WEBVTT
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applause
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Hi, my name is Molly Sauter.
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I'm currently a grad student at MIT in comparative media studies
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and I do research at the center for civic media at the media lab.
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This talk is going to be laying out an analytical framework
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that I've been working on for a while
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of the ethical analysis of activist DDoS actions.
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And though distributed denial of service attacks have been used
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as a tool of digital activism for roughly the past 2.5 decades,
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the past couple of years we have seen this huge explosion of the use
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and the tactic and the popularization of the tactic
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as well as a sharp increase in the attention
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its use attracts for media and state actors.
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All this attention has brought a lot of criticism and
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a lot of sort of support from various people in the digital space,
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including digital activists.
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However both DDoS's critics and DDoS's proponents seek to declare the tactic
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as a whole as good or bad, without a nuance understanding the variety of circumstances in contexts
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that can render the tactics use ethical or unethical.
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So in this talk I'm gonna lay down the preliminaries for a framework
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by which to perform an ethical analysis of an activist DDoS action in individual use context.
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We're gonna go through a brief technical legal note
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which I assume I'm gonna be able to skip for this audience,
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criticisms of activist DDoS actions that have been thrown out in the past.
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Then we're gonna get in to the analytical framework that I'm proposing
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and then I'm gonna tell you a little about where I'm gonna take this
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as I write my thesis, which this is.
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So everybody knows what a DDoS attack is, right?
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Raise your hand if you know what it is.
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Awesome, I can totally skip this slide.
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laughter
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DDoS action, distributed denial of service action by which
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you seek to monopulize the resources of a server or other resource
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with your resources to prevent other people from using it.
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Good, we're happy? We're happy.
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applause
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Alright, brief legal note: unlike this cat I am not a lawyer.
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I do not have a law degree, haven't studied law.
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I worked at a law school for a while but that doesn't make me a lawyer.
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So I'm gonna talk about legal things in this talk, do not take it as legal advice.
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So DDoS actions and DDoS attacks are illegal in most but not all jurisdictions.
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In the US they are prosecuted as felonies.
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Under title 10 section 1030 of the US Code which is complicated and which I won't read.
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But just so that everyone is aware and this does have a bearing on my talk later:
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these things are very illegal and this has severe precautions
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for how organizers should treat them as they engage with them in their protests.
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So one of the major criticisms of DDoS actions is that they constitute censorship.
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This is a very popular criticism among sort of "oldschool" hacktivists
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like cult of the dead cow hacktivism or other groups like that
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which have denounced the tactic as straight-up censorship.
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Basically they say you are impinging the movement of bits on the network and that's wrong.
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If we're going to be engaging in this type of electronic activism
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we want to be encouring the movement of bits on the network, not stopping them.
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This criticism privileges the integrity of the network and the rights of specific individuals
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to unfettered flows of information,
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and it privileges that overpolitical ideals of activism in civil disobedience present in activist DDoS actions.
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This criticism also raises very specific unanswered questions about who can engange in censorship.
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Can in fact non-state actors and non-corporate actors be engaged as censorious bodies?
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And while DDoS is undeniably a disruptive tactic, does disruption of speech,
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particularly in context where the target has many other speech outlets,
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always equal a denial of speech?
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For instance when this tactic is trained against a corporate target
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while certain aspects of that organization's presence may be disrupted
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their abiltiy to engange in political speech through the press and other outlets is not.
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Therefore the criticism that you're engaging in censorship by waging a DDoS action sort of falls flat.
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Though the criticism is appropriate in some cases, especially when it's used against organizations
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that primarily exist online such as ISPs or independent blogs.
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Second major criticism is a sort of a revamping of this very old debate in activism.
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Direct action or symbolic/attention-oriented activism, which is better?
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And the anwswer is, one isn't really better, they are sort of different.
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applause
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Thank you.
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One group that's been particularly vocal about this in the past is a group called the critical art ensemble
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which helped pioneer the idea of electronic civil disobedience in the 90th.
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And they critized groups like the electronic disturbance theatre for their use of DDoS in their actions.
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Saying that the use is ineffectual because corporations
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and states are now ??? waging "media war" with activists.
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And it is ineffectual when compared with direct action.
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In addition to just sort of being mean to attention-oriented activism for no reason,
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this criticism ignores the fact that DDoS is often used as a tool of direct action
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Such as when it was used by the electrohippies in 1999 against the Internet
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that the world trade organization was using during their annual meeting
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or other groups that I'm gonna talk later about in this talk.
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The CAE's conception of DDoS also leaves the tactic
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out of the context of larger actions that it is associated with.
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This tactic is pretty much never and frankly should never be used as the sole tactic in a campaign.
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It should always be used in the context with other tactics
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and it gets its ethical and politcal viability from the context in which it is used.
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Not simply because of things inherent to itself.
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Third major criticism: what is a successful DDoS action?
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Basically it's really hard to take down a large corporate website with an all volunteer manual DDoS action.
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If you and all your friends are really just sitting in your chairs
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hitting refresh a bunch of times on like paypal.com you're not gonna bring it down.
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So then what are we going to consider a successful DDoS action
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if we can't rely on downtime to be a measure of success?
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So there are a couple of different answers to this questions.
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The first is we want to look at the value of the tactic as something which draws and focuses attention.
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And this is way more important now that it has become
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much more of a media magnet than necessarily it was maybe 10 years ago.
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Another use for the tactic is the biographical impact on the participants
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and expanding opportunities for engagement and participation.
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If you have never participated in a political action and you get to participate in a DDoS action
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and you're in the IRC channel with all of these new friends who you didn't know you had
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who you didn't know had the political views that you had
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and you didn't know were willing to participate in ways that you are.
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That has a huge biographical impact on you and it helps you consider yourself.
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And activism helps you move up the ??? the ladder of engagement.
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This enables what Ricardo Dominguez of the EDT calls a permanent culture of resistance
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where resisting modes of power and resisting oppressive systems is part of the culture.
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And it isn't simple something you do for special on weekends but it is something that you do all the time.
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And the value of this symbolic resistence is
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not necessarily its overt effect on the system that its ostensibly targets
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but rather its effects on participants and on the reflective fields that surround it as it occurs
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including media and culture.
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Basically DDoS acts is a tool for the relevation of what James Scott called hidden transcripts of resistance.
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It serves as an open action where an individual participant
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can join a community of resistance with others.
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Moving on to the second major section:
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the analytical framework that I'm presenting.
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There are four major parts of it that I'm gonna talk about in this talk.
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I'm hoping to expand to maybe five or six later, but not right now.
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The first is intended effects and actual effects.
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The second is contacts within a greater campaign which we've already talked about a little bit.
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The third is technology being utilized in the action.
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And the fourth is the specific participant and organizer populations ??at play??.
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I'm gonna go through these one by one.
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The first is intended and actual effects.
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What I mean by this is what the group that is waging the action intends to happen by its use of the action
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what actually happens.
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So there is a good example of this from 1997.
