-
The Joe Rogan experience.
-
Are you aware at all of the current state
-
of surveillance and what, if anything,
has changed since your revelations?
-
Yeah, I mean, the big thing that's changed
-
since I was in in 2013 is now it's mobile.
-
First, everything
-
mobile was still a big deal, right.
-
And the intelligence community
was very much grappling
-
to get its hands around
it and to deal with it.
-
But now people are much less likely to use
laptop than use a desktop than than use,
-
you know, got any kind of wired phone
than they are to use a smartphone.
-
And both Apple and Android
devices, unfortunately,
-
are not especially good in protecting
your privacy, I think, right now.
-
You got a smartphone,
-
right? You might be listening to this
on a train somewhere and in traffic right
-
now, or you, Joe, right now you got
a phone somewhere in the room, right?
-
The phone is turned off for at least the
screen is turned off, it's sitting there.
-
It's powered on.
-
And if somebody sends you a message,
the screen blinks to life.
-
How does that happen,
but how is it that if someone from any
-
corner of the Earth dials a number of your
phone rings and nobody else's rings,
-
how is that you can dial anybody else's
number and only their phone rings?
-
Right.
Every smartphone,
-
every phone at all is constantly
connected to the nearest cellular tower.
-
Every phone, even when the screen is off,
you think it's doing nothing.
-
You can't see it because radio
frequency emissions are invisible.
-
It's screaming in the air
saying, here I am, here I am.
-
Here is my IMEI.
-
I think it's individual manufacturers,
-
equipment, identity and IMEI individual
manufacturers, subscriber identity.
-
I could be wrong on the break out there,
but the acronyms are
-
the Emii and the emcee and you
can search for these things.
-
There are two globally unique identifiers
-
that only exist anywhere
in the world in one place.
-
Right.
-
And it makes your phone different
than all the other phones.
-
The IMEI is burned
into the handset on your phone.
-
No matter what SIM card you change to,
-
it's always going to be the same and it's
always going to be telling the phone
-
network it's this physical handset,
the Iame essi is in your SIM card.
-
Right.
And this is what holds your phone number.
-
Right.
-
Is that basically the key,
the right to use that phone number?
-
And so your phone is sitting there doing
nothing you think,
-
but it's constantly shouting and saying,
I'm here who is closest to me?
-
That's a cell phone tower
and every cell phone tower with its big
-
ears is listening for these little
cries for help and going, oh, right.
-
I see Joe Rogan's phone, right.
-
I see Jamie's phone.
-
I see all these phones
that are here right now.
-
And it compares notes
-
with the other
network towers and your smartphone
-
compares notes with them to go,
who do I hear the loudest and who you hear
-
the loudest is a proxy for
proximity, for closeness, distance.
-
Right.
-
They go whoever I hear more loudly
than anybody else, that's close to me.
-
So you're going to be bound to this cell
phone tower and that cell phone tower is
-
going to make a note, a permanent record,
saying this phone,
-
this phone handset with this phone number
at this time was connected to me.
-
Right.
And based on your phone handset and your
-
phone number,
they can get your identity right
-
because you pay for this stuff with your
credit card and everything like that.
-
And even if you don't write, it's
still active at your house overnight.
-
It's still active, you know,
on your nightstand when you're sleeping.
-
It's still whatever
-
the movements of your phone are,
the movements of you as a person.
-
And those are often
quite uniquely identifying.
-
It goes to your home.
-
It goes to your workplace.
-
Other people don't have it sorry
-
in any way.
It's constantly shutting this out.
-
And then it compares notes
with the other a parts network.
-
And when somebody is trying to get
-
to a phone, it compares notes
of the network, compares notes to go.
-
Where is this phone with this phone number
in the world right now
-
and to that cell phone tower
that is closest to that phone.
-
It sends out a signal saying,
-
we have a call for you,
make your phone start ringing so your
-
owner can answer it, and then it
connects it across this whole path.
-
But what this means
-
is that whenever you carry a phone over,
the phone is turned on.
-
There's a record of your presence
-
at that place that is being
made and created by companies.
-
It does not need to be kept forever.
-
And in fact, there's no good
argument for it to be kept forever.
-
But these companies see that as
valuable information, right?
