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34C3 - Pointing Fingers at 'The Media'

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    34C3 preroll music
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    Herald: The next speaker is born and
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    raised in Germany. He lives and works as a
    PhD student in Canada as a member of a
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    research group on extremist politics in
    democratic systems and he'll give us an
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    insight into the public discourse in
    Germany focused on the so called
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    "Alternative für Deutschland". Please
    welcome Alexander Beyer.
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    applause
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    Beyer: Thank you very much. Thank you
    people, for showing up in the Saal Borg,
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    thank you, the internet, for watching, a
    very big thank you for the organizers, for
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    giving me the opportunity to, to give this
    little talk. Yeah, my name is Alexander
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    Beyer and everywhere I went this winter, I
    didn't have to wear a winter jacket
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    because the temperatures were very mild
    and I will tell you in a minute why that
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    matters.
    As I already said, I'm a member of a
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    research group in Vancouver, where we look
    at what happens, how extremist parties and
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    politics fare in democratic systems and
    we decided to focus this research project
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    on the fascinating - for researchers
    fascinating - case of Germany and asking
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    the questions, if we can point fingers and
    is it a viable, a valid
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    judgment to say, the media, the
    media is to blame for the rise of the AfD?
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    For anyone who, who decided at the end of
    2017 that they would spend most of 2016 in
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    hibernation - which seemed like a pretty
    good idea at the time - I will give a
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    quick rundown what happened: So, we had
    election in September and the domino
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    piece that was Germany fell. Domino piece
    in a sense, that all around in Europe far-
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    right parties had considerable success in
    the past, in the recent past, and Germany
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    was the sort of last stalwart in
    Central Europe, where a far-right party did
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    not get at the government, this
    happened in September and it did not only
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    get into government, er, into Parliament, it
    also, the way that it looks like now, it
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    might become the official leader of the
    opposition.
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    So, when these results came in, pundits
    were really, really quick to call the
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    shots.
    The, the dominating sentiment was, that it
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    was the media's fault: They took the
    positions of the AfD and gave
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    disproportionate amounts of coverage to
    this far-right extremist party. And this
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    sentiment had a lot of truthiness to it.
    So, it had a lot of: "Yeah, sure, I can see
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    why", right, everyone that opened his
    newspaper or opened a news website,
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    stories about the AfD seemed, or about
    anything.. about something that's related
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    to the AfD, seemed to dominate coverage.
    This went along with a little bit of a
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    felt truth, a truth that was perceived by
    people, about how the campaigning season
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    was a lot of season and not a lot of
    campaigning, despite Martin Schultz's best
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    efforts.
    A whole lot of sunshine, but not a lot of
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    conflict and this was something that then
    was perceived to be very, uh, well, I don't
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    want to say very skillfully, but somehow
    filled by the AfD and and the topics that
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    are of concern to this party.
    So what are we doing today here? First
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    off, I'm a political scientist by trade
    and political scientists like theory. I
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    know that this is an event, where [I] figure
    you might not at the forefront of
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    everyone's minds, but it is for me,
    because talking and arguing to political
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    scientists about theory is kind of like
    mud-wrestling with a pig: you do that for
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    two or three hours and then you realize,
    oh, this pig actually enjoys this. So I'll
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    be sort of, I have one slide on what we,
    what previous theories would suggest
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    has, have happened and how it could have
    happened and then I'll show you what kind
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    of data we have collected, to
    systematically answer this question and
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    talk about public discourse in Germany and
    then to the meat and potatoes of the talk,
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    about how the campaign unfolded in the
    media and I will than, to end I will show
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    some more data, that is a bit different,
    that paints a picture on why this election
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    was a special election and why it was sort
    of a perfect storm of an election for a
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    far-right party and why this actually
    makes us claim that the media could be
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    said to have behaved pretty reasonable. As
    a little teaser.
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    OK. Theory. One slide. Two possible
    mechanisms of media effects. There's this
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    normative, very endearing and wonderful
    idea, that if you read something, that
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    someone carefully crafts and he or she
    constructs an argument, that is well
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    written, well made, you read this, you take
    it in, you're persuaded by that,
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    regardless of what this argument is. 60
    years of media research suggests, that this
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    doesn't happen.
    Pre-existing opinions are extremely
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    difficult to change in each and every
    single one of us, even though we're likely
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    to admit that "No, no sure, I'm a rational
    thinker, I take standpoints if they're
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    convincing to me and I internalize them.",
    but it's not how this works.
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    The second possible effect, and the one
    that will be of of concern to us today at
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    the core of the presentation, is something
    that's called Priming. So, the media can't
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    tell people what to think, it can't
    persuade people independently of the
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    previous opinions that people have, but
    it's really, really successful in telling
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    people, what to think about. It's super
    good, the media is super good, reading
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    something is very effective in bringing
    something to the front of your mind.
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    And here I.. here I can tell you, why I
    told you about my my choice of attire in
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    winter. A vast majority of you probably
    thought when I said this "'Oh, I didn't
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    have to wear a winter jacket', wow, what's..
    who is this guy?" But maybe a few of you
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    thought "Yeah, sure it was pretty mild,
    that's climate change."
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    So, without naming the issue, I..
    there's a chance, that I primed a few of
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    you, to consider climate change and pull
    that in your frontal lobe, at the front of
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    your mind.
    This is, this is important, this is a.. the
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    central thing, that we have to consider if
    we ask, if the media wrote up a party like
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    the AfD.
    Also important to consider here is, that
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    priming is easier - or there's an indirect
    effect of priming as well - where a topic
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    that is owned by a specific party, that's
    the thing that then favors the party
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    subsequently.
    So, if the media writes a lot about
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    refugees, a xenophobic far-right party,
    that has this problem of refugees at the
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    core of their agenda, will reap in benefits
    in our minds, in that it's agenda will be,
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    will fall on fertile ground.
    So far the theory, that's all. So, what did
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    we do based on this theory? We collected
    data, lots of data, we have.. we understand this
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    data.. we understand this text, that we
    collected to be data and we use natural
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    language processing to analyze that.
    Natural Language Processing basically
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    means, that we're giving language to a
    computer that wasn't written specifically
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    to be understood by a computer and try to
    extract meaningful analysis based on what
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    the computer is doing with this.
    So, we used some sifting methods to
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    collect about 8.500 articles from four
    central German news websites: Focus, Bild,
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    Welt and Spiegel. And we have.. that
    results in a unique data set, that, to our
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    knowledge, no one else has. If so, please
    reach out to us.
