 2:59citizens and legislators should ask themselves
the question if we add up, -
2:59 - 3:04all of the benefits of this policy
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3:04 - 3:05and subtract
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3:05 - 3:09all of the costs,
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3:09 - 3:11the right thing to do
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3:11 - 3:12is the one
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3:12 - 3:13that maximizes
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3:13 - 3:15the balance
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3:15 - 3:16of happiness
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3:16 - 3:21over suffering.
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3:21 - 3:24that's what it means to maximize utility
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3:24 - 3:25now, today
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3:25 - 3:28I want to see
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3:28 - 3:31whether you agree or disagree with it,
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3:31 - 3:37and it often goes, this utilitarian logic, under
the name of cost-benefit analysis -
3:37 - 3:40which is used by companies
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3:40 - 3:41and by
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3:41 - 3:42governments
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3:42 - 3:44all the time
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3:44 - 3:45and what it involves
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3:45 - 3:51is placing a value usually a dollar value
to stand for utility -
3:51 - 3:53on the costs and the benefits
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3:53 - 3:57of various proposals.
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3:57 - 3:59recently in the Czech Republic
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3:59 - 4:03there was a proposal to increases the excise
tax on smoking -
4:03 - 4:05Philip Morris,
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4:05 - 4:08the tobacco company,
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4:08 - 4:10does huge business
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4:10 - 4:13in the Czech Republic. They commissioned
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4:13 - 4:15a study of cost-benefit analysis
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4:15 - 4:17of smoking
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4:17 - 4:19in the Czech Republic
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4:19 - 4:21and what their cost benefit
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4:21 - 4:23analysis found
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4:23 - 4:24was
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4:24 - 4:26the government gains
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4:26 - 4:27by
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4:27 - 4:31having Czech citizens smoke.
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4:31 - 4:32Now, how do they gain?
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4:32 - 4:36It's true that there are negative effects
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4:36 - 4:40to the public finance of the Czech government
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4:40 - 4:45because there are increased health care costs
for people who develop smoking-related -
4:45 - 4:47diseases
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4:47 - 4:50on the other hand there were positive
effects -
4:50 - 4:52and those were
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4:52 - 4:53added up
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4:53 - 4:55on the other side of the ledger
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4:55 - 5:02the positive effects included, for the most
part, various tax revenues that the government -
5:02 - 5:06derives from the sale of cigarette products
but it also included health care savings to -
5:06 - 5:10the government when people die early
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5:10 - 5:13pensions savings, you don't have to pay pensions
for as long, -
5:13 - 5:15and also savings
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5:15 - 5:20in housing costs for the elderly
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5:20 - 5:25and when all of the costs and benefits were added
up -
5:25 - 5:26the Philip Morris
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5:26 - 5:28study found
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5:28 - 5:33that there is a net public finance gain
in the Czech Republic -
5:33 - 5:36of a hundred and forty seven million dollars
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5:36 - 5:38and given the savings
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5:38 - 5:41in housing and health care and pension costs
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5:41 - 5:47the government enjoys the saving of savings
of over twelve hundred dollars -
5:47 - 5:53for each person who dies prematurely due to
smoking. -
5:53 - 5:57cost-benefit analysis
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5:57 - 6:02now, those among you who are defenders utilitarianism
may think that this is a unfair -
6:02 - 6:03test
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6:03 - 6:09Philip Morris was pilloried in the press and
they issued an apology for this heartless -
6:09 - 6:11calculation
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6:11 - 6:12you may say
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6:12 - 6:17that what's missing here is something that
the utilitarian can be easily incorporate -
6:17 - 6:19mainly
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6:19 - 6:23the value to the person and to the families
of those who die -
6:23 - 6:26from lung cancer.
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6:26 - 6:29what about the value of life?
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6:29 - 6:33Some cost-benefit analyses incorporate
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6:33 - 6:35a measure
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6:35 - 6:37for the value of life.
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6:37 - 6:41One of the most famous of these involved the
Ford Pinto case -
6:41 - 6:45did any of you read about that? this was back
in the 1970's, you remember that -
6:45 - 6:48the Ford Pinto was, a kind of car?
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6:48 - 6:51anybody?
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6:51 - 6:56it was a small car, subcompact car,
very popular -
6:56 - 6:58but it had one
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6:58 - 7:02problem which is the fuel tank was at the
back of the car -
7:02 - 7:08and in rear collisions the fuel tank exploded
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7:08 - 7:10and some people were killed
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7:10 - 7:14and some severely injured.
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7:14 - 7:19victims of these injuries took Ford to court
to sue -
7:19 - 7:22and in the court case it turned out
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7:22 - 7:24that Ford had long
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7:24 - 7:25since known
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7:25 - 7:28about the vulnerable fuel tank
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7:28 - 7:34and had done a cost-benefit analysis to determine
whether it would be worth it -
7:34 - 7:36to put in a special shield
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7:36 - 7:40that would protect the fuel tank and prevent it
from exploding. -
7:40 - 7:43They did a cost benefit analysis
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7:43 - 7:46the cost per part
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7:46 - 7:48to increase the safety
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7:48 - 7:50of the Pinto,
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7:50 - 7:56they calculated at eleven dollars per part
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7:56 - 7:57and here's,
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7:57 - 8:01this was the cost benefit analysis that emerged
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8:01 - 8:03in the trial,
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8:03 - 8:06eleven dollars per part
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8:06 - 8:10at 12.5 million cars and trucks
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8:10 - 8:14came to a total cost of
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8:13 - 8:17137 million dollars to improve the safety
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8:17 - 8:19but then they calculated
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8:19 - 8:20the benefits
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8:20 - 8:23of spending all this money on a safer car
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8:23 - 8:27and they counted 180 deaths
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8:27 - 8:29and they assigned a dollar value
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8:29 - 8:30200 thousand dollars
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8:30 - 8:32per death
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8:32 - 8:35180 injuries
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8:35 - 8:3767 thousand
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8:37 - 8:39and then the cost to repair
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8:39 - 8:43the replacement cost for two thousand
vehicles that would be destroyed without the -
8:43 - 8:45safety device
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8:45 - 8:48700 dollars per vehicle,
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8:48 - 8:50so the benefits
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8:50 - 8:54turned out to be only 49.5 million,
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8:54 - 8:55and so they
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8:55 - 8:56didn't install
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8:56 - 8:58the device
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8:58 - 9:00needless to say
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9:00 - 9:02when this memo
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9:01 - 9:09of the Ford Motor Company's cost-benefit analysis came
out in the trial -
9:09 - 9:11it appalled the jurors
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9:11 - 9:16who awarded a huge settlement
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9:16 - 9:22is this a counter example to the utilitarian
idea of calculating -
9:22 - 9:23because Ford included a
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9:23 - 9:27measure of the value life.
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9:27 - 9:31Now who here wants to defend
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9:31 - 9:33cost-benefit analysis from
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9:33 - 9:35this apparent counter example
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9:35 - 9:39who has a defense?
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9:39 - 9:42or do you think it's completely destroys
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9:42 - 9:47the whole utilitarian calculus?
