Banned speech, banned evidence and banned legal defence.
The reality of "Free Speech".
Our last speaker of the day will be lecturing on
banned speech, banned evidence and even a ban on legal defence in court.
On top of everything else, being banned from defending yourself in court
constitutes a particularly disturbing problem.
This speaker is a fully qualified lawyer and throughout her lecture
I find it of particular importance, that we don't let our judgement be influenced
by what our eyes and ears have already been shown or told.
She really made the headlines a few years ago as a defence attorney.
So, let me briefly explain whom we are dealing with.
This defence lawyer has the courage of the lion.
She is stronger than a man, and I have never met a woman with such a profile.
She bravely stood up and took it upon herself to defend Ernst Zündel
in the famous case against him for so-called Holocaust denial.
She was the trial lawyer of Ernst Zündel.
During the legal proceedings she provided evidence to the court
which could raise doubts regarding the official account of history.
This caused furore in the courtroom.
And she was prohibited from speaking any further.
This speech ban was ordered as she was presenting the arguments of the defendant.
She was not allowed to argue the case and barred from listing more evidence.
She ignored the speech ban and continued to submit evidence.
And was then threatened with penalties if she persisted.
As it became too much for the authorities,
she was arrested right there in the courtroom
during her defence of the so-called Holocaust denier Ernst Zündel.
But not even this could silence her;
she continued to argue the case of her defendant
while being forcefully removed from the courtroom.
For this she was imprisoned for almost three and a half years,
in spite of her having no previous convictions.
Arrested in the courtroom and locked up.
On top of this, she had to face 5 years of professional exclusion
through cancellation of her licence to work as an attorney,
and was removed from the Association for German Lawyers.
They threw her out, but we would like to carry her into our midst.
I urge you to help her along.
(Applause)
We are talking about a legend here, making headlines across Europe.
Welcome Sylvia Stolz.
Frau Sylvia Stolz, if they wouldn't let you speak there, here you can.
We trust you to know the limitations,
I am sure you do.
Much success with your speech, our hearts swell for you.
Sylvia Stolz: Thank you for the warm welcome.
Ladies and Gentlemen, dear friends, thank you again for the warm welcome.
I would like to begin my presentation with one sentence,
with the same one with which I will end.
Since I believe that this sentence is at the heart of human existence,
and gives, I believe, what it means to be human.
"To think what is true, to sense what is beautiful,
and to want what is good,
hereby the spirit finds the purpose of a life in reason."
This is a quote from Johann Gottfried von Herder:
To think what is true,
[what is true, not what was, which sound the same in German]
"To think what is true, to sense what is beautiful,
and to want what is good."
Regardless of your religion, your worldview
or philosophical orientation,
this sentence encapsulates the essence of human life, in my opinion
the "a" and "o",
the alpha and omega.
And one's actions show how one fulfils this human ideal,
one's actions and one's behaviour.
The first ideal is the predominant one,
"To think what is true,"
for only on truth can one build.
When one builds on something untrue, when one builds on something false,
it might stand for a while,
but at some time it must, of itself, collapse.
It is like trying to erect a building
with a foundation of papier mâché rather than proper stone
or proper concrete.
An important notion in relation to the question
"true thinking" or "finding the truth" is:
Hear the other side.
That is an ideal that is paid particular attention to here.
It is an old established principle of law: audiatur et altera pars,
the other side is to be heard.
To be heard in court and also in science
when there are two different opinions.
In science, for example, there may be two different opinions
which are both heard,
and one is not excluded from the outset
for whatever reason;
because it does not suit a result,
or because the result does not fit in with existing opinion.
One should only exclude a result
when it is seen to be definitively wrong.
To that end one must first examine it,
and first hear those who have the given view;
in the case of law, in a court.
When two sides oppose each other there, or when one person is accused,
then it is the duty of the judge to find out first of all what the truth is
and what has really happened,
and only then does one consider how that is to be judged,
whether it is a matter of illegality or culpability,
but the truth must first be clearly established,
what has happened.
"Hear the other side" is today often termed "the right to be heard",
which means every citizen has the right to be heard,
before a court and before other authorities
to be listened to, to put, to be able to put, his point of view.
And it is not sufficient that the judge just listens
and thinks I know how this trial will go, should go, but allow the speeches.
That I have too often in practice over and over again experienced and observed,
that the judges say,
"So what do you want? We're giving you a legal hearing, we're letting you speak."
Only by the conclusions and the judgements is it apparent
that they have taken absolutely nothing into consideration,
that he could be telling the truth or that he could be right.
That is an important factor in legal hearings,
that the judge considers
that someone could be right.
I've often experienced that this is not so,
that much more the attitude prevails:
He is not right, because it cannot be,
or, far more often, because it may not be.
And one does not concern oneself at all with the matters he puts forward.
Such an attitude of a judge can be classified as bias.
He is biased, he is not objective, he is not factual.
Put another way, he allows himself to be led by irrelevant considerations.
That is grounds for objecting to a judge.
Every accused can on these grounds object to a judge.
I have often done that, as a defender, and in my own case.