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It's called the IGC Euskal Herria Journal action and that's Basque and I totally butchered it but I'm not Basque.
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Basically what happened was there was an ISP called IGC
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which was hosting a Basque newspaper publication, an online newspaper.
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This was during a time in Spain when the Basques were not terribly popular.
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There was a lot of violence going around Basque seperatives actions.
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A popular DDoS action was started by people who I don't know, so don't ask me,
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to pressure IGC to take this website down,
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the Euskal Herria Journal website down. People didn't like it.
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It got a lot of popular support.
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Actually several major newspapers in Spain eventually
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published target email addresses for email bombs and other things
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until they eventually decided that was probably a bad idea
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and they retracted their support.
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But the stated goal of the actions was always to get the website offline.
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People didn't like it, they wanted it gone.
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Eventually it did go down because IGC was flooded with these packets and mail bombs and it was horrible.
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It rendered inaccessible the websites and emails of their over 13000 subscribers
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and they couldn't function as a business while this attack was going on.
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So they did eventually stop hosting the site but under firm protest.
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As an ISP IGC exists primarily in fact entirely online.
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Removing its ability to function online removes its core as an organization
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and its ability to function.
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So the goal of this action was to remove content
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by waging the action as long as the DDoS was successful the content was removed.
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So actually the goal of the action was the permanent imposition of the state of the action.
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Its intended effects were its actual effects as it was occurring.
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This fits very well with the criticism that we saw before.
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This was actually just plain censorship.
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This was people saying: I don't like that you're hosting that content
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therefore I'm going to to make you not host that content until you don't host it anymore.
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This is not very cool and is unethical and bad.
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The second example that I have up here is the EDT electronic disturbance to Lufthansa action from 2001.
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This is an example where disrupting content does not equal silencing speech
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as opposed to the example that I just showed which was depressing.
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So in this example rather than removing content from the Internet
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the goal of this action was to raise awareness of Lufthansa's
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allowing the German government to deport immigrants using its flights.
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It's part of a much greater action called the deportation class action.
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While the Lufthansa website itself was rendered inaccessible for brief periods of time,
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the actual communications of the airline, its ability to fly planes,
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maintain normal operations and communicate internally with itself and with the media
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remained for all practical purposes unaffected.
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So while the stated goal of the Lufthansa action was
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to draw public attention to a specific aspect of the Airline's business model
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and through focused attention changed that corporations behavior
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it was actually rather successful in that.
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The airline did eventually stop allowing the government to deport immigrants with its flights.
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Though the action took place on the Internet the effect it sort of had
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was not limited to, was not even really present in the online space.
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And in and of itself this action could not have achieved
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what the electronic disturbance theatre set up to accomplish.
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It took positive behavior on the part of Lufthansa for the deportation class action to achieve its goals
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as opposed to the IGC example which was designed to accomplish its intended effects by gross fear.
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So the third example I'm gonna talk about is something called toywar, or the etoy/toywar campaign.
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The twelve days of Christmas campaign took place in 1999 and was an online attempt to draw attention to
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a legal dispute between etoy which was a performance art collective
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and eToys which was a toy company, an ecommerce company that sold toys online
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and they were fighting over the domain etoy.com.
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And writing about this is very kamikaze because etoy and eToys,
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you have to be very careful.
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So this action was designed to draw attention to that legal battle.
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But it had the additional effect of having a fairly significant impact on eToys' bottom line
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because it took place the twelve days before Christmas
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which was the primary shopping season.
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And it did have a major how their website ran.
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So though their main goal was this attention-oriented campaign in targeting this ecommerce site
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they were targeting the central purpose of their competitor.
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They were attacking, they were going after what they were which is an online organization.
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Etoy, the art ensemble, eventually triumphed in a court case
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and claimed their role in the financial losses suffered by eToys Inc.
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that occurred over the course of that actions.
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Their stock price pretty much plummeted
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which you can rather blame on the bubble or the action, whichever makes you feel better.
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So in this instance we have a combining of direct action and attention-oriented activism into the same action.
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The next part of the framework is context within a larger campaign.
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As I said DDoS actions very rarely occur by themselves
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and in fact if they did occur by themselves you'd probably never hear about them
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because there would be no reason why that site you like
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is down, it would just be down.
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Like physical world sit-ins DDoS actions must be embedded
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within a greater campaign of publicity and messaging
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to ensure that content disruptions are registered by viewers
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and passers-by as protest actions and not as mere technical glitches.
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The EDT/Lufthansa campaign took place within the context of
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a coordinated multi-pronged campaign
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which included physical world actions at stock holder meetings,
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press releases and the distribution of special seatback
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information cards on Lufthansa airlines that explained
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what the protest was about.
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I don't know how they got them into the planes but they did end up in the planes somehow.
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Similirarly toywar was also embedded within a larger campaign of press coverage.
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They were covered by Wired, the New York Times, and the AP
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and there were also solidarity actions and physical world actions
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at court houses.
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So if you are going for this type of action,
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it has to be embedded within many other actions.
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It can't just be your sole activist ???
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You have to use with a bunch of other tools as well.
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The technology problem is a really interesting one.
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As I mentioned it's really difficult for a purely volunteer-based DDoS action
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to bring down a targeted site.
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As a result we started to see the use of botnets,
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traffic multipliers, automated attack tools and other exploits
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to bring the power of such actions in line with the defenses employed by targets.
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While the use of such technological tools doesn't automatically
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negatively affect the validity of these actions,
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the use of non-volunteer botnets is the one thing
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that is particularly worrying.
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And the other things do need to be considered within a larger context.
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Volunteer botnets present their own ethical concerns
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but are less immediately objectionable.
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Like marches, sit-ins and other crowd-based tactics
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DDoS actions gain their ethical and political validity
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from large numbers of willing participants.
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The use of traffic multipliers and exploits,
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while tempting to achieve downtime,
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undercuts claims by organizers that the actions represent a unified political voice of many different people.
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So as an organizers, you would have to balance the
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"do I want downtime at press coverage" or
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"do I want to remain true to the number of participants
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that I have and value their participation over publicity".
00:18:01.484 --> 00:18:05.771
And this is something that lots of organizers have to deal with.
00:18:05.771 --> 00:18:10.409
Non-volunteer botnets, such as those that were used over the course of
00:18:10.409 --> 00:18:13.500
Anonymous's operation payback campaign in
00:18:13.500 --> 00:18:15.694
addition to volunteer botnets,
00:18:15.694 --> 00:18:17.169
they were used together,
00:18:17.169 --> 00:18:19.824
present a serious ethical problem.
00:18:19.824 --> 00:18:22.341
The use of someone else's technological resources
00:18:22.341 --> 00:18:24.459
without their consent in a political action,
00:18:24.459 --> 00:18:27.394
particularly one that carries high legal risk,
00:18:27.394 --> 00:18:29.503
like DDoS actions do,
00:18:29.503 --> 00:18:35.023
is a pretty extremely unethical action.