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    And this was so unique, that it deserves at
    least six fire emojis. It was also pretty
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    exciting because, that was pretty cheap. We
    were two people that were mainly concerned
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    with collecting this data and I don't want
    to, I don't want to calculate my hourly
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    wage, but it was almost done with no
    financial expense. And this is cool,
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    because we're social scientists, we're
    faced with this problem, with this very
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    interesting case of Germany sort of
    falling in line, very delayed, with lots of
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    other countries around it - in terms of
    the far-right party getting their seats in
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    Parliament and we can use methods that are
    available to us, if we're sort of like
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    sitting down and reading our stack
    overflow and sort of teaching those
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    methods to us, to systematically try to
    answer this question.
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    Let's dive right in. The share of party
    mentions in online news. So, what we did
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    for each day, we calculated what the total
    number of mentioned political actors is.
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    We did that based on word lists, that we
    carefully crafted, that included candidate's
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    names and party abbreviations and party
    names and things like "Kanzlerin" and
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    "Kanzlerkandiat" for the CDU/CSU and the
    SPD respectively and we let that thing rip
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    through our little rscript that we have.
    So, the average of mentions of each party
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    over the course of the campaign looks
    something like this: Between July 1st and
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    September 24th - that's the time frame
    that we concentrated on - we see a clear
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    incumbency bonus, the "Kanzlerbonus" the
    "Kanzlerinbonus" for the CDU/CSU, social
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    democrats high twenties, and the AfD at
    10.7 %. Here we might say at smaller
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    parties.. a little note to the green and
    the left, so with this dictionary method is
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    kind of tricky, because we can't say: "Oh yeah,
    well we just gonna count every occurrence
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    of Grüne and Linke" for the Green Party and
    the Left Party, because then we get stuff
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    like 'the green banana' and 'the left hand'
    that is counted for them. So that's why
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    here we're only using candidates' names.
    That's why they probably.. they sort of
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    underperform. But for our purpose of
    talking about why the AFD got favored by
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    the media, we're sort of letting that drop
    under the table. So, the story here is
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    over the course of the campaign, 10.7 % of
    mentions were happening that mentioned the
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    AFD, basically. Case closed. Right, AFD got
    12.7 % in the election. That doesn't really
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    sound like it was favored by the media.
    And a few of you might know this analysis
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    from a blog post, that me and Constanze
    Kurz wrote for Netzpolitik, sort of like 45
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    seconds after the election, when we worked
    on truncated data. And we also focused on
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    print media and this is sort of what this
    graph looked like, that we based our
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    conclusion on. AFD didn't really get any
    disproportionate amount of coverage. It
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    actually is in the.. in the last week of the
    campaign.. last weeks of the campaign
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    actually is outperformed by the FDP.
    Science is the current state of airing, or
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    the.. so, now that we have better data in
    terms of online news data this whole story
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    looks a bit different. If we take the
    average over the whole course of the
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    campaign and actually have it shown to
    us.. Stay by the day - This is what I want
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    to focus on now.
    So just looking at the sort of tail end of
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    this all the way to the right, when we get
    close to the election date, the order of
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    this is surprisingly close to the actual
    election results. The parties actually do
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    get in the order, that they came out of
    the election. But we do see a little curve
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    that gets closer to a curve that should be
    bigger. And this is where the.. well, I
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    don't want to say magic, but this is
    where the interesting stuff lies. So let's
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    look at the curves one after the other.
    The CDU/CSU, as you would expect, as the
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    incumbent anything that is remotely
    political in domestic and international
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    politics, will score mentions for the
    Chancellor and the CDU/CSU. That's why
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    this curve is considerably higher than the
    others, but we do see a downward tendency
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    the closer we get to the campaign, when
    campaign coverage shifted from the
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    incumbent to the competitors. Especially
    the underdog competitors. Which is kind..
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    that's a bad transfer to the SPD
    now, but if we look at the curve of the
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    Social Democratic Party, there's a slight
    bump around August and Martin Schulz
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    really tried to drive home this issue of
    justice as the central campaign promise
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    and there's another little slight
    humper on September 1st, begin of
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    September, when the televised debate
    happened, but the overall trend is pretty
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    linear, doesn't seem to be, if we would
    just smooth this plot out to be a straight
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    line, it probably would be pretty much
    horizontal. Not so for the AFD. So
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    remember, over the course of the campaign
    they got 10.7 % on average of mentions
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    drinks from his bottle
    And that's true. If we calculate an
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    average of that, of course, this looks like
    it scores considerably lower than the two
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    major parties. But something happens in
    late August and all of a sudden this party
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    gets actually close to the Social
    Democrats. It like.. starting in late
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    August, the tendency becomes one, that is
    pretty considerably upwards. And if we
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    take the average of only the two last
    weeks before the election, we get to a
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    number of 19.6 of all mentions are talking
    about the AFD there. Which is something, if
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    you think about the mechanisms of priming,
    those are short term effects. We're
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    looking for things that happen over a
    short term or have an effect in a pretty
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    short term. So this is something that is
    extremely important. At the beginning of
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    this time frame, where the plot becomes
    something that has a trend that shows
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    upwards, around, like, August 28th - where
    that first little mountain.. first little
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    summit occurs - two things happened: one, a
    refugee boat capsized in the
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    Mediterranean. An event that we've sadly
    and.. have to see terrifyingly often and
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    one of the people died. And the second
    thing that happened was, that Alexander
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    Gauland in an interview claimed, that a
    German politician should be dumped in
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    Anatolia. And it's interesting, if you talk
    about.. if you extract the topics, that
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    are covered in relation to the AFD before
    and after this moment.
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    Before this August 28th, it's a lot about
    Alice Weidel writing emails where it turns
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    out, she's not the public persona that she
    claims she is and it's a lot about
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    internal rifts of this far-right party.
    The internal tensions between the super
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    far right wing and the far right or right
    wing-wing and afterwards, there's a
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    surprising amount of citations of this "Oh
    we're gonna... we should dump this person
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    in another country." So that's something
    that indicates, that this strategy of sort
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    of provoking a scandal paid off. But
    let's.. before we get into that, let's
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    look into the topics that were covered
    over the course of the campaign. We did
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    the same thing, we developed topic
    dictionaries with keywords for each
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    category and we let our script read
    through all the data and count
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    occurrences. So looking at this, we see a
    sort of band there in the 10% range,
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    where it's all a colourful rainbow, where
    the topics don't really diverge from each
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    other, except for that
    topic of domestic security, which
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    is there at the low end of the range. But
    we do have one topic, that stands out quite
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    considerably in the early months of the
    Wahlkampfsommer, which is European Union,
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    generally European Union topic. This is
    because on July 1st Helmut Kohl, the
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    eternal Chancellor, get the first European
    act of state and a lot of things were
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    written about his legacy in terms of the
    European Union and lots of people showed
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    up from Strasbourg and Brussels and paid
    their respects. This is why this topic
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    seems like.. or this is, why this topic comes
    in as strong as it does here. Now the
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    topic that has a sort of unusual curve
    here on our graph, is the topic of the
  • 19:11 - 19:18
    environment. Our dictionaries that we
    developed were topical and so what causes
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    this steep, steep summit there in early
    August, is the Dieselgipfel.. there, the
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    Diesel Summit, where German car
    manufacturers try to sort of get out of
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    the fact, that they basically ripped off
    customers with selling cars that emitted
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    toxic amounts of poisonous gas and dust.
