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Tractors, Rockets and the Internet in Belarus

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    37C3 preroll music
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    Applaus
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    Boris: All right so everybody can hear me
    very well. My name is Boris I'm part of the
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    ABC black cross Belarus and I will be
    talking about tractors Rockets and the
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    internet and I have very short time so you
    will see very few things of those. ne
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    thing we are in the saal G because I didn't
    want to be in the saal Z. Z as it's kind of
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    like ideologically doesn't pass for people
    in the Eastern Europe laughter, applause
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    yeah and yeah. We will have like a short
    question answer section in the end. What
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    the [ __ ] is ABC-Belarus? Many of you
    don't know, we are like an activist
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    Anarchist Collective that supports for the
    last 15 years. People who ended up in
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    prison fighting dictatorship in the
    country. Since our existence beginning of
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    our existence we never had any people or
    we never had a situation where we never
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    had people in the prison so people are
    constantly in prison in Belarus in the
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    last 15 years fighting the dictatorship. We
    do solidarity work also with those who are
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    around the people who are in prisons so
    their families and so on we also promote,
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    we we promoting we don't have so much time
    left anymore, but before building up a
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    security culture so for the activists to
    know how to go around the new mechanisms
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    of a dictatorship to suppress the
    population. We do collect a little bit of
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    data from like the courts, so we see what
    the government is using for example to
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    crack the laptops, we see all this [ __ ]
    coming up in in the documents from time to
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    time and this is not a talk about our
    group so you can check out our website and
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    see what is it about so tractors here they
    are they don't always look like that
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    sometimes they look like that tractors
    are one of the important parts of like for
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    you to imagine how Belarusian industry
    looks like so after collapse of the Soviet
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    Union Belarusia Bellarus was and remained
    like a zone of heavy and Light Industry
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    production of tractors but also we had
    industry that was connected with war or
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    militarism of the Soviet Union right? So
    there are factories that are producing
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    small chips for the rockets and [ __ ]
    like that and this continues so partly
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    Russian war industry on Belarus in
    production of the Rockets the situation
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    where you know Russian Rockets hit wrong
    Target in Ukraine also connected with the
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    fact that Belarusian workers are stealing
    precious metals from the factories. So
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    like those produced chips are working like
    [ __ ] and we do have it but it's not like
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    Taiwan or something like that it's more
    like imagine Soviet Union post Soviet
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    Union country that people are doing like
    some outdated Technologies. Yeah. So those
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    are like the topic about the Rockets.
    Belarus is participating in the war
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    efforts of Russia right now and it was
    participating for very long in buildup to
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    the war, so helping producing enough
    rockets and enough of the you know like
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    flying [ __ ] that goes to Ukraine right
    now. However after collapse of the Soviet
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    Union Belarus became also very dependent
    and it was dependent and became dependent
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    on Russian resources so oil gas and all
    this [ __ ] comes mostly from Russia
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    economically dependent on Russia and
    that's politically dependent as well.
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    Talking about Lukashenka, so belorus is a
    dictatorship that ruled by this guy, next
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    year is 30 years anniversary. Lukashenka
    and Technologies he's a very special
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    character you can do like lectures in
    universities about his personality. I will
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    do a couple of quotes about how he
    perceives Technologies and how he sees
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    himself in the technological World. For
    example "we do not need an imported system
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    for falsifying elections, we will create
    our own one run by the State" and thas is connected
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    with this notion that for the you know successful dictatorship you don't need some things, you can
    produce dictatorship in the country yourself.
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    A lot of things that are happening in Belarus are homemade
    shit. As a child I was groing among animals and plans, so he is
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    very close to the nature he thinks also
    shows his like attitude to Technologies
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    and the last part is "I even don't have a
    mobile phone I'm looking at other
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    presidents and see how they're preoccupied
    with their iPhones I'm not doing that I
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    know what security is" and even more "I
    have enough people who can do that for me".
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    And that's an important factor Lukashenka
    knows how to drive a tractor, he doesn't
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    know how to operate iPhone most probably.
    But he's he has this mentality that
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    understands okay I need enough smart
    people around me who will help me to go
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    through the modern world and that's what
    he's doing a lot. So he has quite a huge
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    let's say cabinet of people who are
    helping him out to figure out the modern
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    world in a different directions
    politically technologically wise
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    economically. Although Belarus is a
    dictatorship it is a country that was for
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    many years a partner of the European Union.
