WEBVTT 00:00:03.570 --> 00:00:06.570 Funding for this program provided by 00:00:06.510 --> 00:00:11.850 Additional funding provided by 00:00:32.850 --> 00:00:35.290 last time we argued about 00:00:35.290 --> 00:00:39.400 the case of the Queen verses Dudley and Stephens 00:00:39.400 --> 00:00:45.970 the lifeboat case, the case of cannibalism at sea 00:00:45.970 --> 00:00:48.420 and with the arguments about 00:00:48.420 --> 00:00:49.369 the lifeboat 00:00:49.369 --> 00:00:53.750 in mind the arguments for and against what Dudley and Stephens did in mind, 00:00:53.750 --> 00:00:56.890 let's turn back to the 00:00:56.890 --> 00:00:58.480 philosophy 00:00:58.480 --> 00:01:02.059 the utilitarian philosophy of Jeremy Bentham 00:01:02.060 --> 00:01:06.130 Bentham was born in England in 1748, at the age of twelve 00:01:06.130 --> 00:01:09.740 he went to Oxford, at fifteen he went to law school 00:01:09.740 --> 00:01:15.060 he was admitted to the bar at age nineteen but he never practiced law, 00:01:15.060 --> 00:01:17.470 instead he devoted his life 00:01:17.470 --> 00:01:19.920 to jurisprudence and moral 00:01:19.920 --> 00:01:22.170 philosophy. 00:01:22.170 --> 00:01:27.690 last time we began to consider Bentham's version of utilitarianism 00:01:27.690 --> 00:01:28.810 the main idea 00:01:28.810 --> 00:01:32.870 is simply stated and it's this, 00:01:32.870 --> 00:01:35.750 the highest principle of morality 00:01:35.750 --> 00:01:38.909 whether personal or political morality 00:01:38.909 --> 00:01:40.260 is 00:01:40.260 --> 00:01:42.520 to maximize 00:01:42.520 --> 00:01:44.390 the general welfare 00:01:44.390 --> 00:01:46.560 or the collective happiness 00:01:46.560 --> 00:01:50.070 or the overall balance of pleasure over pain 00:01:50.070 --> 00:01:52.210 in a phrase 00:01:52.210 --> 00:01:53.210 maximize 00:01:53.210 --> 00:01:56.419 utility 00:01:56.420 --> 00:02:00.750 Bentham arrives at this principle by the following line of reasoning 00:02:00.750 --> 00:02:03.150 we're all governed by pain and pleasure 00:02:03.150 --> 00:02:09.009 they are our sovereign masters and so any moral system has to take account of them. 00:02:09.008 --> 00:02:10.999 How best to take account? 00:02:10.999 --> 00:02:14.209 By maximizing 00:02:14.209 --> 00:02:15.739 and this leads to the principle 00:02:15.739 --> 00:02:19.449 of the greatest good for the greatest number 00:02:19.449 --> 00:02:23.029 what exactly should we maximize? 00:02:23.029 --> 00:02:24.698 Bentham tells us 00:02:24.699 --> 00:02:25.510 happiness 00:02:25.510 --> 00:02:27.728 or more precisely 00:02:27.729 --> 00:02:29.479 utility. 00:02:29.479 --> 00:02:34.239 Maximizing utility is a principal not only for individuals but also for communities and 00:02:34.239 --> 00:02:36.569 for legislators 00:02:36.569 --> 00:02:38.749 what after all is a community 00:02:38.749 --> 00:02:41.359 Bentham asks, 00:02:41.359 --> 00:02:45.309 it's the sum of the individuals who comprise it 00:02:45.309 --> 00:02:46.780 and that's why 00:02:46.780 --> 00:02:53.370 in deciding the best policy, in deciding what the law should be, in deciding what's just, 00:02:53.370 --> 00:02:59.029 citizens and legislators should ask themselves the question if we add up, 00:02:59.029 --> 00:03:03.870 all of the benefits of this policy 00:03:03.870 --> 00:03:05.290 and subtract 00:03:05.290 --> 00:03:08.828 all of the costs, 00:03:08.829 --> 00:03:10.669 the right thing to do 00:03:10.669 --> 00:03:11.779 is the one 00:03:11.779 --> 00:03:13.439 that maximizes 00:03:13.439 --> 00:03:14.698 the balance 00:03:14.699 --> 00:03:16.020 of happiness 00:03:16.020 --> 00:03:20.869 over suffering. 00:03:20.869 --> 00:03:24.039 that's what it means to maximize utility 00:03:24.039 --> 00:03:24.988 now, today 00:03:24.989 --> 00:03:28.189 I want to see 00:03:28.189 --> 00:03:31.150 whether you agree or disagree with it, 00:03:31.150 --> 00:03:36.650 and it often goes, this utilitarian logic, under the name of cost-benefit analysis 00:03:36.650 --> 00:03:39.719 which is used by companies 00:03:39.719 --> 00:03:41.219 and by 00:03:41.219 --> 00:03:41.978 governments 00:03:41.979 --> 00:03:43.729 all the time 00:03:43.729 --> 00:03:45.239 and what it involves 00:03:45.239 --> 00:03:50.789 is placing a value usually a dollar value to stand for utility 00:03:50.789 --> 00:03:53.289 on the costs and the benefits 00:03:53.289 --> 00:03:56.539 of various proposals. 00:03:56.539 --> 00:03:58.879 recently in the Czech Republic 00:03:58.879 --> 00:04:03.370 there was a proposal to increases the excise tax on smoking 00:04:03.370 --> 00:04:05.089 Philip Morris, 00:04:05.089 --> 00:04:08.219 the tobacco company, 00:04:08.219 --> 00:04:09.779 does huge business 00:04:09.779 --> 00:04:12.509 in the Czech Republic. They commissioned 00:04:12.509 --> 00:04:15.429 a study of cost-benefit analysis 00:04:15.430 --> 00:04:16.789 of smoking 00:04:16.789 --> 00:04:18.678 in the Czech Republic 00:04:18.678 --> 00:04:20.899 and what their cost benefit 00:04:20.899 --> 00:04:22.830 analysis found 00:04:22.830 --> 00:04:23.550 was 00:04:23.550 --> 00:04:25.660 the government gains 00:04:25.660 --> 00:04:27.349 by 00:04:27.349 --> 00:04:30.779 having Czech citizens smoke. 00:04:30.779 --> 00:04:32.360 Now, how do they gain? 00:04:32.360 --> 00:04:36.189 It's true that there are negative effects 00:04:36.189 --> 00:04:40.000 to the public finance of the Czech government 00:04:40.000 --> 00:04:45.039 because there are increased health care costs for people who develop smoking-related 00:04:45.039 --> 00:04:47.239 diseases 00:04:47.239 --> 00:04:50.369 on the other hand there were positive effects 00:04:50.369 --> 00:04:51.620 and those were 00:04:51.620 --> 00:04:53.099 added up 00:04:53.099 --> 00:04:55.378 on the other side of the ledger 00:04:55.379 --> 00:05:01.960 the positive effects included, for the most part, various tax revenues that the government 00:05:01.960 --> 00:05:06.239 derives from the sale of cigarette products but it also included health care savings to 00:05:06.240 --> 00:05:09.530 the government when people die early 00:05:09.530 --> 00:05:13.339 pensions savings, you don't have to pay pensions for as long, 00:05:13.339 --> 00:05:14.889 and also savings 00:05:14.889 --> 00:05:19.679 in housing costs for the elderly 00:05:19.679 --> 00:05:24.539 and when all of the costs and benefits were added up 00:05:24.539 --> 00:05:25.969 the Philip Morris 00:05:25.969 --> 00:05:27.870 study found 00:05:27.870 --> 00:05:32.610 that there is a net public finance gain in the Czech Republic 00:05:32.610 --> 00:05:36.449 of a hundred and forty seven million dollars 00:05:36.449 --> 00:05:38.120 and given the savings 00:05:38.120 --> 00:05:41.479 in housing and health care and pension costs 00:05:41.479 --> 00:05:46.570 the government enjoys the saving of savings of over twelve hundred dollars 00:05:46.570 --> 00:05:52.569 for each person who dies prematurely due to smoking. 00:05:52.569 --> 00:05:56.740 cost-benefit analysis 00:05:56.740 --> 00:06:01.729 now, those among you who are defenders utilitarianism may think that this is a unfair 00:06:01.729 --> 00:06:03.389 test 00:06:03.389 --> 00:06:09.130 Philip Morris was pilloried in the press and they issued an apology for this heartless 00:06:09.130 --> 00:06:10.990 calculation 00:06:10.990 --> 00:06:12.319 you may say 00:06:12.319 --> 00:06:17.119 that what's missing here is something that the utilitarian can be easily incorporate 00:06:17.119 --> 00:06:19.339 mainly 00:06:19.339 --> 00:06:23.430 the value to the person and to the families of those who die 00:06:23.430 --> 00:06:25.599 from lung cancer. 00:06:25.599 --> 00:06:29.190 what about the value of life? 00:06:29.190 --> 00:06:33.099 Some cost-benefit analyses incorporate 00:06:33.099 --> 00:06:34.560 a measure 00:06:34.560 --> 00:06:36.809 for the value of life. 00:06:36.809 --> 00:06:41.330 One of the most famous of these involved the Ford Pinto case 00:06:41.330 --> 00:06:45.008 did any of you read about that? this was back in the 1970's, you remember that 00:06:45.009 --> 00:06:48.210 the Ford Pinto was, a kind of car? 00:06:48.210 --> 00:06:51.029 anybody? 00:06:51.029 --> 00:06:55.879 it was a small car, subcompact car, very popular 00:06:55.879 --> 00:06:58.059 but it had one 00:06:58.059 --> 00:07:01.959 problem which is the fuel tank was at the back of the car 00:07:01.959 --> 00:07:07.960 and in rear collisions the fuel tank exploded 00:07:07.960 --> 00:07:10.210 and some people were killed 00:07:10.210 --> 00:07:14.349 and some severely injured. 