    This is why this is extremely important in
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    the high.. in the low 40 % range in
    early August. But afterwards the trend
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    line points steeply down.
    A topic that was pretty consistent over
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    the course of the campaign in its overall
    dynamic or at the sort of.. not the
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    overall dynamic, but the role that it
    played, is the topic of immigration. And
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    immigration means migration and refugees
    in our case here. And now, thinking about
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    what that means in relation to our theory
    on priming, we would think that sure,
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    that's a topic that is owned by the AFD.
    It's, like, it's super tightly connected to
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    that party's rise. So, this is something
    that does favour a far-right party like
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    those are, like it is. But we can do
    a sort of more systematic investigation
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    into this. So, this graph shows you the
    poles: each dot represents polling results
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    for the AFD and the line is the average
    out of those polls, again over the course
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    of the of the time frame that we surveyed.
    Pretty much constant
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    until mid-August, and all of a sudden we have
    increasing variance and we have a tendency,
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    a trend line, that points upwards. And now,
    this is where the heart of the story lies:
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    is this, is this dependent on the
    mentions that the AFD got in the media?
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    There's the orange line, now we have a
    sort of we have a different, a different
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    scale of our graph, that's why it looks
    way more nervous than in the bigger one,
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    that we had. Difficult to say. If you have
    data like this, time serious data, you
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    actually want to get rid of trends, in
    terms of what the analysis should be like.
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    So one way to do this in a graphic
    representation, is by not showing the
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    absolute values and how they develop, but
    only showing the change from day to day
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    and plotting that. This is what this graph
    does. So here, these two lines dance around
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    the zero mark, because - especially the blue
    one, where it's the polling results - there
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    wasn't a lot of variation from day to day.
    It's in incremental steps that the curve
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    points up and down. It gets a bit more, a
    bit higher in variance around the.. after
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    the mid of August. And whereas the AFD
    mentions in the media, they stay, well, they
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    stay rich in variance. Hard to tell, if
    anything systematic is there. You would
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    think that after the sort of first, 3rd
    of August, those, those lines are
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    connected. We ran an analysis - a vector
    autoregression model, time series
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    statistics - we couldn't find any
    systematic relation in a timeframe, that
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    made sense for our theory on priming.
    Which is a few days that we're looking
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    for. So if you talk about time series, we
    talk about lag and lead, and so you try to
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    connect a data point that is further down
    the line with a data point that is, that is
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    not as far down the line, and nothing of
    statistical significance showed up here.
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    And this kind of stumped us - we thought,
    right, when we looked at this there was
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    something. That we.. we sort of took a step
    back and we considered another possibility
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    to.. as why to.. as to why the media reported
    as they did. Did the media just give
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    the people what the people wanted?
    And here is why I want to talk
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    to you about why this was a
    special election. This graph - I adapted
  • 23:43 - 23:48
    this graph from the Berliner Morgenpost
    and they based it on on surveys conducted
  • 23:48 - 23:54
    by Infratest dimap on to the.. the data
    I didn't have any access to them. But this
  • 23:54 - 24:00
    impressively shows, why there was a special
    election. In five out of the six preceding
  • 24:00 - 24:05
    elections, employment was the topic that
    was on top of people's minds, when they
  • 24:05 - 24:10
    made the decision in terms of which party
    to vote for. And employment means
  • 24:10 - 24:18
    unemployment. In 2017, with unemployment
    being at record lows, and after 2015
  • 24:18 - 24:24
    having.. or having a Syrian civil war still
    going on, we're having ...
  • 24:24 - 24:32
    refugees come into.. into Western and into
    Europe, immigration jumps on out as the.. as
  • 24:32 - 24:39
    the topic that was the most important for
    people. And here, if we if we look at also
  • 24:39 - 24:45
    the topics that are further down the
    important scale for voters, those are all
  • 24:45 - 24:51
    topics, where one could conceivably think
    that those can be spun in a way that they
  • 24:51 - 24:58
    are connected to this refugee situation.
    Social injustice, economic injustice, that's
  • 24:58 - 25:02
    something that a party like the AFD can
    very effectively turn into an idea on
  • 25:02 - 25:11
    group based conflict: "It's us versus them".
    Same with pensions: "Oh, those people come
  • 25:11 - 25:15
    here to take our jobs and our money, and
    especially from the old people. From our
  • 25:15 - 25:26
    elderly. So 2017, die Bundestagswahl 2017,
    is a special case, if we consider it
  • 25:26 - 25:33
    compared to other parties. So now having
    this situation where we find that it's,
  • 25:33 - 25:37
    it's something that basically never
    happened in recent history and in Germany
  • 25:37 - 25:43
    before in terms of what, what made people
    decide at the polls. We wondered, OK,
  • 25:43 - 25:48
    well, is there a way to more accurately
    measure this demand side of things, this
  • 25:48 - 25:55
    this need for information for.. of voters.
    And what better way there is to measure
  • 25:55 - 26:04
    some.. to measure the salience in the
    population than to look at Google queries?
