0:00:03.570,0:00:06.570
Funding for this program provided by

0:00:06.510,0:00:11.850
Additional funding provided by

0:00:32.850,0:00:35.290
last time we argued about

0:00:35.290,0:00:39.400
the case of the Queen verses Dudley and Stephens

0:00:39.400,0:00:45.970
the lifeboat case, the case of cannibalism[br]at sea

0:00:45.970,0:00:48.420
and with the arguments about

0:00:48.420,0:00:49.369
the lifeboat

0:00:49.369,0:00:53.750
in mind the arguments for and against [br]what Dudley and Stephens did in mind,

0:00:53.750,0:00:56.890
let's turn back to the

0:00:56.890,0:00:58.480
philosophy

0:00:58.480,0:01:02.059
the utilitarian philosophy of Jeremy Bentham

0:01:02.060,0:01:06.130
Bentham was born in England in 1748,[br]at the age of twelve

0:01:06.130,0:01:09.740
he went to Oxford, at fifteen he went to law[br]school

0:01:09.740,0:01:15.060
he was admitted to the bar at age nineteen [br]but he never practiced law,

0:01:15.060,0:01:17.470
instead he devoted his life

0:01:17.470,0:01:19.920
to jurisprudence and moral

0:01:19.920,0:01:22.170
philosophy.

0:01:22.170,0:01:27.690
last time we began to consider Bentham's version[br]of utilitarianism

0:01:27.690,0:01:28.810
the main idea

0:01:28.810,0:01:32.870
is simply stated and it's this,

0:01:32.870,0:01:35.750
the highest principle of morality

0:01:35.750,0:01:38.909
whether personal or political morality

0:01:38.909,0:01:40.260
is

0:01:40.260,0:01:42.520
to maximize

0:01:42.520,0:01:44.390
the general welfare

0:01:44.390,0:01:46.560
or the collective happiness

0:01:46.560,0:01:50.070
or the overall balance of pleasure over[br]pain

0:01:50.070,0:01:52.210
in a phrase

0:01:52.210,0:01:53.210
maximize

0:01:53.210,0:01:56.419
utility

0:01:56.420,0:02:00.750
Bentham arrives at this principle by the following[br]line of reasoning

0:02:00.750,0:02:03.150
we're all governed by pain and pleasure

0:02:03.150,0:02:09.009
they are our sovereign masters and so any[br]moral system has to take account of them.

0:02:09.008,0:02:10.999
How best to take account?

0:02:10.999,0:02:14.209
By maximizing

0:02:14.209,0:02:15.739
and this leads to the principle

0:02:15.739,0:02:19.449
of the greatest good for the greatest[br]number

0:02:19.449,0:02:23.029
what exactly should we maximize?

0:02:23.029,0:02:24.698
Bentham tells us

0:02:24.699,0:02:25.510
happiness

0:02:25.510,0:02:27.728
or more precisely

0:02:27.729,0:02:29.479
utility.

0:02:29.479,0:02:34.239
Maximizing utility is a principal not only[br]for individuals but also for communities and

0:02:34.239,0:02:36.569
for legislators

0:02:36.569,0:02:38.749
what after all is a community

0:02:38.749,0:02:41.359
Bentham asks,

0:02:41.359,0:02:45.309
it's the sum of the individuals who comprise it

0:02:45.309,0:02:46.780
and that's why

0:02:46.780,0:02:53.370
in deciding the best policy, in deciding what the[br]law should be, in deciding what's just,

0:02:53.370,0:02:59.029
citizens and legislators should ask themselves[br]the question if we add up,

0:02:59.029,0:03:03.870
all of the benefits of this policy

0:03:03.870,0:03:05.290
and subtract

0:03:05.290,0:03:08.828
all of the costs,

0:03:08.829,0:03:10.669
the right thing to do

0:03:10.669,0:03:11.779
is the one

0:03:11.779,0:03:13.439
that maximizes

0:03:13.439,0:03:14.698
the balance

0:03:14.699,0:03:16.020
of happiness

0:03:16.020,0:03:20.869
over suffering.

0:03:20.869,0:03:24.039
that's what it means to maximize utility

0:03:24.039,0:03:24.988
now, today

0:03:24.989,0:03:28.189
I want to see

0:03:28.189,0:03:31.150
whether you agree or disagree with it,

0:03:31.150,0:03:36.650
and it often goes, this utilitarian logic, under[br]the name of cost-benefit analysis

0:03:36.650,0:03:39.719
which is used by companies

0:03:39.719,0:03:41.219
and by

0:03:41.219,0:03:41.978
governments

0:03:41.979,0:03:43.729
all the time

0:03:43.729,0:03:45.239
and what it involves

0:03:45.239,0:03:50.789
is placing a value usually a dollar value[br]to stand for utility

0:03:50.789,0:03:53.289
on the costs and the benefits

0:03:53.289,0:03:56.539
of various proposals.

0:03:56.539,0:03:58.879
recently in the Czech Republic

0:03:58.879,0:04:03.370
there was a proposal to increases the excise[br]tax on smoking

0:04:03.370,0:04:05.089
Philip Morris,

0:04:05.089,0:04:08.219
the tobacco company,

0:04:08.219,0:04:09.779
does huge business

0:04:09.779,0:04:12.509
in the Czech Republic. They commissioned

0:04:12.509,0:04:15.429
a study of cost-benefit analysis

0:04:15.430,0:04:16.789
of smoking

0:04:16.789,0:04:18.678
in the Czech Republic

0:04:18.678,0:04:20.899
and what their cost benefit

0:04:20.899,0:04:22.830
analysis found

0:04:22.830,0:04:23.550
was

0:04:23.550,0:04:25.660
the government gains

0:04:25.660,0:04:27.349
by

0:04:27.349,0:04:30.779
having Czech citizens smoke.

0:04:30.779,0:04:32.360
Now, how do they gain?

0:04:32.360,0:04:36.189
It's true that there are negative effects

0:04:36.189,0:04:40.000
to the public finance of the Czech government

0:04:40.000,0:04:45.039
because there are increased health care costs[br]for people who develop smoking-related

0:04:45.039,0:04:47.239
diseases

0:04:47.239,0:04:50.369
on the other hand there were positive [br]effects

0:04:50.369,0:04:51.620
and those were

0:04:51.620,0:04:53.099
added up

0:04:53.099,0:04:55.378
on the other side of the ledger

0:04:55.379,0:05:01.960
the positive effects included, for the most[br]part, various tax revenues that the government

0:05:01.960,0:05:06.239
derives from the sale of cigarette products[br]but it also included health care savings to

0:05:06.240,0:05:09.530
the government when people die early

0:05:09.530,0:05:13.339
pensions savings, you don't have to pay pensions[br]for as long,

0:05:13.339,0:05:14.889
and also savings

0:05:14.889,0:05:19.679
in housing costs for the elderly

0:05:19.679,0:05:24.539
and when all of the costs and benefits were added[br]up

0:05:24.539,0:05:25.969
the Philip Morris

0:05:25.969,0:05:27.870
study found

0:05:27.870,0:05:32.610
that there is a net public finance gain[br]in the Czech Republic

0:05:32.610,0:05:36.449
of a hundred and forty seven million dollars

0:05:36.449,0:05:38.120
and given the savings

0:05:38.120,0:05:41.479
in housing and health care and pension costs

0:05:41.479,0:05:46.570
the government enjoys the saving of savings[br]of over twelve hundred dollars

0:05:46.570,0:05:52.569
for each person who dies prematurely due to[br]smoking.

0:05:52.569,0:05:56.740
cost-benefit analysis

0:05:56.740,0:06:01.729
now, those among you who are defenders utilitarianism [br]may think that this is a unfair

0:06:01.729,0:06:03.389
test

0:06:03.389,0:06:09.130
Philip Morris was pilloried in the press and[br]they issued an apology for this heartless

0:06:09.130,0:06:10.990
calculation

0:06:10.990,0:06:12.319
you may say

0:06:12.319,0:06:17.119
that what's missing here is something that[br]the utilitarian can be easily incorporate

0:06:17.119,0:06:19.339
mainly

0:06:19.339,0:06:23.430
the value to the person and to the families[br]of those who die

0:06:23.430,0:06:25.599
from lung cancer.

0:06:25.599,0:06:29.190
what about the value of life?

0:06:29.190,0:06:33.099
Some cost-benefit analyses incorporate

0:06:33.099,0:06:34.560
a measure

0:06:34.560,0:06:36.809
for the value of life.

0:06:36.809,0:06:41.330
One of the most famous of these involved the[br]Ford Pinto case

0:06:41.330,0:06:45.008
did any of you read about that? this was back[br]in the 1970's, you remember that

0:06:45.009,0:06:48.210
the Ford Pinto was, a kind of car?

0:06:48.210,0:06:51.029
anybody?

0:06:51.029,0:06:55.879
it was a small car, subcompact car,[br]very popular

0:06:55.879,0:06:58.059
but it had one

0:06:58.059,0:07:01.959
problem which is the fuel tank was at the[br]back of the car

0:07:01.959,0:07:07.960
and in rear collisions the fuel tank exploded

0:07:07.960,0:07:10.210
and some people were killed

0:07:10.210,0:07:14.349
and some severely injured.

