Despite UN comment: Speech prohibition - Evidence prohibition - Defence prohibition: Sylvia Stolz, AZK (Anti-Censorship Coalition), Chur, Switzerland 24.11.12

Human Rights Committee
102nd session
Geneva, 11-29 July 2011
General comment No. 34
Article 19: Freedoms of opinion and expression

Laws that penalize the expression of opinions about historical facts are incompatible with the obligations that the Covenant imposes on States parties in relation to the respect for freedom of opinion and expression. The Covenant does not permit general prohibition of expressions of an erroneous opinion or an incorrect interpretation of past events. Restrictions on the right of freedom of opinion should never be imposed and, with regard to freedom of expression, they should not go beyond what is permitted in paragraph 3 or required under article 20. ( Paragraph 49, CCPR/C/GC/34 )

Banned speech, banned evidence
and banned legal defence.

The reality of "Free Speech".

Our last speaker of the day
will be lecturing on

banned speech, banned evidence and
even a ban on legal defence in court.

On top of everything else, being banned
from defending yourself in court

constitutes
a particularly disturbing problem.

This speaker is a fully qualified lawyer
and throughout her lecture

I find it of particular importance, that
we don't let our judgement be influenced

by what our eyes and ears
have already been shown or told.

She really made the headlines
a few years ago as a defence attorney.

So, let me briefly explain
whom we are dealing with.

This defence lawyer
has the courage of the lion.

She is stronger than a man, and I have
never met a woman with such a profile.

She bravely stood up and took it
upon herself to defend Ernst Zündel

in the famous case against him
for so-called Holocaust denial.

She was the trial lawyer
of Ernst Zündel.

During the legal proceedings
she provided evidence to the court

which could raise doubts regarding
the official account of history.

This caused furore in the courtroom.

And she was prohibited
from speaking any further.

This speech ban was ordered as she was
presenting the arguments of the defendant.

She was not allowed to argue the case
and barred from listing more evidence.

She ignored the speech ban
and continued to submit evidence.

And was then threatened
with penalties if she persisted.

As it became too much for the authorities,

she was arrested right there
in the courtroom

during her defence of the so-called
Holocaust denier Ernst Zündel.

But not even this could silence her;

she continued to argue
the case of her defendant

while being forcefully removed
from the courtroom.

For this she was imprisoned
for almost three and a half years,

in spite of her having
no previous convictions.

Arrested in the courtroom
and locked up.

On top of this, she had to face 5 years
of professional exclusion

through cancellation of her licence
to work as an attorney,

and was removed from
the Association for German Lawyers.

They threw her out, but we would like
to carry her into our midst.

I urge you to help her along.

(Applause)

We are talking about a legend here,
making headlines across Europe.

Welcome Sylvia Stolz.

Frau Sylvia Stolz, if they wouldn't
let you speak there, here you can.

We trust you to know the limitations,

I am sure you do.

Much success with your speech,
our hearts swell for you.

Sylvia Stolz: Thank you for
the warm welcome.

Ladies and Gentlemen, dear friends,
thank you again for the warm welcome.

I would like to begin my presentation
with one sentence,

with the same one with which I will end.

Since I believe that this sentence is
at the heart of human existence,

and gives, I believe,
what it means to be human.

"To think what is true,
to sense what is beautiful,

and to want what is good,

hereby the spirit finds the purpose
of a life in reason."

This is a quote
from Johann Gottfried von Herder:

To think what is true,

[what is true, not what was,
which sound the same in German]

"To think what is true,
to sense what is beautiful,

and to want what is good."

Regardless of your religion,
your worldview

or philosophical orientation,

this sentence encapsulates
the essence of human life, in my opinion

the "a" and "o",

the alpha and omega.

And one's actions show
how one fulfils this human ideal,

one's actions and one's behaviour.

The first ideal is the predominant one,

"To think what is true,"

for only on truth can one build.

When one builds on something untrue,
when one builds on something false,

it might stand for a while,

but at some time it must,
of itself, collapse.

It is like trying to erect a building

with a foundation of papier mâché
rather than proper stone

or proper concrete.

An important notion in relation
to the question

"true thinking" or "finding the truth" is:

Hear the other side.

That is an ideal that is paid
particular attention to here.

It is an old established principle of law:
audiatur et altera pars,

the other side is to be heard.

To be heard in court and also in science

when there are two different opinions.

In science, for example, there may be
two different opinions

which are both heard,

and one is not excluded from the outset

for whatever reason;

because it does not suit a result,

or because the result does not fit in
with existing opinion.

One should only exclude a result

when it is seen to be definitively wrong.

To that end one must first examine it,

and first hear those
who have the given view;

in the case of law, in a court.

When two sides oppose each other there,
or when one person is accused,

then it is the duty of the judge
to find out first of all what the truth is

and what has really happened,

and only then does one consider
how that is to be judged,

whether it is a matter of illegality
or culpability,

but the truth must first
be clearly established,

what has happened.

"Hear the other side" is today
often termed "the right to be heard",

which means every citizen
has the right to be heard,

before a court and
before other authorities

to be listened to, to put,
to be able to put, his point of view.

And it is not sufficient
that the judge just listens

and thinks I know how this trial will go,
should go, but allow the speeches.

That I have too often in practice over
and over again experienced and observed,

that the judges say,

"So what do you want? We're giving you
a legal hearing, we're letting you speak."

