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The Ford Pinto Criminal Trial (1980) | American Corp. Prosecuted Criminally for Exploding Fuel Tank

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    STRIKER: Whatcha looking at?
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    WOMAN: The Pinto.
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    STRIKER: I like it. My kind of car.
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    WOMAN: Oh really?
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    STRIKER: Sub-compact. Lots of trunk space. What's the price?
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    WOMAN: Under 2,000 dollars.
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    STRIKER:Huh?
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    WOMAN: In 1971.
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    STRIKER: Oh that makes sense.
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    Still a good deal though.
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    But why is it here in the law museum?
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    WOMAN: The Pinto was at the center of a very important trial in 1979,
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    State of Indiana v. Ford Motor Company.
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    This was the first time an American corporation was
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    criminally prosecuted and the whole country was watching.
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    STRIKER: Why?
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    WOMAN: Everybody wanted to see if a company could be
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    punished criminally for creating a product,
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    in this case, an automobile that was unsafe.
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    STRIKER: Yipes!
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    STRIKER: So what was wrong with the Pinto?
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    WOMAN: Well, the Pinto was created to satisfy two main objectives.
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    Lee Iacocca, who was executive vice president of the Ford Motor Company,
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    tasked his engineers with creating a car that would weigh less
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    than 2,000 pounds and cost less than 2,000 dollars.
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    German and Japanese manufacturers were making lots of money producing
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    sub-compact cars and Ford Motor Company wanted in on the action.
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    STRIKER: What's wrong with that?
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    WOMAN: Well, nothing but I haven't finished the story.
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    Ford was in a hurry to introduce their car into the market so they
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    accelerated their production time from their usual 43 months to 25 months.
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    Compromises were made.
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    Serious risks associated with the placement of
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    the Pintos fuel tanks were ignored despite crash tests resulting in flames.
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    STRIKER: Flames?
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    WOMAN: Yes, flames.
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    The rush design placed the fuel tank behind
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    the rear axle instead of over it like most sub-compact cars,
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    this left only 9 or 10 inches of crush space.
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    Other design flaws included a thin strip of chrome for
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    a bumper and a lack of reinforcement around the fuel tank.
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    The results? At speeds over 25 miles per hour,
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    the fuel tank ruptured every time it experienced a rear impact.
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    STRIKER: Yipes! That looks deadly.
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    WOMAN: It was.
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    STRIKER: Couldn't they fix it?
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    WOMAN: They certainly could have improved the situation.
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    Engineers at Ford came up with
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    several modifications to significantly improve the safety of the vehicle.
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    STRIKER: So they did make it better?
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    WOMAN: No.
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    STRIKER: How come?
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    WOMAN: Well, despite the cost being only 11 dollars per car, Ford declined.
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    STRIKER: Why?
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    WOMAN: It's hard to say.
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    However, we can gain some insight into the corporate mentality
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    at Ford from an internal report regarding safety,
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    which was leaked to the media.
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    STRIKER: What did it say?
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    WOMAN: The document, nicknamed the Pinto Memo,
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    was created by several analysts at Ford.
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    It compared the cost of making safety improvements in advance with the cost
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    Ford would most likely incur through death and injury lawsuits and lost vehicles.
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    STRIKER: What?
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    WOMAN: It's called a cost-benefit analysis.
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    Ford estimated that if they did not fix the safety issues,
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    there would be 180 deaths,
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    180 injuries, and 2,100 vehicles destroyed.
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    They even determined a value for each loss, $200,000 per death,
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    $67,000 per burn injury,
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    and $700 per lost vehicle,
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    which was the average resale value of a Pinto at that time.
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    STRIKER: That's crazy.
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    WOMAN: The public especially didn't appreciate their $200,000 valuation of a human life.
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    STRIKER: Uncool.
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    WOMAN: They compared these costs to those associated with redesigning and installing
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    better safety features on the 12.5 million cars they expected to sell.
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    The cost was only $11 per vehicle.
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    STRIKER: And the result?
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    WOMAN: They determined it will cost the company approximately $49 million in
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    lawsuits and lost vehicles to sell the Pinto as it was already designed,
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    or it would cost
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    approximately $137 million to redesign and improve the safety defect in advance.
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    STRIKER: What did they decide to do?
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    WOMAN: What do you think?
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    STRIKER: Keep the money?
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    WOMAN: Yep, they save the money and ignored the safety risk.
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    STRIKER: What happened?
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    WOMAN: An estimated 27 people were killed in rear-end collisions involving the Pinto.
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    Upon impact, the fuel tank would puncture and explode,
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    often sending fuel into the driver's compartment which would then ignite.
