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The Other Side of Suez (BBC Documentary)

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    This is a story of how the government of the United Kingdom
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    decided to attack an Arab nation, of how afraid
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    its oil supplies were under threat and
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    embarked on a strategy of regime change.
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    Of how Britain deliberately bypassed the United Nations
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    and of how a power British Prime Minister led
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    the nation to war based on suspect intelligence.
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    But this isn't Iraq 2003,
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    this is Egypt 1956. These are British paratroopers
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    fighting on the orders of British Prime Minister
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    Anthony Eden. He has gambled on a war in a desperate bid to destroy
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    Egypt's new young president Gamal Abdel Nasser.
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    "I'm utterly convinced the action we have taken is right."
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    This is a war over who will run
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    this Egyptian waterway - the Suez Canal - and the vital
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    oil supplies which are transported through it.
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    Suez is a crisis which will push the world to the brink of nuclear
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    catastrophe. "That moment I did think
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    this is really going to be the
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    Third World War."
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    In Britain we know Suez is a war based on a Prime Minister's lie,
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    a lie which destroys him. "MI-6 sexed up their intelligence."
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    But seen from the other side, Suez is a story of how a small
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    poor Arab country defended itself against the Western world
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    and won. "People will defend their country, they will defend their land."
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    July the 26th, 1956. It is a warm evening
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    as Egyptian President Gamal Abdel
    Nasser prepares to address his people.
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    His country is in ferment. Only seven
    days before,
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    the young president had suffered a
    humiliating blow when the West sabotaged
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    his key plan to lift
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    Egypt out of poverty. Now, two hundred
    thousand people gathered to hear their
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    president's response.
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    But unknown to the crowd, 30 people
    stationed on the banks of the Suez Canal
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    are listening for a password - a
    Frenchman's name hidden
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    in Nasser's speech. "They have
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    their radio on to follow the speech
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    waiting for the password "De Lesseps."
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    When they hear this word, their president
    has told them to storm the offices of
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    the Suez Canal Company.
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    {Segment from speech}
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    As jubilant Egyptians celebrate,
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    Nasser heads to a movie theater to relax.
    He doesn't know that in London,
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    Anthony Eden has already decided to have
    him killed.
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    Egypt - cradle of ancient civilizations
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    and in the post-war era, strategically
    the most valuable country in the Arab
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    world.
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    Thanks to this, the Suez Canal, which
    carries oil to the economies of the West.
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    The company that runs the canal
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    is largely owned by Egypt's old colonial
    masters, Britain and France,
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    and is staffed by Europeans. "Reconsider
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    the Suez Canal Company is a country, inside
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    our country, a state inside our state. Egypt sees virtually nothing of
    the tens of millions of dollars the
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    canal earns each year.
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    Feelings of resentment are growing.
    "Imagine
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    somebody, a foreigner in your country, and he give
    your nothing.
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    He take everything and give you nothing. Is
    that justice?"
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    In February 1955, Egypt's young President
    Gamal Abdel Nasser
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    meets British Prime Minister Anthony
    Eden for the first time.
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    The two men dislike one another from the
    start.
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    "The impression of President Nasser
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    about Anthony Eden
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    was that he was small Cheshire and not a, you know,
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    committed with imposing
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    the British point of view on the other side."
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    For Eden, Egypt remains part of Britain's
    sphere of influence in the Middle East.
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    Although nominally independent since
    1922, Egyptian kings have dutifully done
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    what British Prime Minister's
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    have told them to do. "Eden lived in the
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    legend of the empire, but the world was different.
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    Eden didn't realize
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    the change in the balance of power."
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    Anthony Eden is every inch the
    conservative Prime Minister.
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    Educated at Eton and Oxford, he was
    foreign secretary during the war
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    and is Winston Churchill's hand-picked
    successor.
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    But in Nasser, Eden encounters a new kind
    of Arab leader.
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    He is part of a new generation
    of Egyptians determined to secure
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    real independence for their country.
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    Nasser is one of a group of officers who
    had overthrown the playboy
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    King Farouk in 1952. Two years later,
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    Nasser had shown Britain that Egypt would
    not be pushed around.
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    An aggressive guerrilla campaign forces
    the British to evacuate
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    eighty-eight thousand soldiers from the
    biggest base in the world,
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    on the banks of the Suez Canal. "At that
    time,
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    what was most important is real independence
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    and to get free, really free, by
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    evacuating the troops." "There was an
    operation
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    against the British troops prior to
    the negotiations.
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    When the negotiations go in a smooth
    way,
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    we ease the resistance. When
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    the British delegation became
    stubborn,
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    we intensify the resistance."
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    By the spring of 1956,
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    Egypt is free of British troops. With
    his country moving away from its
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    colonial past,
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    Nasser embarks on an ambitious plan to
    transform the lives of his people.
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    "Egypt was very much backward,
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    half percent of the people were
    possessing
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    nearly about seventy-five percent of the
    fortune.
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    "We had one of the lowest standards life,
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    the majority of Egyptians were in
    streets with
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    naked feet."
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    Nasser's solution is to build a huge dam on
    the Nile at Aswan
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    which will provide water for agriculture
    and electricity.
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    It will be the biggest dam in the world
    and will lift Egypt out of poverty
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    once and for all. "This project of the high dam
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    will provide Egypt with water to double the
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    farms and will give power - electricity to
    industrialize Egypt."
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    But Nasser needs four hundred million
    dollars to realize his dream,
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    an enormous sum in the 1950s.
    His first port of call
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    is the West. "In the beginning, Nasser
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    and all the revolution have no problem
    with the Americans. On the contrary, we can get help
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    of the Americans." The World Bank, backed by the United
    States and Britain,
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    agrees to give him a loan. At this point,
    Nasser's relations with the Americans
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    seem close. "Nasser's favorite film
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    is It's a Wonderful Life with Jimmy Stewart.
    He really loves that
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    film and Washington arranges to send out
    a special copy of the film
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    with Arabic subtitles." By 1956,
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    Egypt's glamorous young president is
    confident his plans to develop Egypt
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    are on course, but Nasser has another
    problem,
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    which will destroy his plans.
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    "As the sporadic fighting takes on the
    proportions of full-scale war,
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    dead and captured arms are the order of
    the day, as both Arabs and Israelis put
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    their nations on a full mobilization
    basis."
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    {Explosions}
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    Nassar faught in the Arab armies defeated by
    the Israelis in 1948.
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    Since then the Middle East's newest
    state has fought a border war with its
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    Arab neighbors.
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    Israel's very existence is an affront
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    to Nasser. "Nasser was at the time a great
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    danger and enemy. Very soon, it was clear
    that he aspires
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    to the unify the Arab world." "Nasser
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    made great speeches. He was handsome, he
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    was eloquent. He carried fire with him,
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    there was a catastrophe."
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    The Israelis see themselves surrounded
    by enemies,
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    fearing attack, they are desperately
    trolling the world for arms.
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    "The Americans were very strict, they wouldn't supply us arms,
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    so did Great Britain, and I thought
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    the only opening we have is France."
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    France agrees to supply Israel with the
    Jewish state's
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    first jet fighters. To Nasser,
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    it looks like an increasingly powerful
    enemy is at the gates.
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    "The French are giving Israel arms, I am
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    confronting the situation that may distract my
    country.
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    Should I stand still?"
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    So Nasser decides he too will look
    abroad for arms.
