0:00:00.960,0:00:03.320
The Joe Rogan experience.

0:00:03.520,0:00:06.720
Are you aware at all of the current state

0:00:06.920,0:00:12.560
of surveillance and what, if anything,[br]has changed since your revelations?

0:00:12.760,0:00:16.520
Yeah, I mean, the big thing that's changed

0:00:16.720,0:00:22.040
since I was in in 2013 is now it's mobile.

0:00:22.240,0:00:24.600
First, everything

0:00:25.400,0:00:28.640
mobile was still a big deal, right.

0:00:28.840,0:00:32.400
And the intelligence community[br]was very much grappling

0:00:32.640,0:00:35.600
to get its hands around[br]it and to deal with it.

0:00:35.800,0:00:41.600
But now people are much less likely to use[br]laptop than use a desktop than than use,

0:00:41.800,0:00:47.120
you know, got any kind of wired phone[br]than they are to use a smartphone.

0:00:47.320,0:00:52.080
And both Apple and Android[br]devices, unfortunately,

0:00:52.280,0:00:57.600
are not especially good in protecting[br]your privacy, I think, right now.

0:00:59.720,0:01:00.560
You got a smartphone,

0:01:00.760,0:01:05.400
right? You might be listening to this[br]on a train somewhere and in traffic right

0:01:05.600,0:01:10.320
now, or you, Joe, right now you got[br]a phone somewhere in the room, right?

0:01:11.360,0:01:15.480
The phone is turned off for at least the[br]screen is turned off, it's sitting there.

0:01:15.680,0:01:17.880
It's powered on.

0:01:18.080,0:01:22.960
And if somebody sends you a message,[br]the screen blinks to life.

0:01:23.560,0:01:28.600
How does that happen,[br]but how is it that if someone from any

0:01:28.800,0:01:32.760
corner of the Earth dials a number of your[br]phone rings and nobody else's rings,

0:01:32.760,0:01:35.680
how is that you can dial anybody else's[br]number and only their phone rings?

0:01:35.680,0:01:38.520
Right.[br]Every smartphone,

0:01:38.720,0:01:44.200
every phone at all is constantly[br]connected to the nearest cellular tower.

0:01:44.400,0:01:47.880
Every phone, even when the screen is off,[br]you think it's doing nothing.

0:01:48.080,0:01:51.800
You can't see it because radio[br]frequency emissions are invisible.

0:01:52.120,0:01:56.960
It's screaming in the air[br]saying, here I am, here I am.

0:01:57.160,0:01:59.400
Here is my IMEI.

0:01:59.600,0:02:01.840
I think it's individual manufacturers,

0:02:02.040,0:02:09.680
equipment, identity and IMEI individual[br]manufacturers, subscriber identity.

0:02:09.880,0:02:13.240
I could be wrong on the break out there,[br]but the acronyms are

0:02:13.440,0:02:17.040
the Emii and the emcee and you[br]can search for these things.

0:02:17.240,0:02:19.280
There are two globally unique identifiers

0:02:19.480,0:02:23.880
that only exist anywhere[br]in the world in one place.

0:02:23.880,0:02:24.520
Right.

0:02:24.720,0:02:27.360
And it makes your phone different[br]than all the other phones.

0:02:27.560,0:02:30.160
The IMEI is burned[br]into the handset on your phone.

0:02:30.360,0:02:32.880
No matter what SIM card you change to,

0:02:33.080,0:02:35.520
it's always going to be the same and it's[br]always going to be telling the phone

0:02:35.720,0:02:42.000
network it's this physical handset,[br]the Iame essi is in your SIM card.

0:02:42.040,0:02:43.760
Right.[br]And this is what holds your phone number.

0:02:43.760,0:02:43.960
Right.

0:02:43.960,0:02:46.960
Is that basically the key,[br]the right to use that phone number?

0:02:47.160,0:02:51.000
And so your phone is sitting there doing[br]nothing you think,

0:02:51.200,0:02:55.440
but it's constantly shouting and saying,[br]I'm here who is closest to me?

0:02:55.640,0:02:59.280
That's a cell phone tower[br]and every cell phone tower with its big

0:02:59.480,0:03:04.640
ears is listening for these little[br]cries for help and going, oh, right.

0:03:04.840,0:03:06.480
I see Joe Rogan's phone, right.

0:03:06.680,0:03:08.120
I see Jamie's phone.

0:03:08.320,0:03:11.800
I see all these phones[br]that are here right now.

0:03:12.000,0:03:14.880
And it compares notes

0:03:15.080,0:03:18.360
with the other[br]network towers and your smartphone

0:03:18.560,0:03:24.240
compares notes with them to go,[br]who do I hear the loudest and who you hear

0:03:24.440,0:03:29.160
the loudest is a proxy for[br]proximity, for closeness, distance.