00:07:14.349 --> 00:07:18.998 victims of these injuries took Ford to court to sue 00:07:18.999 --> 00:07:21.669 and in the court case it turned out 00:07:21.669 --> 00:07:24.030 that Ford had long 00:07:24.030 --> 00:07:25.248 since known 00:07:25.249 --> 00:07:27.719 about the vulnerable fuel tank 00:07:27.719 --> 00:07:33.599 and had done a cost-benefit analysis to determine whether it would be worth it 00:07:33.599 --> 00:07:36.300 to put in a special shield 00:07:36.300 --> 00:07:40.490 that would protect the fuel tank and prevent it from exploding. 00:07:40.490 --> 00:07:42.979 They did a cost benefit analysis 00:07:42.979 --> 00:07:46.318 the cost per part 00:07:46.319 --> 00:07:48.239 to increase the safety 00:07:48.239 --> 00:07:50.299 of the Pinto, 00:07:50.299 --> 00:07:55.688 they calculated at eleven dollars per part 00:07:55.689 --> 00:07:57.189 and here's, 00:07:57.189 --> 00:08:00.609 this was the cost benefit analysis that emerged 00:08:00.609 --> 00:08:03.089 in the trial, 00:08:03.089 --> 00:08:05.960 eleven dollars per part 00:08:05.960 --> 00:08:09.998 at 12.5 million cars and trucks 00:08:09.999 --> 00:08:13.559 came to a total cost of 00:08:13.370 --> 00:08:17.370 137 million dollars to improve the safety 00:08:17.370 --> 00:08:18.789 but then they calculated 00:08:18.789 --> 00:08:20.139 the benefits 00:08:20.139 --> 00:08:23.300 of spending all this money on a safer car 00:08:23.300 --> 00:08:26.800 and they counted 180 deaths 00:08:26.800 --> 00:08:28.749 and they assigned a dollar value 00:08:28.749 --> 00:08:30.449 200 thousand dollars 00:08:30.449 --> 00:08:32.490 per death 00:08:32.490 --> 00:08:35.250 180 injuries 00:08:35.250 --> 00:08:37.490 67 thousand 00:08:37.490 --> 00:08:38.909 and then the cost to repair 00:08:38.909 --> 00:08:43.289 the replacement cost for two thousand vehicles that would be destroyed without the 00:08:43.289 --> 00:08:45.030 safety device 00:08:45.030 --> 00:08:48.060 700 dollars per vehicle, 00:08:48.060 --> 00:08:50.390 so the benefits 00:08:50.390 --> 00:08:53.930 turned out to be only 49.5 million, 00:08:53.930 --> 00:08:55.270 and so they 00:08:55.270 --> 00:08:56.329 didn't install 00:08:56.330 --> 00:08:58.140 the device 00:08:58.140 --> 00:08:59.840 needless to say 00:08:59.840 --> 00:09:01.740 when this memo 00:09:01.160 --> 00:09:09.160 of the Ford Motor Company's cost-benefit analysis came out in the trial 00:09:09.160 --> 00:09:11.250 it appalled the jurors 00:09:11.250 --> 00:09:15.950 who awarded a huge settlement 00:09:15.950 --> 00:09:21.810 is this a counter example to the utilitarian idea of calculating 00:09:21.810 --> 00:09:23.040 because Ford included a 00:09:23.040 --> 00:09:27.319 measure of the value life. 00:09:27.320 --> 00:09:30.770 Now who here wants to defend 00:09:30.770 --> 00:09:33.240 cost-benefit analysis from 00:09:33.240 --> 00:09:35.320 this apparent counter example 00:09:35.320 --> 00:09:38.720 who has a defense? 00:09:38.720 --> 00:09:41.590 or do you think it's completely destroys 00:09:41.590 --> 00:09:47.410 the whole utilitarian calculus? 00:09:47.410 --> 00:09:48.760 I think that 00:09:48.760 --> 00:09:53.210 once again they've made the same mistake the previous case did that they've assigned a dollar value 00:09:53.210 --> 00:09:56.570 to human life and once again they failed to take into account things like 00:09:56.570 --> 00:10:00.580 suffering and emotional losses of families, I mean families lost earnings 00:10:00.580 --> 00:10:03.980 but they also lost a loved one and that 00:10:03.980 --> 00:10:06.820 is more value than 200 thousand dollars. 00:10:06.820 --> 00:10:09.170 Good, and wait wait wait, what's you're name? 00:10:09.170 --> 00:10:10.479 Julie Roto. 00:10:10.480 --> 00:10:14.400 so if two hundred thousand, Julie, is too 00:10:14.400 --> 00:10:18.660 too low a figure because it doesn't include the loss of a loved one, 00:10:18.660 --> 00:10:21.660 and the loss of those years of life, 00:10:21.660 --> 00:10:23.980 what would be, what do you think 00:10:23.980 --> 00:10:27.290 would be a more accurate number? 00:10:27.290 --> 00:10:32.430 I don't believe I could give a number I think that this sort of analysis shouldn't be applied to 00:10:32.430 --> 00:10:33.560 issues of human life. 00:10:33.560 --> 00:10:36.199 I think it can't be used monetarily 00:10:36.200 --> 00:10:39.270 so they didn't just put to low a number, 00:10:39.270 --> 00:10:44.510 Julie says, they were wrong to try to put any number at all. 00:10:44.510 --> 00:10:49.540 all right let's hear someone who 00:10:49.540 --> 00:10:51.860 you have to adjust for inflation 00:10:57.700 --> 00:10:59.130 all right 00:10:59.130 --> 00:11:00.050 fair enough 00:11:00.050 --> 00:11:02.660 so what would the number of being now? 00:11:02.660 --> 00:11:07.640 this is was thirty five years ago 00:11:07.640 --> 00:11:10.330 two million dollars 00:11:10.330 --> 00:11:12.030 you would put two million 00:11:12.030 --> 00:11:14.079 and what's your name 00:11:14.080 --> 00:11:15.410 Voicheck 00:11:15.410 --> 00:11:17.329 Voicheck says we have to allow for inflation 00:11:17.330 --> 00:11:19.640 we should be more generous 00:11:19.640 --> 00:11:25.170 then would you be satisfied that this is the right way of thinking about the question? 00:11:25.170 --> 00:11:27.310 I guess unfortunately 00:11:27.310 --> 00:11:29.589 it is for 00:11:29.590 --> 00:11:32.980 there's needs to be of number put somewhere 00:11:32.980 --> 00:11:37.330 I'm not sure what number would be but I do agree that there could possibly 00:11:37.330 --> 00:11:39.490 be a number put 00:11:39.490 --> 00:11:41.060 on a human life. 00:11:41.060 --> 00:11:42.439 all right so 00:11:42.440 --> 00:11:44.420 Voicheck says 00:11:44.420 --> 00:11:46.280 and here he disagrees with 00:11:46.280 --> 00:11:46.649 Julie 00:11:46.649 --> 00:11:49.750 Julie says we can't put a number of human life 00:11:49.750 --> 00:11:53.670 for the purpose of a cost-benefit analysis, Voicheck says we have to 00:11:53.670 --> 00:11:59.870 because we have to make decisions somehow 00:11:59.870 --> 00:12:04.750 what do other people think about this? Is there anyone prepared to defend cost-benefit 00:12:04.750 --> 00:12:06.270 analysis here 00:12:06.270 --> 00:12:09.810 as accurate, as desirable? 00:12:09.810 --> 00:12:16.000 I think that if ford and other car companies didn't use cost-benefit analysis they'd eventually go out 00:12:16.000 --> 00:12:18.949 of business because they wouldn't be able to be profitable 00:12:18.949 --> 00:12:23.139 and millions of people wouldn't be able to use their cars to get to jobs, to put food on the table 00:12:23.139 --> 00:12:27.939 to feed their children so I think that if cost-benefit analysis isn't employed 00:12:27.939 --> 00:12:29.699 the greater good 00:12:29.700 --> 00:12:31.870 is sacrificed 00:12:31.870 --> 00:12:34.810 in this case. Alright let me ask, what's your name? 00:12:34.810 --> 00:12:37.599 Raul. Raul. 00:12:37.600 --> 00:12:41.760 there was recently a study done about cell phone use by drivers, when people are driving 00:12:41.760 --> 00:12:43.090 a car, 00:12:43.090 --> 00:12:47.080 and there's a debate about whether that should be banned 00:12:47.080 --> 00:12:48.660 and 00:12:48.660 --> 00:12:50.689 the figure was that some 00:12:50.690 --> 00:12:54.990 two thousand people die 00:12:54.990 --> 00:12:57.280 as a result of accidents 00:12:57.280 --> 00:12:59.240 each year 00:12:59.240 --> 00:13:02.120 using cell phones 00:13:02.120 --> 00:13:07.860 and yet the cost benefit analysis which was done by the center for risk analysis at Harvard 00:13:07.860 --> 00:13:10.520 found that if you look at the benefits 00:13:10.520 --> 00:13:13.560 of the cell phone use 00:13:13.560 --> 00:13:15.089 and you put some 00:13:15.090 --> 00:13:19.050 value on the life, it comes out about the same 00:13:19.050 --> 00:13:23.290 because of the enormous economic benefit of enabling people to take advantage 00:13:23.290 --> 00:13:27.370 of their time, not waste time, be able to make deals and talk to friends and so on 00:13:27.370 --> 00:13:30.370 while they're driving 00:13:30.370 --> 00:13:32.060 doesn't that suggest that 00:13:32.060 --> 00:13:35.619 it's a mistake to try to put monetary figures on questions 00:13:35.620 --> 00:13:37.590 of human life? 00:13:37.590 --> 00:13:39.330 well I think that if 00:13:39.330 --> 00:13:41.780 the great majority of people 00:13:41.780 --> 00:13:47.569 tried to derive maximum utility out of a service like using cell phones and the convenience that cell phones 00:13:47.570 --> 00:13:47.989 provide 00:13:47.989 --> 00:13:50.400 that sacrifice is necessary 00:13:50.400 --> 00:13:52.160 for 00:13:52.160 --> 00:13:53.230 satisfaction to occur. 