00:18:35.023 --> 00:18:39.091
Moreover it cheapens the participation of activists
00:18:39.091 --> 00:18:40.784
who are consensually participating and
00:18:40.784 --> 00:18:43.920
makes it easier for critics to dismiss DDoS actions as
00:18:43.920 --> 00:18:47.791
criminality cloaked in free speech.
00:18:47.791 --> 00:18:51.008
Even though, again, it may be tempting to be like
00:18:51.008 --> 00:18:53.394
"oh let's just rent this creepy-ass botnet
00:18:53.394 --> 00:18:58.259
from wherever to bring down the site for five minutes"
00:18:58.259 --> 00:19:02.888
Really not in fitting with ethical use of mass participation
00:19:02.888 --> 00:19:05.491
in political activism.
00:19:05.491 --> 00:19:09.398
This brings us to volunteer botnets such as those that were enabled
00:19:09.398 --> 00:19:12.702
by the hive mind mode of low-orbit ion cannon, again,
00:19:12.702 --> 00:19:14.461
during operation payback.
00:19:14.461 --> 00:19:18.062
Participants could pledge their support to an action and then
00:19:18.062 --> 00:19:19.592
basically walk away.
00:19:19.592 --> 00:19:21.667
They could say "great, use my computer"
00:19:21.667 --> 00:19:23.894
"to DDoS whatever you want"
00:19:23.894 --> 00:19:27.666
"because I trust you and I believe that we are all fighting for the same cause"
00:19:27.666 --> 00:19:30.945
"I'm gonna go walk the dog now"
00:19:30.945 --> 00:19:33.197
So they pledge their support for an action and place
00:19:33.197 --> 00:19:37.144
their computing resources under the control of the organizers of that action.
00:19:37.144 --> 00:19:42.064
This places on those organizers a strong responsibility
00:19:42.064 --> 00:19:45.355
to maintain open communication channels to participants
00:19:45.355 --> 00:19:48.807
and to not make significant changes to the operation of the campaign
00:19:48.807 --> 00:19:51.148
without the consent of those participants.
00:19:51.148 --> 00:19:54.772
Changing plans, tactics or targets without the consent
00:19:54.772 --> 00:19:57.906
of the participant population constitutes a major breach
00:19:57.906 --> 00:20:03.006
of trust and really should not happen.
00:20:03.006 --> 00:20:06.255
This brings us to the final ?? bit in the framework
00:20:06.255 --> 00:20:08.082
which I'm going to go over in this talk
00:20:08.082 --> 00:20:11.631
which is different participant and organizer populations.
00:20:11.631 --> 00:20:14.548
The great thing about DDoS actions is that
00:20:14.548 --> 00:20:16.498
they're relatively easy to join and
00:20:16.498 --> 00:20:18.867
they're fairly relatively easy to wage in the first place
00:20:18.867 --> 00:20:21.816
meaning many of these participants in these actions
00:20:21.816 --> 00:20:26.987
are inexperienced and unaware of the risks they could potentially be taking
00:20:26.987 --> 00:20:32.418
like accidentally committing a felony from the comfort of your own living room.
00:20:32.418 --> 00:20:35.857
Therefore it is ??? on organizers to make sure
00:20:35.857 --> 00:20:39.507
that all participants have enough information to usefully
00:20:39.507 --> 00:20:43.006
consent to participate in such actions.
00:20:43.006 --> 00:20:48.150
This includes information about risks that they could be taking
00:20:48.150 --> 00:20:51.105
and ways to mitigate those risks.
00:20:51.105 --> 00:20:53.868
This was a very big issue in the fallout from
00:20:53.868 --> 00:20:55.403
operation payback.
00:20:55.403 --> 00:20:58.356
when during the course of the campaign a great deal
00:20:58.356 --> 00:21:02.217
of misinformation was present in organizing channels
00:21:02.217 --> 00:21:05.841
and the use of the low-orbit ion cannon tool was encouraged
00:21:05.841 --> 00:21:09.538
despite significant concerns about its security.
00:21:09.538 --> 00:21:12.789
Training should be provided to participants in ways
00:21:12.789 --> 00:21:15.387
to mitigate risk and support should be provided in the
00:21:15.387 --> 00:21:17.874
event of arrest or other negative outcomes.
00:21:17.874 --> 00:21:21.791
This is similar to the way the physical world activists provide
00:21:21.791 --> 00:21:23.871
training for their participants in the
00:21:23.871 --> 00:21:26.685
"we're gonna go outside today and we're gonna hold up
00:21:26.685 --> 00:21:28.188
a bunch of signs and yell at some people.
00:21:28.188 --> 00:21:30.066
These people may yell back.
00:21:30.066 --> 00:21:32.336
These people may also try to physically harm us.
00:21:32.336 --> 00:21:33.774
If you're totally not interested in that
00:21:33.774 --> 00:21:35.904
that's ok, we still think you're cool."
00:21:35.904 --> 00:21:38.851
There should be that type of effort to educate and
00:21:38.851 --> 00:21:41.969
provide different channels for participation for electronic
00:21:41.969 --> 00:21:46.231
civil disobedience in the same way there is in the physical world.
00:21:46.231 --> 00:21:48.888
There are two big things that I want to do with this model
00:21:48.888 --> 00:21:52.008
in the future as I continue to work on my thesis.
00:21:52.008 --> 00:21:55.502
The first is: I want to develop an analysis for
00:21:55.502 --> 00:21:56.986
state/state related actors,
00:21:56.986 --> 00:22:00.470
particularly patriotic hackers
00:22:00.470 --> 00:22:02.768
and see how they fit into this framework
00:22:02.768 --> 00:22:05.537
and how the entrance of states into this area
00:22:05.537 --> 00:22:08.302
affects the ethical validity of these actions
00:22:08.302 --> 00:22:13.123
or whether we're just wandering full force into cyberwar territory there.
00:22:13.123 --> 00:22:14.989
The second thing I want to do is adapt the framework
00:22:14.989 --> 00:22:17.933
from a reflective model, which it currently is,
00:22:17.933 --> 00:22:19.771
to a prescriptive model,
00:22:19.771 --> 00:22:22.091
so be more useful to activists who want to
00:22:22.091 --> 00:22:24.952
organize their own DDoS campaign and want to find out
00:22:24.952 --> 00:22:28.653
how to do it effectively and ethically.
00:22:28.653 --> 00:22:29.983
And that's actually it.
00:22:29.983 --> 00:22:31.502
Who has questions?
00:22:31.502 --> 00:22:42.203
applause
00:22:42.203 --> 00:22:43.778
Dude who stood up first.
00:22:43.778 --> 00:22:46.082
Mike: No other questions.
00:22:46.082 --> 00:22:48.265
Hi, I'm Mike. I'm from Poland.
00:22:48.265 --> 00:22:51.514
I was heavily involved in the anti-ACTA campaign in Poland.
00:22:51.514 --> 00:22:53.526
I was not doing any DDoSes,
00:22:53.526 --> 00:22:55.553
I was doing the, you know, subject matter work.