A judge has never been declined in all Holocaust denial trials
in which I have been present and observed,
the objection has never been accepted,
the judges were retained.
One of the important topics we will be discussing
is "Freedom of Speech".
One hears from many places,
that people who have certain opinions get into trouble.
And this is not confined to political discourse.
I am sure you know of quite a few areas without me listing them.
But to give an example, say, the issue of vaccines.
There are doctors out there who have been banned from practising
because they warned against vaccination.
This is just one example out of many within medicine,
one of the many areas in which such things happen.
Or journalists who are ostracized
because they have a differing view of the events of 9/11 2001, for example,
and report on this.
Such journalists are also bound to get in trouble.
However, these people are not punished by criminal law,
but find themselves punished in their respective occupations.
These two examples should suffice to show
that the highly praised "Freedom of Speech",
in reality, isn't all that it is made out to be.
And now to the issue of banned evidence, banned legal defence
within the area of "Holocaust denial".
Much could be said about this, one hour is far from sufficient.
My job here is to omit that for which there is no time.
But there are certain points which I think are essential to emphasize.
First of all, it must be said, that the principle of
nulla poena sine lege (no penalty without law)
is not observed but regularly contravened.
This principle dictates that the accused
must be allowed to know what he did wrong,
and what would have been right.
If someone takes a bicycle that does not belong to him,
most people know this is theft and not allowed.
In cases of libel,
where a person says something negative, something damaging reputation,
then it's a question of whether it is true or false.
And if it's true what he has said,
then it does not constitute libel,
because in theory one is allowed to speak the truth.
In the case of Holocaust denial trials,
the first problem we are faced with is that the Holocaust isn't defined anywhere.
There is, therefore, a problem of lack of defining law.
An authoritative definition is not to be found anywhere.
I'll come back to what I mean by this later,
what needs to be said exactly so that it's authoritatively defined.
Let's turn to to the legal passages in the different laws.
First of all, the ones in German law.
In paragraph 130 section 3, [of the German Criminal Code]
according to which so-called Holocaust deniers
can be fined or imprisoned for up to 5 years for each singular offence,
there is no mention of Holocaust.
It is not defined in the law as such.
Instead it refers to paragraph 6 section 1 of the German International Criminal Code.
And here we find a definition of genocide.
Whoever denies that such a genocide has occurred, can be convicted,
provided that additional criteria are met,
the disturbance of public order, for example.
But what I would like to emphasize
is the definition of genocide in paragraph 6
of the German International Criminal Code.
It's just a few lines,
I'll not give it quite in its entirety.
It is considered genocide
when one member of an ethnic, religious or other group
is killed with the intention of causing
the destruction of that group, in whole or in part.
So, one member of, say, a religious group is killed,
and the perpetrator intended to kill the whole or part of the group,
so is genocide defined in this paragraph 6.
If one brings this together
with paragraph 130 section 3,
the denial of an act defined in paragraph 6,
then one can according to this definition,
convict a person who denies ...
one must add: under the rule of National Socialism,
it states in paragraph 130 section 3 ...
So, according to according to paragraph 130 section 3,
a person can be convicted
who denies that under the rule of National Socialism
a Jew was killed by someone to the end of destroying the Jewry
as an ethnic or religious group.
What is not necessary, for example,
is that the German government wanted it,
had given the order, or even that it knew
that something had happened, it is not required here.
Equally unrequired is that the killing was committed by a German,
this is also not to be found in these laws.
So, one cannot speak of a clear principle of law,
because of this, in my opinion, inexact definition of genocide.
Or otherwise, one can define genocide,
but the denial of it is naturally yet another question.
There are then the questions: Is it Holocaust denial
when one contests whether 1 was killed or whether 6 million were killed?
This alone shows the inexactitude.
In the Federal Republic of Austria, there is also a relevant paragraph,
there too the Holocaust itself is not defined.
It is not clear what is meant.
Let us now turn to the question of how it should be defined in order to be clear.
Normally, in cases of murder,
the verdict must state where the crime took place ...
the police, the investigating magistrate, must naturally first establish matters
and then present their findings to the court ...
and in the verdict, when it is appropriately proved,
the judge can then state that on such and such a day at such and such a place
a murder took place with such and such a weapon,
and the perpetrators were so and so,
and it is proved because, for example,
it has become clear, shown beyond doubt,
that this is the weapon,
that the fingerprints of the perpetrators, the accused, are on it,
and that there were powder residues on the perpetrator,
anyway a couple of examples.
These things must be stated in the judgement.
When we are dealing with the denial of such an act,
with the criminal denial of such an act,
then, of course, we would expect the relevant act,
the murder itself, established.
Otherwise, we have no idea what the accused actually denied.
I suggest it is not clear what is really denied,
because it is not definitively defined.
There should be at least one case,
against a Holocaust denier,
in which the relevant crime, the Holocaust itself,
is exactly established in all necessary details.
I know of no such verdict.
There are no details concerning the crime scenes, the method of killing,
the number of victims, the time-frame of the killings,
the perpetrators, the bodies,
or physical trace of a killing.