  • 26:04 - 26:10
    So we collected Google Trends data - more
    specifically, the Google searches on
  • 26:10 - 26:14
    refugees, 'Flüchtlinge',
    general term,
  • 26:14 - 26:18
    and again, here's this..
    this way to even out a trend
  • 26:18 - 26:25
    line - this is the daily change in
    how this topic developed. And if we put
  • 26:25 - 26:32
    our daily change of AFD mentions over
    that, we do see that there's something
  • 26:32 - 26:40
    there. There's some sort of systematic
    relationship. And then, crunching these
  • 26:40 - 26:45
    numbers and putting them again through a
    vector autoregression model, we come to
  • 26:45 - 26:53
    the conclusion, that with a lag of only one
    day, Google searches for refugees actually
  • 26:53 - 26:59
    lead AFD mentions in the media. So, if on
    Tuesday a higher number of people in
  • 26:59 - 27:07
    Germany googled "Refugees", on Wednesday, the
    AFD was mentioned more often than the day
  • 27:07 - 27:12
    before. The end effect wasn't big, but it
    was there and it was significant. We also, of
  • 27:12 - 27:18
    course, considered the alternative, and the
    magic word is here it's.. it's Granger
  • 27:18 - 27:24
    causality, so you can actually calculate,
    and reliably calculate, the temporal
  • 27:24 - 27:35
    succession, means that one follows the
    other. And so all of a sudden, it becomes
  • 27:35 - 27:41
    a bit difficult to point the fingers at
    the media. Because, if the media just
  • 27:41 - 27:46
    reacts to an interest, it operates like a
    business. If we like it or not. There's
  • 27:46 - 27:50
    the normative idea of the media, especially
    in a country that is rich in high-quality
  • 27:50 - 27:57
    publications as is Germany, that the media
    is a public good, that educates people and
  • 27:57 - 28:02
    brings out the best in them, in
    challenging them, and persuading them of
  • 28:02 - 28:06
    the best side of the argument. But at the
    end of the day, in your online worlds, it
  • 28:06 - 28:09
    is a business with a measurable outcome.
    You have clicks, you have trackers, we
  • 28:09 - 28:15
    have ad durations that you can measure.
    And so you can see, which articles are
  • 28:15 - 28:23
    favored and which articles people
    last the longest on. And we're not saying
  • 28:23 - 28:26
    - there's important distinction to make
    here - we're not saying, that there's a
  • 28:26 - 28:31
    direct causal link between people googling
    refugees and the media directly
  • 28:31 - 28:37
    reacts to that prompt, because there's
    some search engine optimization guy or
  • 28:37 - 28:43
    girl.. every media publishing house,
    that monitors what people are interested
  • 28:43 - 28:48
    in. We're saying, that there's an
    intermediate step there. It's not a
  • 28:48 - 28:55
    direct cause, it's just a sort of delay,
    that is in there, that allows for other
  • 28:55 - 29:01
    mechanisms to get in. So we're
    wondering: What about the consumer focusing
  • 29:01 - 29:08
    on the demand side? And in 2017, there's a
    few things that you could actually look at
  • 29:08 - 29:18
    to gauge what the demand-side demands, and
    we decided to focus on Twitter. Because,
  • 29:18 - 29:21
    without actually knowing this, when we
    first started out with collecting all this
  • 29:21 - 29:27
    data, we decided to set up, yeah, to set up
    a Twitter scraper. And that way, between
  • 29:27 - 29:33
    September 1st and September 24th, we
    collected 4.5 million tweets, that
  • 29:33 - 29:40
    contained keywords.. that contain any one of
    a list of keywords, that had
  • 29:40 - 29:50
    politic connotation. So looking at this
    body of data, we can extract things like
  • 29:50 - 29:58
    the top 200 most used Hashtags. And if we
    do that and we, we count the tweets that
  • 29:58 - 30:05
    contains one of the top 200 Hashtags and
    we pay special attention, to which one of
  • 30:05 - 30:13
    these Hashtags are decidedly pro AFD, we
    get to a number, that 30.9 % of the tweets
  • 30:13 - 30:18
    that contained any of those top 200
    Hashtags, actually contain one that is in
  • 30:18 - 30:24
    favor of the AFD. Whereas if we count the
    decidedly no AFD, the anti AFD, no AFD in
  • 30:24 - 30:31
    all ways of spelling and capitalization
    and so forth, that's only 1.2 %.
  • 30:31 - 30:39
    And here it becomes a bit
    ticklish. So, in order to sort of give a
  • 30:39 - 30:46
    better idea, of what role Twitter might
    have played in our little, in our little
  • 30:46 - 30:51
    relationship here, between the demand side
    and the supply side, the supply side
  • 30:51 - 30:59
    supplying the news, we have a
    beautiful network graph. So this is a
  • 30:59 - 31:08
    retweeting network: this is we extract all
    the mentions of a.. of an actor. Each dot is
  • 31:08 - 31:14
    a Twitter user, each line is 5 or more
    retweets. Retweets, we're aware of that,
  • 31:14 - 31:17
    Retweets don't automatically mean
    endorsement - you might retweet something
  • 31:17 - 31:25
    that is outlandish and crazy. But for the
    sake of visualizing, what the weights are
  • 31:25 - 31:30
    on Twitter, we're treating them as the
    same. And anyone, who ever has worked
  • 31:30 - 31:32
    with network graphs of that size, that
    take a long time
  • 31:32 - 31:37
    to generate, and it's kind of
    tough to to label them, so I'm very proud,
  • 31:37 - 31:44
    that I was able to do so. If we look at
    this Island down there, that blob, that
  • 31:44 - 31:54
    blue blob - those are accounts, that
    cluster around AFD accounts. The coloring
  • 31:54 - 31:58
    here was done by a walk trap
    algorithm, I just adjusted the colors that
  • 31:58 - 32:03
    that algorithm used to actually match the
    colors in the, in the German party
  • 32:03 - 32:11
    landscape. And so we do have a hefty
    continent at the bottom right, that
  • 32:11 - 32:17
    connects all kinds of people to the
    AFD. There, if you look at the little
  • 32:17 - 32:24
    appendix below here, that is colored in
    brown, that is mainly organized around a
  • 32:24 - 32:32
    movement called Reconquista Europe, which
    is an even further right wing, right wing
  • 32:32 - 32:41
    movement that is sort of, like, directly
    tacked to this island of the AFD, and the
  • 32:41 - 32:48
    the connecting node is Björn Höcke, which
    is quite interesting. So we have the AFD down
  • 32:48 - 32:53
    there, we have the other parties up there, the
    rainbow, that is the pluralistic political
  • 32:53 - 33:00
    landscape, we have those.. those two extreme
    points there, at the at the super top right
  • 33:00 - 33:08
    and there at the bottom left - that is..
    those are very extremely.. extreme Twitter
  • 33:08 - 33:14
    user parties. That's the ÖDP and the
    Freien Wähler, so they don't.. they don't seem to
  • 33:14 - 33:19
    engage with the nodes, that are in the
    center here. But what's also valiable to
  • 33:19 - 33:25
    note, is that for the other parties, for the
    established parties, starting from the left
  • 33:25 - 33:30
    and orange - the Pirate Party and then red
    the Social Democrats, Purple is Die Linke,
  • 33:30 - 33:37
    green die Grünen, yellow FDP and black the
    Conservative Party CDU/CSU. All of these
  • 33:37 - 33:44
    parties have a central node - a central, a
    central account, around which a lot of
  • 33:44 - 33:50
    other users are fanned out. So there's.. for
    each party, there's a smaller number, or a
  • 33:50 - 33:56
    relatively small number, of accounts, that
    are highly favored in how often they are
  • 33:56 - 34:04
    retweeted. AFD doesn't have that. Even.. so,
    this is of course a projection of
  • 34:04 - 34:07
    something that's 3D in a
    2D place, so there might be
  • 34:07 - 34:11
    some skewing going on here, in terms of how
    it shows on our screen, but even turning it
  • 34:11 - 34:19
    and trying to identify which party is at
    the center, wasn't, wasn't really possible.