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9:47 - 9:49I think that
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9:49 - 9:53once again they've made the same mistake the previous case
did that they've assigned a dollar value -
9:53 - 9:57to human life and once again they failed to take into
account things like -
9:57 - 10:01suffering and emotional losses of families, I mean families
lost earnings -
10:01 - 10:04but they also lost a loved one and that
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10:04 - 10:07is more value than 200 thousand dollars.
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10:07 - 10:09Good, and wait wait wait, what's you're name?
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10:09 - 10:10Julie Roto.
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10:10 - 10:14so if two hundred thousand, Julie, is too
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10:14 - 10:19too low a figure because it doesn't include
the loss of a loved one, -
10:19 - 10:22and the loss of those years of life,
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10:22 - 10:24what would be, what do you think
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10:24 - 10:27would be a more accurate number?
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10:27 - 10:32I don't believe I could give a number I think
that this sort of analysis shouldn't be applied to -
10:32 - 10:34issues of human life.
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10:34 - 10:36I think it can't be used monetarily
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10:36 - 10:39so they didn't just put to low a number,
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10:39 - 10:45Julie says, they were wrong to try to
put any number at all. -
10:45 - 10:50all right let's hear someone who
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10:50 - 10:52you have to adjust for inflation
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10:58 - 10:59all right
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10:59 - 11:00fair enough
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11:00 - 11:03so what would the number of being now?
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11:03 - 11:08this is was thirty five years ago
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11:08 - 11:10two million dollars
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11:10 - 11:12you would put two million
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11:12 - 11:14and what's your name
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11:14 - 11:15Voicheck
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11:15 - 11:17Voicheck says we have to allow for inflation
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11:17 - 11:20we should be more generous
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11:20 - 11:25then would you be satisfied that this is the
right way of thinking about the question? -
11:25 - 11:27I guess unfortunately
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11:27 - 11:30it is for
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11:30 - 11:33there's needs to be of number put somewhere
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11:33 - 11:37I'm not sure what number would be but I do
agree that there could possibly -
11:37 - 11:39be a number put
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11:39 - 11:41on a human life.
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11:41 - 11:42all right so
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11:42 - 11:44Voicheck says
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11:44 - 11:46and here he disagrees with
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11:46 - 11:47Julie
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11:47 - 11:50Julie says we can't put a number of human
life -
11:50 - 11:54for the purpose of a cost-benefit analysis,
Voicheck says we have to -
11:54 - 12:00because we have to make decisions somehow
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12:00 - 12:05what do other people think about this?
Is there anyone prepared to defend cost-benefit -
12:05 - 12:06analysis here
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12:06 - 12:10as accurate, as desirable?
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12:10 - 12:16I think that if ford and other car companies didn't use
cost-benefit analysis they'd eventually go out -
12:16 - 12:19of business because they wouldn't be able
to be profitable -
12:19 - 12:23and millions of people wouldn't be able to use
their cars to get to jobs, to put food on the table -
12:23 - 12:28to feed their children so I think that if cost-benefit
analysis isn't employed -
12:28 - 12:30the greater good
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12:30 - 12:32is sacrificed
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12:32 - 12:35in this case. Alright let me ask, what's your name?
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12:35 - 12:38Raul. Raul.
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12:38 - 12:42there was recently a study done about cell
phone use by drivers, when people are driving -
12:42 - 12:43a car,
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12:43 - 12:47and there's a debate about whether that should be
banned -
12:47 - 12:49and
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12:49 - 12:51the figure was that some
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12:51 - 12:55two thousand people die
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12:55 - 12:57as a result of accidents
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12:57 - 12:59each year
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12:59 - 13:02using cell phones
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13:02 - 13:08and yet the cost benefit analysis which was done by
the center for risk analysis at Harvard -
13:08 - 13:11found that if you look at the benefits
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13:11 - 13:14of the cell phone use
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13:14 - 13:15and you put some
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13:15 - 13:19value on the life, it comes out about
the same -
13:19 - 13:23because of the enormous economic benefit
of enabling people to take advantage -
13:23 - 13:27of their time, not waste time, be able to make deals
and talk to friends and so on -
13:27 - 13:30while they're driving
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13:30 - 13:32doesn't that suggest that
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13:32 - 13:36it's a mistake to try to put monetary figures
on questions -
13:36 - 13:38of human life?
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13:38 - 13:39well I think that if
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13:39 - 13:42the great majority of people
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13:42 - 13:48tried to derive maximum utility out of a service
like using cell phones and the convenience that cell phones -
13:48 - 13:48provide
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13:48 - 13:50that sacrifice is necessary
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13:50 - 13:52for
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13:52 - 13:53satisfaction to occur.
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13:53 - 13:59You're an outright utilitarian. In, yes okay.
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13:59 - 14:03all right then, one last question Raul
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14:03 - 14:06and I put this to Voicheck,
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14:06 - 14:08what dollar figure should be put
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14:08 - 14:13on human life to decide whether to ban the
use of cell phones -
14:13 - 14:15well I don't want to
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14:15 - 14:16arbitrarily
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14:16 - 14:18calculate a figure, I mean right now
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14:18 - 14:19I think that
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14:21 - 14:24you want to take it under advisement.
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14:24 - 14:25yeah I'll take it under advisement.
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14:25 - 14:29but what roughly speaking would it be? you've
got 23 hundred deaths -
14:29 - 14:32you've got to assign a dollar value to know
whether you want to prevent those deaths by -
14:32 - 14:37banning the use of cell phones in cars
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14:37 - 14:39so what would you're hunch be?
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14:39 - 14:40how much?
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14:40 - 14:41million
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14:41 - 14:42two million
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14:42 - 14:44two million was Voitech's figure
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14:44 - 14:46is that about right? maybe a million.
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14:46 - 14:50a million.?!
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14:50 - 14:55Alright that's good, thank you
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14:55 - 15:00So these are some of the controversies that arise
these days from cost-benefit analysis especially -
15:00 - 15:02those that involve
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15:02 - 15:07placing a dollar value on everything to be
added up. -
15:07 - 15:09well now I want to turn
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15:09 - 15:15to your objections, to your objections not necessarily
to cost benefit analysis specifically, -
15:15 - 15:18because that's just one version of the
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15:18 - 15:22utilitarian logic in practice today,
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15:22 - 15:27but to the theory as a whole, to the idea
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15:27 - 15:30that the right thing to do,
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15:30 - 15:34the just basis for policy and law,
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15:34 - 15:36is to maximize
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15:36 - 15:40utility.
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15:40 - 15:42How many disagree
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15:42 - 15:43with the utilitarian
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15:43 - 15:44approach
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15:44 - 15:46to law
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15:46 - 15:48and to the common good?
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15:48 - 15:52How many bring with it?
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15:52 - 15:55so more agree than disagree.
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15:55 - 16:00so let's hear from the critics
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16:00 - 16:02my main issue with it is that I feel like
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16:02 - 16:06you can't say that just because someone's
in the minority -
16:06 - 16:12what they want and need is less valuable than
someone who's in the majority -
16:12 - 16:14so I guess I have an issue with the idea that
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16:14 - 16:16the greatest good for the greatest number
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16:16 - 16:18is okay because
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16:18 - 16:21there is still what about people who are in
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16:21 - 16:25the lesser number, like it's not fair to them
they didn't have a say in where they wanted -
16:25 - 16:26to be.