Only by the conclusions
and the judgements is it apparent

that they have taken absolutely nothing
into consideration,

that he could be telling the truth
or that he could be right.

That is an important factor
in legal hearings,

that the judge considers

that someone could be right.

I've often experienced
that this is not so,

that much more the attitude prevails:

He is not right, because it cannot be,

or, far more often, because it may not be.

And one does not concern oneself at all
with the matters he puts forward.

Such an attitude of a judge
can be classified as bias.

He is biased, he is not objective,
he is not factual.

Put another way, he allows himself
to be led by irrelevant considerations.

That is grounds for objecting to a judge.

Every accused can on these grounds
object to a judge.

I have often done that, as a defender,
and in my own case.

A judge has never been declined
in all Holocaust denial trials

in which I have been present and observed,

the objection has never been accepted,

the judges were retained.

One of the important topics
we will be discussing

is "Freedom of Speech".

One hears from many places,

that people who have certain opinions
get into trouble.

And this is not confined
to political discourse.

I am sure you know of quite a few areas
without me listing them.

But to give an example, say,
the issue of vaccines.

There are doctors out there
who have been banned from practising

because they warned against vaccination.

This is just one example out of many
within medicine,

one of the many areas
in which such things happen.

Or journalists who are ostracized

because they have a differing view
of the events of 9/11 2001, for example,

and report on this.

Such journalists are also bound
to get in trouble.

However, these people are not punished
by criminal law,

but find themselves punished
in their respective occupations.

These two examples should suffice to show

that the highly praised
"Freedom of Speech",

in reality, isn't all
that it is made out to be.

And now to the issue of banned evidence,
banned legal defence

within the area of "Holocaust denial".

Much could be said about this,
one hour is far from sufficient.

My job here is to omit that
for which there is no time.

But there are certain points
which I think are essential to emphasize.

First of all, it must be said,
that the principle of

nulla poena sine lege
(no penalty without law)

is not observed
but regularly contravened.

This principle dictates that the accused

must be allowed to know
what he did wrong,

and what would have been right.

If someone takes a bicycle
that does not belong to him,

most people know this is theft
and not allowed.

In cases of libel,

where a person says something negative,
something damaging reputation,

then it's a question
of whether it is true or false.

And if it's true what he has said,

then it does not constitute libel,

because in theory one is allowed
to speak the truth.

In the case of Holocaust denial trials,

the first problem we are faced with is
that the Holocaust isn't defined anywhere.

There is, therefore, a problem
of lack of defining law.

An authoritative definition
is not to be found anywhere.

I'll come back
to what I mean by this later,

what needs to be said exactly
so that it's authoritatively defined.

Let's turn to to the legal passages
in the different laws.

First of all, the ones in German law.

In paragraph 130 section 3,
[of the German Criminal Code]

according to which
so-called Holocaust deniers

can be fined or imprisoned for
up to 5 years for each singular offence,

there is no mention of Holocaust.

It is not defined in the law as such.

Instead it refers to paragraph 6 section 1
of the German International Criminal Code.

And here we find
a definition of genocide.

Whoever denies that such a genocide
has occurred, can be convicted,

provided that additional criteria are met,

the disturbance of public order,
for example.

But what I would like to emphasize

is the definition of genocide
in paragraph 6

of the German International Criminal Code.

It's just a few lines,

I'll not give it quite in its entirety.

It is considered genocide

when one member of an ethnic,
religious or other group

is killed with the intention of causing

the destruction of that group,
in whole or in part.

So, one member of, say,
a religious group is killed,

and the perpetrator intended
to kill the whole or part of the group,

so is genocide defined
in this paragraph 6.

If one brings this together

with paragraph 130 section 3,

the denial of an act defined
in paragraph 6,

then one can according to this definition,

convict a person who denies ...

one must add:
under the rule of National Socialism,

it states in paragraph 130 section 3 ...

So, according to according to
paragraph 130 section 3,

a person can be convicted

who denies that under the rule
of National Socialism

a Jew was killed by someone
to the end of destroying the Jewry

as an ethnic or religious group.

What is not necessary, for example,

is that the German government wanted it,

had given the order,
or even that it knew

that something had happened,
it is not required here.

Equally unrequired is that the killing
was committed by a German,

this is also not to be found
in these laws.

So, one cannot speak
of a clear principle of law,

because of this, in my opinion,
inexact definition of genocide.

Or otherwise, one can define genocide,

but the denial of it is naturally
yet another question.

There are then the questions:
Is it Holocaust denial

when one contests whether 1 was killed
or whether 6 million were killed?

This alone shows the inexactitude.

In the Federal Republic of Austria,
there is also a relevant paragraph,

there too the Holocaust itself
is not defined.

It is not clear what is meant.

Let us now turn to the question of how
it should be defined in order to be clear.

Normally, in cases of murder,

the verdict must state
where the crime took place ...

the police, the investigating magistrate,
must naturally first establish matters

and then present their findings
to the court ...

and in the verdict, when it is
appropriately proved,

the judge can then state that on such
and such a day at such and such a place

a murder took place
with such and such a weapon,

and the perpetrators were so and so,

and it is proved because, for example,

it has become clear,
shown beyond doubt,

that this is the weapon,

that the fingerprints of the perpetrators,
the accused, are on it,

and that there were powder residues
on the perpetrator,

anyway a couple of examples.

These things must be stated
in the judgement.