0:07:14.349,0:07:18.998
victims of these injuries took Ford to court[br]to sue

0:07:18.999,0:07:21.669
and in the court case it turned out

0:07:21.669,0:07:24.030
that Ford had long

0:07:24.030,0:07:25.248
since known

0:07:25.249,0:07:27.719
about the vulnerable fuel tank

0:07:27.719,0:07:33.599
and had done a cost-benefit analysis to determine[br]whether it would be worth it

0:07:33.599,0:07:36.300
to put in a special shield

0:07:36.300,0:07:40.490
that would protect the fuel tank and prevent it[br]from exploding.

0:07:40.490,0:07:42.979
They did a cost benefit analysis

0:07:42.979,0:07:46.318
the cost per part

0:07:46.319,0:07:48.239
to increase the safety

0:07:48.239,0:07:50.299
of the Pinto,

0:07:50.299,0:07:55.688
they calculated at eleven dollars per part

0:07:55.689,0:07:57.189
and here's,

0:07:57.189,0:08:00.609
this was the cost benefit analysis that emerged

0:08:00.609,0:08:03.089
in the trial,

0:08:03.089,0:08:05.960
eleven dollars per part

0:08:05.960,0:08:09.998
at 12.5 million cars and trucks

0:08:09.999,0:08:13.559
came to a total cost of

0:08:13.370,0:08:17.370
137 million dollars to improve the safety

0:08:17.370,0:08:18.789
but then they calculated

0:08:18.789,0:08:20.139
the benefits

0:08:20.139,0:08:23.300
of spending all this money on a safer car

0:08:23.300,0:08:26.800
and they counted 180 deaths

0:08:26.800,0:08:28.749
and they assigned a dollar value

0:08:28.749,0:08:30.449
200 thousand dollars

0:08:30.449,0:08:32.490
per death

0:08:32.490,0:08:35.250
180 injuries

0:08:35.250,0:08:37.490
67 thousand

0:08:37.490,0:08:38.909
and then the cost to repair

0:08:38.909,0:08:43.289
the replacement cost for two thousand[br]vehicles that would be destroyed without the

0:08:43.289,0:08:45.030
safety device

0:08:45.030,0:08:48.060
700 dollars per vehicle,

0:08:48.060,0:08:50.390
so the benefits

0:08:50.390,0:08:53.930
turned out to be only 49.5 million,

0:08:53.930,0:08:55.270
and so they

0:08:55.270,0:08:56.329
didn't install

0:08:56.330,0:08:58.140
the device

0:08:58.140,0:08:59.840
needless to say

0:08:59.840,0:09:01.740
when this memo

0:09:01.160,0:09:09.160
of the Ford Motor Company's cost-benefit analysis came[br]out in the trial

0:09:09.160,0:09:11.250
it appalled the jurors

0:09:11.250,0:09:15.950
who awarded a huge settlement

0:09:15.950,0:09:21.810
is this a counter example to the utilitarian[br]idea of calculating

0:09:21.810,0:09:23.040
because Ford included a

0:09:23.040,0:09:27.319
measure of the value life.

0:09:27.320,0:09:30.770
Now who here wants to defend

0:09:30.770,0:09:33.240
cost-benefit analysis from

0:09:33.240,0:09:35.320
this apparent counter example

0:09:35.320,0:09:38.720
who has a defense?

0:09:38.720,0:09:41.590
or do you think it's completely destroys

0:09:41.590,0:09:47.410
the whole utilitarian calculus?

0:09:47.410,0:09:48.760
I think that

0:09:48.760,0:09:53.210
once again they've made the same mistake the previous case[br]did that they've assigned a dollar value

0:09:53.210,0:09:56.570
to human life and once again they failed to take into[br]account things like

0:09:56.570,0:10:00.580
suffering and emotional losses of families, I mean families[br]lost earnings

0:10:00.580,0:10:03.980
but they also lost a loved one and that

0:10:03.980,0:10:06.820
is more value than 200 thousand dollars.

0:10:06.820,0:10:09.170
Good, and wait wait wait, what's you're name?

0:10:09.170,0:10:10.479
Julie Roto.

0:10:10.480,0:10:14.400
so if two hundred thousand, Julie, is too

0:10:14.400,0:10:18.660
too low a figure because it doesn't include[br]the loss of a loved one,

0:10:18.660,0:10:21.660
and the loss of those years of life,

0:10:21.660,0:10:23.980
what would be, what do you think

0:10:23.980,0:10:27.290
would be a more accurate number?

0:10:27.290,0:10:32.430
I don't believe I could give a number I think[br]that this sort of analysis shouldn't be applied to

0:10:32.430,0:10:33.560
issues of human life.

0:10:33.560,0:10:36.199
I think it can't be used monetarily

0:10:36.200,0:10:39.270
so they didn't just put to low a number,

0:10:39.270,0:10:44.510
Julie says, they were wrong to try to[br]put any number at all.

0:10:44.510,0:10:49.540
all right let's hear someone who

0:10:49.540,0:10:51.860
you have to adjust for inflation

0:10:57.700,0:10:59.130
all right

0:10:59.130,0:11:00.050
fair enough

0:11:00.050,0:11:02.660
so what would the number of being now?

0:11:02.660,0:11:07.640
this is was thirty five years ago

0:11:07.640,0:11:10.330
two million dollars

0:11:10.330,0:11:12.030
you would put two million

0:11:12.030,0:11:14.079
and what's your name

0:11:14.080,0:11:15.410
Voicheck

0:11:15.410,0:11:17.329
Voicheck says we have to allow for inflation

0:11:17.330,0:11:19.640
we should be more generous

0:11:19.640,0:11:25.170
then would you be satisfied that this is the[br]right way of thinking about the question?

0:11:25.170,0:11:27.310
I guess unfortunately

0:11:27.310,0:11:29.589
it is for

0:11:29.590,0:11:32.980
there's needs to be of number put somewhere

0:11:32.980,0:11:37.330
I'm not sure what number would be but I do[br]agree that there could possibly

0:11:37.330,0:11:39.490
be a number put

0:11:39.490,0:11:41.060
on a human life.

0:11:41.060,0:11:42.439
all right so

0:11:42.440,0:11:44.420
Voicheck says

0:11:44.420,0:11:46.280
and here he disagrees with

0:11:46.280,0:11:46.649
Julie

0:11:46.649,0:11:49.750
Julie says we can't put a number of human[br]life

0:11:49.750,0:11:53.670
for the purpose of a cost-benefit analysis,[br]Voicheck says we have to

0:11:53.670,0:11:59.870
because we have to make decisions somehow

0:11:59.870,0:12:04.750
what do other people think about this?[br]Is there anyone prepared to defend cost-benefit

0:12:04.750,0:12:06.270
analysis here

0:12:06.270,0:12:09.810
as accurate, as desirable?

0:12:09.810,0:12:16.000
I think that if ford and other car companies didn't use[br]cost-benefit analysis they'd eventually go out

0:12:16.000,0:12:18.949
of business because they wouldn't be able[br]to be profitable

0:12:18.949,0:12:23.139
and millions of people wouldn't be able to use[br]their cars to get to jobs, to put food on the table

0:12:23.139,0:12:27.939
to feed their children so I think that if cost-benefit[br]analysis isn't employed

0:12:27.939,0:12:29.699
the greater good

0:12:29.700,0:12:31.870
is sacrificed

0:12:31.870,0:12:34.810
in this case. Alright let me ask, what's your name?

0:12:34.810,0:12:37.599
Raul. Raul.

0:12:37.600,0:12:41.760
there was recently a study done about cell[br]phone use by drivers, when people are driving

0:12:41.760,0:12:43.090
a car,

0:12:43.090,0:12:47.080
and there's a debate about whether that should be[br]banned

0:12:47.080,0:12:48.660
and

0:12:48.660,0:12:50.689
the figure was that some

0:12:50.690,0:12:54.990
two thousand people die

0:12:54.990,0:12:57.280
as a result of accidents

0:12:57.280,0:12:59.240
each year

0:12:59.240,0:13:02.120
using cell phones

0:13:02.120,0:13:07.860
and yet the cost benefit analysis which was done by[br]the center for risk analysis at Harvard

0:13:07.860,0:13:10.520
found that if you look at the benefits

0:13:10.520,0:13:13.560
of the cell phone use

0:13:13.560,0:13:15.089
and you put some

0:13:15.090,0:13:19.050
value on the life, it comes out about[br]the same

0:13:19.050,0:13:23.290
because of the enormous economic benefit[br]of enabling people to take advantage

0:13:23.290,0:13:27.370
of their time, not waste time, be able to make deals[br]and talk to friends and so on

0:13:27.370,0:13:30.370
while they're driving

0:13:30.370,0:13:32.060
doesn't that suggest that

0:13:32.060,0:13:35.619
it's a mistake to try to put monetary figures[br]on questions

0:13:35.620,0:13:37.590
of human life?

