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Edward Snowden: How Your Cell Phone Spies on You

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    The Joe Rogan experience.
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    Are you aware at all of the current state
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    of surveillance and what, if anything,
    has changed since your revelations?
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    Yeah, I mean, the big thing that's changed
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    since I was in in 2013 is now it's mobile.
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    First, everything
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    mobile was still a big deal, right.
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    And the intelligence community
    was very much grappling
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    to get its hands around
    it and to deal with it.
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    But now people are much less likely to use
    laptop than use a desktop than than use,
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    you know, got any kind of wired phone
    than they are to use a smartphone.
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    And both Apple and Android
    devices, unfortunately,
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    are not especially good in protecting
    your privacy, I think, right now.
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    You got a smartphone,
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    right? You might be listening to this
    on a train somewhere and in traffic right
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    now, or you, Joe, right now you got
    a phone somewhere in the room, right?
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    The phone is turned off for at least the
    screen is turned off, it's sitting there.
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    It's powered on.
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    And if somebody sends you a message,
    the screen blinks to life.
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    How does that happen,
    but how is it that if someone from any
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    corner of the Earth dials a number of your
    phone rings and nobody else's rings,
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    how is that you can dial anybody else's
    number and only their phone rings?
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    Right.
    Every smartphone,
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    every phone at all is constantly
    connected to the nearest cellular tower.
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    Every phone, even when the screen is off,
    you think it's doing nothing.
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    You can't see it because radio
    frequency emissions are invisible.
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    It's screaming in the air
    saying, here I am, here I am.
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    Here is my IMEI.
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    I think it's individual manufacturers,
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    equipment, identity and IMEI individual
    manufacturers, subscriber identity.
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    I could be wrong on the break out there,
    but the acronyms are
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    the Emii and the emcee and you
    can search for these things.
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    There are two globally unique identifiers
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    that only exist anywhere
    in the world in one place.
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    Right.
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    And it makes your phone different
    than all the other phones.
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    The IMEI is burned
    into the handset on your phone.
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    No matter what SIM card you change to,
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    it's always going to be the same and it's
    always going to be telling the phone
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    network it's this physical handset,
    the Iame essi is in your SIM card.
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    Right.
    And this is what holds your phone number.
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    Right.
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    Is that basically the key,
    the right to use that phone number?
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    And so your phone is sitting there doing
    nothing you think,
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    but it's constantly shouting and saying,
    I'm here who is closest to me?
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    That's a cell phone tower
    and every cell phone tower with its big
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    ears is listening for these little
    cries for help and going, oh, right.
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    I see Joe Rogan's phone, right.
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    I see Jamie's phone.
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    I see all these phones
    that are here right now.
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    And it compares notes
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    with the other
    network towers and your smartphone
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    compares notes with them to go,
    who do I hear the loudest and who you hear
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    the loudest is a proxy for
    proximity, for closeness, distance.
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    Right.
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    They go whoever I hear more loudly
    than anybody else, that's close to me.
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    So you're going to be bound to this cell
    phone tower and that cell phone tower is
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    going to make a note, a permanent record,
    saying this phone,
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    this phone handset with this phone number
    at this time was connected to me.
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    Right.
    And based on your phone handset and your
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    phone number,
    they can get your identity right
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    because you pay for this stuff with your
    credit card and everything like that.
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    And even if you don't write, it's
    still active at your house overnight.
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    It's still active, you know,
    on your nightstand when you're sleeping.
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    It's still whatever
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    the movements of your phone are,
    the movements of you as a person.
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    And those are often
    quite uniquely identifying.
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    It goes to your home.
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    It goes to your workplace.
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    Other people don't have it sorry
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    in any way.
    It's constantly shutting this out.
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    And then it compares notes
    with the other a parts network.
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    And when somebody is trying to get
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    to a phone, it compares notes
    of the network, compares notes to go.
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    Where is this phone with this phone number
    in the world right now
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    and to that cell phone tower
    that is closest to that phone.
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    It sends out a signal saying,
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    we have a call for you,
    make your phone start ringing so your
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    owner can answer it, and then it
    connects it across this whole path.
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    But what this means
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    is that whenever you carry a phone over,
    the phone is turned on.
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    There's a record of your presence
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    at that place that is being
    made and created by companies.
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    It does not need to be kept forever.
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    And in fact, there's no good
    argument for it to be kept forever.
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    But these companies see that as
    valuable information, right?
