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Justice: What's The Right Thing To Do? Episode 02: "PUTTING A PRICE TAG ON LIFE"

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    Funding for this program provided by
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    Additional funding provided by
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    last time we argued about
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    the case of the Queen verses Dudley and Stephens
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    the lifeboat case, the case of cannibalism
    at sea
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    and with the arguments about
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    the lifeboat
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    in mind the arguments for and against
    what Dudley and Stephens did in mind,
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    let's turn back to the
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    philosophy
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    the utilitarian philosophy of Jeremy Bentham
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    Bentham was born in England in 1748,
    at the age of twelve
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    he went to Oxford, at fifteen he went to law
    school
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    he was admitted to the bar at age nineteen
    but he never practiced law,
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    instead he devoted his life
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    to jurisprudence and moral
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    philosophy.
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    last time we began to consider Bentham's version
    of utilitarianism
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    the main idea
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    is simply stated and it's this,
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    the highest principle of morality
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    whether personal or political morality
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    is
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    to maximize
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    the general welfare
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    or the collective happiness
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    or the overall balance of pleasure over
    pain
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    in a phrase
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    maximize
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    utility
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    Bentham arrives at this principle by the following
    line of reasoning
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    we're all governed by pain and pleasure
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    they are our sovereign masters and so any
    moral system has to take account of them.
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    How best to take account?
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    By maximizing
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    and this leads to the principle
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    of the greatest good for the greatest
    number
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    what exactly should we maximize?
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    Bentham tells us
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    happiness
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    or more precisely
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    utility.
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    Maximizing utility is a principal not only
    for individuals but also for communities and
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    for legislators
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    what after all is a community
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    Bentham asks,
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    it's the sum of the individuals who comprise it
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    and that's why
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    in deciding the best policy, in deciding what the
    law should be, in deciding what's just,
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    citizens and legislators should ask themselves
    the question if we add up,
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    all of the benefits of this policy
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    and subtract
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    all of the costs,
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    the right thing to do
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    is the one
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    that maximizes
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    the balance
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    of happiness
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    over suffering.
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    that's what it means to maximize utility
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    now, today
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    I want to see
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    whether you agree or disagree with it,
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    and it often goes, this utilitarian logic, under
    the name of cost-benefit analysis
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    which is used by companies
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    and by
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    governments
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    all the time
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    and what it involves
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    is placing a value usually a dollar value
    to stand for utility
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    on the costs and the benefits
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    of various proposals.
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    recently in the Czech Republic
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    there was a proposal to increases the excise
    tax on smoking
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    Philip Morris,
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    the tobacco company,
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    does huge business
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    in the Czech Republic. They commissioned
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    a study of cost-benefit analysis
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    of smoking
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    in the Czech Republic
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    and what their cost benefit
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    analysis found
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    was
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    the government gains
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    by
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    having Czech citizens smoke.
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    Now, how do they gain?
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    It's true that there are negative effects
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    to the public finance of the Czech government
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    because there are increased health care costs
    for people who develop smoking-related
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    diseases
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    on the other hand there were positive
    effects
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    and those were
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    added up
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    on the other side of the ledger
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    the positive effects included, for the most
    part, various tax revenues that the government
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    derives from the sale of cigarette products
    but it also included health care savings to
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    the government when people die early
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    pensions savings, you don't have to pay pensions
    for as long,
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    and also savings
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    in housing costs for the elderly
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    and when all of the costs and benefits were added
    up
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    the Philip Morris
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    study found
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    that there is a net public finance gain
    in the Czech Republic
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    of a hundred and forty seven million dollars
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    and given the savings
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    in housing and health care and pension costs
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    the government enjoys the saving of savings
    of over twelve hundred dollars
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    for each person who dies prematurely due to
    smoking.
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    cost-benefit analysis
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    now, those among you who are defenders utilitarianism
    may think that this is a unfair
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    test
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    Philip Morris was pilloried in the press and
    they issued an apology for this heartless
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    calculation
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    you may say
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    that what's missing here is something that
    the utilitarian can be easily incorporate
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    mainly
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    the value to the person and to the families
    of those who die
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    from lung cancer.
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    what about the value of life?
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    Some cost-benefit analyses incorporate
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    a measure
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    for the value of life.
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    One of the most famous of these involved the
    Ford Pinto case
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    did any of you read about that? this was back
    in the 1970's, you remember that
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    the Ford Pinto was, a kind of car?
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    anybody?
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    it was a small car, subcompact car,
    very popular
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    but it had one
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    problem which is the fuel tank was at the
    back of the car
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    and in rear collisions the fuel tank exploded
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    and some people were killed
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    and some severely injured.
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    victims of these injuries took Ford to court
    to sue
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    and in the court case it turned out
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    that Ford had long
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    since known
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    about the vulnerable fuel tank
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    and had done a cost-benefit analysis to determine
    whether it would be worth it
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    to put in a special shield
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    that would protect the fuel tank and prevent it
    from exploding.
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    They did a cost benefit analysis
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    the cost per part
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    to increase the safety
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    of the Pinto,
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    they calculated at eleven dollars per part
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    and here's,
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    this was the cost benefit analysis that emerged
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    in the trial,
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    eleven dollars per part
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    at 12.5 million cars and trucks
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    came to a total cost of
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    137 million dollars to improve the safety
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    but then they calculated
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    the benefits
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    of spending all this money on a safer car
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    and they counted 180 deaths
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    and they assigned a dollar value
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    200 thousand dollars
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    per death
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    180 injuries
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    67 thousand
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    and then the cost to repair
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    the replacement cost for two thousand
    vehicles that would be destroyed without the
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    safety device
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    700 dollars per vehicle,
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    so the benefits
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    turned out to be only 49.5 million,
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    and so they
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    didn't install
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    the device
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    needless to say
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    when this memo
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    of the Ford Motor Company's cost-benefit analysis came
    out in the trial
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    it appalled the jurors
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    who awarded a huge settlement
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    is this a counter example to the utilitarian
    idea of calculating
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    because Ford included a
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    measure of the value life.
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    Now who here wants to defend
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    cost-benefit analysis from
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    this apparent counter example
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    who has a defense?
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    or do you think it's completely destroys
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    the whole utilitarian calculus?
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    I think that
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    once again they've made the same mistake the previous case
    did that they've assigned a dollar value
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    to human life and once again they failed to take into
    account things like
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    suffering and emotional losses of families, I mean families
    lost earnings
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    but they also lost a loved one and that
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    is more value than 200 thousand dollars.
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    Good, and wait wait wait, what's you're name?
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    Julie Roto.
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    so if two hundred thousand, Julie, is too
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    too low a figure because it doesn't include
    the loss of a loved one,
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    and the loss of those years of life,
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    what would be, what do you think
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    would be a more accurate number?
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    I don't believe I could give a number I think
    that this sort of analysis shouldn't be applied to
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    issues of human life.
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    I think it can't be used monetarily
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    so they didn't just put to low a number,
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    Julie says, they were wrong to try to
    put any number at all.
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    all right let's hear someone who
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    you have to adjust for inflation
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    all right
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    fair enough
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    so what would the number of being now?
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    this is was thirty five years ago
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    two million dollars
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    you would put two million
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    and what's your name
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    Voicheck
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    Voicheck says we have to allow for inflation
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    we should be more generous
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    then would you be satisfied that this is the
    right way of thinking about the question?