0:13:37.590,0:13:39.330
well I think that if

0:13:39.330,0:13:41.780
the great majority of people

0:13:41.780,0:13:47.569
tried to derive maximum utility out of a service[br]like using cell phones and the convenience that cell phones

0:13:47.570,0:13:47.989
provide

0:13:47.989,0:13:50.400
that sacrifice is necessary

0:13:50.400,0:13:52.160
for

0:13:52.160,0:13:53.230
satisfaction to occur.

0:13:53.230,0:13:59.200
You're an outright utilitarian. In, yes okay.

0:13:59.200,0:14:02.820
all right then, one last question Raul

0:14:02.820,0:14:05.810
and I put this to Voicheck,

0:14:05.810,0:14:07.829
what dollar figure should be put

0:14:07.829,0:14:12.870
on human life to decide whether to ban the[br]use of cell phones

0:14:12.870,0:14:14.640
well I don't want to

0:14:14.640,0:14:16.199
arbitrarily

0:14:16.200,0:14:18.140
calculate a figure, I mean right now

0:14:18.140,0:14:19.370
I think that

0:14:21.350,0:14:23.610
you want to take it under advisement.

0:14:23.610,0:14:24.790
yeah I'll take it under advisement.

0:14:24.790,0:14:28.689
but what roughly speaking would it be? you've[br]got 23 hundred deaths

0:14:28.690,0:14:32.400
you've got to assign a dollar value to know[br]whether you want to prevent those deaths by

0:14:32.400,0:14:37.069
banning the use of cell phones in cars

0:14:37.070,0:14:38.900
so what would you're hunch be?

0:14:38.900,0:14:40.350
how much?

0:14:40.350,0:14:40.799
million

0:14:40.799,0:14:42.280
two million

0:14:42.280,0:14:44.410
two million was Voitech's figure

0:14:44.410,0:14:46.120
is that about right? maybe a million.

0:14:46.120,0:14:50.500
a million.?!

0:14:50.500,0:14:55.110
Alright that's good, thank you

0:14:55.110,0:15:00.440
So these are some of the controversies that arise[br]these days from cost-benefit analysis especially

0:15:00.440,0:15:01.859
those that involve

0:15:01.859,0:15:06.770
placing a dollar value on everything to be[br]added up.

0:15:06.770,0:15:08.840
well now I want to turn

0:15:08.840,0:15:15.110
to your objections, to your objections not necessarily[br]to cost benefit analysis specifically,

0:15:15.110,0:15:18.400
because that's just one version of the

0:15:18.400,0:15:21.959
utilitarian logic in practice today,

0:15:21.960,0:15:26.830
but to the theory as a whole, to the idea

0:15:26.830,0:15:30.000
that the right thing to do,

0:15:30.000,0:15:33.710
the just basis for policy and law,

0:15:33.710,0:15:35.559
is to maximize

0:15:35.559,0:15:39.750
utility.

0:15:39.750,0:15:41.590
How many disagree

0:15:41.590,0:15:43.359
with the utilitarian

0:15:43.359,0:15:44.330
approach

0:15:44.330,0:15:46.390
to law

0:15:46.390,0:15:48.480
and to the common good?

0:15:48.480,0:15:52.230
How many bring with it?

0:15:52.230,0:15:55.200
so more agree than disagree.

0:15:55.200,0:15:59.560
so let's hear from the critics

0:15:59.560,0:16:02.209
my main issue with it is that I feel like

0:16:02.209,0:16:06.280
you can't say that just because someone's[br]in the minority

0:16:06.280,0:16:11.650
what they want and need is less valuable than[br]someone who's in the majority

0:16:11.650,0:16:14.189
so I guess I have an issue with the idea that

0:16:14.190,0:16:16.099
the greatest good for the greatest number

0:16:16.099,0:16:18.070
is okay because

0:16:18.070,0:16:21.040
there is still what about people who are in

0:16:21.040,0:16:24.719
the lesser number, like it's not fair to them[br]they didn't have a say in where they wanted

0:16:24.720,0:16:25.840
to be.

0:16:25.840,0:16:28.880
alright now that's an interesting objection, you're[br]worried about

0:16:28.880,0:16:32.460
the effect on minority. yes.

0:16:32.460,0:16:34.940
what's your name by the way. Anna.

0:16:34.940,0:16:39.819
alright who has an answer to Anna's worry about[br]the effect on the minority

0:16:39.819,0:16:41.689
What do you say to Anna?

0:16:41.690,0:16:42.540
she said that

0:16:42.540,0:16:47.490
the minorities value less, I don't think that's[br]the case because individually the minorities

0:16:47.490,0:16:51.339
value is just the same as the individual in the majority[br]it's just that

0:16:51.339,0:16:54.520
the numbers outweigh the

0:16:54.520,0:16:55.670
minority

0:16:55.670,0:16:58.919
and I mean at a certain point you have to make a[br]decision

0:16:58.919,0:17:01.510
and I'm sorry for the minority but

0:17:01.510,0:17:02.640
sometimes

0:17:02.640,0:17:03.670
it's for the general

0:17:03.670,0:17:08.839
for the greater good. For the greater good, Anna what do you[br]say? what's your name? Youngda.

0:17:08.839,0:17:10.839
What do you say to Youngda?

0:17:10.839,0:17:13.589
Youngda says you just have to add up people's[br]preferences

0:17:13.589,0:17:17.698
and those in the minority do have their preferences[br]weighed.

0:17:17.699,0:17:22.000
can you give an example of the kind of thing[br]you're worried about when you say you're worried

0:17:22.000,0:17:24.880
about utilitarianism violating

0:17:24.880,0:17:27.970
the concern or respect due the minority?

0:17:27.970,0:17:29.730
can you give an example.

0:17:29.730,0:17:35.179
so well with any of the cases that we've talked[br]about, like with the shipwreck one,

0:17:35.179,0:17:36.450
I think that

0:17:36.450,0:17:39.700
the boy who was eaten

0:17:39.700,0:17:39.980
still had

0:17:39.980,0:17:43.560
just as much of a right to live as the other people[br]and

0:17:43.560,0:17:44.710
just because

0:17:44.710,0:17:45.980
he was the

0:17:48.120,0:17:50.610
minority in that case the one who

0:17:50.610,0:17:53.459
maybe had less of a chance to keep living

0:17:53.460,0:17:54.870
that doesn't mean

0:17:54.870,0:17:58.449
that the others automatically have a right[br]to eat him

0:17:58.450,0:17:59.680
just because

0:17:59.680,0:18:01.849
it would give a greater amount of people

0:18:01.849,0:18:03.290
the chance to live.

0:18:03.290,0:18:05.740
so there may be a certain rights

0:18:05.740,0:18:07.850
that the minority

0:18:07.850,0:18:12.550
members have that the individual has that[br]shouldn't be traded off

0:18:12.550,0:18:14.399
for the sake of

0:18:14.400,0:18:16.520
utility?

0:18:16.520,0:18:18.210
yes Anna?

0:18:18.210,0:18:21.990
Now this would be a test for you,

0:18:21.990,0:18:24.550
back in ancient Rome

0:18:24.550,0:18:29.510
they threw Christians to the lions in the[br]coliseum for sport

0:18:29.510,0:18:33.890
if you think how the utilitarian calculus[br]would go

0:18:33.890,0:18:38.770
yes, the Christian thrown to the lion suffers enormous[br]excruciating pain,

0:18:38.770,0:18:45.770
but look at the collective ecstasy of the Romans.

0:18:48.460,0:18:50.580
Youngda. Well

0:18:50.580,0:18:51.889
in that time

0:18:51.890,0:18:53.250
I don't think

0:18:54.920,0:19:01.710
in the modern-day of time to value the, um, to given [br]a number to the happiness given to the people watching

0:19:01.710,0:19:02.900
I don't think

0:19:02.900,0:19:05.300
any

0:19:05.300,0:19:07.490
policy maker would say

0:19:07.490,0:19:11.390
the pain of one person, the suffering of one person is[br]much much,

0:19:11.390,0:19:14.680
in comparison to the happiness gained

0:19:14.680,0:19:20.460
no but you have to admit that if there were[br]enough Romans delirious with happiness,

0:19:20.460,0:19:25.220
it would outweigh even the most excruciating[br]pain of a handful of

0:19:25.220,0:19:28.600
Christians thrown to the lion.

0:19:28.600,0:19:33.570
so we really have here two different objections[br]to utilitarianism

0:19:33.570,0:19:35.030
one has to do

0:19:35.030,0:19:37.850
with whether utilitarianism

0:19:37.850,0:19:39.559
adequately respects

0:19:39.559,0:19:40.740
individual rights

0:19:40.740,0:19:42.500
or minority rights

0:19:42.500,0:19:45.150
and the other has to do

0:19:45.150,0:19:46.940
with the whole idea

0:19:46.940,0:19:48.980
of aggregating

0:19:48.980,0:19:49.900
utility

0:19:49.900,0:19:51.610
for preferences

0:19:51.610,0:19:53.070
or values

0:19:53.070,0:19:56.470
is it possible to aggregate all values

0:19:56.470,0:19:58.050
to translate them

0:19:58.050,0:20:00.360
into dollar terms?