  • 34:19 - 34:26
    So the internal rifts, and the internal
    power struggles - they do show in how
  • 34:26 - 34:32
    members of the party are retweeted. Also
    interesting to note is which nodes, which
  • 34:32 - 34:39
    users are connecting these two continents,
    so to speak. One is, that blue dot, is
  • 34:39 - 34:42
    wahlrecht.de, a polling
    aggregator, of course, everyone is
  • 34:42 - 34:46
    interested in getting their polling
    numbers out. And there's.. that's tough to
  • 34:46 - 34:53
    see here, but there's a beige user in
    the middle therem which is welt.de, so
  • 34:53 - 34:58
    one of the media.. one of the media
    publications, that we actually collected
  • 34:58 - 35:03
    data on and surveyed. Another thing that
    is.. I'm just gonna mention here briefly, is
  • 35:03 - 35:14
    the.. that light pink colored insert between
    the greens and the central gray beige dot
  • 35:14 - 35:18
    - those are Jan Böhmermann, die Heute-show
    und Extra 3.
  • 35:18 - 35:26
    laughing, clapping
    Yeah, so there's a.. the dynamics are
  • 35:26 - 35:33
    clear, that we have this party that is
    pretty well organized on social media,
  • 35:33 - 35:40
    and thus is able to dominate a media
    agenda, that is based on algorithms basically.
  • 35:40 - 35:47
    If you think about how, how the logic of
    information dissemination works on
  • 35:47 - 35:55
    Twitter: with trending Hashtags. If you
    have a party that is as - well, I don't want
  • 35:55 - 35:59
    to say organized - but as tightly clustered
    around itself.. within itself as the AFD
  • 35:59 - 36:05
    shows up here, there's a good chance, that
    that will influence, what all of us get to
  • 36:05 - 36:12
    see, when we check out the Twitter homepage.
    Now I know, that probably a good chunk of
  • 36:12 - 36:18
    you have burning questions in their mind,
    and I'm gonna going to want to know - so
  • 36:18 - 36:26
    how many of these of these bright blue bar
    blobs are bots? Are Twitter bots. We tried to
  • 36:26 - 36:32
    find that out, using a tool called the
    Botometer, which is something that has an
  • 36:32 - 36:36
    API available online, where you can submit,
    it's a project from a research team
  • 36:36 - 36:41
    in Indiana, where you can submit the name
    of a Twitter user and then it gives you a..
  • 36:41 - 36:46
    it rends lots of lots of analyses and
    analysis lots of things
  • 36:46 - 36:52
    about this user: the frequency of tweets,
    the time at which it tweets, who is.. who
  • 36:52 - 36:56
    is it following, who is it followed by, who
    is it talking to, that kind of stuff. But
  • 36:56 - 37:04
    when I tried to submit that, I broke their
    API. And so, if they're happen to watch I
  • 37:04 - 37:10
    apologize, that was me. So it wasn't be
    able to do so in time, but there's a bunch of
  • 37:10 - 37:14
    talks tomorrow, that talk about exactly..
    about that thing, so I'm happy to have
  • 37:14 - 37:20
    this sort of as a lead-in for the day
    tomorrow. So what can we.. go, what can we
  • 37:20 - 37:27
    take from this? The Bundestagswahl 2017 was a
    perfect storm for a far-right party like
  • 37:27 - 37:32
    the AFD. You had a high issue salience of
    the topic that is at the center of its
  • 37:32 - 37:42
    agenda, and you have a sort of unregulated
    Wild West of social media. We'll see
  • 37:42 - 37:47
    how that changes with recent law
    changes come into effect, where all of a
  • 37:47 - 37:53
    sudden the platform itself has some
    liability, to which kind of messages are
  • 37:53 - 37:57
    spread. But if that's effective for
    Twitter, is a whole other bag of
  • 37:57 - 38:04
    worms. So in that sense, that's why I was..
    what I was sorting.. hinting at: in this
  • 38:04 - 38:09
    issue environment, we have people be
    interested in the topic that is central
  • 38:09 - 38:17
    for the party like the AFDs. The media
    behaved like pretty surprisingly..
  • 38:17 - 38:23
    surprisingly predictable?
    And did not.. at least for the.. for the
  • 38:23 - 38:31
    topics, or for the publications, that we
    covered, it did so. And for the context
  • 38:31 - 38:36
    that we're arguing herein, that the AFD
    only get like 20 % of the share
  • 38:36 - 38:40
    towards the end of the campaign, is
    something that is a little bit surprising.
  • 38:40 - 38:47
    And that also leads into a different
    question of what does this "Oh it's the
  • 38:47 - 38:55
    journalists fault!" actually mean? What
    does it really mean? This sort of is based
  • 38:55 - 39:01
    on this normative expectation of the media
    being an impartial.. an impartial
  • 39:01 - 39:06
    deliverer of information and if you think
    about what else is going on on the
  • 39:06 - 39:12
    internet, with alternative media and an
    alternative news sphere establishing
  • 39:12 - 39:18
    itself with news blogs like, well I
    don't wanna.. I don't want to call any
  • 39:18 - 39:26
    names, because.. and so, there's a sort of
    scene of far-right fringe blogs in Germany
  • 39:26 - 39:30
    that we also collected.
    And so we're.. further down the line,
  • 39:30 - 39:34
    we're going to look at what the topics
    were, that were covered in that and how
  • 39:34 - 39:39
    that connected to influencing public
    opinion in Germany, but having said this,
  • 39:39 - 39:45
    with these alternative ways of getting
    your news, information being available, if
  • 39:45 - 39:50
    you have the press, if you have the
    mainstream press, not covering a party like
  • 39:50 - 39:56
    the AFD to a certain extent, you only give
    the fodder to those cries of
  • 39:56 - 40:07
    "Lügenpresse", mendacious press, in
    members of the population, that are sort of
  • 40:07 - 40:11
    at the risk of being lost as audience
    members.
  • 40:11 - 40:15
    So, it's kind of difficult to call the..
    to call the shots here and actually point
  • 40:15 - 40:18
    the fingers at the media, because they
    delivered on informing on an interest that
  • 40:18 - 40:30
    existed in the in the population, before
    they reported on something like the AFD.