    It changed recently before 2020 protest
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    before the uprising of 2020 European Union
    was cooperating with Belarus on the border
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    security, what they're doing also in turkey
    and many other authoritarian regimes. So
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    for European politicians to protect the
    borders build up a fences it's fine to
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    have like a bloody dictator that is ready
    to kill people. So that's what European
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    Union was doing and that involved also
    transaction of Technologies so for example
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    you go to the Belarusian border and you
    get in controlled and you have this huge
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    x-ray machine that is going to x-ray your
    car or whatever [ __ ] you have and it's
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    written like there's a plate that says
    like this machine is financed by the
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    European Union and you think like wow
    thank you European Union, you're like
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    really helping democracy in Belarus. So
    European Union was also investing a lot in
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    the infrastructure projects inside of the
    country roads and [ __ ] like that this
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    was connected also because Belarus is
    Transit country so you need a lot of
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    Transit between Russia and Europe not
    anymore but before it was the case right
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    everybody wanted to trade with Russia a
    lot still do. Also some countries inside
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    of the European Union were supporting
    police efforts in Belarus, there was a
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    huge scandal in Germany, that German cops
    were bringing Belorussian Riot cops to
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    evictions of or like protection of
    Gorleben transport like the nuclear waste
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    transport back in the days. So they
    wouldn't have like Belorussian cops hitting
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    you you know but they would have them like
    just sitting next to you and and watching
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    how the German cops are working and that's
    where for example Belarusian cops learned
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    to film everything at the demonstrations
    or at some events so they're also running
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    with these cameras and filming and then
    post factum might apply repressions to the
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    people who were participating in the
    protests. And some of the cameras were
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    donated generously by the German state to
    the Belarusian cops. And there are many
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    more other money flows like ecological,
    technological also private public
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    everything goes in Belarus, dictatorship
    yes but I mean money you know that cross
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    the border easily. Very simple
    Technologies to fight the population,
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    water cannons were brought from Canada so
    we had this fancy water Canadian water
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    cannons. I will show you how Belarussian
    people hacked those during the protests
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    very easy. Camera usage for documentation
    as I was mentioning cops running around
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    with cameras all the time. This is they
    what they learned from the German cops
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    there were like a new technologies that
    were like mobile car Shields so they bring
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    it up to block the whole street. Russians
    have like bigger machines belarusians have
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    smaller machines but in general the idea
    is that you you have this kind of like a a
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    truck that brings a huge shield and you
    block the whole street so protesters
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    cannot go through it. And crowd control
    equipment from other countries like we had
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    tear gas from Czech and stun grenades from
    Czech and Israelis and so on so like
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    everybody were delivering and providing
    weapons to Belarus as if it's like sure
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    you know we know that you doing some [ __
    ] there but have it for you. But there are
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    some other funny you know like hacking
    from Belarusian state so for example here
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    like during the protest people were
    putting Flags like white red white flags
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    which were the protest Flags [ __ ] I have
    to put the sound in one second, but it's
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    not really important what people was
    laughing about him some laughs. So yeah
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    this is one of the hack that this is I
    think somebody connected with the ban
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    State who was trying to remove the flag
    then we have like this systems of
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    notification in the city that were used to
    play like a patriotic music during the
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    protests which Belarusian state was doing
    trying to like you know demoralize the
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    protesters looks [ __ ] bizarre and
    crazy and that was the hacking part of the
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    Canadian water cannon. Belarussian people
    are very creative you can see you love
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    hacking we all love hacking that's how you
    hack the the water cannon.
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    Applause
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    Later on they stopped using them
    because this what happened to them when
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    you hack them
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    Music yeah.
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    But they were they were very open for
    hacking like nothing is closed you can
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    just open and take it away. Internet in
    Belarus right, so this is a separate topic,
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    we we are the country of the post Soviet
    so we didn't have internet for very long I
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    think like the general consumers market
    for the internet opened like beginning of
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    2000s maybe middle of 2000s I got my
    internet connection first 2004 - 2005 so
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    internet is a is a is kind of like a thing
    that was developing very slowly but then
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    it exploded. One of the things was for
    example internet like online
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    infrastructure was used for the protests
    in 2005, wrong date, of the elections
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    so we had like a protest camp on the
    streets and people set up an indymedia
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    media information point which was
    broadcasting updates online life you know.
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    And this was one of the first situations
    in Belarus where the website started
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    getting blocked. So Belarus in IND media
    was the first attemp of Belarusian state
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    to fight certain content on the internet.
    There was like mirrors there was a lot of
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    solidarity also from outside. So this
    worked pretty well for the protesters
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    didn't work so well for the government. The
    protest was smashed, but for a lot of
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    people the opportunity of organizing
    through the internet became very obvious
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    and people started using it in mass. Later
    on Belarusian State started blocking from
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    2016 Tor network with different success
    of course like you can't block it with
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    tractors putting it on the road so you
    need more sufficient you know like or
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    complicated systems and of course you
    can't get them easily in Belarus from the
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    factories that are producing Rockets. You
    can't hit the Tor network with the rocket.
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    So like they started searching for those
    and you can see that like three years
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    Belarusian cops were going to security
    congresses where like this private
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    companies was selling [ __ ] to anybody
    pretty much and they were searching for
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    Solutions, there were like for 2014 I think
    there was a hacking team Italian hacking
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    team leak where we figure out that
    Belarusian state was trying to buy
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    something from Italians and stuff like
    that, right? So at the end of the day they
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    got some stuff in 2016 and slowly started
    applying more and more censorship in on
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    the internet, Anarchist websites
    oppositional websites starting getting
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    blocked in 2020 this system like exploded
    in Mass so we have like hundreds and
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    hundreds of the websites some of them like
    you know islamist [ __ ] and and stuff
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    like that but some of them are legit
    oppositional anarchists and stuff like
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    that that are blocked and you can't access
    them through like a normal Network. Yeah
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    and right now because Belarusian state was
    under attack for quite often from certain
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    groups, a lot of websites governmental
    websites kind of created a white listing
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    just for belarussian IPs so you can't go to
    the belarussian state websites from outside.