0:20:00.360,0:20:02.479
there was

0:20:02.480,0:20:07.000
in the 1930's

0:20:07.000,0:20:09.190
a psychologist

0:20:09.190,0:20:10.840
who tried

0:20:10.840,0:20:12.370
to address

0:20:12.370,0:20:15.850
the second question. He tried to prove

0:20:15.850,0:20:18.530
what utilitarianism assumes,

0:20:18.530,0:20:22.040
that it is possible

0:20:22.040,0:20:23.230
to translate

0:20:23.230,0:20:27.309
all goods, all values, all human concerns

0:20:27.309,0:20:28.908
into a single uniform measure

0:20:28.909,0:20:30.230
and he did this

0:20:30.230,0:20:32.660
by conducting a survey

0:20:32.660,0:20:37.610
of the young recipients of relief, this was[br]in the 1930's

0:20:37.610,0:20:42.000
and he asked them, he gave them a list of[br]unpleasant experiences

0:20:42.000,0:20:45.360
and he asked them how much would you have to[br]be paid to undergo

0:20:45.360,0:20:49.899
the following experiences and he kept track

0:20:49.900,0:20:51.040
for example

0:20:51.040,0:20:57.240
how much would you have to be paid to have[br]one upper front tooth pulled out

0:20:57.240,0:21:04.240
or how much would you have to be paid to have one little[br]one tow cut off?

0:21:05.030,0:21:11.649
or eat a live earth worm, six inches long

0:21:11.650,0:21:18.650
or to live the rest of your life on a farm in[br]Kansas

0:21:19.430,0:21:24.480
or to choke a stray cat to death with your bare hands

0:21:24.480,0:21:26.140
now what do you suppose

0:21:26.140,0:21:32.900
what do you suppose was the most expensive[br]item on that list

0:21:32.900,0:21:39.750
Kansas?

0:21:39.750,0:21:44.840
You're right it was Kansas

0:21:44.840,0:21:46.059
for a Kansas

0:21:46.059,0:21:47.619
people said they'd have to pay them

0:21:47.619,0:21:51.980
they have to be paid three hundred[br]thousand dollars

0:21:57.340,0:21:59.800
what do you think

0:21:59.800,0:22:03.139
what do you think was the next most expensive?

0:22:03.140,0:22:06.010
not the cat

0:22:06.010,0:22:08.190
not the tooth

0:22:08.190,0:22:11.250
not the toe

0:22:11.250,0:22:16.580
the worm!

0:22:16.580,0:22:20.600
people said you'd have to pay them a hundred[br]thousand dollars

0:22:20.600,0:22:23.419
to eat the worm

0:22:23.420,0:22:28.010
what do you think was the least expensive[br]item?

0:22:28.010,0:22:30.010
not the cat

0:22:30.010,0:22:31.300
the tooth

0:22:31.300,0:22:34.990
during the depression people were willing[br]to have their tooth pulled

0:22:34.990,0:22:39.600
for only forty five hundred dollars

0:22:39.600,0:22:40.669
now

0:22:42.020,0:22:45.010
here's what Thorndike

0:22:45.010,0:22:48.460
concluded from his study

0:22:48.460,0:22:51.650
any want or satisfaction which exists, exists

0:22:51.650,0:22:54.600
in some amount and is therefore measurable

0:22:54.600,0:22:55.949
the life of a dog

0:22:55.950,0:22:57.010
or a cat

0:22:57.010,0:22:59.430
or a chicken consists

0:22:59.430,0:23:00.979
of appetites

0:23:00.979,0:23:01.880
cravings

0:23:01.880,0:23:04.290
desires and their gratifications

0:23:04.290,0:23:05.750
so does the life

0:23:05.750,0:23:06.940
of human beings

0:23:06.940,0:23:09.409
though the appetites and desires

0:23:09.409,0:23:12.450
are more complicated

0:23:12.450,0:23:14.330
but what about

0:23:14.330,0:23:15.990
Thorndike's study?

0:23:15.990,0:23:17.870
does it support

0:23:17.870,0:23:20.209
Bentham's idea

0:23:20.210,0:23:22.130
that all

0:23:22.130,0:23:28.390
goods all values can be captured according[br]to a single uniform measure of value

0:23:28.390,0:23:34.289
or does the preposterous character of those[br]different items on the list

0:23:34.289,0:23:37.220
suggest the opposite conclusion

0:23:37.220,0:23:40.290
that may be whether we're talking about life

0:23:40.290,0:23:42.120
or Kansas

0:23:42.120,0:23:44.179
or the worm

0:23:44.180,0:23:45.440
maybe

0:23:45.440,0:23:47.810
the things we value

0:23:47.810,0:23:49.399
and cherish

0:23:49.400,0:23:51.350
can't be captured

0:23:51.350,0:23:54.280
according to a single uniform measure of value

0:23:54.280,0:23:56.129
and if they can't

0:23:56.130,0:23:57.910
what are the consequences

0:23:57.910,0:24:00.740
for the utilitarian theory

0:24:00.740,0:24:02.180
of morality

0:24:02.180,0:24:09.180
that's a question we'll continue with next[br]time

0:24:13.179,0:24:15.530
alright now let's take the other

0:24:15.530,0:24:17.680
part of the poll

0:24:17.680,0:24:19.309
which is the

0:24:19.309,0:24:21.470
the highest

0:24:21.470,0:24:23.410
experience or pleasure?

0:24:23.410,0:24:25.659
how many say

0:24:25.659,0:24:31.720
Shakespeare

0:24:31.720,0:24:38.120
how many say fear Factor

0:24:38.120,0:24:39.760
no you can't be serious

0:24:39.760,0:24:46.160
really?

0:24:46.160,0:24:48.530
last time

0:24:48.530,0:24:53.510
last time we began to consider some objections

0:24:53.510,0:24:56.570
to Jeremy Bentham's version

0:24:56.570,0:25:01.790
of utilitarianism

0:25:01.790,0:25:04.950
people raised two objections in the discussion

0:25:04.950,0:25:08.380
we had

0:25:08.380,0:25:10.600
the first

0:25:10.600,0:25:12.709
was the objection, the claim

0:25:12.710,0:25:14.760
that utilitarianism,

0:25:14.760,0:25:16.970
by concerning itself

0:25:16.970,0:25:20.110
with the greatest good for the greatest number

0:25:20.110,0:25:23.120
fails adequately to respect

0:25:23.120,0:25:25.479
individual rights.

0:25:25.480,0:25:28.880
today we have debates

0:25:28.880,0:25:29.990
about torture

0:25:29.990,0:25:33.610
and terrorism

0:25:33.610,0:25:35.139
suppose

0:25:35.140,0:25:41.350
a suspected terrorists was apprehended[br]on September tenth

0:25:41.350,0:25:44.189
and you had reason to believe

0:25:44.190,0:25:46.490
that the suspect

0:25:46.490,0:25:51.230
had crucial information about an impending[br]terrorist attack that would kill over three thousand

0:25:51.230,0:25:52.200
people

0:25:52.200,0:25:55.690
and you couldn't extract the information

0:25:55.690,0:25:57.670
would it be just

0:25:57.670,0:25:59.440
to torture

0:25:59.440,0:26:01.070
the suspect

0:26:01.070,0:26:03.060
to get the information

0:26:03.060,0:26:05.550
or

0:26:05.550,0:26:07.770
do you say no

0:26:07.770,0:26:14.550
there is a categorical moral duty of [br]respect for individual rights

0:26:14.550,0:26:17.899
in a way we're back to the questions we started[br]with t

0:26:17.900,0:26:23.910
about trolley cars and organ transplants so that's[br]the first issue

0:26:23.910,0:26:29.250
and you remember we considered some examples of[br]cost-benefit analysis

0:26:29.250,0:26:33.870
but a lot of people were unhappy with cost-benefit[br]analysis

0:26:33.870,0:26:39.969
when it came to placing a dollar value on[br]human life

0:26:39.970,0:26:42.290
and so that led us to the

0:26:42.290,0:26:44.500
second objection,

0:26:44.500,0:26:48.810
it questioned whether it's possible to translate[br]all values

0:26:48.810,0:26:52.879
into a single uniform measure of value

0:26:52.880,0:26:57.580
it asks in other words whether all values[br]are commensurable

0:26:57.580,0:27:00.080
let me give you one other

0:27:00.080,0:27:01.299
example

0:27:01.299,0:27:07.240
of an experience, this actually is a true[br]story, it comes from personal experience

0:27:07.240,0:27:12.900
that raises a question at least about whether[br]all values can be translated without

0:27:12.900,0:27:14.060
loss

0:27:14.060,0:27:20.158
into utilitarian terms

0:27:20.159,0:27:22.390
some years ago

0:27:22.390,0:27:28.080
when I was a graduate student I was at Oxford[br]in England and they had menâs and women's

0:27:28.080,0:27:29.800
colleges they weren't yet mixed

0:27:29.800,0:27:31.428
and the women's colleges had rules

0:27:31.429,0:27:33.590
against

0:27:33.590,0:27:37.470
overnight male guests

0:27:37.470,0:27:40.080
by the nineteen seventies these

0:27:40.080,0:27:44.030
rules were rarely enforced and easily violated,

0:27:44.030,0:27:51.030
or so I was told,

0:27:51.600,0:27:56.549
by the late nineteen seventies when I was there,[br]pressure grew to relax these rules and it became

0:27:56.549,0:28:01.100
the subject of debate among the faculty at St. Anne's College

0:28:01.100,0:28:03.840
which was one of these all women colleges

0:28:03.840,0:28:06.629
the older women on the faculty

0:28:06.630,0:28:10.720
we're traditionalists they were opposed to[br]change

0:28:10.720,0:28:12.820
on conventional moral grounds

0:28:12.820,0:28:14.320
but times had changed

0:28:14.320,0:28:17.110
and they were embarrassed

0:28:17.110,0:28:20.000
to give the true grounds of their objection

0:28:20.000,0:28:22.809
and so the translated their arguments

0:28:22.809,0:28:26.120
into utilitarian terms

0:28:26.120,0:28:27.419
if men stay overnight,

0:28:27.420,0:28:31.680
they argued, the costs to the college will increase.