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    STRIKER: That's terrible.
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    WOMAN: In one of the few cases that made it to trial,
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    Grimshaw versus Ford, a California jury awarded a boy who had been badly burned,
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    127 million dollars, 125 million of which was for
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    punitive damages to punish Ford for its decision to elevate profits over human life.
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    Although the judge subsequently reduced the punitive damages to 3.5 million,
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    the unexpectedly high amount sent the Ford Motor Company scrambling.
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    STRIKER: Scrambling to do what?
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    WOMAN: To settle as many of their pending cases as possible out of court.
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    STRIKER: How many cases were there?
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    WOMAN: Ford was involved in dozens of cases related to the Pinto.
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    However, their public image was suffering more than their bank account.
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    Here's an opinion given by a California Appellate Court regarding the Ford Motor Company.
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    STRIKER: "Ford decided to defer correction of the Pinto's shortcomings by engaging in
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    a cost-benefit analysis balancing human lives and limbs against corporate profits.
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    Ford's institutional mentality was shown to
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    be one of callous indifference to public safety.
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    There was substantial evidence that Ford's conduct constituted
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    conscious disregard of the probability of injury to members of the consuming public.
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    The conduct of Ford's management was reprehensible in the extreme.
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    It exhibited a conscious and callous disregard of
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    public safety in order to maximize corporate profits."
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    Harsh words.
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    WOMAN: It was a disaster.
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    In 1976, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
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    finally introduced rear impact safety regulations.
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    Ford complied with the standards on their new 1977 Pinto model.
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    However, the NHTSA also announced that a safety defect existed in
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    the fuel systems of all Pintos manufactured between 1971 and 1976.
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    Ford was forced to recall and repair 1.5 million cars.
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    STRIKER: But what about those criminal charges you mentioned earlier?
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    WOMAN: Oh yes. That's right.
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    Prior to 1978, Ford had only been sued for monetary damages.
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    However, that changed on August 10, 1978,
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    when three teenage girls were driving in a 1973 Pinto down a highway in rural Indiana,
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    suddenly their gas cap rolled from the top of their car into the middle of the road,
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    realizing they forgot to attach it after fueling up,
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    they stopped their car to retrieve it.
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    Since there was no shoulder available,
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    they parked their car in a driving lane.
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    Moments later, a van whose driver was distracted as he searched for
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    a fallen cigarette hit their Pinto while traveling at 50 miles per hour.
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    The Pinto burst into flames and all three teenagers were killed.
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    The state prosecutor charged the Ford Motor Company
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    with criminal recklessness and reckless homicide.
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    STRIKER: This was the first time a corporation had ever been charged with a criminal offense?
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    WOMAN: In a product liability case, yes.
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    STRIKER: Wow. I'll bet other corporations around
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    the country were nervous about the outcome of the trial.
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    WOMAN: Yes, they were.
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    STRIKER: What did the court decide?
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    WOMAN: On March 13, 1980,
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    the jury returned not-guilty verdicts on
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    all three counts of reckless homicide against the Ford Motor Company.
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    STRIKER: Really, how come?
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    WOMAN: The prosecution was unable to show that Ford had failed to warn the public about
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    the Pinto's defects since Ford had issued a recall prior to the date of the accident.
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    STRIKER: But the girls didn't hear about the recall?
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    WOMAN: Yes. But just because you don't hear about something
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    doesn't mean it didn't happen.
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    The defense also called several Ford engineers to the stand who
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    testified they bought 1973 Pintos for their wives, children, and themselves.
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    This showed their confidence in the safety of the car.
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    But the main reason Ford Motor won the case was
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    because the impact happened at 50 miles per hour.
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    STRIKER: Why did that matter?
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    WOMAN: Well, not even the new rear impact standard in effect for 1977
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    models required that car fuel tanks be able to withstand crashes at that speed.
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    STRIKER: I see. So nothing happened to Ford?
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    WOMAN: Ford Motor paid out well over $100 million in damages,
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    endured approximately 117 civil lawsuits,
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    and recalled 1.5 million cars.
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    STRIKER: I guess that is pretty significant.
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    I just feel bad for all the people who unknowingly rode in a car that was clearly unsafe.
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    WOMAN: No car is ever 100% safe.
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    Just remember, every time you get into a vehicle, drive carefully.
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    STRIKER: Buckle up for safety.
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    WOMAN: Good advice, Striker.
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    Now, let's see if we can learn some other important lessons from the history of law.
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    Click on something and let's go explore.
Title:
The Ford Pinto Criminal Trial (1980) | American Corp. Prosecuted Criminally for Exploding Fuel Tank
Description:

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Video Language:
English
Team:
BYU Continuing Education
Project:
MSB-360-300
Duration:
10:21

English subtitles

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