When we are dealing with the denial
of such an act,

with the criminal denial of such an act,

then, of course, we would expect
the relevant act,

the murder itself, established.

Otherwise, we have no idea
what the accused actually denied.

I suggest it is not clear
what is really denied,

because it is not definitively defined.

There should be at least one case,

against a Holocaust denier,

in which the relevant crime,
the Holocaust itself,

is exactly established
in all necessary details.

I know of no such verdict.

There are no details concerning
the crime scenes, the method of killing,

the number of victims,
the time-frame of the killings,

the perpetrators, the bodies,

or physical trace of a killing.

The testimonies are not specified,

nor are the documents
or similar kinds of evidence.

The intention to destroy
all or part of the Jewry

under National Socialist rule has not been
demonstrated anywhere.

There are no documents showing
any prior decisions, plans or orders.

When it comes to the trial
of Holocaust deniers,

we do not find these things specified.

Nor do we find any references
to other verdicts,

where all these things
could have been stated.

When one wants to show something, it is
the most scientific thing to do

to refer to other verdicts
containing the exact information.

This is also not the case.

This is the problem.

As long as the court will not commit
to certain specified crime scenes

where these mass killings
are supposed to have happened,

as long as the court will not commit to
at least one specified piece of evidence,

as long as this remains the case,

these mass killings simply
cannot be demonstrated.

And no more so the denial
of these mass killings.

Now one might say,

"What about the Nuremberg trial?

It's probably in there somewhere,
the details."

This is not the case.

Let me read you the relevant passage
of the Nuremberg verdict

where gas chambers are mentioned.

Here it says and I quote:

A certain number
of the concentration camps

were equipped with gas chambers

for the wholesale destruction
of the inmates,

and with furnaces
for the burning of the bodies.

Some of them were in fact used
for the extermination of Jews

as part of the "final solution"
of the Jewish problem.

Most of the non-Jewish inmates
were used for labour,

although the conditions
under which they worked

made labour and death
almost synonymous terms.

Those inmates who became ill
and were unable to work

were either murdered in the gas chambers
or sent to special infirmaries,

where they were given
entirely inadequate medical treatment,

worse food if possible
than the working inmates,

and left to die.
End quote.

That is all it says about gas chambers
in the Nuremberg verdicts.

It is all stated in general terms

such as "a certain number
of concentration camps".

It is not mentioned
where the gas chambers were.

This means that a defence lawyer
is left with no place to begin.

It is also important to emphasize

that the rules of evidence
were nullified in the Nuremberg trials.

Perhaps not all of them,
but in substantial part.

It says here, in the London Charter

which decreed laws specifically
for this military tribunal,

in Article 19:

The Tribunal shall not be bound
by technical rules of evidence.

That is a sentence
that is worth pondering.

That a military tribunal
from its inception

is given a free hand
when it comes to rules of evidence.

And further in article 20:

The Tribunal shall not require
proof of facts of common knowledge

but shall take judicial notice thereof.

Interesting, right?

It shall not require proof
of facts of common knowledge.

But what are facts of common knowledge?

It is usually the job of the courts
to establish the facts,

not presume the facts.

It all becomes somewhat clearer

in the words
of the American chief prosecutor,

Robert H Jackson.

They are given in the Nuremberg protocols
vol. 19 p. 440:

As a military tribunal,

this Tribunal is a continuation
of the war effort

of the Allied nations.

I'll repeat, the Nuremberg tribunal is
a continuation of the war effort

of the Allied nations.

Does a nation engaged in a war effort
need rules of evidence

as it seeks to burden
its opponent with guilt?

I would now like to read you a passage
from another verdict,

in which one might assume
to find the details

of the Holocaust specified.

This is from the so-called
Frankfurt Auschwitz Trials.

Here it says in the final verdict,
and I quote:

Almost all the usual forms of evidence
of a normal murder trial

necessary for gaining
a true image of the events

at the time of the murder

were unavailable to the court.

There were no bodies of the victims,

no autopsy reports,

no expert reports on the cause
and time of death,

there was no evidence
as to the perpetrators,

the murder weapons, and so on.

Verification of the witness testimonies
was only possible in a few cases.

And further below:

The court was, therefore, almost solely
dependent upon witness testimonies

in the clarification of the crimes
of the accused.

And yet further on:

There were hardly any witnesses

who lived through the events
at Auschwitz concentration camp

as neutral observers.

One can conclude from this verdict,

or rather simply see what stands there,

the court was almost solely dependent
upon witness testimonies

in the clarification
of the crimes of the accused.

Such is the situation at the start
of a trial for Holocaust denial,

and it is also the situation at the end,
because nothing is changed.

One gets to know,

neither as defence attorney
nor as accused,

absolutely nothing of what has
actually been established as fact,

because it is not given in the verdict.

Not in older verdicts
nor in newer verdicts.

There is a lot in the media
and much can be read in books about it,

but we want to hear it from the courts,
we want to hear it stated officially.

We want to know.
Really know.

One does not want to deny what is proved,
but one wants to know what was,

only one cannot find it stated officially,
that's the problem.

One is accused and condemned

without being told authoritatively
of what one is really accused.

What can one say to put it firmly?

I'll come back to this later,
how things go in a trial.

When an accused wants to know
what he should have said,

he gets no answer.

But more about that later.

At this point I would like to add
a very telling revelation

made by 34 French historians.