0:28:31.680,0:28:33.490
how you might wonder

0:28:33.490,0:28:39.429
well they'll want to take baths, and that[br]will use up hot water they said

0:28:39.429,0:28:40.779
furthermore they argued

0:28:40.779,0:28:46.780
we'll have to replace the mattresses more often

0:28:46.780,0:28:48.379
the reformers

0:28:48.380,0:28:52.250
met these arguments by adopting the following[br]compromise

0:28:52.250,0:28:53.280
each woman

0:28:53.280,0:29:00.280
could have a maximum of three overnight male[br]guest each week

0:29:01.160,0:29:05.940
they didn't say whether it had to be the same[br]one, or three different

0:29:05.940,0:29:06.800
provided

0:29:06.800,0:29:09.240
and this is the compromise provided

0:29:09.240,0:29:10.400
the guest

0:29:10.400,0:29:15.340
paid fifty pence to defray the cost to the college

0:29:15.340,0:29:17.179
the next day

0:29:17.180,0:29:23.080
the national headline in the national newspaper[br]read St. Anne's girls, fifty pence a night

0:29:29.500,0:29:31.040
another

0:29:31.040,0:29:31.730
illustration

0:29:31.730,0:29:34.730
of the difficulty of translating

0:29:34.730,0:29:36.150
all values

0:29:36.150,0:29:38.930
in this case a certain idea of virtue

0:29:38.930,0:29:44.200
into utilitarian terms

0:29:44.200,0:29:46.980
so that's all to illustrate

0:29:46.980,0:29:48.830
the second objection

0:29:48.830,0:29:52.679
to utilitarianism, at least the[br]part of that objection

0:29:52.680,0:29:54.780
that questions rather

0:29:54.780,0:29:56.620
the utilitarianism

0:29:56.620,0:29:58.809
is right to assume

0:29:58.809,0:30:00.670
that we can

0:30:00.670,0:30:02.420
assume the uniformity of

0:30:02.420,0:30:08.230
value, the commensurability of values[br]and translate all moral considerations

0:30:08.230,0:30:09.740
into

0:30:09.740,0:30:10.280
dollars

0:30:10.280,0:30:12.220
or money.

0:30:12.220,0:30:14.510
But there is a second

0:30:14.510,0:30:19.690
aspect to this worry about aggregating values[br]and preferences

0:30:19.690,0:30:21.990
why should we

0:30:21.990,0:30:23.120
weigh

0:30:23.120,0:30:25.260
all preferences

0:30:25.260,0:30:27.390
that people have

0:30:27.390,0:30:32.650
without assessing whether they're good preferences[br]or bad preferences

0:30:32.650,0:30:35.120
shouldn't we distinguish

0:30:35.120,0:30:36.010
between

0:30:36.010,0:30:37.590
higher

0:30:37.590,0:30:38.260
pleasures

0:30:38.260,0:30:41.760
and lower pleasures.

0:30:41.760,0:30:44.250
Now, part of the appeal of

0:30:44.250,0:30:49.380
not making any qualitative distinctions about[br]the worth of people's preferences, part of the

0:30:49.380,0:30:50.820
appeal

0:30:50.820,0:30:55.250
is that it is non-judgmental and egalitarian

0:30:55.250,0:30:58.110
the Benthamite utilitarian says

0:30:58.110,0:31:01.199
everybody's preferences count

0:31:01.200,0:31:04.890
and they count regardless of what people want

0:31:04.890,0:31:08.580
regardless of what makes it different people

0:31:08.580,0:31:09.530
happy. For Bentham,

0:31:09.530,0:31:11.250
all that matters

0:31:11.250,0:31:12.960
you'll remember

0:31:12.960,0:31:16.010
are the intensity and the duration

0:31:16.010,0:31:18.270
of a pleasure or pain

0:31:18.270,0:31:24.040
the so-called higher pleasures or nobler[br]virtues are simply those, according to Bentham

0:31:24.040,0:31:25.420
that produce

0:31:25.420,0:31:26.419
stronger,

0:31:26.419,0:31:29.380
longer, pleasure

0:31:29.380,0:31:32.790
yet a famous phrase to express this idea

0:31:32.790,0:31:35.770
the quantity of pleasure being equal

0:31:35.770,0:31:37.059
pushpin

0:31:37.059,0:31:39.519
is as good as poetry.

0:31:39.519,0:31:41.789
What was pushpin?

0:31:41.789,0:31:46.929
It was some kind of a child's game like to tidily winks[br]pushpin is as good as poetry

0:31:46.929,0:31:48.850
Bentham said

0:31:48.850,0:31:50.509
and lying behind this idea

0:31:50.509,0:31:51.510
I think

0:31:51.510,0:31:52.779
is the claim

0:31:52.779,0:31:54.090
the intuition

0:31:54.090,0:31:55.870
that it's a presumption

0:31:55.870,0:31:57.949
to judge

0:31:57.950,0:31:58.979
whose pleasures

0:31:58.979,0:32:00.670
are intrinsically higher

0:32:00.670,0:32:03.850
or worthier or better

0:32:03.850,0:32:07.010
and there is something attractive in this

0:32:07.010,0:32:09.770
refusal to judge, after all some people like

0:32:09.770,0:32:11.790
Mozart, others

0:32:11.790,0:32:12.520
Madonna

0:32:12.520,0:32:15.090
some people like ballet

0:32:15.090,0:32:16.389
others

0:32:16.390,0:32:17.360
bowling,

0:32:17.360,0:32:19.439
who's to say

0:32:19.440,0:32:23.140
a Benthamite might argue, who's to say which [br]of these pleasures

0:32:23.140,0:32:24.260
whose pleasures

0:32:24.260,0:32:25.460
are higher

0:32:25.460,0:32:26.350
worthier

0:32:26.350,0:32:27.500
nobler

0:32:27.500,0:32:31.570
than others?

0:32:31.570,0:32:35.980
But, is that right?

0:32:35.980,0:32:40.310
this refusal to make qualitative distinctions

0:32:40.310,0:32:42.179
can we

0:32:42.180,0:32:45.170
altogether dispense with the idea

0:32:45.170,0:32:49.010
that certain things we take pleasure in are

0:32:49.010,0:32:50.660
better or worthier

0:32:50.660,0:32:53.890
than others

0:32:53.890,0:32:58.640
think back to the case of the Romans in the coliseum,[br]one thing that troubled people about that

0:32:58.640,0:32:58.960
practice

0:32:58.960,0:33:01.170
is that it seemed to violate the rights

0:33:01.170,0:33:04.490
of the Christian

0:33:04.490,0:33:07.250
another way of objecting to what's going[br]on there

0:33:07.250,0:33:10.720
is that the pleasure that the Romans[br]take

0:33:10.720,0:33:13.480
in this bloody spectacle

0:33:13.480,0:33:15.850
should that pleasure

0:33:15.850,0:33:16.500
which is a base,

0:33:16.500,0:33:19.130
kind of corrupt

0:33:19.130,0:33:22.730
degrading pleasure, should that even

0:33:22.730,0:33:26.960
be valorized or weighed in deciding what[br]the

0:33:26.960,0:33:33.770
the general welfare is?

0:33:33.770,0:33:38.760
so here are the objections to Bentham's[br]utilitarianism

0:33:38.760,0:33:42.800
and now we turn to someone who tried to

0:33:42.800,0:33:45.889
respond to those objections,

0:33:45.890,0:33:47.820
a later day utilitarian

0:33:47.820,0:33:50.120
John Stuart Mill

0:33:50.120,0:33:52.780
so what we need to

0:33:52.780,0:33:54.510
examine now

0:33:54.510,0:33:58.809
is whether John Stuart Mill had a convincing[br]reply

0:33:58.809,0:34:05.090
to these objections to utilitarianism.

0:34:05.090,0:34:06.750
John Stuart Mill

0:34:06.750,0:34:08.760
was born in 1806

0:34:08.760,0:34:11.369
his father James Mill

0:34:11.369,0:34:14.079
was a disciple of Benthamâs

0:34:14.079,0:34:17.389
and James Mills set about giving his son

0:34:17.389,0:34:20.329
John Stuart Mill a model education

0:34:20.329,0:34:22.429
he was a child prodigy

0:34:22.429,0:34:23.569
John Stuart Mill

0:34:23.569,0:34:27.859
the knew Latin, sorry, Greek at the age of three, [br]Latin at eight

0:34:27.859,0:34:29.139
and at age ten

0:34:29.139,0:34:33.659
he wrote a history of Roman law.