The testimonies are not specified,
nor are the documents or similar kinds of evidence.
The intention to destroy all or part of the Jewry
under National Socialist rule has not been demonstrated anywhere.
There are no documents showing any prior decisions, plans or orders.
When it comes to the trial of Holocaust deniers,
we do not find these things specified.
Nor do we find any references to other verdicts,
where all these things could have been stated.
When one wants to show something, it is the most scientific thing to do
to refer to other verdicts containing the exact information.
This is also not the case.
This is the problem.
As long as the court will not commit to certain specified crime scenes
where these mass killings are supposed to have happened,
as long as the court will not commit to at least one specified piece of evidence,
as long as this remains the case,
these mass killings simply cannot be demonstrated.
And no more so the denial of these mass killings.
Now one might say,
"What about the Nuremberg trial?
It's probably in there somewhere, the details."
This is not the case.
Let me read you the relevant passage of the Nuremberg verdict
where gas chambers are mentioned.
Here it says and I quote:
A certain number of the concentration camps
were equipped with gas chambers
for the wholesale destruction of the inmates,
and with furnaces for the burning of the bodies.
Some of them were in fact used for the extermination of Jews
as part of the "final solution" of the Jewish problem.
Most of the non-Jewish inmates were used for labour,
although the conditions under which they worked
made labour and death almost synonymous terms.
Those inmates who became ill and were unable to work
were either murdered in the gas chambers or sent to special infirmaries,
where they were given entirely inadequate medical treatment,
worse food if possible than the working inmates,
and left to die. End quote.
That is all it says about gas chambers in the Nuremberg verdicts.
It is all stated in general terms
such as "a certain number of concentration camps".
It is not mentioned where the gas chambers were.
This means that a defence lawyer is left with no place to begin.
It is also important to emphasize
that the rules of evidence were nullified in the Nuremberg trials.
Perhaps not all of them, but in substantial part.
It says here, in the London Charter
which decreed laws specifically for this military tribunal,
in Article 19:
The Tribunal shall not be bound by technical rules of evidence.
That is a sentence that is worth pondering.
That a military tribunal from its inception
is given a free hand when it comes to rules of evidence.
And further in article 20:
The Tribunal shall not require proof of facts of common knowledge
but shall take judicial notice thereof.
Interesting, right?
It shall not require proof of facts of common knowledge.
But what are facts of common knowledge?
It is usually the job of the courts to establish the facts,
not presume the facts.
It all becomes somewhat clearer
in the words of the American chief prosecutor,
Robert H Jackson.
They are given in the Nuremberg protocols vol. 19 p. 440:
As a military tribunal,
this Tribunal is a continuation of the war effort
of the Allied nations.
I'll repeat, the Nuremberg tribunal is a continuation of the war effort
of the Allied nations.
Does a nation engaged in a war effort need rules of evidence
as it seeks to burden its opponent with guilt?
I would now like to read you a passage from another verdict,
in which one might assume to find the details
of the Holocaust specified.
This is from the so-called Frankfurt Auschwitz Trials.
Here it says in the final verdict, and I quote:
Almost all the usual forms of evidence of a normal murder trial
necessary for gaining a true image of the events
at the time of the murder
were unavailable to the court.
There were no bodies of the victims,
no autopsy reports,
no expert reports on the cause and time of death,
there was no evidence as to the perpetrators,
the murder weapons, and so on.
Verification of the witness testimonies was only possible in a few cases.
And further below:
The court was, therefore, almost solely dependent upon witness testimonies
in the clarification of the crimes of the accused.
And yet further on:
There were hardly any witnesses
who lived through the events at Auschwitz concentration camp
as neutral observers.
One can conclude from this verdict,
or rather simply see what stands there,
the court was almost solely dependent upon witness testimonies
in the clarification of the crimes of the accused.
Such is the situation at the start of a trial for Holocaust denial,
and it is also the situation at the end, because nothing is changed.
One gets to know,
neither as defence attorney nor as accused,
absolutely nothing of what has actually been established as fact,
because it is not given in the verdict.
Not in older verdicts nor in newer verdicts.
There is a lot in the media and much can be read in books about it,
but we want to hear it from the courts, we want to hear it stated officially.
We want to know. Really know.
One does not want to deny what is proved, but one wants to know what was,
only one cannot find it stated officially, that's the problem.
One is accused and condemned
without being told authoritatively of what one is really accused.
What can one say to put it firmly?
I'll come back to this later, how things go in a trial.
When an accused wants to know what he should have said,
he gets no answer.
But more about that later.
At this point I would like to add a very telling revelation
made by 34 French historians.
In 1979, they issued a statement.
These historians specialize in the history of the Holocaust.
The revisionist historian, Professor Robert Faurisson,
put forward technical arguments against the existence of gas chambers.
These 34 French historians stated the following
to the counterargument of Professor Faurisson in 1979.
Quote: It must not be asked
how such a mass murder was technically possible.
It was technically possible because it happened.
That is the required point of departure, – point of departure!? –
of any historical inquiry on this subject.