In 1979, they issued a statement.

These historians specialize
in the history of the Holocaust.

The revisionist historian,
Professor Robert Faurisson,

put forward technical arguments
against the existence of gas chambers.

These 34 French historians
stated the following

to the counterargument
of Professor Faurisson in 1979.

Quote:
It must not be asked

how such a mass murder
was technically possible.

It was technically possible
because it happened.

That is the required point of departure,
– point of departure!? –

of any historical inquiry on this subject.

These truths we should
just recall to memory:

There is no debate about the existence
of the gas chambers

and there may not be one.
End quote.

This also belongs
to the point of departure,

because this is how
the judges, the prosecutors, go on,

as do many other lawyers and other people.

Through their actions
they are clearly letting you know

that you are not allowed to ask.

This has had immense consequences.

I am in no way the first lawyer
to be punished for Holocaust denial.

Please don't think that.

I might be the first lawyer
to be imprisoned for it though.

But for years, lawyers have been
forever accused of Holocaust denial

because they submitted evidence
regarding details of the Holocaust.

When submitting evidence,

one necessarily has to phrase it
as statement of fact,

otherwise it will not be termed evidence.

That means you have to claim as fact,
what you want to demonstrate to the court.

Otherwise it will be dismissed,
on formal grounds.

Only when one as a defender
of a Holocaust denier

puts an argument, and says
this and this is true,

and there is this and that
expert evidence,

this and that is proved,

the court may determine it,
may ask an expert witness, for example,

then if this submission is declined,

the defender is then additionally accused
and convicted of Holocaust denial.

These things are not so well-known

because most lawyers don't make
much of a fuss about it.

They are just given a fine,
which they then pay,

and then say or think to themselves,

they'll not do it again, they'll not cause
themselves the trouble ever again.

But there are many, many cases
of this nature.

Only, I just wonder,
why this should remain so unknown,

this way of going on with the accused,
with the law,

and to punish defence lawyers
for quite normal professional practice.

I find it important that the people
become aware of it.

(Applause)

There are many, many people,
not just lawyers,

but also scientists, of different types,

who have been punished
for Holocaust denial.

I will not name many because
it would become a task without end

to name the many scientists and others
who have been punished with fines,

or many times even with prison sentences.

I would like to mention just a few,
for example, Germar Rudolf,

who also was subjected
to the treatment I just described.

He is a chemist and made
certain observations –

this is not the place to recite them.

He wrote books on what he observed,

truly scientific books,

and because of these books
he was twice given a prison sentence.

In one case, I defended him in court,

and the books were then destroyed,

they were forbidden,
removed from the index,

completely destroyed.

All the books the authorities
could get hold of were burned.

There were masses of books burned
on these grounds,

including those by Germar Rudolf,

and one must say about this,
one must explain why it happened.

Why a chemist who seriously took
to considering the matter,

why one does not at least discuss
what he says,

because it was not discussed,
it was not openly discussed.

When one passes on what he says,
one can expect a prison sentence.

The discussion is hindered.

How does one explain that in a structure
that considers itself free?

That's quite simple.

One just says he was a pseudoscientist.

It's just that simple!

Well, yes, I could explain
the matter to you –

well, one then gets to the verdict

and it's all about a pseudoscientist
who has denied the Holocaust.

Haven't we already heard today the phrase:
Bad science?

We heard it in a different context,
but the meaning is the same.

If someone accused of Holocaust denial
stands before the court

and he there presents how he came
to not believe in the Holocaust,

to doubt the Holocaust,

to place the Holocaust in question,

or to argue about the Holocaust

– there are several different levels –

when anyway he presents his case,

I've experienced it myself
as defence counsel,

he is again, because of
this declaration in court in his defence,

he is yet further accused and sentenced
for Holocaust denial.

Because he had for sure, in public,
before the court,

he had again questioned the Holocaust,
and is again accused and sentenced.

So that is prohibition of defence,
not only for defence counsel,

but also for the defendant himself.

He may not defend himself,
he may not discuss the issue of

why he questioned the Holocaust,

what grounds, what facts
brought him to do it.

So, not just a prohibition of evidence,
but a prohibition of defence.

I will quote you from the judgement
against me at the Mannheim court.

It states in the verdict:

The court sought to limit increasingly
almost all defence rights of the accused.

It then concerns itself
with which defence rights were limited.

For example,
to express oneself on the matter,

and ask a witness in what concerns me.

So, to sum it up, they took away
my right to speak.

I might not express myself further,
and then I was allowed ten questions.

The questions I put
did not please the court,

and I was not permitted
to ask further questions.

This is just one example.

What is often done then,

is that a relatively newly added paragraph
is introduced,

the Code of Criminal Procedure,
paragraph 252a.

It was introduced in the 90's

to tighten paragraph 130 section 3
relating to Holocaust denial,

and possibly to tighten
the whole of paragraph 130.

This paragraph 252a enables the judge
to require the accused or the defender

to express themselves
only in writing to the court.

So, petitions and statements
are to be presented only in written form,

and not read out loud first.

This the normal way,
to express oneself orally.

It is one of
the most fundamental principles

of German criminal law,
of German criminal proceedings,

the oral principle, that everything
must be spoken out loud before the court.

There are different, good reasons
why this should be,

but this was abolished in the 90's.

Apparently, there are things
that one doesn't want to hear.

