The Ethics of Activist DDOS Actions [29c3]
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0:10 - 0:21applause
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0:21 - 0:23Hi, my name is Molly Sauter.
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0:23 - 0:26I'm currently a grad student at MIT in comparative media studies
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0:26 - 0:30and I do research at the center for civic media at the media lab.
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0:30 - 0:35This talk is going to be laying out an analytical framework
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0:35 - 0:37that I've been working on for a while
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0:37 - 0:41of the ethical analysis of activist DDoS actions.
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0:41 - 0:45And though distributed denial of service attacks have been used
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0:45 - 0:49as a tool of digital activism for roughly the past 2.5 decades,
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0:49 - 0:53the past couple of years we have seen this huge explosion of the use
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0:53 - 0:55and the tactic and the popularization of the tactic
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0:55 - 0:58as well as a sharp increase in the attention
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0:58 - 1:01its use attracts for media and state actors.
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1:01 - 1:04All this attention has brought a lot of criticism and
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1:04 - 1:08a lot of sort of support from various people in the digital space,
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1:08 - 1:10including digital activists.
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1:10 - 1:15However both DDoS's critics and DDoS's proponents seek to declare the tactic
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1:15 - 1:21as a whole as good or bad, without a nuance understanding the variety of circumstances in contexts
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1:21 - 1:24that can render the tactics use ethical or unethical.
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1:24 - 1:27So in this talk I'm gonna lay down the preliminaries for a framework
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1:27 - 1:33by which to perform an ethical analysis of an activist DDoS action in individual use context.
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1:34 - 1:37We're gonna go through a brief technical legal note
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1:37 - 1:40which I assume I'm gonna be able to skip for this audience,
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1:40 - 1:46criticisms of activist DDoS actions that have been thrown out in the past.
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1:46 - 1:50Then we're gonna get in to the analytical framework that I'm proposing
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1:50 - 1:53and then I'm gonna tell you a little about where I'm gonna take this
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1:53 - 1:56as I write my thesis, which this is.
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1:57 - 2:00So everybody knows what a DDoS attack is, right?
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2:00 - 2:02Raise your hand if you know what it is.
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2:02 - 2:04Awesome, I can totally skip this slide.
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2:04 - 2:06laughter
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2:07 - 2:11DDoS action, distributed denial of service action by which
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2:11 - 2:15you seek to monopulize the resources of a server or other resource
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2:15 - 2:18with your resources to prevent other people from using it.
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2:18 - 2:20Good, we're happy? We're happy.
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2:20 - 2:24applause
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2:24 - 2:27Alright, brief legal note: unlike this cat I am not a lawyer.
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2:27 - 2:29I do not have a law degree, haven't studied law.
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2:29 - 2:32I worked at a law school for a while but that doesn't make me a lawyer.
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2:32 - 2:37So I'm gonna talk about legal things in this talk, do not take it as legal advice.
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2:37 - 2:43So DDoS actions and DDoS attacks are illegal in most but not all jurisdictions.
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2:43 - 2:46In the US they are prosecuted as felonies.
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2:46 - 2:52Under title 10 section 1030 of the US Code which is complicated and which I won't read.
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2:52 - 2:56But just so that everyone is aware and this does have a bearing on my talk later:
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2:56 - 3:01these things are very illegal and this has severe precautions
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3:01 - 3:08for how organizers should treat them as they engage with them in their protests.
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3:08 - 3:13So one of the major criticisms of DDoS actions is that they constitute censorship.
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3:13 - 3:20This is a very popular criticism among sort of "oldschool" hacktivists
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3:20 - 3:23like cult of the dead cow hacktivism or other groups like that
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3:23 - 3:26which have denounced the tactic as straight-up censorship.
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3:26 - 3:32Basically they say you are impinging the movement of bits on the network and that's wrong.
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3:32 - 3:35If we're going to be engaging in this type of electronic activism
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3:35 - 3:39we want to be encouring the movement of bits on the network, not stopping them.
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3:39 - 3:45This criticism privileges the integrity of the network and the rights of specific individuals
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3:45 - 3:48to unfettered flows of information,
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3:48 - 3:54and it privileges that overpolitical ideals of activism in civil disobedience present in activist DDoS actions.
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3:54 - 4:01This criticism also raises very specific unanswered questions about who can engange in censorship.
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4:01 - 4:09Can in fact non-state actors and non-corporate actors be engaged as censorious bodies?
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4:09 - 4:15And while DDoS is undeniably a disruptive tactic, does disruption of speech,
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4:15 - 4:19particularly in context where the target has many other speech outlets,
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4:19 - 4:22always equal a denial of speech?
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4:22 - 4:26For instance when this tactic is trained against a corporate target
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4:26 - 4:30while certain aspects of that organization's presence may be disrupted
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4:30 - 4:36their abiltiy to engange in political speech through the press and other outlets is not.
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4:36 - 4:43Therefore the criticism that you're engaging in censorship by waging a DDoS action sort of falls flat.
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4:43 - 4:49Though the criticism is appropriate in some cases, especially when it's used against organizations
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4:49 - 4:54that primarily exist online such as ISPs or independent blogs.
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4:55 - 5:02Second major criticism is a sort of a revamping of this very old debate in activism.
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5:02 - 5:08Direct action or symbolic/attention-oriented activism, which is better?
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5:08 - 5:12And the anwswer is, one isn't really better, they are sort of different.
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5:13 - 5:16applause
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5:16 - 5:17Thank you.
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5:17 - 5:23One group that's been particularly vocal about this in the past is a group called the critical art ensemble
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5:23 - 5:28which helped pioneer the idea of electronic civil disobedience in the 90th.
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5:28 - 5:33And they critized groups like the electronic disturbance theatre for their use of DDoS in their actions.
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5:33 - 5:36Saying that the use is ineffectual because corporations
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5:36 - 5:41and states are now ??? waging "media war" with activists.
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5:41 - 5:45And it is ineffectual when compared with direct action.
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5:45 - 5:50In addition to just sort of being mean to attention-oriented activism for no reason,
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5:50 - 5:56this criticism ignores the fact that DDoS is often used as a tool of direct action
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5:56 - 6:01Such as when it was used by the electrohippies in 1999 against the Internet
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6:01 - 6:05that the world trade organization was using during their annual meeting
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6:05 - 6:08or other groups that I'm gonna talk later about in this talk.
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6:08 - 6:13The CAE's conception of DDoS also leaves the tactic
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6:13 - 6:16out of the context of larger actions that it is associated with.
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6:16 - 6:23This tactic is pretty much never and frankly should never be used as the sole tactic in a campaign.
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6:23 - 6:27It should always be used in the context with other tactics
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6:27 - 6:32and it gets its ethical and politcal viability from the context in which it is used.
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6:32 - 6:36Not simply because of things inherent to itself.
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6:36 - 6:40Third major criticism: what is a successful DDoS action?