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    I guess unfortunately
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    it is for
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    there's needs to be of number put somewhere
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    I'm not sure what number would be but I do
    agree that there could possibly
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    be a number put
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    on a human life.
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    all right so
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    Voicheck says
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    and here he disagrees with
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    Julie
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    Julie says we can't put a number of human
    life
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    for the purpose of a cost-benefit analysis,
    Voicheck says we have to
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    because we have to make decisions somehow
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    what do other people think about this?
    Is there anyone prepared to defend cost-benefit
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    analysis here
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    as accurate, as desirable?
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    I think that if ford and other car companies didn't use
    cost-benefit analysis they'd eventually go out
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    of business because they wouldn't be able
    to be profitable
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    and millions of people wouldn't be able to use
    their cars to get to jobs, to put food on the table
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    to feed their children so I think that if cost-benefit
    analysis isn't employed
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    the greater good
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    is sacrificed
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    in this case. Alright let me ask, what's your name?
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    Raul. Raul.
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    there was recently a study done about cell
    phone use by drivers, when people are driving
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    a car,
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    and there's a debate about whether that should be
    banned
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    and
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    the figure was that some
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    two thousand people die
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    as a result of accidents
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    each year
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    using cell phones
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    and yet the cost benefit analysis which was done by
    the center for risk analysis at Harvard
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    found that if you look at the benefits
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    of the cell phone use
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    and you put some
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    value on the life, it comes out about
    the same
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    because of the enormous economic benefit
    of enabling people to take advantage
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    of their time, not waste time, be able to make deals
    and talk to friends and so on
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    while they're driving
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    doesn't that suggest that
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    it's a mistake to try to put monetary figures
    on questions
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    of human life?
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    well I think that if
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    the great majority of people
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    tried to derive maximum utility out of a service
    like using cell phones and the convenience that cell phones
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    provide
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    that sacrifice is necessary
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    for
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    satisfaction to occur.
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    You're an outright utilitarian. In, yes okay.
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    all right then, one last question Raul
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    and I put this to Voicheck,
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    what dollar figure should be put
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    on human life to decide whether to ban the
    use of cell phones
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    well I don't want to
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    arbitrarily
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    calculate a figure, I mean right now
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    I think that
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    you want to take it under advisement.
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    yeah I'll take it under advisement.
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    but what roughly speaking would it be? you've
    got 23 hundred deaths
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    you've got to assign a dollar value to know
    whether you want to prevent those deaths by
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    banning the use of cell phones in cars
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    so what would you're hunch be?
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    how much?
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    million
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    two million
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    two million was Voitech's figure
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    is that about right? maybe a million.
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    a million.?!
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    Alright that's good, thank you
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    So these are some of the controversies that arise
    these days from cost-benefit analysis especially
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    those that involve
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    placing a dollar value on everything to be
    added up.
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    well now I want to turn
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    to your objections, to your objections not necessarily
    to cost benefit analysis specifically,
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    because that's just one version of the
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    utilitarian logic in practice today,
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    but to the theory as a whole, to the idea
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    that the right thing to do,
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    the just basis for policy and law,
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    is to maximize
  • 15:36 - 15:40
    utility.
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    How many disagree
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    with the utilitarian
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    approach
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    to law
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    and to the common good?
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    How many bring with it?
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    so more agree than disagree.
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    so let's hear from the critics
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    my main issue with it is that I feel like
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    you can't say that just because someone's
    in the minority
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    what they want and need is less valuable than
    someone who's in the majority
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    so I guess I have an issue with the idea that
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    the greatest good for the greatest number
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    is okay because
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    there is still what about people who are in
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    the lesser number, like it's not fair to them
    they didn't have a say in where they wanted
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    to be.
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    alright now that's an interesting objection, you're
    worried about
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    the effect on minority. yes.
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    what's your name by the way. Anna.
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    alright who has an answer to Anna's worry about
    the effect on the minority
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    What do you say to Anna?
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    she said that
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    the minorities value less, I don't think that's
    the case because individually the minorities
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    value is just the same as the individual in the majority
    it's just that
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    the numbers outweigh the
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    minority
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    and I mean at a certain point you have to make a
    decision
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    and I'm sorry for the minority but
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    sometimes
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    it's for the general
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    for the greater good. For the greater good, Anna what do you
    say? what's your name? Youngda.
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    What do you say to Youngda?
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    Youngda says you just have to add up people's
    preferences
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    and those in the minority do have their preferences
    weighed.
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    can you give an example of the kind of thing
    you're worried about when you say you're worried
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    about utilitarianism violating
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    the concern or respect due the minority?
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    can you give an example.
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    so well with any of the cases that we've talked
    about, like with the shipwreck one,
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    I think that
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    the boy who was eaten
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    still had
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    just as much of a right to live as the other people
    and
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    just because
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    he was the
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    minority in that case the one who
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    maybe had less of a chance to keep living
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    that doesn't mean
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    that the others automatically have a right
    to eat him
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    just because
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    it would give a greater amount of people
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    the chance to live.
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    so there may be a certain rights
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    that the minority
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    members have that the individual has that
    shouldn't be traded off
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    for the sake of
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    utility?
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    yes Anna?
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    Now this would be a test for you,
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    back in ancient Rome
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    they threw Christians to the lions in the
    coliseum for sport
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    if you think how the utilitarian calculus
    would go
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    yes, the Christian thrown to the lion suffers enormous
    excruciating pain,
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    but look at the collective ecstasy of the Romans.
  • 18:48 - 18:51
    Youngda. Well
  • 18:51 - 18:52
    in that time
  • 18:52 - 18:53
    I don't think
  • 18:55 - 19:02
    in the modern-day of time to value the, um, to given
    a number to the happiness given to the people watching
  • 19:02 - 19:03
    I don't think
  • 19:03 - 19:05
    any
  • 19:05 - 19:07
    policy maker would say
  • 19:07 - 19:11
    the pain of one person, the suffering of one person is
    much much,
  • 19:11 - 19:15
    in comparison to the happiness gained
  • 19:15 - 19:20
    no but you have to admit that if there were
    enough Romans delirious with happiness,
  • 19:20 - 19:25
    it would outweigh even the most excruciating
    pain of a handful of
  • 19:25 - 19:29
    Christians thrown to the lion.
  • 19:29 - 19:34
    so we really have here two different objections
    to utilitarianism
  • 19:34 - 19:35
    one has to do
  • 19:35 - 19:38
    with whether utilitarianism
  • 19:38 - 19:40
    adequately respects
  • 19:40 - 19:41
    individual rights
  • 19:41 - 19:42
    or minority rights
  • 19:42 - 19:45
    and the other has to do
  • 19:45 - 19:47
    with the whole idea
  • 19:47 - 19:49
    of aggregating
  • 19:49 - 19:50
    utility
  • 19:50 - 19:52
    for preferences
  • 19:52 - 19:53
    or values
  • 19:53 - 19:56
    is it possible to aggregate all values
  • 19:56 - 19:58
    to translate them
  • 19:58 - 20:00
    into dollar terms?