00:13:53.230 --> 00:13:59.200 You're an outright utilitarian. In, yes okay. 00:13:59.200 --> 00:14:02.820 all right then, one last question Raul 00:14:02.820 --> 00:14:05.810 and I put this to Voicheck, 00:14:05.810 --> 00:14:07.829 what dollar figure should be put 00:14:07.829 --> 00:14:12.870 on human life to decide whether to ban the use of cell phones 00:14:12.870 --> 00:14:14.640 well I don't want to 00:14:14.640 --> 00:14:16.199 arbitrarily 00:14:16.200 --> 00:14:18.140 calculate a figure, I mean right now 00:14:18.140 --> 00:14:19.370 I think that 00:14:21.350 --> 00:14:23.610 you want to take it under advisement. 00:14:23.610 --> 00:14:24.790 yeah I'll take it under advisement. 00:14:24.790 --> 00:14:28.689 but what roughly speaking would it be? you've got 23 hundred deaths 00:14:28.690 --> 00:14:32.400 you've got to assign a dollar value to know whether you want to prevent those deaths by 00:14:32.400 --> 00:14:37.069 banning the use of cell phones in cars 00:14:37.070 --> 00:14:38.900 so what would you're hunch be? 00:14:38.900 --> 00:14:40.350 how much? 00:14:40.350 --> 00:14:40.799 million 00:14:40.799 --> 00:14:42.280 two million 00:14:42.280 --> 00:14:44.410 two million was Voitech's figure 00:14:44.410 --> 00:14:46.120 is that about right? maybe a million. 00:14:46.120 --> 00:14:50.500 a million.?! 00:14:50.500 --> 00:14:55.110 Alright that's good, thank you 00:14:55.110 --> 00:15:00.440 So these are some of the controversies that arise these days from cost-benefit analysis especially 00:15:00.440 --> 00:15:01.859 those that involve 00:15:01.859 --> 00:15:06.770 placing a dollar value on everything to be added up. 00:15:06.770 --> 00:15:08.840 well now I want to turn 00:15:08.840 --> 00:15:15.110 to your objections, to your objections not necessarily to cost benefit analysis specifically, 00:15:15.110 --> 00:15:18.400 because that's just one version of the 00:15:18.400 --> 00:15:21.959 utilitarian logic in practice today, 00:15:21.960 --> 00:15:26.830 but to the theory as a whole, to the idea 00:15:26.830 --> 00:15:30.000 that the right thing to do, 00:15:30.000 --> 00:15:33.710 the just basis for policy and law, 00:15:33.710 --> 00:15:35.559 is to maximize 00:15:35.559 --> 00:15:39.750 utility. 00:15:39.750 --> 00:15:41.590 How many disagree 00:15:41.590 --> 00:15:43.359 with the utilitarian 00:15:43.359 --> 00:15:44.330 approach 00:15:44.330 --> 00:15:46.390 to law 00:15:46.390 --> 00:15:48.480 and to the common good? 00:15:48.480 --> 00:15:52.230 How many bring with it? 00:15:52.230 --> 00:15:55.200 so more agree than disagree. 00:15:55.200 --> 00:15:59.560 so let's hear from the critics 00:15:59.560 --> 00:16:02.209 my main issue with it is that I feel like 00:16:02.209 --> 00:16:06.280 you can't say that just because someone's in the minority 00:16:06.280 --> 00:16:11.650 what they want and need is less valuable than someone who's in the majority 00:16:11.650 --> 00:16:14.189 so I guess I have an issue with the idea that 00:16:14.190 --> 00:16:16.099 the greatest good for the greatest number 00:16:16.099 --> 00:16:18.070 is okay because 00:16:18.070 --> 00:16:21.040 there is still what about people who are in 00:16:21.040 --> 00:16:24.719 the lesser number, like it's not fair to them they didn't have a say in where they wanted 00:16:24.720 --> 00:16:25.840 to be. 00:16:25.840 --> 00:16:28.880 alright now that's an interesting objection, you're worried about 00:16:28.880 --> 00:16:32.460 the effect on minority. yes. 00:16:32.460 --> 00:16:34.940 what's your name by the way. Anna. 00:16:34.940 --> 00:16:39.819 alright who has an answer to Anna's worry about the effect on the minority 00:16:39.819 --> 00:16:41.689 What do you say to Anna? 00:16:41.690 --> 00:16:42.540 she said that 00:16:42.540 --> 00:16:47.490 the minorities value less, I don't think that's the case because individually the minorities 00:16:47.490 --> 00:16:51.339 value is just the same as the individual in the majority it's just that 00:16:51.339 --> 00:16:54.520 the numbers outweigh the 00:16:54.520 --> 00:16:55.670 minority 00:16:55.670 --> 00:16:58.919 and I mean at a certain point you have to make a decision 00:16:58.919 --> 00:17:01.510 and I'm sorry for the minority but 00:17:01.510 --> 00:17:02.640 sometimes 00:17:02.640 --> 00:17:03.670 it's for the general 00:17:03.670 --> 00:17:08.839 for the greater good. For the greater good, Anna what do you say? what's your name? Youngda. 00:17:08.839 --> 00:17:10.839 What do you say to Youngda? 00:17:10.839 --> 00:17:13.589 Youngda says you just have to add up people's preferences 00:17:13.589 --> 00:17:17.698 and those in the minority do have their preferences weighed. 00:17:17.699 --> 00:17:22.000 can you give an example of the kind of thing you're worried about when you say you're worried 00:17:22.000 --> 00:17:24.880 about utilitarianism violating 00:17:24.880 --> 00:17:27.970 the concern or respect due the minority? 00:17:27.970 --> 00:17:29.730 can you give an example. 00:17:29.730 --> 00:17:35.179 so well with any of the cases that we've talked about, like with the shipwreck one, 00:17:35.179 --> 00:17:36.450 I think that 00:17:36.450 --> 00:17:39.700 the boy who was eaten 00:17:39.700 --> 00:17:39.980 still had 00:17:39.980 --> 00:17:43.560 just as much of a right to live as the other people and 00:17:43.560 --> 00:17:44.710 just because 00:17:44.710 --> 00:17:45.980 he was the 00:17:48.120 --> 00:17:50.610 minority in that case the one who 00:17:50.610 --> 00:17:53.459 maybe had less of a chance to keep living 00:17:53.460 --> 00:17:54.870 that doesn't mean 00:17:54.870 --> 00:17:58.449 that the others automatically have a right to eat him 00:17:58.450 --> 00:17:59.680 just because 00:17:59.680 --> 00:18:01.849 it would give a greater amount of people 00:18:01.849 --> 00:18:03.290 the chance to live. 00:18:03.290 --> 00:18:05.740 so there may be a certain rights 00:18:05.740 --> 00:18:07.850 that the minority 00:18:07.850 --> 00:18:12.550 members have that the individual has that shouldn't be traded off 00:18:12.550 --> 00:18:14.399 for the sake of 00:18:14.400 --> 00:18:16.520 utility? 00:18:16.520 --> 00:18:18.210 yes Anna? 00:18:18.210 --> 00:18:21.990 Now this would be a test for you, 00:18:21.990 --> 00:18:24.550 back in ancient Rome 00:18:24.550 --> 00:18:29.510 they threw Christians to the lions in the coliseum for sport 00:18:29.510 --> 00:18:33.890 if you think how the utilitarian calculus would go 00:18:33.890 --> 00:18:38.770 yes, the Christian thrown to the lion suffers enormous excruciating pain, 00:18:38.770 --> 00:18:45.770 but look at the collective ecstasy of the Romans. 00:18:48.460 --> 00:18:50.580 Youngda. Well 00:18:50.580 --> 00:18:51.889 in that time 00:18:51.890 --> 00:18:53.250 I don't think 00:18:54.920 --> 00:19:01.710 in the modern-day of time to value the, um, to given a number to the happiness given to the people watching 00:19:01.710 --> 00:19:02.900 I don't think 00:19:02.900 --> 00:19:05.300 any 00:19:05.300 --> 00:19:07.490 policy maker would say 00:19:07.490 --> 00:19:11.390 the pain of one person, the suffering of one person is much much, 00:19:11.390 --> 00:19:14.680 in comparison to the happiness gained 00:19:14.680 --> 00:19:20.460 no but you have to admit that if there were enough Romans delirious with happiness, 00:19:20.460 --> 00:19:25.220 it would outweigh even the most excruciating pain of a handful of 00:19:25.220 --> 00:19:28.600 Christians thrown to the lion. 00:19:28.600 --> 00:19:33.570 so we really have here two different objections to utilitarianism 00:19:33.570 --> 00:19:35.030 one has to do 00:19:35.030 --> 00:19:37.850 with whether utilitarianism 00:19:37.850 --> 00:19:39.559 adequately respects 00:19:39.559 --> 00:19:40.740 individual rights 00:19:40.740 --> 00:19:42.500 or minority rights 00:19:42.500 --> 00:19:45.150 and the other has to do 00:19:45.150 --> 00:19:46.940 with the whole idea 00:19:46.940 --> 00:19:48.980 of aggregating 00:19:48.980 --> 00:19:49.900 utility 00:19:49.900 --> 00:19:51.610 for preferences 00:19:51.610 --> 00:19:53.070 or values 00:19:53.070 --> 00:19:56.470 is it possible to aggregate all values 00:19:56.470 --> 00:19:58.050 to translate them 00:19:58.050 --> 00:20:00.360 into dollar terms? 