0:03:29.160,0:03:29.800
Right.

0:03:30.000,0:03:33.920
They go whoever I hear more loudly[br]than anybody else, that's close to me.

0:03:34.120,0:03:37.120
So you're going to be bound to this cell[br]phone tower and that cell phone tower is

0:03:37.320,0:03:42.520
going to make a note, a permanent record,[br]saying this phone,

0:03:42.720,0:03:48.640
this phone handset with this phone number[br]at this time was connected to me.

0:03:48.840,0:03:51.360
Right.[br]And based on your phone handset and your

0:03:51.560,0:03:55.920
phone number,[br]they can get your identity right

0:03:56.120,0:03:59.600
because you pay for this stuff with your[br]credit card and everything like that.

0:03:59.800,0:04:04.200
And even if you don't write, it's[br]still active at your house overnight.

0:04:04.200,0:04:06.520
It's still active, you know,[br]on your nightstand when you're sleeping.

0:04:06.720,0:04:08.840
It's still whatever

0:04:09.200,0:04:11.760
the movements of your phone are,[br]the movements of you as a person.

0:04:11.960,0:04:15.000
And those are often[br]quite uniquely identifying.

0:04:15.200,0:04:16.280
It goes to your home.

0:04:16.380,0:04:17.680
It goes to your workplace.

0:04:17.880,0:04:20.440
Other people don't have it sorry

0:04:22.120,0:04:23.880
in any way.[br]It's constantly shutting this out.

0:04:23.880,0:04:26.400
And then it compares notes[br]with the other a parts network.

0:04:26.600,0:04:28.200
And when somebody is trying to get

0:04:28.400,0:04:32.360
to a phone, it compares notes[br]of the network, compares notes to go.

0:04:32.560,0:04:37.560
Where is this phone with this phone number[br]in the world right now

0:04:37.760,0:04:41.200
and to that cell phone tower[br]that is closest to that phone.

0:04:41.400,0:04:43.160
It sends out a signal saying,

0:04:43.360,0:04:47.000
we have a call for you,[br]make your phone start ringing so your

0:04:47.000,0:04:49.760
owner can answer it, and then it[br]connects it across this whole path.

0:04:49.960,0:04:51.240
But what this means

0:04:51.440,0:04:54.640
is that whenever you carry a phone over,[br]the phone is turned on.

0:04:54.840,0:04:56.840
There's a record of your presence

0:04:57.040,0:05:00.400
at that place that is being[br]made and created by companies.

0:05:00.600,0:05:02.760
It does not need to be kept forever.

0:05:02.760,0:05:05.360
And in fact, there's no good[br]argument for it to be kept forever.

0:05:05.560,0:05:08.520
But these companies see that as[br]valuable information, right?

0:05:08.620,0:05:10.320
This is the whole big data problem

0:05:10.320,0:05:14.000
that we're running into and all this[br]information that used to be ephemeral.

0:05:14.000,0:05:14.320
Right.

0:05:14.520,0:05:16.600
Where were you when you[br]were eight years old?

0:05:16.800,0:05:20.480
You know, where were where'd you[br]go after you had a bad breakup?

0:05:20.680,0:05:22.440
You know, who'd you spend the night with?[br]Who'd you call?

0:05:22.640,0:05:26.800
After all, this information used to be[br]ephemeral, meaning it disappeared.

0:05:26.800,0:05:29.640
Right.[br]Like like the morning do it would be gone.

0:05:29.840,0:05:32.760
No one would remember it.[br]But now these things are stored.

0:05:32.850,0:05:34.200
Now these things are saved.

0:05:34.240,0:05:36.280
It doesn't matter whether[br]you're doing anything wrong.

0:05:36.480,0:05:40.000
Does it matter where you most[br]ordinary person on Earth?

0:05:40.200,0:05:42.680
Because that's how bulk collection,

0:05:42.880,0:05:46.520
which is the government's euphemism[br]for mass surveillance, works.

0:05:46.520,0:05:50.400
They simply collect it all in advance in[br]hopes that one day it will become useful.

0:05:50.600,0:05:56.200
And that was just talking about how[br]you connected the phone network.

0:05:56.400,0:05:58.440
That's not talking about all those apps

0:05:58.640,0:06:02.800
on your phone that are contacting[br]the network even more frequently.

0:06:03.000,0:06:04.440
Right.

0:06:04.640,0:06:06.320
How do you get a text[br]message notification?

0:06:06.320,0:06:10.040
How do you get an email notification? How[br]is it the Facebook knows where you're at?

0:06:10.240,0:06:14.040
You know, all of these things,[br]these analytics,

0:06:14.600,0:06:16.000
they are trying to keep track through

0:06:16.200,0:06:20.880
location services on your phone to GPS,[br]through even just wireless access points

0:06:20.880,0:06:23.040
you're connected to because[br]there's a global contact.