And then when the judge
gets the impression,

now it is time,

he commands the defender to communicate
to the court in written form only.

And in the trial of Ernst Zündel
it was exactly like this too.

In other trials it was different,
I could say everything I wanted to,

the accused was nonetheless convicted,

but I could say all I wanted to.

But in the Zündel case and a few others,
this speech prohibition was imposed.

The result, of course,
of communication in writing alone,

is that those listening don't get to know
what the defender wants to convey.

So, only the judges are aware
of what the defender is trying to say,

and not those listening.

The public is excluded.

In this connection I would like
to quickly describe

how things went at the trial
of Ernst Zündel.

It got to be a bit of a muddle,
I must tell you,

it's no wonder,
but it is a bit complicated.

It was the case that
this speech prohibition was imposed,

and it was not only me
but three other defenders.

There were six defenders in all.
Four Ernst Zündel chose himself,

and two were appointed by the court.

Why this was done became clear afterwards.

They wanted lawyers in reserve
in case the others were removed.

If there were only one defender
and he became unavailable,

the trial would have to start
from the beginning again.

So, doing this avoids having to start
the trial from the beginning again.

So, I and two other chosen defenders
were allowed only written communication.

And it was my opinion, and still is,

that it is the duty of the defender
to protect the interests of his client,

and to make it clear
when he is of the opinion

that the legal standards
you expect in court are not being met.

I was accused of damaging
my duty as a defender.

On these grounds, the judges
dismissed me from the case.

But I am of the opposite conviction;

it is just the duty of a defender,
just in such difficult situations,

to point out, stop,
I cannot remain silent,

injustice is going on here.

(Applause)

And had I submitted
to the prohibition imposed on me,

and made my submissions in writing,
then I would have felt

that everything happening
was estranged from the law.

The fact that I could not
express myself orally

was already a breach of the law.

Of others I will not speak,
but for this reason alone

I continued to speak.

And I explained why I continued to speak.

I explained to them exactly
what I am explaining to you.

I explained why the use of this 252a,
this prohibition of speech,

this breach of the oral tradition,
was something I would not submit to it.

I explained it all to the Mannheim court.

In such difficult cases, it is sensible
to make submissions in writing also,

first to read them,
and then to present them in writing,

so everything is documented
and in the files.

I told them exactly why I would not bow
to this speech prohibition.

Because I don't accept it as right
is the reason in essence.

And then it continued
with my nonetheless reading a submission,

at least began to,
I did not have permission to,

I should have just handed it over,
but I read it out.

The judge then asked me to stop,

but I continued to speak on the grounds
I've just explained,

and it collapsed into an argumentation.

It's in
the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,

end of 2005, beginning of 2006,

really well put in parts.

So, there was quite an argumentation,

sometimes speaking over each other,

until the microphone
was taken away from me,

when I had the cheek
to speak without a microphone,

(Applause)

which was referred to in the sentence.

It must be particularly reprehensible
to do such a thing.

And in the end,
after much argument,

it reached the point
where the judge interjected,

that he would entertain my exclusion
as a defender from these proceedings.

But it was not true that I was arrested
there and then,

that was later,

it was requested,

and the high court in Karlsruhe
took the decision to grant the request,

and had me as defender
excluded from the proceedings.

So, the Karlsruhe court had me excluded
as defender from the Zündel proceedings,

but this decision was not yet final,

an appeal was allowable.

The time allowed for the appeal
was not up,

when a new date was given
for the Zündel trial

to which I was not invited.

And a lawyer friend told me about it,
and naturally I appeared,

because the appeal time was not up,

let alone an appeal decision made.

So, I sat down at the defence table.

But then the judge requested
that I leave the defence table.

So, there was a long discussion.

In the first place, if my appeal
deferred my exclusion or not.

If it did, then I still had the right
to sit there,

if it didn't then I had no right
to sit there.

You can imagine
who had which opinion,

but the point is he had power on his side,

and, then, naturally, opining that
the appeal did not defer my exclusion,

I was to leave the defence table.

I answered saying that the time was past

when the German people
would allow themselves to be oppressed.

(Applause)

So, then he ordered the police present
to remove me from the courtroom,

and a couple of policewomen
stood in front of me

and asked me to leave the courtroom.

I said, "You'll have to carry me."

Basically, it all went quite civilly.

The media naturally made
a great show out of it.

I wondered how it would go on,
it wasn't right.

It all went quite calmly.

I said quite civilly to the officers,
"You'll have to carry me."

Which they then did.

(Laughter)

And as I was carried out, I called out,
"The German people will rise."

(Applause)

So, that's how it was.

Anyway, the trial of Ernst Zündel
then lasted a further 10 months.

I mention that because it was suggested

I might have been trying
to protract the trial.

It was suggested I might be trying
to protract the trial

with the petitions I made.

So, after my forced removal, the case
went on for 10 months.

The intention to speed up the trial was,
after my removal,

very quickly lost, it would seem.

Ernst Zündel was sentenced
to 5 years imprisonment.

As he was free in 2010,
he was released earlier.

He was, in total, seven years in prison,

two years in the USA,
which were not taken into consideration,

five years here,
so, seven years continuous imprisonment.

And then, I myself,
I was also brought to trial,

as is well-known
at the court in Mannheim,

where I was, in the first instance,
sentenced to 3½ years imprisonment,

for Holocaust denial,

for defaming the state, to wit, defamation
of the Federal Republic of Germany,

in that I had said that Germany,
since 1945,

stood under the foreign rule
of the victors of the war.