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6:40 - 6:49Basically it's really hard to take down a large corporate website with an all volunteer manual DDoS action.
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6:49 - 6:52If you and all your friends are really just sitting in your chairs
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6:52 - 6:58hitting refresh a bunch of times on like paypal.com you're not gonna bring it down.
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6:58 - 7:02So then what are we going to consider a successful DDoS action
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7:02 - 7:08if we can't rely on downtime to be a measure of success?
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7:08 - 7:11So there are a couple of different answers to this questions.
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7:11 - 7:16The first is we want to look at the value of the tactic as something which draws and focuses attention.
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7:16 - 7:20And this is way more important now that it has become
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7:20 - 7:25much more of a media magnet than necessarily it was maybe 10 years ago.
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7:25 - 7:30Another use for the tactic is the biographical impact on the participants
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7:30 - 7:33and expanding opportunities for engagement and participation.
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7:33 - 7:39If you have never participated in a political action and you get to participate in a DDoS action
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7:39 - 7:43and you're in the IRC channel with all of these new friends who you didn't know you had
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7:43 - 7:46who you didn't know had the political views that you had
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7:46 - 7:50and you didn't know were willing to participate in ways that you are.
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7:50 - 7:53That has a huge biographical impact on you and it helps you consider yourself.
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7:53 - 7:57And activism helps you move up the ??? the ladder of engagement.
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7:57 - 8:03This enables what Ricardo Dominguez of the EDT calls a permanent culture of resistance
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8:03 - 8:10where resisting modes of power and resisting oppressive systems is part of the culture.
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8:10 - 8:16And it isn't simple something you do for special on weekends but it is something that you do all the time.
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8:16 - 8:18And the value of this symbolic resistence is
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8:18 - 8:23not necessarily its overt effect on the system that its ostensibly targets
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8:23 - 8:28but rather its effects on participants and on the reflective fields that surround it as it occurs
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8:28 - 8:30including media and culture.
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8:30 - 8:37Basically DDoS acts is a tool for the relevation of what James Scott called hidden transcripts of resistance.
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8:37 - 8:40It serves as an open action where an individual participant
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8:40 - 8:44can join a community of resistance with others.
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8:45 - 8:47Moving on to the second major section:
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8:47 - 8:49the analytical framework that I'm presenting.
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8:49 - 8:53There are four major parts of it that I'm gonna talk about in this talk.
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8:53 - 8:58I'm hoping to expand to maybe five or six later, but not right now.
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8:58 - 9:02The first is intended effects and actual effects.
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9:02 - 9:06The second is contacts within a greater campaign which we've already talked about a little bit.
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9:06 - 9:09The third is technology being utilized in the action.
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9:09 - 9:14And the fourth is the specific participant and organizer populations ??at play??.
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9:14 - 9:17I'm gonna go through these one by one.
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9:17 - 9:19The first is intended and actual effects.
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9:19 - 9:26What I mean by this is what the group that is waging the action intends to happen by its use of the action
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9:26 - 9:28what actually happens.
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9:28 - 9:31So there is a good example of this from 1997.
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9:31 - 9:40It's called the IGC Euskal Herria Journal action and that's Basque and I totally butchered it but I'm not Basque.
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9:40 - 9:45Basically what happened was there was an ISP called IGC
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9:45 - 9:50which was hosting a Basque newspaper publication, an online newspaper.
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9:50 - 9:54This was during a time in Spain when the Basques were not terribly popular.
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9:54 - 9:58There was a lot of violence going around Basque seperatives actions.
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9:58 - 10:07A popular DDoS action was started by people who I don't know, so don't ask me,
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10:07 - 10:11to pressure IGC to take this website down,
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10:11 - 10:16the Euskal Herria Journal website down. People didn't like it.
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10:16 - 10:19It got a lot of popular support.
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10:19 - 10:22Actually several major newspapers in Spain eventually
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10:22 - 10:27published target email addresses for email bombs and other things
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10:27 - 10:30until they eventually decided that was probably a bad idea
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10:30 - 10:33and they retracted their support.
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10:33 - 10:37But the stated goal of the actions was always to get the website offline.
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10:37 - 10:40People didn't like it, they wanted it gone.
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10:40 - 10:47Eventually it did go down because IGC was flooded with these packets and mail bombs and it was horrible.
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10:47 - 10:53It rendered inaccessible the websites and emails of their over 13000 subscribers
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10:53 - 10:57and they couldn't function as a business while this attack was going on.
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10:57 - 11:01So they did eventually stop hosting the site but under firm protest.
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11:01 - 11:06As an ISP IGC exists primarily in fact entirely online.
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11:06 - 11:11Removing its ability to function online removes its core as an organization
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11:11 - 11:13and its ability to function.
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11:13 - 11:17So the goal of this action was to remove content
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11:17 - 11:24by waging the action as long as the DDoS was successful the content was removed.
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11:24 - 11:31So actually the goal of the action was the permanent imposition of the state of the action.
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11:31 - 11:36Its intended effects were its actual effects as it was occurring.
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11:36 - 11:39This fits very well with the criticism that we saw before.
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11:39 - 11:41This was actually just plain censorship.
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11:41 - 11:44This was people saying: I don't like that you're hosting that content
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11:44 - 11:50therefore I'm going to to make you not host that content until you don't host it anymore.
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11:50 - 11:55This is not very cool and is unethical and bad.
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11:56 - 12:02The second example that I have up here is the EDT electronic disturbance to Lufthansa action from 2001.
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12:02 - 12:08This is an example where disrupting content does not equal silencing speech
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12:08 - 12:11as opposed to the example that I just showed which was depressing.
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12:11 - 12:17So in this example rather than removing content from the Internet
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12:17 - 12:21the goal of this action was to raise awareness of Lufthansa's
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12:21 - 12:26allowing the German government to deport immigrants using its flights.
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12:26 - 12:31It's part of a much greater action called the deportation class action.
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12:31 - 12:37While the Lufthansa website itself was rendered inaccessible for brief periods of time,
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12:37 - 12:41the actual communications of the airline, its ability to fly planes,
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12:41 - 12:46maintain normal operations and communicate internally with itself and with the media
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12:46 - 12:50remained for all practical purposes unaffected.
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12:50 - 12:52So while the stated goal of the Lufthansa action was
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12:52 - 12:57to draw public attention to a specific aspect of the Airline's business model
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12:57 - 13:00and through focused attention changed that corporations behavior
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13:00 - 13:03it was actually rather successful in that.
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13:03 - 13:08The airline did eventually stop allowing the government to deport immigrants with its flights.
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13:08 - 13:13Though the action took place on the Internet the effect it sort of had
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13:13 - 13:18was not limited to, was not even really present in the online space.
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13:18 - 13:21And in and of itself this action could not have achieved
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13:21 - 13:24what the electronic disturbance theatre set up to accomplish.