  • 20:00 - 20:02
    there was
  • 20:02 - 20:07
    in the 1930's
  • 20:07 - 20:09
    a psychologist
  • 20:09 - 20:11
    who tried
  • 20:11 - 20:12
    to address
  • 20:12 - 20:16
    the second question. He tried to prove
  • 20:16 - 20:19
    what utilitarianism assumes,
  • 20:19 - 20:22
    that it is possible
  • 20:22 - 20:23
    to translate
  • 20:23 - 20:27
    all goods, all values, all human concerns
  • 20:27 - 20:29
    into a single uniform measure
  • 20:29 - 20:30
    and he did this
  • 20:30 - 20:33
    by conducting a survey
  • 20:33 - 20:38
    of the young recipients of relief, this was
    in the 1930's
  • 20:38 - 20:42
    and he asked them, he gave them a list of
    unpleasant experiences
  • 20:42 - 20:45
    and he asked them how much would you have to
    be paid to undergo
  • 20:45 - 20:50
    the following experiences and he kept track
  • 20:50 - 20:51
    for example
  • 20:51 - 20:57
    how much would you have to be paid to have
    one upper front tooth pulled out
  • 20:57 - 21:04
    or how much would you have to be paid to have one little
    one tow cut off?
  • 21:05 - 21:12
    or eat a live earth worm, six inches long
  • 21:12 - 21:19
    or to live the rest of your life on a farm in
    Kansas
  • 21:19 - 21:24
    or to choke a stray cat to death with your bare hands
  • 21:24 - 21:26
    now what do you suppose
  • 21:26 - 21:33
    what do you suppose was the most expensive
    item on that list
  • 21:33 - 21:40
    Kansas?
  • 21:40 - 21:45
    You're right it was Kansas
  • 21:45 - 21:46
    for a Kansas
  • 21:46 - 21:48
    people said they'd have to pay them
  • 21:48 - 21:52
    they have to be paid three hundred
    thousand dollars
  • 21:57 - 22:00
    what do you think
  • 22:00 - 22:03
    what do you think was the next most expensive?
  • 22:03 - 22:06
    not the cat
  • 22:06 - 22:08
    not the tooth
  • 22:08 - 22:11
    not the toe
  • 22:11 - 22:17
    the worm!
  • 22:17 - 22:21
    people said you'd have to pay them a hundred
    thousand dollars
  • 22:21 - 22:23
    to eat the worm
  • 22:23 - 22:28
    what do you think was the least expensive
    item?
  • 22:28 - 22:30
    not the cat
  • 22:30 - 22:31
    the tooth
  • 22:31 - 22:35
    during the depression people were willing
    to have their tooth pulled
  • 22:35 - 22:40
    for only forty five hundred dollars
  • 22:40 - 22:41
    now
  • 22:42 - 22:45
    here's what Thorndike
  • 22:45 - 22:48
    concluded from his study
  • 22:48 - 22:52
    any want or satisfaction which exists, exists
  • 22:52 - 22:55
    in some amount and is therefore measurable
  • 22:55 - 22:56
    the life of a dog
  • 22:56 - 22:57
    or a cat
  • 22:57 - 22:59
    or a chicken consists
  • 22:59 - 23:01
    of appetites
  • 23:01 - 23:02
    cravings
  • 23:02 - 23:04
    desires and their gratifications
  • 23:04 - 23:06
    so does the life
  • 23:06 - 23:07
    of human beings
  • 23:07 - 23:09
    though the appetites and desires
  • 23:09 - 23:12
    are more complicated
  • 23:12 - 23:14
    but what about
  • 23:14 - 23:16
    Thorndike's study?
  • 23:16 - 23:18
    does it support
  • 23:18 - 23:20
    Bentham's idea
  • 23:20 - 23:22
    that all
  • 23:22 - 23:28
    goods all values can be captured according
    to a single uniform measure of value
  • 23:28 - 23:34
    or does the preposterous character of those
    different items on the list
  • 23:34 - 23:37
    suggest the opposite conclusion
  • 23:37 - 23:40
    that may be whether we're talking about life
  • 23:40 - 23:42
    or Kansas
  • 23:42 - 23:44
    or the worm
  • 23:44 - 23:45
    maybe
  • 23:45 - 23:48
    the things we value
  • 23:48 - 23:49
    and cherish
  • 23:49 - 23:51
    can't be captured
  • 23:51 - 23:54
    according to a single uniform measure of value
  • 23:54 - 23:56
    and if they can't
  • 23:56 - 23:58
    what are the consequences
  • 23:58 - 24:01
    for the utilitarian theory
  • 24:01 - 24:02
    of morality
  • 24:02 - 24:09
    that's a question we'll continue with next
    time
  • 24:13 - 24:16
    alright now let's take the other
  • 24:16 - 24:18
    part of the poll
  • 24:18 - 24:19
    which is the
  • 24:19 - 24:21
    the highest
  • 24:21 - 24:23
    experience or pleasure?
  • 24:23 - 24:26
    how many say
  • 24:26 - 24:32
    Shakespeare
  • 24:32 - 24:38
    how many say fear Factor
  • 24:38 - 24:40
    no you can't be serious
  • 24:40 - 24:46
    really?
  • 24:46 - 24:49
    last time
  • 24:49 - 24:54
    last time we began to consider some objections
  • 24:54 - 24:57
    to Jeremy Bentham's version
  • 24:57 - 25:02
    of utilitarianism
  • 25:02 - 25:05
    people raised two objections in the discussion
  • 25:05 - 25:08
    we had
  • 25:08 - 25:11
    the first
  • 25:11 - 25:13
    was the objection, the claim
  • 25:13 - 25:15
    that utilitarianism,
  • 25:15 - 25:17
    by concerning itself
  • 25:17 - 25:20
    with the greatest good for the greatest number
  • 25:20 - 25:23
    fails adequately to respect
  • 25:23 - 25:25
    individual rights.