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    This is the whole big data problem
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    that we're running into and all this
    information that used to be ephemeral.
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    Right.
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    Where were you when you
    were eight years old?
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    You know, where were where'd you
    go after you had a bad breakup?
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    You know, who'd you spend the night with?
    Who'd you call?
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    After all, this information used to be
    ephemeral, meaning it disappeared.
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    Right.
    Like like the morning do it would be gone.
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    No one would remember it.
    But now these things are stored.
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    Now these things are saved.
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    It doesn't matter whether
    you're doing anything wrong.
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    Does it matter where you most
    ordinary person on Earth?
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    Because that's how bulk collection,
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    which is the government's euphemism
    for mass surveillance, works.
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    They simply collect it all in advance in
    hopes that one day it will become useful.
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    And that was just talking about how
    you connected the phone network.
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    That's not talking about all those apps
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    on your phone that are contacting
    the network even more frequently.
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    Right.
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    How do you get a text
    message notification?
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    How do you get an email notification? How
    is it the Facebook knows where you're at?
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    You know, all of these things,
    these analytics,
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    they are trying to keep track through
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    location services on your phone to GPS,
    through even just wireless access points
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    you're connected to because
    there's a global contact.
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    The updated map, there's actually many
    of them of wireless access points
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    in the world, because just like we talked
    about, every phone has a unique identifier
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    that's globally unique,
    every wireless access point in the world.
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    Right.
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    You cable modem at home,
    whether it's in your laptop,
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    every device that has a radio modem
    has a globally unique identifier in it.
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    And this is standard term.
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    You can look it up
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    and these things can be mapped when
    they're broadcasting in the air because
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    again, like your phone says to the cell
    phone tower, I have this identifier.
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    The cell phone tower responds and says,
    I have this identifier.
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    And anybody who's listening,
    they can write these things down.
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    And all those Google Street View
    cars that go back and forth.
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    Right.
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    They're keeping notes on whose Wi-Fi
    is active on this block.
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    Right.
    And then they build a new GM app.
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    So even if you have turned off right,
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    as long as you connect to Wi-Fi,
    those apps can go well,
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    I'm connected to Joe's Wi-Fi, but I can
    also see his neighbor's Wi-Fi here.
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    And the other one in this apartment over
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    here and the other one
    in the apartment here.
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    And you should only be able to hear
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    those four globally unique Wi-Fi access
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    points from these points
    in physical space.
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    Right.
    The intersection in between the spread's,
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    the domes of all those
    wireless access points,
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    it's a proxy for location
    and it just goes on and on and on.
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    We can talk about this for more hours.
    We don't have that kind of time.
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    Can I ask you this? Is there a way
    to mitigate any of this personally? I
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    mean, is shutting your phone
    off doesn't even work, right?
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    Well, so it does.
    In a way, it's yes.
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    No, I'm the thing with shutting your phone
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    off that is a risk is how do you
    know if phones actually turned off?
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    It used to be when I was in Geneva,
    for example, working for the CIA,
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    we would all carry like
    drug dealer phones.
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    You know, the old smartphones
    are old dumb phones.
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    They're not smartphones.
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    And the reason why was just because they
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    had removal that from the banks where
    you could take the battery out.
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    Right.
    And the one beautiful thing about
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    technology is if there's
    no electricity in it.
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    Right.
    If there's there's no go juice
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    available to it, if there's no battery
    connected to it, it's not sending anything
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    because you have to get
    power from somewhere.
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    You have to have power
    in order to do work.
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    But now your phones are all sealed
    and you can't take the batteries out.
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    So there are potential ways that you can
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    hack a phone where it appears to be off,
    but it's not actually off.
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    It's just pretending to be off,
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    whereas in fact, it's still listening
    in and doing all this stuff.
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    But for the average person,
    that doesn't apply.
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    Right.
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    And I got to tell you guys, they've
    been chasing me all over the place.
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    I don't worry about that stuff.
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    Right.
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    And it's because if they're applying
    that level of effort to me,
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    I don't probably get the same
    information through other routes.
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    I am as careful as I can.
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    And I use things like Faraday cages.
    I turn devices off.
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    But if they're actually
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    manipulating the way devices display,
    it's just too great a level of effort,
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    even for someone like me to keep
    that up on a constant basis.
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    Also, if they get me,
    I only trust phones so much.
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    So there's only so much they
    can derive from the compromise.
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    And this is how operational
    security works.