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16:26 - 16:29alright now that's an interesting objection, you're
worried about -
16:29 - 16:32the effect on minority. yes.
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16:32 - 16:35what's your name by the way. Anna.
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16:35 - 16:40alright who has an answer to Anna's worry about
the effect on the minority -
16:40 - 16:42What do you say to Anna?
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16:42 - 16:43she said that
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16:43 - 16:47the minorities value less, I don't think that's
the case because individually the minorities -
16:47 - 16:51value is just the same as the individual in the majority
it's just that -
16:51 - 16:55the numbers outweigh the
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16:55 - 16:56minority
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16:56 - 16:59and I mean at a certain point you have to make a
decision -
16:59 - 17:02and I'm sorry for the minority but
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17:02 - 17:03sometimes
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17:03 - 17:04it's for the general
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17:04 - 17:09for the greater good. For the greater good, Anna what do you
say? what's your name? Youngda. -
17:09 - 17:11What do you say to Youngda?
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17:11 - 17:14Youngda says you just have to add up people's
preferences -
17:14 - 17:18and those in the minority do have their preferences
weighed. -
17:18 - 17:22can you give an example of the kind of thing
you're worried about when you say you're worried -
17:22 - 17:25about utilitarianism violating
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17:25 - 17:28the concern or respect due the minority?
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17:28 - 17:30can you give an example.
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17:30 - 17:35so well with any of the cases that we've talked
about, like with the shipwreck one, -
17:35 - 17:36I think that
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17:36 - 17:40the boy who was eaten
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17:40 - 17:40still had
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17:40 - 17:44just as much of a right to live as the other people
and -
17:44 - 17:45just because
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17:45 - 17:46he was the
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17:48 - 17:51minority in that case the one who
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17:51 - 17:53maybe had less of a chance to keep living
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17:53 - 17:55that doesn't mean
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17:55 - 17:58that the others automatically have a right
to eat him -
17:58 - 18:00just because
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18:00 - 18:02it would give a greater amount of people
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18:02 - 18:03the chance to live.
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18:03 - 18:06so there may be a certain rights
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18:06 - 18:08that the minority
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18:08 - 18:13members have that the individual has that
shouldn't be traded off -
18:13 - 18:14for the sake of
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18:14 - 18:17utility?
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18:17 - 18:18yes Anna?
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18:18 - 18:22Now this would be a test for you,
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18:22 - 18:25back in ancient Rome
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18:25 - 18:30they threw Christians to the lions in the
coliseum for sport -
18:30 - 18:34if you think how the utilitarian calculus
would go -
18:34 - 18:39yes, the Christian thrown to the lion suffers enormous
excruciating pain, -
18:39 - 18:46but look at the collective ecstasy of the Romans.
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18:48 - 18:51Youngda. Well
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18:51 - 18:52in that time
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18:52 - 18:53I don't think
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18:55 - 19:02in the modern-day of time to value the, um, to given
a number to the happiness given to the people watching -
19:02 - 19:03I don't think
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19:03 - 19:05any
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19:05 - 19:07policy maker would say
-
19:07 - 19:11the pain of one person, the suffering of one person is
much much, -
19:11 - 19:15in comparison to the happiness gained
-
19:15 - 19:20no but you have to admit that if there were
enough Romans delirious with happiness, -
19:20 - 19:25it would outweigh even the most excruciating
pain of a handful of -
19:25 - 19:29Christians thrown to the lion.
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19:29 - 19:34so we really have here two different objections
to utilitarianism -
19:34 - 19:35one has to do
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19:35 - 19:38with whether utilitarianism
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19:38 - 19:40adequately respects
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19:40 - 19:41individual rights
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19:41 - 19:42or minority rights
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19:42 - 19:45and the other has to do
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19:45 - 19:47with the whole idea
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19:47 - 19:49of aggregating
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19:49 - 19:50utility
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19:50 - 19:52for preferences
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19:52 - 19:53or values
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19:53 - 19:56is it possible to aggregate all values
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19:56 - 19:58to translate them
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19:58 - 20:00into dollar terms?
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20:00 - 20:02there was
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20:02 - 20:07in the 1930's
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20:07 - 20:09a psychologist
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20:09 - 20:11who tried
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20:11 - 20:12to address
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20:12 - 20:16the second question. He tried to prove
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20:16 - 20:19what utilitarianism assumes,
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20:19 - 20:22that it is possible
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20:22 - 20:23to translate
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20:23 - 20:27all goods, all values, all human concerns
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20:27 - 20:29into a single uniform measure
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20:29 - 20:30and he did this
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20:30 - 20:33by conducting a survey
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20:33 - 20:38of the young recipients of relief, this was
in the 1930's -
20:38 - 20:42and he asked them, he gave them a list of
unpleasant experiences -
20:42 - 20:45and he asked them how much would you have to
be paid to undergo -
20:45 - 20:50the following experiences and he kept track
-
20:50 - 20:51for example
-
20:51 - 20:57how much would you have to be paid to have
one upper front tooth pulled out -
20:57 - 21:04or how much would you have to be paid to have one little
one tow cut off? -
21:05 - 21:12or eat a live earth worm, six inches long
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21:12 - 21:19or to live the rest of your life on a farm in
Kansas -
21:19 - 21:24or to choke a stray cat to death with your bare hands
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21:24 - 21:26now what do you suppose
-
21:26 - 21:33what do you suppose was the most expensive
item on that list -
21:33 - 21:40Kansas?
-
21:40 - 21:45You're right it was Kansas
-
21:45 - 21:46for a Kansas
-
21:46 - 21:48people said they'd have to pay them
-
21:48 - 21:52they have to be paid three hundred
thousand dollars -
21:57 - 22:00what do you think
-
22:00 - 22:03what do you think was the next most expensive?
-
22:03 - 22:06not the cat
-
22:06 - 22:08not the tooth
-
22:08 - 22:11not the toe
-
22:11 - 22:17the worm!
-
22:17 - 22:21people said you'd have to pay them a hundred
thousand dollars -
22:21 - 22:23to eat the worm
-
22:23 - 22:28what do you think was the least expensive
item? -
22:28 - 22:30not the cat
-
22:30 - 22:31the tooth
-
22:31 - 22:35during the depression people were willing
to have their tooth pulled -
22:35 - 22:40for only forty five hundred dollars
-
22:40 - 22:41now
-
22:42 - 22:45here's what Thorndike
-
22:45 - 22:48concluded from his study
-
22:48 - 22:52any want or satisfaction which exists, exists
-
22:52 - 22:55in some amount and is therefore measurable
-
22:55 - 22:56the life of a dog
-
22:56 - 22:57or a cat
-
22:57 - 22:59or a chicken consists
-
22:59 - 23:01of appetites
-
23:01 - 23:02cravings
-
23:02 - 23:04desires and their gratifications
-
23:04 - 23:06so does the life
-
23:06 - 23:07of human beings
-
23:07 - 23:09though the appetites and desires
-
23:09 - 23:12are more complicated
-
23:12 - 23:14but what about
-
23:14 - 23:16Thorndike's study?