  • 25:25 - 25:29
    today we have debates
  • 25:29 - 25:30
    about torture
  • 25:30 - 25:34
    and terrorism
  • 25:34 - 25:35
    suppose
  • 25:35 - 25:41
    a suspected terrorists was apprehended
    on September tenth
  • 25:41 - 25:44
    and you had reason to believe
  • 25:44 - 25:46
    that the suspect
  • 25:46 - 25:51
    had crucial information about an impending
    terrorist attack that would kill over three thousand
  • 25:51 - 25:52
    people
  • 25:52 - 25:56
    and you couldn't extract the information
  • 25:56 - 25:58
    would it be just
  • 25:58 - 25:59
    to torture
  • 25:59 - 26:01
    the suspect
  • 26:01 - 26:03
    to get the information
  • 26:03 - 26:06
    or
  • 26:06 - 26:08
    do you say no
  • 26:08 - 26:15
    there is a categorical moral duty of
    respect for individual rights
  • 26:15 - 26:18
    in a way we're back to the questions we started
    with t
  • 26:18 - 26:24
    about trolley cars and organ transplants so that's
    the first issue
  • 26:24 - 26:29
    and you remember we considered some examples of
    cost-benefit analysis
  • 26:29 - 26:34
    but a lot of people were unhappy with cost-benefit
    analysis
  • 26:34 - 26:40
    when it came to placing a dollar value on
    human life
  • 26:40 - 26:42
    and so that led us to the
  • 26:42 - 26:44
    second objection,
  • 26:44 - 26:49
    it questioned whether it's possible to translate
    all values
  • 26:49 - 26:53
    into a single uniform measure of value
  • 26:53 - 26:58
    it asks in other words whether all values
    are commensurable
  • 26:58 - 27:00
    let me give you one other
  • 27:00 - 27:01
    example
  • 27:01 - 27:07
    of an experience, this actually is a true
    story, it comes from personal experience
  • 27:07 - 27:13
    that raises a question at least about whether
    all values can be translated without
  • 27:13 - 27:14
    loss
  • 27:14 - 27:20
    into utilitarian terms
  • 27:20 - 27:22
    some years ago
  • 27:22 - 27:28
    when I was a graduate student I was at Oxford
    in England and they had menâs and women's
  • 27:28 - 27:30
    colleges they weren't yet mixed
  • 27:30 - 27:31
    and the women's colleges had rules
  • 27:31 - 27:34
    against
  • 27:34 - 27:37
    overnight male guests
  • 27:37 - 27:40
    by the nineteen seventies these
  • 27:40 - 27:44
    rules were rarely enforced and easily violated,
  • 27:44 - 27:51
    or so I was told,
  • 27:52 - 27:57
    by the late nineteen seventies when I was there,
    pressure grew to relax these rules and it became
  • 27:57 - 28:01
    the subject of debate among the faculty at St. Anne's College
  • 28:01 - 28:04
    which was one of these all women colleges
  • 28:04 - 28:07
    the older women on the faculty
  • 28:07 - 28:11
    we're traditionalists they were opposed to
    change
  • 28:11 - 28:13
    on conventional moral grounds
  • 28:13 - 28:14
    but times had changed
  • 28:14 - 28:17
    and they were embarrassed
  • 28:17 - 28:20
    to give the true grounds of their objection
  • 28:20 - 28:23
    and so the translated their arguments
  • 28:23 - 28:26
    into utilitarian terms
  • 28:26 - 28:27
    if men stay overnight,
  • 28:27 - 28:32
    they argued, the costs to the college will increase.
  • 28:32 - 28:33
    how you might wonder
  • 28:33 - 28:39
    well they'll want to take baths, and that
    will use up hot water they said
  • 28:39 - 28:41
    furthermore they argued
  • 28:41 - 28:47
    we'll have to replace the mattresses more often
  • 28:47 - 28:48
    the reformers
  • 28:48 - 28:52
    met these arguments by adopting the following
    compromise
  • 28:52 - 28:53
    each woman
  • 28:53 - 29:00
    could have a maximum of three overnight male
    guest each week
  • 29:01 - 29:06
    they didn't say whether it had to be the same
    one, or three different
  • 29:06 - 29:07
    provided
  • 29:07 - 29:09
    and this is the compromise provided
  • 29:09 - 29:10
    the guest
  • 29:10 - 29:15
    paid fifty pence to defray the cost to the college
  • 29:15 - 29:17
    the next day
  • 29:17 - 29:23
    the national headline in the national newspaper
    read St. Anne's girls, fifty pence a night
  • 29:30 - 29:31
    another
  • 29:31 - 29:32
    illustration
  • 29:32 - 29:35
    of the difficulty of translating
  • 29:35 - 29:36
    all values
  • 29:36 - 29:39
    in this case a certain idea of virtue
  • 29:39 - 29:44
    into utilitarian terms
  • 29:44 - 29:47
    so that's all to illustrate
  • 29:47 - 29:49
    the second objection
  • 29:49 - 29:53
    to utilitarianism, at least the
    part of that objection
  • 29:53 - 29:55
    that questions rather
  • 29:55 - 29:57
    the utilitarianism
  • 29:57 - 29:59
    is right to assume
  • 29:59 - 30:01
    that we can
  • 30:01 - 30:02
    assume the uniformity of
  • 30:02 - 30:08
    value, the commensurability of values
    and translate all moral considerations
  • 30:08 - 30:10
    into
  • 30:10 - 30:10
    dollars
  • 30:10 - 30:12
    or money.
  • 30:12 - 30:15
    But there is a second
  • 30:15 - 30:20
    aspect to this worry about aggregating values
    and preferences
  • 30:20 - 30:22
    why should we
  • 30:22 - 30:23
    weigh
  • 30:23 - 30:25
    all preferences
  • 30:25 - 30:27
    that people have
  • 30:27 - 30:33
    without assessing whether they're good preferences
    or bad preferences
  • 30:33 - 30:35
    shouldn't we distinguish
  • 30:35 - 30:36
    between
  • 30:36 - 30:38
    higher
  • 30:38 - 30:38
    pleasures
  • 30:38 - 30:42
    and lower pleasures.
  • 30:42 - 30:44
    Now, part of the appeal of
  • 30:44 - 30:49
    not making any qualitative distinctions about
    the worth of people's preferences, part of the
  • 30:49 - 30:51
    appeal
  • 30:51 - 30:55
    is that it is non-judgmental and egalitarian
  • 30:55 - 30:58
    the Benthamite utilitarian says
  • 30:58 - 31:01
    everybody's preferences count
  • 31:01 - 31:05
    and they count regardless of what people want
  • 31:05 - 31:09
    regardless of what makes it different people
  • 31:09 - 31:10
    happy. For Bentham,
  • 31:10 - 31:11
    all that matters
  • 31:11 - 31:13
    you'll remember
  • 31:13 - 31:16
    are the intensity and the duration
  • 31:16 - 31:18
    of a pleasure or pain
  • 31:18 - 31:24
    the so-called higher pleasures or nobler
    virtues are simply those, according to Bentham
  • 31:24 - 31:25
    that produce
  • 31:25 - 31:26
    stronger,
  • 31:26 - 31:29
    longer, pleasure
  • 31:29 - 31:33
    yet a famous phrase to express this idea
  • 31:33 - 31:36
    the quantity of pleasure being equal
  • 31:36 - 31:37
    pushpin
  • 31:37 - 31:40
    is as good as poetry.
  • 31:40 - 31:42
    What was pushpin?
  • 31:42 - 31:47
    It was some kind of a child's game like to tidily winks
    pushpin is as good as poetry
  • 31:47 - 31:49
    Bentham said
  • 31:49 - 31:51
    and lying behind this idea
  • 31:51 - 31:52
    I think
  • 31:52 - 31:53
    is the claim
  • 31:53 - 31:54
    the intuition
  • 31:54 - 31:56
    that it's a presumption
  • 31:56 - 31:58
    to judge
  • 31:58 - 31:59
    whose pleasures
  • 31:59 - 32:01
    are intrinsically higher
  • 32:01 - 32:04
    or worthier or better
  • 32:04 - 32:07
    and there is something attractive in this
  • 32:07 - 32:10
    refusal to judge, after all some people like
  • 32:10 - 32:12
    Mozart, others
  • 32:12 - 32:13
    Madonna
  • 32:13 - 32:15
    some people like ballet
  • 32:15 - 32:16
    others
  • 32:16 - 32:17
    bowling,
  • 32:17 - 32:19
    who's to say
  • 32:19 - 32:23
    a Benthamite might argue, who's to say which
    of these pleasures
  • 32:23 - 32:24
    whose pleasures
  • 32:24 - 32:25
    are higher
  • 32:25 - 32:26
    worthier
  • 32:26 - 32:28
    nobler
  • 32:28 - 32:32
    than others?