00:20:00.360 --> 00:20:02.479 there was 00:20:02.480 --> 00:20:07.000 in the 1930's 00:20:07.000 --> 00:20:09.190 a psychologist 00:20:09.190 --> 00:20:10.840 who tried 00:20:10.840 --> 00:20:12.370 to address 00:20:12.370 --> 00:20:15.850 the second question. He tried to prove 00:20:15.850 --> 00:20:18.530 what utilitarianism assumes, 00:20:18.530 --> 00:20:22.040 that it is possible 00:20:22.040 --> 00:20:23.230 to translate 00:20:23.230 --> 00:20:27.309 all goods, all values, all human concerns 00:20:27.309 --> 00:20:28.908 into a single uniform measure 00:20:28.909 --> 00:20:30.230 and he did this 00:20:30.230 --> 00:20:32.660 by conducting a survey 00:20:32.660 --> 00:20:37.610 of the young recipients of relief, this was in the 1930's 00:20:37.610 --> 00:20:42.000 and he asked them, he gave them a list of unpleasant experiences 00:20:42.000 --> 00:20:45.360 and he asked them how much would you have to be paid to undergo 00:20:45.360 --> 00:20:49.899 the following experiences and he kept track 00:20:49.900 --> 00:20:51.040 for example 00:20:51.040 --> 00:20:57.240 how much would you have to be paid to have one upper front tooth pulled out 00:20:57.240 --> 00:21:04.240 or how much would you have to be paid to have one little one tow cut off? 00:21:05.030 --> 00:21:11.649 or eat a live earth worm, six inches long 00:21:11.650 --> 00:21:18.650 or to live the rest of your life on a farm in Kansas 00:21:19.430 --> 00:21:24.480 or to choke a stray cat to death with your bare hands 00:21:24.480 --> 00:21:26.140 now what do you suppose 00:21:26.140 --> 00:21:32.900 what do you suppose was the most expensive item on that list 00:21:32.900 --> 00:21:39.750 Kansas? 00:21:39.750 --> 00:21:44.840 You're right it was Kansas 00:21:44.840 --> 00:21:46.059 for a Kansas 00:21:46.059 --> 00:21:47.619 people said they'd have to pay them 00:21:47.619 --> 00:21:51.980 they have to be paid three hundred thousand dollars 00:21:57.340 --> 00:21:59.800 what do you think 00:21:59.800 --> 00:22:03.139 what do you think was the next most expensive? 00:22:03.140 --> 00:22:06.010 not the cat 00:22:06.010 --> 00:22:08.190 not the tooth 00:22:08.190 --> 00:22:11.250 not the toe 00:22:11.250 --> 00:22:16.580 the worm! 00:22:16.580 --> 00:22:20.600 people said you'd have to pay them a hundred thousand dollars 00:22:20.600 --> 00:22:23.419 to eat the worm 00:22:23.420 --> 00:22:28.010 what do you think was the least expensive item? 00:22:28.010 --> 00:22:30.010 not the cat 00:22:30.010 --> 00:22:31.300 the tooth 00:22:31.300 --> 00:22:34.990 during the depression people were willing to have their tooth pulled 00:22:34.990 --> 00:22:39.600 for only forty five hundred dollars 00:22:39.600 --> 00:22:40.669 now 00:22:42.020 --> 00:22:45.010 here's what Thorndike 00:22:45.010 --> 00:22:48.460 concluded from his study 00:22:48.460 --> 00:22:51.650 any want or satisfaction which exists, exists 00:22:51.650 --> 00:22:54.600 in some amount and is therefore measurable 00:22:54.600 --> 00:22:55.949 the life of a dog 00:22:55.950 --> 00:22:57.010 or a cat 00:22:57.010 --> 00:22:59.430 or a chicken consists 00:22:59.430 --> 00:23:00.979 of appetites 00:23:00.979 --> 00:23:01.880 cravings 00:23:01.880 --> 00:23:04.290 desires and their gratifications 00:23:04.290 --> 00:23:05.750 so does the life 00:23:05.750 --> 00:23:06.940 of human beings 00:23:06.940 --> 00:23:09.409 though the appetites and desires 00:23:09.409 --> 00:23:12.450 are more complicated 00:23:12.450 --> 00:23:14.330 but what about 00:23:14.330 --> 00:23:15.990 Thorndike's study? 00:23:15.990 --> 00:23:17.870 does it support 00:23:17.870 --> 00:23:20.209 Bentham's idea 00:23:20.210 --> 00:23:22.130 that all 00:23:22.130 --> 00:23:28.390 goods all values can be captured according to a single uniform measure of value 00:23:28.390 --> 00:23:34.289 or does the preposterous character of those different items on the list 00:23:34.289 --> 00:23:37.220 suggest the opposite conclusion 00:23:37.220 --> 00:23:40.290 that may be whether we're talking about life 00:23:40.290 --> 00:23:42.120 or Kansas 00:23:42.120 --> 00:23:44.179 or the worm 00:23:44.180 --> 00:23:45.440 maybe 00:23:45.440 --> 00:23:47.810 the things we value 00:23:47.810 --> 00:23:49.399 and cherish 00:23:49.400 --> 00:23:51.350 can't be captured 00:23:51.350 --> 00:23:54.280 according to a single uniform measure of value 00:23:54.280 --> 00:23:56.129 and if they can't 00:23:56.130 --> 00:23:57.910 what are the consequences 00:23:57.910 --> 00:24:00.740 for the utilitarian theory 00:24:00.740 --> 00:24:02.180 of morality 00:24:02.180 --> 00:24:09.180 that's a question we'll continue with next time 00:24:13.179 --> 00:24:15.530 alright now let's take the other 00:24:15.530 --> 00:24:17.680 part of the poll 00:24:17.680 --> 00:24:19.309 which is the 00:24:19.309 --> 00:24:21.470 the highest 00:24:21.470 --> 00:24:23.410 experience or pleasure? 00:24:23.410 --> 00:24:25.659 how many say 00:24:25.659 --> 00:24:31.720 Shakespeare 00:24:31.720 --> 00:24:38.120 how many say fear Factor 00:24:38.120 --> 00:24:39.760 no you can't be serious 00:24:39.760 --> 00:24:46.160 really? 00:24:46.160 --> 00:24:48.530 last time 00:24:48.530 --> 00:24:53.510 last time we began to consider some objections 00:24:53.510 --> 00:24:56.570 to Jeremy Bentham's version 00:24:56.570 --> 00:25:01.790 of utilitarianism 00:25:01.790 --> 00:25:04.950 people raised two objections in the discussion 00:25:04.950 --> 00:25:08.380 we had 00:25:08.380 --> 00:25:10.600 the first 00:25:10.600 --> 00:25:12.709 was the objection, the claim 00:25:12.710 --> 00:25:14.760 that utilitarianism, 00:25:14.760 --> 00:25:16.970 by concerning itself 00:25:16.970 --> 00:25:20.110 with the greatest good for the greatest number 00:25:20.110 --> 00:25:23.120 fails adequately to respect 00:25:23.120 --> 00:25:25.479 individual rights. 00:25:25.480 --> 00:25:28.880 today we have debates 00:25:28.880 --> 00:25:29.990 about torture 00:25:29.990 --> 00:25:33.610 and terrorism 00:25:33.610 --> 00:25:35.139 suppose 00:25:35.140 --> 00:25:41.350 a suspected terrorists was apprehended on September tenth 00:25:41.350 --> 00:25:44.189 and you had reason to believe 00:25:44.190 --> 00:25:46.490 that the suspect 00:25:46.490 --> 00:25:51.230 had crucial information about an impending terrorist attack that would kill over three thousand 00:25:51.230 --> 00:25:52.200 people 00:25:52.200 --> 00:25:55.690 and you couldn't extract the information 00:25:55.690 --> 00:25:57.670 would it be just 00:25:57.670 --> 00:25:59.440 to torture 00:25:59.440 --> 00:26:01.070 the suspect 00:26:01.070 --> 00:26:03.060 to get the information 00:26:03.060 --> 00:26:05.550 or 00:26:05.550 --> 00:26:07.770 do you say no 00:26:07.770 --> 00:26:14.550 there is a categorical moral duty of respect for individual rights 00:26:14.550 --> 00:26:17.899 in a way we're back to the questions we started with t 00:26:17.900 --> 00:26:23.910 about trolley cars and organ transplants so that's the first issue 00:26:23.910 --> 00:26:29.250 and you remember we considered some examples of cost-benefit analysis 00:26:29.250 --> 00:26:33.870 but a lot of people were unhappy with cost-benefit analysis 00:26:33.870 --> 00:26:39.969 when it came to placing a dollar value on human life 00:26:39.970 --> 00:26:42.290 and so that led us to the 00:26:42.290 --> 00:26:44.500 second objection, 00:26:44.500 --> 00:26:48.810 it questioned whether it's possible to translate all values 00:26:48.810 --> 00:26:52.879 into a single uniform measure of value 00:26:52.880 --> 00:26:57.580 it asks in other words whether all values are commensurable 00:26:57.580 --> 00:27:00.080 let me give you one other 00:27:00.080 --> 00:27:01.299 example 00:27:01.299 --> 00:27:07.240 of an experience, this actually is a true story, it comes from personal experience 00:27:07.240 --> 00:27:12.900 that raises a question at least about whether all values can be translated without 00:27:12.900 --> 00:27:14.060 loss 00:27:14.060 --> 00:27:20.158 into utilitarian terms 00:27:20.159 --> 00:27:22.390 some years ago 00:27:22.390 --> 00:27:28.080 when I was a graduate student I was at Oxford in England and they had menâs and women's 00:27:28.080 --> 00:27:29.800 colleges they weren't yet mixed 00:27:29.800 --> 00:27:31.428 and the women's colleges had rules 00:27:31.429 --> 00:27:33.590 against 00:27:33.590 --> 00:27:37.470 overnight male guests 00:27:37.470 --> 00:27:40.080 by the nineteen seventies these 00:27:40.080 --> 00:27:44.030 rules were rarely enforced and easily violated, 00:27:44.030 --> 00:27:51.030 or so I was told, 00:27:51.600 --> 00:27:56.549 by the late nineteen seventies when I was there, pressure grew to relax these rules and it became 00:27:56.549 --> 00:28:01.100 the subject of debate among the faculty at St. Anne's College 00:28:01.100 --> 00:28:03.840 which was one of these all women colleges 00:28:03.840 --> 00:28:06.629 the older women on the faculty 00:28:06.630 --> 00:28:10.720 we're traditionalists they were opposed to change 00:28:10.720 --> 00:28:12.820 on conventional moral grounds 00:28:12.820 --> 00:28:14.320 but times had changed 00:28:14.320 --> 00:28:17.110 and they were embarrassed 00:28:17.110 --> 00:28:20.000 to give the true grounds of their objection 00:28:20.000 --> 00:28:22.809 and so the translated their arguments 00:28:22.809 --> 00:28:26.120 into utilitarian terms 00:28:26.120 --> 00:28:27.419 if men stay overnight, 00:28:27.420 --> 00:28:31.680 they argued, the costs to the college will increase. 