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    And you think about what are the realistic
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    threats that you're facing
    that you're trying to mitigate
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    and the mitigation that you're trying
    to do is what would be the loss? What
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    would be the damage done to you
    if this stuff was exploited? Much more
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    realistic than worrying about these
    things that I call voodoo hacks.
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    Right.
    Which are like next level stuff.
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    And actually just a shout out for those
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    of your readers who are
    interested in this stuff.
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    I wrote a paper on this specific problem.
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    How do you know when
    a phone is actually off?
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    How do you know when it's
    actually not spying on you?
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    With a brilliant, brilliant
    guy named Andrew Bunnie Huang.
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    He's an MIT Ph.D. and I
    think electrical engineering
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    called the Introspection Engine
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    that was published in the Journal
    of Hope Engineering.
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    You can find it online
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    and it'll go as deep down in the weeds,
    I promise you, as you.
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    Well, we take an iPhone six.
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    This was back when it was fairly new
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    and we modified it so we could actually
    not trust the device to report its own
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    state, but physically monitor it
    state to see if it was spying on you.
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    But for average people, right
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    this academic night,
    that's not your primary threat.
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    Your primary threats are these
    bulk collection programs.
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    Your primary threat is the fact that your
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    phone is constantly squawking
    to these cell phone towers.
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    It's doing all of these things
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    because we leave our phones
    in a state that is constantly on.
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    You're constantly connected right now.
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    Airplane mode doesn't even
    turn off Wi-Fi really anymore.
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    Just turns off the cellular modem.
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    The whole idea is
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    we need to identify the problem
    and the central problem with smartphone
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    use today is you have no idea what
    the hell it's doing at any given time.
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    Like the phone has the screen off.
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    You don't know what it's connected to.
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    You don't know how
    frequently it's doing it.
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    Apple and iOS, unfortunately,
    makes it impossible to see what kind
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    of network connections are constantly made
    on the device and to intermediate them
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    going, I don't want Facebook
    to be able to talk right now.
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    You know, I don't want Google
    to be able to talk right now.
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    I just want my secure messenger
    app to be able to talk.
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    I just want my weather app to be able
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    to talk, but I just check my weather
    and now I'm done with it.
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    So I don't want that to be
    able to talk anymore.
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    And we need to be able to make
    these intelligent decisions.
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    Are not just an app by app basis, but a
    connection by connection basis, right.
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    You want let's say you use
    Facebook because, you know,
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    for whatever judgment we have,
    a lot of people might do it.
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    You want to be able to connect
    to Facebook's content servers.
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    You want to be able to message a friend.
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    You want to be able to download
    a photograph or whatever,
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    but you don't want it to be
    able to talk to an ad server.
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    You don't want to talk to an analytics
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    server that that's
    monitoring your behavior.
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    Right.
    You don't want to talk to all these third
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    party things because Facebook crams their
    garbage and almost every app that you
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    download and you don't even know what's
    happening because you can't see it.
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    Right.
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    And this is the problem
    with the data collection used today
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    is there is an industry that is
    built on keeping this invisible.
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    And what we need to do is we need to make
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    the activities of our devices,
    whether it's a phone,
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    whether it's computer or whatever,
    are more visible and understandable
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    to the average person and then
    give them control over it.
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    So if you could see your phone right now
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    and at the very center of it
    is a little green icon.
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    That's your, you know, handset or
    it's a picture, your face, whatever.
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    And you see all these little
    spokes coming off of it.
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    That's every app that your phone is
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    talking to right now
    or every app that is active on your phone
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    right now and all the hosts
    that it's connecting to.
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    And you can see right now,
    once every three seconds,
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    your phone is checking into Facebook
    and you could just poke that app and then,
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    boom, it's not talking
    to Facebook anymore.
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    Facebook's not allowed Facebook
    speaking privileges have been revoked.
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    Right.
    You would do that.
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    We would all do that if there was a button
    on your phone that said,
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    do what I want but not spy on me,
    you would press that button, right?
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    That button is not does
    not exist right now.
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    And both Google and Apple, unfortunately,
    Apple's a lot better at this than Google,
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    but neither of them allow
    that button to exist.
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    In fact, they actively interfere with it
    because they say it's a security risk.
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    And from a particular perspective,
    they they actually aren't wrong there.
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    But it's not enough to go.
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    You know, we have to lock that capability
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    off from people because we don't trust
    they would make the right decisions.
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    We think it's too complicated
    for people to do this.
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    We think there's too many
    connections being made.
