Game theory challenge: can you predict human behavior? - Lucas Husted
-
0:07 - 0:10A few months ago we posed a challenge
to our community. -
0:10 - 0:15We asked everyone: given a range of
integers from 0 to 100, -
0:15 - 0:22guess the whole number closest to 2/3
of the average of all numbers guessed. -
0:22 - 0:27So if the average of all guesses is 60,
the correct guess will be 40. -
0:27 - 0:31What number do you think was the
correct guess at 2/3 of the average? -
0:33 - 0:36Let’s see if we can try and reason
our way to the answer. -
0:36 - 0:41This game is played under conditions known
to game theorists as common knowledge. -
0:41 - 0:44Not only does every player have
the same information— -
0:44 - 0:47they also know that everyone else does,
-
0:47 - 0:53and that everyone else knows that
everyone else does, and so on, infinitely. -
0:53 - 0:59Now, the highest possible average would
occur if every person guessed 100. -
0:59 - 1:03In that case, 2/3 of the average
would be 66.66. -
1:03 - 1:05Since everyone can figure this out,
-
1:05 - 1:10it wouldn’t make sense to guess
anything higher than 67. -
1:10 - 1:13If everyone playing comes to
this same conclusion, -
1:13 - 1:16no one will guess higher than 67.
-
1:16 - 1:20Now 67 is the new highest
possible average, -
1:20 - 1:25so no reasonable guess should be
higher than ⅔ of that, which is 44. -
1:25 - 1:29This logic can be extended further
and further. -
1:29 - 1:34With each step, the highest possible
logical answer keeps getting smaller. -
1:34 - 1:38So it would seem sensible to guess the
lowest number possible. -
1:38 - 1:41And indeed, if everyone chose zero,
-
1:41 - 1:45the game would reach what’s known
as a Nash Equilibrium. -
1:45 - 1:49This is a state where every player has
chosen the best possible strategy -
1:49 - 1:53for themselves given
everyone else playing, -
1:53 - 1:57and no individual player can benefit
by choosing differently. -
1:57 - 2:02But, that’s not what happens
in the real world. -
2:02 - 2:05People, as it turns out, either aren’t
perfectly rational, -
2:05 - 2:09or don’t expect each other
to be perfectly rational. -
2:09 - 2:12Or, perhaps, it’s some combination
of the two. -
2:12 - 2:15When this game is played in
real-world settings, -
2:15 - 2:20the average tends to be somewhere
between 20 and 35. -
2:20 - 2:26Danish newspaper Politiken ran the game
with over 19,000 readers participating, -
2:26 - 2:32resulting in an average of roughly 22,
making the correct answer 14. -
2:32 - 2:36For our audience, the average was 31.3.
-
2:36 - 2:41So if you guessed 21 as 2/3 of
the average, well done. -
2:41 - 2:45Economic game theorists have a
way of modeling this interplay -
2:45 - 2:50between rationality and practicality
called k-level reasoning. -
2:50 - 2:55K stands for the number of times a
cycle of reasoning is repeated. -
2:55 - 2:59A person playing at k-level 0 would
approach our game naively, -
2:59 - 3:03guessing a number at random without
thinking about the other players. -
3:03 - 3:08At k-level 1, a player would assume
everyone else was playing at level 0, -
3:08 - 3:12resulting in an average of 50,
and thus guess 33. -
3:12 - 3:17At k-level 2, they’d assume that everyone
else was playing at level 1, -
3:17 - 3:19leading them to guess 22.
-
3:19 - 3:23It would take 12 k-levels to reach 0.
-
3:23 - 3:28The evidence suggests that most
people stop at 1 or 2 k-levels. -
3:28 - 3:29And that’s useful to know,
-
3:29 - 3:34because k-level thinking comes into
play in high-stakes situations. -
3:34 - 3:39For example, stock traders evaluate stocks
not only based on earnings reports, -
3:39 - 3:43but also on the value that others
place on those numbers. -
3:43 - 3:45And during penalty kicks in soccer,
-
3:45 - 3:50both the shooter and the goalie decide
whether to go right or left -
3:50 - 3:53based on what they think the other
person is thinking. -
3:53 - 3:57Goalies often memorize the patterns of
their opponents ahead of time, -
3:57 - 4:00but penalty shooters know that
and can plan accordingly. -
4:00 - 4:04In each case, participants must weigh
their own understanding -
4:04 - 4:08of the best course of action against how
well they think other participants -
4:08 - 4:10understand the situation.
-
4:10 - 4:15But 1 or 2 k-levels is by no means
a hard and fast rule— -
4:15 - 4:20simply being conscious of this tendency
can make people adjust their expectations. -
4:20 - 4:24For instance, what would happen
if people played the 2/3 game -
4:24 - 4:28after understanding the difference between
the most logical approach -
4:28 - 4:30and the most common?
-
4:30 - 4:34Submit your own guess at what 2/3
of the new average will be -
4:34 - 4:36by using the form below,
-
4:36 - 4:38and we’ll find out.
- Title:
- Game theory challenge: can you predict human behavior? - Lucas Husted
- Speaker:
- Lucas Husted
- Description:
-
View full lesson: https://ed.ted.com/lessons/game-theory-challenge-can-you-predict-human-behavior-lucas-husted
Given a range of integers from 0 to 100, what would the whole number closest to 2/3 of the average of all numbers guessed be? For example, if the average of all guesses is 60, the correct guess will be 40. The game is played under conditions known to game theorists as “common knowledge:” every player has the same information— they also know that everyone else does too. Lucas Husted explains.
Lesson by Lucas Husted, directed by Anton Trofimov.
- Video Language:
- English
- Team:
closed TED
- Project:
- TED-Ed
- Duration:
- 04:40
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Yasushi Aoki
Note: Because the answer should be a whole number, k-level reasoning wouldn't reach to 0.
k1 50*2/3 = 33.3333 -> 33
k2 33*2/3 = 22
k3 22*2/3 = 14.6667 -> 15
k4 15*2/3 = 10
k5 10*2/3 = 6.6667 -> 7
k6 7*2/3 = 4.6667 -> 5
k7 5*2/3 = 3.3333 -> 3
k8 3*2/3 = 2
k9 2*2/3 = 1.3333 -> 1
k10 1*2/3 = 0.6667 -> 1