0:06:23.170,0:06:26.720
The updated map, there's actually many[br]of them of wireless access points

0:06:26.720,0:06:29.920
in the world, because just like we talked[br]about, every phone has a unique identifier

0:06:30.120,0:06:33.720
that's globally unique,[br]every wireless access point in the world.

0:06:33.720,0:06:33.920
Right.

0:06:34.120,0:06:37.080
You cable modem at home,[br]whether it's in your laptop,

0:06:37.280,0:06:43.920
every device that has a radio modem[br]has a globally unique identifier in it.

0:06:44.200,0:06:45.680
And this is standard term.

0:06:45.880,0:06:46.920
You can look it up

0:06:47.120,0:06:51.280
and these things can be mapped when[br]they're broadcasting in the air because

0:06:51.480,0:06:55.800
again, like your phone says to the cell[br]phone tower, I have this identifier.

0:06:56.000,0:06:58.960
The cell phone tower responds and says,[br]I have this identifier.

0:06:59.160,0:07:02.520
And anybody who's listening,[br]they can write these things down.

0:07:02.720,0:07:05.440
And all those Google Street View[br]cars that go back and forth.

0:07:05.440,0:07:05.960
Right.

0:07:06.160,0:07:11.400
They're keeping notes on whose Wi-Fi[br]is active on this block.

0:07:11.400,0:07:13.520
Right.[br]And then they build a new GM app.

0:07:13.720,0:07:16.280
So even if you have turned off right,

0:07:16.480,0:07:20.920
as long as you connect to Wi-Fi,[br]those apps can go well,

0:07:21.120,0:07:26.080
I'm connected to Joe's Wi-Fi, but I can[br]also see his neighbor's Wi-Fi here.

0:07:26.280,0:07:27.680
And the other one in this apartment over

0:07:27.680,0:07:29.480
here and the other one[br]in the apartment here.

0:07:29.680,0:07:32.960
And you should only be able to hear

0:07:33.160,0:07:36.160
those four globally unique Wi-Fi access

0:07:36.360,0:07:39.400
points from these points[br]in physical space.

0:07:39.400,0:07:42.320
Right.[br]The intersection in between the spread's,

0:07:42.520,0:07:45.720
the domes of all those[br]wireless access points,

0:07:45.920,0:07:49.000
it's a proxy for location[br]and it just goes on and on and on.

0:07:49.040,0:07:51.440
We can talk about this for more hours.[br]We don't have that kind of time.

0:07:51.640,0:07:55.200
Can I ask you this? Is there a way[br]to mitigate any of this personally? I

0:07:55.400,0:07:59.680
mean, is shutting your phone[br]off doesn't even work, right?

0:07:59.880,0:08:02.560
Well, so it does.[br]In a way, it's yes.

0:08:02.560,0:08:04.200
No, I'm the thing with shutting your phone

0:08:04.400,0:08:08.360
off that is a risk is how do you[br]know if phones actually turned off?

0:08:08.560,0:08:14.640
It used to be when I was in Geneva,[br]for example, working for the CIA,

0:08:15.760,0:08:19.040
we would all carry like[br]drug dealer phones.

0:08:19.240,0:08:22.920
You know, the old smartphones[br]are old dumb phones.

0:08:23.000,0:08:24.200
They're not smartphones.

0:08:24.400,0:08:26.880
And the reason why was just because they

0:08:27.080,0:08:30.800
had removal that from the banks where[br]you could take the battery out.

0:08:30.800,0:08:33.440
Right.[br]And the one beautiful thing about

0:08:33.640,0:08:35.920
technology is if there's[br]no electricity in it.

0:08:35.920,0:08:38.200
Right.[br]If there's there's no go juice

0:08:38.400,0:08:41.920
available to it, if there's no battery[br]connected to it, it's not sending anything

0:08:41.920,0:08:43.880
because you have to get[br]power from somewhere.

0:08:44.080,0:08:48.440
You have to have power[br]in order to do work.

0:08:48.640,0:08:51.640
But now your phones are all sealed[br]and you can't take the batteries out.

0:08:51.840,0:08:55.240
So there are potential ways that you can

0:08:55.300,0:08:58.600
hack a phone where it appears to be off,[br]but it's not actually off.

0:08:58.600,0:09:00.040
It's just pretending to be off,

0:09:00.040,0:09:02.520
whereas in fact, it's still listening[br]in and doing all this stuff.

0:09:02.720,0:09:06.000
But for the average person,[br]that doesn't apply.

0:09:06.000,0:09:06.240
Right.

0:09:06.420,0:09:09.920
And I got to tell you guys, they've[br]been chasing me all over the place.

0:09:10.120,0:09:12.120
I don't worry about that stuff.