-
23:16 - 23:18does it support
-
23:18 - 23:20Bentham's idea
-
23:20 - 23:22that all
-
23:22 - 23:28goods all values can be captured according
to a single uniform measure of value -
23:28 - 23:34or does the preposterous character of those
different items on the list -
23:34 - 23:37suggest the opposite conclusion
-
23:37 - 23:40that may be whether we're talking about life
-
23:40 - 23:42or Kansas
-
23:42 - 23:44or the worm
-
23:44 - 23:45maybe
-
23:45 - 23:48the things we value
-
23:48 - 23:49and cherish
-
23:49 - 23:51can't be captured
-
23:51 - 23:54according to a single uniform measure of value
-
23:54 - 23:56and if they can't
-
23:56 - 23:58what are the consequences
-
23:58 - 24:01for the utilitarian theory
-
24:01 - 24:02of morality
-
24:02 - 24:09that's a question we'll continue with next
time -
24:13 - 24:16alright now let's take the other
-
24:16 - 24:18part of the poll
-
24:18 - 24:19which is the
-
24:19 - 24:21the highest
-
24:21 - 24:23experience or pleasure?
-
24:23 - 24:26how many say
-
24:26 - 24:32Shakespeare
-
24:32 - 24:38how many say fear Factor
-
24:38 - 24:40no you can't be serious
-
24:40 - 24:46really?
-
24:46 - 24:49last time
-
24:49 - 24:54last time we began to consider some objections
-
24:54 - 24:57to Jeremy Bentham's version
-
24:57 - 25:02of utilitarianism
-
25:02 - 25:05people raised two objections in the discussion
-
25:05 - 25:08we had
-
25:08 - 25:11the first
-
25:11 - 25:13was the objection, the claim
-
25:13 - 25:15that utilitarianism,
-
25:15 - 25:17by concerning itself
-
25:17 - 25:20with the greatest good for the greatest number
-
25:20 - 25:23fails adequately to respect
-
25:23 - 25:25individual rights.
-
25:25 - 25:29today we have debates
-
25:29 - 25:30about torture
-
25:30 - 25:34and terrorism
-
25:34 - 25:35suppose
-
25:35 - 25:41a suspected terrorists was apprehended
on September tenth -
25:41 - 25:44and you had reason to believe
-
25:44 - 25:46that the suspect
-
25:46 - 25:51had crucial information about an impending
terrorist attack that would kill over three thousand -
25:51 - 25:52people
-
25:52 - 25:56and you couldn't extract the information
-
25:56 - 25:58would it be just
-
25:58 - 25:59to torture
-
25:59 - 26:01the suspect
-
26:01 - 26:03to get the information
-
26:03 - 26:06or
-
26:06 - 26:08do you say no
-
26:08 - 26:15there is a categorical moral duty of
respect for individual rights -
26:15 - 26:18in a way we're back to the questions we started
with t -
26:18 - 26:24about trolley cars and organ transplants so that's
the first issue -
26:24 - 26:29and you remember we considered some examples of
cost-benefit analysis -
26:29 - 26:34but a lot of people were unhappy with cost-benefit
analysis -
26:34 - 26:40when it came to placing a dollar value on
human life -
26:40 - 26:42and so that led us to the
-
26:42 - 26:44second objection,
-
26:44 - 26:49it questioned whether it's possible to translate
all values -
26:49 - 26:53into a single uniform measure of value
-
26:53 - 26:58it asks in other words whether all values
are commensurable -
26:58 - 27:00let me give you one other
-
27:00 - 27:01example
-
27:01 - 27:07of an experience, this actually is a true
story, it comes from personal experience -
27:07 - 27:13that raises a question at least about whether
all values can be translated without -
27:13 - 27:14loss
-
27:14 - 27:20into utilitarian terms
-
27:20 - 27:22some years ago
-
27:22 - 27:28when I was a graduate student I was at Oxford
in England and they had menâs and women's -
27:28 - 27:30colleges they weren't yet mixed
-
27:30 - 27:31and the women's colleges had rules
-
27:31 - 27:34against
-
27:34 - 27:37overnight male guests
-
27:37 - 27:40by the nineteen seventies these
-
27:40 - 27:44rules were rarely enforced and easily violated,
-
27:44 - 27:51or so I was told,
-
27:52 - 27:57by the late nineteen seventies when I was there,
pressure grew to relax these rules and it became -
27:57 - 28:01the subject of debate among the faculty at St. Anne's College
-
28:01 - 28:04which was one of these all women colleges
-
28:04 - 28:07the older women on the faculty
-
28:07 - 28:11we're traditionalists they were opposed to
change -
28:11 - 28:13on conventional moral grounds
-
28:13 - 28:14but times had changed
-
28:14 - 28:17and they were embarrassed
-
28:17 - 28:20to give the true grounds of their objection
-
28:20 - 28:23and so the translated their arguments
-
28:23 - 28:26into utilitarian terms
-
28:26 - 28:27if men stay overnight,
-
28:27 - 28:32they argued, the costs to the college will increase.
-
28:32 - 28:33how you might wonder
-
28:33 - 28:39well they'll want to take baths, and that
will use up hot water they said -
28:39 - 28:41furthermore they argued
-
28:41 - 28:47we'll have to replace the mattresses more often
-
28:47 - 28:48the reformers
-
28:48 - 28:52met these arguments by adopting the following
compromise -
28:52 - 28:53each woman
-
28:53 - 29:00could have a maximum of three overnight male
guest each week -
29:01 - 29:06they didn't say whether it had to be the same
one, or three different -
29:06 - 29:07provided
-
29:07 - 29:09and this is the compromise provided
-
29:09 - 29:10the guest
-
29:10 - 29:15paid fifty pence to defray the cost to the college
-
29:15 - 29:17the next day
-
29:17 - 29:23the national headline in the national newspaper
read St. Anne's girls, fifty pence a night -
29:30 - 29:31another
-
29:31 - 29:32illustration
-
29:32 - 29:35of the difficulty of translating
-
29:35 - 29:36all values
-
29:36 - 29:39in this case a certain idea of virtue
-
29:39 - 29:44into utilitarian terms
-
29:44 - 29:47so that's all to illustrate
-
29:47 - 29:49the second objection
-
29:49 - 29:53to utilitarianism, at least the
part of that objection -
29:53 - 29:55that questions rather
-
29:55 - 29:57the utilitarianism
-
29:57 - 29:59is right to assume
-
29:59 - 30:01that we can
-
30:01 - 30:02assume the uniformity of
-
30:02 - 30:08value, the commensurability of values
and translate all moral considerations -
30:08 - 30:10into
-
30:10 - 30:10dollars
-
30:10 - 30:12or money.
-
30:12 - 30:15But there is a second
-
30:15 - 30:20aspect to this worry about aggregating values
and preferences -
30:20 - 30:22why should we
-
30:22 - 30:23weigh
-
30:23 - 30:25all preferences
-
30:25 - 30:27that people have
-
30:27 - 30:33without assessing whether they're good preferences
or bad preferences -
30:33 - 30:35shouldn't we distinguish
-
30:35 - 30:36between
-
30:36 - 30:38higher
-
30:38 - 30:38pleasures
-
30:38 - 30:42and lower pleasures.