00:22:55.553 --> 00:22:57.908
Molly: You don't have to incriminate yourself in this talk.
00:22:57.908 --> 00:23:01.508
Mike: Yes. But I can, right?
00:23:01.544 --> 00:23:03.909
laughter
00:23:03.970 --> 00:23:07.641
Mike: Thank you for this talk
00:23:07.641 --> 00:23:11.413
because I feel there is much to little talking
00:23:11.413 --> 00:23:17.896
about ethics in the whole DDoS and hacking area.
00:23:17.896 --> 00:23:19.560
So thank you for this.
00:23:19.560 --> 00:23:23.198
Second thing that I would like to add to this talk is that
00:23:23.198 --> 00:23:26.550
I think the framework works quite well
00:23:26.550 --> 00:23:31.445
because there is a criticism that I am going to make
00:23:31.445 --> 00:23:33.484
about DDoS campaigns right now.
00:23:33.484 --> 00:23:38.444
That is already kind of handled in this framework.
00:23:38.444 --> 00:23:43.200
The criticism is that while the anti-ACTA campaign in Poland
00:23:43.200 --> 00:23:46.529
was at full speed and doing stuff and people were
00:23:46.529 --> 00:23:47.860
protesting on the streets,
00:23:47.860 --> 00:23:52.149
suddenly Anonymous started DDoSing Polish government websites.
00:23:52.149 --> 00:23:52.968
Molly: I've heard about.
00:23:52.968 --> 00:23:58.294
Mike: And this had the exact opposite effect.
00:23:58.294 --> 00:24:01.791
Maybe it was there, but I didn't see that in your presentation
00:24:01.791 --> 00:24:04.421
that you have to be very very careful with
00:24:04.421 --> 00:24:05.590
DDoS campaigns
00:24:05.590 --> 00:24:09.676
because they can actually cause harm to the cause
00:24:09.676 --> 00:24:11.339
that you're trying to do.
00:24:11.339 --> 00:24:15.402
I think it was a little bit in the success part
00:24:15.402 --> 00:24:18.143
but I don't think it was highlighted enough
00:24:18.143 --> 00:24:19.573
that you have to be very careful
00:24:19.573 --> 00:24:21.637
because there is this huge framework,
00:24:21.637 --> 00:24:23.791
other actions that are happening.
00:24:23.791 --> 00:24:26.621
And maybe, just maybe, doing DDoS right now
00:24:26.621 --> 00:24:28.822
might actually harm because it will give the
00:24:28.822 --> 00:24:31.272
government, as was this case,
00:24:31.272 --> 00:24:34.693
the government the excuse to actually do bad stuff
00:24:34.696 --> 00:24:35.993
that you don't want them to do.
00:24:35.993 --> 00:24:38.352
Because they will say: "Oh they're DDoSing our websites."
00:24:38.352 --> 00:24:40.560
"They are hackers and we don't have to do
00:24:40.560 --> 00:24:42.770
anything good for them."
00:24:42.770 --> 00:24:46.954
Well done, because the framework already kind of works for that. Thanks.
00:24:47.416 --> 00:24:49.635
Molly: Yeah, I agree with that.
00:24:49.635 --> 00:24:52.534
This tactic is right now extremely controversial
00:24:52.534 --> 00:24:54.328
but people keep using it.
00:24:54.328 --> 00:24:57.233
My view is that as long as we're gonna use it
00:24:57.233 --> 00:24:59.583
we should at least be using it in some sort of
00:24:59.583 --> 00:25:03.530
reflective way in which we consider our actions
00:25:03.530 --> 00:25:06.778
before we just do them.
00:25:07.502 --> 00:25:08.978
Dude over there.
00:25:08.978 --> 00:25:10.935
Male: Hi, I just have a question.
00:25:10.935 --> 00:25:18.827
You said that disrupting a business which just
00:25:18.827 --> 00:25:23.048
relies on the Internet is unethical.
00:25:23.922 --> 00:25:26.610
I just ask why you make this assumption.
00:25:26.610 --> 00:25:28.926
I would make a different assumption.
00:25:28.926 --> 00:25:32.972
I would have said that maybe running an unethical business
00:25:32.972 --> 00:25:36.627
on the Internet is unethical and disrupting it is ethical.
00:25:36.627 --> 00:25:39.714
Molly: So, really good point. Yay.
00:25:39.714 --> 00:25:42.825
applause
00:25:42.825 --> 00:25:46.717
Something that I didn't maybe have make clear is that each of these bits
00:25:46.717 --> 00:25:49.192
of the framework should not be taken as a
00:25:49.192 --> 00:25:52.427
"oh you didn't do that, therefore you are totally unethical."
00:25:52.427 --> 00:25:57.225
This should all be taken as sort of a big lump of stuff which you can
00:25:57.225 --> 00:25:58.644
sort of massage and be like
00:25:58.644 --> 00:26:02.239
"well, you're 60% here on that and 45% here on that
00:26:02.239 --> 00:26:04.087
and we'll figure it out from there".
00:26:04.087 --> 00:26:06.195
Yes, you're right.
00:26:06.195 --> 00:26:08.322
That's actually sort of one of the issues that I'm really
00:26:08.322 --> 00:26:11.702
interested in looking at in the WTO/electrohippies example
00:26:11.702 --> 00:26:15.154
because I usually don't like it when people are like
00:26:15.154 --> 00:26:19.055
"I'm gonna protest you by making you fall off the face of the planet"
00:26:19.055 --> 00:26:22.009
That seems like a bit of an overkill to me.
00:26:22.009 --> 00:26:28.240
On the other hand disrupting the Internet for the WTO meeting
00:26:28.240 --> 00:26:31.696
at the Seattle World Trade Organization meeting
00:26:31.696 --> 00:26:33.428
I'm kind of for that
00:26:33.428 --> 00:26:37.735
that seems like a good use of resources to me.
00:26:37.735 --> 00:26:42.342
So I'm very interested in pushing those weeds aside
00:26:42.342 --> 00:26:45.937
and figuring out when exactly it's ok to basically
00:26:45.937 --> 00:26:48.220
attack the root of something,
00:26:48.220 --> 00:26:52.189
as opposed to having a more symbolic protest
00:26:52.189 --> 00:26:53.878
which I'm generally more in favor of.
00:26:53.878 --> 00:26:56.619
But you're right, I like you.
00:26:56.619 --> 00:27:00.005
We're just gonna switch to this mic and then we'll bounce.
00:27:00.005 --> 00:27:03.475
Female: I was wondering what your thoughts are on these action impacts
00:27:03.475 --> 00:27:05.057
on non-participants.
00:27:05.057 --> 00:27:08.935
Like say you DDoS eBay and then other companies lose business
00:27:08.935 --> 00:27:12.343
or you say DDoS a health care provider and people can't access health care.
00:27:12.343 --> 00:27:14.436
Is that a factor in your mind?