-
This is the whole big data problem
-
that we're running into and all this
information that used to be ephemeral.
-
Right.
-
Where were you when you
were eight years old?
-
You know, where were where'd you
go after you had a bad breakup?
-
You know, who'd you spend the night with?
Who'd you call?
-
After all, this information used to be
ephemeral, meaning it disappeared.
-
Right.
Like like the morning do it would be gone.
-
No one would remember it.
But now these things are stored.
-
Now these things are saved.
-
It doesn't matter whether
you're doing anything wrong.
-
Does it matter where you most
ordinary person on Earth?
-
Because that's how bulk collection,
-
which is the government's euphemism
for mass surveillance, works.
-
They simply collect it all in advance in
hopes that one day it will become useful.
-
And that was just talking about how
you connected the phone network.
-
That's not talking about all those apps
-
on your phone that are contacting
the network even more frequently.
-
Right.
-
How do you get a text
message notification?
-
How do you get an email notification? How
is it the Facebook knows where you're at?
-
You know, all of these things,
these analytics,
-
they are trying to keep track through
-
location services on your phone to GPS,
through even just wireless access points
-
you're connected to because
there's a global contact.
-
The updated map, there's actually many
of them of wireless access points
-
in the world, because just like we talked
about, every phone has a unique identifier
-
that's globally unique,
every wireless access point in the world.
-
Right.
-
You cable modem at home,
whether it's in your laptop,
-
every device that has a radio modem
has a globally unique identifier in it.
-
And this is standard term.
-
You can look it up
-
and these things can be mapped when
they're broadcasting in the air because
-
again, like your phone says to the cell
phone tower, I have this identifier.
-
The cell phone tower responds and says,
I have this identifier.
-
And anybody who's listening,
they can write these things down.
-
And all those Google Street View
cars that go back and forth.
-
Right.
-
They're keeping notes on whose Wi-Fi
is active on this block.
-
Right.
And then they build a new GM app.
-
So even if you have turned off right,
-
as long as you connect to Wi-Fi,
those apps can go well,
-
I'm connected to Joe's Wi-Fi, but I can
also see his neighbor's Wi-Fi here.
-
And the other one in this apartment over
-
here and the other one
in the apartment here.
-
And you should only be able to hear
-
those four globally unique Wi-Fi access
-
points from these points
in physical space.
-
Right.
The intersection in between the spread's,
-
the domes of all those
wireless access points,
-
it's a proxy for location
and it just goes on and on and on.
-
We can talk about this for more hours.
We don't have that kind of time.
-
Can I ask you this? Is there a way
to mitigate any of this personally? I
-
mean, is shutting your phone
off doesn't even work, right?
-
Well, so it does.
In a way, it's yes.
-
No, I'm the thing with shutting your phone
-
off that is a risk is how do you
know if phones actually turned off?
-
It used to be when I was in Geneva,
for example, working for the CIA,
-
we would all carry like
drug dealer phones.
-
You know, the old smartphones
are old dumb phones.
-
They're not smartphones.
-
And the reason why was just because they
-
had removal that from the banks where
you could take the battery out.
-
Right.
And the one beautiful thing about
-
technology is if there's
no electricity in it.
-
Right.
If there's there's no go juice
-
available to it, if there's no battery
connected to it, it's not sending anything
-
because you have to get
power from somewhere.
-
You have to have power
in order to do work.
-
But now your phones are all sealed
and you can't take the batteries out.
-
So there are potential ways that you can
-
hack a phone where it appears to be off,
but it's not actually off.
-
It's just pretending to be off,
-
whereas in fact, it's still listening
in and doing all this stuff.
-
But for the average person,
that doesn't apply.
-
Right.
-
And I got to tell you guys, they've
been chasing me all over the place.
-
I don't worry about that stuff.
-
Right.
-
And it's because if they're applying
that level of effort to me,
-
I don't probably get the same
information through other routes.
-
I am as careful as I can.
-
And I use things like Faraday cages.
I turn devices off.
-
But if they're actually
-
manipulating the way devices display,
it's just too great a level of effort,
-
even for someone like me to keep
that up on a constant basis.
-
Also, if they get me,
I only trust phones so much.
-
So there's only so much they
can derive from the compromise.