-
30:42 - 30:44Now, part of the appeal of
-
30:44 - 30:49not making any qualitative distinctions about
the worth of people's preferences, part of the -
30:49 - 30:51appeal
-
30:51 - 30:55is that it is non-judgmental and egalitarian
-
30:55 - 30:58the Benthamite utilitarian says
-
30:58 - 31:01everybody's preferences count
-
31:01 - 31:05and they count regardless of what people want
-
31:05 - 31:09regardless of what makes it different people
-
31:09 - 31:10happy. For Bentham,
-
31:10 - 31:11all that matters
-
31:11 - 31:13you'll remember
-
31:13 - 31:16are the intensity and the duration
-
31:16 - 31:18of a pleasure or pain
-
31:18 - 31:24the so-called higher pleasures or nobler
virtues are simply those, according to Bentham -
31:24 - 31:25that produce
-
31:25 - 31:26stronger,
-
31:26 - 31:29longer, pleasure
-
31:29 - 31:33yet a famous phrase to express this idea
-
31:33 - 31:36the quantity of pleasure being equal
-
31:36 - 31:37pushpin
-
31:37 - 31:40is as good as poetry.
-
31:40 - 31:42What was pushpin?
-
31:42 - 31:47It was some kind of a child's game like to tidily winks
pushpin is as good as poetry -
31:47 - 31:49Bentham said
-
31:49 - 31:51and lying behind this idea
-
31:51 - 31:52I think
-
31:52 - 31:53is the claim
-
31:53 - 31:54the intuition
-
31:54 - 31:56that it's a presumption
-
31:56 - 31:58to judge
-
31:58 - 31:59whose pleasures
-
31:59 - 32:01are intrinsically higher
-
32:01 - 32:04or worthier or better
-
32:04 - 32:07and there is something attractive in this
-
32:07 - 32:10refusal to judge, after all some people like
-
32:10 - 32:12Mozart, others
-
32:12 - 32:13Madonna
-
32:13 - 32:15some people like ballet
-
32:15 - 32:16others
-
32:16 - 32:17bowling,
-
32:17 - 32:19who's to say
-
32:19 - 32:23a Benthamite might argue, who's to say which
of these pleasures -
32:23 - 32:24whose pleasures
-
32:24 - 32:25are higher
-
32:25 - 32:26worthier
-
32:26 - 32:28nobler
-
32:28 - 32:32than others?
-
32:32 - 32:36But, is that right?
-
32:36 - 32:40this refusal to make qualitative distinctions
-
32:40 - 32:42can we
-
32:42 - 32:45altogether dispense with the idea
-
32:45 - 32:49that certain things we take pleasure in are
-
32:49 - 32:51better or worthier
-
32:51 - 32:54than others
-
32:54 - 32:59think back to the case of the Romans in the coliseum,
one thing that troubled people about that -
32:59 - 32:59practice
-
32:59 - 33:01is that it seemed to violate the rights
-
33:01 - 33:04of the Christian
-
33:04 - 33:07another way of objecting to what's going
on there -
33:07 - 33:11is that the pleasure that the Romans
take -
33:11 - 33:13in this bloody spectacle
-
33:13 - 33:16should that pleasure
-
33:16 - 33:16which is a base,
-
33:16 - 33:19kind of corrupt
-
33:19 - 33:23degrading pleasure, should that even
-
33:23 - 33:27be valorized or weighed in deciding what
the -
33:27 - 33:34the general welfare is?
-
33:34 - 33:39so here are the objections to Bentham's
utilitarianism -
33:39 - 33:43and now we turn to someone who tried to
-
33:43 - 33:46respond to those objections,
-
33:46 - 33:48a later day utilitarian
-
33:48 - 33:50John Stuart Mill
-
33:50 - 33:53so what we need to
-
33:53 - 33:55examine now
-
33:55 - 33:59is whether John Stuart Mill had a convincing
reply -
33:59 - 34:05to these objections to utilitarianism.
-
34:05 - 34:07John Stuart Mill
-
34:07 - 34:09was born in 1806
-
34:09 - 34:11his father James Mill
-
34:11 - 34:14was a disciple of Benthamâs
-
34:14 - 34:17and James Mills set about giving his son
-
34:17 - 34:20John Stuart Mill a model education
-
34:20 - 34:22he was a child prodigy
-
34:22 - 34:24John Stuart Mill
-
34:24 - 34:28the knew Latin, sorry, Greek at the age of three,
Latin at eight -
34:28 - 34:29and at age ten
-
34:29 - 34:34he wrote a history of Roman law.
-
34:34 - 34:36At age twenty
-
34:36 - 34:39he had a nervous breakdown
-
34:39 - 34:44this left him in a depression for five years
-
34:44 - 34:47but at age twenty five what helped lift him
out of this depression -
34:47 - 34:50is that he met Harriet Taylor
-
34:50 - 34:53she in no doubt married him, they lived happily ever after
-
34:53 - 34:55and it was under her
-
34:55 - 34:57influence
-
34:57 - 35:00the John Stuart Mill try to humanize
-
35:00 - 35:02utilitarianism
-
35:02 - 35:05what Mill tried to do was to see
-
35:05 - 35:08whether the utilitarian calculus could be
-
35:08 - 35:09enlarged
-
35:09 - 35:11and modified
-
35:11 - 35:14to accommodate
-
35:14 - 35:17humanitarian concerns
-
35:17 - 35:20like the concern to respect individual rights
-
35:20 - 35:25and also to address the distinction between
higher and lower -
35:25 - 35:26pleasures.
-
35:26 - 35:30In 1859 Mill wrote a famous book
on liberty -
35:30 - 35:35the main point of which was the importance
of defending individual rights and minority -
35:35 - 35:36rights
-
35:36 - 35:38and in 1861
-
35:38 - 35:40toward the end of his life
-
35:40 - 35:43he wrote the book we read is part of this course
-
35:43 - 35:45Utilitarianism.
-
35:45 - 35:47It makes it clear
-
35:47 - 35:50that utility is the only standard of morality
-
35:50 - 35:51in his view
-
35:51 - 35:53so he's not challenging
-
35:53 - 35:54Bentham's premise,
-
35:54 - 35:55he's affirming it.
-
35:55 - 35:59he says very explicitly the sole evidence,
-
35:59 - 36:05it is possible to produce that anything is
desirable is that people actually do -
36:05 - 36:06desire it.
-
36:06 - 36:12so he stays with the idea that our de facto
actual empirical desires are the only -
36:12 - 36:13basis
-
36:13 - 36:16for moral judgment.
-
36:16 - 36:18but then
-
36:18 - 36:19page eight
-
36:19 - 36:25also in chapter two, he argues that it is possible
for a utilitarian to distinguish -
36:25 - 36:26higher from lower
-
36:26 - 36:29pleasures.