These truths we should just recall to memory:
There is no debate about the existence of the gas chambers
and there may not be one. End quote.
This also belongs to the point of departure,
because this is how the judges, the prosecutors, go on,
as do many other lawyers and other people.
Through their actions they are clearly letting you know
that you are not allowed to ask.
This has had immense consequences.
I am in no way the first lawyer to be punished for Holocaust denial.
Please don't think that.
I might be the first lawyer to be imprisoned for it though.
But for years, lawyers have been forever accused of Holocaust denial
because they submitted evidence regarding details of the Holocaust.
When submitting evidence,
one necessarily has to phrase it as statement of fact,
otherwise it will not be termed evidence.
That means you have to claim as fact, what you want to demonstrate to the court.
Otherwise it will be dismissed, on formal grounds.
Only when one as a defender of a Holocaust denier
puts an argument, and says this and this is true,
and there is this and that expert evidence,
this and that is proved,
the court may determine it, may ask an expert witness, for example,
then if this submission is declined,
the defender is then additionally accused and convicted of Holocaust denial.
These things are not so well-known
because most lawyers don't make much of a fuss about it.
They are just given a fine, which they then pay,
and then say or think to themselves,
they'll not do it again, they'll not cause themselves the trouble ever again.
But there are many, many cases of this nature.
Only, I just wonder, why this should remain so unknown,
this way of going on with the accused, with the law,
and to punish defence lawyers for quite normal professional practice.
I find it important that the people become aware of it.
(Applause)
There are many, many people, not just lawyers,
but also scientists, of different types,
who have been punished for Holocaust denial.
I will not name many because it would become a task without end
to name the many scientists and others who have been punished with fines,
or many times even with prison sentences.
I would like to mention just a few, for example, Germar Rudolf,
who also was subjected to the treatment I just described.
He is a chemist and made certain observations –
this is not the place to recite them.
He wrote books on what he observed,
truly scientific books,
and because of these books he was twice given a prison sentence.
In one case, I defended him in court,
and the books were then destroyed,
they were forbidden, removed from the index,
completely destroyed.
All the books the authorities could get hold of were burned.
There were masses of books burned on these grounds,
including those by Germar Rudolf,
and one must say about this, one must explain why it happened.
Why a chemist who seriously took to considering the matter,
why one does not at least discuss what he says,
because it was not discussed, it was not openly discussed.
When one passes on what he says, one can expect a prison sentence.
The discussion is hindered.
How does one explain that in a structure that considers itself free?
That's quite simple.
One just says he was a pseudoscientist.
It's just that simple!
Well, yes, I could explain the matter to you –
well, one then gets to the verdict
and it's all about a pseudoscientist who has denied the Holocaust.
Haven't we already heard today the phrase: Bad science?
We heard it in a different context, but the meaning is the same.
If someone accused of Holocaust denial stands before the court
and he there presents how he came to not believe in the Holocaust,
to doubt the Holocaust,
to place the Holocaust in question,
or to argue about the Holocaust
– there are several different levels –
when anyway he presents his case,
I've experienced it myself as defence counsel,
he is again, because of this declaration in court in his defence,
he is yet further accused and sentenced for Holocaust denial.
Because he had for sure, in public, before the court,
he had again questioned the Holocaust, and is again accused and sentenced.
So that is prohibition of defence, not only for defence counsel,
but also for the defendant himself.
He may not defend himself, he may not discuss the issue of
why he questioned the Holocaust,
what grounds, what facts brought him to do it.
So, not just a prohibition of evidence, but a prohibition of defence.
I will quote you from the judgement against me at the Mannheim court.
It states in the verdict:
The court sought to limit increasingly almost all defence rights of the accused.
It then concerns itself with which defence rights were limited.
For example, to express oneself on the matter,
and ask a witness in what concerns me.
So, to sum it up, they took away my right to speak.
I might not express myself further, and then I was allowed ten questions.
The questions I put did not please the court,
and I was not permitted to ask further questions.
This is just one example.
What is often done then,
is that a relatively newly added paragraph is introduced,
the Code of Criminal Procedure, paragraph 252a.
It was introduced in the 90's
to tighten paragraph 130 section 3 relating to Holocaust denial,
and possibly to tighten the whole of paragraph 130.
This paragraph 252a enables the judge to require the accused or the defender
to express themselves only in writing to the court.
So, petitions and statements are to be presented only in written form,
and not read out loud first.
This the normal way, to express oneself orally.
It is one of the most fundamental principles
of German criminal law, of German criminal proceedings,
the oral principle, that everything must be spoken out loud before the court.
There are different, good reasons why this should be,
but this was abolished in the 90's.
Apparently, there are things that one doesn't want to hear.
And then when the judge gets the impression,
now it is time,
he commands the defender to communicate to the court in written form only.
And in the trial of Ernst Zündel it was exactly like this too.
In other trials it was different, I could say everything I wanted to,
the accused was nonetheless convicted,
but I could say all I wanted to.
But in the Zündel case and a few others, this speech prohibition was imposed.
The result, of course, of communication in writing alone,
is that those listening don't get to know what the defender wants to convey.