-
And this is how operational
security works.
-
And you think about what are the realistic
-
threats that you're facing
that you're trying to mitigate
-
and the mitigation that you're trying
to do is what would be the loss? What
-
would be the damage done to you
if this stuff was exploited? Much more
-
realistic than worrying about these
things that I call voodoo hacks.
-
Right.
Which are like next level stuff.
-
And actually just a shout out for those
-
of your readers who are
interested in this stuff.
-
I wrote a paper on this specific problem.
-
How do you know when
a phone is actually off?
-
How do you know when it's
actually not spying on you?
-
With a brilliant, brilliant
guy named Andrew Bunnie Huang.
-
He's an MIT Ph.D. and I
think electrical engineering
-
called the Introspection Engine
-
that was published in the Journal
of Hope Engineering.
-
You can find it online
-
and it'll go as deep down in the weeds,
I promise you, as you.
-
Well, we take an iPhone six.
-
This was back when it was fairly new
-
and we modified it so we could actually
not trust the device to report its own
-
state, but physically monitor it
state to see if it was spying on you.
-
But for average people, right
-
this academic night,
that's not your primary threat.
-
Your primary threats are these
bulk collection programs.
-
Your primary threat is the fact that your
-
phone is constantly squawking
to these cell phone towers.
-
It's doing all of these things
-
because we leave our phones
in a state that is constantly on.
-
You're constantly connected right now.
-
Airplane mode doesn't even
turn off Wi-Fi really anymore.
-
Just turns off the cellular modem.
-
The whole idea is
-
we need to identify the problem
and the central problem with smartphone
-
use today is you have no idea what
the hell it's doing at any given time.
-
Like the phone has the screen off.
-
You don't know what it's connected to.
-
You don't know how
frequently it's doing it.
-
Apple and iOS, unfortunately,
makes it impossible to see what kind
-
of network connections are constantly made
on the device and to intermediate them
-
going, I don't want Facebook
to be able to talk right now.
-
You know, I don't want Google
to be able to talk right now.
-
I just want my secure messenger
app to be able to talk.
-
I just want my weather app to be able
-
to talk, but I just check my weather
and now I'm done with it.
-
So I don't want that to be
able to talk anymore.
-
And we need to be able to make
these intelligent decisions.
-
Are not just an app by app basis, but a
connection by connection basis, right.
-
You want let's say you use
Facebook because, you know,
-
for whatever judgment we have,
a lot of people might do it.
-
You want to be able to connect
to Facebook's content servers.
-
You want to be able to message a friend.
-
You want to be able to download
a photograph or whatever,
-
but you don't want it to be
able to talk to an ad server.
-
You don't want to talk to an analytics
-
server that that's
monitoring your behavior.
-
Right.
You don't want to talk to all these third
-
party things because Facebook crams their
garbage and almost every app that you
-
download and you don't even know what's
happening because you can't see it.
-
Right.
-
And this is the problem
with the data collection used today
-
is there is an industry that is
built on keeping this invisible.
-
And what we need to do is we need to make
-
the activities of our devices,
whether it's a phone,
-
whether it's computer or whatever,
are more visible and understandable
-
to the average person and then
give them control over it.
-
So if you could see your phone right now
-
and at the very center of it
is a little green icon.
-
That's your, you know, handset or
it's a picture, your face, whatever.
-
And you see all these little
spokes coming off of it.
-
That's every app that your phone is
-
talking to right now
or every app that is active on your phone
-
right now and all the hosts
that it's connecting to.
-
And you can see right now,
once every three seconds,
-
your phone is checking into Facebook
and you could just poke that app and then,
-
boom, it's not talking
to Facebook anymore.
-
Facebook's not allowed Facebook
speaking privileges have been revoked.
-
Right.
You would do that.
-
We would all do that if there was a button
on your phone that said,
-
do what I want but not spy on me,
you would press that button, right?
-
That button is not does
not exist right now.
-
And both Google and Apple, unfortunately,
Apple's a lot better at this than Google,
-
but neither of them allow
that button to exist.
-
In fact, they actively interfere with it
because they say it's a security risk.
-
And from a particular perspective,
they they actually aren't wrong there.
-
But it's not enough to go.