(Applause)

And then I was convicted
of attempted obstruction of justice.

One must look at what I was accused of.

Attempted obstruction of justice,
it says in the verdict.

I made petitions which were intended
to put the Holocaust in question,

and because these petitions so obviously
could not be successful,

they could, therefore,
only have been made to delay the court.

Brilliant logic, would you believe!?

If you make petitions which the court
considers from the beginning as senseless,

then one is seen as obstructing the court.

I was also convicted of
assault of constitutional institutions

because I practically forced my petitions
and positions on the judges.

A further conviction of attempted
assault of constitutional institutions

was then quashed
by the federal court on appeal.

In the first instance I was sentenced
for assault of constitutional institutions

because I threatened the judges
with an address.

It was in relation to instructing
the lay judges

on the legal position –

a lay judge may not know
the legal position in Germany,

and perhaps make themselves
liable to prosecution,

if they send an accused
to prison on political grounds

without justification.

That is at the very least
perversion of the course of justice.

These facts I made fully clear
in my motion,

to wit, that I would have the professional
and the lay judges

answer one day when possible
before a Reich's court

if they convicted Ernst Zündel unjustly.

(Applause)

This was then taken as threats,

and I was convicted of
assault of constitutional institutions.

This was, however, overturned,
as threatening behaviour was not found.

Exceptionally, the situation
was judicially judged.

It was in fact no threat, as I argued,

but a making clear, a warning.

This is not punishable, it's no threat.

But in the media and Internet, yet again,

I was sentenced because
I threatened the judges,

which sounds much better than if one said
I was convicted because I made claims

which brought the Holocaust into question.

And, of course, I was also convicted
of inciting racial hatred.

Because when one places
the Holocaust in doubt,

one vilifies the victims.

And that is inciting racial hatred.

Such is the logic.
If you don't understand it, I can't help.

If you don't understand it,
then you have a clear legal conscience.

(Applause)

The appeal then brought about
a reduction of 3 months,

so, in the end, I was in prison
for 3 years, 3 months.

I was also forbidden to practise law
for 5 years,

which is no longer relevant as I have been
excluded from the legal profession.

I must check
what I want to continue with.

One of the most important things
is that one wants to know

what is seen as legally correct
by the court.

One would like to know
what the problem was.

I have always requested a discussion

of the foundation of the obviousness
of the Holocaust.

Because it's like this,
it's a little complicated.

When one makes a motion
to produce evidence

that brings the Holocaust into question,

then such a motion is declined
on the grounds

that the Holocaust is self-evident.

This is a quite usual procedure

that one doesn't have to produce evidence
for something that is self-evident.

It is entirely superfluous.

If something is self-evident there is
no further evidence to produce.

The text book example is
that it is self-evident

that rain falls down from above
and not from below to above.

And if in a criminal trial it came to
whence the rain falls,

then a motion to produce evidence
by the defence can be denied

on the grounds it is self-evident
that rain falls down from above.

One does not need
to produce evidence for it.

In such cases it is normal, in that
it's something that will always be true.

In a case where the rain
came from the side,

with the wind,
then one must produce evidence,

how it was on the day.

Was it windy or not?

We are getting into details
about the way it is self-evident.

Self-evident means something that for
all laymen is always easily perceptible,

always checkable in reference works,
in books.

And it assumes...

I would not like to withhold
from you the exact definition,

because it's really important
what self-evident actually is.

From this reference book for lawyers:

Historical facts are self-evident

when, on the grounds
of historical research,

they are generally considered proved,

so that anyone can inform himself

with history books, encyclopaedias
and similar reference sources

without specialized subject knowledge.

There's something else
that is very important here,

in the same book, at another place.

The precondition for the acceptance
of the self-evidence of a matter

is the unchallenged nature
of the matter under consideration.

So, only something unchallenged
can be self-evident.

It must hold universal acceptance
in science.

Thereby one understands
why some scientists

are classified as pseudoscientists.

Because then one can ignore them,
and self-evidence is not challenged.

Is, however, the correctness of a matter

argued in the literature,

then the matter is not
thereby self-evident

in that much is written, expounded
and set forth about it;

the deliberation on a matter
in no way relates to its self-evidence.

Motions to hear evidence
regarding the Holocaust

were, in my experience, rejected
because the Holocaust is self-evident.

I have ever and again in every case made
the request to discuss the self-evidence.

These requests were rejected
on the grounds

that the Holocaust is self-evident.

I cannot put it another way.

A discussion of the self-evidence
of the Holocaust

is superfluous because the Holocaust
is self-evident.

So, goes the reasoning in a nutshell,
it is a circular argument.

And I have then often also read
the additional reason,

that it will be seen as misuse of the law

to make such a request,

because, as was the case at my trial,
it means inducing the court

to tackle the subject.

So, it is written, it means considering
the revisionist theories,

but that is just the basis
of the accusation.

So, it will be seen as misuse of the law

to let the court get into a discussion
about the charge.

There's much to say,
but as short as possible...

The Bavarian lawyer's disciplinary court
had to consider

if I should be excluded
from the legal profession.

And also there I made requests

in relation to self-evidence,

and they were rejected on the grounds

that the disciplinary court had no doubt
that the Holocaust is self-evident,

in view of the known available written,
pictorial and sound material.