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    So a lot of people paradoxically left the
    country live in Exile but use Belarusian
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    VPN to know if they're included in
    extremist the terrorist lists. Yeah so one
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    more thing about Belarusian internet and
    Belarusian like communication
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    infrastructure is sorm, some of you have
    heard about it this is like a saying that
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    was developed for many years and there are
    different versions of it and it's pretty
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    much backdoor like legal back door to put
    into the networks of the communication
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    providers before it was just a
    cell network now it's also
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    internet Network and so on internet
    providers you just put a black box and the
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    cops somewhere on the other side of the of
    the country can have access to your
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    network directly and they can see all the
    what is happening on the network and they
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    you know like clone easily IDs and so on
    and so forth. So they are like owning
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    pretty much the net the private networks
    of the private providers also what is not
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    mentioned on the slides Belarusian
    internet is in one way or another is
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    governmental so you have like one exit for
    the internet to the outside world and this
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    is controlled by the state and all the
    private companies that are working with
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    the internet are actually like renting
    internet from the state and then reselling
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    it to the private biders. Internet
    censorship. So I was telling you that they
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    were going and buying [ __ ] on the market
    one of the things that kind of blew out
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    and we figure out in 2020 was this company
    sandvine you might have heard about it
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    they were selling pretty much the the gear
    the hardware for for censoring traffic in
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    the first days after elections. But the
    network was set up already for longer so
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    it was not like s Vine is rushing into
    Minsk and on the day of Elections but
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    rather this was sold for some years before
    and the Belarusian and state was successfully
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    using it and on the day of Elections like
    we lost internet connection for most of
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    the country. There was also coming a lot
    of assistance days following that from
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    Russian and Chinese government who would
    try to you know nav help to navigate
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    Belarusian government through the fact
    that they basically shut down not only
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    like a protest infrastructure but their
    own infrastructure because a lot of their
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    own [ __ ] was dependent on the internet
    and that was one of the reasons why
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    internet was returned to Belarus three
    days later as a lot of repressive
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    infrastructure was not working for the
    state. Yeah so those were very supportive
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    of Belarusian regime and they're still
    doing that but there were some also
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    private companies that were helping
    Belarus to deal with the protests
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    Microsoft I mean there is a lot of pirated
    Microsoft installs but Skype server
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    infrastructure was used for prosecuting
    protesters, this was very handy so you
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    would have a court, where there will be
    like just a computer standard, like it's
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    not really technological country so much
    right? So in the court there will be a
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    laptop and there would be like a guy in
    the Mask who would be a witness in the
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    case of the of the protesters and it takes
    around like 2 minutes to prosecute the
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    person for them to get like 15 25 days in
    prison. The person leaves and then there
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    is a new case and quite often there were
    like the same cops basically testifying
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    for the people on many on multiple
    occasions and this provided a lot of
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    anonymity from one side for the
    infrastructure of repressions because the
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    cops didn't ha:ve to be at the place and
    they couldn't be identified but on the
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    other side it provided allso this kind of
    like a mobility of repressions. You don't
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    need to bring another cop who would stand
    there and he doesn't know what to read and
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    to say and so on and so forth. So this was
    there and this was like Skype was not in
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    any way you know and Microsoft was not in
    any way reacting how the Belarusian state
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    is using their services in the country at
    that .Then we had cinezis, cinezis is like
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    a Belarusian company that was developing a
    face recognition system and this smart
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    City [ __ ] and all the crap you can find
    on the pages of the internet days. So one
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    of the products they had was keypod and
    this was basically like a life face
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    recognition system that they installed in
    Minsk. And this keypod was used for
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    identifying also protesters during the
    protests and also identifying High Target
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    like high political Targets in the city at
    some point. So for example one of the
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    congress warrs an anarchist was arrested
    through like a common operation of keypod.
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    That was telling the police that he's
    there so they would follow him to the
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    place where he was living underground and
    so on and so forth. So, face recognition
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    system worked pretty well in certain
    situations right? They were also using
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    like their own face recognition system for
    postprocess so they get images of high
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    resolution from Big crowds like 100,000
    people and from there they would pick up
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    some faces of the protesters and this
    would be like ending up in the court cases
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    of the people. So you would have like a
    print out from keod system that was saying
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    okay we identify this person like this and
    that. The CEO of the company is like a son
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    of the KGB agent so they had like a lot of
    connections with the state and what else
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    is here? Like the company itself was
    trying to present itself, we are like an
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    IT company that is doing just a you know
    like a nice thing for everybody and make