  • 40:30 - 40:34
    And with this, I want to leave it at that.
    I thank you very much for your attention
  • 40:34 - 40:38
    and I'm highly, highly eager to hear
    questions and prompts and ideas, how we
  • 40:38 - 40:41
    could pursue this further.
  • 40:41 - 40:48
    applause
  • 40:48 - 40:56
    Herald: Vielen Dank, thank you very much.
    Questions? [unintelligible] any questions?
  • 40:56 - 41:00
    Feel free to attend the microphones.
    Even the microphone I don't
  • 41:00 - 41:06
    see behind the cameras. Let's start with
    number two. laughs
  • 41:06 - 41:09
    Mic 2: [unintelligible] some sound.
    Thank you. Thank you very much for your
  • 41:09 - 41:16
    amazing work. I've got only one question.
    Do you plan on releasing those
  • 41:16 - 41:21
    collected data and on what license?
    Beyer: That's a question that we.. that
  • 41:21 - 41:28
    we asked ourselves, too. We would love to
    collect the data and ultimately it will
  • 41:28 - 41:31
    happen, but we have to make sure, that we
    actually have the right to do so, with the
  • 41:31 - 41:36
    way we collected it. But we're definitely
    looking into that.
  • 41:36 - 41:44
    Herald: OK, number 5. Yeah, you.
    Mic 5: OK. Hello. Is this working? Yeah. It's
  • 41:44 - 41:48
    tempting - I'm from the Netherlands -
    to compare these experiences with the AFD
  • 41:48 - 41:52
    with the experience in the Netherlands.
    You know, we had Wilders, we had Verdonk
  • 41:52 - 41:58
    we had Fortuyn, now we have Baudet and it
    seems that there is a major difference
  • 41:58 - 42:02
    between.. with the AFD, because presently,
    I have frankly, I don't know the name of
  • 42:02 - 42:08
    the leader of the AFD, it used to be
    Frauke Petry and now, I don't know.
  • 42:08 - 42:16
    But in the Netherlands, the leaders of the..
    those populist right-wing parties, they
  • 42:16 - 42:21
    were.. they were very good in manipulating
    the media. They were sending out messages
  • 42:21 - 42:28
    sustaining a "Köder", in Germany, what's the
    word? Like, um, provocating, sending
  • 42:28 - 42:32
    out provocations and that attracted
    attention of the media. So, there are
  • 42:32 - 42:37
    people saying that you shouldn't react on
    all provocations, but anyway they were
  • 42:37 - 42:44
    geared to draw attention and I wonder,
    whether AFD has been to the same extent
  • 42:44 - 42:53
    active in the field of drawing attention,
    purposely using even agencies that are
  • 42:53 - 42:58
    specialized in advertising.
    Beyer: Great question. There is this idea,
  • 42:58 - 43:05
    that the AFD was very skillful at sort of
    inscenating scandal and purposely doing
  • 43:05 - 43:12
    things on a public stage that would draw
    attention to them. For example, this..
  • 43:12 - 43:17
    yeah, I say it again.. this
    expression by Alexander Gauland, to dispose
  • 43:17 - 43:24
    of a German politician, or the other
    leading candidate Alice Weidel leaving a
  • 43:24 - 43:32
    talk show, while it was being broadcast. So
    there's.. there definitely is this
  • 43:32 - 43:37
    element of the.. of actually taking a
    scandal and using it for your own, for
  • 43:37 - 43:45
    pushing your own agenda, whereas if they
    used ad agencies for their media campaign,
  • 43:45 - 43:53
    they did, their campaigning was highly
    professionalized, in terms of what their
  • 43:53 - 43:57
    posters were and how their campaign ads
    were worked.
  • 43:57 - 44:05
    And they did work with a company, that also
    was involved with Donald Trump's campaign.
  • 44:05 - 44:13
    But in terms of.. sort of new media or
    like online media – it's not that new
  • 44:13 - 44:19
    anymore – and in terms of what they did on
    online media, I.. I only have an
  • 44:19 - 44:29
    anecdotal sense, if they use something like
    bots, which is also a way of buying,
  • 44:29 - 44:35
    buying attention. I can.. I can sort
    of tell you about one specific case, where
  • 44:35 - 44:42
    we investigated, which Twitter users were
    the most active in tweeting on the AFD on
  • 44:42 - 44:47
    German Twitter – tomorrow's a talk about a
    Twitter user called Ballerina, which is
  • 44:47 - 44:50
    a name that has been out there which..
    there's great education, that that is
  • 44:50 - 44:55
    definitely a bot, that has been planted
    and has been controlled by someone else or
  • 44:55 - 45:06
    by sort of.. by any group of
    actors that is not actually a ballerina.
  • 45:06 - 45:14
    What we found was a Twitter user called
    Teletubbies007, that tweeted in those three
  • 45:14 - 45:23
    weeks, that we surveyed, 6.500 times and
    mostly just retweeted, retweeted calls to
  • 45:23 - 45:30
    go and cast your ballot, that were all put
    out by the central AFD accounts. And it
  • 45:30 - 45:34
    didn't have a lot of followers, like
    something 500 or so, but it just kept
  • 45:34 - 45:40
    retweeting over and over and over and over.
    And when we actually wanted to check out
  • 45:40 - 45:46
    the page of that bot, it was deleted,
    the user was deleted.
  • 45:46 - 45:51
    So there's, to answer your question, um,
    this high.. this degree of
  • 45:51 - 46:00
    personalization that the Partij voor
    de Vrijheid has in the Netherlands is not
  • 46:00 - 46:03
    as extreme for the AFD in Germany, because
    there's more leading candidates and
  • 46:03 - 46:09
    there's internal rifts like Geerd Wilders
    is basically his own party. That's not the
  • 46:09 - 46:15
    same. But the strategy to use scandal and
    to use something that is outrageous and
  • 46:15 - 46:19
    push the boundaries a little bit more,
    then jump back and say "Oh no, we did not
  • 46:19 - 46:24
    mean that at all in this way", that is
    the exact same spot on strategy they used.
  • 46:24 - 46:28
    Mic 5: Perhaps I should add that Wilders
    made it like..
  • 46:28 - 46:32
    Herald: Excuse me, many people queuing.
    Mic 5: Okay. Then I'll stop.
  • 46:32 - 46:35
    Herald: Okay, thank you. We have questions
    from the internet, then.
  • 46:35 - 46:41
    Signal Angel: Yes. (?) is asking: "Why
    did you come to the conclusion that this
  • 46:41 - 46:45
    was a special election, while the last
    election in Austria has exactly the same
  • 46:45 - 46:49
    issues? Don't you see this as some sort of
    an global effect?"