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    As with the loan for his dam, his first
    call
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    is on the United States. "Nasser, from the first
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    day of revolution, asks the Americans,
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    I need arms, our
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    army needs arms and he asked the British
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    the same question. Neither the British
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    nor the Americans gave a response on that." But
    this
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    is the 1950s, the depths of
    the Cold War,
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    the West and the Soviet Union are locked
    in a battle for influence across the
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    world.
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    Nasser knows that if Washington says no
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    then maybe Nikita Khrushchev in
    Moscow will say yes.
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    "Egypt flexes its military muscles with
    the display of arms newly acquired from
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    Russia and its satellites."
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    The first arms from the Soviet bloc
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    land in Alexandria on the 27th of
    September,
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    1955. The deal as a triumph for Khrushchev,
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    who is keen to extend Communist
    influence in the region.
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    "He didn't expect that countries would
    be communist immediately,
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    he's willing to wait. Egypt was
    the first great success for him.
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    This was for Khrushchev a sign.
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    The kind of relationship he could have
    with many of the large states in
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    developing world.
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    And for the West, this was a very
    dramatic achievement."
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    But Nasser is not in Khrushchev's pocket,
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    as many in the West fear. "Nasser has
    never been a Communist, never, never
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    at all." "We are believer. I
    am a believer, I believe in God. Nasser
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    used to believe in God. Nasser used to
    pray.
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    The Communists don't believe in God.
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    Nasser was an anti-communist.
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    The soviets knew full well he was an anti-communist.
    They knew that he was putting communists
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    in jail.
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    He didn't let those communists out of jail
    when his relations improved with the
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    Soviet Union, but both sides made a
    pragmatic
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    decision." But in Eden's view,
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    Nasser does look like a communist stooge. The prime minister and the Americans
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    decide to punish him for cutting a deal
    with the Soviets.
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    Their response is to mount a covert
    campaign against Nasser,
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    code-named Omega. "Omega includes
    propaganda
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    to provide information to journalists, to
    broadcasters,
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    that say, "Nasser really isn't a very good
    person, can you please report this?"
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    "Omega also includes sanctions against
    Egypt. It includes
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    locking military aid to Egypt." Then
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    as part of this undeclared war, a secret
    decision is taken to slow down financing
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    on the Aswan dam.
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    Anthony Eden and the US Secretary of
    State, John Foster Dulles,
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    are behind the new strategy. "I think
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    Dulles was angry with Nasser for having
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    almost flaunted his independence. I really
    think that
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    Dulles believed that Nasser's
    behavior was
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    almost a personal affront him.
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    In London, Eden's mistrust of Nasser is
    increased by some mysterious
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    intelligence reports which have just
    landed on his desk.
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    They are from an MI6 contact known as
    "Lucky Break".
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    Lucky Break tells Eden that Nasser is a
    pawn of the Soviet Union
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    and the Egyptian people will welcome his
    overthrow. "From reading the reports in MI6
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    is giving to British officials and
    giving to the Americans,
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    I think they're taking a few sources and
    their sexing them up.
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    No one individual
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    could have provided the information that
    Nasser was so close to the Soviets,
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    that Nasser was so vulnerable to being
    overthrown,
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    if not assinated, because that was
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    not true, that simply was not true."
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    But "Lucky Break" is telling the British
    Prime Minister
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    what he wants to hear them. The firm attitude that the
    government have adopted is not (quote fades)
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    Foreign Office Minister Anthony Nutting
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    is one of the first to realize just how
    far the Prime Minister
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    is now prepared to go. "Over an open line,
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    having just said, 'it's me,' we started
    a violent argument on the telephone, and he
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    was really violent
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    in our conversation
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    and ended up by shouting at me, 'I don't
    want Nasser neutralized, I want him
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    destroyed'."
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    There were two-two people [unintelligible] in conversation:
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    Eden and Nutting. Nutting said subsequently that Eden had said murder.
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    Operatives within MI6
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    take the Prime Minister at his word. "What
    you have is Thomas of Becket situation
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    were Eden says will someone not
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    make me rid of this turbulent Nasser." "I'm not
    exaggerating.
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    Nearly every month, nearly
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    every month, there was an attempt against Nasser.
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    From the West, either French
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    or British, or Israelis, nearly every month.
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    As Nasser was making a public speech in
    Alexandria,
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    a young man fired eight bullets at him.
    All missed the Premier, but two of his aids
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    were wounded.
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    "The plans just are are wildly out of
    control,
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    putting nerve gas into the ventilation
    system of
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    Nasser's headquarters, trying to put poison
    into Nasser's coffee,
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    trying at some point to possibly shoot
    Nasser.
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    If Lucky Break did not exist in 1956, he would
    have had to be created
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    to justify their extravagant plans to
    get rid of Nasser.
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    On the 19th of July, 1956, the Egyptian
    ambassador to the USA
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    is called into the state department. He is
    informed that the financing up the Aswan
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    dam is cancelled.
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    If the West can't assassinate Nasser,
    then they will destroy his dreams to
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    develop Egypt.
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    To add insult to injury, president Nasser
    only learns of the decision from the
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    radio news.
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    I was surprised by the insultive attitude
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    which the refusal was declared,
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    not by the refusal itself, but the
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    insultive attitude and- which
    meant humiliation. Now
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    Nasser has two choices, he can meekly except
    the West's punishment,
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    or he can fight. Three days later,
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    he gathers his most trusted lieutenants
    together. "President Nasser
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    ordered me to bring him the file on the
    Suez Canal.
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    And he told me 'what about nationalizing this canal?'"
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    I got surprised
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    but internally
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    in myself, I got proud to think about
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    this action at that time.
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    I felt proud."
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    Nasser calculates that the Aswan dam
    can still be built,
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    if the tolls have ships transiting the
    Suez Canal come to Egypt
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    and not the British and French
    controlled Suez Canal Company.
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    But Nasser knows that nationalization is a
    huge risk,
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    he will have to physically seize control
    of the canal itself.
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    The next day he is scheduled to make his
    first speech since his humiliation at
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    the hands of the West. All Egypt
    waits for his response.
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    The speech is an anti-climax. "It was all
    rhetoric.
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    The reaction of Egyptians was 'Oh, that
    he hasn't got the balls
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    to really stand up to the United States. But
    afterwards
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    Nasser orders an old military colleague,
    Mahmoud Eunice,
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    to mastermind the dangerous job taking
    physical control of the canal.
  • 19:11 - 19:15
    Eunice selects 30 man he can trust.
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    Eunice emphasized that, if
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    this peace of news
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    is released then
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    it will surely
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    not succeed. Three days later,
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    Nasser is scheduled to speak publicly
    again. The men know their queue for
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    action is a password hidden in the
    President's speech,
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    which will be carried on Egyptian radio.
    The password
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    is the name of the man who designed the
    canal, Ferdinand de Lesseps.
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    As they wait, they still don't know if
    their President has definitely decided
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    to take the gamble.
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    "My feelings were combination
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    of first, fear,
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    and of course the sense of
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    responsibility. This
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    is tremendous.
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    In the stifling July heat, Nasser makes his
    way to Alexandria's Mansheya Square,
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    where he is to deliver his speech. Once
    again his people wait to hear if he
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    will respond to the West's
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    denial of funding for the Aswan dam.
    At 9pm,
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    Nasser climbs the podium. The speech is long.
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    Nasser catalogs the centuries of
    humiliations the Egyptians have suffered
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    at the hands of the West.