0:34:33.659,0:34:35.649
At age twenty

0:34:35.649,0:34:39.129
he had a nervous breakdown

0:34:39.129,0:34:43.549
this left him in a depression for five years

0:34:43.549,0:34:46.800
but at age twenty five what helped lift him[br]out of this depression

0:34:46.800,0:34:49.949
is that he met Harriet Taylor

0:34:49.949,0:34:52.659
she in no doubt married him, they lived happily ever after

0:34:52.659,0:34:54.849
and it was under her

0:34:54.849,0:34:56.659
influence

0:34:56.659,0:34:59.859
the John Stuart Mill try to humanize

0:34:59.859,0:35:01.720
utilitarianism

0:35:01.720,0:35:05.279
what Mill tried to do was to see

0:35:05.279,0:35:07.710
whether the utilitarian calculus could be

0:35:07.710,0:35:09.029
enlarged

0:35:09.029,0:35:11.200
and modified

0:35:11.200,0:35:13.759
to accommodate

0:35:13.759,0:35:17.429
humanitarian concerns

0:35:17.429,0:35:20.390
like the concern to respect individual rights

0:35:20.390,0:35:24.598
and also to address the distinction between[br]higher and lower

0:35:24.599,0:35:26.439
pleasures.

0:35:26.439,0:35:30.368
In 1859 Mill wrote a famous book[br]on liberty

0:35:30.369,0:35:35.399
the main point of which was the importance[br]of defending individual rights and minority

0:35:35.399,0:35:36.380
rights

0:35:36.380,0:35:38.329
and in 1861

0:35:38.329,0:35:40.339
toward the end of his life

0:35:40.339,0:35:43.130
he wrote the book we read is part of this course

0:35:43.130,0:35:45.099
Utilitarianism.

0:35:45.099,0:35:46.599
It makes it clear

0:35:46.599,0:35:49.739
that utility is the only standard of morality

0:35:49.739,0:35:50.769
in his view

0:35:50.769,0:35:52.549
so he's not challenging

0:35:52.550,0:35:53.949
Bentham's premise,

0:35:53.949,0:35:55.279
he's affirming it.

0:35:55.279,0:35:58.829
he says very explicitly the sole evidence,

0:35:58.829,0:36:04.659
it is possible to produce that anything is[br]desirable is that people actually do

0:36:04.659,0:36:05.929
desire it.

0:36:05.929,0:36:11.679
so he stays with the idea that our de facto[br]actual empirical desires are the only

0:36:11.679,0:36:12.979
basis

0:36:12.979,0:36:15.618
for moral judgment.

0:36:15.619,0:36:17.549
but then

0:36:17.549,0:36:18.979
page eight

0:36:18.979,0:36:24.879
also in chapter two, he argues that it is possible[br]for a utilitarian to distinguish

0:36:24.879,0:36:26.319
higher from lower

0:36:26.320,0:36:28.970
pleasures.

0:36:28.970,0:36:30.519
now, those of you who've read

0:36:30.519,0:36:32.078
Mill already

0:36:32.079,0:36:33.329
how

0:36:33.329,0:36:36.559
according to him is it possible to draw that[br]distinction?

0:36:36.559,0:36:40.079
How can a utilitarian

0:36:40.079,0:36:42.819
distinguish qualitatively higher pleasures

0:36:42.819,0:36:43.540
from

0:36:43.540,0:36:48.859
lesser ones, base ones, unworthy ones?

0:36:48.859,0:36:50.519
If you tried both of them

0:36:50.519,0:36:55.308
and you'll prefer the higher one naturally[br]always

0:36:55.309,0:36:59.819
that's great, that's right. What's your name? John.

0:36:59.819,0:37:01.759
so as John points out

0:37:01.759,0:37:05.019
Mill says here's the test,

0:37:05.019,0:37:07.868
since we can't step outside

0:37:07.869,0:37:10.490
actual desires, actual preferences

0:37:10.490,0:37:11.649
that would

0:37:11.650,0:37:13.670
violate utilitarian premises,

0:37:13.670,0:37:16.819
the only test

0:37:16.819,0:37:17.600
of whether

0:37:17.600,0:37:19.769
a pleasure is higher

0:37:19.769,0:37:26.468
or lower is whether someone who has experienced[br]both

0:37:26.469,0:37:28.109
would prefer it.

0:37:28.109,0:37:29.369
And here,

0:37:29.369,0:37:31.259
in chapter two

0:37:31.259,0:37:32.900
we see the passage

0:37:32.900,0:37:37.199
where Mill makes the point that John just described

0:37:37.199,0:37:42.680
of two pleasures, if there be one to which all[br]are almost all who have experience

0:37:42.680,0:37:46.219
of both give a decided preference,

0:37:46.219,0:37:51.859
irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to[br]prefer it, in other words no outside, no independent

0:37:51.859,0:37:53.390
standard,

0:37:53.390,0:37:57.529
then that is the more desirable pleasure.

0:37:57.529,0:37:59.829
what do people think about that argument.

0:37:59.829,0:38:01.549
does that

0:38:01.549,0:38:03.489
does it succeeded?

0:38:03.489,0:38:06.380
how many think that it does succeed?

0:38:06.380,0:38:11.489
of arguing within utilitarian terms for a[br]distinction between higher and lower pleasures.

0:38:11.489,0:38:12.390
how many

0:38:12.390,0:38:17.788
think it doesn't succeed?

0:38:17.789,0:38:20.829
I want to hear your reasons.

0:38:20.829,0:38:22.249
but before

0:38:22.249,0:38:23.848
we give the reasons

0:38:23.849,0:38:26.329
let's do an experiment

0:38:26.329,0:38:28.719
of Mills'

0:38:28.719,0:38:31.569
claim.

0:38:31.569,0:38:35.199
In order to do this experiment

0:38:35.199,0:38:39.859
we're going to look that three

0:38:39.859,0:38:41.558
short excerpts

0:38:41.559,0:38:44.889
of popular entertainment

0:38:44.889,0:38:48.170
the first one is a Hamlet soliloquy

0:38:48.170,0:38:52.939
it'll be followed by two other

0:38:52.939,0:38:55.420
experiences

0:38:55.420,0:38:58.259
see what you think.

0:38:58.259,0:39:02.249
'what a piece of work is a man

0:39:02.249,0:39:05.509
how noble in reason

0:39:05.509,0:39:07.579
how infinite in faculties

0:39:07.579,0:39:11.439
in form and moving, how express and admirable

0:39:11.439,0:39:14.949
in action how like an angel. In apprehension, how like a god

0:39:14.949,0:39:16.430
the beauty of the world

0:39:16.430,0:39:18.348
the paragon of animals

0:39:18.349,0:39:21.259
and yet, to me

0:39:21.259,0:39:24.689
what is this quintessence of dust?

0:39:24.689,0:39:31.689
man delights not me.

0:39:43.309,0:39:47.749
Imagine a world where your greatest fears become reality

0:39:47.749,0:39:52.609
each show, six contestants from around the country battle[br]each other in three

0:39:52.609,0:39:59.609
extreme stunts. these stunts are designed to challenge [br]these contestants both physically and mentally

0:40:00.419,0:40:02.288
six contestants, three stunts, one winner.

0:40:02.289,0:40:09.289
Fear factor.

0:40:16.449,0:40:22.919
The Simpsons. Well hi diddly-o peddle to the metal o-philes! [br]Flanders- since when do you like anything cool.

0:40:22.919,0:40:25.240
well, I don't care for the speed, but I can't get enough of that [br]safety gear

0:40:25.240,0:40:28.729
helmets, roll bars, caution flags. I like the fresh[br]air

0:40:28.729,0:40:35.499
and looking at the poor people in the infield.

0:40:35.499,0:40:41.319
Dang Cletus, why you got to park by my parents.

0:40:41.320,0:40:43.029
Now hunny, it's my parents too.

0:40:55.759,0:41:00.629
I don't even have to ask which one you like[br]most

0:41:00.629,0:41:05.109
the Simpsons? How many like the Simpson's most?

0:41:05.109,0:41:10.140
How many Shakespeare?

0:41:10.140,0:41:12.710
What about fear factor?

0:41:12.710,0:41:15.959
how many preferred fear factor?

0:41:15.959,0:41:22.368
really?

0:41:22.369,0:41:24.079
people overwhelmingly

0:41:24.079,0:41:25.769
like the Simpsons

0:41:25.769,0:41:29.229
better

0:41:29.229,0:41:31.598
than Shakespeare. alright, now let's take the other

0:41:31.599,0:41:33.749
part of the poll

0:41:33.749,0:41:35.799
which is the

0:41:35.799,0:41:37.529
highest

0:41:37.529,0:41:39.409
experience or pleasure?

0:41:39.409,0:41:41.729
how many say

0:41:41.729,0:41:47.788
Shakespeare?