00:27:14.436 --> 00:27:17.989
Molly: Well, you sort of brought up two wildly divergent examples of
00:27:17.989 --> 00:27:24.722
eBay which means I can't buy my awesome collectable Battlestar Galactica glasses anymore
00:27:24.722 --> 00:27:27.787
and my health care provider which means I can't get my tests
00:27:27.787 --> 00:27:30.922
from that thing that I had that may be cancer.
00:27:30.922 --> 00:27:33.776
Those seem like very divergent targets to me ,
00:27:33.776 --> 00:27:35.772
just to address that off the bet.
00:27:35.772 --> 00:27:39.285
Second point, yes, collateral damage is something that does
00:27:39.285 --> 00:27:41.344
definitely need to be considered.
00:27:41.344 --> 00:27:44.856
But it is not actually sort of specific to DDoS in itself.
00:27:44.856 --> 00:27:47.659
Like if you just stay sit-in at a lunch counter,
00:27:47.659 --> 00:27:49.941
I just wanted to eat lunch.
00:27:49.941 --> 00:27:52.571
I'm not a bad guy, I really just wanted lunch.
00:27:52.571 --> 00:27:56.543
But you have a political voice and you're using it to sit-in at this lunch counter.
00:27:56.543 --> 00:28:02.162
That needs to be part of the overall consideration of
00:28:02.162 --> 00:28:05.255
"do we think this is an appropriate tactic for whatever question is
00:28:05.255 --> 00:28:08.690
that you're trying to address with your activism at this time."
00:28:08.690 --> 00:28:12.223
Because not all tactics are appropriate for all questions.
00:28:13.685 --> 00:28:14.567
Female: Thanks.
00:28:14.567 --> 00:28:15.871
Molly: Ok, cool.
00:28:17.641 --> 00:28:19.030
That guy.
00:28:22.353 --> 00:28:25.433
Sorry, we have a question from the Internet.
00:28:25.433 --> 00:28:26.817
It hasn't gotten to speak yet.
00:28:26.817 --> 00:28:29.905
Male: I have this kind of comment and question.
00:28:29.905 --> 00:28:31.306
Thank you very much for your talk,
00:28:31.306 --> 00:28:34.030
it was very original material and I enjoyed it.
00:28:34.030 --> 00:28:37.665
But however you announced to talk about the ethics of DDoS
00:28:37.665 --> 00:28:40.073
but you didn't say anything about ethics at all
00:28:40.073 --> 00:28:42.608
except for some personal beliefs.
00:28:43.040 --> 00:28:43.965
Molly: laughs
00:28:43.965 --> 00:28:49.554
What kind of ethical framework would you actually suggest to use to analyze DDoS?
00:28:49.554 --> 00:28:54.131
Molly: The four bits of the framework that I set out.
00:28:54.131 --> 00:28:57.252
I'm looking at you because you were talking, not because you're the Internet.
00:28:57.252 --> 00:29:00.014
laughter
00:29:00.014 --> 00:29:06.442
Basically you cannot just say that DDoS is ethical or unethical.
00:29:06.442 --> 00:29:10.336
The way that I'm looking at, you have to look at it
00:29:10.336 --> 00:29:15.140
in the context of these at least four aspects, possibly more.
00:29:15.140 --> 00:29:18.192
But you can't just simply slam your hand down and be like
00:29:18.192 --> 00:29:22.500
"nope, this one action which actually has very little political value
00:29:22.500 --> 00:29:25.805
because it's just a bunch of bits swimming around a bunch of tubes,
00:29:25.805 --> 00:29:31.437
has real ethical value."
00:29:31.437 --> 00:29:34.012
I'm sure a lot of people were gonna be like
00:29:34.012 --> 00:29:37.363
"she's gonna say that DDoS is right or wrong one way or another
00:29:37.363 --> 00:29:40.157
and then I will feel good and/or bad about myself."
00:29:40.157 --> 00:29:41.711
laughter
00:29:41.711 --> 00:29:45.605
I'm sorry, that wasn't what was gonna happen.
00:29:45.605 --> 00:29:48.630
I'm far more interesting in looking at these very nuanced questions
00:29:48.630 --> 00:29:52.298
of how this fits into political economy and protest methodology
00:29:52.298 --> 00:29:53.976
which is far squishier than just saying
00:29:53.976 --> 00:29:57.012
this is ethical or unethical straight off the bet.
00:29:57.012 --> 00:29:59.379
I hope that answers the Internet's question.
00:29:59.379 --> 00:30:02.126
Male: Yeah, I would also come back to the ethics.
00:30:02.126 --> 00:30:06.644
Because I wouldn't like to start talking whether DDoS is good or bad.
00:30:06.644 --> 00:30:09.056
But I think DDoS is a very interesting example
00:30:09.056 --> 00:30:14.358
because it can make us question our ethics again
00:30:14.358 --> 00:30:16.946
because basically I, like you, I believe that DDoS
00:30:16.946 --> 00:30:20.484
is really a pretty violent act of censorship
00:30:20.484 --> 00:30:22.693
but I think it can be very often justified
00:30:22.693 --> 00:30:27.506
because this violent act can simply give us benefits
00:30:27.506 --> 00:30:30.291
that couldn't be made any other way.
00:30:30.291 --> 00:30:35.169
So basically I think that when we think about DDoS and when we want to act with DDoS
00:30:35.169 --> 00:30:42.472
we have to think about violence and making violence an ethical act, actually.
00:30:42.472 --> 00:30:44.245
Your comment?
00:30:44.245 --> 00:30:47.337
Molly: Violence is a pretty prejudicial term.
00:30:47.337 --> 00:30:49.097
I prefer not to use it.
00:30:49.097 --> 00:30:51.324
You also notice that I usually don't say DDoS attacks.
00:30:51.324 --> 00:30:55.443
I try to say DDoS actions because attacks is also a pretty prejudicial term.
00:30:55.443 --> 00:30:59.961
I think a lot of the "violence" inherent in DDoS has a lot to do with
00:30:59.961 --> 00:31:04.728
the inherent power structures that play among the people who are participating.
00:31:04.728 --> 00:31:11.978
For instance, if I am a state government and you have a free press blog
00:31:11.978 --> 00:31:14.492
and you like to critize me in your blog
00:31:14.492 --> 00:31:18.780
and I hire a bunch of people to DDoS your blog
00:31:18.780 --> 00:31:20.957
that's not really cool.
00:31:20.957 --> 00:31:22.613
That's fairly violent.
00:31:22.613 --> 00:31:27.073
I am silencing your speech using my superior power as a big state.
00:31:27.073 --> 00:31:31.340
On the other hand, if you are a private citizen
00:31:31.340 --> 00:31:36.794
and you and a bunch of friends use floodnet to attack whitehouse.gov
00:31:36.794 --> 00:31:41.012
I feel that there's less violence inherent in that system.
00:31:41.012 --> 00:31:44.577
Male: I would partially agree but I think that both acts
00:31:44.577 --> 00:31:47.715
are violent but basically the ethics are different.
00:31:47.715 --> 00:31:52.166
So instead of avoiding the word I think that we should just think about the term.