Then I asked, that is,
I and my defender,

the court to say on which material
it based its opinion.

This question was dismissed on the grounds

that the Holocaust,
or the crimes of violence

by the National Socialists on the Jews,
is self-evident.

So, it was no answer.

On which material the court
based its opinion, no answer,

other than a very vague one, to wit,

passing it all off to, quote:
newspapers, television and radio material,

reference works and history books.
End quote.

So, in other words, if one wants to know
why one has been convicted,

then one should read it in the newspapers,

it's not stated in the court decision
and verdict,

but to be read
in the tabloids, apparently!

So, there's an essential point here.

The newspapers,
what's in the newspapers, then?

A French historian by the name
of Jacques Beynac,

was quoted in the Swiss newspaper,
Le Nouveau Quotidien de Lausanne,

in September 1996.

He said, "When it comes to the existence
of Nazi gas chambers,

one can only point to
the absence of documents,

physical traces and
other material evidence."

One can only point to
the absence of documents,

physical traces and
other material evidence.

This opinion of a French historian,

who specializes in the history
of the Holocaust,

does this not show that the "obviousness"
could and should be questioned in court?

Another historian, Ernst Nolte,

wrote in his book, The Causal Nexus,
quote:

"The witness testimonies are,
for the most part, based on hearsay,

and assumptions.

The few eye-witness testimonies we have,
are in part contradictory,

and raise questions
regarding their credibility."

The historian Hans Mommsen was quoted
in the Süddeutsche Zeitung, saying,

"The Holocaust was not, not,
ordered by Hitler."

Again statements showing that questions

regarding the "obviousness"
of the Holocaust are valid.

The last statement I would like to read
is from Fritjof Meyer.

In the journal Osteuropa
in an article entitled,

The number of Auschwitz Victims:
New insights from new-found archives,

he wrote the following
with regard to the crime-scene.

He is editor at Der Spiegel,
by the way...

And in May 2002 this journal
came out in which he states

that the genocide did not happen within
Auschwitz concentration camp,

but, quote: Probably, in two farmhouses
outside of the camp.

So, the genocide did not happen
inside the camp,

but probably in two farmhouses
outside of the camp.

Again this shows the need for discussion
of the "obviousness" of the Holocaust.

Here the Federal Constitutional Court,
I'll leave some of it out,

but this is very important, I feel,

states its position regarding
the criminality of Holocaust denial.

It comes clean with regard
to freedom of speech,

but since it is
a specific freedom of speech,

it is a special law.

A special law is unconstitutional
because a specific opinion is forbidden.

It was determined by the supreme court
in a relatively new decision, in 2009,

that it was a special law.

That it's been officially determined
to be a special law

is an advance.

It just remains
to declare it unconstitutional

and abolished it,
the offence of Holocaust denial.

However, I will not spare you
their reasons for not doing so,

the justifications given
by the supreme court.

In the so-called Wunsiedel decision,

the Federal Constitutional Court declared
that the Federal Republic of Germany

is by way of exception allowed to keep
special statutes such as paragraph 130.

That is, in fact, criminalize
a particular opinion

with implied prohibition of defence
and prohibition of evidence.

Germany is by exception allowed
to keep this special statute

because of, quote:
The unique historical identity

of the Federal Republic of Germany,

in contrast to National Socialism.

In other words, they are allowed to do it,

because it's
the Federal Republic of Germany.

This is naturally
a very pretty formulation.

A clear case of arbitrary despotism.

The second explanation given
which is not stated so boldly,

but which is given
in another part of this decision.

It's not exactly defined, but it talks
about singular breaches.

One might conclude from it, that
in the case of a singular type of breach

the hearing of evidence is
superfluous and punishable.

The hearing of evidence is
superfluous and punishable

when it is a unique crime.

Do you find any logic in that?

So, that is in the end the two pillars

on which the punishability
of Holocaust denial is based.

The legal philosophy or legal grounds

for justifying the punishability
of Holocaust denial

is the historical identity
of the Federal Republic of Germany

and the uniqueness of the crime.

Because of that no presentation
of one's case is required.

Revisions and constitutional complaint
are regularly rejected

as being obviously ungrounded.

This has the effect of making reasons
for the decision unnecessary.

If something is obviously without grounds
there can be no grounds for it.

That's practical!

So, no answer there either.

What can one say,
one does not get an answer.

I heard myself
during the trial of Ernst Zündel

the following said by judge Meinerzhagen.

If it were just I who told you,
probably no one would believe me.

Naturally, it's not
in the court transcript.

But Die Tageszeitung, the so-called TAZ,

rendered the service of reporting it.

I quote from Die Tageszeitung, the TAZ,
from 9 February 2007,

reporting on the trial
against Ernst Zündel:

In the end, the court tersely refused
all petitions

on grounds which came as a shock to
some anti-Fascist members of the public,

that it was completely irrelevant
whether the Holocaust took place or not,

its denial was illegal in Germany
and that was all that concerned the court.

To conclude,
I left some things out, of course ...

... to conclude, or rather
in preparation for my conclusion,

let's consider how one can change things.

I see all over the place,
one reads on the Internet, in newspapers,

that many distance themselves
from the Nazis.

There are people, for example,

who know fully what happens
[in cases like we're discussiing],

but who nonetheless say,
"I am, however, no Nazi."

And they distance themselves from others
who might be described as Nazis.