00:28:31.680 --> 00:28:33.490 how you might wonder 00:28:33.490 --> 00:28:39.429 well they'll want to take baths, and that will use up hot water they said 00:28:39.429 --> 00:28:40.779 furthermore they argued 00:28:40.779 --> 00:28:46.780 we'll have to replace the mattresses more often 00:28:46.780 --> 00:28:48.379 the reformers 00:28:48.380 --> 00:28:52.250 met these arguments by adopting the following compromise 00:28:52.250 --> 00:28:53.280 each woman 00:28:53.280 --> 00:29:00.280 could have a maximum of three overnight male guest each week 00:29:01.160 --> 00:29:05.940 they didn't say whether it had to be the same one, or three different 00:29:05.940 --> 00:29:06.800 provided 00:29:06.800 --> 00:29:09.240 and this is the compromise provided 00:29:09.240 --> 00:29:10.400 the guest 00:29:10.400 --> 00:29:15.340 paid fifty pence to defray the cost to the college 00:29:15.340 --> 00:29:17.179 the next day 00:29:17.180 --> 00:29:23.080 the national headline in the national newspaper read St. Anne's girls, fifty pence a night 00:29:29.500 --> 00:29:31.040 another 00:29:31.040 --> 00:29:31.730 illustration 00:29:31.730 --> 00:29:34.730 of the difficulty of translating 00:29:34.730 --> 00:29:36.150 all values 00:29:36.150 --> 00:29:38.930 in this case a certain idea of virtue 00:29:38.930 --> 00:29:44.200 into utilitarian terms 00:29:44.200 --> 00:29:46.980 so that's all to illustrate 00:29:46.980 --> 00:29:48.830 the second objection 00:29:48.830 --> 00:29:52.679 to utilitarianism, at least the part of that objection 00:29:52.680 --> 00:29:54.780 that questions rather 00:29:54.780 --> 00:29:56.620 the utilitarianism 00:29:56.620 --> 00:29:58.809 is right to assume 00:29:58.809 --> 00:30:00.670 that we can 00:30:00.670 --> 00:30:02.420 assume the uniformity of 00:30:02.420 --> 00:30:08.230 value, the commensurability of values and translate all moral considerations 00:30:08.230 --> 00:30:09.740 into 00:30:09.740 --> 00:30:10.280 dollars 00:30:10.280 --> 00:30:12.220 or money. 00:30:12.220 --> 00:30:14.510 But there is a second 00:30:14.510 --> 00:30:19.690 aspect to this worry about aggregating values and preferences 00:30:19.690 --> 00:30:21.990 why should we 00:30:21.990 --> 00:30:23.120 weigh 00:30:23.120 --> 00:30:25.260 all preferences 00:30:25.260 --> 00:30:27.390 that people have 00:30:27.390 --> 00:30:32.650 without assessing whether they're good preferences or bad preferences 00:30:32.650 --> 00:30:35.120 shouldn't we distinguish 00:30:35.120 --> 00:30:36.010 between 00:30:36.010 --> 00:30:37.590 higher 00:30:37.590 --> 00:30:38.260 pleasures 00:30:38.260 --> 00:30:41.760 and lower pleasures. 00:30:41.760 --> 00:30:44.250 Now, part of the appeal of 00:30:44.250 --> 00:30:49.380 not making any qualitative distinctions about the worth of people's preferences, part of the 00:30:49.380 --> 00:30:50.820 appeal 00:30:50.820 --> 00:30:55.250 is that it is non-judgmental and egalitarian 00:30:55.250 --> 00:30:58.110 the Benthamite utilitarian says 00:30:58.110 --> 00:31:01.199 everybody's preferences count 00:31:01.200 --> 00:31:04.890 and they count regardless of what people want 00:31:04.890 --> 00:31:08.580 regardless of what makes it different people 00:31:08.580 --> 00:31:09.530 happy. For Bentham, 00:31:09.530 --> 00:31:11.250 all that matters 00:31:11.250 --> 00:31:12.960 you'll remember 00:31:12.960 --> 00:31:16.010 are the intensity and the duration 00:31:16.010 --> 00:31:18.270 of a pleasure or pain 00:31:18.270 --> 00:31:24.040 the so-called higher pleasures or nobler virtues are simply those, according to Bentham 00:31:24.040 --> 00:31:25.420 that produce 00:31:25.420 --> 00:31:26.419 stronger, 00:31:26.419 --> 00:31:29.380 longer, pleasure 00:31:29.380 --> 00:31:32.790 yet a famous phrase to express this idea 00:31:32.790 --> 00:31:35.770 the quantity of pleasure being equal 00:31:35.770 --> 00:31:37.059 pushpin 00:31:37.059 --> 00:31:39.519 is as good as poetry. 00:31:39.519 --> 00:31:41.789 What was pushpin? 00:31:41.789 --> 00:31:46.929 It was some kind of a child's game like to tidily winks pushpin is as good as poetry 00:31:46.929 --> 00:31:48.850 Bentham said 00:31:48.850 --> 00:31:50.509 and lying behind this idea 00:31:50.509 --> 00:31:51.510 I think 00:31:51.510 --> 00:31:52.779 is the claim 00:31:52.779 --> 00:31:54.090 the intuition 00:31:54.090 --> 00:31:55.870 that it's a presumption 00:31:55.870 --> 00:31:57.949 to judge 00:31:57.950 --> 00:31:58.979 whose pleasures 00:31:58.979 --> 00:32:00.670 are intrinsically higher 00:32:00.670 --> 00:32:03.850 or worthier or better 00:32:03.850 --> 00:32:07.010 and there is something attractive in this 00:32:07.010 --> 00:32:09.770 refusal to judge, after all some people like 00:32:09.770 --> 00:32:11.790 Mozart, others 00:32:11.790 --> 00:32:12.520 Madonna 00:32:12.520 --> 00:32:15.090 some people like ballet 00:32:15.090 --> 00:32:16.389 others 00:32:16.390 --> 00:32:17.360 bowling, 00:32:17.360 --> 00:32:19.439 who's to say 00:32:19.440 --> 00:32:23.140 a Benthamite might argue, who's to say which of these pleasures 00:32:23.140 --> 00:32:24.260 whose pleasures 00:32:24.260 --> 00:32:25.460 are higher 00:32:25.460 --> 00:32:26.350 worthier 00:32:26.350 --> 00:32:27.500 nobler 00:32:27.500 --> 00:32:31.570 than others? 00:32:31.570 --> 00:32:35.980 But, is that right? 00:32:35.980 --> 00:32:40.310 this refusal to make qualitative distinctions 00:32:40.310 --> 00:32:42.179 can we 00:32:42.180 --> 00:32:45.170 altogether dispense with the idea 00:32:45.170 --> 00:32:49.010 that certain things we take pleasure in are 00:32:49.010 --> 00:32:50.660 better or worthier 00:32:50.660 --> 00:32:53.890 than others 00:32:53.890 --> 00:32:58.640 think back to the case of the Romans in the coliseum, one thing that troubled people about that 00:32:58.640 --> 00:32:58.960 practice 00:32:58.960 --> 00:33:01.170 is that it seemed to violate the rights 00:33:01.170 --> 00:33:04.490 of the Christian 00:33:04.490 --> 00:33:07.250 another way of objecting to what's going on there 00:33:07.250 --> 00:33:10.720 is that the pleasure that the Romans take 00:33:10.720 --> 00:33:13.480 in this bloody spectacle 00:33:13.480 --> 00:33:15.850 should that pleasure 00:33:15.850 --> 00:33:16.500 which is a base, 00:33:16.500 --> 00:33:19.130 kind of corrupt 00:33:19.130 --> 00:33:22.730 degrading pleasure, should that even 00:33:22.730 --> 00:33:26.960 be valorized or weighed in deciding what the 00:33:26.960 --> 00:33:33.770 the general welfare is? 00:33:33.770 --> 00:33:38.760 so here are the objections to Bentham's utilitarianism 00:33:38.760 --> 00:33:42.800 and now we turn to someone who tried to 00:33:42.800 --> 00:33:45.889 respond to those objections, 00:33:45.890 --> 00:33:47.820 a later day utilitarian 00:33:47.820 --> 00:33:50.120 John Stuart Mill 00:33:50.120 --> 00:33:52.780 so what we need to 00:33:52.780 --> 00:33:54.510 examine now 00:33:54.510 --> 00:33:58.809 is whether John Stuart Mill had a convincing reply 00:33:58.809 --> 00:34:05.090 to these objections to utilitarianism. 