00:31:52.166 --> 00:31:54.362
That's my opinion.
00:31:54.362 --> 00:31:59.590
Molly: The grad student in me wants to come up with a new word, but yeah.
00:31:59.590 --> 00:32:03.426
Male: Hello, has the decision process who attacks
00:32:03.426 --> 00:32:10.696
which website at what point any effects on the ethical part?
00:32:10.696 --> 00:32:12.049
Molly: On the organizing?
00:32:12.049 --> 00:32:14.811
Male: Yeah.
00:32:14.811 --> 00:32:17.327
Molly: I can't say that I do.
00:32:17.327 --> 00:32:21.602
I think that falls into the purview of the people who are actually organizing these actions.
00:32:21.602 --> 00:32:24.731
As someone who is not an organizer I can't really comment
00:32:24.731 --> 00:32:28.756
on the organizing process, having never sat in one.
00:32:28.756 --> 00:32:31.610
Yes? That makes sense? Okay.
00:32:31.610 --> 00:32:33.705
We're gonna switch back to this mic.
00:32:33.705 --> 00:32:44.463
Male: Aside from the coercive vs. non-coerciveness of volunteer vs. non-volunteer action
00:32:44.463 --> 00:32:49.069
which maybe falls into ethical standpoint
00:32:49.069 --> 00:32:53.376
other than that, there's a question of liability.
00:32:53.376 --> 00:32:57.627
If you're for instance participating in a volunteer action
00:32:57.627 --> 00:32:59.661
and you have a packet sniffer going on that network,
00:32:59.661 --> 00:33:01.331
then you can trace it back to
00:33:01.331 --> 00:33:03.367
"ok you obviously volunteered to this action,
00:33:03.367 --> 00:33:06.160
therefore you're obviously culpable for those actions"
00:33:06.160 --> 00:33:15.927
vs. if it's "box that's been compromised" and ???
00:33:15.927 --> 00:33:21.528
that person is theoretically not liable for those actions
00:33:21.528 --> 00:33:27.331
because it was a ??? or a virus or ???
00:33:27.331 --> 00:33:28.823
Molly: Yes.
00:33:28.823 --> 00:33:32.986
Male: I just wanted to point that out.
00:33:32.986 --> 00:33:34.329
Molly: Yes, no, you're right.
00:33:34.329 --> 00:33:36.218
That is a thing that also needs to be considered
00:33:36.218 --> 00:33:37.665
but it also comes back to
00:33:37.665 --> 00:33:40.897
"there needs to be more education" upon people who
00:33:40.897 --> 00:33:42.732
are organizing these actions to be like
00:33:42.732 --> 00:33:45.651
"hey, you know you could be committing a felony."
00:33:45.651 --> 00:33:47.143
"you could lose your house."
00:33:47.143 --> 00:33:50.834
"that's a thing that could totally happen if you get arrested in the course of this action."
00:33:50.834 --> 00:33:53.032
as oppossed to if you get arrested for chaining yourself to
00:33:53.032 --> 00:33:54.118
the ??? of the White House
00:33:54.118 --> 00:33:55.808
because you don't like the tarsands pipeline.
00:33:55.808 --> 00:33:59.329
You really unlikely lose your house in that instance.
00:33:59.329 --> 00:34:02.139
This is something that I have a huge problem with.
00:34:02.139 --> 00:34:06.099
I think the state response to these actions is completely out of proportion
00:34:06.099 --> 00:34:10.294
and bad and chilling and not good at all.
00:34:11.464 --> 00:34:14.566
Until that changes there just needs to be
00:34:14.566 --> 00:34:17.678
way more education, way more informed consent happening
00:34:17.678 --> 00:34:23.613
among the activist population who participating in these actions.
00:34:23.613 --> 00:34:30.906
Male: In terms of looking to the sources of products used to make DDoS,
00:34:30.906 --> 00:34:35.892
how do you think about the ethical responsibility of a company based in Redmond,
00:34:35.892 --> 00:34:40.930
allowing with their products to very easy make big botnets
00:34:40.930 --> 00:34:42.903
and use it for DDoS.
00:34:42.903 --> 00:34:44.059
Molly: laughs
00:34:44.059 --> 00:34:46.597
Male: Especially this company is working in a country where
00:34:46.597 --> 00:34:51.404
DDoS is a crime so they could be forced to change this very easily.
00:34:51.404 --> 00:34:52.921
Molly: That's a hell of a question.
00:34:52.921 --> 00:34:56.057
applause
00:34:56.057 --> 00:34:59.167
Molly: And I think I'm going to politely decline a comment
00:34:59.167 --> 00:35:00.489
until I learn more about it
00:35:00.489 --> 00:35:04.033
but we can totally talk about this, not right now.
00:35:04.771 --> 00:35:07.752
laughs Sorry.
00:35:09.120 --> 00:35:11.014
Molly: Sorry, was there more of that?
00:35:11.014 --> 00:35:11.755
Male: Why?
00:35:11.755 --> 00:35:16.177
Molly: Why? Because I don't like to talk about things that I don't know
00:35:16.177 --> 00:35:18.729
a lot about and that I'm not competent talking about.
00:35:18.729 --> 00:35:21.979
I'm a grad student, sorry.
00:35:21.979 --> 00:35:28.293
Male: Do you really think that DDoS attacks will have a big role in activism in the future?
00:35:28.293 --> 00:35:36.141
Because I think the media interest in those kind of attacks is diminishing.
00:35:36.141 --> 00:35:42.580
When I think of, I mean, you talk about this partially as
00:35:42.580 --> 00:35:45.895
very useful means of activism
00:35:45.895 --> 00:35:51.279
but when I think of DDoS I think of a few people sitting in their cellars,
00:35:51.279 --> 00:35:58.837
being bored in the IRC room and just hitting their LOICs just like they hit the retweet button
00:35:58.837 --> 00:36:00.789
and think they save the world
00:36:00.789 --> 00:36:05.525
I don't think that this will make any difference in the future.
00:36:05.525 --> 00:36:11.277
Molly: So you roled up a lot of things in that, including a valid, not-so-valid critism of slacktivism
00:36:11.277 --> 00:36:13.263
which I will also address in this answer.
00:36:14.539 --> 00:36:16.036
You're right.
00:36:16.036 --> 00:36:21.006
There are a lot of DDoS attacks happening, not a lot of them getting a lot of coverage.
00:36:21.006 --> 00:36:23.865
On the other hand there are a lot of street marches happening
00:36:23.865 --> 00:36:25.770
and not a lot of them get a lot coverage.
00:36:25.770 --> 00:36:30.659
People still get their signs together and march in the streets sometimes.
00:36:30.659 --> 00:36:35.327
There's a concept in social movement theory called the ladder of engagement
00:36:35.327 --> 00:36:37.289
which is basically like it's what it sounds like
00:36:37.289 --> 00:36:39.459
you start at the bottom and you work your way up
00:36:39.459 --> 00:36:44.386
to more and more complex modes of political engagement over the course of time.