0:09:12.120,0:09:13.520
Right.

0:09:13.720,0:09:16.720
And it's because if they're applying[br]that level of effort to me,

0:09:16.920,0:09:20.640
I don't probably get the same[br]information through other routes.

0:09:20.840,0:09:22.640
I am as careful as I can.

0:09:22.840,0:09:26.040
And I use things like Faraday cages.[br]I turn devices off.

0:09:26.240,0:09:28.680
But if they're actually

0:09:28.880,0:09:33.320
manipulating the way devices display,[br]it's just too great a level of effort,

0:09:33.320,0:09:36.160
even for someone like me to keep[br]that up on a constant basis.

0:09:36.360,0:09:41.120
Also, if they get me,[br]I only trust phones so much.

0:09:41.120,0:09:43.520
So there's only so much they[br]can derive from the compromise.

0:09:43.720,0:09:47.440
And this is how operational[br]security works.

0:09:47.640,0:09:49.280
And you think about what are the realistic

0:09:49.480,0:09:52.320
threats that you're facing[br]that you're trying to mitigate

0:09:52.520,0:09:57.520
and the mitigation that you're trying[br]to do is what would be the loss? What

0:09:57.720,0:10:02.680
would be the damage done to you[br]if this stuff was exploited? Much more

0:10:02.730,0:10:06.080
realistic than worrying about these[br]things that I call voodoo hacks.

0:10:06.080,0:10:07.840
Right.[br]Which are like next level stuff.

0:10:08.040,0:10:10.120
And actually just a shout out for those

0:10:10.320,0:10:13.320
of your readers who are[br]interested in this stuff.

0:10:13.520,0:10:16.360
I wrote a paper on this specific problem.

0:10:16.360,0:10:18.320
How do you know when[br]a phone is actually off?

0:10:18.320,0:10:20.560
How do you know when it's[br]actually not spying on you?

0:10:20.760,0:10:24.800
With a brilliant, brilliant[br]guy named Andrew Bunnie Huang.

0:10:25.000,0:10:30.040
He's an MIT Ph.D. and I[br]think electrical engineering

0:10:30.280,0:10:32.800
called the Introspection Engine

0:10:33.000,0:10:35.280
that was published in the Journal[br]of Hope Engineering.

0:10:35.480,0:10:37.440
You can find it online

0:10:37.920,0:10:40.560
and it'll go as deep down in the weeds,[br]I promise you, as you.

0:10:40.760,0:10:42.800
Well, we take an iPhone six.

0:10:43.000,0:10:44.960
This was back when it was fairly new

0:10:45.160,0:10:50.480
and we modified it so we could actually[br]not trust the device to report its own

0:10:50.480,0:10:53.160
state, but physically monitor it[br]state to see if it was spying on you.

0:10:53.360,0:10:55.400
But for average people, right

0:10:55.600,0:10:59.960
this academic night,[br]that's not your primary threat.

0:11:00.160,0:11:03.600
Your primary threats are these[br]bulk collection programs.

0:11:03.670,0:11:05.720
Your primary threat is the fact that your

0:11:05.920,0:11:08.920
phone is constantly squawking[br]to these cell phone towers.

0:11:08.920,0:11:10.280
It's doing all of these things

0:11:10.480,0:11:13.720
because we leave our phones[br]in a state that is constantly on.

0:11:13.920,0:11:16.120
You're constantly connected right now.

0:11:16.320,0:11:19.720
Airplane mode doesn't even[br]turn off Wi-Fi really anymore.

0:11:19.920,0:11:22.880
Just turns off the cellular modem.

0:11:23.080,0:11:25.360
The whole idea is

0:11:25.560,0:11:29.320
we need to identify the problem[br]and the central problem with smartphone

0:11:29.520,0:11:33.400
use today is you have no idea what[br]the hell it's doing at any given time.

0:11:33.600,0:11:35.360
Like the phone has the screen off.

0:11:35.560,0:11:36.840
You don't know what it's connected to.

0:11:36.840,0:11:38.560
You don't know how[br]frequently it's doing it.

0:11:38.760,0:11:43.080
Apple and iOS, unfortunately,[br]makes it impossible to see what kind

0:11:43.080,0:11:46.960
of network connections are constantly made[br]on the device and to intermediate them

0:11:47.160,0:11:49.880
going, I don't want Facebook[br]to be able to talk right now.

0:11:49.920,0:11:52.080
You know, I don't want Google[br]to be able to talk right now.

0:11:52.280,0:11:56.120
I just want my secure messenger[br]app to be able to talk.

0:11:56.320,0:11:58.080
I just want my weather app to be able

0:11:58.280,0:12:01.480
to talk, but I just check my weather[br]and now I'm done with it.