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    It is an attitude of such arrogance towards other peoples. We will not be manipulated.
  • 20:55 - 20:56
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    His tone is measured but angry.
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    Today we are going to get rid of what happened in the past.
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    On the canal, Esset and his men are in
    position,
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    ready for the signal, but after two hours,
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    it still hasn't come.
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    "Every year the Company earn 35 million pounds sterling. This money should be ours.
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    Then the moment of truth
  • 21:29 - 21:33
    "I imagined I had seen Ferdinand De Lesseps."
  • 21:34 - 21:38
    At the signal, Eunice, Esset and their
    men, simultaneously break into the
  • 21:38 - 21:40
    four main offices ot the Suez Canal
    Company.
  • 21:41 - 21:45
    In Alexandria, Nasser leaves nothing to
    chance.
  • 21:45 - 21:48
    He repeats the password a total of 14
    times.
  • 21:49 - 21:52
  • 21:52 - 21:54
  • 21:55 - 21:59
    In the Canal Company headquarters, Eunice
    informs the European employees that the
  • 22:00 - 22:01
    company has been nationalized.
  • 22:02 - 22:03
    He is polite,
  • 22:03 - 22:07
    but he is also armed. Attempts sabotage
    or obstruction by the employees
  • 22:08 - 22:11
    will not be tolerated. "They were very
  • 22:12 - 22:16
    astonished and afraid.
  • 22:16 - 22:19
    We tried to calmed them down and
  • 22:19 - 22:23
    asked them to continue work
  • 22:24 - 22:27
    as if nothing has happened."
  • 22:26 - 22:30
    Back in Alexandria, Nasser now reveals to
    the world
  • 22:31 - 22:38
    what the employees at the Suez Canal
    Company have just discovered.
  • 22:43 - 22:46
    "Some of your fellow citizens have just taken over the Canal." Across Egypt, there is pandemonium. "It was a.
  • 22:47 - 22:51
    bombshell, of course, absolute bombshell. We
    listen to this thing
  • 22:51 - 22:55
    nobody expected." "People were rioting
  • 22:56 - 22:59
    in the street.
  • 22:59 - 23:02
    I celebrated with all Egyptians."
  • 23:02 - 23:04
    The Suez Canal Company shall be nationalized. All Company assets shall be transferred to the state. The Company is under new management.
  • 23:04 - 23:11
  • 23:13 - 23:19
  • 23:19 - 23:21
    The employees at the newly nationalized
    company
  • 23:22 - 23:25
    do not join in the celebrations. "I
    remember that
  • 23:26 - 23:29
    some of them said, 'You do not
  • 23:29 - 23:32
    to realize the impact
  • 23:33 - 23:36
    and the reactions from the West.
  • 23:36 - 23:39
    Because the West cannot leave
  • 23:39 - 23:42
    this international waterway
  • 23:42 - 23:45
    in incapable hands.
  • 23:46 - 23:50
    In London,
  • 23:51 - 23:55
    Eden is enjoying post-dinner brandys
    with military and diplomatic top brass
  • 23:55 - 23:56
    at No. 10.
  • 23:56 - 23:59
    When news of Nasser's actions comes
    through,
  • 23:59 - 24:02
    he is furious. "We all know this is how
  • 24:03 - 24:07
    fascist governments behave and we all
    remember,
  • 24:07 - 24:10
    only too well, what the cost can be
  • 24:11 - 24:15
    in giving in to Fascism." The former commanding
    officer
  • 24:16 - 24:20
    of our battalion described, in his usual blunt way
    to me, he said that
  • 24:20 - 24:24
    the moment you mentioned the name Nasser,
    Eden practically
  • 24:25 - 24:30
    got down and chewed the carpet.
  • 24:30 - 24:34
    But in the United States, initial
    reaction is less belligerent.
  • 24:34 - 24:38
    Eisenhower dispatches John Foster Dulles
    to London,
  • 24:38 - 24:43
    to calm me Eden down. Dulles carries with him
    a letter from the President.
  • 24:43 - 24:46
    "The letter said that, under no circumstances,
    within
  • 24:46 - 24:50
    American public opinion or the american
    government support use of force in the
  • 24:50 - 24:55
    Middle East." But Eden has already made
    his decision.
  • 24:54 - 24:57
    The next morning, Eisenhower had a
  • 24:58 - 25:02
    cable from Eden,
  • 25:01 - 25:05
    stating the explicitly that the
    government had decided that they were
  • 25:06 - 25:07
    going to get rid of Nasser,
  • 25:08 - 25:12
    that this is the only alternative, that
    there was a firm decision, they were
  • 25:13 - 25:14
    going to change it,
  • 25:14 - 25:18
    and that was that."
  • 25:18 - 25:21
    "Essentially, the British and French reaction
  • 25:20 - 25:25
    to the Suez Crisis, captivated
    two principles,
  • 25:26 - 25:29
    about which we have heard quite a lot
    recently.
  • 25:30 - 25:33
    One was regime change, feeling that Nasser must go.
  • 25:33 - 25:36
    The other was preemptive
  • 25:36 - 25:40
    self-defense. Eden's justification for
    this
  • 25:39 - 25:43
    is the belief that Nasser is a Soviet
    puppet, a direct threat
  • 25:43 - 25:47
    to British interests. Lucky Break's
    intelligence has told him so.
  • 25:48 - 25:52
    But the intelligence is wrong. In moscow,
  • 25:52 - 25:55
    Nikita Kruschev knows nothing of Nasser's
    plans.
  • 25:55 - 26:01
    "When he nationalized the canal, it was
    a surprise for the Soviet Union also.
  • 26:00 - 26:04
    He didn't take their permission or anything."
  • 26:04 - 26:08
    "Even once he had made this decision, a few days before
    the announcement, he didn't tell the Soviets.
  • 26:09 - 26:13
    And he didn't tell them for an obvious
    reason, he knew what their reaction
  • 26:12 - 26:17
    would be. Moscow would tell him, "Don't do
    it." The West
  • 26:18 - 26:24
    saw Moscow as the ginger man in the
    story, as provoking Nasser to be more and
  • 26:24 - 26:24
    more aggressive.
  • 26:25 - 26:29
    In fact, Moscow was doing the opposite."
    Meanwhile,
  • 26:30 - 26:33
    in the newly nationalized canal, the
    atmosphere is tense.
  • 26:33 - 26:38
    Nasser knows that Edan does not expect
    the Egyptians will be able to run the
  • 26:38 - 26:38
    canal.
  • 26:38 - 26:41
    Critical to its running, are the three
    hundred pilots,
  • 26:41 - 26:45
    nearly all European, who guide each ship
    from one end to the other.
  • 26:46 - 26:49
    "Without these pilots, the traffic will
  • 26:49 - 26:52
    will never start, canal will stop."
  • 26:52 - 26:55
    "We noticed that after
  • 26:56 - 26:59
    the summer leave is over, some
  • 27:00 - 27:04
    did not come back. We also notice
  • 27:04 - 27:07
    that some are selling their cars."
  • 27:07 - 27:11
    "In fourteenth of September,
  • 27:11 - 27:14
    at twelve o'clock, they declared
  • 27:15 - 27:20
    we stop work." Seven weeks after nationalization,
  • 27:19 - 27:23
    the British Prime Minister has secretly
    instructed the pilots to abandon the
  • 27:24 - 27:24
    canal.