  • 32:32 - 32:36
    But, is that right?
  • 32:36 - 32:40
    this refusal to make qualitative distinctions
  • 32:40 - 32:42
    can we
  • 32:42 - 32:45
    altogether dispense with the idea
  • 32:45 - 32:49
    that certain things we take pleasure in are
  • 32:49 - 32:51
    better or worthier
  • 32:51 - 32:54
    than others
  • 32:54 - 32:59
    think back to the case of the Romans in the coliseum,
    one thing that troubled people about that
  • 32:59 - 32:59
    practice
  • 32:59 - 33:01
    is that it seemed to violate the rights
  • 33:01 - 33:04
    of the Christian
  • 33:04 - 33:07
    another way of objecting to what's going
    on there
  • 33:07 - 33:11
    is that the pleasure that the Romans
    take
  • 33:11 - 33:13
    in this bloody spectacle
  • 33:13 - 33:16
    should that pleasure
  • 33:16 - 33:16
    which is a base,
  • 33:16 - 33:19
    kind of corrupt
  • 33:19 - 33:23
    degrading pleasure, should that even
  • 33:23 - 33:27
    be valorized or weighed in deciding what
    the
  • 33:27 - 33:34
    the general welfare is?
  • 33:34 - 33:39
    so here are the objections to Bentham's
    utilitarianism
  • 33:39 - 33:43
    and now we turn to someone who tried to
  • 33:43 - 33:46
    respond to those objections,
  • 33:46 - 33:48
    a later day utilitarian
  • 33:48 - 33:50
    John Stuart Mill
  • 33:50 - 33:53
    so what we need to
  • 33:53 - 33:55
    examine now
  • 33:55 - 33:59
    is whether John Stuart Mill had a convincing
    reply
  • 33:59 - 34:05
    to these objections to utilitarianism.
  • 34:05 - 34:07
    John Stuart Mill
  • 34:07 - 34:09
    was born in 1806
  • 34:09 - 34:11
    his father James Mill
  • 34:11 - 34:14
    was a disciple of Benthamâs
  • 34:14 - 34:17
    and James Mills set about giving his son
  • 34:17 - 34:20
    John Stuart Mill a model education
  • 34:20 - 34:22
    he was a child prodigy
  • 34:22 - 34:24
    John Stuart Mill
  • 34:24 - 34:28
    the knew Latin, sorry, Greek at the age of three,
    Latin at eight
  • 34:28 - 34:29
    and at age ten
  • 34:29 - 34:34
    he wrote a history of Roman law.
  • 34:34 - 34:36
    At age twenty
  • 34:36 - 34:39
    he had a nervous breakdown
  • 34:39 - 34:44
    this left him in a depression for five years
  • 34:44 - 34:47
    but at age twenty five what helped lift him
    out of this depression
  • 34:47 - 34:50
    is that he met Harriet Taylor
  • 34:50 - 34:53
    she in no doubt married him, they lived happily ever after
  • 34:53 - 34:55
    and it was under her
  • 34:55 - 34:57
    influence
  • 34:57 - 35:00
    the John Stuart Mill try to humanize
  • 35:00 - 35:02
    utilitarianism
  • 35:02 - 35:05
    what Mill tried to do was to see
  • 35:05 - 35:08
    whether the utilitarian calculus could be
  • 35:08 - 35:09
    enlarged
  • 35:09 - 35:11
    and modified
  • 35:11 - 35:14
    to accommodate
  • 35:14 - 35:17
    humanitarian concerns
  • 35:17 - 35:20
    like the concern to respect individual rights
  • 35:20 - 35:25
    and also to address the distinction between
    higher and lower
  • 35:25 - 35:26
    pleasures.
  • 35:26 - 35:30
    In 1859 Mill wrote a famous book
    on liberty
  • 35:30 - 35:35
    the main point of which was the importance
    of defending individual rights and minority
  • 35:35 - 35:36
    rights
  • 35:36 - 35:38
    and in 1861
  • 35:38 - 35:40
    toward the end of his life
  • 35:40 - 35:43
    he wrote the book we read is part of this course
  • 35:43 - 35:45
    Utilitarianism.
  • 35:45 - 35:47
    It makes it clear
  • 35:47 - 35:50
    that utility is the only standard of morality
  • 35:50 - 35:51
    in his view
  • 35:51 - 35:53
    so he's not challenging
  • 35:53 - 35:54
    Bentham's premise,
  • 35:54 - 35:55
    he's affirming it.
  • 35:55 - 35:59
    he says very explicitly the sole evidence,
  • 35:59 - 36:05
    it is possible to produce that anything is
    desirable is that people actually do
  • 36:05 - 36:06
    desire it.
  • 36:06 - 36:12
    so he stays with the idea that our de facto
    actual empirical desires are the only
  • 36:12 - 36:13
    basis
  • 36:13 - 36:16
    for moral judgment.
  • 36:16 - 36:18
    but then
  • 36:18 - 36:19
    page eight
  • 36:19 - 36:25
    also in chapter two, he argues that it is possible
    for a utilitarian to distinguish
  • 36:25 - 36:26
    higher from lower
  • 36:26 - 36:29
    pleasures.
  • 36:29 - 36:31
    now, those of you who've read
  • 36:31 - 36:32
    Mill already
  • 36:32 - 36:33
    how
  • 36:33 - 36:37
    according to him is it possible to draw that
    distinction?
  • 36:37 - 36:40
    How can a utilitarian
  • 36:40 - 36:43
    distinguish qualitatively higher pleasures
  • 36:43 - 36:44
    from
  • 36:44 - 36:49
    lesser ones, base ones, unworthy ones?
  • 36:49 - 36:51
    If you tried both of them
  • 36:51 - 36:55
    and you'll prefer the higher one naturally
    always
  • 36:55 - 37:00
    that's great, that's right. What's your name? John.
  • 37:00 - 37:02
    so as John points out
  • 37:02 - 37:05
    Mill says here's the test,
  • 37:05 - 37:08
    since we can't step outside
  • 37:08 - 37:10
    actual desires, actual preferences
  • 37:10 - 37:12
    that would
  • 37:12 - 37:14
    violate utilitarian premises,
  • 37:14 - 37:17
    the only test
  • 37:17 - 37:18
    of whether
  • 37:18 - 37:20
    a pleasure is higher
  • 37:20 - 37:26
    or lower is whether someone who has experienced
    both
  • 37:26 - 37:28
    would prefer it.
  • 37:28 - 37:29
    And here,
  • 37:29 - 37:31
    in chapter two
  • 37:31 - 37:33
    we see the passage
  • 37:33 - 37:37
    where Mill makes the point that John just described
  • 37:37 - 37:43
    of two pleasures, if there be one to which all
    are almost all who have experience
  • 37:43 - 37:46
    of both give a decided preference,
  • 37:46 - 37:52
    irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to
    prefer it, in other words no outside, no independent
  • 37:52 - 37:53
    standard,
  • 37:53 - 37:58
    then that is the more desirable pleasure.
  • 37:58 - 38:00
    what do people think about that argument.
  • 38:00 - 38:02
    does that
  • 38:02 - 38:03
    does it succeeded?
  • 38:03 - 38:06
    how many think that it does succeed?
  • 38:06 - 38:11
    of arguing within utilitarian terms for a
    distinction between higher and lower pleasures.