-
36:29 - 36:31now, those of you who've read
-
36:31 - 36:32Mill already
-
36:32 - 36:33how
-
36:33 - 36:37according to him is it possible to draw that
distinction? -
36:37 - 36:40How can a utilitarian
-
36:40 - 36:43distinguish qualitatively higher pleasures
-
36:43 - 36:44from
-
36:44 - 36:49lesser ones, base ones, unworthy ones?
-
36:49 - 36:51If you tried both of them
-
36:51 - 36:55and you'll prefer the higher one naturally
always -
36:55 - 37:00that's great, that's right. What's your name? John.
-
37:00 - 37:02so as John points out
-
37:02 - 37:05Mill says here's the test,
-
37:05 - 37:08since we can't step outside
-
37:08 - 37:10actual desires, actual preferences
-
37:10 - 37:12that would
-
37:12 - 37:14violate utilitarian premises,
-
37:14 - 37:17the only test
-
37:17 - 37:18of whether
-
37:18 - 37:20a pleasure is higher
-
37:20 - 37:26or lower is whether someone who has experienced
both -
37:26 - 37:28would prefer it.
-
37:28 - 37:29And here,
-
37:29 - 37:31in chapter two
-
37:31 - 37:33we see the passage
-
37:33 - 37:37where Mill makes the point that John just described
-
37:37 - 37:43of two pleasures, if there be one to which all
are almost all who have experience -
37:43 - 37:46of both give a decided preference,
-
37:46 - 37:52irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to
prefer it, in other words no outside, no independent -
37:52 - 37:53standard,
-
37:53 - 37:58then that is the more desirable pleasure.
-
37:58 - 38:00what do people think about that argument.
-
38:00 - 38:02does that
-
38:02 - 38:03does it succeeded?
-
38:03 - 38:06how many think that it does succeed?
-
38:06 - 38:11of arguing within utilitarian terms for a
distinction between higher and lower pleasures. -
38:11 - 38:12how many
-
38:12 - 38:18think it doesn't succeed?
-
38:18 - 38:21I want to hear your reasons.
-
38:21 - 38:22but before
-
38:22 - 38:24we give the reasons
-
38:24 - 38:26let's do an experiment
-
38:26 - 38:29of Mills'
-
38:29 - 38:32claim.
-
38:32 - 38:35In order to do this experiment
-
38:35 - 38:40we're going to look that three
-
38:40 - 38:42short excerpts
-
38:42 - 38:45of popular entertainment
-
38:45 - 38:48the first one is a Hamlet soliloquy
-
38:48 - 38:53it'll be followed by two other
-
38:53 - 38:55experiences
-
38:55 - 38:58see what you think.
-
38:58 - 39:02'what a piece of work is a man
-
39:02 - 39:06how noble in reason
-
39:06 - 39:08how infinite in faculties
-
39:08 - 39:11in form and moving, how express and admirable
-
39:11 - 39:15in action how like an angel. In apprehension, how like a god
-
39:15 - 39:16the beauty of the world
-
39:16 - 39:18the paragon of animals
-
39:18 - 39:21and yet, to me
-
39:21 - 39:25what is this quintessence of dust?
-
39:25 - 39:32man delights not me.
-
39:43 - 39:48Imagine a world where your greatest fears become reality
-
39:48 - 39:53each show, six contestants from around the country battle
each other in three -
39:53 - 40:00extreme stunts. these stunts are designed to challenge
these contestants both physically and mentally -
40:00 - 40:02six contestants, three stunts, one winner.
-
40:02 - 40:09Fear factor.
-
40:16 - 40:23The Simpsons. Well hi diddly-o peddle to the metal o-philes!
Flanders- since when do you like anything cool. -
40:23 - 40:25well, I don't care for the speed, but I can't get enough of that
safety gear -
40:25 - 40:29helmets, roll bars, caution flags. I like the fresh
air -
40:29 - 40:35and looking at the poor people in the infield.
-
40:35 - 40:41Dang Cletus, why you got to park by my parents.
-
40:41 - 40:43Now hunny, it's my parents too.
-
40:56 - 41:01I don't even have to ask which one you like
most -
41:01 - 41:05the Simpsons? How many like the Simpson's most?
-
41:05 - 41:10How many Shakespeare?
-
41:10 - 41:13What about fear factor?
-
41:13 - 41:16how many preferred fear factor?
-
41:16 - 41:22really?
-
41:22 - 41:24people overwhelmingly
-
41:24 - 41:26like the Simpsons
-
41:26 - 41:29better
-
41:29 - 41:32than Shakespeare. alright, now let's take the other
-
41:32 - 41:34part of the poll
-
41:34 - 41:36which is the
-
41:36 - 41:38highest
-
41:38 - 41:39experience or pleasure?
-
41:39 - 41:42how many say
-
41:42 - 41:48Shakespeare?
-
41:48 - 41:50how many say
-
41:50 - 41:54fear factor?
-
41:54 - 41:59no you can't be serious
-
41:59 - 42:01really?
-
42:01 - 42:03alright go ahead you can say it.
-
42:03 - 42:03I found that one
-
42:03 - 42:05the most entertaining
-
42:05 - 42:09I know but which do you think was the worthiest,
the noblest experience, I know you find it -
42:09 - 42:11the most anything
-
42:11 - 42:16if something is good just because it is pleasurable
what is the matter if you have some kind of -
42:16 - 42:17abstract
-
42:17 - 42:22idea of whether it is good by someone else's
sense or not. -
42:22 - 42:25Alright so you come down on the straight Benthamite's side
-
42:25 - 42:26whose to judge
-
42:26 - 42:29and why should we judge
-
42:29 - 42:34apart from just registering and aggregating
de facto preferences, alright fair enough. -
42:34 - 42:35what's your name?
-
42:35 - 42:37Nate? okay fair enough
-
42:37 - 42:38Alright so
-
42:38 - 42:41how many think that the Simpson's is actually
-
42:41 - 42:46apart from liking is actually the higher experience
-
42:46 - 42:47higher than Shakespeare.
-
42:47 - 42:49Alright let's see the vote for Shakespeare again
-
42:49 - 42:53how many think Shakespeare is higher?
-
42:53 - 42:54alright so
-
42:54 - 42:56why is it
-
42:56 - 42:59ideally I'd like to hear from someone is there
someone -
42:59 - 43:02think Shakespeare is highest
-
43:02 - 43:03but who preferred
-
43:03 - 43:04watching
-
43:04 - 43:09the Simpsons
-
43:09 - 43:14Like I guess just sitting and watching the Simpsons, it's entertaining
because the make jokes, they make us laugh but -
43:14 - 43:18someone has to tell us that Shakespeare was this great writer
we had to be taught how to read him, how to -
43:18 - 43:21understand him, we had to be taught how to
-
43:21 - 43:23take in Rembrandt, how to analyze a painting.
-
43:23 - 43:26well how do, what's your name? Aneesha.