  • 27:24 - 27:28
    "It was now an exam, in
  • 27:27 - 27:30
    which if we failed, then soon,
  • 27:31 - 27:37
    then soon the Suez Canal would be lost.
    Egypt's hopes rest on the shoulders of the
  • 27:37 - 27:40
    26-year-old trainee pilot Ali Nasri,
  • 27:41 - 27:45
    who, with only a fortnight's training, has
    to take a ship through the canal.
  • 27:45 - 27:50
    "My first vessel was German and the
    captain came and say,
  • 27:50 - 27:55
    'You are from the new pilots?', I said, 'Yes
    and this is my first time.
  • 27:55 - 27:59
    I have to take a ship alone'."
  • 27:59 - 28:04
    The potential for disaster is huge. The
    canal is little over a hundred meters
  • 28:05 - 28:06
    wide at points.
  • 28:06 - 28:10
    Ali Nasri fears a miscalculation could
    send his tanker into the bank's
  • 28:11 - 28:14
    blocking the whole canal and proving
    Eden right.
  • 28:14 - 28:19
    "The feeling of responsibility makes me losing
    some confidence.
  • 28:20 - 28:24
    I couldn't see the buoys. You see the
    green boys and red buoys.
  • 28:23 - 28:27
    I couldn't see any.
  • 28:28 - 28:32
    But by time, they [unintelligible], and they start to give orders.
  • 28:33 - 28:35
  • 28:35 - 28:42
    Slowly his ship moves off down the canal.
  • 28:45 - 28:51
    "My orders, I executed immediately.
  • 28:51 - 28:53
    You keep the vessel in the middle, straight.
  • 28:54 - 28:57
    So I start to feel happy, relax.
  • 28:57 - 29:00
    I can see the way, the vessel was moving.
  • 29:01 - 29:07
    So I start to feel easy-easy." Nasri's
    progress is followed with baited breath
  • 29:07 - 29:10
    on the banks of the canal. I saw somebody
  • 29:10 - 29:13
    in the road, somebody calling, "Pilot, Pilot."
  • 29:14 - 29:18
    Yes, I look by the glass, and found him,
    Mahmoud Younis himself.
  • 29:18 - 29:22
    The Chairman standing in the road saying,
  • 29:23 - 29:26
    'Good luck, go ahead."
  • 29:26 - 29:30
    14 hours later, a ship piloted by an
    Egyptian has passed successfully through
  • 29:31 - 29:31
    the canal.
  • 29:32 - 29:35
    Once again, there are celebrations in the
    streets.
  • 29:35 - 29:38
    "It is beyond any imagination
  • 29:39 - 29:42
    that gave the confidence
  • 29:42 - 29:45
    to the Egyptian state that they can do
  • 29:46 - 29:49
    what the whole world thought
  • 29:49 - 29:56
    that they cannot.
  • 29:56 - 30:00
    But in London, Eden is still determined
    to build a case for intervention.
  • 30:00 - 30:04
    Removing the pilots is only his opening
    gambit.
  • 30:03 - 30:07
    Now he decides to overwhelm the
    inexperienced Egyptians
  • 30:08 - 30:13
    by forcing a gigantic fleet of tankers
    through the canal.
  • 30:13 - 30:17
    "Now the British had planned a nice
    little scheme which would demonstrate to
  • 30:18 - 30:19
    the world Egyptians were incompetent at
  • 30:19 - 30:23
    running the canal and they would have lots of
    ships, just poised and ready,
  • 30:24 - 30:27
    to go through the canal once the pilot's have been withdrawn."
  • 30:26 - 30:30
    "Then instead of receiving, say 20 vessels at
  • 30:31 - 30:36
    Port Said, you receive 30, to make it more difficult
  • 30:37 - 30:44
    for any group to carry on as [unintelligible].
  • 30:43 - 30:46
    Exhausted, the 36 Egyptian pilots
  • 30:46 - 30:49
    and whatever foreign recruits they can
    muster, work day and night
  • 30:50 - 30:53
    to deny Eden his wish and to keep the
    canal running.
  • 30:53 - 30:56
    We were working continuously.
  • 30:57 - 31:00
    President Nasser, at that time,
  • 31:01 - 31:04
    was on the phone, on the wireless,
  • 31:04 - 31:08
    hour by hour."
  • 31:09 - 31:13
    The Egyptians succeed in keeping the
    canal open, despite Eden's best efforts
  • 31:13 - 31:13
    at sabotage.
  • 31:14 - 31:17
    For a second time, the Prime Minister has
    been foiled.
  • 31:18 - 31:21
    The whole world was
  • 31:21 - 31:24
    not expect, at all, that
  • 31:25 - 31:29
    Egypt would succeed in this severe
  • 31:29 - 31:32
    exam. And some of the Western
  • 31:33 - 31:36
    papers sugguested that the Egyptians
  • 31:36 - 31:39
    cultivate the Suez Canal area with
  • 31:40 - 31:43
    potatoes, instead of running
  • 31:43 - 31:47
    the Suez Canal." Eden is frustrated,
  • 31:48 - 31:53
    but Nasser feels vindicated. It is now
    almost three months since nationalization
  • 31:53 - 31:58
    and the canal is still open for business.
    It seems Aiden's plans to overthrow Nasser
  • 31:59 - 32:04
    and wrestle back control of the canal,
    have failed. The world can see no reason
  • 32:05 - 32:10
    for war. Then,
  • 32:10 - 32:14
    on the 14th of October, two visitors from
    the French Ministry of Defence
  • 32:15 - 32:18
    arrive to see a gloomy Prime Minister
    at his country retreat,
  • 32:18 - 32:21
    Checkers. "The French had invented the
    following
  • 32:22 - 32:25
    senario, that Israel should attack
  • 32:26 - 32:29
    Egypt. There upon, Britain and France, who
  • 32:29 - 32:34
    had forces in the neighborhood, should say,
    'We cannot allow this kind of war because
  • 32:34 - 32:37
    it will interfere with the Suez Canal, and therefore.
  • 32:38 - 32:41
    we are going to intervene and hold the two
    countries apart.
  • 32:42 - 32:43
    "I happened to be in Paris,
  • 32:46 - 32:48
    so the Minister of Defense called me in
  • 32:49 - 32:54
    and says, 'You ever thought about storming over Sinai?'
  • 32:55 - 33:01
  • 33:02 - 33:05
    And that's how it started."
  • 33:05 - 33:07
    Eden is enthusiastic about this
    French plan,
  • 33:08 - 33:12
    not only will he be able to seize the
    canal, he sees a way to bring about
  • 33:13 - 33:14
    Nassar's downfall.
  • 33:14 - 33:17
    "To bomb Egypt, you
  • 33:18 - 33:22
    create panic within the country, you link
    this
  • 33:22 - 33:26
    to an invasion - Israeli invasion, and
    the new government will emerge
  • 33:26 - 33:30
    and Nasser will be no more. As Eden is
    plotting in Britain,
  • 33:31 - 33:34
    the rest of the world is trying to
    broker a peace deal at the United
  • 33:34 - 33:34
    Nations.
  • 33:35 - 33:38
    Eden has reluctantly sent his foreign
    secretary,
  • 33:38 - 33:41
    Selwyn Lloyd, to meet with the French and
    Egyptians in New York.
  • 33:41 - 33:44
    To Lloyd's surprise, the talks are going
    well.