  • 46:49 - 46:57
    Beyer: That's true, a Syrian civil war
    that pushes people to flee from,
  • 46:57 - 47:00
    from war and save their livelihood, is
    something that is not only felt in
  • 47:00 - 47:05
    Germany, but for the context of Germany,
    it's a special election. That's.. this sort
  • 47:05 - 47:11
    of situations never.. has never occurred in
    this way before. But absolutely, each
  • 47:11 - 47:21
    election in Europe basically since 2015
    was a special election in that sense. But
  • 47:21 - 47:25
    not in terms of the outcomes, in a way,
    that.. because far-right parties in other
  • 47:25 - 47:30
    European countries already had, had their
    foot in the door and especially in Austria,
  • 47:30 - 47:36
    where.. with the FPÖ were pretty well
    established with previously having been
  • 47:36 - 47:40
    part of a government. And now
    being part of the government again. But
  • 47:40 - 47:46
    for Germany, in what the issues were, that
    were top of people's minds: that's the
  • 47:46 - 47:51
    special case that I meant.
    Herald: OK, microphone number 3, please.
  • 47:51 - 47:58
    Mic 3: Thank you, first I really
    appreciate the sincerity and transparency
  • 47:58 - 48:03
    of your talk, thank you very much, we need
    more of this in such circumstances and
  • 48:03 - 48:11
    maybe less polemics sometimes. There's
    just a little trifle in your method, where
  • 48:11 - 48:18
    I was wondering: how did you filter the
    "Linke" and "Grüne" stuff. Did you..
  • 48:18 - 48:24
    yeah, how exactly did you do it? Did you
    maybe count all the mentions of "Grün"
  • 48:24 - 48:30
    with a capital and non-capital "G", and
    "Linke" with a capital L and non-capital
  • 48:30 - 48:35
    and then filter it out further? Or did you
    do it the other way around? I know, that
  • 48:35 - 48:41
    you focused specifically on the AFD stuff,
    and maybe you were focused on representing
  • 48:41 - 48:47
    all the parties that might be relevant.
    But I would still be interested in that
  • 48:47 - 48:51
    part, thanks.
    Beyer: That's a great question. The thing
  • 48:51 - 48:55
    is, that we used.. when we actually put all
    that.. when after we collected text, before
  • 48:55 - 49:02
    we put it through the unloading
    methods, we put it all into lowercase.
  • 49:02 - 49:10
    Just so we could have a consistent way of
    analyzing. And with capitalization, it's
  • 49:10 - 49:16
    kind of.. sometimes it just trips up the
    way to treat this. And that's why you
  • 49:16 - 49:21
    ran into these issues with "Linke und
    Grüne" where we had to resort to only
  • 49:21 - 49:26
    taking basically the candidates names and
    then also "Linke Partei" and "Grüne
  • 49:26 - 49:36
    Partei" and a few conjugations, so "der Linken
    Partei", "den".. right, like grammatically..
  • 49:36 - 49:40
    the cases, we only, like, we conjugated
    them through. Yeah, but we.. since our focus
  • 49:40 - 49:44
    was on the AfD, we weren't especially
    concerned with that, which is
  • 49:44 - 49:48
    unfortunate, I admit that, but for the
    purpose of this talk, we decided to just
  • 49:48 - 49:54
    use this workaround.
    Mic 3: OK, thanks.
  • 49:54 - 49:56
    Herald: OK. Microphone six,
    please.
  • 49:56 - 49:59
    Mic 6: Hello, thanks for your interesting
    presentation.
  • 49:59 - 50:03
    I'm wondering if you and your team..
    so, you'd.. you looked at mentions
  • 50:03 - 50:08
    of the different parties, but I'm wondering
    if you looked at the content of the articles
  • 50:08 - 50:13
    and how they talked about it, if they were
    talked about positively or negatively.
  • 50:13 - 50:15
    Beyer: Thank you very much, that's a great
  • 50:15 - 50:19
    question, that we actually did consider.
    And I'll answer this question with a
  • 50:19 - 50:24
    counter question, as social scientists
    like to do. Anyone in this room use Amazon
  • 50:24 - 50:29
    Mechanical Turk and works on hits to earn
    a few cents here and there? No? OK, so I
  • 50:29 - 50:38
    can speak freely. There's a.. there's a
    method that uses cheap labor on Amazon
  • 50:38 - 50:43
    Mechanical Turk and presents each worker
    with two sentences, out of which they have
  • 50:43 - 50:50
    to change the one that is more positive.
    And so we wanted to use this to train a
  • 50:50 - 50:55
    machine learning algorithm to actually get
    a way to gauge the sentiment of positive
  • 50:55 - 50:59
    and negative in the text that we had
    collected. We started that in early
  • 50:59 - 51:07
    December and we had a, like, a workbook with
    4.000 so-called hits, 4.000 little jobs,
  • 51:07 - 51:16
    4.000 comparisons and when this job was
    done, five or six days later, we sort of put
  • 51:16 - 51:23
    that through a test and compared it with
    our own hand-coding that we had done.
  • 51:23 - 51:32
    And it turned out that one worker on Amazon
    Mechanical Turk spent over seven hours and
  • 51:32 - 51:39
    worked.. of those 4.000 little jobs
    that we had, he worked 3.980.
  • 51:39 - 51:45
    And over 1.400 of which
    he did in less than two seconds.
  • 51:45 - 51:54
    Which is unfortunate, because: a) this
    person.. so, this person - right, "Person?, Question
  • 51:54 - 52:00
    Mark" - probably used a script, probably
    used a bot or just randomly clicked. The
  • 52:00 - 52:07
    coding didn't match up at all with what we
    did hand-wise ourselves and that really
  • 52:07 - 52:14
    screwed up our approach there. If any of
    you plan on doing some hits in the new
  • 52:14 - 52:19
    year for Amazon Mechanical Turk and you're
    asked to compare two sentences that
  • 52:19 - 52:23
    mention a political actor in Germany, you
    can send me an email and maybe a
  • 52:23 - 52:28
    screenshot and tell me how much you
    appreciate that we're paying six cents for
  • 52:28 - 52:34
    each comparison. But that's the story, why
    we haven't.. we don't have any sentiment in
  • 52:34 - 52:40
    this analysis here.
    Herald: [unintelligible]
  • 52:40 - 52:45
    Mic ?: Hello. I'm from Denmark, so in this
    context, I'm very much a ghost of
  • 52:45 - 52:48
    Christmas future.