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13:24 - 13:30It took positive behavior on the part of Lufthansa for the deportation class action to achieve its goals
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13:30 - 13:38as opposed to the IGC example which was designed to accomplish its intended effects by gross fear.
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13:38 - 13:45So the third example I'm gonna talk about is something called toywar, or the etoy/toywar campaign.
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13:45 - 13:52The twelve days of Christmas campaign took place in 1999 and was an online attempt to draw attention to
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13:52 - 13:56a legal dispute between etoy which was a performance art collective
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13:56 - 14:04and eToys which was a toy company, an ecommerce company that sold toys online
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14:04 - 14:08and they were fighting over the domain etoy.com.
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14:08 - 14:12And writing about this is very kamikaze because etoy and eToys,
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14:12 - 14:15you have to be very careful.
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14:15 - 14:21So this action was designed to draw attention to that legal battle.
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14:21 - 14:28But it had the additional effect of having a fairly significant impact on eToys' bottom line
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14:28 - 14:31because it took place the twelve days before Christmas
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14:31 - 14:34which was the primary shopping season.
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14:34 - 14:37And it did have a major how their website ran.
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14:37 - 14:45So though their main goal was this attention-oriented campaign in targeting this ecommerce site
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14:45 - 14:48they were targeting the central purpose of their competitor.
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14:48 - 14:53They were attacking, they were going after what they were which is an online organization.
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14:53 - 14:58Etoy, the art ensemble, eventually triumphed in a court case
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14:58 - 15:02and claimed their role in the financial losses suffered by eToys Inc.
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15:02 - 15:03that occurred over the course of that actions.
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15:03 - 15:06Their stock price pretty much plummeted
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15:06 - 15:11which you can rather blame on the bubble or the action, whichever makes you feel better.
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15:11 - 15:21So in this instance we have a combining of direct action and attention-oriented activism into the same action.
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15:21 - 15:25The next part of the framework is context within a larger campaign.
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15:25 - 15:28As I said DDoS actions very rarely occur by themselves
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15:28 - 15:31and in fact if they did occur by themselves you'd probably never hear about them
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15:31 - 15:33because there would be no reason why that site you like
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15:33 - 15:36is down, it would just be down.
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15:36 - 15:39Like physical world sit-ins DDoS actions must be embedded
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15:39 - 15:42within a greater campaign of publicity and messaging
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15:42 - 15:46to ensure that content disruptions are registered by viewers
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15:46 - 15:50and passers-by as protest actions and not as mere technical glitches.
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15:50 - 15:53The EDT/Lufthansa campaign took place within the context of
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15:53 - 15:56a coordinated multi-pronged campaign
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15:56 - 15:59which included physical world actions at stock holder meetings,
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15:59 - 16:02press releases and the distribution of special seatback
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16:02 - 16:06information cards on Lufthansa airlines that explained
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16:06 - 16:07what the protest was about.
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16:07 - 16:12I don't know how they got them into the planes but they did end up in the planes somehow.
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16:12 - 16:17Similirarly toywar was also embedded within a larger campaign of press coverage.
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16:17 - 16:21They were covered by Wired, the New York Times, and the AP
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16:21 - 16:24and there were also solidarity actions and physical world actions
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16:24 - 16:26at court houses.
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16:26 - 16:30So if you are going for this type of action,
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16:30 - 16:32it has to be embedded within many other actions.
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16:32 - 16:35It can't just be your sole activist ???
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16:35 - 16:39You have to use with a bunch of other tools as well.
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16:39 - 16:43The technology problem is a really interesting one.
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16:43 - 16:47As I mentioned it's really difficult for a purely volunteer-based DDoS action
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16:47 - 16:49to bring down a targeted site.
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16:49 - 16:53As a result we started to see the use of botnets,
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16:53 - 16:56traffic multipliers, automated attack tools and other exploits
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16:56 - 17:01to bring the power of such actions in line with the defenses employed by targets.
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17:01 - 17:05While the use of such technological tools doesn't automatically
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17:05 - 17:08negatively affect the validity of these actions,
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17:08 - 17:12the use of non-volunteer botnets is the one thing
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17:12 - 17:14that is particularly worrying.
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17:14 - 17:18And the other things do need to be considered within a larger context.
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17:18 - 17:20Volunteer botnets present their own ethical concerns
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17:20 - 17:23but are less immediately objectionable.
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17:23 - 17:27Like marches, sit-ins and other crowd-based tactics
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17:27 - 17:30DDoS actions gain their ethical and political validity
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17:30 - 17:34from large numbers of willing participants.
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17:34 - 17:36The use of traffic multipliers and exploits,
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17:36 - 17:39while tempting to achieve downtime,
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17:39 - 17:47undercuts claims by organizers that the actions represent a unified political voice of many different people.
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17:47 - 17:51So as an organizers, you would have to balance the
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17:51 - 17:54"do I want downtime at press coverage" or
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17:54 - 17:57"do I want to remain true to the number of participants
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17:57 - 18:01that I have and value their participation over publicity".
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18:01 - 18:06And this is something that lots of organizers have to deal with.
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18:06 - 18:10Non-volunteer botnets, such as those that were used over the course of
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18:10 - 18:14Anonymous's operation payback campaign in
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18:14 - 18:16addition to volunteer botnets,
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18:16 - 18:17they were used together,
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18:17 - 18:20present a serious ethical problem.
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18:20 - 18:22The use of someone else's technological resources
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18:22 - 18:24without their consent in a political action,
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18:24 - 18:27particularly one that carries high legal risk,
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18:27 - 18:30like DDoS actions do,
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18:30 - 18:35is a pretty extremely unethical action.
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18:35 - 18:39Moreover it cheapens the participation of activists
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18:39 - 18:41who are consensually participating and
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18:41 - 18:44makes it easier for critics to dismiss DDoS actions as
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18:44 - 18:48criminality cloaked in free speech.
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18:48 - 18:51Even though, again, it may be tempting to be like
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18:51 - 18:53"oh let's just rent this creepy-ass botnet
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18:53 - 18:58from wherever to bring down the site for five minutes"
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18:58 - 19:03Really not in fitting with ethical use of mass participation
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19:03 - 19:05in political activism.
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19:05 - 19:09This brings us to volunteer botnets such as those that were enabled
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19:09 - 19:13by the hive mind mode of low-orbit ion cannon, again,
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19:13 - 19:14during operation payback.
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19:14 - 19:18Participants could pledge their support to an action and then
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19:18 - 19:20basically walk away.
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19:20 - 19:22They could say "great, use my computer"
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19:22 - 19:24"to DDoS whatever you want"
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19:24 - 19:28"because I trust you and I believe that we are all fighting for the same cause"
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19:28 - 19:31"I'm gonna go walk the dog now"
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19:31 - 19:33So they pledge their support for an action and place
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19:33 - 19:37their computing resources under the control of the organizers of that action.