  • 38:11 - 38:12
    how many
  • 38:12 - 38:18
    think it doesn't succeed?
  • 38:18 - 38:21
    I want to hear your reasons.
  • 38:21 - 38:22
    but before
  • 38:22 - 38:24
    we give the reasons
  • 38:24 - 38:26
    let's do an experiment
  • 38:26 - 38:29
    of Mills'
  • 38:29 - 38:32
    claim.
  • 38:32 - 38:35
    In order to do this experiment
  • 38:35 - 38:40
    we're going to look that three
  • 38:40 - 38:42
    short excerpts
  • 38:42 - 38:45
    of popular entertainment
  • 38:45 - 38:48
    the first one is a Hamlet soliloquy
  • 38:48 - 38:53
    it'll be followed by two other
  • 38:53 - 38:55
    experiences
  • 38:55 - 38:58
    see what you think.
  • 38:58 - 39:02
    'what a piece of work is a man
  • 39:02 - 39:06
    how noble in reason
  • 39:06 - 39:08
    how infinite in faculties
  • 39:08 - 39:11
    in form and moving, how express and admirable
  • 39:11 - 39:15
    in action how like an angel. In apprehension, how like a god
  • 39:15 - 39:16
    the beauty of the world
  • 39:16 - 39:18
    the paragon of animals
  • 39:18 - 39:21
    and yet, to me
  • 39:21 - 39:25
    what is this quintessence of dust?
  • 39:25 - 39:32
    man delights not me.
  • 39:43 - 39:48
    Imagine a world where your greatest fears become reality
  • 39:48 - 39:53
    each show, six contestants from around the country battle
    each other in three
  • 39:53 - 40:00
    extreme stunts. these stunts are designed to challenge
    these contestants both physically and mentally
  • 40:00 - 40:02
    six contestants, three stunts, one winner.
  • 40:02 - 40:09
    Fear factor.
  • 40:16 - 40:23
    The Simpsons. Well hi diddly-o peddle to the metal o-philes!
    Flanders- since when do you like anything cool.
  • 40:23 - 40:25
    well, I don't care for the speed, but I can't get enough of that
    safety gear
  • 40:25 - 40:29
    helmets, roll bars, caution flags. I like the fresh
    air
  • 40:29 - 40:35
    and looking at the poor people in the infield.
  • 40:35 - 40:41
    Dang Cletus, why you got to park by my parents.
  • 40:41 - 40:43
    Now hunny, it's my parents too.
  • 40:56 - 41:01
    I don't even have to ask which one you like
    most
  • 41:01 - 41:05
    the Simpsons? How many like the Simpson's most?
  • 41:05 - 41:10
    How many Shakespeare?
  • 41:10 - 41:13
    What about fear factor?
  • 41:13 - 41:16
    how many preferred fear factor?
  • 41:16 - 41:22
    really?
  • 41:22 - 41:24
    people overwhelmingly
  • 41:24 - 41:26
    like the Simpsons
  • 41:26 - 41:29
    better
  • 41:29 - 41:32
    than Shakespeare. alright, now let's take the other
  • 41:32 - 41:34
    part of the poll
  • 41:34 - 41:36
    which is the
  • 41:36 - 41:38
    highest
  • 41:38 - 41:39
    experience or pleasure?
  • 41:39 - 41:42
    how many say
  • 41:42 - 41:48
    Shakespeare?
  • 41:48 - 41:50
    how many say
  • 41:50 - 41:54
    fear factor?
  • 41:54 - 41:59
    no you can't be serious
  • 41:59 - 42:01
    really?
  • 42:01 - 42:03
    alright go ahead you can say it.
  • 42:03 - 42:03
    I found that one
  • 42:03 - 42:05
    the most entertaining
  • 42:05 - 42:09
    I know but which do you think was the worthiest,
    the noblest experience, I know you find it
  • 42:09 - 42:11
    the most anything
  • 42:11 - 42:16
    if something is good just because it is pleasurable
    what is the matter if you have some kind of
  • 42:16 - 42:17
    abstract
  • 42:17 - 42:22
    idea of whether it is good by someone else's
    sense or not.
  • 42:22 - 42:25
    Alright so you come down on the straight Benthamite's side
  • 42:25 - 42:26
    whose to judge
  • 42:26 - 42:29
    and why should we judge
  • 42:29 - 42:34
    apart from just registering and aggregating
    de facto preferences, alright fair enough.
  • 42:34 - 42:35
    what's your name?
  • 42:35 - 42:37
    Nate? okay fair enough
  • 42:37 - 42:38
    Alright so
  • 42:38 - 42:41
    how many think that the Simpson's is actually
  • 42:41 - 42:46
    apart from liking is actually the higher experience
  • 42:46 - 42:47
    higher than Shakespeare.
  • 42:47 - 42:49
    Alright let's see the vote for Shakespeare again
  • 42:49 - 42:53
    how many think Shakespeare is higher?
  • 42:53 - 42:54
    alright so
  • 42:54 - 42:56
    why is it
  • 42:56 - 42:59
    ideally I'd like to hear from someone is there
    someone
  • 42:59 - 43:02
    think Shakespeare is highest
  • 43:02 - 43:03
    but who preferred
  • 43:03 - 43:04
    watching
  • 43:04 - 43:09
    the Simpsons
  • 43:09 - 43:14
    Like I guess just sitting and watching the Simpsons, it's entertaining
    because the make jokes, they make us laugh but
  • 43:14 - 43:18
    someone has to tell us that Shakespeare was this great writer
    we had to be taught how to read him, how to
  • 43:18 - 43:21
    understand him, we had to be taught how to
  • 43:21 - 43:23
    take in Rembrandt, how to analyze a painting.
  • 43:23 - 43:26
    well how do, what's your name? Aneesha.
  • 43:26 - 43:28
    Aneesha, when you say someone
  • 43:28 - 43:31
    told you that Shakespeare's better
  • 43:31 - 43:37
    are you accepting it on blind faith you voted that
    Shakespeare's higher only because the culture
  • 43:37 - 43:42
    tells you that our teachers tell you that
    or do you
  • 43:42 - 43:44
    actually agree with that yourself
  • 43:44 - 43:48
    well in the sense that Shakespeare, no, but earlier you made
  • 43:48 - 43:50
    an example of Rembrandt
  • 43:50 - 43:54
    I feel like I would enjoy a reading a comic book
    more than I would enjoy a kind of analyzing
  • 43:54 - 43:58
    Rembrandt because someone told me it was
    great, you know. Right so of some this seems
  • 43:58 - 44:02
    to be, you're suggesting a kind of
  • 44:02 - 44:05
    cultural convention and pressure. We're told
  • 44:05 - 44:12
    what books, what works of art are great. who else?
  • 44:15 - 44:20
    although I enjoyed watching the Simpsons more
    in this particular moment in Justice,
  • 44:20 - 44:23
    if I were to spend the rest of my life
    considering
  • 44:23 - 44:25
    the three different
  • 44:25 - 44:27
    video clips shown
  • 44:27 - 44:29
    I would not want to spend
  • 44:29 - 44:32
    that remainder of my life considering
  • 44:32 - 44:34
    the latter two clips.