0:12:01.480,0:12:03.240
So I don't want that to be[br]able to talk anymore.

0:12:03.440,0:12:06.880
And we need to be able to make[br]these intelligent decisions.

0:12:07.080,0:12:11.160
Are not just an app by app basis, but a[br]connection by connection basis, right.

0:12:11.360,0:12:16.600
You want let's say you use[br]Facebook because, you know,

0:12:16.800,0:12:19.960
for whatever judgment we have,[br]a lot of people might do it.

0:12:20.160,0:12:24.040
You want to be able to connect[br]to Facebook's content servers.

0:12:24.240,0:12:26.000
You want to be able to message a friend.

0:12:26.000,0:12:28.440
You want to be able to download[br]a photograph or whatever,

0:12:28.640,0:12:30.840
but you don't want it to be[br]able to talk to an ad server.

0:12:31.040,0:12:32.640
You don't want to talk to an analytics

0:12:32.640,0:12:34.520
server that that's[br]monitoring your behavior.

0:12:34.520,0:12:36.000
Right.[br]You don't want to talk to all these third

0:12:36.200,0:12:40.360
party things because Facebook crams their[br]garbage and almost every app that you

0:12:40.460,0:12:44.160
download and you don't even know what's[br]happening because you can't see it.

0:12:44.160,0:12:44.400
Right.

0:12:44.600,0:12:47.760
And this is the problem[br]with the data collection used today

0:12:47.960,0:12:52.280
is there is an industry that is[br]built on keeping this invisible.

0:12:52.480,0:12:54.680
And what we need to do is we need to make

0:12:54.880,0:12:58.720
the activities of our devices,[br]whether it's a phone,

0:12:58.920,0:13:03.480
whether it's computer or whatever,[br]are more visible and understandable

0:13:03.480,0:13:05.720
to the average person and then[br]give them control over it.

0:13:05.920,0:13:08.480
So if you could see your phone right now

0:13:08.680,0:13:10.680
and at the very center of it[br]is a little green icon.

0:13:10.880,0:13:14.680
That's your, you know, handset or[br]it's a picture, your face, whatever.

0:13:14.880,0:13:18.040
And you see all these little[br]spokes coming off of it.

0:13:18.240,0:13:20.160
That's every app that your phone is

0:13:20.360,0:13:24.000
talking to right now[br]or every app that is active on your phone

0:13:24.050,0:13:26.600
right now and all the hosts[br]that it's connecting to.

0:13:26.800,0:13:30.200
And you can see right now,[br]once every three seconds,

0:13:30.400,0:13:34.760
your phone is checking into Facebook[br]and you could just poke that app and then,

0:13:34.760,0:13:36.320
boom, it's not talking[br]to Facebook anymore.

0:13:36.360,0:13:39.600
Facebook's not allowed Facebook[br]speaking privileges have been revoked.

0:13:39.600,0:13:41.680
Right.[br]You would do that.

0:13:41.880,0:13:45.520
We would all do that if there was a button[br]on your phone that said,

0:13:45.720,0:13:50.800
do what I want but not spy on me,[br]you would press that button, right?

0:13:51.000,0:13:53.800
That button is not does[br]not exist right now.

0:13:54.000,0:13:58.200
And both Google and Apple, unfortunately,[br]Apple's a lot better at this than Google,

0:13:58.400,0:14:03.280
but neither of them allow[br]that button to exist.

0:14:03.280,0:14:07.040
In fact, they actively interfere with it[br]because they say it's a security risk.

0:14:07.240,0:14:10.960
And from a particular perspective,[br]they they actually aren't wrong there.

0:14:11.160,0:14:13.520
But it's not enough to go.

0:14:13.680,0:14:15.600
You know, we have to lock that capability

0:14:15.600,0:14:18.640
off from people because we don't trust[br]they would make the right decisions.

0:14:18.840,0:14:21.360
We think it's too complicated[br]for people to do this.

0:14:21.360,0:14:23.520
We think there's too many[br]connections being made.

0:14:23.720,0:14:28.160
Well, that is actually a confession[br]of the problem right there.

0:14:28.360,0:14:30.120
If you think people can't understand it,

0:14:30.320,0:14:32.520
if you think there are too many[br]communications happening,

0:14:32.720,0:14:36.560
if you think there's too much complexity[br]in there, it needs to be simplified,

0:14:36.760,0:14:39.280
just like the president can't[br]control everything like that.

0:14:39.280,0:14:42.640
If you have to be the president[br]of the phone and the phone is as complex

0:14:42.640,0:14:45.120
as the United States government,[br]we have a problem.

0:14:45.320,0:14:47.680
Guys, this should be much[br]more simple process.

0:14:47.880,0:14:48.840
It should be obvious.