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    people happy in Belarus. But reality was
    different and we figured that also po
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    factum I think a month later there was a
    bigger article published on what they're
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    doing and how they are basically like
    helping out the Belarusian state to
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    suppress the uprising. And here we also
    have a great Corporation Called Intel that
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    doesn't you know for whom money also
    doesn't smell it's it's very funny because
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    intel was very proud of cooperating with
    cinezis till 2022 even though cinezis was
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    on sanction under sanctions in the
    European Union by that time but US was not
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    sanctioning. So when the fullscale war in
    Ukraine broke broke out cinezis ended up
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    on us sanction list so intel was like okay
    we we this is not good imagery for us, so
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    they deleted the keypod page from their
    website, where they were very proud of it
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    but if you search keypod Intel it's you
    still find a Chinese page like a page in
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    Chinese on the Intel website that still
    does like all this [ __ ] advertisement we
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    are helping human rights and developing
    Technologies and progress and blah blah
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    blah. So Intel is still partly proud of
    cooperating with the repressive
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    organization in belarus but only for the
    Chinese market most probably. Social
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    networks, so there is like a certain you
    know a hype around that telegram was used
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    a lot to coordinate protest and so on and
    so forth but reality I mean and it was
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    but reality the other side of the coin was
    that we ended up in quite a [ __ ] storm
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    because people could be identified through
    the telegram or the way telegram is built
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    through ID IDs like the unique IDs that
    are doesn't matter if you change the phone
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    number and so on and so forth. So a lot of
    people ended up being prosecuted because
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    they did some [ __ ] on telegram and in
    like the further we went after repressions
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    of the uprising the more ridiculous those
    could be, like even putting you know a [
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    __ ] Emoji under information that a KGB
    agent was shot during a raid would be
  • 19:48 - 19:55
    enough to start criminal prosecution
    against you. So those things became very
  • 19:55 - 19:59
    problematic and at the end of the day
    we've seen that Belarusian in state is
  • 19:59 - 20:04
    observing not only telegram but also other
    social networks. Telegram at that point
  • 20:04 - 20:08
    was not really Cooperative with
    belarussian State and they were still
  • 20:08 - 20:12
    selling like Durov was still selling this
    you know image of we are like for the
  • 20:12 - 20:18
    human rights and for people and all this [
    __ ] but by the time like a year later
  • 20:18 - 20:24
    we ended up with a situation when the
    protest like died out that Durov started
  • 20:24 - 20:29
    blocking like telegram started blocking
    certain website certain [ __ ] not
  • 20:29 - 20:33
    websites certain channels in telegram
    that were for example dedoxing police or
  • 20:33 - 20:38
    documenting police violence and and court
    cases and so on and so forth. So those
  • 20:38 - 20:42
    channels are for example like U there is a
    channel that is called Belarusian
  • 20:42 - 20:45
    punishers that has a list of police
    officers who were responsible for the
  • 20:45 - 20:52
    violence and this is blocked on Telegram
    and you can't find it. Official point of
  • 20:52 - 20:56
    like telegram this is not us saying, they
    said okay Apple actually forced us to do
  • 20:56 - 21:01
    that but reality is that it goes both
    ways. You know like you have to cooperate
  • 21:01 - 21:06
    with each other for this to to happen and
    this was happening on one side on the
  • 21:06 - 21:12
    other side telegram was blocking also
    channels of the same kind of groups in
  • 21:12 - 21:16
    Russia that were also dedoxing cops who
    were using violence and who were
  • 21:16 - 21:21
    participating in repressions even after
    the fullscale invasion. So we see a lot of
  • 21:21 - 21:26
    censorship and a lot of cooperation
    happening after like the protest, so
  • 21:26 - 21:29
    during the the active phase like they
    would be like yeah we standing with you
  • 21:29 - 21:34
    and you're almost one so we would like to
    be with you but when you know they see
  • 21:34 - 21:38
    that the status quo is maintained they
    start cooperating they start like
  • 21:38 - 21:42
    following the laws of the country even if
    those laws are oppressive or doesn't make
  • 21:42 - 21:48
    any [ __ ] sense and so on and so forth.
    Yeah and vkontakte, I think you know this
  • 21:48 - 21:53
    is like a social network in Russia, they
    are like completely working with FSB and
  • 21:53 - 21:56
    and [ __ ] and Belarusian State also has
    pretty much direct access on what you're
  • 21:56 - 22:02
    doing there. So there there were some
    people organizing but for even like normal
  • 22:02 - 22:06
    people it became clear that like don't use
    Russian social networks, this is like a
  • 22:06 - 22:11
    bad idea and then apparently you shouldn't
    use Chinese social networks and maybe
  • 22:11 - 22:15
    don't use social networks in general
    because a lot of them have like a
  • 22:15 - 22:19
    potential of repressions of not on the
    individuals but the social movements and
  • 22:19 - 22:26
    and [ __ ] like that. Mobile phones and
    data collection. So what did we figure out
  • 22:26 - 22:32
    during the protests and and the last years
    celebrate of course they are [ __ ] happy
  • 22:32 - 22:38
    to to sell themselves to any repressive
    regime so Belarus is not an exception and
  • 22:38 - 22:42
    they they're they they were used they're
    still used so belarusan state is still
  • 22:42 - 22:47
    buying celebrite licenses through some
    third party companies and I mean sanctions
  • 22:47 - 22:50
    is is a [ __ ] joke in general. And even
    the companies who are saying we are not
  • 22:50 - 22:56
    doing that in most cases they are doing
    that but through the third party. Data
  • 22:56 - 23:01
    dumps so through cellebride but through
    other certain other companies you just get
  • 23:01 - 23:06
    like a set of phones right and I don't
    know there would be like 500 people
  • 23:06 - 23:11
    detained there would be all the phones
    confiscated and the cops would be dumping
  • 23:11 - 23:17
    all the data from those phones and then
    you know like they wouldn't have a time to
  • 23:17 - 23:20
    go through this data at the point but then
    you might be prosecuted in half a year
  • 23:20 - 23:26
    later for what they found from those
    phones. And also you know like there is a
  • 23:26 - 23:30
    lot discussions you're the Congress as
    well and in general in the security
  • 23:30 - 23:34
    Community the strong passwords you know
    encryption is very important but we
  • 23:34 - 23:40
    figured out that you know encryption works
    very bad if they're torturing you. And
  • 23:40 - 23:44
    that was the Belarusian like way to break
    encryption, they didn't try to you know
  • 23:44 - 23:48
    make a technological way into this, but
    rather they [ __ ] you up to the point
  • 23:48 - 23:53
    where you decide okay I rather die or I
    give them the password and quite often it
  • 23:53 - 23:57
    worked pretty well and it worked also in
    the way like not retrospectively but in a
  • 23:57 - 24:02
    in a threaten way so you know, okay some
    people were tortured to get access to the
  • 24:02 - 24:06
    encrypted drives and other people would be
    like okay I give you the password without
  • 24:06 - 24:12
    torture. So encryption doesn't work
    against torture in Belarusian State and in
  • 24:12 - 24:17
    many other cases and this is yeah it
    doesn't matter how perfect your security
  • 24:17 - 24:23
    system built technologically wise quite
    often the human factor is still the the
  • 24:23 - 24:27
    the weakest link in the whole situation.