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19:37 - 19:42This places on those organizers a strong responsibility
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19:42 - 19:45to maintain open communication channels to participants
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19:45 - 19:49and to not make significant changes to the operation of the campaign
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19:49 - 19:51without the consent of those participants.
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19:51 - 19:55Changing plans, tactics or targets without the consent
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19:55 - 19:58of the participant population constitutes a major breach
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19:58 - 20:03of trust and really should not happen.
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20:03 - 20:06This brings us to the final ?? bit in the framework
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20:06 - 20:08which I'm going to go over in this talk
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20:08 - 20:12which is different participant and organizer populations.
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20:12 - 20:15The great thing about DDoS actions is that
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20:15 - 20:16they're relatively easy to join and
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20:16 - 20:19they're fairly relatively easy to wage in the first place
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20:19 - 20:22meaning many of these participants in these actions
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20:22 - 20:27are inexperienced and unaware of the risks they could potentially be taking
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20:27 - 20:32like accidentally committing a felony from the comfort of your own living room.
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20:32 - 20:36Therefore it is ??? on organizers to make sure
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20:36 - 20:40that all participants have enough information to usefully
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20:40 - 20:43consent to participate in such actions.
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20:43 - 20:48This includes information about risks that they could be taking
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20:48 - 20:51and ways to mitigate those risks.
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20:51 - 20:54This was a very big issue in the fallout from
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20:54 - 20:55operation payback.
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20:55 - 20:58when during the course of the campaign a great deal
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20:58 - 21:02of misinformation was present in organizing channels
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21:02 - 21:06and the use of the low-orbit ion cannon tool was encouraged
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21:06 - 21:10despite significant concerns about its security.
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21:10 - 21:13Training should be provided to participants in ways
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21:13 - 21:15to mitigate risk and support should be provided in the
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21:15 - 21:18event of arrest or other negative outcomes.
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21:18 - 21:22This is similar to the way the physical world activists provide
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21:22 - 21:24training for their participants in the
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21:24 - 21:27"we're gonna go outside today and we're gonna hold up
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21:27 - 21:28a bunch of signs and yell at some people.
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21:28 - 21:30These people may yell back.
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21:30 - 21:32These people may also try to physically harm us.
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21:32 - 21:34If you're totally not interested in that
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21:34 - 21:36that's ok, we still think you're cool."
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21:36 - 21:39There should be that type of effort to educate and
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21:39 - 21:42provide different channels for participation for electronic
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21:42 - 21:46civil disobedience in the same way there is in the physical world.
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21:46 - 21:49There are two big things that I want to do with this model
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21:49 - 21:52in the future as I continue to work on my thesis.
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21:52 - 21:56The first is: I want to develop an analysis for
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21:56 - 21:57state/state related actors,
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21:57 - 22:00particularly patriotic hackers
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22:00 - 22:03and see how they fit into this framework
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22:03 - 22:06and how the entrance of states into this area
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22:06 - 22:08affects the ethical validity of these actions
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22:08 - 22:13or whether we're just wandering full force into cyberwar territory there.
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22:13 - 22:15The second thing I want to do is adapt the framework
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22:15 - 22:18from a reflective model, which it currently is,
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22:18 - 22:20to a prescriptive model,
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22:20 - 22:22so be more useful to activists who want to
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22:22 - 22:25organize their own DDoS campaign and want to find out
-
22:25 - 22:29how to do it effectively and ethically.
-
22:29 - 22:30And that's actually it.
-
22:30 - 22:32Who has questions?
-
22:32 - 22:42applause
-
22:42 - 22:44Dude who stood up first.
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22:44 - 22:46Mike: No other questions.
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22:46 - 22:48Hi, I'm Mike. I'm from Poland.
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22:48 - 22:52I was heavily involved in the anti-ACTA campaign in Poland.
-
22:52 - 22:54I was not doing any DDoSes,
-
22:54 - 22:56I was doing the, you know, subject matter work.
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22:56 - 22:58Molly: You don't have to incriminate yourself in this talk.
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22:58 - 23:02Mike: Yes. But I can, right?
-
23:02 - 23:04laughter
-
23:04 - 23:08Mike: Thank you for this talk
-
23:08 - 23:11because I feel there is much to little talking
-
23:11 - 23:18about ethics in the whole DDoS and hacking area.
-
23:18 - 23:20So thank you for this.
-
23:20 - 23:23Second thing that I would like to add to this talk is that
-
23:23 - 23:27I think the framework works quite well
-
23:27 - 23:31because there is a criticism that I am going to make
-
23:31 - 23:33about DDoS campaigns right now.
-
23:33 - 23:38That is already kind of handled in this framework.
-
23:38 - 23:43The criticism is that while the anti-ACTA campaign in Poland
-
23:43 - 23:47was at full speed and doing stuff and people were
-
23:47 - 23:48protesting on the streets,
-
23:48 - 23:52suddenly Anonymous started DDoSing Polish government websites.
-
23:52 - 23:53Molly: I've heard about.
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23:53 - 23:58Mike: And this had the exact opposite effect.
-
23:58 - 24:02Maybe it was there, but I didn't see that in your presentation
-
24:02 - 24:04that you have to be very very careful with
-
24:04 - 24:06DDoS campaigns
-
24:06 - 24:10because they can actually cause harm to the cause
-
24:10 - 24:11that you're trying to do.
-
24:11 - 24:15I think it was a little bit in the success part
-
24:15 - 24:18but I don't think it was highlighted enough
-
24:18 - 24:20that you have to be very careful
-
24:20 - 24:22because there is this huge framework,
-
24:22 - 24:24other actions that are happening.
-
24:24 - 24:27And maybe, just maybe, doing DDoS right now
-
24:27 - 24:29might actually harm because it will give the
-
24:29 - 24:31government, as was this case,
-
24:31 - 24:35the government the excuse to actually do bad stuff
-
24:35 - 24:36that you don't want them to do.
-
24:36 - 24:38Because they will say: "Oh they're DDoSing our websites."
-
24:38 - 24:41"They are hackers and we don't have to do
-
24:41 - 24:43anything good for them."
-
24:43 - 24:47Well done, because the framework already kind of works for that. Thanks.
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24:47 - 24:50Molly: Yeah, I agree with that.
-
24:50 - 24:53This tactic is right now extremely controversial
-
24:53 - 24:54but people keep using it.
-
24:54 - 24:57My view is that as long as we're gonna use it
-
24:57 - 25:00we should at least be using it in some sort of
-
25:00 - 25:04reflective way in which we consider our actions
-
25:04 - 25:07before we just do them.
-
25:08 - 25:09Dude over there.
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25:09 - 25:11Male: Hi, I just have a question.
-
25:11 - 25:19You said that disrupting a business which just
-
25:19 - 25:23relies on the Internet is unethical.