  • 33:45 - 33:48
    "He desperately hoped he would be able to
    make
  • 33:48 - 33:51
    real progress in these talks in the United
    Nations
  • 33:51 - 33:55
    and was encouraged by the Egyptian Foreign
    Minister, Fawzi's,
  • 33:56 - 34:01
    willingness to talk over the subject." But
    just as it seems progress is being made
  • 34:02 - 34:05
    the atmosphere changes, the attitude
  • 34:05 - 34:09
    of Pireau, the French Foreign Minister,
    was very ambiguous.
  • 34:09 - 34:13
    From the beginning, he seemed to be
    prepared
  • 34:14 - 34:19
    to get down to real negotiations, but
    then halfway through,
  • 34:19 - 34:23
    he seemed to lose interest intirely and
    we wondered
  • 34:23 - 34:26
    what was going on and why. Eden,
  • 34:27 - 34:31
    anxious that no deal is struck in New
    York, telephones Lloyd and orders him to
  • 34:32 - 34:33
    abandon the talks immediately.
  • 34:34 - 34:37
    The Foreign Secretary, feeling he might
    be close to a solution,
  • 34:37 - 34:40
    is exasperated. Selwyn Lloyd
  • 34:41 - 34:44
    probably thought that it was worthwhile
    continuing with these discussions.
  • 34:45 - 34:48
    You might say like Hans Blix thought that he
    could do with a couple more months
  • 34:48 - 34:52
    of time to decide something very definite
    about the weapons of mass destruction
  • 34:53 - 34:57
    but Eden wasn't having any of it."
  • 34:58 - 35:02
    Eden has another agenda and instructs
    Lloyd and Logan to travel,
  • 35:02 - 35:05
    in secret, to a Parisian suburb called
    Se,
  • 35:06 - 35:09
    to finalize the plot with the French and
    Israelis.
  • 35:09 - 35:13
    Lloyd was desperately disappointed, but felt,
  • 35:13 - 35:17
    out of loyalty, that he had to do it but it
    turned his stomach to do it
  • 35:18 - 35:22
    and he hated it all the way through. The
    document agreed on here,
  • 35:22 - 35:26
    known as the Sev protocol, puts down in
    black and white the covert plan to
  • 35:27 - 35:28
    invade Egypt
  • 35:28 - 35:32
    and fool the world. At the end, copies of
    the protocol are presented for
  • 35:33 - 35:33
    signatures.
  • 35:34 - 35:38
    Patrick Dean, a Foreign Office official,
    signs on behalf of the British.
  • 35:38 - 35:41
    But Eden does not expect his desire
    for war
  • 35:42 - 35:45
    to be confirmed in writing. "We returned late
    that night and took the
  • 35:46 - 35:50
    document to him in No. 10 and his immediate reaction
  • 35:51 - 35:56
    was, 'Oh my god, I never expected it to be signed'." When this document finally emerged,
  • 35:56 - 35:59
    forty years later, it confirmed how a
    British Prime Minister
  • 36:00 - 36:03
    had deceived the world and deliberately
    engineered a war
  • 36:04 - 36:06
    in the Middle East.
  • 36:07 - 36:13
  • 36:13 - 36:17
    On October the 29th, the Israelis land a
    parachute brigade
  • 36:16 - 36:21
    deep in the Sinai, as agreed at Sev. Nasser
    is awoken at 4am
  • 36:21 - 36:24
    and told the news. "You can take that he
    was surprised
  • 36:25 - 36:30
    and not surprised. We were predicting
  • 36:30 - 36:34
    that there would be an action against Egypt, but
    we have
  • 36:34 - 36:40
    no information from Israel." But the
    Israeli advance towards the canal
  • 36:40 - 36:41
    is a fake,
  • 36:41 - 36:44
    designed purely to convince the world
    that the canal is threatened.
  • 36:45 - 36:48
    "It was about 40 kilometers from the canal or
    45 kilometers.
  • 36:48 - 36:51
    But when you look at big maps then you can say
  • 36:52 - 36:56
    the drop was not far from the canal. There
    was enough to fulfill the needs of the
  • 36:56 - 36:56
    British to say
  • 36:57 - 37:01
    the canal is threatened."
  • 37:01 - 37:04
    "We didn't go into the motives and
    consideration of
  • 37:05 - 37:08
    France and England because our aims were clear."
  • 37:09 - 37:14
    The Israeli forces concentrate instead
  • 37:14 - 37:18
    on destroying the Egyptian army in Sinai
    which they have long seen as a threat
  • 37:18 - 37:22
    to Israel's security. The attack takes
    Nasser's commanders by surprise.
  • 37:23 - 37:26
    They are quickly overwhelmed and forced
    to retreat.
  • 37:26 - 37:29
    The following day, Britain and France
  • 37:30 - 37:35
    issue their ultimatum as planned at Sev,
    Israel and Egypt are to cease fighting
  • 37:35 - 37:39
    or the two Western powers will intervene.
    Eden knows
  • 37:40 - 37:43
    this is an ultimatum that Nasser cannot
    accept.
  • 37:43 - 37:47
    On the evening of the 30th of October,
    the ultimatum expires.
  • 37:47 - 37:54
  • 37:57 - 38:02
    Shortly afterwards, Nasser hears planes in
    the skies above Cairo.
  • 38:02 - 38:07
    "I was with the Indonesian ambassador and there
    were the air warning
  • 38:08 - 38:10
    and then
  • 38:11 - 38:15
    came the blackout. I listened
  • 38:15 - 38:21
    and there was the jet airplanes and I said to
    the Indonesian
  • 38:20 - 38:24
    ambassador these are British."
  • 38:24 - 38:28
    Now Nasser realizes just how much Eden is
    prepared to gamble.
  • 38:29 - 38:32
    "I hadn't thought at all that Britain would do
  • 38:32 - 38:35
    any attack against us because it was clear
  • 38:35 - 38:38
    that any attack against us would effect
  • 38:38 - 38:41
    the British position all over the Arab countries.
  • 38:42 - 38:45
    And would mean the end of the British relations and
  • 38:46 - 38:50
    influence in the Middle East.
  • 38:50 - 38:53
    As the bombs fall, a frightened
    Egyptian population
  • 38:53 - 38:56
    rush to join civilian militias. "Most of
    us,
  • 38:57 - 39:00
    the young people, decided that we're going to
    defend the country."
  • 39:01 - 39:05
    "We really didn't know what we're gonna
    do because our training was very cursory.
  • 39:05 - 39:09
    It included one clip of live ammunition.
    When we joined,
  • 39:09 - 39:13
    first thing they did was they give us
    those cases of Kalashnikov rifles
  • 39:13 - 39:18
    right out of the boxes with Greece,
    and they said, 'Okay, here is your rifle.'"
  • 39:18 - 39:21
    This makeshift civilian army
  • 39:21 - 39:24
    now waits for the arrival of British
    paratroopers.
  • 39:24 - 39:27
    "You hear a lot of fire, people flying
  • 39:27 - 39:30
    rifles and firing in the air. We don't-
  • 39:31 - 39:35
    you know, everybody is a parachutist, you know.
    Any noise you think somebody had just
  • 39:35 - 39:38
    come from sky. So it was a very very
  • 39:39 - 39:43
    tense moment and we were scared."