    Beyer laughs
  • 52:48 - 52:49
    Mic ?: In your Twitter data,
  • 52:49 - 52:55
    where you take Retweets as well, do you
    determine what are quotes and what
  • 52:55 - 53:00
    are direct Retweets? Because in my
    experience, and I work with this in Denmark
  • 53:00 - 53:07
    and in the UK, a lot of people like to
    distance themselves from what the AfD and
  • 53:07 - 53:16
    similar are saying by quoting everything
    they're saying and giving them the press.
  • 53:16 - 53:21
    Beyer: That's a very good point to make.
    We did not make any distinction
  • 53:21 - 53:27
    between quotes and Retweets, but we did
    filter, based on 5 Retweets, by thinking:
  • 53:27 - 53:31
    OK, if you occasionally feel like you
    have to point something out that is
  • 53:31 - 53:37
    outrageous and ridiculous, that a person,
    a member of a party, says on Twitter, you
  • 53:37 - 53:41
    would be inclined to do so less than a
    certain amount of time. We also tried it
  • 53:41 - 53:46
    with other cut-offs. The graph basically
    always looked the same. But if we think
  • 53:46 - 53:53
    about what this means for how the demand-
    side is influenced, it doesn't matter.
  • 53:53 - 53:57
    Basically, if you're retweeting out of
    endorsement or out of ... out of ...
  • 53:57 - 53:59
    Mic ?: Spite.
    Beyer: ... out of spite, that's right.
  • 53:59 - 54:04
    That's the logic, why we decided to use
    mentions and Retweets.
  • 54:04 - 54:05
    Mic ?: Thank you.
    Herald: Another question
  • 54:05 - 54:09
    from the internet?
    Signal: Yes. Luke23 is asking: Do you
  • 54:09 - 54:13
    think that the window of commonly
    acceptable ideas, the so-called Overton
  • 54:13 - 54:22
    window, was shifted to the right by the
    ideas of the AfD echoed in the media?
  • 54:22 - 54:26
    Beyer: That's a good question. That's a
    good question. Something that comes to
  • 54:26 - 54:31
    mind here, is that media use is
    epiphenomenal - you're sort of
  • 54:31 - 54:38
    likely.. but the question is, like: Do you
    think.. does something happen in you,
  • 54:38 - 54:42
    because you use a certain media outlet, or
    do you use a certain media outlet, because
  • 54:42 - 54:48
    something happened in you ?
    From the sense that I got, I would say that
  • 54:48 - 54:54
    the degree to what is.. what is acceptable,
    definitely was shifted over the course of
  • 54:54 - 54:58
    this campaign, that all of a sudden we're
    questioning, if remembering the Holocaust
  • 54:58 - 55:04
    should be something that is at the heart
    or very close to German identity.
  • 55:04 - 55:09
    That's something that a political
    scientist would have never expected, that
  • 55:09 - 55:16
    this cleavage can be opened up again in a
    way that is so potent as it did now. So it
  • 55:16 - 55:23
    definitely did something to the overall
    discourse in Germany. Whereas that is an
  • 55:23 - 55:31
    effect of media reporting on the AFD,
    would require us to use something like
  • 55:31 - 55:36
    this.. the sentiment analysis, to actually
    determine how the media talked about which
  • 55:36 - 55:42
    aspect of the AFD agendas.
  • 55:42 - 55:47
    Herald: I can see some movement behind
    microphone number 8. I'm sorry. laughs
  • 55:47 - 55:52
    Mic 8: Thank you very much. Thank you for
    your work, I still do have a critical
  • 55:52 - 55:58
    question. Basically, the things you showed
    is something like we all know, yeah? We
  • 55:58 - 56:03
    could see this happening last year, and so -
    I mean this year, in the last election. So
  • 56:03 - 56:09
    I am wondering now, whether the method you
    used, which was basically focusing on
  • 56:09 - 56:16
    quantity, is in a sort of mirroring what
    was happening. And I'm wondering if you
  • 56:16 - 56:22
    would work.. keep working on it. Like, you
    used buzzwords and you used "the media"
  • 56:22 - 56:31
    instead of, like, narrowing it down, or more..
    using more specific questions and I was
  • 56:31 - 56:37
    wondering, if you have these results now and
    you have proof for them? What are your next
  • 56:37 - 56:44
    questions and how can you continue to use
    these.. the data you have, to make it more
  • 56:44 - 56:50
    specific, so we can really have some outcome
    and some conclusions coming from this?
  • 56:50 - 56:53
    Beyer: It's a absolutely wonderful
    question.
  • 56:53 - 56:58
    Of course, we thought about using
    this data further down the line. We.. our
  • 56:58 - 57:04
    initial plan was, to connect this not just
    with salience data that we derive from
  • 57:04 - 57:08
    Google searches.
    We also have Facebook data that we
  • 57:08 - 57:12
    collected, that we wanted to look into,
    but there.. it's a bit challenging, to
  • 57:12 - 57:20
    actually analyze comments in depth onto
    language, because language tends to be way
  • 57:20 - 57:27
    more fluid and you have certain problems
    with selection and self-selection. So you
  • 57:27 - 57:30
    really, really have to be careful to cross-
    connect, which person that comments on
  • 57:30 - 57:38
    Facebook is the same person and thus, if
    you only do quantitative stuff, would
  • 57:38 - 57:44
    appear disproportionally. As I mentioned,
    we have also collected data from far-right
  • 57:44 - 57:52
    blogs, from "news" blogs, that very
    actively endorsed the AFD and their topics
  • 57:52 - 57:59
    and so we're planning to pull this into
    the analysis along with data from the
  • 57:59 - 58:04
    German Longitudinal Election Study, where
    in this time frame, that we surveyed, in the
  • 58:04 - 58:11
    data, each day 100 people in Germany were
    called up and asked about their feelings
  • 58:11 - 58:16
    toward specific parties and actors. So we
    actually have day-by-day data, once it
  • 58:16 - 58:22
    comes out, on how people.. what people
    thought about those actors. So we're
  • 58:22 - 58:28
    planning to pull that in, as a more
    reliable measure for salience.
  • 58:28 - 58:31
    Herald: Thank you very much. I'm very
    sorry, but time's up, so there will be no
  • 58:31 - 58:35
    more questions right now in front of the
    audience. Alexander Beyer, thank you very
  • 58:35 - 58:38
    much. A warm applause, please.
    applause
  • 58:38 - 58:41
    Beyer: Thank you.
    applause continues
  • 58:41 - 58:46
    postroll music
  • 58:46 - 59:03
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Title:
34C3 - Pointing Fingers at 'The Media'
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Video Language:
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Duration:
59:03

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