00:34:05.090 --> 00:34:06.750 John Stuart Mill 00:34:06.750 --> 00:34:08.760 was born in 1806 00:34:08.760 --> 00:34:11.369 his father James Mill 00:34:11.369 --> 00:34:14.079 was a disciple of Benthamâs 00:34:14.079 --> 00:34:17.389 and James Mills set about giving his son 00:34:17.389 --> 00:34:20.329 John Stuart Mill a model education 00:34:20.329 --> 00:34:22.429 he was a child prodigy 00:34:22.429 --> 00:34:23.569 John Stuart Mill 00:34:23.569 --> 00:34:27.859 the knew Latin, sorry, Greek at the age of three, Latin at eight 00:34:27.859 --> 00:34:29.139 and at age ten 00:34:29.139 --> 00:34:33.659 he wrote a history of Roman law. 00:34:33.659 --> 00:34:35.649 At age twenty 00:34:35.649 --> 00:34:39.129 he had a nervous breakdown 00:34:39.129 --> 00:34:43.549 this left him in a depression for five years 00:34:43.549 --> 00:34:46.800 but at age twenty five what helped lift him out of this depression 00:34:46.800 --> 00:34:49.949 is that he met Harriet Taylor 00:34:49.949 --> 00:34:52.659 she in no doubt married him, they lived happily ever after 00:34:52.659 --> 00:34:54.849 and it was under her 00:34:54.849 --> 00:34:56.659 influence 00:34:56.659 --> 00:34:59.859 the John Stuart Mill try to humanize 00:34:59.859 --> 00:35:01.720 utilitarianism 00:35:01.720 --> 00:35:05.279 what Mill tried to do was to see 00:35:05.279 --> 00:35:07.710 whether the utilitarian calculus could be 00:35:07.710 --> 00:35:09.029 enlarged 00:35:09.029 --> 00:35:11.200 and modified 00:35:11.200 --> 00:35:13.759 to accommodate 00:35:13.759 --> 00:35:17.429 humanitarian concerns 00:35:17.429 --> 00:35:20.390 like the concern to respect individual rights 00:35:20.390 --> 00:35:24.598 and also to address the distinction between higher and lower 00:35:24.599 --> 00:35:26.439 pleasures. 00:35:26.439 --> 00:35:30.368 In 1859 Mill wrote a famous book on liberty 00:35:30.369 --> 00:35:35.399 the main point of which was the importance of defending individual rights and minority 00:35:35.399 --> 00:35:36.380 rights 00:35:36.380 --> 00:35:38.329 and in 1861 00:35:38.329 --> 00:35:40.339 toward the end of his life 00:35:40.339 --> 00:35:43.130 he wrote the book we read is part of this course 00:35:43.130 --> 00:35:45.099 Utilitarianism. 00:35:45.099 --> 00:35:46.599 It makes it clear 00:35:46.599 --> 00:35:49.739 that utility is the only standard of morality 00:35:49.739 --> 00:35:50.769 in his view 00:35:50.769 --> 00:35:52.549 so he's not challenging 00:35:52.550 --> 00:35:53.949 Bentham's premise, 00:35:53.949 --> 00:35:55.279 he's affirming it. 00:35:55.279 --> 00:35:58.829 he says very explicitly the sole evidence, 00:35:58.829 --> 00:36:04.659 it is possible to produce that anything is desirable is that people actually do 00:36:04.659 --> 00:36:05.929 desire it. 00:36:05.929 --> 00:36:11.679 so he stays with the idea that our de facto actual empirical desires are the only 00:36:11.679 --> 00:36:12.979 basis 00:36:12.979 --> 00:36:15.618 for moral judgment. 00:36:15.619 --> 00:36:17.549 but then 00:36:17.549 --> 00:36:18.979 page eight 00:36:18.979 --> 00:36:24.879 also in chapter two, he argues that it is possible for a utilitarian to distinguish 00:36:24.879 --> 00:36:26.319 higher from lower 00:36:26.320 --> 00:36:28.970 pleasures. 00:36:28.970 --> 00:36:30.519 now, those of you who've read 00:36:30.519 --> 00:36:32.078 Mill already 00:36:32.079 --> 00:36:33.329 how 00:36:33.329 --> 00:36:36.559 according to him is it possible to draw that distinction? 00:36:36.559 --> 00:36:40.079 How can a utilitarian 00:36:40.079 --> 00:36:42.819 distinguish qualitatively higher pleasures 00:36:42.819 --> 00:36:43.540 from 00:36:43.540 --> 00:36:48.859 lesser ones, base ones, unworthy ones? 00:36:48.859 --> 00:36:50.519 If you tried both of them 00:36:50.519 --> 00:36:55.308 and you'll prefer the higher one naturally always 00:36:55.309 --> 00:36:59.819 that's great, that's right. What's your name? John. 00:36:59.819 --> 00:37:01.759 so as John points out 00:37:01.759 --> 00:37:05.019 Mill says here's the test, 00:37:05.019 --> 00:37:07.868 since we can't step outside 00:37:07.869 --> 00:37:10.490 actual desires, actual preferences 00:37:10.490 --> 00:37:11.649 that would 00:37:11.650 --> 00:37:13.670 violate utilitarian premises, 00:37:13.670 --> 00:37:16.819 the only test 00:37:16.819 --> 00:37:17.600 of whether 00:37:17.600 --> 00:37:19.769 a pleasure is higher 00:37:19.769 --> 00:37:26.468 or lower is whether someone who has experienced both 00:37:26.469 --> 00:37:28.109 would prefer it. 00:37:28.109 --> 00:37:29.369 And here, 00:37:29.369 --> 00:37:31.259 in chapter two 00:37:31.259 --> 00:37:32.900 we see the passage 00:37:32.900 --> 00:37:37.199 where Mill makes the point that John just described 00:37:37.199 --> 00:37:42.680 of two pleasures, if there be one to which all are almost all who have experience 00:37:42.680 --> 00:37:46.219 of both give a decided preference, 00:37:46.219 --> 00:37:51.859 irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, in other words no outside, no independent 00:37:51.859 --> 00:37:53.390 standard, 00:37:53.390 --> 00:37:57.529 then that is the more desirable pleasure. 00:37:57.529 --> 00:37:59.829 what do people think about that argument. 00:37:59.829 --> 00:38:01.549 does that 00:38:01.549 --> 00:38:03.489 does it succeeded? 00:38:03.489 --> 00:38:06.380 how many think that it does succeed? 00:38:06.380 --> 00:38:11.489 of arguing within utilitarian terms for a distinction between higher and lower pleasures. 00:38:11.489 --> 00:38:12.390 how many 00:38:12.390 --> 00:38:17.788 think it doesn't succeed? 00:38:17.789 --> 00:38:20.829 I want to hear your reasons. 00:38:20.829 --> 00:38:22.249 but before 00:38:22.249 --> 00:38:23.848 we give the reasons 00:38:23.849 --> 00:38:26.329 let's do an experiment 00:38:26.329 --> 00:38:28.719 of Mills' 00:38:28.719 --> 00:38:31.569 claim. 00:38:31.569 --> 00:38:35.199 In order to do this experiment 00:38:35.199 --> 00:38:39.859 we're going to look that three 00:38:39.859 --> 00:38:41.558 short excerpts 00:38:41.559 --> 00:38:44.889 of popular entertainment 00:38:44.889 --> 00:38:48.170 the first one is a Hamlet soliloquy 00:38:48.170 --> 00:38:52.939 it'll be followed by two other 00:38:52.939 --> 00:38:55.420 experiences 00:38:55.420 --> 00:38:58.259 see what you think. 00:38:58.259 --> 00:39:02.249 'what a piece of work is a man 00:39:02.249 --> 00:39:05.509 how noble in reason 00:39:05.509 --> 00:39:07.579 how infinite in faculties 00:39:07.579 --> 00:39:11.439 in form and moving, how express and admirable 00:39:11.439 --> 00:39:14.949 in action how like an angel. In apprehension, how like a god 00:39:14.949 --> 00:39:16.430 the beauty of the world 00:39:16.430 --> 00:39:18.348 the paragon of animals 00:39:18.349 --> 00:39:21.259 and yet, to me 00:39:21.259 --> 00:39:24.689 what is this quintessence of dust? 00:39:24.689 --> 00:39:31.689 man delights not me. 00:39:43.309 --> 00:39:47.749 Imagine a world where your greatest fears become reality 00:39:47.749 --> 00:39:52.609 each show, six contestants from around the country battle each other in three 00:39:52.609 --> 00:39:59.609 extreme stunts. these stunts are designed to challenge these contestants both physically and mentally 00:40:00.419 --> 00:40:02.288 six contestants, three stunts, one winner. 00:40:02.289 --> 00:40:09.289 Fear factor. 00:40:16.449 --> 00:40:22.919 The Simpsons. Well hi diddly-o peddle to the metal o-philes! Flanders- since when do you like anything cool. 00:40:22.919 --> 00:40:25.240 well, I don't care for the speed, but I can't get enough of that safety gear 00:40:25.240 --> 00:40:28.729 helmets, roll bars, caution flags. I like the fresh air 00:40:28.729 --> 00:40:35.499 and looking at the poor people in the infield. 00:40:35.499 --> 00:40:41.319 Dang Cletus, why you got to park by my parents. 00:40:41.320 --> 00:40:43.029 Now hunny, it's my parents too. 00:40:55.759 --> 00:41:00.629 I don't even have to ask which one you like most 00:41:00.629 --> 00:41:05.109 the Simpsons? How many like the Simpson's most? 00:41:05.109 --> 00:41:10.140 How many Shakespeare? 00:41:10.140 --> 00:41:12.710 What about fear factor? 00:41:12.710 --> 00:41:15.959 how many preferred fear factor? 00:41:15.959 --> 00:41:22.368 really? 00:41:22.369 --> 00:41:24.079 people overwhelmingly 00:41:24.079 --> 00:41:25.769 like the Simpsons 00:41:25.769 --> 00:41:29.229 better 00:41:29.229 --> 00:41:31.598 than Shakespeare. alright, now let's take the other 00:41:31.599 --> 00:41:33.749 part of the poll 00:41:33.749 --> 00:41:35.799 which is the 00:41:35.799 --> 00:41:37.529 highest 00:41:37.529 --> 00:41:39.409 experience or pleasure? 