0:41:47.789,0:41:49.960
how many say

0:41:49.960,0:41:54.189
fear factor?

0:41:54.189,0:41:59.069
no you can't be serious

0:41:59.069,0:42:01.038
really?

0:42:01.039,0:42:02.709
alright go ahead you can say it.

0:42:02.709,0:42:03.439
I found that one

0:42:03.439,0:42:04.709
the most entertaining

0:42:04.709,0:42:09.428
I know but which do you think was the worthiest, [br]the noblest experience, I know you find it

0:42:09.429,0:42:10.920
the most anything

0:42:10.920,0:42:15.920
if something is good just because it is pleasurable[br]what is the matter if you have some kind of

0:42:15.920,0:42:17.209
abstract

0:42:17.209,0:42:21.729
idea of whether it is good by someone else's[br]sense or not.

0:42:21.729,0:42:25.038
Alright so you come down on the straight Benthamite's side

0:42:25.039,0:42:26.429
whose to judge

0:42:26.429,0:42:29.279
and why should we judge

0:42:29.279,0:42:33.880
apart from just registering and aggregating[br]de facto preferences, alright fair enough.

0:42:33.880,0:42:35.349
what's your name?

0:42:35.349,0:42:37.329
Nate? okay fair enough

0:42:37.329,0:42:38.219
Alright so

0:42:38.219,0:42:40.919
how many think that the Simpson's is actually

0:42:40.919,0:42:46.259
apart from liking is actually the higher experience

0:42:46.259,0:42:47.420
higher than Shakespeare.

0:42:47.420,0:42:49.309
Alright let's see the vote for Shakespeare again

0:42:49.309,0:42:52.869
how many think Shakespeare is higher?

0:42:52.869,0:42:53.869
alright so

0:42:53.869,0:42:55.540
why is it

0:42:55.540,0:42:58.999
ideally I'd like to hear from someone is there[br]someone

0:42:58.999,0:43:02.109
think Shakespeare is highest

0:43:02.109,0:43:02.989
but who preferred

0:43:02.989,0:43:04.060
watching

0:43:04.060,0:43:08.739
the Simpsons

0:43:08.739,0:43:14.160
Like I guess just sitting and watching the Simpsons, it's entertaining[br]because the make jokes, they make us laugh but

0:43:14.160,0:43:17.839
someone has to tell us that Shakespeare was this great writer[br]we had to be taught how to read him, how to

0:43:17.839,0:43:20.630
understand him, we had to be taught how to

0:43:20.630,0:43:23.150
take in Rembrandt, how to analyze a painting.

0:43:23.150,0:43:25.859
well how do, what's your name? Aneesha.

0:43:25.859,0:43:27.840
Aneesha, when you say someone

0:43:27.840,0:43:31.259
told you that Shakespeare's better

0:43:31.259,0:43:37.299
are you accepting it on blind faith you voted that[br]Shakespeare's higher only because the culture

0:43:37.299,0:43:41.529
tells you that our teachers tell you that[br]or do you

0:43:41.529,0:43:44.049
actually agree with that yourself

0:43:44.049,0:43:48.319
well in the sense that Shakespeare, no, but earlier you made

0:43:48.319,0:43:49.740
an example of Rembrandt

0:43:49.740,0:43:54.479
I feel like I would enjoy a reading a comic book[br]more than I would enjoy a kind of analyzing

0:43:54.479,0:43:58.348
Rembrandt because someone told me it was[br]great, you know. Right so of some this seems

0:43:58.349,0:44:01.699
to be, you're suggesting a kind of

0:44:01.699,0:44:05.319
cultural convention and pressure. We're told

0:44:05.319,0:44:12.319
what books, what works of art are great. who else?

0:44:15.309,0:44:19.640
although I enjoyed watching the Simpsons more[br]in this particular moment in Justice,

0:44:19.640,0:44:23.049
if I were to spend the rest of my life[br]considering

0:44:23.049,0:44:25.369
the three different

0:44:25.369,0:44:26.869
video clips shown

0:44:26.869,0:44:29.119
I would not want to spend

0:44:29.119,0:44:31.869
that remainder of my life considering

0:44:31.869,0:44:33.800
the latter two clips.

0:44:33.800,0:44:36.650
I think I would derive more pleasure

0:44:36.650,0:44:38.309
from being able to

0:44:38.309,0:44:39.269
branch out in my own mind

0:44:39.269,0:44:40.488
sort of

0:44:40.489,0:44:44.869
considering more deep pleasures, more[br]deep thoughts.

0:44:44.869,0:44:48.630
and tell me your name

0:44:48.630,0:44:49.630
Joe.

0:44:49.630,0:44:52.559
Joe, so if you had to spend the rest of your life[br]on

0:44:52.559,0:44:55.409
on a farm in Kansas with only

0:44:55.409,0:44:57.489
with only Shakespeare

0:44:57.489,0:45:02.079
or the collected episodes of the Simpsons

0:45:02.079,0:45:04.119
you would prefer

0:45:04.119,0:45:06.599
Shakespeare

0:45:06.599,0:45:09.849
what do you conclude from that

0:45:09.849,0:45:12.149
about John Stuart Mill's test

0:45:12.149,0:45:15.078
but the test of a higher pleasure

0:45:15.079,0:45:16.359
is whether

0:45:16.359,0:45:18.369
people who have experienced

0:45:18.369,0:45:21.509
both prefer it.

0:45:21.509,0:45:23.880
can I cite another example briefly?

0:45:23.880,0:45:25.130
in biology

0:45:25.130,0:45:28.769
in neuro biology last year we were told of a rat who was[br]tested

0:45:28.769,0:45:31.209
a particular center in the brain

0:45:31.209,0:45:35.879
where the rat was able to stimulate its[br]brain and cause itself intense pleasure repeatedly

0:45:35.879,0:45:38.368
the rat did not eat or drink until it died

0:45:38.369,0:45:42.179
so the rat was clearly experiencing intense[br]pleasure

0:45:42.179,0:45:46.269
now if you asked me right now if I'd rather[br]experience intense pleasure

0:45:46.269,0:45:47.140
or have

0:45:47.140,0:45:52.690
a full lifetime of higher pleasure, I would consider[br]intense pleasure to be lower pleasure, right

0:45:52.690,0:45:55.799
now enjoy intense pleasure

0:45:55.799,0:46:01.969
yes I would

0:46:01.969,0:46:03.159
but over a lifetime I think

0:46:03.159,0:46:04.360
I would think

0:46:04.360,0:46:06.899
almost a complete majority here would agree

0:46:06.899,0:46:11.630
that they would rather be a human[br]with higher pleasure that rat

0:46:11.630,0:46:13.269
with intense pleasure

0:46:13.269,0:46:14.930
for a momentary period of time

0:46:14.930,0:46:15.870
so now

0:46:15.870,0:46:18.959
in answer to your question, right, I think

0:46:18.959,0:46:21.348
this proves that, or I won't say proves

0:46:21.349,0:46:24.999
I think the conclusion

0:46:24.999,0:46:28.649
is that Mill's theory that when a majority people are[br]asked

0:46:28.650,0:46:31.439
what they would rather do,

0:46:31.439,0:46:33.118
they will answer

0:46:33.119,0:46:34.689
that they would rather

0:46:34.689,0:46:39.499
engage in a higher pleasure. So you think that this[br]supports Mills, that Mills was on to something here

0:46:39.499,0:46:40.738
I do.

0:46:40.739,0:46:42.629
all right is there anyone

0:46:42.629,0:46:46.839
who disagrees with Joe who thinks that[br]our experiment

0:46:46.839,0:46:48.578
disproves

0:46:48.579,0:46:49.959
Mills'

0:46:49.959,0:46:51.098
test

0:46:51.099,0:46:53.239
shows that that's not an adequate way

0:46:53.239,0:46:57.689
that you can't distinguish higher pleasures within[br]the utilitarian

0:46:57.689,0:47:02.649
framework.

0:47:05.879,0:47:09.509
If whatever is good is truly just whatever[br]people prefer it's truly relative and there's

0:47:09.509,0:47:11.519
no objective definition then

0:47:11.519,0:47:14.888
there will be some society where people prefer[br]Simpsons

0:47:14.889,0:47:15.849
more

0:47:15.849,0:47:21.380
anyone can appreciate the Simpsons, but I think[br]it does take education to appreciate Shakespeare

0:47:21.380,0:47:25.660
Alright, you're saying it takes education to appreciate[br]higher

0:47:25.660,0:47:27.319
true thing

0:47:27.319,0:47:29.719
Mill's point is

0:47:29.719,0:47:32.890
that the higher pleasures do require

0:47:32.890,0:47:35.089
cultivation and appreciation and education

0:47:35.090,0:47:37.799
he doesn't dispute that

0:47:37.799,0:47:38.650
but

0:47:38.650,0:47:41.660
once having been cultivated

0:47:41.660,0:47:44.029
and educated

0:47:44.029,0:47:45.509
people will see

0:47:45.509,0:47:48.270
not only see the difference between higher[br]lower

0:47:48.270,0:47:49.009
pleasures

0:47:49.009,0:47:51.539
but will it actually

0:47:51.539,0:47:52.769
prefer

0:47:52.769,0:47:53.970
the higher

0:47:53.970,0:47:55.848
to the lower.