    Then we had situations where the cops were
  • 24:27 - 24:31
    impersonating activists. Up to the point
    where they were registering like for
  • 24:31 - 24:35
    example on the dating apps and putting
    like naked pictures that they would get
  • 24:35 - 24:38
    from the data damps and so on and then
    people would be calling those activists
  • 24:38 - 24:43
    hooking up with them and so on and so
    forth. Sim cloning that's a huge thing
  • 24:43 - 24:50
    that I think people should [ __ ] like get
    engraved in their like brain that's that
  • 24:50 - 24:53
    your phone and the SIM cards that you get
    do not belong to you you are like
  • 24:53 - 24:57
    borrowing them from the companies and
    quite often if the companies have or the
  • 24:57 - 25:02
    state has access to the companies then the
    state owns those and that means the state
  • 25:02 - 25:05
    owns your [ __ ] phone number and that
    means phone number is not unique
  • 25:05 - 25:11
    identification. So we had a lot of
    situations where telegram accounts were
  • 25:11 - 25:16
    hijacked by the state just by you know
    like cloning the SIM card and getting all
  • 25:16 - 25:22
    the access and normal person wouldn't put
    a password on your account. Yeah so be
  • 25:22 - 25:28
    aware of that and please like stop using
    that for your you know technological
  • 25:28 - 25:33
    things you're doing or software that you
    are developing this is not a secure way in
  • 25:33 - 25:40
    any way. This also goes to Signal people.
    Traffic analysis yes as I was mentioning
  • 25:40 - 25:44
    like the [ __ ] storm is there so they're
    trying to identify what people are doing
  • 25:44 - 25:48
    and this might be also a reason for a
    house rate or something like that if your
  • 25:48 - 25:56
    traffic looks suspicious. Resistance so
    resistance unfortunately is very low
  • 25:56 - 26:02
    technologically speaking so there's not so
    much of like you know laser rifles and [
  • 26:02 - 26:06
    __ ] like that. But rather and and and
    that's like unfortunately the story of
  • 26:06 - 26:12
    resistance against authoritarian regimes,
    that normally even when the state has like
  • 26:12 - 26:16
    very sophisticated heat guns and [ __ ]
    like that people end up on the streets
  • 26:16 - 26:22
    with the stones and sticks and that was
    the case also in Belarus. However people
  • 26:22 - 26:27
    started learning Technologies very fast so
    there were a lot of people who learned how
  • 26:27 - 26:33
    to use toxy tor VPN, you see how the whole
    usage of those Services spiked during the
  • 26:33 - 26:38
    protest and this is not like you know your
    20 30 year old friends but rather like
  • 26:38 - 26:43
    older people 50 60 who were forced into
    doing that, because they are interested in
  • 26:43 - 26:46
    joining the protest. So to be part of the
    protest you actually have to learn how to
  • 26:46 - 26:51
    do those. We also figured out that mesh
    networks although it's such a great idea
  • 26:51 - 26:56
    and maybe one day on the other planet it
    will work out but for your average
  • 26:56 - 27:00
    protester and average participant in in
    like an anti-authoritarian uprising this
  • 27:00 - 27:05
    is not the case you can't [ __ ] get them
    working and people are not really capable
  • 27:05 - 27:09
    of of using them. Destruction of
    surveillance property so there were people
  • 27:09 - 27:13
    who would just go around and smash the [
    __ ] cameras that was the way to resist
  • 27:13 - 27:19
    the facial recognition system. Hacking of
    infrastructure so there were a lot of
  • 27:19 - 27:24
    different attempts and the biggest one I
    think was hacking into the ID database
  • 27:24 - 27:29
    where which brought like a lot of other
    stuff so there databases of all this
  • 27:29 - 27:33
    Belarusian citizens their criminal records
    and and [ __ ] like that available to
  • 27:33 - 27:39
    certain groups right now and this gives
    also opportunity to look into police
  • 27:39 - 27:44
    activity and what the cops are doing what
    they own where they work and so on and so
  • 27:44 - 27:50
    Forth. The doxxing of the police officers
    and regime functions like the judges and
  • 27:50 - 27:55
    other bureaucrats basically as I was
    mentioning like on telegram you have this
  • 27:55 - 28:00
    whole list like thousands and tens of
    thousands of people there is also a map so
  • 28:00 - 28:04
    you can have a look if you're living next
    to a [ __ ] in your house who is like a
  • 28:04 - 28:07
    colonel of repression operatus or
    something like that so this is also
  • 28:07 - 28:11
    helping a lot but it also build up a lot
    of pressure on the police because police
  • 28:11 - 28:15
    apparently think if you know if you know
    the address of the police officer most
  • 28:15 - 28:19
    probably you will go and smash his [ __ ]
    house and kill everybody and so on which
  • 28:19 - 28:24
    didn't didn't happen but it did provide a