-
43:26 - 43:28Aneesha, when you say someone
-
43:28 - 43:31told you that Shakespeare's better
-
43:31 - 43:37are you accepting it on blind faith you voted that
Shakespeare's higher only because the culture -
43:37 - 43:42tells you that our teachers tell you that
or do you -
43:42 - 43:44actually agree with that yourself
-
43:44 - 43:48well in the sense that Shakespeare, no, but earlier you made
-
43:48 - 43:50an example of Rembrandt
-
43:50 - 43:54I feel like I would enjoy a reading a comic book
more than I would enjoy a kind of analyzing -
43:54 - 43:58Rembrandt because someone told me it was
great, you know. Right so of some this seems -
43:58 - 44:02to be, you're suggesting a kind of
-
44:02 - 44:05cultural convention and pressure. We're told
-
44:05 - 44:12what books, what works of art are great. who else?
-
44:15 - 44:20although I enjoyed watching the Simpsons more
in this particular moment in Justice, -
44:20 - 44:23if I were to spend the rest of my life
considering -
44:23 - 44:25the three different
-
44:25 - 44:27video clips shown
-
44:27 - 44:29I would not want to spend
-
44:29 - 44:32that remainder of my life considering
-
44:32 - 44:34the latter two clips.
-
44:34 - 44:37I think I would derive more pleasure
-
44:37 - 44:38from being able to
-
44:38 - 44:39branch out in my own mind
-
44:39 - 44:40sort of
-
44:40 - 44:45considering more deep pleasures, more
deep thoughts. -
44:45 - 44:49and tell me your name
-
44:49 - 44:50Joe.
-
44:50 - 44:53Joe, so if you had to spend the rest of your life
on -
44:53 - 44:55on a farm in Kansas with only
-
44:55 - 44:57with only Shakespeare
-
44:57 - 45:02or the collected episodes of the Simpsons
-
45:02 - 45:04you would prefer
-
45:04 - 45:07Shakespeare
-
45:07 - 45:10what do you conclude from that
-
45:10 - 45:12about John Stuart Mill's test
-
45:12 - 45:15but the test of a higher pleasure
-
45:15 - 45:16is whether
-
45:16 - 45:18people who have experienced
-
45:18 - 45:22both prefer it.
-
45:22 - 45:24can I cite another example briefly?
-
45:24 - 45:25in biology
-
45:25 - 45:29in neuro biology last year we were told of a rat who was
tested -
45:29 - 45:31a particular center in the brain
-
45:31 - 45:36where the rat was able to stimulate its
brain and cause itself intense pleasure repeatedly -
45:36 - 45:38the rat did not eat or drink until it died
-
45:38 - 45:42so the rat was clearly experiencing intense
pleasure -
45:42 - 45:46now if you asked me right now if I'd rather
experience intense pleasure -
45:46 - 45:47or have
-
45:47 - 45:53a full lifetime of higher pleasure, I would consider
intense pleasure to be lower pleasure, right -
45:53 - 45:56now enjoy intense pleasure
-
45:56 - 46:02yes I would
-
46:02 - 46:03but over a lifetime I think
-
46:03 - 46:04I would think
-
46:04 - 46:07almost a complete majority here would agree
-
46:07 - 46:12that they would rather be a human
with higher pleasure that rat -
46:12 - 46:13with intense pleasure
-
46:13 - 46:15for a momentary period of time
-
46:15 - 46:16so now
-
46:16 - 46:19in answer to your question, right, I think
-
46:19 - 46:21this proves that, or I won't say proves
-
46:21 - 46:25I think the conclusion
-
46:25 - 46:29is that Mill's theory that when a majority people are
asked -
46:29 - 46:31what they would rather do,
-
46:31 - 46:33they will answer
-
46:33 - 46:35that they would rather
-
46:35 - 46:39engage in a higher pleasure. So you think that this
supports Mills, that Mills was on to something here -
46:39 - 46:41I do.
-
46:41 - 46:43all right is there anyone
-
46:43 - 46:47who disagrees with Joe who thinks that
our experiment -
46:47 - 46:49disproves
-
46:49 - 46:50Mills'
-
46:50 - 46:51test
-
46:51 - 46:53shows that that's not an adequate way
-
46:53 - 46:58that you can't distinguish higher pleasures within
the utilitarian -
46:58 - 47:03framework.
-
47:06 - 47:10If whatever is good is truly just whatever
people prefer it's truly relative and there's -
47:10 - 47:12no objective definition then
-
47:12 - 47:15there will be some society where people prefer
Simpsons -
47:15 - 47:16more
-
47:16 - 47:21anyone can appreciate the Simpsons, but I think
it does take education to appreciate Shakespeare -
47:21 - 47:26Alright, you're saying it takes education to appreciate
higher -
47:26 - 47:27true thing
-
47:27 - 47:30Mill's point is
-
47:30 - 47:33that the higher pleasures do require
-
47:33 - 47:35cultivation and appreciation and education
-
47:35 - 47:38he doesn't dispute that
-
47:38 - 47:39but
-
47:39 - 47:42once having been cultivated
-
47:42 - 47:44and educated
-
47:44 - 47:46people will see
-
47:46 - 47:48not only see the difference between higher
lower -
47:48 - 47:49pleasures
-
47:49 - 47:52but will it actually
-
47:52 - 47:53prefer
-
47:53 - 47:54the higher
-
47:54 - 47:56to the lower.
-
47:56 - 48:00you find this famous passage from John Stuart
Mill- -
48:00 - 48:01it is better
-
48:01 - 48:04to be a human being dissatisfied
-
48:04 - 48:06then a pig satisfied.
-
48:06 - 48:11Better to the Socrates dissatisfied than
a fool satisfied -
48:11 - 48:12and if the fool
-
48:12 - 48:13or the pig
-
48:13 - 48:16are of a different opinion
-
48:16 - 48:18it is because they only know
-
48:18 - 48:21their side of the question.
-
48:21 - 48:22so here you have
-
48:22 - 48:23an attempt
-
48:23 - 48:25to distinguish
-
48:25 - 48:27higher from lower
-
48:27 - 48:29pleasures
-
48:29 - 48:33so going to an art museum or being a couch
potato, swilling beer watching television -
48:33 - 48:35at home
-
48:35 - 48:38sometimes Mill agrees we might succumb
-
48:38 - 48:41to the temptation
-
48:41 - 48:42to do the latter,
-
48:42 - 48:46to be couch potatoes,
-
48:46 - 48:48but even when we do that
-
48:48 - 48:50out of indolence
-
48:50 - 48:51and sloth,
-
48:51 - 48:52we know
-
48:52 - 48:54that the pleasure we get
-
48:54 - 48:56gazing at Rembrandts
-
48:56 - 48:57in the museum
-
48:57 - 49:00is actually higher,
-
49:00 - 49:03because we've experienced both.
-
49:03 - 49:06And is a higher pressure
-
49:06 - 49:07gazing at Rembrandts
-
49:07 - 49:11because of engages our higher human faculties
-
49:11 - 49:14what about Mill's attempt
-
49:14 - 49:19to reply to the objection about individual rights?
-
49:19 - 49:22In a way he uses the same
-
49:22 - 49:25kind of argument
-
49:25 - 49:28and this comes out in chapter five
-
49:28 - 49:33he says while I dispute the pretensions of any
theory which sets up an imaginary standard -
49:33 - 49:35of justice
-
49:35 - 49:40not grounded on utility,
-
49:40 - 49:41but still
-
49:41 - 49:43he considers
-
49:43 - 49:45justice
-
49:45 - 49:49grounded on utility to be what he calls the
chief part -
49:49 - 49:53and incomparably the most sacred and binding
part -
49:53 - 49:55of all morality.