-
25:24 - 25:27I just ask why you make this assumption.
-
25:27 - 25:29I would make a different assumption.
-
25:29 - 25:33I would have said that maybe running an unethical business
-
25:33 - 25:37on the Internet is unethical and disrupting it is ethical.
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25:37 - 25:40Molly: So, really good point. Yay.
-
25:40 - 25:43applause
-
25:43 - 25:47Something that I didn't maybe have make clear is that each of these bits
-
25:47 - 25:49of the framework should not be taken as a
-
25:49 - 25:52"oh you didn't do that, therefore you are totally unethical."
-
25:52 - 25:57This should all be taken as sort of a big lump of stuff which you can
-
25:57 - 25:59sort of massage and be like
-
25:59 - 26:02"well, you're 60% here on that and 45% here on that
-
26:02 - 26:04and we'll figure it out from there".
-
26:04 - 26:06Yes, you're right.
-
26:06 - 26:08That's actually sort of one of the issues that I'm really
-
26:08 - 26:12interested in looking at in the WTO/electrohippies example
-
26:12 - 26:15because I usually don't like it when people are like
-
26:15 - 26:19"I'm gonna protest you by making you fall off the face of the planet"
-
26:19 - 26:22That seems like a bit of an overkill to me.
-
26:22 - 26:28On the other hand disrupting the Internet for the WTO meeting
-
26:28 - 26:32at the Seattle World Trade Organization meeting
-
26:32 - 26:33I'm kind of for that
-
26:33 - 26:38that seems like a good use of resources to me.
-
26:38 - 26:42So I'm very interested in pushing those weeds aside
-
26:42 - 26:46and figuring out when exactly it's ok to basically
-
26:46 - 26:48attack the root of something,
-
26:48 - 26:52as opposed to having a more symbolic protest
-
26:52 - 26:54which I'm generally more in favor of.
-
26:54 - 26:57But you're right, I like you.
-
26:57 - 27:00We're just gonna switch to this mic and then we'll bounce.
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27:00 - 27:03Female: I was wondering what your thoughts are on these action impacts
-
27:03 - 27:05on non-participants.
-
27:05 - 27:09Like say you DDoS eBay and then other companies lose business
-
27:09 - 27:12or you say DDoS a health care provider and people can't access health care.
-
27:12 - 27:14Is that a factor in your mind?
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27:14 - 27:18Molly: Well, you sort of brought up two wildly divergent examples of
-
27:18 - 27:25eBay which means I can't buy my awesome collectable Battlestar Galactica glasses anymore
-
27:25 - 27:28and my health care provider which means I can't get my tests
-
27:28 - 27:31from that thing that I had that may be cancer.
-
27:31 - 27:34Those seem like very divergent targets to me ,
-
27:34 - 27:36just to address that off the bet.
-
27:36 - 27:39Second point, yes, collateral damage is something that does
-
27:39 - 27:41definitely need to be considered.
-
27:41 - 27:45But it is not actually sort of specific to DDoS in itself.
-
27:45 - 27:48Like if you just stay sit-in at a lunch counter,
-
27:48 - 27:50I just wanted to eat lunch.
-
27:50 - 27:53I'm not a bad guy, I really just wanted lunch.
-
27:53 - 27:57But you have a political voice and you're using it to sit-in at this lunch counter.
-
27:57 - 28:02That needs to be part of the overall consideration of
-
28:02 - 28:05"do we think this is an appropriate tactic for whatever question is
-
28:05 - 28:09that you're trying to address with your activism at this time."
-
28:09 - 28:12Because not all tactics are appropriate for all questions.
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28:14 - 28:15Female: Thanks.
-
28:15 - 28:16Molly: Ok, cool.
-
28:18 - 28:19That guy.
-
28:22 - 28:25Sorry, we have a question from the Internet.
-
28:25 - 28:27It hasn't gotten to speak yet.
-
28:27 - 28:30Male: I have this kind of comment and question.
-
28:30 - 28:31Thank you very much for your talk,
-
28:31 - 28:34it was very original material and I enjoyed it.
-
28:34 - 28:38But however you announced to talk about the ethics of DDoS
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28:38 - 28:40but you didn't say anything about ethics at all
-
28:40 - 28:43except for some personal beliefs.
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28:43 - 28:44Molly: laughs
-
28:44 - 28:50What kind of ethical framework would you actually suggest to use to analyze DDoS?
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28:50 - 28:54Molly: The four bits of the framework that I set out.
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28:54 - 28:57I'm looking at you because you were talking, not because you're the Internet.
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28:57 - 29:00laughter
-
29:00 - 29:06Basically you cannot just say that DDoS is ethical or unethical.
-
29:06 - 29:10The way that I'm looking at, you have to look at it
-
29:10 - 29:15in the context of these at least four aspects, possibly more.
-
29:15 - 29:18But you can't just simply slam your hand down and be like
-
29:18 - 29:22"nope, this one action which actually has very little political value
-
29:22 - 29:26because it's just a bunch of bits swimming around a bunch of tubes,
-
29:26 - 29:31has real ethical value."
-
29:31 - 29:34I'm sure a lot of people were gonna be like
-
29:34 - 29:37"she's gonna say that DDoS is right or wrong one way or another
-
29:37 - 29:40and then I will feel good and/or bad about myself."
-
29:40 - 29:42laughter
-
29:42 - 29:46I'm sorry, that wasn't what was gonna happen.
-
29:46 - 29:49I'm far more interesting in looking at these very nuanced questions
-
29:49 - 29:52of how this fits into political economy and protest methodology
-
29:52 - 29:54which is far squishier than just saying
-
29:54 - 29:57this is ethical or unethical straight off the bet.
-
29:57 - 29:59I hope that answers the Internet's question.
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29:59 - 30:02Male: Yeah, I would also come back to the ethics.
-
30:02 - 30:07Because I wouldn't like to start talking whether DDoS is good or bad.
-
30:07 - 30:09But I think DDoS is a very interesting example
-
30:09 - 30:14because it can make us question our ethics again
-
30:14 - 30:17because basically I, like you, I believe that DDoS
-
30:17 - 30:20is really a pretty violent act of censorship
-
30:20 - 30:23but I think it can be very often justified
-
30:23 - 30:28because this violent act can simply give us benefits
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30:28 - 30:30that couldn't be made any other way.
-
30:30 - 30:35So basically I think that when we think about DDoS and when we want to act with DDoS
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30:35 - 30:42we have to think about violence and making violence an ethical act, actually.
-
30:42 - 30:44Your comment?
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30:44 - 30:47Molly: Violence is a pretty prejudicial term.
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30:47 - 30:49I prefer not to use it.
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30:49 - 30:51You also notice that I usually don't say DDoS attacks.
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30:51 - 30:55I try to say DDoS actions because attacks is also a pretty prejudicial term.