    certain pressure on the repression
  • 28:24 - 28:29
    apparatus. We also ended up with the
    solution for like what do you do when the
  • 28:29 - 28:34
    cops torture you for your password for
    encrypted hard drive you break your hard
  • 28:34 - 28:38
    drive and sometimes maybe you wouldn't be
    able to break your hard drive so you do
  • 28:38 - 28:43
    like this thing that they do in the movies
    you know in US you break the screen. *some
  • 28:43 - 28:48
    laughs* Really bizarre right but it works
    the the point here and I'm not talking
  • 28:48 - 28:52
    about the laptop the point here is you
    have a smartphone and there you have
  • 28:52 - 28:58
    something going on so if you smash it the
    average Riot cob guy doesn't know what
  • 28:58 - 29:03
    what to do with it, so he can't torture
    you to open it right it doesn't work. And
  • 29:03 - 29:07
    that was like a solution for a lot of
    activist so basically if you are in the
  • 29:07 - 29:13
    danger of being arrested you just break
    the phone and you have this buffer time
  • 29:13 - 29:17
    when the cops arrest you put you in jail
    and blah blah blah and this expert comes
  • 29:17 - 29:21
    who knows how to you know open the phone
    that has a broken screen. And that's kind
  • 29:21 - 29:26
    of like a place where most of the torture
    happens so you're capable of avoiding and
  • 29:26 - 29:32
    the cops also figured out that pretty fast
    so they started trying to get you arrested
  • 29:32 - 29:35
    before you break that and I have a story
    like of a friend who you know like who was
  • 29:35 - 29:38
    laying on the ground and he was putting
    his hand in the pocket and like smashing
  • 29:38 - 29:43
    the screen and he did it and the cops were
    like how did you do that we were formed
  • 29:43 - 29:47
    sitting on you you couldn't [ __ ] move so
    these kind of things and these kind of
  • 29:47 - 29:53
    things I think saved at least a health of
    certain people and also there was a lot of
  • 29:53 - 29:58
    online education where there were like
    workshops for the people how to figure out
  • 29:58 - 30:02
    out their smartphone security their
    telegram security and [ __ ] like that.
  • 30:02 - 30:07
    This is one of the examples of online
    education that is not connected with the
  • 30:07 - 30:11
    security of the smartphones it is more
    about production of new technologies
  • 30:11 - 30:17
    right? In Belarus not connected the
    tractors and those are like just to
  • 30:17 - 30:23
    immobilize the police Vans Yeah so this
    this was a lot of this kind of online
  • 30:23 - 30:27
    education as well the interesting fact
    again that a lot of people were afraid to
  • 30:27 - 30:32
    put to do that online education because
    eventually on many social networks you can
  • 30:32 - 30:38
    get banned for that like if you put you
    know how do you say a video how to make
  • 30:38 - 30:44
    molotov cocktail this is considered
    illegal activity and you know your account
  • 30:44 - 30:54
    can be banned and [ __ ] like that and I
    think people in not in the first World War
  • 30:54 - 30:59
    figure that out a lot. Like people who are
    in in Palestine and in many other places
  • 30:59 - 31:03
    figure that you know the repressions are
    working from the private companies against
  • 31:03 - 31:08
    them when they're fighting against the
    regimes. Conclusions so this is a small
  • 31:08 - 31:13
    sticker that says if you can't break the
    dictatorship you can still burn it down.
  • 31:13 - 31:16
    laughter
  • 31:16 - 31:21
    Conclusions are very short there they can
    there is a lot to talk about. Capitalism
  • 31:21 - 31:27
    is [ __ ] evil I mean hundreds of years of
    this [ __ ] up story you I hope all of you
  • 31:27 - 31:31
    figured this out this is not really a [ __
    ] mystery you know you don't have to come
  • 31:31 - 31:36
    from USSR indoctrinated by Marxism
    leninism to know that capitalism is evil
  • 31:36 - 31:40
    and capitalism
  • 31:40 - 31:44
    Many Applaus
  • 31:44 - 31:48
    and capitalism destroys lives not only
    here you know like in in Germany in US or
  • 31:48 - 31:52
    whatever and your political life but it
    destroys lives everywhere in Belarus,
  • 31:52 - 31:57
    Myanmar, Hong Kong, Syria like the [ __ ]
    corporations and the [ __ ] private
  • 31:57 - 32:03
    business is ready to sell anything even
    their [ __ ] mothers and brothers and
  • 32:03 - 32:10
    sisters to the dictators just to make
    money. Your phone number is not a good ID
  • 32:10 - 32:14
    it's a bad ID don't [ __ ] use it ever
    because it can be easily identified in
  • 32:14 - 32:19
    Germany as well in many other countries it
    is like it it's a [ __ ] like if giving a
  • 32:19 - 32:23
    passport. Just when you are registering
    with your phone number just imagine that
  • 32:23 - 32:26
    you're giving a passport to some company
    right?
  • 32:26 - 32:29
    Someone from the audience: taking
    pictures.