They say, "Don't call me a Nazi.
I'm not one. I'm not one of them,

those Nazis."
They say, "Don't call me a Nazi.
I'm not one. I'm not one of them,

those Nazis."

They mean only they would unjustly be
described as evil Nazis;

the others would justly
be described as evil Nazis.

It's been like that for me.

I was first called a Nazi many years ago

on an information stand
against experiments on animals.

"You must be Nazis,
Hitler was also a vegetarian."

At that I began to ask myself
what Nazis actually are,

because with my picture of Nazis,
I could not attune myself

to the idea that I should be a Nazi,
as a defender of animal rights.

The next time I was described as a Nazi
was in relation to philosophy.

When one studies Plato,
when one speaks about Plato,

Plato is considered the forerunner
of the National Socialists,

a forerunner of Hitler,
someone who prepared the way,

because he was, for example,
a severe critic of democracy,

he rejected the democratic system.

This is one of the reasons
why one condemns Plato, in part.

Or one asserts, I've also read,

that he said something
quite different about democracy.

That's not true,
but just to mention it.

One tries to alter the image.

When one doesn't want to attack Plato,
one says he said something different,

although it stands unambiguously
in his book The Republic.

It is not to be denied that he was
a severe critic of democracy.

Anyway, these were the first times
that I was called a Nazi,

and I got really interested
in what a Nazi is.

One must build a picture for oneself.

One must get to know people
who are described as Nazis,

and people who consider themselves Nazis.

Both, they're not the same.

But it is interesting to get to know both,
then one get a picture for oneself.

One should do.

That is crucial.

That one doesn't engage in this exclusion.

Well, one asks, who then is not a Nazi.

Because anyone who says
anything meaningful,

or does anything useful,
anything healing,

he must sooner or later expect
to be called a Nazi.

(Applause)

Which means he should not be listened to.

Suddenly, he is labelled a Nazi,

and from then on one is not to listen
to him any more,

because one could be corrupted,
one could be ... um, well, what ...

I cannot understand
what people are afraid of.

Probably they are much less worried
by those called Nazis,

than they are worried
of being ostracized

if they have anything to do with a Nazi.

It's not the Nazis being dangerous,

but the consequences when one carries on
with someone who is considered a Nazi.

It's nothing to do with what is true
and what is untrue,

what is useful or harmful;

it's just about who has said it.

And when it's someone considered a Nazi
who says something,

then it must be false.

One doesn't want to be concerned with it,

it is in any case false,

it is worse than false, it is repulsive,

by nature.

Now, a very important point
in relation to this.

Recently, the opinions of groups
purporting to maintain an ideal standard

are increasing on the Internet.

They distance themselves from Nazis
and right-wing extremists,

they say they want
nothing to do with them.

A few months ago, I read of
a call to demonstration

against the ESM,
[European Stability Mechanism]

first only against the ESM and then
against the ESM and right-wing extremism.

For me, when someone distances himself,

it shows that he does not understand
what is going on.

(Applause)

And such a group I would not join,
because I would lose perspective,

not because they might not want me, but
because I would lose my own perspective.

When one wants to avoid
being called a Nazi,

and there are many such people,

most people want to avoid
being called a Nazi,

what does that involve?

It involves, results in, holding aside
important issues.

When one addresses serious issues,

when one gets to the heart of the matter,

then the danger of being called a Nazi
arises very quickly.

But, holding aside important issues,
one is ineffective, totally ineffective.

One works for what already exists,
but not at all for something different.

I really will end soon.

I would like to consider shortly
who is decidedly called a Nazi.

This is a very interesting matter to me.

Naturally, as a denier of the Holocaust,

or as one who takes
the national standpoint,

one is very quickly called a Nazi.

When one simply takes to the interests
of one's people,

then ... "Nazi."

(Applause)

When one speaks of interest slavery
... "Nazi."

(Applause)

There's another word which is
very closely connected with it:

anti-semite.

It is almost identical,
anti-semite and Nazi,

in the propaganda, so to speak,
of the opponents, the Nazi opponents.

Who, for example, connects
the following terms with the Jews,

is called a right-wing
or left-wing anti-semite,

and sometimes punished.

The following terms, for example:

international finance,

US East Coast,

interest slavery,

capitalism,

financial crisis,

globalization,

democratization,

Highgrade Freemason,

EU,

UN,

or New World Order.

Whoever, for example, connects
these terms with the Jews,

will be considered a right-wing
or left-wing anti-semite and punished.

(Applause)

Equally, whoever opines
the currency markets, the stock exchanges,

the democratic parties, the media
are in Jewish hands.

For example, lawyer, Horst Mahler,

was sentenced in 1999
to over 10 years in jail

for Holocaust denial
and anti-semitic remarks

and was arrested in the courtroom.

That is taken into custody immediately
after sentencing,

just like me.

After the sentence was given,
I was arrested.

I return to my beginning sentence,
which is also my closing sentence,

"To think what is true,
to sense what is beautiful,

and to want what is good."

This implies recognizing
and denoting lies,

this implies recognizing
and denoting inhumanity,

this implies recognizing
and denoting injustice.

Belonging with this

are the qualities that are
of particular importance today:

the consciousness of immortality,

steadfastness and incorruptibility.

With these qualities we might be able
to create a world

for the children who are with us today,

a world in which one can speak the truth
without being punished.

(Applause)