So, only the judges are aware of what the defender is trying to say,
and not those listening.
The public is excluded.
In this connection I would like to quickly describe
how things went at the trial of Ernst Zündel.
It got to be a bit of a muddle, I must tell you,
it's no wonder, but it is a bit complicated.
It was the case that this speech prohibition was imposed,
and it was not only me but three other defenders.
There were six defenders in all. Four Ernst Zündel chose himself,
and two were appointed by the court.
Why this was done became clear afterwards.
They wanted lawyers in reserve in case the others were removed.
If there were only one defender and he became unavailable,
the trial would have to start from the beginning again.
So, doing this avoids having to start the trial from the beginning again.
So, I and two other chosen defenders were allowed only written communication.
And it was my opinion, and still is,
that it is the duty of the defender to protect the interests of his client,
and to make it clear when he is of the opinion
that the legal standards you expect in court are not being met.
I was accused of damaging my duty as a defender.
On these grounds, the judges dismissed me from the case.
But I am of the opposite conviction;
it is just the duty of a defender, just in such difficult situations,
to point out, stop, I cannot remain silent,
injustice is going on here.
(Applause)
And had I submitted to the prohibition imposed on me,
and made my submissions in writing, then I would have felt
that everything happening was estranged from the law.
The fact that I could not express myself orally
was already a breach of the law.
Of others I will not speak, but for this reason alone
I continued to speak.
And I explained why I continued to speak.
I explained to them exactly what I am explaining to you.
I explained why the use of this 252a, this prohibition of speech,
this breach of the oral tradition, was something I would not submit to it.
I explained it all to the Mannheim court.
In such difficult cases, it is sensible to make submissions in writing also,
first to read them, and then to present them in writing,
so everything is documented and in the files.
I told them exactly why I would not bow to this speech prohibition.
Because I don't accept it as right is the reason in essence.
And then it continued with my nonetheless reading a submission,
at least began to, I did not have permission to,
I should have just handed it over, but I read it out.
The judge then asked me to stop,
but I continued to speak on the grounds I've just explained,
and it collapsed into an argumentation.
It's in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,
end of 2005, beginning of 2006,
really well put in parts.
So, there was quite an argumentation,
sometimes speaking over each other,
until the microphone was taken away from me,
when I had the cheek to speak without a microphone,
(Applause)
which was referred to in the sentence.
It must be particularly reprehensible to do such a thing.
And in the end, after much argument,
it reached the point where the judge interjected,
that he would entertain my exclusion as a defender from these proceedings.
But it was not true that I was arrested there and then,
that was later,
it was requested,
and the high court in Karlsruhe took the decision to grant the request,
and had me as defender excluded from the proceedings.
So, the Karlsruhe court had me excluded as defender from the Zündel proceedings,
but this decision was not yet final,
an appeal was allowable.
The time allowed for the appeal was not up,
when a new date was given for the Zündel trial
to which I was not invited.
And a lawyer friend told me about it, and naturally I appeared,
because the appeal time was not up,
let alone an appeal decision made.
So, I sat down at the defence table.
But then the judge requested that I leave the defence table.
So, there was a long discussion.
In the first place, if my appeal deferred my exclusion or not.
If it did, then I still had the right to sit there,
if it didn't then I had no right to sit there.
You can imagine who had which opinion,
but the point is he had power on his side,
and, then, naturally, opining that the appeal did not defer my exclusion,
I was to leave the defence table.
I answered saying that the time was past
when the German people would allow themselves to be oppressed.
(Applause)
So, then he ordered the police present to remove me from the courtroom,
and a couple of policewomen stood in front of me
and asked me to leave the courtroom.
I said, "You'll have to carry me."
Basically, it all went quite civilly.
The media naturally made a great show out of it.
I wondered how it would go on, it wasn't right.
It all went quite calmly.
I said quite civilly to the officers, "You'll have to carry me."
Which they then did.
(Laughter)
And as I was carried out, I called out, "The German people will rise."
(Applause)
So, that's how it was.
Anyway, the trial of Ernst Zündel then lasted a further 10 months.
I mention that because it was suggested
I might have been trying to protract the trial.
It was suggested I might be trying to protract the trial
with the petitions I made.
So, after my forced removal, the case went on for 10 months.
The intention to speed up the trial was, after my removal,
very quickly lost, it would seem.
Ernst Zündel was sentenced to 5 years imprisonment.
As he was free in 2010, he was released earlier.
He was, in total, seven years in prison,
two years in the USA, which were not taken into consideration,
five years here, so, seven years continuous imprisonment.
And then, I myself, I was also brought to trial,
as is well-known at the court in Mannheim,
where I was, in the first instance, sentenced to 3½ years imprisonment,
for Holocaust denial,
for defaming the state, to wit, defamation of the Federal Republic of Germany,
in that I had said that Germany, since 1945,
stood under the foreign rule of the victors of the war.
(Applause)
And then I was convicted of attempted obstruction of justice.
One must look at what I was accused of.
Attempted obstruction of justice, it says in the verdict.