  • 32:29 - 32:34
    Boris: Yeah password is a good thing,
    still, many years after you can also
  • 32:34 - 32:40
    forget it. You get a concussion you forget
    it, you get tortured you forget it,
  • 32:40 - 32:44
    password is good right? Surveillance is
    good for the state bad for society so all
  • 32:44 - 32:50
    those corporations that are selling right
    now also in Western world the business of
  • 32:50 - 32:56
    surveillance they are destroying the
    social glue of the society and this is
  • 32:56 - 33:00
    like a different topic but but in general
    like surveillance is destructive for us as
  • 33:00 - 33:06
    a humankind. Western private companies are
    crucial for the dictatorship, we are not
  • 33:06 - 33:09
    living in the world where you know like
    the dictators have horses and they are
  • 33:09 - 33:15
    riding them into the crowd and like w
    hooray but rather a lot of technologies
  • 33:15 - 33:20
    that are used by the state by the
    Belarusian state but also by Syrian state,
  • 33:20 - 33:23
    by Russian state are not the technologies
    that were developed within the small
  • 33:23 - 33:28
    states by the local companies but rather a
    lot of technologies that were brought in
  • 33:28 - 33:32
    and developed in this countries where we
    are sitting you know? And they were
  • 33:32 - 33:38
    developed under certain freedom but at the
    same time they are now used to engrave the
  • 33:38 - 33:43
    dictatorship and those dictatorships are
    spreading like Russia wants to [ __ ]
  • 33:43 - 33:48
    conquer half of the Europe so you have to
    be aware of that and you have to like WE
  • 33:48 - 33:53
    have to fight that back. This is not you
    know whether it is should be done or not
  • 33:53 - 33:58
    it is more like how much energy and how [
    __ ] your ass should be on on fire to
  • 33:58 - 34:05
    fight those. Smart also doesn't mean smart
    and by that I mean that a lot of Engineers
  • 34:05 - 34:09
    believe that they they you know they can
    open a [ __ ] Wikipedia page, so they know
  • 34:09 - 34:15
    everything about the world. But it is not
    the case a lot of Engineers fail miserably
  • 34:15 - 34:19
    in understanding how the world is working
    how the society is working so if we
  • 34:19 - 34:23
    develop technological solutions to certain
    problems we do have to work with
  • 34:23 - 34:28
    sociologists Political scientists with
    activists to understand how those
  • 34:28 - 34:31
    technologies will influence the world you
    know:
  • 34:31 - 34:38
    very many ovations
  • 34:38 - 34:43
    The time is [ __ ] running out and I'm not
    talking about all only about ecological
  • 34:43 - 34:48
    catastrophe but also technologically
    speaking. We are in the race with you know
  • 34:48 - 34:53
    the dictators and authoritarian regimes
    who want to enforce and make their regime
  • 34:53 - 34:58
    stronger through Technologies, face
    recognition systems and all this [ __ ]
  • 34:58 - 35:03
    that is making the state way stronger
    against the society so yeah get your [ __
  • 35:03 - 35:08
    ] done and get your [ __ ] like going
    already now today, you know. And digital
  • 35:08 - 35:13
    resistance is part of a broader Uprising
    so do not see yourself you know as a
  • 35:13 - 35:17
    hackers community that exist in isolated
    world and you're in a bubble and [ __ ]
  • 35:17 - 35:21
    like that but rather if we want to stop
    like technological dictatorships or
  • 35:21 - 35:25
    whatever [ __ ] you can imagine we
    actually have to work together,
  • 35:25 - 35:29
    technological activists, Street activists,
    Community organizers all of those get
  • 35:29 - 35:32
    together and fight against the
    dictatorships fight against the
  • 35:32 - 35:37
    authoritarian attacks on us, on our
    society, on our families, on our friends
  • 35:37 - 35:38
    and only then we can win thank you!
  • 35:38 - 35:39
    Applause
  • 35:39 - 35:40
    Music
  • 35:40 - 36:14
    Angel: I have one more thing ...
    Boris: And don't forget to donate to our
  • 36:14 - 36:17
    group we are not like getting money for
    ourselves we're collecting money for the
  • 36:17 - 36:23
    political prisoners so don't forget to do
    that this is an important part of just
  • 36:23 - 36:33
    supporting the struggle.
    Angel: Yeah Applaus so we have a couple
  • 36:33 - 36:39
    minutes for questions but if you have to
    leave, leave super quietly and also a
  • 36:39 - 36:44
    question is a short sentence with a
    question mark behind it not a long essay.
  • 36:44 - 36:49
    I have chat GPT for that and we have a
    question from the the signal Angel by the
  • 36:49 - 36:54
    way the microphones are up front here here
    1 2 3 4 that's where you have to stand in
  • 36:54 - 36:57
    order to do a question signal Angel go
    ahead.
  • 36:57 - 37:03
    Signal Angel: Yes the internet wants to
    know what you expect Microsoft or Skype to
  • 37:03 - 37:08
    do for example blocking Belarus as a whole
    or wouldn't that also negatively impact
  • 37:08 - 37:14
    the activist? What's your opinion on that?
    Boris: I mean I don't think that blocking
  • 37:14 - 37:19
    Skype like or Skype stopping providing
    services in bellus would negatively affect
  • 37:19 - 37:25
    activist scene, nobody in activist scene
    was using Skype right? On the other side
  • 37:25 - 37:29
    like you do have mechanisms of black
    listing cord IPS at least you know like
  • 37:29 - 37:33
    this is Belarusian state is not you know
    super sophisticated going to connect to
  • 37:33 - 37:36
    the [ __ ] bpn and [ __ ] like that, but
    rather you block those and the court is
  • 37:36 - 37:40
    already not doing that. The thing with the
    Microsoft and Skype is that it's story of
  • 37:40 - 37:45
    the past because right now they switched
    to Viber so like this is this is gone,
  • 37:45 - 37:49
    like they did their part and nobody will
    most probably remember that and I mean
  • 37:49 - 37:52
    honestly [ __ ] Microsoft.
  • 37:52 - 37:55
    few ovations
  • 37:55 - 37:58
    Angel: We're running out of time question
    for Num 3.
  • 37:58 - 38:06
    -Okay I have a question how much would a
    better and more secure VPN technology and
  • 38:06 - 38:13
    better anonymizing systems help in these
    kinds of situations and what what has the
  • 38:13 - 38:18
    Bella russian State done against using VPS
    into foreign countries?