00:41:39.409 --> 00:41:41.729 how many say 00:41:41.729 --> 00:41:47.788 Shakespeare? 00:41:47.789 --> 00:41:49.960 how many say 00:41:49.960 --> 00:41:54.189 fear factor? 00:41:54.189 --> 00:41:59.069 no you can't be serious 00:41:59.069 --> 00:42:01.038 really? 00:42:01.039 --> 00:42:02.709 alright go ahead you can say it. 00:42:02.709 --> 00:42:03.439 I found that one 00:42:03.439 --> 00:42:04.709 the most entertaining 00:42:04.709 --> 00:42:09.428 I know but which do you think was the worthiest, the noblest experience, I know you find it 00:42:09.429 --> 00:42:10.920 the most anything 00:42:10.920 --> 00:42:15.920 if something is good just because it is pleasurable what is the matter if you have some kind of 00:42:15.920 --> 00:42:17.209 abstract 00:42:17.209 --> 00:42:21.729 idea of whether it is good by someone else's sense or not. 00:42:21.729 --> 00:42:25.038 Alright so you come down on the straight Benthamite's side 00:42:25.039 --> 00:42:26.429 whose to judge 00:42:26.429 --> 00:42:29.279 and why should we judge 00:42:29.279 --> 00:42:33.880 apart from just registering and aggregating de facto preferences, alright fair enough. 00:42:33.880 --> 00:42:35.349 what's your name? 00:42:35.349 --> 00:42:37.329 Nate? okay fair enough 00:42:37.329 --> 00:42:38.219 Alright so 00:42:38.219 --> 00:42:40.919 how many think that the Simpson's is actually 00:42:40.919 --> 00:42:46.259 apart from liking is actually the higher experience 00:42:46.259 --> 00:42:47.420 higher than Shakespeare. 00:42:47.420 --> 00:42:49.309 Alright let's see the vote for Shakespeare again 00:42:49.309 --> 00:42:52.869 how many think Shakespeare is higher? 00:42:52.869 --> 00:42:53.869 alright so 00:42:53.869 --> 00:42:55.540 why is it 00:42:55.540 --> 00:42:58.999 ideally I'd like to hear from someone is there someone 00:42:58.999 --> 00:43:02.109 think Shakespeare is highest 00:43:02.109 --> 00:43:02.989 but who preferred 00:43:02.989 --> 00:43:04.060 watching 00:43:04.060 --> 00:43:08.739 the Simpsons 00:43:08.739 --> 00:43:14.160 Like I guess just sitting and watching the Simpsons, it's entertaining because the make jokes, they make us laugh but 00:43:14.160 --> 00:43:17.839 someone has to tell us that Shakespeare was this great writer we had to be taught how to read him, how to 00:43:17.839 --> 00:43:20.630 understand him, we had to be taught how to 00:43:20.630 --> 00:43:23.150 take in Rembrandt, how to analyze a painting. 00:43:23.150 --> 00:43:25.859 well how do, what's your name? Aneesha. 00:43:25.859 --> 00:43:27.840 Aneesha, when you say someone 00:43:27.840 --> 00:43:31.259 told you that Shakespeare's better 00:43:31.259 --> 00:43:37.299 are you accepting it on blind faith you voted that Shakespeare's higher only because the culture 00:43:37.299 --> 00:43:41.529 tells you that our teachers tell you that or do you 00:43:41.529 --> 00:43:44.049 actually agree with that yourself 00:43:44.049 --> 00:43:48.319 well in the sense that Shakespeare, no, but earlier you made 00:43:48.319 --> 00:43:49.740 an example of Rembrandt 00:43:49.740 --> 00:43:54.479 I feel like I would enjoy a reading a comic book more than I would enjoy a kind of analyzing 00:43:54.479 --> 00:43:58.348 Rembrandt because someone told me it was great, you know. Right so of some this seems 00:43:58.349 --> 00:44:01.699 to be, you're suggesting a kind of 00:44:01.699 --> 00:44:05.319 cultural convention and pressure. We're told 00:44:05.319 --> 00:44:12.319 what books, what works of art are great. who else? 00:44:15.309 --> 00:44:19.640 although I enjoyed watching the Simpsons more in this particular moment in Justice, 00:44:19.640 --> 00:44:23.049 if I were to spend the rest of my life considering 00:44:23.049 --> 00:44:25.369 the three different 00:44:25.369 --> 00:44:26.869 video clips shown 00:44:26.869 --> 00:44:29.119 I would not want to spend 00:44:29.119 --> 00:44:31.869 that remainder of my life considering 00:44:31.869 --> 00:44:33.800 the latter two clips. 00:44:33.800 --> 00:44:36.650 I think I would derive more pleasure 00:44:36.650 --> 00:44:38.309 from being able to 00:44:38.309 --> 00:44:39.269 branch out in my own mind 00:44:39.269 --> 00:44:40.488 sort of 00:44:40.489 --> 00:44:44.869 considering more deep pleasures, more deep thoughts. 00:44:44.869 --> 00:44:48.630 and tell me your name 00:44:48.630 --> 00:44:49.630 Joe. 00:44:49.630 --> 00:44:52.559 Joe, so if you had to spend the rest of your life on 00:44:52.559 --> 00:44:55.409 on a farm in Kansas with only 00:44:55.409 --> 00:44:57.489 with only Shakespeare 00:44:57.489 --> 00:45:02.079 or the collected episodes of the Simpsons 00:45:02.079 --> 00:45:04.119 you would prefer 00:45:04.119 --> 00:45:06.599 Shakespeare 00:45:06.599 --> 00:45:09.849 what do you conclude from that 00:45:09.849 --> 00:45:12.149 about John Stuart Mill's test 00:45:12.149 --> 00:45:15.078 but the test of a higher pleasure 00:45:15.079 --> 00:45:16.359 is whether 00:45:16.359 --> 00:45:18.369 people who have experienced 00:45:18.369 --> 00:45:21.509 both prefer it. 00:45:21.509 --> 00:45:23.880 can I cite another example briefly? 00:45:23.880 --> 00:45:25.130 in biology 00:45:25.130 --> 00:45:28.769 in neuro biology last year we were told of a rat who was tested 00:45:28.769 --> 00:45:31.209 a particular center in the brain 00:45:31.209 --> 00:45:35.879 where the rat was able to stimulate its brain and cause itself intense pleasure repeatedly 00:45:35.879 --> 00:45:38.368 the rat did not eat or drink until it died 00:45:38.369 --> 00:45:42.179 so the rat was clearly experiencing intense pleasure 00:45:42.179 --> 00:45:46.269 now if you asked me right now if I'd rather experience intense pleasure 00:45:46.269 --> 00:45:47.140 or have 00:45:47.140 --> 00:45:52.690 a full lifetime of higher pleasure, I would consider intense pleasure to be lower pleasure, right 00:45:52.690 --> 00:45:55.799 now enjoy intense pleasure 00:45:55.799 --> 00:46:01.969 yes I would 00:46:01.969 --> 00:46:03.159 but over a lifetime I think 00:46:03.159 --> 00:46:04.360 I would think 00:46:04.360 --> 00:46:06.899 almost a complete majority here would agree 00:46:06.899 --> 00:46:11.630 that they would rather be a human with higher pleasure that rat 00:46:11.630 --> 00:46:13.269 with intense pleasure 00:46:13.269 --> 00:46:14.930 for a momentary period of time 00:46:14.930 --> 00:46:15.870 so now 00:46:15.870 --> 00:46:18.959 in answer to your question, right, I think 00:46:18.959 --> 00:46:21.348 this proves that, or I won't say proves 00:46:21.349 --> 00:46:24.999 I think the conclusion 00:46:24.999 --> 00:46:28.649 is that Mill's theory that when a majority people are asked 00:46:28.650 --> 00:46:31.439 what they would rather do, 00:46:31.439 --> 00:46:33.118 they will answer 00:46:33.119 --> 00:46:34.689 that they would rather 00:46:34.689 --> 00:46:39.499 engage in a higher pleasure. So you think that this supports Mills, that Mills was on to something here 00:46:39.499 --> 00:46:40.738 I do. 00:46:40.739 --> 00:46:42.629 all right is there anyone 00:46:42.629 --> 00:46:46.839 who disagrees with Joe who thinks that our experiment 00:46:46.839 --> 00:46:48.578 disproves 00:46:48.579 --> 00:46:49.959 Mills' 00:46:49.959 --> 00:46:51.098 test 00:46:51.099 --> 00:46:53.239 shows that that's not an adequate way 00:46:53.239 --> 00:46:57.689 that you can't distinguish higher pleasures within the utilitarian 00:46:57.689 --> 00:47:02.649 framework. 00:47:05.879 --> 00:47:09.509 If whatever is good is truly just whatever people prefer it's truly relative and there's 00:47:09.509 --> 00:47:11.519 no objective definition then 00:47:11.519 --> 00:47:14.888 there will be some society where people prefer Simpsons 00:47:14.889 --> 00:47:15.849 more 00:47:15.849 --> 00:47:21.380 anyone can appreciate the Simpsons, but I think it does take education to appreciate Shakespeare 00:47:21.380 --> 00:47:25.660 Alright, you're saying it takes education to appreciate higher 00:47:25.660 --> 00:47:27.319 true thing 00:47:27.319 --> 00:47:29.719 Mill's point is 00:47:29.719 --> 00:47:32.890 that the higher pleasures do require 00:47:32.890 --> 00:47:35.089 cultivation and appreciation and education 00:47:35.090 --> 00:47:37.799 he doesn't dispute that 00:47:37.799 --> 00:47:38.650 but 00:47:38.650 --> 00:47:41.660 once having been cultivated 00:47:41.660 --> 00:47:44.029 and educated 00:47:44.029 --> 00:47:45.509 people will see 00:47:45.509 --> 00:47:48.270 not only see the difference between higher lower 00:47:48.270 --> 00:47:49.009 pleasures 00:47:49.009 --> 00:47:51.539 but will it actually 00:47:51.539 --> 00:47:52.769 prefer 00:47:52.769 --> 00:47:53.970 the higher 00:47:53.970 --> 00:47:55.848 to the lower. 