  • 39:43 - 39:46
    But Cairo, where Talaat Badrawi and
    other volunteers are waiting
  • 39:47 - 39:51
    is not the target for the British
    paratroopers assault. Port Said,
  • 39:51 - 39:55
    at the mouth of the canal, is where
    Britain will begin the reconquest
  • 39:56 - 40:03
    of Egypt.
  • 40:03 - 40:09
    After five days of aerial bombardment,
    668 British paratroopers land in Port Said.
  • 40:10 - 40:16
    The city quickly finds itself under
    occupation,
  • 40:16 - 40:20
    but its population is determined not to
    give Eden the easy victory
  • 40:20 - 40:24
    he has anticipated. "And then they landed,
  • 40:25 - 40:28
    the British landed
    in Port Said.
  • 40:28 - 40:31
    So of course we wanted to wipe them
    out."
  • 40:31 - 40:34
    "All the people have
  • 40:34 - 40:38
    arms and guns and machine guns. They shoot at the airplanes
  • 40:38 - 40:41
    and every Egyptian people are ready to
    sacrifice himself
  • 40:42 - 40:46
    in order to- to defend his country."
    As the resistance mobilizes,
  • 40:47 - 40:50
    the British Prime Minister is insisting
    to the world
  • 40:50 - 40:53
    that his actions are right, legal, and
    morally sound.
  • 40:54 - 41:00
    "All my life, I've been a man a man of peace.
  • 41:00 - 41:03
    Working for peace, striving for peace,
  • 41:04 - 41:07
    negotiating for peace
  • 41:07 - 41:12
    and I'm still the same, with the same
    conviction,
  • 41:13 - 41:16
    same diversion to peace.
  • 41:16 - 41:19
    But I'm utterly
  • 41:19 - 41:24
    convinced the action we have taken is
    right."
  • 41:25 - 41:26
    As Eden is speaking,
  • 41:26 - 41:29
    Port Said is burning.
  • 41:29 - 41:32
    "There were two streets
  • 41:33 - 41:36
    I'm Abbas Street and Adadi
  • 41:36 - 41:39
    Street. These were mainly slums of wooden huts.
  • 41:40 - 41:43
    So they shot powder
  • 41:43 - 41:47
    at this homes and they were all set
    ablaze. One would see so many
  • 41:48 - 41:51
    homes burned, from the start to the end
    of the street.
  • 41:52 - 41:56
    This homes were all burned.
  • 41:56 - 41:59
    I saw corpses down the streets that
    nobody
  • 41:59 - 42:02
    could bury and they brought small
    wagons,
  • 42:02 - 42:05
    usually used to sell vegetables, and put
    six
  • 42:05 - 42:09
    or seven corpses on every wagon to
    take them to the graveyard,
  • 42:09 - 42:12
    in order to be buried there and I saw two corpses
  • 42:13 - 42:16
    which were flattened to the ground all
    together.
  • 42:16 - 42:21
    They were crushed by tanks."
  • 42:21 - 42:26
    The war is barely a week old, hundreds of
    Egyptian civilians have already been
  • 42:26 - 42:27
    killed in the bombing campaign
  • 42:28 - 42:34
    and more die in the street fighting that
    follows.
  • 42:34 - 42:36
  • 42:37 - 42:41
    it is at this point that Eden hopes a
    terrified Egyptian population
  • 42:41 - 42:46
    will rise up to overthrow Nasser. "They do
    not understand what Egypt
  • 42:46 - 42:51
    is. They were completely wrong. The
    Egyptians were- all of them- were
  • 42:51 - 42:58
    where at one heart behind Nasser."
  • 42:59 - 43:02
    "When they feel a foreign threat,
  • 43:03 - 43:06
    people come together and that's what happened exactly."
  • 43:05 - 43:11
    The Egyptian Armed Forces may be
    hopelessly outgunned,
  • 43:12 - 43:15
    but Nasser and his government remain in
    Cairo.
  • 43:14 - 43:17
    Plans are made to begin a guerrilla war,
  • 43:17 - 43:20
    should the army be overwhelmed. "A popular
    army
  • 43:21 - 43:24
    to fight in the canals, in the streets, in the countryside, in the ports."
  • 43:24 - 43:28
    "We were hiding
  • 43:29 - 43:32
    arms all over the villages, everywhere in
    Egypt;
  • 43:31 - 43:35
    So even if the troops, they
    came to invade Egypt, we will fight- we
  • 43:36 - 43:38
    will resist."
  • 43:38 - 43:41
    And to prevent the British taking the
    canal,
  • 43:42 - 43:45
    Nassar orders ships to be sunk and the
    canal blocked.
  • 43:45 - 43:49
    Eden's invasion has succeeded in
    obstructing the very waterway
  • 43:49 - 43:54
    is trying to save and that is in the
    Prime Minister's only miscalculation.
  • 43:53 - 43:56
    The Suez Crisis suddenly increases the
    temperature
  • 43:56 - 43:59
    of the Cold War. "Burning buildings and
    bitter street fighting,
  • 44:00 - 44:05
    signal the release of long, pent-up resentment."
  • 44:05 - 44:07
    2,000 kilometers away, in Budapest,
  • 44:08 - 44:12
    the Soviet Union's empire in Europe is
    threatened by a popular uprising.
  • 44:13 - 44:17
    "The red star has been ripped, the hated symbol of communism is effaced
  • 44:17 - 44:20
    where ever found." Nikita Kruschev
  • 44:20 - 44:23
    sees his ally Nasser coming under attack
    in Cairo
  • 44:24 - 44:27
    and realizes that Soviet prestige
    appears to be crumbling
  • 44:27 - 44:30
    on two continents. "He feels
  • 44:31 - 44:35
    that the West is taking advantage of him
    when he is down,
  • 44:36 - 44:39
    that that British and the French are
    watching his troubles in eastern Europe
  • 44:39 - 44:42
    and see that they have an opportunity to
    deal with one of his allies now because
  • 44:43 - 44:44
    he is distracted.
  • 44:44 - 44:47
    His reaction was the reaction of
    political leader
  • 44:48 - 44:52
    who is fearful, surprised, and
  • 44:52 - 44:56
    angry at the same time. Kruschev
  • 44:57 - 45:01
    uses the city of Budapest to send a
    bloody message to the West,
  • 45:01 - 45:08
    as recent research has uncovered.
  • 45:08 - 45:11
    "We have the Politburo minutes and it makes clear
  • 45:11 - 45:16
    what's going on here. He wants to send a
    signal to them that no, Soviet Union is as
  • 45:17 - 45:17
    powerful as ever.
  • 45:18 - 45:21
    You cannot mess with me, either in the
    Middle East
  • 45:21 - 45:26
    or in Eastern Europe." Then
  • 45:27 - 45:31
    Kruschev ups the stakes. Lacking
    conventional forces in the Middle East
  • 45:32 - 45:34
    to help, Egypt against the British and
    French
  • 45:33 - 45:37
    he threatens the West with the doomsday
    option. "He
  • 45:38 - 45:42
    said to the world that, don't be
    surprised
  • 45:42 - 45:46
    if the consequences of your actions is
    that nuclear weapons will fall on
  • 45:47 - 45:53
    London and Paris.
  • 45:54 - 45:56
    This was the first time they had
  • 45:57 - 45:59
    ever made a nuclear threat." Suddenly,
  • 45:59 - 46:03
    it looks like Eden's adventure in Egypt
    is going to end in Armageddon.