  • 44:34 - 44:37
    I think I would derive more pleasure
  • 44:37 - 44:38
    from being able to
  • 44:38 - 44:39
    branch out in my own mind
  • 44:39 - 44:40
    sort of
  • 44:40 - 44:45
    considering more deep pleasures, more
    deep thoughts.
  • 44:45 - 44:49
    and tell me your name
  • 44:49 - 44:50
    Joe.
  • 44:50 - 44:53
    Joe, so if you had to spend the rest of your life
    on
  • 44:53 - 44:55
    on a farm in Kansas with only
  • 44:55 - 44:57
    with only Shakespeare
  • 44:57 - 45:02
    or the collected episodes of the Simpsons
  • 45:02 - 45:04
    you would prefer
  • 45:04 - 45:07
    Shakespeare
  • 45:07 - 45:10
    what do you conclude from that
  • 45:10 - 45:12
    about John Stuart Mill's test
  • 45:12 - 45:15
    but the test of a higher pleasure
  • 45:15 - 45:16
    is whether
  • 45:16 - 45:18
    people who have experienced
  • 45:18 - 45:22
    both prefer it.
  • 45:22 - 45:24
    can I cite another example briefly?
  • 45:24 - 45:25
    in biology
  • 45:25 - 45:29
    in neuro biology last year we were told of a rat who was
    tested
  • 45:29 - 45:31
    a particular center in the brain
  • 45:31 - 45:36
    where the rat was able to stimulate its
    brain and cause itself intense pleasure repeatedly
  • 45:36 - 45:38
    the rat did not eat or drink until it died
  • 45:38 - 45:42
    so the rat was clearly experiencing intense
    pleasure
  • 45:42 - 45:46
    now if you asked me right now if I'd rather
    experience intense pleasure
  • 45:46 - 45:47
    or have
  • 45:47 - 45:53
    a full lifetime of higher pleasure, I would consider
    intense pleasure to be lower pleasure, right
  • 45:53 - 45:56
    now enjoy intense pleasure
  • 45:56 - 46:02
    yes I would
  • 46:02 - 46:03
    but over a lifetime I think
  • 46:03 - 46:04
    I would think
  • 46:04 - 46:07
    almost a complete majority here would agree
  • 46:07 - 46:12
    that they would rather be a human
    with higher pleasure that rat
  • 46:12 - 46:13
    with intense pleasure
  • 46:13 - 46:15
    for a momentary period of time
  • 46:15 - 46:16
    so now
  • 46:16 - 46:19
    in answer to your question, right, I think
  • 46:19 - 46:21
    this proves that, or I won't say proves
  • 46:21 - 46:25
    I think the conclusion
  • 46:25 - 46:29
    is that Mill's theory that when a majority people are
    asked
  • 46:29 - 46:31
    what they would rather do,
  • 46:31 - 46:33
    they will answer
  • 46:33 - 46:35
    that they would rather
  • 46:35 - 46:39
    engage in a higher pleasure. So you think that this
    supports Mills, that Mills was on to something here
  • 46:39 - 46:41
    I do.
  • 46:41 - 46:43
    all right is there anyone
  • 46:43 - 46:47
    who disagrees with Joe who thinks that
    our experiment
  • 46:47 - 46:49
    disproves
  • 46:49 - 46:50
    Mills'
  • 46:50 - 46:51
    test
  • 46:51 - 46:53
    shows that that's not an adequate way
  • 46:53 - 46:58
    that you can't distinguish higher pleasures within
    the utilitarian
  • 46:58 - 47:03
    framework.
  • 47:06 - 47:10
    If whatever is good is truly just whatever
    people prefer it's truly relative and there's
  • 47:10 - 47:12
    no objective definition then
  • 47:12 - 47:15
    there will be some society where people prefer
    Simpsons
  • 47:15 - 47:16
    more
  • 47:16 - 47:21
    anyone can appreciate the Simpsons, but I think
    it does take education to appreciate Shakespeare
  • 47:21 - 47:26
    Alright, you're saying it takes education to appreciate
    higher
  • 47:26 - 47:27
    true thing
  • 47:27 - 47:30
    Mill's point is
  • 47:30 - 47:33
    that the higher pleasures do require
  • 47:33 - 47:35
    cultivation and appreciation and education
  • 47:35 - 47:38
    he doesn't dispute that
  • 47:38 - 47:39
    but
  • 47:39 - 47:42
    once having been cultivated
  • 47:42 - 47:44
    and educated
  • 47:44 - 47:46
    people will see
  • 47:46 - 47:48
    not only see the difference between higher
    lower
  • 47:48 - 47:49
    pleasures
  • 47:49 - 47:52
    but will it actually
  • 47:52 - 47:53
    prefer
  • 47:53 - 47:54
    the higher
  • 47:54 - 47:56
    to the lower.
  • 47:56 - 48:00
    you find this famous passage from John Stuart
    Mill-
  • 48:00 - 48:01
    it is better
  • 48:01 - 48:04
    to be a human being dissatisfied
  • 48:04 - 48:06
    then a pig satisfied.
  • 48:06 - 48:11
    Better to the Socrates dissatisfied than
    a fool satisfied
  • 48:11 - 48:12
    and if the fool
  • 48:12 - 48:13
    or the pig
  • 48:13 - 48:16
    are of a different opinion
  • 48:16 - 48:18
    it is because they only know
  • 48:18 - 48:21
    their side of the question.
  • 48:21 - 48:22
    so here you have
  • 48:22 - 48:23
    an attempt
  • 48:23 - 48:25
    to distinguish
  • 48:25 - 48:27
    higher from lower
  • 48:27 - 48:29
    pleasures
  • 48:29 - 48:33
    so going to an art museum or being a couch
    potato, swilling beer watching television
  • 48:33 - 48:35
    at home
  • 48:35 - 48:38
    sometimes Mill agrees we might succumb
  • 48:38 - 48:41
    to the temptation
  • 48:41 - 48:42
    to do the latter,
  • 48:42 - 48:46
    to be couch potatoes,
  • 48:46 - 48:48
    but even when we do that
  • 48:48 - 48:50
    out of indolence
  • 48:50 - 48:51
    and sloth,
  • 48:51 - 48:52
    we know
  • 48:52 - 48:54
    that the pleasure we get
  • 48:54 - 48:56
    gazing at Rembrandts
  • 48:56 - 48:57
    in the museum
  • 48:57 - 49:00
    is actually higher,
  • 49:00 - 49:03
    because we've experienced both.
  • 49:03 - 49:06
    And is a higher pressure
  • 49:06 - 49:07
    gazing at Rembrandts
  • 49:07 - 49:11
    because of engages our higher human faculties
  • 49:11 - 49:14
    what about Mill's attempt
  • 49:14 - 49:19
    to reply to the objection about individual rights?
  • 49:19 - 49:22
    In a way he uses the same
  • 49:22 - 49:25
    kind of argument
  • 49:25 - 49:28
    and this comes out in chapter five
  • 49:28 - 49:33
    he says while I dispute the pretensions of any
    theory which sets up an imaginary standard
  • 49:33 - 49:35
    of justice
  • 49:35 - 49:40
    not grounded on utility,
  • 49:40 - 49:41
    but still
  • 49:41 - 49:43
    he considers
  • 49:43 - 49:45
    justice
  • 49:45 - 49:49
    grounded on utility to be what he calls the
    chief part
  • 49:49 - 49:53
    and incomparably the most sacred and binding
    part
  • 49:53 - 49:55
    of all morality.