-
30:55 - 31:00I think a lot of the "violence" inherent in DDoS has a lot to do with
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31:00 - 31:05the inherent power structures that play among the people who are participating.
-
31:05 - 31:12For instance, if I am a state government and you have a free press blog
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31:12 - 31:14and you like to critize me in your blog
-
31:14 - 31:19and I hire a bunch of people to DDoS your blog
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31:19 - 31:21that's not really cool.
-
31:21 - 31:23That's fairly violent.
-
31:23 - 31:27I am silencing your speech using my superior power as a big state.
-
31:27 - 31:31On the other hand, if you are a private citizen
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31:31 - 31:37and you and a bunch of friends use floodnet to attack whitehouse.gov
-
31:37 - 31:41I feel that there's less violence inherent in that system.
-
31:41 - 31:45Male: I would partially agree but I think that both acts
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31:45 - 31:48are violent but basically the ethics are different.
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31:48 - 31:52So instead of avoiding the word I think that we should just think about the term.
-
31:52 - 31:54That's my opinion.
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31:54 - 32:00Molly: The grad student in me wants to come up with a new word, but yeah.
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32:00 - 32:03Male: Hello, has the decision process who attacks
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32:03 - 32:11which website at what point any effects on the ethical part?
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32:11 - 32:12Molly: On the organizing?
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32:12 - 32:15Male: Yeah.
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32:15 - 32:17Molly: I can't say that I do.
-
32:17 - 32:22I think that falls into the purview of the people who are actually organizing these actions.
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32:22 - 32:25As someone who is not an organizer I can't really comment
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32:25 - 32:29on the organizing process, having never sat in one.
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32:29 - 32:32Yes? That makes sense? Okay.
-
32:32 - 32:34We're gonna switch back to this mic.
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32:34 - 32:44Male: Aside from the coercive vs. non-coerciveness of volunteer vs. non-volunteer action
-
32:44 - 32:49which maybe falls into ethical standpoint
-
32:49 - 32:53other than that, there's a question of liability.
-
32:53 - 32:58If you're for instance participating in a volunteer action
-
32:58 - 33:00and you have a packet sniffer going on that network,
-
33:00 - 33:01then you can trace it back to
-
33:01 - 33:03"ok you obviously volunteered to this action,
-
33:03 - 33:06therefore you're obviously culpable for those actions"
-
33:06 - 33:16vs. if it's "box that's been compromised" and ???
-
33:16 - 33:22that person is theoretically not liable for those actions
-
33:22 - 33:27because it was a ??? or a virus or ???
-
33:27 - 33:29Molly: Yes.
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33:29 - 33:33Male: I just wanted to point that out.
-
33:33 - 33:34Molly: Yes, no, you're right.
-
33:34 - 33:36That is a thing that also needs to be considered
-
33:36 - 33:38but it also comes back to
-
33:38 - 33:41"there needs to be more education" upon people who
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33:41 - 33:43are organizing these actions to be like
-
33:43 - 33:46"hey, you know you could be committing a felony."
-
33:46 - 33:47"you could lose your house."
-
33:47 - 33:51"that's a thing that could totally happen if you get arrested in the course of this action."
-
33:51 - 33:53as oppossed to if you get arrested for chaining yourself to
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33:53 - 33:54the ??? of the White House
-
33:54 - 33:56because you don't like the tarsands pipeline.
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33:56 - 33:59You really unlikely lose your house in that instance.
-
33:59 - 34:02This is something that I have a huge problem with.
-
34:02 - 34:06I think the state response to these actions is completely out of proportion
-
34:06 - 34:10and bad and chilling and not good at all.
-
34:11 - 34:15Until that changes there just needs to be
-
34:15 - 34:18way more education, way more informed consent happening
-
34:18 - 34:24among the activist population who participating in these actions.
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34:24 - 34:31Male: In terms of looking to the sources of products used to make DDoS,
-
34:31 - 34:36how do you think about the ethical responsibility of a company based in Redmond,
-
34:36 - 34:41allowing with their products to very easy make big botnets
-
34:41 - 34:43and use it for DDoS.
-
34:43 - 34:44Molly: laughs
-
34:44 - 34:47Male: Especially this company is working in a country where
-
34:47 - 34:51DDoS is a crime so they could be forced to change this very easily.
-
34:51 - 34:53Molly: That's a hell of a question.
-
34:53 - 34:56applause
-
34:56 - 34:59Molly: And I think I'm going to politely decline a comment
-
34:59 - 35:00until I learn more about it
-
35:00 - 35:04but we can totally talk about this, not right now.
-
35:05 - 35:08laughs Sorry.
-
35:09 - 35:11Molly: Sorry, was there more of that?
-
35:11 - 35:12Male: Why?
-
35:12 - 35:16Molly: Why? Because I don't like to talk about things that I don't know
-
35:16 - 35:19a lot about and that I'm not competent talking about.
-
35:19 - 35:22I'm a grad student, sorry.
-
35:22 - 35:28Male: Do you really think that DDoS attacks will have a big role in activism in the future?
-
35:28 - 35:36Because I think the media interest in those kind of attacks is diminishing.
-
35:36 - 35:43When I think of, I mean, you talk about this partially as
-
35:43 - 35:46very useful means of activism
-
35:46 - 35:51but when I think of DDoS I think of a few people sitting in their cellars,
-
35:51 - 35:59being bored in the IRC room and just hitting their LOICs just like they hit the retweet button
-
35:59 - 36:01and think they save the world
-
36:01 - 36:06I don't think that this will make any difference in the future.
-
36:06 - 36:11Molly: So you roled up a lot of things in that, including a valid, not-so-valid critism of slacktivism
-
36:11 - 36:13which I will also address in this answer.
-
36:15 - 36:16You're right.
-
36:16 - 36:21There are a lot of DDoS attacks happening, not a lot of them getting a lot of coverage.
-
36:21 - 36:24On the other hand there are a lot of street marches happening
-
36:24 - 36:26and not a lot of them get a lot coverage.
-
36:26 - 36:31People still get their signs together and march in the streets sometimes.
-
36:31 - 36:35There's a concept in social movement theory called the ladder of engagement
-
36:35 - 36:37which is basically like it's what it sounds like
-
36:37 - 36:39you start at the bottom and you work your way up
-
36:39 - 36:44to more and more complex modes of political engagement over the course of time.
-
36:44 - 36:47You can't just jump straight to the top of the ladder
-
36:47 - 36:49because you're not Superman and you don't do that usually
-
36:49 - 36:53cause you'd fall off and hurt yourself.
-
36:53 - 36:57DDoS is a very useful tool to get on that first rung.
-
36:57 - 37:01It's easy, it's low financial cost,
-
37:01 - 37:04it's generally pretty easy to advertise,
-
37:04 - 37:07it doesn't look like it will cost you a lot of time and money.
-
37:07 - 37:11All you have to do is really press a button and suddenly you are participating in this thing.