0:14:49.040,0:14:53.480
And the fact that it's not and the fact[br]that we read story after story year after

0:14:53.480,0:14:55.920
year, saying all your date has been[br]breached here,

0:14:56.120,0:15:00.360
this company's spying on you here is[br]companies manipulating your purchases or

0:15:00.560,0:15:05.320
your search results or they're hiding[br]these things from your timeline

0:15:05.520,0:15:09.400
or they're influencing you or manipulating[br]you in all of these different ways.

0:15:09.600,0:15:16.080
That happens as a result of a single[br]problem.

0:15:16.280,0:15:20.800
And that problem is in inequality[br]of available information.

0:15:21.000,0:15:22.520
They can see everything about you.

0:15:22.560,0:15:23.760
They can see everything about what your

0:15:23.760,0:15:26.120
device is doing, and they can do[br]whatever they want with your device.

0:15:26.320,0:15:32.760
You, on the other hand, owned the device[br]well, rather, you paid for the device.

0:15:32.960,0:15:35.200
But increasingly these[br]corporations own it.

0:15:35.200,0:15:37.040
Increasingly, these governments own it.

0:15:37.240,0:15:41.120
And increasingly, we are living in a world[br]where we do all the work right.

0:15:41.320,0:15:48.360
We pay all the taxes, we pay all[br]the costs, but we own less and less.

0:15:48.360,0:15:51.040
And nobody understands this better[br]than the youngest generation.

0:15:51.240,0:15:53.000
Well, it seems like our data became

0:15:53.200,0:15:55.960
a commodity before we[br]understood what it was.

0:15:56.160,0:15:58.440
It became this thing that's insanely

0:15:58.640,0:16:02.320
valuable to Google and Facebook[br]and all these social media platforms.

0:16:02.520,0:16:06.600
Before we understood what we were giving[br]up, they were making billions of dollars.

0:16:06.800,0:16:10.920
And then once that money is being earned[br]and once everyone's accustomed

0:16:11.120,0:16:14.200
to the situation, it's very[br]difficult to pull the reins back.

0:16:14.400,0:16:17.200
It's very difficult[br]to turn that horse around

0:16:17.400,0:16:19.880
precisely because the money[br]then becomes part right.

0:16:20.080,0:16:22.200
The information then becomes influence.

0:16:22.200,0:16:23.640
That also seems to be the same sort

0:16:23.640,0:16:26.360
of situation that would happen[br]with these mass surveillance states.

0:16:26.560,0:16:28.360
Once they have the access,

0:16:28.560,0:16:32.920
it's going to be incredibly difficult[br]for them to relinquish that,

0:16:33.120,0:16:35.840
right?[br]Yeah, no, you're exactly correct.

0:16:35.960,0:16:37.760
And this is the subject of the book.

0:16:37.760,0:16:40.640
I mean, this is the permanent record[br]and this is where it came from.

0:16:40.840,0:16:43.440
This is how it came to exist.

0:16:43.640,0:16:50.800
The story of our lifetimes is how[br]intentionally by design,

0:16:51.000,0:16:55.480
a number of institutions,[br]both governmental and corporate,

0:16:55.680,0:17:00.480
realized it was in their mutual interest[br]to conceal their data collection

0:17:00.680,0:17:06.640
activities, to increase the breadth[br]and depth of their sensor network.

0:17:06.840,0:17:10.320
That were sort of spread out through[br]society, rumor back in the day

0:17:10.520,0:17:13.760
intelligence collection[br]in the United States, even at Segan,

0:17:13.960,0:17:18.880
used to mean sending an FBI agent right[br]to put alligator clips on an embassy

0:17:19.080,0:17:23.200
building or sending in somebody[br]disguised as a workman.

0:17:23.400,0:17:29.080
And they put a bug in a building or[br]they built a satellite listening side.

0:17:29.080,0:17:29.280
Right.

0:17:29.480,0:17:33.080
We called these foreign set were[br]foreign satellite collection.

0:17:33.320,0:17:34.560
We're out in the desert somewhere.

0:17:34.760,0:17:38.040
They built a big parabolic collector.

0:17:38.240,0:17:40.560
And it's just listening[br]to satellite missions.

0:17:40.560,0:17:40.840
Right.

0:17:41.040,0:17:46.440
But these satellite emmissions, these[br]satellite links were owned by militaries.

0:17:46.440,0:17:48.360
They were exclusive to governments.[br]Right.

0:17:48.560,0:17:51.400
It wasn't affecting everybody broadly.

0:17:51.600,0:17:55.640
All surveillance was targeted[br]because it had to be.

0:17:55.920,0:17:57.560
What changed with technology is

0:17:57.760,0:18:00.680
that surveillance could[br]now become indiscriminate.

0:18:00.880,0:18:02.560
It could become dragnet.