0:47:55.849,0:47:59.519
you find this famous passage from John Stuart[br]Mill-

0:47:59.519,0:48:00.808
it is better

0:48:00.809,0:48:03.869
to be a human being dissatisfied

0:48:03.869,0:48:06.109
then a pig satisfied.

0:48:06.109,0:48:10.538
Better to the Socrates dissatisfied than[br]a fool satisfied

0:48:10.539,0:48:12.229
and if the fool

0:48:12.229,0:48:13.439
or the pig

0:48:13.439,0:48:15.538
are of a different opinion

0:48:15.539,0:48:18.209
it is because they only know

0:48:18.209,0:48:20.700
their side of the question.

0:48:20.700,0:48:22.339
so here you have

0:48:22.339,0:48:23.159
an attempt

0:48:23.159,0:48:24.609
to distinguish

0:48:24.609,0:48:27.199
higher from lower

0:48:27.199,0:48:28.719
pleasures

0:48:28.719,0:48:33.169
so going to an art museum or being a couch[br]potato, swilling beer watching television

0:48:33.169,0:48:35.489
at home

0:48:35.489,0:48:37.950
sometimes Mill agrees we might succumb

0:48:37.950,0:48:40.839
to the temptation

0:48:40.839,0:48:41.839
to do the latter,

0:48:41.839,0:48:46.308
to be couch potatoes,

0:48:46.309,0:48:47.779
but even when we do that

0:48:47.779,0:48:49.609
out of indolence

0:48:49.609,0:48:50.680
and sloth,

0:48:50.680,0:48:52.200
we know

0:48:52.200,0:48:54.029
that the pleasure we get

0:48:54.029,0:48:55.670
gazing at Rembrandts

0:48:55.670,0:48:56.989
in the museum

0:48:56.989,0:49:00.219
is actually higher,

0:49:00.219,0:49:03.190
because we've experienced both.

0:49:03.190,0:49:05.699
And is a higher pressure

0:49:05.699,0:49:06.940
gazing at Rembrandts

0:49:06.940,0:49:11.499
because of engages our higher human faculties

0:49:11.499,0:49:13.848
what about Mill's attempt

0:49:13.849,0:49:18.890
to reply to the objection about individual rights?

0:49:18.890,0:49:21.859
In a way he uses the same

0:49:21.859,0:49:25.319
kind of argument

0:49:25.319,0:49:27.859
and this comes out in chapter five

0:49:27.859,0:49:33.369
he says while I dispute the pretensions of any[br]theory which sets up an imaginary standard

0:49:33.369,0:49:34.889
of justice

0:49:34.889,0:49:39.719
not grounded on utility,

0:49:39.719,0:49:41.389
but still

0:49:41.389,0:49:43.429
he considers

0:49:43.429,0:49:44.599
justice

0:49:44.599,0:49:48.549
grounded on utility to be what he calls the[br]chief part

0:49:48.549,0:49:52.679
and incomparably the most sacred and binding[br]part

0:49:52.679,0:49:54.599
of all morality.

0:49:54.599,0:49:57.249
so justice is higher

0:49:57.249,0:50:00.049
individual rights are privileged

0:50:00.049,0:50:01.899
but not for

0:50:01.899,0:50:05.310
reasons that depart from utilitarian assumptions.

0:50:05.310,0:50:06.769
Justice is a name

0:50:06.769,0:50:09.069
for certain moral requirements

0:50:09.069,0:50:11.220
which, regarded collectively

0:50:11.220,0:50:14.519
stand higher in the scale of social utility

0:50:14.519,0:50:17.109
and are therefore

0:50:17.109,0:50:19.209
of more

0:50:19.209,0:50:20.678
paramount obligation

0:50:20.679,0:50:23.200
than any others

0:50:23.200,0:50:28.919
so justice is sacred, it's prior, it's privileged,[br]it isn't something that can easily be traded

0:50:28.920,0:50:30.890
off against lesser things

0:50:30.890,0:50:32.239
but the reason

0:50:32.239,0:50:33.619
is ultimately

0:50:33.619,0:50:35.799
Mills Claims

0:50:35.799,0:50:37.929
a utilitarian reason

0:50:37.929,0:50:39.239
once you consider

0:50:39.239,0:50:41.199
the long run interests

0:50:41.199,0:50:43.539
of humankind,

0:50:43.539,0:50:44.670
of all of us,

0:50:44.670,0:50:46.329
as progressive

0:50:46.329,0:50:47.699
beings.

0:50:47.699,0:50:51.279
If we do justice and if we respect rights

0:50:51.279,0:50:52.609
society as a whole

0:50:52.609,0:50:55.949
will be better off in the long run.

0:50:55.949,0:50:57.999
Well is that convincing?

0:50:57.999,0:50:59.158
Or

0:50:59.159,0:51:04.549
is Mill actually, without admitting it, stepping[br]outside

0:51:04.549,0:51:06.219
utilitarian considerations

0:51:06.219,0:51:07.789
in arguing

0:51:07.789,0:51:11.129
for qualitatively higher

0:51:11.129,0:51:12.788
pleasures

0:51:12.789,0:51:14.479
and for sacred

0:51:14.479,0:51:16.948
or specially important

0:51:16.949,0:51:18.479
individual rights?

0:51:18.479,0:51:21.718
we haven't fully answered that question

0:51:21.719,0:51:23.809
because to answer that question

0:51:23.809,0:51:26.259
in the case of rights and justice

0:51:26.259,0:51:28.869
will require that we explore

0:51:28.869,0:51:30.419
other ways,

0:51:30.419,0:51:33.368
non utilitarian ways

0:51:33.369,0:51:35.030
of accounting for the basis

0:51:35.030,0:51:36.479
or rights

0:51:36.479,0:51:38.269
and then asking

0:51:38.269,0:51:40.408
whether they succeed

0:51:40.409,0:51:42.949
as for Jeremy Bentham,

0:51:42.949,0:51:44.969
who launched

0:51:44.969,0:51:46.099
utilitarianism

0:51:46.099,0:51:47.419
as a doctrine

0:51:47.419,0:51:49.979
in moral and legal philosophy

0:51:49.979,0:51:53.819
Bentham died in 1832 at the[br]age of eighty five

0:51:53.819,0:51:57.509
but if you go to London you can visit him[br]today

0:51:57.509,0:51:58.729
literally.

0:51:58.729,0:52:01.439
he provided in his will

0:52:01.440,0:52:03.390
that his body be preserved,

0:52:03.390,0:52:05.489
embalmed and displayed

0:52:05.489,0:52:07.739
in the university of London

0:52:07.739,0:52:11.069
where he still presides in a glass case

0:52:11.069,0:52:12.950
with a wax head

0:52:12.950,0:52:14.989
dressed in his actual clothing.

0:52:14.989,0:52:17.049
you see before he died,

0:52:17.049,0:52:22.339
Bentham addressed himself to a question consistent[br]with his philosophy,

0:52:22.339,0:52:23.499
of what use

0:52:23.499,0:52:26.839
could a dead man be to the living

0:52:26.839,0:52:30.499
one use, he said, would be to make one's corpse[br]available

0:52:30.499,0:52:33.519
for the study of anatomy

0:52:33.519,0:52:37.129
in the case of great philosophers, however,

0:52:37.129,0:52:38.159
better yet

0:52:38.159,0:52:44.919
to preserve one's physical presence in order[br]to inspire future generations of thinkers.

0:52:44.919,0:52:47.618
You want to see what Bentham looks like stuffed?

0:52:47.619,0:52:50.410
Here's what he looks like

0:52:50.410,0:52:53.549
There he is

0:52:53.549,0:52:55.459
now, if you look closely

0:52:55.459,0:52:57.459
you'll notice

0:52:57.459,0:52:58.529
that

0:52:58.529,0:53:05.529
the embalming up his actual had was not a[br]success so they substituted a waxed head

0:53:06.910,0:53:10.009
and at the bottom for verisimilitude

0:53:10.009,0:53:13.390
you can actually see his actual had

0:53:13.390,0:53:14.979
on a plate

0:53:16.529,0:53:17.809
you see it?

0:53:17.809,0:53:22.599
right there

0:53:22.599,0:53:25.709
so, what's the moral of the story?

0:53:25.709,0:53:29.499
the moral of the story

0:53:29.499,0:53:33.698
by the way they bring him out during meetings[br]of the board at university college London

0:53:33.699,0:53:40.659
and the minutes record him as present but[br]not voting.

0:53:40.659,0:53:42.539
here is a philosopher

0:53:42.539,0:53:45.109
in life and in death

0:53:45.109,0:53:46.769
who adhered

0:53:46.769,0:53:48.399
to the principles

0:53:48.400,0:53:55.400
of his philosophy. we'll continue with rights next time.

0:53:57.439,0:54:00.808
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0:54:00.809,0:54:03.369
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0:54:03.369,0:54:07.799
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0:54:07.799,0:54:14.799
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0:54:49.739,0:54:53.789
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