  • 38:18 - 38:24
    B: I mean in the first days of the
    protests in the first days of the uprising
  • 38:24 - 38:28
    the whole internet infrastructure was
    gone. Like there were certain ways to go
  • 38:28 - 38:32
    around the blocking that were connected
    with telegram proxies, I have no [ __ ]
  • 38:32 - 38:36
    clue how they managed to do it
    successfully but they did and in general
  • 38:36 - 38:39
    like the internet was just not working. So
    it doesn't matter if you have VPN and a
  • 38:39 - 38:46
    Tor, the internet doesn't work and later
    on when they unlocked the internet they
  • 38:46 - 38:52
    were very slow in reacting to the fast
    protest community so in those cases VPNs
  • 38:52 - 38:57
    very important somehow but for us at that
    point the the local organizing and
  • 38:57 - 39:02
    providing infrastructure for the local
    organizers was way more important. So also
  • 39:02 - 39:06
    like building decentralized networks
    inside of the country sometimes is way
  • 39:06 - 39:10
    more crucial to the protests than getting
    out to the services that are outside of
  • 39:10 - 39:15
    the country and that's what was happening
    as well. But in general like it's still an
  • 39:15 - 39:20
    important part of fighting back like
    having a reliable VPN or any other
  • 39:20 - 39:28
    anonymizing and like censorship circumsing
    Technologies. How to develop those more
  • 39:28 - 39:31
    successfully? I have no [ __ ] clue
    honestly. Because those like the fight
  • 39:31 - 39:38
    against those are going on very fast and I
    like I can't answer this, I'm very sorry.
  • 39:38 - 39:42
    Herald: So we might be able to squeeze in
    another two questions very briefly. on
  • 39:42 - 39:46
    number one.
    -How bad is the suppression of the APC
  • 39:46 - 39:51
    Belarus activists and can you safely
    reside inside Belarus without getting
  • 39:51 - 39:55
    arrested immediately or do you have to
    flee into Exile?
  • 39:55 - 40:03
    B: Like in general not talking only about
    us but the bigger political spectrum of
  • 40:03 - 40:06
    all the groups that are providing
    solidarity work all of them are gone like
  • 40:06 - 40:11
    from Belarus. So all of the activists from
    Liberal also human right defending groups
  • 40:11 - 40:16
    and so on had to leave and if you would be
    identified as a member of such a group
  • 40:16 - 40:20
    inside of the country this would be enough
    to prosecute you and to put I mean any
  • 40:20 - 40:24
    case they want on you. This is not a you
    know like a legal state but rather they
  • 40:24 - 40:29
    prosecute you and that's it. And with the
    case of activist Anarchist activists in
  • 40:29 - 40:36
    general there are laws that would allow
    them to make a group extremist
  • 40:36 - 40:40
    organization that doesn't need a core
    decision and through that you can get like
  • 40:40 - 40:45
    five six seven years in prison easily
    without any other actions you know. And
  • 40:45 - 40:51
    this is happening to certain solidarity
    groups already yeah. So we also have in
  • 40:51 - 40:56
    tomorrow in like a self-organized sessions
    a bigger presentation another collegue
  • 40:56 - 41:01
    will be doing that about repressions in
    Belarus about the political situation less
  • 41:01 - 41:05
    like focused on Technologies more focused
    on social political situation so if you
  • 41:05 - 41:10
    want to know a little bit more about that
    you can come there and ask your questions
  • 41:10 - 41:13
    and and [ __ ] like that.
    Herald: I would suggest that for anybody
  • 41:13 - 41:16
    in the room but we will take one last
    question very briefly from the signal
  • 41:16 - 41:19
    Angel and then we'll have to call it quits
    unfortunately.
  • 41:19 - 41:24
    Signal Engel: Yes another question
    regarding the use of encryption. It is if
  • 41:24 - 41:30
    theography is used with to encryption or
    instead of encryption in Belarus by
  • 41:30 - 41:35
    activists.
    B: I mean we do not have so many people
  • 41:35 - 41:40
    who were like technologically savvy and
    were participating in the protests that's
  • 41:40 - 41:45
    why nobody was hiding messages like that
    but we did have like a collective for
  • 41:45 - 41:52
    example that developed a telegram app
    that would have like a double I don't know
  • 41:52 - 41:59
    how it's in English like a double
    something double like basically you have
  • 41:59 - 42:05
    two accounts in the telegram and one of
    those accounts like is is is a very nice
  • 42:05 - 42:09
    fluffy you don't do anything and that's
    where what the cops see and then you need
  • 42:09 - 42:15
    to put a password to get another one so we
    got like this kind of hiding your activity
  • 42:15 - 42:20
    on the internet but this was I think like
    the biggest people can imagine using on
  • 42:20 - 42:25
    their smartphones. In general like we have
    to understand that technological savy is
  • 42:25 - 42:29
    dropping right people when people are
    using smartphones they know less about
  • 42:29 - 42:33
    Technologies than they did like 10 years
    ago so people are capable of doing less
  • 42:33 - 42:36
    and less and less yeah.
    Herald: So that's all the questions we can
  • 42:36 - 42:41
    take please help me thank him for this
    wonderful talk something we never and...
  • 42:41 - 42:42
    B: Thanks for doing it!
  • 42:42 - 42:44
    a lot of ovations
  • 42:44 - 42:52
    37c postroll music
  • 42:52 - 43:05
    Subtitles created by many many volunteers and
    the c3subtitles.de team. Join us, and help us!
Title:
Tractors, Rockets and the Internet in Belarus
Video Language:
English
Duration:
43:05

English subtitles

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