I made petitions which were intended to put the Holocaust in question,
and because these petitions so obviously could not be successful,
they could, therefore, only have been made to delay the court.
Brilliant logic, would you believe!?
If you make petitions which the court considers from the beginning as senseless,
then one is seen as obstructing the court.
I was also convicted of assault of constitutional institutions
because I practically forced my petitions and positions on the judges.
A further conviction of attempted assault of constitutional institutions
was then quashed by the federal court on appeal.
In the first instance I was sentenced for assault of constitutional institutions
because I threatened the judges with an address.
It was in relation to instructing the lay judges
on the legal position –
a lay judge may not know the legal position in Germany,
and perhaps make themselves liable to prosecution,
if they send an accused to prison on political grounds
without justification.
That is at the very least perversion of the course of justice.
These facts I made fully clear in my motion,
to wit, that I would have the professional and the lay judges
answer one day when possible before a Reich's court
if they convicted Ernst Zündel unjustly.
(Applause)
This was then taken as threats,
and I was convicted of assault of constitutional institutions.
This was, however, overturned, as threatening behaviour was not found.
Exceptionally, the situation was judicially judged.
It was in fact no threat, as I argued,
but a making clear, a warning.
This is not punishable, it's no threat.
But in the media and Internet, yet again,
I was sentenced because I threatened the judges,
which sounds much better than if one said I was convicted because I made claims
which brought the Holocaust into question.
And, of course, I was also convicted of inciting racial hatred.
Because when one places the Holocaust in doubt,
one vilifies the victims.
And that is inciting racial hatred.
Such is the logic. If you don't understand it, I can't help.
If you don't understand it, then you have a clear legal conscience.
(Applause)
The appeal then brought about a reduction of 3 months,
so, in the end, I was in prison for 3 years, 3 months.
I was also forbidden to practise law for 5 years,
which is no longer relevant as I have been excluded from the legal profession.
I must check what I want to continue with.
One of the most important things is that one wants to know
what is seen as legally correct by the court.
One would like to know what the problem was.
I have always requested a discussion
of the foundation of the obviousness of the Holocaust.
Because it's like this, it's a little complicated.
When one makes a motion to produce evidence
that brings the Holocaust into question,
then such a motion is declined on the grounds
that the Holocaust is self-evident.
This is a quite usual procedure
that one doesn't have to produce evidence for something that is self-evident.
It is entirely superfluous.
If something is self-evident there is no further evidence to produce.
The text book example is that it is self-evident
that rain falls down from above and not from below to above.
And if in a criminal trial it came to whence the rain falls,
then a motion to produce evidence by the defence can be denied
on the grounds it is self-evident that rain falls down from above.
One does not need to produce evidence for it.
In such cases it is normal, in that it's something that will always be true.
In a case where the rain came from the side,
with the wind, then one must produce evidence,
how it was on the day.
Was it windy or not?
We are getting into details about the way it is self-evident.
Self-evident means something that for all laymen is always easily perceptible,
always checkable in reference works, in books.
And it assumes...
I would not like to withhold from you the exact definition,
because it's really important what self-evident actually is.
From this reference book for lawyers:
Historical facts are self-evident
when, on the grounds of historical research,
they are generally considered proved,
so that anyone can inform himself
with history books, encyclopaedias and similar reference sources
without specialized subject knowledge.
There's something else that is very important here,
in the same book, at another place.
The precondition for the acceptance of the self-evidence of a matter
is the unchallenged nature of the matter under consideration.
So, only something unchallenged can be self-evident.
It must hold universal acceptance in science.
Thereby one understands why some scientists
are classified as pseudoscientists.
Because then one can ignore them, and self-evidence is not challenged.
Is, however, the correctness of a matter
argued in the literature,
then the matter is not thereby self-evident
in that much is written, expounded and set forth about it;
the deliberation on a matter in no way relates to its self-evidence.
Motions to hear evidence regarding the Holocaust
were, in my experience, rejected because the Holocaust is self-evident.
I have ever and again in every case made the request to discuss the self-evidence.
These requests were rejected on the grounds
that the Holocaust is self-evident.
I cannot put it another way.
A discussion of the self-evidence of the Holocaust
is superfluous because the Holocaust is self-evident.
So, goes the reasoning in a nutshell, it is a circular argument.
And I have then often also read the additional reason,
that it will be seen as misuse of the law
to make such a request,
because, as was the case at my trial, it means inducing the court
to tackle the subject.
So, it is written, it means considering the revisionist theories,
but that is just the basis of the accusation.
So, it will be seen as misuse of the law
to let the court get into a discussion about the charge.
There's much to say, but as short as possible...
The Bavarian lawyer's disciplinary court had to consider
if I should be excluded from the legal profession.
And also there I made requests
in relation to self-evidence,
and they were rejected on the grounds
that the disciplinary court had no doubt that the Holocaust is self-evident,
in view of the known available written, pictorial and sound material.
Then I asked, that is, I and my defender,
the court to say on which material it based its opinion.
This question was dismissed on the grounds
that the Holocaust, or the crimes of violence
by the National Socialists on the Jews, is self-evident.