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    Well, that is actually a confession
    of the problem right there.
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    If you think people can't understand it,
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    if you think there are too many
    communications happening,
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    if you think there's too much complexity
    in there, it needs to be simplified,
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    just like the president can't
    control everything like that.
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    If you have to be the president
    of the phone and the phone is as complex
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    as the United States government,
    we have a problem.
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    Guys, this should be much
    more simple process.
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    It should be obvious.
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    And the fact that it's not and the fact
    that we read story after story year after
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    year, saying all your date has been
    breached here,
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    this company's spying on you here is
    companies manipulating your purchases or
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    your search results or they're hiding
    these things from your timeline
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    or they're influencing you or manipulating
    you in all of these different ways.
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    That happens as a result of a single
    problem.
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    And that problem is in inequality
    of available information.
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    They can see everything about you.
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    They can see everything about what your
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    device is doing, and they can do
    whatever they want with your device.
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    You, on the other hand, owned the device
    well, rather, you paid for the device.
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    But increasingly these
    corporations own it.
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    Increasingly, these governments own it.
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    And increasingly, we are living in a world
    where we do all the work right.
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    We pay all the taxes, we pay all
    the costs, but we own less and less.
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    And nobody understands this better
    than the youngest generation.
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    Well, it seems like our data became
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    a commodity before we
    understood what it was.
  • 15:56 - 15:58
    It became this thing that's insanely
  • 15:59 - 16:02
    valuable to Google and Facebook
    and all these social media platforms.
  • 16:03 - 16:07
    Before we understood what we were giving
    up, they were making billions of dollars.
  • 16:07 - 16:11
    And then once that money is being earned
    and once everyone's accustomed
  • 16:11 - 16:14
    to the situation, it's very
    difficult to pull the reins back.
  • 16:14 - 16:17
    It's very difficult
    to turn that horse around
  • 16:17 - 16:20
    precisely because the money
    then becomes part right.
  • 16:20 - 16:22
    The information then becomes influence.
  • 16:22 - 16:24
    That also seems to be the same sort
  • 16:24 - 16:26
    of situation that would happen
    with these mass surveillance states.
  • 16:27 - 16:28
    Once they have the access,
  • 16:29 - 16:33
    it's going to be incredibly difficult
    for them to relinquish that,
  • 16:33 - 16:36
    right?
    Yeah, no, you're exactly correct.
  • 16:36 - 16:38
    And this is the subject of the book.
  • 16:38 - 16:41
    I mean, this is the permanent record
    and this is where it came from.
  • 16:41 - 16:43
    This is how it came to exist.
  • 16:44 - 16:51
    The story of our lifetimes is how
    intentionally by design,
  • 16:51 - 16:55
    a number of institutions,
    both governmental and corporate,
  • 16:56 - 17:00
    realized it was in their mutual interest
    to conceal their data collection
  • 17:01 - 17:07
    activities, to increase the breadth
    and depth of their sensor network.
  • 17:07 - 17:10
    That were sort of spread out through
    society, rumor back in the day
  • 17:11 - 17:14
    intelligence collection
    in the United States, even at Segan,
  • 17:14 - 17:19
    used to mean sending an FBI agent right
    to put alligator clips on an embassy
  • 17:19 - 17:23
    building or sending in somebody
    disguised as a workman.
  • 17:23 - 17:29
    And they put a bug in a building or
    they built a satellite listening side.
  • 17:29 - 17:29
    Right.
  • 17:29 - 17:33
    We called these foreign set were
    foreign satellite collection.
  • 17:33 - 17:35
    We're out in the desert somewhere.
  • 17:35 - 17:38
    They built a big parabolic collector.
  • 17:38 - 17:41
    And it's just listening
    to satellite missions.
  • 17:41 - 17:41
    Right.
  • 17:41 - 17:46
    But these satellite emmissions, these
    satellite links were owned by militaries.
  • 17:46 - 17:48
    They were exclusive to governments.
    Right.
  • 17:49 - 17:51
    It wasn't affecting everybody broadly.
  • 17:52 - 17:56
    All surveillance was targeted
    because it had to be.
  • 17:56 - 17:58
    What changed with technology is
  • 17:58 - 18:01
    that surveillance could
    now become indiscriminate.
  • 18:01 - 18:03
    It could become dragnet.
  • 18:03 - 18:07
    It could become bulk collection,
    which should become one of the dirtiest
  • 18:07 - 18:11
    phrases in the language
    if we have any kind of decency.