-
You know, we have to lock that capability
-
off from people because we don't trust
they would make the right decisions.
-
We think it's too complicated
for people to do this.
-
We think there's too many
connections being made.
-
Well, that is actually a confession
of the problem right there.
-
If you think people can't understand it,
-
if you think there are too many
communications happening,
-
if you think there's too much complexity
in there, it needs to be simplified,
-
just like the president can't
control everything like that.
-
If you have to be the president
of the phone and the phone is as complex
-
as the United States government,
we have a problem.
-
Guys, this should be much
more simple process.
-
It should be obvious.
-
And the fact that it's not and the fact
that we read story after story year after
-
year, saying all your date has been
breached here,
-
this company's spying on you here is
companies manipulating your purchases or
-
your search results or they're hiding
these things from your timeline
-
or they're influencing you or manipulating
you in all of these different ways.
-
That happens as a result of a single
problem.
-
And that problem is in inequality
of available information.
-
They can see everything about you.
-
They can see everything about what your
-
device is doing, and they can do
whatever they want with your device.
-
You, on the other hand, owned the device
well, rather, you paid for the device.
-
But increasingly these
corporations own it.
-
Increasingly, these governments own it.
-
And increasingly, we are living in a world
where we do all the work right.
-
We pay all the taxes, we pay all
the costs, but we own less and less.
-
And nobody understands this better
than the youngest generation.
-
Well, it seems like our data became
-
a commodity before we
understood what it was.
-
It became this thing that's insanely
-
valuable to Google and Facebook
and all these social media platforms.
-
Before we understood what we were giving
up, they were making billions of dollars.
-
And then once that money is being earned
and once everyone's accustomed
-
to the situation, it's very
difficult to pull the reins back.
-
It's very difficult
to turn that horse around
-
precisely because the money
then becomes part right.
-
The information then becomes influence.
-
That also seems to be the same sort
-
of situation that would happen
with these mass surveillance states.
-
Once they have the access,
-
it's going to be incredibly difficult
for them to relinquish that,
-
right?
Yeah, no, you're exactly correct.
-
And this is the subject of the book.
-
I mean, this is the permanent record
and this is where it came from.
-
This is how it came to exist.
-
The story of our lifetimes is how
intentionally by design,
-
a number of institutions,
both governmental and corporate,
-
realized it was in their mutual interest
to conceal their data collection
-
activities, to increase the breadth
and depth of their sensor network.
-
That were sort of spread out through
society, rumor back in the day
-
intelligence collection
in the United States, even at Segan,
-
used to mean sending an FBI agent right
to put alligator clips on an embassy
-
building or sending in somebody
disguised as a workman.
-
And they put a bug in a building or
they built a satellite listening side.
-
Right.
-
We called these foreign set were
foreign satellite collection.
-
We're out in the desert somewhere.
-
They built a big parabolic collector.
-
And it's just listening
to satellite missions.
-
Right.
-
But these satellite emmissions, these
satellite links were owned by militaries.
-
They were exclusive to governments.
Right.
-
It wasn't affecting everybody broadly.
-
All surveillance was targeted
because it had to be.
-
What changed with technology is
-
that surveillance could
now become indiscriminate.
-
It could become dragnet.
-
It could become bulk collection,
which should become one of the dirtiest
-
phrases in the language
if we have any kind of decency.
-
But we were intentionally
-
this was intentionally concealed from us.
Right.
-
The government did it.
-
They used classification,
companies did it.
-
They intentionally didn't talk about it.
-
They denied these things were going.
-
They said you agreed to this and you
didn't agree to nothing like this.
-
I'm sorry.
Right.
-
Right.
They go we put that terms of service page
-
up and you click that,
you click the button.
-
That said, I agree
-
because you were trying to open an account
so you could talk to your friends.
-
You were trying to get driving directions.
-
You were trying to get an email account.
-
You were trying to agree to some 600 page
-
legal form that even if you read,
you wouldn't understand.
-
And it doesn't matter even if you did
-
understand, because one of the very first
paragraphs and it said this agreement can
-
be changed at any time unilaterally
without your consent by the company.
-
Right.
-
They have built a legal paradigm
-
that presumes records collected about us
do not belong to us.