So, it was no answer.
On which material the court based its opinion, no answer,
other than a very vague one, to wit,
passing it all off to, quote: newspapers, television and radio material,
reference works and history books. End quote.
So, in other words, if one wants to know why one has been convicted,
then one should read it in the newspapers,
it's not stated in the court decision and verdict,
but to be read in the tabloids, apparently!
So, there's an essential point here.
The newspapers, what's in the newspapers, then?
A French historian by the name of Jacques Beynac,
was quoted in the Swiss newspaper, Le Nouveau Quotidien de Lausanne,
in September 1996.
He said, "When it comes to the existence of Nazi gas chambers,
one can only point to the absence of documents,
physical traces and other material evidence."
One can only point to the absence of documents,
physical traces and other material evidence.
This opinion of a French historian,
who specializes in the history of the Holocaust,
does this not show that the "obviousness" could and should be questioned in court?
Another historian, Ernst Nolte,
wrote in his book, The Causal Nexus, quote:
"The witness testimonies are, for the most part, based on hearsay,
and assumptions.
The few eye-witness testimonies we have, are in part contradictory,
and raise questions regarding their credibility."
The historian Hans Mommsen was quoted in the Süddeutsche Zeitung, saying,
"The Holocaust was not, not, ordered by Hitler."
Again statements showing that questions
regarding the "obviousness" of the Holocaust are valid.
The last statement I would like to read is from Fritjof Meyer.
In the journal Osteuropa in an article entitled,
The number of Auschwitz Victims: New insights from new-found archives,
he wrote the following with regard to the crime-scene.
He is editor at Der Spiegel, by the way...
And in May 2002 this journal came out in which he states
that the genocide did not happen within Auschwitz concentration camp,
but, quote: Probably, in two farmhouses outside of the camp.
So, the genocide did not happen inside the camp,
but probably in two farmhouses outside of the camp.
Again this shows the need for discussion of the "obviousness" of the Holocaust.
Here the Federal Constitutional Court, I'll leave some of it out,
but this is very important, I feel,
states its position regarding the criminality of Holocaust denial.
It comes clean with regard to freedom of speech,
but since it is a specific freedom of speech,
it is a special law.
A special law is unconstitutional because a specific opinion is forbidden.
It was determined by the supreme court in a relatively new decision, in 2009,
that it was a special law.
That it's been officially determined to be a special law
is an advance.
It just remains to declare it unconstitutional
and abolished it, the offence of Holocaust denial.
However, I will not spare you their reasons for not doing so,
the justifications given by the supreme court.
In the so-called Wunsiedel decision,
the Federal Constitutional Court declared that the Federal Republic of Germany
is by way of exception allowed to keep special statutes such as paragraph 130.
That is, in fact, criminalize a particular opinion
with implied prohibition of defence and prohibition of evidence.
Germany is by exception allowed to keep this special statute
because of, quote: The unique historical identity
of the Federal Republic of Germany,
in contrast to National Socialism.
In other words, they are allowed to do it,
because it's the Federal Republic of Germany.
This is naturally a very pretty formulation.
A clear case of arbitrary despotism.
The second explanation given which is not stated so boldly,
but which is given in another part of this decision.
It's not exactly defined, but it talks about singular breaches.
One might conclude from it, that in the case of a singular type of breach
the hearing of evidence is superfluous and punishable.
The hearing of evidence is superfluous and punishable
when it is a unique crime.
Do you find any logic in that?
So, that is in the end the two pillars
on which the punishability of Holocaust denial is based.
The legal philosophy or legal grounds
for justifying the punishability of Holocaust denial
is the historical identity of the Federal Republic of Germany
and the uniqueness of the crime.
Because of that no presentation of one's case is required.
Revisions and constitutional complaint are regularly rejected
as being obviously ungrounded.
This has the effect of making reasons for the decision unnecessary.
If something is obviously without grounds there can be no grounds for it.
That's practical!
So, no answer there either.
What can one say, one does not get an answer.
I heard myself during the trial of Ernst Zündel
the following said by judge Meinerzhagen.
If it were just I who told you, probably no one would believe me.
Naturally, it's not in the court transcript.
But Die Tageszeitung, the so-called TAZ,
rendered the service of reporting it.
I quote from Die Tageszeitung, the TAZ, from 9 February 2007,
reporting on the trial against Ernst Zündel:
In the end, the court tersely refused all petitions
on grounds which came as a shock to some anti-Fascist members of the public,
that it was completely irrelevant whether the Holocaust took place or not,
its denial was illegal in Germany and that was all that concerned the court.
To conclude, I left some things out, of course ...
... to conclude, or rather in preparation for my conclusion,
let's consider how one can change things.
I see all over the place, one reads on the Internet, in newspapers,
that many distance themselves from the Nazis.
There are people, for example,
who know fully what happens [in cases like we're discussiing],
but who nonetheless say, "I am, however, no Nazi."
And they distance themselves from others who might be described as Nazis.
They say, "Don't call me a Nazi. I'm not one. I'm not one of them,
those Nazis." They say, "Don't call me a Nazi. I'm not one. I'm not one of them,
those Nazis."