  • 18:11 - 18:15
    But we were intentionally
  • 18:15 - 18:17
    this was intentionally concealed from us.
    Right.
  • 18:18 - 18:18
    The government did it.
  • 18:18 - 18:21
    They used classification,
    companies did it.
  • 18:22 - 18:23
    They intentionally didn't talk about it.
  • 18:23 - 18:25
    They denied these things were going.
  • 18:26 - 18:30
    They said you agreed to this and you
    didn't agree to nothing like this.
  • 18:30 - 18:31
    I'm sorry.
    Right.
  • 18:31 - 18:34
    Right.
    They go we put that terms of service page
  • 18:34 - 18:37
    up and you click that,
    you click the button.
  • 18:37 - 18:38
    That said, I agree
  • 18:38 - 18:42
    because you were trying to open an account
    so you could talk to your friends.
  • 18:42 - 18:44
    You were trying to get driving directions.
  • 18:44 - 18:45
    You were trying to get an email account.
  • 18:45 - 18:48
    You were trying to agree to some 600 page
  • 18:48 - 18:51
    legal form that even if you read,
    you wouldn't understand.
  • 18:52 - 18:53
    And it doesn't matter even if you did
  • 18:53 - 18:57
    understand, because one of the very first
    paragraphs and it said this agreement can
  • 18:57 - 19:01
    be changed at any time unilaterally
    without your consent by the company.
  • 19:01 - 19:02
    Right.
  • 19:03 - 19:06
    They have built a legal paradigm
  • 19:06 - 19:12
    that presumes records collected about us
    do not belong to us.
  • 19:12 - 19:17
    This is sort of one of the core principles
    on which mass surveillance
  • 19:17 - 19:20
    from the government's perspective
    in the United States is legal.
  • 19:20 - 19:21
    And you have to understand that all
  • 19:21 - 19:24
    the stuff we talk about today, government
    says everything we do is legal.
  • 19:24 - 19:26
    Right.
    And they go, so it's fine.
  • 19:27 - 19:31
    Our perspective, the public should be
    well, that's actually the problem,
  • 19:31 - 19:34
    because this is an OK,
    the scandal isn't how they're breaking
  • 19:35 - 19:38
    the law, the scandals that they
    don't have to break the law.
  • 19:39 - 19:41
    And the way they say they're not breaking
  • 19:41 - 19:43
    the law is something called
    the third party doctrine.
  • 19:43 - 19:46
    Third party doctrine is a.
  • 19:48 - 19:50
    Legal principle derived from a case and I
  • 19:50 - 19:55
    believe the 1970s called
    Smith versus Maryland
  • 19:55 - 19:58
    and Smith was this knucklehead who was
  • 19:58 - 20:02
    harassing this lady,
    making phone calls to her house.
  • 20:02 - 20:04
    And when she would pick up, he just,
  • 20:04 - 20:09
    I don't know, sit there, heavy breathing,
    whatever, like a classic creeper.
  • 20:09 - 20:12
    And, you know, it was terrifying,
    this poor lady.
  • 20:12 - 20:14
    So she calls the cops
  • 20:14 - 20:19
    and says, one day I got one of these phone
    calls and I see this car creep past
  • 20:19 - 20:22
    my house on the street
    and she got a license plate number.
  • 20:22 - 20:25
    So she goes to the cops and she goes,
    is this the guy?
  • 20:25 - 20:26
    And the cops?
  • 20:26 - 20:29
    Again, they're trying
    to do a good thing here.
  • 20:30 - 20:35
    They look up his license plate number
    and they find out where this guy is
  • 20:35 - 20:38
    and then they go, what phone number
    is registered to that house?
  • 20:38 - 20:39
    And they go to the phone company and they
  • 20:39 - 20:42
    say, can you give us this record
    in the phone? Company says, yeah, sure.
  • 20:42 - 20:45
    And it's the guy the cops got there, man.
  • 20:45 - 20:46
    Right.
  • 20:46 - 20:48
    So they go arrest this guy.
  • 20:48 - 20:53
    And then in court, his lawyer brings
    all this stuff up and they go.
  • 20:55 - 20:57
    A.
  • 20:58 - 21:02
    You did this without a warrant that was
    sorry, that was that was the problem was
  • 21:02 - 21:05
    they went to the phone company,
    they got the records without a warrant.
  • 21:05 - 21:06
    They just asked for it
    or they subpoenaed it.