-
This is sort of one of the core principles
on which mass surveillance
-
from the government's perspective
in the United States is legal.
-
And you have to understand that all
-
the stuff we talk about today, government
says everything we do is legal.
-
Right.
And they go, so it's fine.
-
Our perspective, the public should be
well, that's actually the problem,
-
because this is an OK,
the scandal isn't how they're breaking
-
the law, the scandals that they
don't have to break the law.
-
And the way they say they're not breaking
-
the law is something called
the third party doctrine.
-
Third party doctrine is a.
-
Legal principle derived from a case and I
-
believe the 1970s called
Smith versus Maryland
-
and Smith was this knucklehead who was
-
harassing this lady,
making phone calls to her house.
-
And when she would pick up, he just,
-
I don't know, sit there, heavy breathing,
whatever, like a classic creeper.
-
And, you know, it was terrifying,
this poor lady.
-
So she calls the cops
-
and says, one day I got one of these phone
calls and I see this car creep past
-
my house on the street
and she got a license plate number.
-
So she goes to the cops and she goes,
is this the guy?
-
And the cops?
-
Again, they're trying
to do a good thing here.
-
They look up his license plate number
and they find out where this guy is
-
and then they go, what phone number
is registered to that house?
-
And they go to the phone company and they
-
say, can you give us this record
in the phone? Company says, yeah, sure.
-
And it's the guy the cops got there, man.
-
Right.
-
So they go arrest this guy.
-
And then in court, his lawyer brings
all this stuff up and they go.
-
A.
-
You did this without a warrant that was
sorry, that was that was the problem was
-
they went to the phone company,
they got the records without a warrant.
-
They just asked for it
or they subpoenaed it.
-
Right.
Some lower standard of legal review.
-
And the company gave it to him and
got the guy they marchmont in jail.
-
And they could have gotten a warrant.
Right.
-
But it was just expedients.
-
They just didn't want to take the time.
-
Small town cops, you can
understand how it happens.
-
They know the guy's a creep or they
just want to get him off to jail.
-
And so they made a misstep with the
government doesn't want to let go.
-
They fight on this and they go.
-
It wasn't actually
they weren't his records,
-
and so because they didn't belong to him,
he didn't have a Fourth Amendment right
-
to demand a warrant be issued for them,
-
they were the company's records and
the company provided them voluntarily.
-
And hence no warrant was required because
-
you can give whatever you want without
a warrant as long as it's yours.
-
Now, here's the problem.
-
The government extrapolated
a principle in a single case of a single
-
known suspected criminal who they had real
good reasons to suspect was their guy
-
and use that to go to a company and get
records from them and establish
-
a precedent that these records
don't belong to the guy.
-
They belong to the company.
-
And then they said, well,
if one person doesn't have
-
a Fourth Amendment interest in records
held by a company, no one does.
-
And so the company then has absolute
-
proprietary ownership of all of these
records about all of our lives.
-
And remember, this is back in the 1970s.
-
You know, the Internet hardly
exists in these kind of contexts.
-
Smartphones, you know, don't exist.
-
Modern society, modern
communications don't exist.
-
This is the very beginning
of the technological era.
-
And flash forward now, 40 years.
-
And they are still relying on this
-
precedent about this one,
you know, pervy creeper to go.
-
Nobody has a privacy right
for anything that's held by a company.
-
And so long as they do that,
companies are going to be extraordinarily
-
powerful and they're going
to be extraordinarily abusive.
-
And this is something
that people don't get.
-
They go, oh, well,
it's Data-Collection, right?
-
They're exploiting data.
-
This is data about human lives.
-
It is state about people.
-
These records are about you.
-
It's not data that's being exploited.
-
It's people that are being exploited.
-
It's not data that's being manipulated.
-
It's you.
-
It's being manipulated.
-
And this this is this is something that I
-
think a lot of people
are beginning to understand.
-
Now, the problem is the companies
and the governments are still pretending
-
they don't understand or
disagreeing with this.
-
And this reminds me of something that one
of my old friends, John Perry Barlow,
-
who served with me at the Freedom
-
of Press Foundation,
I'm the president of the board,
-
used to say to me.
-
Which is you can't awaken someone
who's pretending to be asleep.