00:36:44.386 --> 00:36:46.738
You can't just jump straight to the top of the ladder
00:36:46.738 --> 00:36:49.441
because you're not Superman and you don't do that usually
00:36:49.441 --> 00:36:52.628
cause you'd fall off and hurt yourself.
00:36:52.628 --> 00:36:56.675
DDoS is a very useful tool to get on that first rung.
00:36:56.675 --> 00:37:01.208
It's easy, it's low financial cost,
00:37:01.208 --> 00:37:03.751
it's generally pretty easy to advertise,
00:37:03.751 --> 00:37:07.338
it doesn't look like it will cost you a lot of time and money.
00:37:07.338 --> 00:37:11.124
All you have to do is really press a button and suddenly you are participating in this thing.
00:37:11.124 --> 00:37:16.787
The sense of participating has a big impact on something that is called biographical impact
00:37:16.787 --> 00:37:19.595
which is how you view yourself as an activist.
00:37:19.595 --> 00:37:23.744
It is really pushing people over the edge to view themselves as activists
00:37:23.744 --> 00:37:26.876
and the beginning is very very important.
00:37:26.876 --> 00:37:35.360
So while DDoS may not be "effective" or "successful" as a standalone protest tactic,
00:37:35.360 --> 00:37:41.153
as part of larger system I think it is still useful.
00:37:41.153 --> 00:37:43.910
I think it will probably continue to be useful,
00:37:43.910 --> 00:37:49.258
just like retweeting someone saying something vaguely political
00:37:49.258 --> 00:37:52.508
on Twitter is also useful.
00:37:52.508 --> 00:37:56.041
Or liking someone's status or sharing something on Facebook
00:37:56.041 --> 00:37:59.579
or turning your Twitter icon green because you like the Iranian election.
00:37:59.579 --> 00:38:02.642
No one in Iran cares that you turn your Twitter icon green.
00:38:02.642 --> 00:38:03.570
They don't even know you.
00:38:03.570 --> 00:38:05.510
They don't know that you've turned your Twitter icon green
00:38:05.510 --> 00:38:10.070
but what that does is that it connects you with all the other people
00:38:10.070 --> 00:38:12.657
on Twitter who turn their Twitter icons green.
00:38:12.657 --> 00:38:15.622
You can see all the other people who turn the Twitter icon green.
00:38:15.622 --> 00:38:18.012
Suddenly you're not just sitting there in your living room
00:38:18.012 --> 00:38:20.775
saying I really support democracy in Iran.
00:38:20.775 --> 00:38:24.823
You are part of this community of green people on Twitter
00:38:24.823 --> 00:38:27.171
who all support democracy in Iran.
00:38:27.171 --> 00:38:30.405
That's way more powerful to you as a person.
00:38:30.405 --> 00:38:36.505
Not necessarily to anybody else. But to you as a person it matters. laughter
00:38:36.505 --> 00:38:38.845
And that's important.
00:38:38.845 --> 00:38:41.271
That's important for getting people onto that ladder of engagement
00:38:41.271 --> 00:38:43.407
and making them feel like activists.
00:38:43.407 --> 00:38:47.595
Feeling like activists is just a couple of ladders away from being an activist
00:38:47.595 --> 00:38:49.708
which is even better.
00:38:49.708 --> 00:38:50.613
Yeah.
00:38:50.613 --> 00:38:57.492
applause
00:38:57.492 --> 00:38:59.048
Molly: They're clapping for you.
00:38:59.048 --> 00:39:02.741
Male: laughs I'm from Austria and we have an organization
00:39:02.741 --> 00:39:06.929
in Austria, it's called Austromechana.
00:39:06.929 --> 00:39:17.837
Its website got DDoSes on May 11, 2012
00:39:17.837 --> 00:39:22.157
and they didn't get the website on until now.
00:39:22.157 --> 00:39:24.128
They used this as an argument:
00:39:24.128 --> 00:39:27.255
"Oh my god, the Internet is so cruel."
00:39:27.255 --> 00:39:34.488
"It's bad and we can do nothing against them."
00:39:34.488 --> 00:39:44.690
"They play with... they have weapons we can't do something against it."
00:39:44.690 --> 00:39:51.653
I'm not sure if in this case the DDoS was the right tool
00:39:51.653 --> 00:40:01.807
to get Aufmerksamkeit, attention.
00:40:01.807 --> 00:40:08.391
I'm not sure if it was helpful in this case.
00:40:08.391 --> 00:40:20.062
I don't think it's a good weapon for everything and there was not enough messaging with it.
00:40:20.062 --> 00:40:21.130
Molly: No, you're right.
00:40:21.130 --> 00:40:23.079
DDoS is not appropriate for all cases.
00:40:23.079 --> 00:40:27.044
Given that I know nothing about your organization and didn't hear about that action
00:40:27.044 --> 00:40:30.258
they probably didn't have enough messaging.
00:40:30.258 --> 00:40:31.604
I don't know.
00:40:31.604 --> 00:40:33.496
But I'm sorry your website went down.
00:40:33.496 --> 00:40:37.008
Male: Not my website.
00:40:37.008 --> 00:40:45.689
It was from the people who want to have the Festplattenabgabe, I don't know the English word.
00:40:45.689 --> 00:40:47.656
It was their site.
00:40:47.656 --> 00:40:48.523
Molly: Okay.
00:40:50.399 --> 00:40:51.071
Hi!
00:40:51.609 --> 00:40:52.628
Female: Hi.
00:40:52.628 --> 00:41:01.293
What exactly are your parameters for deciding if a DDoS action was ethical right or wrong?
00:41:01.293 --> 00:41:03.919
I'm still waiting for this.
00:41:03.919 --> 00:41:07.305
Molly: Like I said, this is a very holistic model
00:41:07.305 --> 00:41:10.124
in that you look at a bunch of different factors and say
00:41:10.124 --> 00:41:14.473
"well, these things fell on one or either side of these different factors,
00:41:14.473 --> 00:41:16.671
therefore I'm gonna look at it, squint my eyes
00:41:16.671 --> 00:41:19.270
and say ok, I think that this was ethical
00:41:19.270 --> 00:41:21.158
and that this was unethical".
00:41:21.158 --> 00:41:24.052
Like I said, this is probably much less scientific
00:41:24.052 --> 00:41:26.294
than a lot of people here were looking for.
00:41:27.294 --> 00:41:30.614
Liberal studies major. What do you want?
00:41:30.614 --> 00:41:31.947
laughter
00:41:31.947 --> 00:41:36.743
So, this is not gonna give you sort of a tick list for things
00:41:36.743 --> 00:41:40.263
that you can say "oh we did this, oh we didn't do that
00:41:40.263 --> 00:41:44.266
therefore we're totally on the right side of god and the law".
00:41:44.266 --> 00:41:51.206
Instead what I'm hoping that this system will give people is a way to look at these actions
00:41:51.206 --> 00:41:53.426
to give them different factors to consider
00:41:53.426 --> 00:41:57.474
when saying yes this was appropriate or yes this wasn't appropriate.