-
37:11 - 37:17The sense of participating has a big impact on something that is called biographical impact
-
37:17 - 37:20which is how you view yourself as an activist.
-
37:20 - 37:24It is really pushing people over the edge to view themselves as activists
-
37:24 - 37:27and the beginning is very very important.
-
37:27 - 37:35So while DDoS may not be "effective" or "successful" as a standalone protest tactic,
-
37:35 - 37:41as part of larger system I think it is still useful.
-
37:41 - 37:44I think it will probably continue to be useful,
-
37:44 - 37:49just like retweeting someone saying something vaguely political
-
37:49 - 37:53on Twitter is also useful.
-
37:53 - 37:56Or liking someone's status or sharing something on Facebook
-
37:56 - 38:00or turning your Twitter icon green because you like the Iranian election.
-
38:00 - 38:03No one in Iran cares that you turn your Twitter icon green.
-
38:03 - 38:04They don't even know you.
-
38:04 - 38:06They don't know that you've turned your Twitter icon green
-
38:06 - 38:10but what that does is that it connects you with all the other people
-
38:10 - 38:13on Twitter who turn their Twitter icons green.
-
38:13 - 38:16You can see all the other people who turn the Twitter icon green.
-
38:16 - 38:18Suddenly you're not just sitting there in your living room
-
38:18 - 38:21saying I really support democracy in Iran.
-
38:21 - 38:25You are part of this community of green people on Twitter
-
38:25 - 38:27who all support democracy in Iran.
-
38:27 - 38:30That's way more powerful to you as a person.
-
38:30 - 38:37Not necessarily to anybody else. But to you as a person it matters. laughter
-
38:37 - 38:39And that's important.
-
38:39 - 38:41That's important for getting people onto that ladder of engagement
-
38:41 - 38:43and making them feel like activists.
-
38:43 - 38:48Feeling like activists is just a couple of ladders away from being an activist
-
38:48 - 38:50which is even better.
-
38:50 - 38:51Yeah.
-
38:51 - 38:57applause
-
38:57 - 38:59Molly: They're clapping for you.
-
38:59 - 39:03Male: laughs I'm from Austria and we have an organization
-
39:03 - 39:07in Austria, it's called Austromechana.
-
39:07 - 39:18Its website got DDoSes on May 11, 2012
-
39:18 - 39:22and they didn't get the website on until now.
-
39:22 - 39:24They used this as an argument:
-
39:24 - 39:27"Oh my god, the Internet is so cruel."
-
39:27 - 39:34"It's bad and we can do nothing against them."
-
39:34 - 39:45"They play with... they have weapons we can't do something against it."
-
39:45 - 39:52I'm not sure if in this case the DDoS was the right tool
-
39:52 - 40:02to get Aufmerksamkeit, attention.
-
40:02 - 40:08I'm not sure if it was helpful in this case.
-
40:08 - 40:20I don't think it's a good weapon for everything and there was not enough messaging with it.
-
40:20 - 40:21Molly: No, you're right.
-
40:21 - 40:23DDoS is not appropriate for all cases.
-
40:23 - 40:27Given that I know nothing about your organization and didn't hear about that action
-
40:27 - 40:30they probably didn't have enough messaging.
-
40:30 - 40:32I don't know.
-
40:32 - 40:33But I'm sorry your website went down.
-
40:33 - 40:37Male: Not my website.
-
40:37 - 40:46It was from the people who want to have the Festplattenabgabe, I don't know the English word.
-
40:46 - 40:48It was their site.
-
40:48 - 40:49Molly: Okay.
-
40:50 - 40:51Hi!
-
40:52 - 40:53Female: Hi.
-
40:53 - 41:01What exactly are your parameters for deciding if a DDoS action was ethical right or wrong?
-
41:01 - 41:04I'm still waiting for this.
-
41:04 - 41:07Molly: Like I said, this is a very holistic model
-
41:07 - 41:10in that you look at a bunch of different factors and say
-
41:10 - 41:14"well, these things fell on one or either side of these different factors,
-
41:14 - 41:17therefore I'm gonna look at it, squint my eyes
-
41:17 - 41:19and say ok, I think that this was ethical
-
41:19 - 41:21and that this was unethical".
-
41:21 - 41:24Like I said, this is probably much less scientific
-
41:24 - 41:26than a lot of people here were looking for.
-
41:27 - 41:31Liberal studies major. What do you want?
-
41:31 - 41:32laughter
-
41:32 - 41:37So, this is not gonna give you sort of a tick list for things
-
41:37 - 41:40that you can say "oh we did this, oh we didn't do that
-
41:40 - 41:44therefore we're totally on the right side of god and the law".
-
41:44 - 41:51Instead what I'm hoping that this system will give people is a way to look at these actions
-
41:51 - 41:53to give them different factors to consider
-
41:53 - 41:57when saying yes this was appropriate or yes this wasn't appropriate.
-
41:57 - 42:02Cause I feel right now the debate right now is really a bunch of people being like
-
42:02 - 42:04"this is always awesome"
-
42:04 - 42:05and a bunch of other people going
-
42:05 - 42:07"this is never awesome"
-
42:07 - 42:10and that's not very useful.
-
42:10 - 42:12Female: But don't you think that's quite outstanding that
-
42:12 - 42:16you are the one who is getting to decide which is ethical right and wrong?
-
42:16 - 42:18Molly: You can also decide.
-
42:18 - 42:20I would love it if someone else would come up with a framework
-
42:20 - 42:22so that I didn't have to do all the work.
-
42:22 - 42:24Female: I thought it's your scientific study, so...
-
42:24 - 42:26Molly: It's not terribly scientific.
-
42:26 - 42:30It's me reviewing a bunch of case studies
-
42:30 - 42:31and saying these are the things that happened,
-
42:31 - 42:36this is were they fall on these different factors
-
42:36 - 42:39and this is now what I think of this action.
-
42:39 - 42:44For instance, Lufthansa/EDT action, I think that actually was ethical.
-
42:44 - 42:48I think it was ethical because it occurred within the framework of a much larger campaign
-
42:48 - 42:57because it focused on a corporate website that didn't attack the central core of the corporation.
-
42:57 - 42:58It didn't stopped it from communicating,
-
42:58 - 43:01it didn't stop it from responding to the action,
-
43:01 - 43:05it just made itself known in that way.
-
43:05 - 43:07And it did a great deal of publicity work.
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43:07 - 43:10In the end it actually worked,
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43:10 - 43:13The effect that it wanted to have in that,
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43:13 - 43:16they wanted Lufthansa to stop flying immigrants out of the country,
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43:16 - 43:18actually took place.
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43:18 - 43:21And that also has an impact on the ethical validity of an action
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43:21 - 43:23which is why this is currently a reflective framework
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43:23 - 43:25and not a prescriptive framework.