0:18:02.760,0:18:06.920
It could become bulk collection,[br]which should become one of the dirtiest

0:18:07.120,0:18:10.920
phrases in the language[br]if we have any kind of decency.

0:18:11.120,0:18:14.600
But we were intentionally

0:18:14.800,0:18:17.320
this was intentionally concealed from us.[br]Right.

0:18:17.520,0:18:18.200
The government did it.

0:18:18.400,0:18:21.400
They used classification,[br]companies did it.

0:18:21.600,0:18:23.040
They intentionally didn't talk about it.

0:18:23.240,0:18:25.320
They denied these things were going.

0:18:25.520,0:18:30.080
They said you agreed to this and you[br]didn't agree to nothing like this.

0:18:30.280,0:18:31.280
I'm sorry.[br]Right.

0:18:31.360,0:18:33.760
Right.[br]They go we put that terms of service page

0:18:33.960,0:18:36.600
up and you click that,[br]you click the button.

0:18:36.800,0:18:38.080
That said, I agree

0:18:38.280,0:18:42.120
because you were trying to open an account[br]so you could talk to your friends.

0:18:42.320,0:18:43.960
You were trying to get driving directions.

0:18:43.960,0:18:45.280
You were trying to get an email account.

0:18:45.480,0:18:47.760
You were trying to agree to some 600 page

0:18:47.960,0:18:51.480
legal form that even if you read,[br]you wouldn't understand.

0:18:51.680,0:18:53.040
And it doesn't matter even if you did

0:18:53.040,0:18:56.680
understand, because one of the very first[br]paragraphs and it said this agreement can

0:18:56.880,0:19:00.880
be changed at any time unilaterally[br]without your consent by the company.

0:19:01.080,0:19:02.360
Right.

0:19:02.560,0:19:05.600
They have built a legal paradigm

0:19:05.800,0:19:12.160
that presumes records collected about us[br]do not belong to us.

0:19:12.360,0:19:16.520
This is sort of one of the core principles[br]on which mass surveillance

0:19:16.720,0:19:19.840
from the government's perspective[br]in the United States is legal.

0:19:20.040,0:19:21.120
And you have to understand that all

0:19:21.120,0:19:24.200
the stuff we talk about today, government[br]says everything we do is legal.

0:19:24.400,0:19:26.480
Right.[br]And they go, so it's fine.

0:19:26.680,0:19:30.560
Our perspective, the public should be[br]well, that's actually the problem,

0:19:30.760,0:19:34.320
because this is an OK,[br]the scandal isn't how they're breaking

0:19:34.520,0:19:38.480
the law, the scandals that they[br]don't have to break the law.

0:19:38.680,0:19:40.520
And the way they say they're not breaking

0:19:40.520,0:19:43.080
the law is something called[br]the third party doctrine.

0:19:43.280,0:19:46.240
Third party doctrine is a.

0:19:47.640,0:19:49.920
Legal principle derived from a case and I

0:19:50.120,0:19:54.680
believe the 1970s called[br]Smith versus Maryland

0:19:55.040,0:19:58.080
and Smith was this knucklehead who was

0:19:58.280,0:20:02.200
harassing this lady,[br]making phone calls to her house.

0:20:02.400,0:20:04.120
And when she would pick up, he just,

0:20:04.320,0:20:08.600
I don't know, sit there, heavy breathing,[br]whatever, like a classic creeper.

0:20:08.800,0:20:11.520
And, you know, it was terrifying,[br]this poor lady.

0:20:11.720,0:20:13.840
So she calls the cops

0:20:14.040,0:20:18.520
and says, one day I got one of these phone[br]calls and I see this car creep past

0:20:18.720,0:20:22.120
my house on the street[br]and she got a license plate number.

0:20:22.320,0:20:25.120
So she goes to the cops and she goes,[br]is this the guy?

0:20:25.320,0:20:26.280
And the cops?

0:20:26.480,0:20:29.480
Again, they're trying[br]to do a good thing here.

0:20:29.680,0:20:35.040
They look up his license plate number[br]and they find out where this guy is

0:20:35.040,0:20:37.520
and then they go, what phone number[br]is registered to that house?

0:20:37.520,0:20:38.840
And they go to the phone company and they

0:20:38.840,0:20:42.240
say, can you give us this record[br]in the phone? Company says, yeah, sure.

0:20:42.440,0:20:44.880
And it's the guy the cops got there, man.

0:20:44.920,0:20:46.120
Right.

0:20:46.320,0:20:47.640
So they go arrest this guy.

0:20:47.840,0:20:52.800
And then in court, his lawyer brings[br]all this stuff up and they go.

0:20:55.440,0:20:56.840
A.

0:20:57.600,0:21:02.080
You did this without a warrant that was[br]sorry, that was that was the problem was

0:21:02.280,0:21:04.520
they went to the phone company,[br]they got the records without a warrant.