  • 21:06 - 21:09
    Right.
    Some lower standard of legal review.
  • 21:09 - 21:14
    And the company gave it to him and
    got the guy they marchmont in jail.
  • 21:14 - 21:17
    And they could have gotten a warrant.
    Right.
  • 21:17 - 21:18
    But it was just expedients.
  • 21:18 - 21:19
    They just didn't want to take the time.
  • 21:20 - 21:22
    Small town cops, you can
    understand how it happens.
  • 21:22 - 21:26
    They know the guy's a creep or they
    just want to get him off to jail.
  • 21:26 - 21:28
    And so they made a misstep with the
    government doesn't want to let go.
  • 21:29 - 21:32
    They fight on this and they go.
  • 21:33 - 21:37
    It wasn't actually
    they weren't his records,
  • 21:37 - 21:43
    and so because they didn't belong to him,
    he didn't have a Fourth Amendment right
  • 21:43 - 21:45
    to demand a warrant be issued for them,
  • 21:46 - 21:49
    they were the company's records and
    the company provided them voluntarily.
  • 21:49 - 21:51
    And hence no warrant was required because
  • 21:51 - 21:55
    you can give whatever you want without
    a warrant as long as it's yours.
  • 21:55 - 21:56
    Now, here's the problem.
  • 21:56 - 22:01
    The government extrapolated
    a principle in a single case of a single
  • 22:02 - 22:09
    known suspected criminal who they had real
    good reasons to suspect was their guy
  • 22:10 - 22:14
    and use that to go to a company and get
    records from them and establish
  • 22:14 - 22:17
    a precedent that these records
    don't belong to the guy.
  • 22:17 - 22:18
    They belong to the company.
  • 22:18 - 22:21
    And then they said, well,
    if one person doesn't have
  • 22:22 - 22:26
    a Fourth Amendment interest in records
    held by a company, no one does.
  • 22:26 - 22:29
    And so the company then has absolute
  • 22:29 - 22:32
    proprietary ownership of all of these
    records about all of our lives.
  • 22:32 - 22:34
    And remember, this is back in the 1970s.
  • 22:34 - 22:38
    You know, the Internet hardly
    exists in these kind of contexts.
  • 22:38 - 22:40
    Smartphones, you know, don't exist.
  • 22:40 - 22:43
    Modern society, modern
    communications don't exist.
  • 22:43 - 22:48
    This is the very beginning
    of the technological era.
  • 22:48 - 22:53
    And flash forward now, 40 years.
  • 22:55 - 22:57
    And they are still relying on this
  • 22:57 - 23:00
    precedent about this one,
    you know, pervy creeper to go.
  • 23:00 - 23:03
    Nobody has a privacy right
    for anything that's held by a company.
  • 23:04 - 23:07
    And so long as they do that,
    companies are going to be extraordinarily
  • 23:07 - 23:10
    powerful and they're going
    to be extraordinarily abusive.
  • 23:10 - 23:11
    And this is something
    that people don't get.
  • 23:12 - 23:14
    They go, oh, well,
    it's Data-Collection, right?
  • 23:14 - 23:16
    They're exploiting data.
  • 23:16 - 23:19
    This is data about human lives.
  • 23:19 - 23:21
    It is state about people.
  • 23:21 - 23:23
    These records are about you.
  • 23:23 - 23:26
    It's not data that's being exploited.
  • 23:26 - 23:28
    It's people that are being exploited.
  • 23:29 - 23:33
    It's not data that's being manipulated.
  • 23:33 - 23:34
    It's you.
  • 23:34 - 23:37
    It's being manipulated.
  • 23:37 - 23:39
    And this this is this is something that I
  • 23:40 - 23:43
    think a lot of people
    are beginning to understand.
  • 23:43 - 23:45
    Now, the problem is the companies
    and the governments are still pretending
  • 23:45 - 23:47
    they don't understand or
    disagreeing with this.
  • 23:47 - 23:53
    And this reminds me of something that one
    of my old friends, John Perry Barlow,
  • 23:54 - 23:56
    who served with me at the Freedom
  • 23:56 - 23:59
    of Press Foundation,
    I'm the president of the board,
  • 23:59 - 24:02
    used to say to me.
  • 24:03 - 24:06
    Which is you can't awaken someone
    who's pretending to be asleep.
Title:
Edward Snowden: How Your Cell Phone Spies on You
Description:

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Video Language:
English
Duration:
24:16
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