00:41:57.474 --> 00:42:01.991
Cause I feel right now the debate right now is really a bunch of people being like
00:42:01.991 --> 00:42:04.143
"this is always awesome"
00:42:04.143 --> 00:42:05.228
and a bunch of other people going
00:42:05.228 --> 00:42:07.076
"this is never awesome"
00:42:07.076 --> 00:42:09.593
and that's not very useful.
00:42:09.593 --> 00:42:12.046
Female: But don't you think that's quite outstanding that
00:42:12.046 --> 00:42:16.310
you are the one who is getting to decide which is ethical right and wrong?
00:42:16.310 --> 00:42:17.778
Molly: You can also decide.
00:42:17.778 --> 00:42:20.228
I would love it if someone else would come up with a framework
00:42:20.228 --> 00:42:21.751
so that I didn't have to do all the work.
00:42:21.751 --> 00:42:23.915
Female: I thought it's your scientific study, so...
00:42:24.315 --> 00:42:26.091
Molly: It's not terribly scientific.
00:42:26.091 --> 00:42:29.540
It's me reviewing a bunch of case studies
00:42:29.540 --> 00:42:31.415
and saying these are the things that happened,
00:42:31.415 --> 00:42:35.929
this is were they fall on these different factors
00:42:35.929 --> 00:42:38.725
and this is now what I think of this action.
00:42:38.725 --> 00:42:43.656
For instance, Lufthansa/EDT action, I think that actually was ethical.
00:42:43.693 --> 00:42:48.358
I think it was ethical because it occurred within the framework of a much larger campaign
00:42:48.358 --> 00:42:57.041
because it focused on a corporate website that didn't attack the central core of the corporation.
00:42:57.041 --> 00:42:58.472
It didn't stopped it from communicating,
00:42:58.472 --> 00:43:01.229
it didn't stop it from responding to the action,
00:43:01.229 --> 00:43:04.858
it just made itself known in that way.
00:43:04.858 --> 00:43:07.311
And it did a great deal of publicity work.
00:43:07.311 --> 00:43:09.972
In the end it actually worked,
00:43:09.972 --> 00:43:12.825
The effect that it wanted to have in that,
00:43:12.825 --> 00:43:16.456
they wanted Lufthansa to stop flying immigrants out of the country,
00:43:16.456 --> 00:43:17.634
actually took place.
00:43:17.634 --> 00:43:20.892
And that also has an impact on the ethical validity of an action
00:43:20.892 --> 00:43:23.412
which is why this is currently a reflective framework
00:43:23.412 --> 00:43:25.031
and not a prescriptive framework.
00:43:25.031 --> 00:43:28.613
Female: Thanks. Good luck with your studies then.
00:43:28.613 --> 00:43:30.322
Molly: Yay.
00:43:31.722 --> 00:43:33.220
There's another question.
00:43:33.220 --> 00:43:37.965
Male: My naive approach to judge the ethics of a DDoS attack
00:43:37.965 --> 00:43:41.315
would have been to compare it to usual demonstrations,
00:43:41.315 --> 00:43:43.405
just marching on the street.
00:43:43.405 --> 00:43:47.290
Because I guess what has a rather good feeling on what the ethics are there.
00:43:47.290 --> 00:43:49.602
You didn't highlight that too much in your talk.
00:43:49.602 --> 00:43:52.337
Was this on purpose or can you say something about that?
00:43:52.337 --> 00:43:57.148
Molly: People really like, and lots of people really like to say
00:43:57.148 --> 00:44:02.030
"oh DDoS is just a sit-in, except on the Internet".
00:44:02.030 --> 00:44:04.438
I really don't like that comparison.
00:44:04.438 --> 00:44:12.023
I think it's really attractive because it sort of feels like a sit-in,
00:44:12.023 --> 00:44:14.969
You feel like you are monopolizing resources in the same way
00:44:14.969 --> 00:44:17.455
that sitting in a lunch counter is monopolizing resources.
00:44:17.455 --> 00:44:22.339
But it's not in the physical world, it's on the Internet.
00:44:22.339 --> 00:44:24.272
And frankly, these are two different things.
00:44:24.272 --> 00:44:27.035
We can't just say "oh this is just like it"
00:44:27.035 --> 00:44:27.856
because it's not.
00:44:27.856 --> 00:44:30.371
What it is just like, it is just like a DDoS.
00:44:30.371 --> 00:44:33.085
It's not just like a sit-in.
00:44:33.085 --> 00:44:37.001
Disruptive tactics in both areas are very parallel
00:44:37.001 --> 00:44:39.457
but they are very different.
00:44:39.473 --> 00:44:43.281
That is something that I want to go into much greater detail on,
00:44:43.281 --> 00:44:47.760
specifically both in sort of the socially acceptable disruptive tactics
00:44:47.760 --> 00:44:49.550
like sit-ins and street marches
00:44:49.550 --> 00:44:52.311
but also the non-socially-acceptable disruptive tactics
00:44:52.311 --> 00:44:54.732
like black bloc tactics.
00:44:54.732 --> 00:44:57.592
I'd really love to compare that to other modes of
00:44:57.592 --> 00:44:59.576
disruptive activism online,
00:44:59.576 --> 00:45:01.957
and other modes of disruptive activism
00:45:01.957 --> 00:45:03.531
and destructive activism.
00:45:03.531 --> 00:45:07.067
So that is, if you are interested in reading my Master's thesis,
00:45:07.067 --> 00:45:09.294
I will have a whole chapter on this
00:45:09.294 --> 00:45:12.344
that I could not fit into this talk.
00:45:12.344 --> 00:45:15.392
Because there is a lot of that there.
00:45:15.392 --> 00:45:19.647
But the instinct to fall back on the physical analogy is,
00:45:19.647 --> 00:45:22.412
I think, inherently damaging to the discourse of
00:45:22.412 --> 00:45:27.076
electronic civil disobedience and digital activism
00:45:27.076 --> 00:45:29.679
because you fall back on these tropes
00:45:29.679 --> 00:45:31.998
that don't really fit and then
00:45:31.998 --> 00:45:34.591
when people point out that they don't really fit
00:45:34.591 --> 00:45:37.230
you're sort of left with nothing.
00:45:37.230 --> 00:45:39.944
When you say like "that's not actually a sit-in, that's a DDoS"
00:45:39.944 --> 00:45:42.771
you sitting there going "but I said it was a sit-in
00:45:42.771 --> 00:45:44.981
and you like sit-ins, right?"
00:45:44.981 --> 00:45:47.580
and then you're sort of: that's it.
00:45:47.580 --> 00:45:51.479
So I'd like to push the argument beyond that point.
00:45:51.479 --> 00:45:53.110
Male: Thanks.
00:45:54.680 --> 00:46:01.145
Male: Ok, so it looks like we have no more questions. Thank you very much, Molly, for the talk.
00:46:01.145 --> 00:46:12.383
applause