00:47:55.849 --> 00:47:59.519 you find this famous passage from John Stuart Mill- 00:47:59.519 --> 00:48:00.808 it is better 00:48:00.809 --> 00:48:03.869 to be a human being dissatisfied 00:48:03.869 --> 00:48:06.109 then a pig satisfied. 00:48:06.109 --> 00:48:10.538 Better to the Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied 00:48:10.539 --> 00:48:12.229 and if the fool 00:48:12.229 --> 00:48:13.439 or the pig 00:48:13.439 --> 00:48:15.538 are of a different opinion 00:48:15.539 --> 00:48:18.209 it is because they only know 00:48:18.209 --> 00:48:20.700 their side of the question. 00:48:20.700 --> 00:48:22.339 so here you have 00:48:22.339 --> 00:48:23.159 an attempt 00:48:23.159 --> 00:48:24.609 to distinguish 00:48:24.609 --> 00:48:27.199 higher from lower 00:48:27.199 --> 00:48:28.719 pleasures 00:48:28.719 --> 00:48:33.169 so going to an art museum or being a couch potato, swilling beer watching television 00:48:33.169 --> 00:48:35.489 at home 00:48:35.489 --> 00:48:37.950 sometimes Mill agrees we might succumb 00:48:37.950 --> 00:48:40.839 to the temptation 00:48:40.839 --> 00:48:41.839 to do the latter, 00:48:41.839 --> 00:48:46.308 to be couch potatoes, 00:48:46.309 --> 00:48:47.779 but even when we do that 00:48:47.779 --> 00:48:49.609 out of indolence 00:48:49.609 --> 00:48:50.680 and sloth, 00:48:50.680 --> 00:48:52.200 we know 00:48:52.200 --> 00:48:54.029 that the pleasure we get 00:48:54.029 --> 00:48:55.670 gazing at Rembrandts 00:48:55.670 --> 00:48:56.989 in the museum 00:48:56.989 --> 00:49:00.219 is actually higher, 00:49:00.219 --> 00:49:03.190 because we've experienced both. 00:49:03.190 --> 00:49:05.699 And is a higher pressure 00:49:05.699 --> 00:49:06.940 gazing at Rembrandts 00:49:06.940 --> 00:49:11.499 because of engages our higher human faculties 00:49:11.499 --> 00:49:13.848 what about Mill's attempt 00:49:13.849 --> 00:49:18.890 to reply to the objection about individual rights? 00:49:18.890 --> 00:49:21.859 In a way he uses the same 00:49:21.859 --> 00:49:25.319 kind of argument 00:49:25.319 --> 00:49:27.859 and this comes out in chapter five 00:49:27.859 --> 00:49:33.369 he says while I dispute the pretensions of any theory which sets up an imaginary standard 00:49:33.369 --> 00:49:34.889 of justice 00:49:34.889 --> 00:49:39.719 not grounded on utility, 00:49:39.719 --> 00:49:41.389 but still 00:49:41.389 --> 00:49:43.429 he considers 00:49:43.429 --> 00:49:44.599 justice 00:49:44.599 --> 00:49:48.549 grounded on utility to be what he calls the chief part 00:49:48.549 --> 00:49:52.679 and incomparably the most sacred and binding part 00:49:52.679 --> 00:49:54.599 of all morality. 00:49:54.599 --> 00:49:57.249 so justice is higher 00:49:57.249 --> 00:50:00.049 individual rights are privileged 00:50:00.049 --> 00:50:01.899 but not for 00:50:01.899 --> 00:50:05.310 reasons that depart from utilitarian assumptions. 00:50:05.310 --> 00:50:06.769 Justice is a name 00:50:06.769 --> 00:50:09.069 for certain moral requirements 00:50:09.069 --> 00:50:11.220 which, regarded collectively 00:50:11.220 --> 00:50:14.519 stand higher in the scale of social utility 00:50:14.519 --> 00:50:17.109 and are therefore 00:50:17.109 --> 00:50:19.209 of more 00:50:19.209 --> 00:50:20.678 paramount obligation 00:50:20.679 --> 00:50:23.200 than any others 00:50:23.200 --> 00:50:28.919 so justice is sacred, it's prior, it's privileged, it isn't something that can easily be traded 00:50:28.920 --> 00:50:30.890 off against lesser things 00:50:30.890 --> 00:50:32.239 but the reason 00:50:32.239 --> 00:50:33.619 is ultimately 00:50:33.619 --> 00:50:35.799 Mills Claims 00:50:35.799 --> 00:50:37.929 a utilitarian reason 00:50:37.929 --> 00:50:39.239 once you consider 00:50:39.239 --> 00:50:41.199 the long run interests 00:50:41.199 --> 00:50:43.539 of humankind, 00:50:43.539 --> 00:50:44.670 of all of us, 00:50:44.670 --> 00:50:46.329 as progressive 00:50:46.329 --> 00:50:47.699 beings. 00:50:47.699 --> 00:50:51.279 If we do justice and if we respect rights 00:50:51.279 --> 00:50:52.609 society as a whole 00:50:52.609 --> 00:50:55.949 will be better off in the long run. 00:50:55.949 --> 00:50:57.999 Well is that convincing? 00:50:57.999 --> 00:50:59.158 Or 00:50:59.159 --> 00:51:04.549 is Mill actually, without admitting it, stepping outside 00:51:04.549 --> 00:51:06.219 utilitarian considerations 00:51:06.219 --> 00:51:07.789 in arguing 00:51:07.789 --> 00:51:11.129 for qualitatively higher 00:51:11.129 --> 00:51:12.788 pleasures 00:51:12.789 --> 00:51:14.479 and for sacred 00:51:14.479 --> 00:51:16.948 or specially important 00:51:16.949 --> 00:51:18.479 individual rights? 00:51:18.479 --> 00:51:21.718 we haven't fully answered that question 00:51:21.719 --> 00:51:23.809 because to answer that question 00:51:23.809 --> 00:51:26.259 in the case of rights and justice 00:51:26.259 --> 00:51:28.869 will require that we explore 00:51:28.869 --> 00:51:30.419 other ways, 00:51:30.419 --> 00:51:33.368 non utilitarian ways 00:51:33.369 --> 00:51:35.030 of accounting for the basis 00:51:35.030 --> 00:51:36.479 or rights 00:51:36.479 --> 00:51:38.269 and then asking 00:51:38.269 --> 00:51:40.408 whether they succeed 00:51:40.409 --> 00:51:42.949 as for Jeremy Bentham, 00:51:42.949 --> 00:51:44.969 who launched 00:51:44.969 --> 00:51:46.099 utilitarianism 00:51:46.099 --> 00:51:47.419 as a doctrine 00:51:47.419 --> 00:51:49.979 in moral and legal philosophy 00:51:49.979 --> 00:51:53.819 Bentham died in 1832 at the age of eighty five 00:51:53.819 --> 00:51:57.509 but if you go to London you can visit him today 00:51:57.509 --> 00:51:58.729 literally. 00:51:58.729 --> 00:52:01.439 he provided in his will 00:52:01.440 --> 00:52:03.390 that his body be preserved, 00:52:03.390 --> 00:52:05.489 embalmed and displayed 00:52:05.489 --> 00:52:07.739 in the university of London 00:52:07.739 --> 00:52:11.069 where he still presides in a glass case 00:52:11.069 --> 00:52:12.950 with a wax head 00:52:12.950 --> 00:52:14.989 dressed in his actual clothing. 00:52:14.989 --> 00:52:17.049 you see before he died, 00:52:17.049 --> 00:52:22.339 Bentham addressed himself to a question consistent with his philosophy, 00:52:22.339 --> 00:52:23.499 of what use 00:52:23.499 --> 00:52:26.839 could a dead man be to the living 00:52:26.839 --> 00:52:30.499 one use, he said, would be to make one's corpse available 00:52:30.499 --> 00:52:33.519 for the study of anatomy 00:52:33.519 --> 00:52:37.129 in the case of great philosophers, however, 00:52:37.129 --> 00:52:38.159 better yet 00:52:38.159 --> 00:52:44.919 to preserve one's physical presence in order to inspire future generations of thinkers. 00:52:44.919 --> 00:52:47.618 You want to see what Bentham looks like stuffed? 00:52:47.619 --> 00:52:50.410 Here's what he looks like 00:52:50.410 --> 00:52:53.549 There he is 00:52:53.549 --> 00:52:55.459 now, if you look closely 00:52:55.459 --> 00:52:57.459 you'll notice 00:52:57.459 --> 00:52:58.529 that 00:52:58.529 --> 00:53:05.529 the embalming up his actual had was not a success so they substituted a waxed head 00:53:06.910 --> 00:53:10.009 and at the bottom for verisimilitude 00:53:10.009 --> 00:53:13.390 you can actually see his actual had 00:53:13.390 --> 00:53:14.979 on a plate 00:53:16.529 --> 00:53:17.809 you see it? 00:53:17.809 --> 00:53:22.599 right there 00:53:22.599 --> 00:53:25.709 so, what's the moral of the story? 00:53:25.709 --> 00:53:29.499 the moral of the story 00:53:29.499 --> 00:53:33.698 by the way they bring him out during meetings of the board at university college London 00:53:33.699 --> 00:53:40.659 and the minutes record him as present but not voting. 00:53:40.659 --> 00:53:42.539 here is a philosopher 00:53:42.539 --> 00:53:45.109 in life and in death 00:53:45.109 --> 00:53:46.769 who adhered 00:53:46.769 --> 00:53:48.399 to the principles 00:53:48.400 --> 00:53:55.400 of his philosophy. we'll continue with rights next time. 00:53:57.439 --> 00:54:00.808 Don't miss the chance to interact online with other viewers of Justice 00:54:00.809 --> 00:54:03.369 join the conversation, take a pop quiz, 00:54:03.369 --> 00:54:07.799 watch lectures you've missed, and a lot more. 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