They mean only they would unjustly be described as evil Nazis;
the others would justly be described as evil Nazis.
It's been like that for me.
I was first called a Nazi many years ago
on an information stand against experiments on animals.
"You must be Nazis, Hitler was also a vegetarian."
At that I began to ask myself what Nazis actually are,
because with my picture of Nazis, I could not attune myself
to the idea that I should be a Nazi, as a defender of animal rights.
The next time I was described as a Nazi was in relation to philosophy.
When one studies Plato, when one speaks about Plato,
Plato is considered the forerunner of the National Socialists,
a forerunner of Hitler, someone who prepared the way,
because he was, for example, a severe critic of democracy,
he rejected the democratic system.
This is one of the reasons why one condemns Plato, in part.
Or one asserts, I've also read,
that he said something quite different about democracy.
That's not true, but just to mention it.
One tries to alter the image.
When one doesn't want to attack Plato, one says he said something different,
although it stands unambiguously in his book The Republic.
It is not to be denied that he was a severe critic of democracy.
Anyway, these were the first times that I was called a Nazi,
and I got really interested in what a Nazi is.
One must build a picture for oneself.
One must get to know people who are described as Nazis,
and people who consider themselves Nazis.
Both, they're not the same.
But it is interesting to get to know both, then one get a picture for oneself.
One should do.
That is crucial.
That one doesn't engage in this exclusion.
Well, one asks, who then is not a Nazi.
Because anyone who says anything meaningful,
or does anything useful, anything healing,
he must sooner or later expect to be called a Nazi.
(Applause)
Which means he should not be listened to.
Suddenly, he is labelled a Nazi,
and from then on one is not to listen to him any more,
because one could be corrupted, one could be ... um, well, what ...
I cannot understand what people are afraid of.
Probably they are much less worried by those called Nazis,
than they are worried of being ostracized
if they have anything to do with a Nazi.
It's not the Nazis being dangerous,
but the consequences when one carries on with someone who is considered a Nazi.
It's nothing to do with what is true and what is untrue,
what is useful or harmful;
it's just about who has said it.
And when it's someone considered a Nazi who says something,
then it must be false.
One doesn't want to be concerned with it,
it is in any case false,
it is worse than false, it is repulsive,
by nature.
Now, a very important point in relation to this.
Recently, the opinions of groups purporting to maintain an ideal standard
are increasing on the Internet.
They distance themselves from Nazis and right-wing extremists,
they say they want nothing to do with them.
A few months ago, I read of a call to demonstration
against the ESM, [European Stability Mechanism]
first only against the ESM and then against the ESM and right-wing extremism.
For me, when someone distances himself,
it shows that he does not understand what is going on.
(Applause)
And such a group I would not join, because I would lose perspective,
not because they might not want me, but because I would lose my own perspective.
When one wants to avoid being called a Nazi,
and there are many such people,
most people want to avoid being called a Nazi,
what does that involve?
It involves, results in, holding aside important issues.
When one addresses serious issues,
when one gets to the heart of the matter,
then the danger of being called a Nazi arises very quickly.
But, holding aside important issues, one is ineffective, totally ineffective.
One works for what already exists, but not at all for something different.
I really will end soon.
I would like to consider shortly who is decidedly called a Nazi.
This is a very interesting matter to me.
Naturally, as a denier of the Holocaust,
or as one who takes the national standpoint,
one is very quickly called a Nazi.
When one simply takes to the interests of one's people,
then ... "Nazi."
(Applause)
When one speaks of interest slavery ... "Nazi."
(Applause)
There's another word which is very closely connected with it:
anti-semite.
It is almost identical, anti-semite and Nazi,
in the propaganda, so to speak, of the opponents, the Nazi opponents.
Who, for example, connects the following terms with the Jews,
is called a right-wing or left-wing anti-semite,
and sometimes punished.
The following terms, for example:
international finance,
US East Coast,
interest slavery,
capitalism,
financial crisis,
globalization,
democratization,
Highgrade Freemason,
EU,
UN,
or New World Order.
Whoever, for example, connects these terms with the Jews,
will be considered a right-wing or left-wing anti-semite and punished.
(Applause)
Equally, whoever opines the currency markets, the stock exchanges,
the democratic parties, the media are in Jewish hands.
For example, lawyer, Horst Mahler,
was sentenced in 1999 to over 10 years in jail
for Holocaust denial and anti-semitic remarks
and was arrested in the courtroom.
That is taken into custody immediately after sentencing,
just like me.
After the sentence was given, I was arrested.
I return to my beginning sentence, which is also my closing sentence,
"To think what is true, to sense what is beautiful,
and to want what is good."
This implies recognizing and denoting lies,
this implies recognizing and denoting inhumanity,
this implies recognizing and denoting injustice.
Belonging with this
are the qualities that are of particular importance today:
the consciousness of immortality,
steadfastness and incorruptibility.
With these qualities we might be able to create a world
for the children who are with us today,
a world in which one can speak the truth without being punished.
(Applause)