  • 46:04 - 46:09
    "Somebody had a radio and we heard of
    that-
  • 46:09 - 46:12
    that the Russians were threatening
  • 46:13 - 46:17
    to drop bombs on London, and the Chinese might
    be about to join in
  • 46:17 - 46:22
    too. And that moment I did think, this
    is really going to be
  • 46:23 - 46:28
    the third world war.
  • 46:28 - 46:31
    The threat of nuclear war
  • 46:32 - 46:36
    concentrates minds in Washington, where
    President Eisenhower is already furious
  • 46:36 - 46:37
    with the Prime Minister.
  • 46:38 - 46:41
    "United States was not consulted in any
    way about
  • 46:41 - 46:44
    any phase of these actions. Nor were we informed of
    them
  • 46:45 - 46:48
    in advance." "He was so angry with the
    British,
  • 46:49 - 46:53
    I mean, he was really angry with the
    British. they'd gone
  • 46:53 - 46:58
    around his back and colluded with these
    other guys."
  • 46:59 - 47:02
  • 47:02 - 47:05
    In front of the world, the American
    Secretary of State
  • 47:05 - 47:08
    condemns his country's oldest ally. "I
    doubt that any
  • 47:09 - 47:14
    delegate ever spoke from this forum with as
    heavy a heart
  • 47:14 - 47:17
    as I have brought here tonight."
  • 47:18 - 47:21
    "Eden had the
  • 47:21 - 47:24
    awful realization
  • 47:25 - 47:30
    that he had totally misjudged the
    American aspect of the affair."
  • 47:30 - 47:34
    Eden's plans are unraveling fast. He is
    not anticipated this level of hostility
  • 47:35 - 47:36
    from the Americans,
  • 47:37 - 47:41
    nor from his own people. "If he is sincere in what he is saying, then he is too stupid to be a prime minister."
  • 47:42 - 47:46
  • 47:46 - 47:50
    "There was demonstrations in London as big as
    demonstrations in Egypt."
  • 47:50 - 47:56
    "And there is only one way in which that they can even begin to restore that tarnished reputation. And that is to get out, get out, get out!"
  • 47:56 - 47:58
  • 47:59 - 48:04
  • 48:05 - 48:08
    The world sees photographs which show in
    grisly detail
  • 48:08 - 48:13
    the effects of the war on the Egyptian
    people. As opposition across the world
  • 48:13 - 48:13
    mounts,
  • 48:14 - 48:18
    moral in Port Said soars. "People
    around the world we're backing
  • 48:19 - 48:23
    you. In the West, we had the public
    opinion with Egyptians."
  • 48:23 - 48:28
    And Eden realizes he has fatally
    miscalculated the reaction
  • 48:29 - 48:32
    of the Egyptian population to invasion.
    "If you ask me,
  • 48:32 - 48:38
    where they afraid? Yes, we were all
    afraid, because nobody likes to die.
  • 48:39 - 48:44
    We used to live a daily natural life, but with
    little commodities.
  • 48:45 - 48:48
    Limited food but people would stay
  • 48:49 - 48:52
    at cafes, listening to the radio, encouraging people to resist -
  • 48:53 - 48:58
    very special atmosphere."
  • 48:58 - 49:02
    Nasser refuses to go into hiding. He
    determines instead to rally his people
  • 49:02 - 49:04
    after Friday prayers at Cairo's
  • 49:04 - 49:08
    ancient Al Azar mosque.
  • 49:09 - 49:13
    "We will fight from house to house, from village to village. We will fight and never surrender.
  • 49:13 - 49:18
    We will fight rather than live humiliated. We will fight to the last drop of blood. We're building our country, our history, our future.
  • 49:18 - 49:21
  • 49:22 - 49:27
  • 49:27 - 49:34
  • 49:39 - 49:44
    In London, Eden is feeling the strain. He
    has failed to win the hearts and minds
  • 49:44 - 49:46
    of the Egyptian people.
  • 49:45 - 49:50
    Nasser is more popular than ever and now
    comes the decisive blow.
  • 49:50 - 49:54
    Britain's currency reserves have been
    hemorrhaging since the bombing campaign
  • 49:55 - 49:55
    began,
  • 49:55 - 49:59
    as dealers all over the world dump
    sterling. "In those days,
  • 49:59 - 50:04
    Britain was the banker of the sterling
    area. Britain saw
  • 50:04 - 50:11
    immediate danger over the bottom falling
    out of that."
  • 50:10 - 50:12
    When Eden appeals to the Americans for
    financial help,
  • 50:13 - 50:17
    President Eisenhower makes sure there
    will be no room for misunderstanding
  • 50:18 - 50:23
    this time. "Eisenhower's was quite firm, he said as soon as you agree to get out
  • 50:23 - 50:25
    and really are getting out, we willl help you,
    but not a minute before."
  • 50:27 - 50:29
    On the 6th of November,
  • 50:30 - 50:33
    after nine days of war, Eden has no
    choice.
  • 50:34 - 50:38
    With British troops having advanced
    little over 10 miles down the canal,
  • 50:38 - 50:43
    the Prime Minister reluctantly calls a
    cease-fire. If the United Nations will take over
  • 50:44 - 50:45
    this police action,
  • 50:45 - 50:49
    we shall welcome, indeed we prefer
  • 50:50 - 50:56
    that cause to them."
  • 50:56 - 51:03
    The arrival of United
    Nations contingents at Port Said
  • 51:08 - 51:12
    causes a sensation that nearly develops into a
    riot by excitable Egyptians.
  • 51:12 - 51:15
    "Of
    course,
  • 51:15 - 51:19
    I was jumping with joy. When the last
    British soldier left,
  • 51:20 - 51:26
    we used to say, "Go to hell." Plans
    are made for United Nations troops to
  • 51:26 - 51:28
    replace the British and French on the
    ground.
  • 51:28 - 51:31
    The cease-fire is a humiliating
    climbdown for Eden
  • 51:32 - 51:35
    and his commanders. "I have to say
  • 51:36 - 51:40
    that most of the offices in the regiment
  • 51:40 - 51:44
    took it as a mortal blow. I think it was
  • 51:44 - 51:47
    very, very hard all professional soldiers
    who'd gone into this
  • 51:48 - 51:52
    enterprise in good faith, thought that
    this was going to be the final
  • 51:52 - 51:56
    roar of the British lion and suddenly found it
    it was just a sort of a
  • 51:56 - 52:01
    mingy little squeak that achieved nothing." For
    the prime minister,
  • 52:02 - 52:07
    the pressure of failure is unbearable.
    With Britain facing a winter fuel crisis
  • 52:07 - 52:08
    because of the closure of the canal,
  • 52:09 - 52:12
    he leaves the country for Jamaica, his
    health and career
  • 52:12 - 52:15
    crumbling. So anthony, at the moment of departure may we ask you how you're feeling?"
  • 52:16 - 52:19
    "The main thing I'm feeling
  • 52:20 - 52:23
    is that I'm deeply sorry to have to leave
  • 52:23 - 52:27
    the country at this time."
  • 52:27 - 52:33
    Five weeks later, he is back but not for
    long.
  • 52:34 - 52:38
    Eden never returned to frontline politics
    and his reputation never recovered from
  • 52:39 - 52:41
    taking Britain to war in the Middle East
  • 52:41 - 52:45
    under false pretenses. Britain's
    reputation was equally damaged.