-
49:55 - 49:57so justice is higher
-
49:57 - 50:00individual rights are privileged
-
50:00 - 50:02but not for
-
50:02 - 50:05reasons that depart from utilitarian assumptions.
-
50:05 - 50:07Justice is a name
-
50:07 - 50:09for certain moral requirements
-
50:09 - 50:11which, regarded collectively
-
50:11 - 50:15stand higher in the scale of social utility
-
50:15 - 50:17and are therefore
-
50:17 - 50:19of more
-
50:19 - 50:21paramount obligation
-
50:21 - 50:23than any others
-
50:23 - 50:29so justice is sacred, it's prior, it's privileged,
it isn't something that can easily be traded -
50:29 - 50:31off against lesser things
-
50:31 - 50:32but the reason
-
50:32 - 50:34is ultimately
-
50:34 - 50:36Mills Claims
-
50:36 - 50:38a utilitarian reason
-
50:38 - 50:39once you consider
-
50:39 - 50:41the long run interests
-
50:41 - 50:44of humankind,
-
50:44 - 50:45of all of us,
-
50:45 - 50:46as progressive
-
50:46 - 50:48beings.
-
50:48 - 50:51If we do justice and if we respect rights
-
50:51 - 50:53society as a whole
-
50:53 - 50:56will be better off in the long run.
-
50:56 - 50:58Well is that convincing?
-
50:58 - 50:59Or
-
50:59 - 51:05is Mill actually, without admitting it, stepping
outside -
51:05 - 51:06utilitarian considerations
-
51:06 - 51:08in arguing
-
51:08 - 51:11for qualitatively higher
-
51:11 - 51:13pleasures
-
51:13 - 51:14and for sacred
-
51:14 - 51:17or specially important
-
51:17 - 51:18individual rights?
-
51:18 - 51:22we haven't fully answered that question
-
51:22 - 51:24because to answer that question
-
51:24 - 51:26in the case of rights and justice
-
51:26 - 51:29will require that we explore
-
51:29 - 51:30other ways,
-
51:30 - 51:33non utilitarian ways
-
51:33 - 51:35of accounting for the basis
-
51:35 - 51:36or rights
-
51:36 - 51:38and then asking
-
51:38 - 51:40whether they succeed
-
51:40 - 51:43as for Jeremy Bentham,
-
51:43 - 51:45who launched
-
51:45 - 51:46utilitarianism
-
51:46 - 51:47as a doctrine
-
51:47 - 51:50in moral and legal philosophy
-
51:50 - 51:54Bentham died in 1832 at the
age of eighty five -
51:54 - 51:58but if you go to London you can visit him
today -
51:58 - 51:59literally.
-
51:59 - 52:01he provided in his will
-
52:01 - 52:03that his body be preserved,
-
52:03 - 52:05embalmed and displayed
-
52:05 - 52:08in the university of London
-
52:08 - 52:11where he still presides in a glass case
-
52:11 - 52:13with a wax head
-
52:13 - 52:15dressed in his actual clothing.
-
52:15 - 52:17you see before he died,
-
52:17 - 52:22Bentham addressed himself to a question consistent
with his philosophy, -
52:22 - 52:23of what use
-
52:23 - 52:27could a dead man be to the living
-
52:27 - 52:30one use, he said, would be to make one's corpse
available -
52:30 - 52:34for the study of anatomy
-
52:34 - 52:37in the case of great philosophers, however,
-
52:37 - 52:38better yet
-
52:38 - 52:45to preserve one's physical presence in order
to inspire future generations of thinkers. -
52:45 - 52:48You want to see what Bentham looks like stuffed?
-
52:48 - 52:50Here's what he looks like
-
52:50 - 52:54There he is
-
52:54 - 52:55now, if you look closely
-
52:55 - 52:57you'll notice
-
52:57 - 52:59that
-
52:59 - 53:06the embalming up his actual had was not a
success so they substituted a waxed head -
53:07 - 53:10and at the bottom for verisimilitude
-
53:10 - 53:13you can actually see his actual had
-
53:13 - 53:15on a plate
-
53:17 - 53:18you see it?
-
53:18 - 53:23right there
-
53:23 - 53:26so, what's the moral of the story?
-
53:26 - 53:29the moral of the story
-
53:29 - 53:34by the way they bring him out during meetings
of the board at university college London -
53:34 - 53:41and the minutes record him as present but
not voting. -
53:41 - 53:43here is a philosopher
-
53:43 - 53:45in life and in death
-
53:45 - 53:47who adhered
-
53:47 - 53:48to the principles
-
53:48 - 53:55of his philosophy. we'll continue with rights next time.
-
53:57 - 54:01Don't miss the chance to interact online with other viewers of Justice
-
54:01 - 54:03join the conversation, take a pop quiz,
-
54:03 - 54:08watch lectures you've missed, and a lot more. Visit Justiceharvard.org
-
54:08 - 54:15It's the right thing to do.
-
54:50 - 54:54funding for this program is provided by
-
54:54 - 54:55additional funding provided by
- Title:
- Justice: What's The Right Thing To Do? Episode 02: "PUTTING A PRICE TAG ON LIFE"
- Description:
-
PART ONE: PUTTING A PRICE TAG ON LIFE
Today, companies and governments often use Jeremy Benthams utilitarian logic under the name of cost-benefit analysis. Sandel presents some contemporary cases in which cost-benefit analysis was used to put a dollar value on human life. The cases give rise to several objections to the utilitarian logic of seeking the greatest good for the greatest number. Should we always give more weight to the happiness of a majority, even if the majority is cruel or ignoble? Is it possible to sum up and compare all values using a common measure like money?
PART TWO: HOW TO MEASURE PLEASURE
Sandel introduces J.S. Mill, a utilitarian philosopher who attempts to defend utilitarianism against the objections raised by critics of the doctrine. Mill argues that seeking the greatest good for the greatest number is compatible with protecting individual rights, and that utilitarianism can make room for a distinction between higher and lower pleasures. Mills idea is that the higher pleasure is always the pleasure preferred by a well-informed majority. Sandel tests this theory by playing video clips from three very different forms of entertainment: Shakespeares Hamlet, the reality show Fear Factor, and The Simpsons. Students debate which experience provides the higher pleasure, and whether Mills defense of utilitarianism is successful.
- Video Language:
- English
- Team:
- PACE
- Duration:
- 55:10
khaled aljuhani edited English subtitles for Justice: What's The Right Thing To Do? Episode 02: "PUTTING A PRICE TAG ON LIFE" | ||
khaled aljuhani edited English subtitles for Justice: What's The Right Thing To Do? Episode 02: "PUTTING A PRICE TAG ON LIFE" | ||
khaled aljuhani edited English subtitles for Justice: What's The Right Thing To Do? Episode 02: "PUTTING A PRICE TAG ON LIFE" | ||
khaled aljuhani added a translation |