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43:25 - 43:29Female: Thanks. Good luck with your studies then.
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43:29 - 43:30Molly: Yay.
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43:32 - 43:33There's another question.
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43:33 - 43:38Male: My naive approach to judge the ethics of a DDoS attack
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43:38 - 43:41would have been to compare it to usual demonstrations,
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43:41 - 43:43just marching on the street.
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43:43 - 43:47Because I guess what has a rather good feeling on what the ethics are there.
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43:47 - 43:50You didn't highlight that too much in your talk.
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43:50 - 43:52Was this on purpose or can you say something about that?
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43:52 - 43:57Molly: People really like, and lots of people really like to say
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43:57 - 44:02"oh DDoS is just a sit-in, except on the Internet".
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44:02 - 44:04I really don't like that comparison.
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44:04 - 44:12I think it's really attractive because it sort of feels like a sit-in,
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44:12 - 44:15You feel like you are monopolizing resources in the same way
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44:15 - 44:17that sitting in a lunch counter is monopolizing resources.
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44:17 - 44:22But it's not in the physical world, it's on the Internet.
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44:22 - 44:24And frankly, these are two different things.
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44:24 - 44:27We can't just say "oh this is just like it"
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44:27 - 44:28because it's not.
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44:28 - 44:30What it is just like, it is just like a DDoS.
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44:30 - 44:33It's not just like a sit-in.
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44:33 - 44:37Disruptive tactics in both areas are very parallel
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44:37 - 44:39but they are very different.
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44:39 - 44:43That is something that I want to go into much greater detail on,
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44:43 - 44:48specifically both in sort of the socially acceptable disruptive tactics
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44:48 - 44:50like sit-ins and street marches
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44:50 - 44:52but also the non-socially-acceptable disruptive tactics
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44:52 - 44:55like black bloc tactics.
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44:55 - 44:58I'd really love to compare that to other modes of
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44:58 - 45:00disruptive activism online,
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45:00 - 45:02and other modes of disruptive activism
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45:02 - 45:04and destructive activism.
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45:04 - 45:07So that is, if you are interested in reading my Master's thesis,
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45:07 - 45:09I will have a whole chapter on this
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45:09 - 45:12that I could not fit into this talk.
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45:12 - 45:15Because there is a lot of that there.
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45:15 - 45:20But the instinct to fall back on the physical analogy is,
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45:20 - 45:22I think, inherently damaging to the discourse of
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45:22 - 45:27electronic civil disobedience and digital activism
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45:27 - 45:30because you fall back on these tropes
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45:30 - 45:32that don't really fit and then
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45:32 - 45:35when people point out that they don't really fit
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45:35 - 45:37you're sort of left with nothing.
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45:37 - 45:40When you say like "that's not actually a sit-in, that's a DDoS"
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45:40 - 45:43you sitting there going "but I said it was a sit-in
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45:43 - 45:45and you like sit-ins, right?"
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45:45 - 45:48and then you're sort of: that's it.
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45:48 - 45:51So I'd like to push the argument beyond that point.
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45:51 - 45:53Male: Thanks.
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45:55 - 46:01Male: Ok, so it looks like we have no more questions. Thank you very much, Molly, for the talk.
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46:01 - 46:12applause
- Title:
- The Ethics of Activist DDOS Actions [29c3]
- Description:
-
The Ethics of Activist DDOS Actions
A Historical AnalysisIn the world of digital activism, distributed denial of service attacks present relatively low barriers to popular participation, have a high potential for attracting large numbers of first-time and repeat participants, and can attract large amounts of media attention. But though such actions popular, are they ethical? In this talk I will be presenting an ethical framework for the analysis of activist DDOS actions. The framework is grounded in a historical analysis of various activist DDOS actions, such as the IGC attacks in Spain in the late 90s, Electronic Disturbance Theater actions in the early 2000s, and the Anonymous-led Operation Payback attacks in 2010. Each historical case study presents a unique confluence of technological, political, legal and operational factors allowing for a full spectrum of ethical analysis.
Though DDOS actions are only one aspect of digital activism, the tactic crystalizes many issues that are central to the development of the internet as a field of political action. Property rights, free speech, public versus private spaces online, participant responsibility, and the legal consequences of protest are all issues central to the validity of both DDOS actions and digital activism overall. How do changes in technology, such as the use of botnets (volunteer or otherwise), traffic amplifiers, or exploits, affect the ethical validity of a DDOS action? What about so-called wildcat DDOS actions, which are instigated by a single individual through the use of a botnet or exploit (making it a DOS action)? What does the overwhelmingly privatized nature of the internet mean for the ethical validity of disruptive tactics like DDOS? How do the legal penalties, which are based in a criminal understanding of such attacks, affect the ethical responsibilities of the organizers of such actions? What are the ethical responsibilities activists bear towards the network itself? Are disruptive tactics like DDOS actions effective, and in what ways are they effective? In examining these questions, I will be looking at how DDOS actions fit into the landscape of digital activism and what they mean for the development of civil disobedience tactics online. I am a second-year Masters student at MIT, studying digital activism at the Center for Civic Media at the Media Lab. I'm particularly interested in digital civil disobedience and disruptive protest, and my DDOS research encompasses a significant part of my master's thesis. I presented a preliminary version of this work at the HOPE conference in New York this past summer (notes and a recording of that talk can be viewed here: http://oddletters.com/2012/07/15/hope9-talk-activist-ddos-when-similes-and-metaphors-fail/). While that talk focused on the rhetorical framings of DDOS actions, this version concentrates on the ethics of such actions. Since HOPE, I have expanded the historical analysis significantly, including three additional case studies to more thoroughly cover the spectrum of potential actions. I've also encorporated a stronger theoretical underpinning for the ethical framework, which solidifies and strengthens the analysis overall. The general analysis has also been expanded to address larger issues implicated by DDOS actions, including the validity of disruptive tactics and public spaces online.
Speaker: Molly Sauter
EventID: 5206
Event: 29th Chaos Communication Congress [29c3] by the Chaos Computer Club [CCC]
Location: Congress Centrum Hamburg (CCH); Am Dammtor; Marseiller Straße; 20355 Hamburg; Germany
Language: english
Begin: Fri, 12/28/2012 21:45:00 +01:00
Lizenz: CC-by-nc-sa - Video Language:
- English
- Duration:
- 46:26
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mw edited English subtitles for The Ethics of Activist DDOS Actions [29c3] | |
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mw edited English subtitles for The Ethics of Activist DDOS Actions [29c3] | |
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mw edited English subtitles for The Ethics of Activist DDOS Actions [29c3] | |
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mw edited English subtitles for The Ethics of Activist DDOS Actions [29c3] | |
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mw edited English subtitles for The Ethics of Activist DDOS Actions [29c3] | |
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mw edited English subtitles for The Ethics of Activist DDOS Actions [29c3] | |
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matthaeus.wander added a translation |