0:21:04.560,0:21:06.480
They just asked for it[br]or they subpoenaed it.

0:21:06.480,0:21:08.960
Right.[br]Some lower standard of legal review.

0:21:09.160,0:21:13.680
And the company gave it to him and[br]got the guy they marchmont in jail.

0:21:14.160,0:21:16.680
And they could have gotten a warrant.[br]Right.

0:21:16.680,0:21:17.920
But it was just expedients.

0:21:17.920,0:21:19.400
They just didn't want to take the time.

0:21:19.580,0:21:22.080
Small town cops, you can[br]understand how it happens.

0:21:22.160,0:21:25.560
They know the guy's a creep or they[br]just want to get him off to jail.

0:21:26.360,0:21:28.480
And so they made a misstep with the[br]government doesn't want to let go.

0:21:28.680,0:21:32.280
They fight on this and they go.

0:21:33.000,0:21:36.520
It wasn't actually[br]they weren't his records,

0:21:36.720,0:21:42.760
and so because they didn't belong to him,[br]he didn't have a Fourth Amendment right

0:21:42.960,0:21:45.360
to demand a warrant be issued for them,

0:21:45.560,0:21:49.040
they were the company's records and[br]the company provided them voluntarily.

0:21:49.040,0:21:51.080
And hence no warrant was required because

0:21:51.080,0:21:54.520
you can give whatever you want without[br]a warrant as long as it's yours.

0:21:54.720,0:21:56.000
Now, here's the problem.

0:21:56.200,0:22:01.400
The government extrapolated[br]a principle in a single case of a single

0:22:01.600,0:22:08.680
known suspected criminal who they had real[br]good reasons to suspect was their guy

0:22:10.040,0:22:14.320
and use that to go to a company and get[br]records from them and establish

0:22:14.420,0:22:17.120
a precedent that these records[br]don't belong to the guy.

0:22:17.320,0:22:18.240
They belong to the company.

0:22:18.440,0:22:21.480
And then they said, well,[br]if one person doesn't have

0:22:21.680,0:22:26.080
a Fourth Amendment interest in records[br]held by a company, no one does.

0:22:26.280,0:22:28.600
And so the company then has absolute

0:22:28.600,0:22:31.760
proprietary ownership of all of these[br]records about all of our lives.

0:22:31.960,0:22:33.840
And remember, this is back in the 1970s.

0:22:34.040,0:22:38.040
You know, the Internet hardly[br]exists in these kind of contexts.

0:22:38.090,0:22:39.840
Smartphones, you know, don't exist.

0:22:40.040,0:22:43.280
Modern society, modern[br]communications don't exist.

0:22:43.480,0:22:47.600
This is the very beginning[br]of the technological era.

0:22:47.800,0:22:53.040
And flash forward now, 40 years.

0:22:54.600,0:22:56.880
And they are still relying on this

0:22:57.080,0:23:00.440
precedent about this one,[br]you know, pervy creeper to go.

0:23:00.480,0:23:03.440
Nobody has a privacy right[br]for anything that's held by a company.

0:23:03.640,0:23:07.280
And so long as they do that,[br]companies are going to be extraordinarily

0:23:07.280,0:23:09.920
powerful and they're going[br]to be extraordinarily abusive.

0:23:09.920,0:23:11.440
And this is something[br]that people don't get.

0:23:11.640,0:23:14.280
They go, oh, well,[br]it's Data-Collection, right?

0:23:14.480,0:23:16.120
They're exploiting data.

0:23:16.320,0:23:18.840
This is data about human lives.

0:23:19.040,0:23:21.120
It is state about people.

0:23:21.320,0:23:22.720
These records are about you.

0:23:22.920,0:23:26.280
It's not data that's being exploited.

0:23:26.480,0:23:28.320
It's people that are being exploited.

0:23:28.520,0:23:32.560
It's not data that's being manipulated.

0:23:32.760,0:23:33.760
It's you.

0:23:33.960,0:23:36.520
It's being manipulated.

0:23:36.720,0:23:39.480
And this this is this is something that I

0:23:39.680,0:23:42.680
think a lot of people[br]are beginning to understand.

0:23:42.880,0:23:45.160
Now, the problem is the companies[br]and the governments are still pretending

0:23:45.160,0:23:47.240
they don't understand or[br]disagreeing with this.

0:23:47.440,0:23:52.960
And this reminds me of something that one[br]of my old friends, John Perry Barlow,

0:23:53.800,0:23:55.560
who served with me at the Freedom

0:23:55.760,0:23:59.200
of Press Foundation,[br]I'm the president of the board,

0:23:59.400,0:24:01.640
used to say to me.

0:24:02.520,0:24:06.120
Which is you can't awaken someone[br]who's pretending to be asleep.