  • 49:55 - 49:57
    so justice is higher
  • 49:57 - 50:00
    individual rights are privileged
  • 50:00 - 50:02
    but not for
  • 50:02 - 50:05
    reasons that depart from utilitarian assumptions.
  • 50:05 - 50:07
    Justice is a name
  • 50:07 - 50:09
    for certain moral requirements
  • 50:09 - 50:11
    which, regarded collectively
  • 50:11 - 50:15
    stand higher in the scale of social utility
  • 50:15 - 50:17
    and are therefore
  • 50:17 - 50:19
    of more
  • 50:19 - 50:21
    paramount obligation
  • 50:21 - 50:23
    than any others
  • 50:23 - 50:29
    so justice is sacred, it's prior, it's privileged,
    it isn't something that can easily be traded
  • 50:29 - 50:31
    off against lesser things
  • 50:31 - 50:32
    but the reason
  • 50:32 - 50:34
    is ultimately
  • 50:34 - 50:36
    Mills Claims
  • 50:36 - 50:38
    a utilitarian reason
  • 50:38 - 50:39
    once you consider
  • 50:39 - 50:41
    the long run interests
  • 50:41 - 50:44
    of humankind,
  • 50:44 - 50:45
    of all of us,
  • 50:45 - 50:46
    as progressive
  • 50:46 - 50:48
    beings.
  • 50:48 - 50:51
    If we do justice and if we respect rights
  • 50:51 - 50:53
    society as a whole
  • 50:53 - 50:56
    will be better off in the long run.
  • 50:56 - 50:58
    Well is that convincing?
  • 50:58 - 50:59
    Or
  • 50:59 - 51:05
    is Mill actually, without admitting it, stepping
    outside
  • 51:05 - 51:06
    utilitarian considerations
  • 51:06 - 51:08
    in arguing
  • 51:08 - 51:11
    for qualitatively higher
  • 51:11 - 51:13
    pleasures
  • 51:13 - 51:14
    and for sacred
  • 51:14 - 51:17
    or specially important
  • 51:17 - 51:18
    individual rights?
  • 51:18 - 51:22
    we haven't fully answered that question
  • 51:22 - 51:24
    because to answer that question
  • 51:24 - 51:26
    in the case of rights and justice
  • 51:26 - 51:29
    will require that we explore
  • 51:29 - 51:30
    other ways,
  • 51:30 - 51:33
    non utilitarian ways
  • 51:33 - 51:35
    of accounting for the basis
  • 51:35 - 51:36
    or rights
  • 51:36 - 51:38
    and then asking
  • 51:38 - 51:40
    whether they succeed
  • 51:40 - 51:43
    as for Jeremy Bentham,
  • 51:43 - 51:45
    who launched
  • 51:45 - 51:46
    utilitarianism
  • 51:46 - 51:47
    as a doctrine
  • 51:47 - 51:50
    in moral and legal philosophy
  • 51:50 - 51:54
    Bentham died in 1832 at the
    age of eighty five
  • 51:54 - 51:58
    but if you go to London you can visit him
    today
  • 51:58 - 51:59
    literally.
  • 51:59 - 52:01
    he provided in his will
  • 52:01 - 52:03
    that his body be preserved,
  • 52:03 - 52:05
    embalmed and displayed
  • 52:05 - 52:08
    in the university of London
  • 52:08 - 52:11
    where he still presides in a glass case
  • 52:11 - 52:13
    with a wax head
  • 52:13 - 52:15
    dressed in his actual clothing.
  • 52:15 - 52:17
    you see before he died,
  • 52:17 - 52:22
    Bentham addressed himself to a question consistent
    with his philosophy,
  • 52:22 - 52:23
    of what use
  • 52:23 - 52:27
    could a dead man be to the living
  • 52:27 - 52:30
    one use, he said, would be to make one's corpse
    available
  • 52:30 - 52:34
    for the study of anatomy
  • 52:34 - 52:37
    in the case of great philosophers, however,
  • 52:37 - 52:38
    better yet
  • 52:38 - 52:45
    to preserve one's physical presence in order
    to inspire future generations of thinkers.
  • 52:45 - 52:48
    You want to see what Bentham looks like stuffed?
  • 52:48 - 52:50
    Here's what he looks like
  • 52:50 - 52:54
    There he is
  • 52:54 - 52:55
    now, if you look closely
  • 52:55 - 52:57
    you'll notice
  • 52:57 - 52:59
    that
  • 52:59 - 53:06
    the embalming up his actual had was not a
    success so they substituted a waxed head
  • 53:07 - 53:10
    and at the bottom for verisimilitude
  • 53:10 - 53:13
    you can actually see his actual had
  • 53:13 - 53:15
    on a plate
  • 53:17 - 53:18
    you see it?
  • 53:18 - 53:23
    right there
  • 53:23 - 53:26
    so, what's the moral of the story?
  • 53:26 - 53:29
    the moral of the story
  • 53:29 - 53:34
    by the way they bring him out during meetings
    of the board at university college London
  • 53:34 - 53:41
    and the minutes record him as present but
    not voting.
  • 53:41 - 53:43
    here is a philosopher
  • 53:43 - 53:45
    in life and in death
  • 53:45 - 53:47
    who adhered
  • 53:47 - 53:48
    to the principles
  • 53:48 - 53:55
    of his philosophy. we'll continue with rights next time.
  • 53:57 - 54:01
    Don't miss the chance to interact online with other viewers of Justice
  • 54:01 - 54:03
    join the conversation, take a pop quiz,
  • 54:03 - 54:08
    watch lectures you've missed, and a lot more. Visit Justiceharvard.org
  • 54:08 - 54:15
    It's the right thing to do.
  • 54:50 - 54:54
    funding for this program is provided by
  • 54:54 - 54:55
    additional funding provided by
Title:
Justice: What's The Right Thing To Do? Episode 02: "PUTTING A PRICE TAG ON LIFE"
Description:

PART ONE: PUTTING A PRICE TAG ON LIFE

Today, companies and governments often use Jeremy Benthams utilitarian logic under the name of cost-benefit analysis. Sandel presents some contemporary cases in which cost-benefit analysis was used to put a dollar value on human life. The cases give rise to several objections to the utilitarian logic of seeking the greatest good for the greatest number. Should we always give more weight to the happiness of a majority, even if the majority is cruel or ignoble? Is it possible to sum up and compare all values using a common measure like money?

PART TWO: HOW TO MEASURE PLEASURE

Sandel introduces J.S. Mill, a utilitarian philosopher who attempts to defend utilitarianism against the objections raised by critics of the doctrine. Mill argues that seeking the greatest good for the greatest number is compatible with protecting individual rights, and that utilitarianism can make room for a distinction between higher and lower pleasures. Mills idea is that the higher pleasure is always the pleasure preferred by a well-informed majority. Sandel tests this theory by playing video clips from three very different forms of entertainment: Shakespeares Hamlet, the reality show Fear Factor, and The Simpsons. Students debate which experience provides the higher pleasure, and whether Mills defense of utilitarianism is successful.

more » « less
Video Language:
English
Team:
PACE
Duration:
55:10

English subtitles

Revisions