  • 52:46 - 52:49
    "Well it was a total utter disaster
  • 52:50 - 52:53
    and it took us twenty years
  • 52:53 - 52:57
    to recover our rightful position as someone
    who was not
  • 52:58 - 53:01
    lord and master in that area, but a
    friend
  • 53:02 - 53:06
    to those states which will emerge after
    many centuries when we and the French
  • 53:06 - 53:09
    had ruled the roost." In Egypt,
  • 53:10 - 53:15
    the Suez Crisis was the making of Nasser.
    "The 23rd of December,
  • 53:16 - 53:19
    1956 [unintelligible].
  • 53:19 - 53:22
    It was the first day of the liberation of Port Said
  • 53:23 - 53:28
    and the whole city was out to celebrate victory."
  • 53:28 - 53:31
    "At that time, he was, you know, he was
    God, I have to tell you."
  • 53:31 - 53:34
    "President Nasser is a
    historic hero."
  • 53:35 - 53:39
    In the aftermath of the Suez Crisis,
  • 53:40 - 53:44
    Nasser was fated all over the Arab world.
    Here at last was a leader who could
  • 53:44 - 53:45
    stand up to the West
  • 53:46 - 53:49
    and win. "And the Arabs at that time
  • 53:49 - 53:53
    started to realize that Nasser was hero,
  • 53:53 - 53:56
    who was sent by god
  • 53:57 - 54:00
    to retrieve the Arabs from
  • 54:00 - 54:04
    many years of subordination." "Nasser,
  • 54:04 - 54:08
    in a sense, was a big winner but with a
    win which set him up
  • 54:09 - 54:14
    to be an awfully big loser because Nasser
    eventually came to believe his own
  • 54:14 - 54:14
    propaganda that
  • 54:15 - 54:19
    he had won a great battle." A little over 10
    years later,
  • 54:19 - 54:23
    Nasser decides that he is strong enough to
    settle old scores with the Israeli
  • 54:23 - 54:25
    invaders of 1956.
  • 54:25 - 54:28
    "In 1967, he said, 'Last time,
  • 54:29 - 54:32
    we were fighting Israel, Britain, and
    France. We won then,
  • 54:33 - 54:38
    this time, Israel is alone."
  • 54:38 - 54:41
    It is an appalling misjudgment. "In the
    Sinai desert,
  • 54:42 - 54:45
    in the wake of Egypt catastrophic
    retreat, line Nasser's
  • 54:45 - 54:50
    wrecked tanks. The whole world hopes, that from
    great victory and utter defeat, wisdom
  • 54:51 - 54:52
    will emerge and bring lasting peace
  • 54:52 - 54:55
    to this part of the world."
  • 54:56 - 54:59
    But instead of peace coming to the
    Middle East,
  • 55:00 - 55:03
    the unresolved issues at the 1967 war,
  • 55:03 - 55:07
    the West Bank, and Gaza Strip, still
    poison the region today.
  • 55:07 - 55:11
  • 55:12 - 55:16
    The end of the Suez Crisis was also the
    moment a new power decided to take
  • 55:16 - 55:16
    center stage
  • 55:17 - 55:21
    in the Middle East. Within weeks at
    the end of the war,
  • 55:21 - 55:24
    President Eisenhower, convinced that the
    British and French could no longer be
  • 55:25 - 55:28
    trusted to protect Western interests in
    the region,
  • 55:28 - 55:31
    announces a fight for change in American
    policy.
  • 55:31 - 55:36
    He concludes that what the Middle East
    needs is more American involvement
  • 55:36 - 55:41
    not less. The Eisenhower doctrine said
    we're going to safeguard any country
  • 55:42 - 55:45
    which is threatened by Communism within
    the Middle East. That's the old idea of
  • 55:46 - 55:50
    you're either with us in Washington or with
    us in Moscow and cuts out a third way
  • 55:50 - 55:50
    for Arab Nationalism.
  • 55:50 - 55:54
    The very factors which lead the Americans
    keep their distance
  • 55:54 - 55:57
    from Britain's in moving to aggressively
    against Nasser in 1956,
  • 55:58 - 56:01
    they lose sight of those." "The occasion
  • 56:01 - 56:04
    has come for us, to show our deep respect
    for the rights
  • 56:05 - 56:08
    and independence of every nation, however
    great,
  • 56:08 - 56:11
    however small. We seek not violence, but peace.
  • 56:12 - 56:15
  • 56:15 - 56:17
    It is a policy which echoes from Suez
  • 56:18 - 56:21
    to today. "States like these
  • 56:21 - 56:24
    and their terrorist allies constitute
    an
  • 56:24 - 56:29
    axis of evil. I will now wait on a bench
    while dangers gather.
  • 56:29 - 56:32
    The United States of America will not
    permit
  • 56:32 - 56:35
    the world's most dangerous regimes to
    threaten us
  • 56:35 - 56:42
    with the world's most destructive
    weapons."
  • 56:42 - 56:48
    "This is not the time to falter, this is the
    time for this house to give a lead,
  • 56:47 - 56:50
    to show that we wil,l stand up for what
    we know to be right
  • 56:51 - 56:54
    to show that we will confront the
    tyrannies
  • 56:54 - 57:01
    and dictatorships and terrorists who put
    our way of life at risk."
  • 57:02 - 57:03
    "The fact of the matter is
  • 57:03 - 57:07
    that Iraq could turn out in the long run
    to be a Suez fifty years later.
  • 57:07 - 57:11
    But where as that will take years to find
    out with Iraq, with Suez,
  • 57:12 - 57:17
    we found it out within a matter of weeks."
  • 57:17 - 57:21
    Ordinary Egyptians have drawn their own
    lessons from the Suez Crisis.
  • 57:21 - 57:25
    "There is a great difference between
    resistance
  • 57:26 - 57:29
    and terroism.
  • 57:29 - 57:36
    I was a patriot, defending my country.
  • 57:36 - 57:39
    The spirit of resistance is deeply rooted
  • 57:39 - 57:44
    in our country and in the area."
  • 57:45 - 57:48
    "When the US and Britain went into Iraq
  • 57:48 - 57:53
    with the idea of being accepted with open arms and
    so on,
  • 57:53 - 57:57
    that was a very stupid idea. I mean
  • 57:57 - 58:00
    where did they ever come up with that idea. I don't know. They could have looked at the
  • 58:01 - 58:04
    history books; they could have looked at the Suez
    Crisis, you know.
  • 58:04 - 58:07
    Which is after all, it's only fifty years
    ago and they
  • 58:08 - 58:11
    could have learned that this will never happen, it will
    never happen.
  • 58:11 - 58:15
    You know, people will defend the country
    they would defend their land."
  • 58:16 - 58:19
    "I am a human being, I have dignity. I don't
  • 58:20 - 58:24
    except any foreigner to dominate me or
    at else,
  • 58:24 - 58:31
    I am a slave. Right or wrong?"
  • 58:39 - 58:42
  • 58:43 - 58:46
Title:
The Other Side of Suez (BBC Documentary)
Description:

"This is a story of how the government of the United Kingdom decided to attack an Arab nation; of how, afraid its oil supplies were under threat, it embarked on a strategy of regime change; of how Britian deliberately bypassed the United Nations, and of how a British prime minister led the nation to war based on suspect intelligence.

"But this isn't Iraq, 2003. This is Egypt, 1956." - Narrator

(not available for purchase legally)

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Video Language:
English
Duration:
58:59

English subtitles

Revisions