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Law Enforcement Are Hacking the Planet (33c3)

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    33C3 preroll music
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    Herald: The talk is gonna be called
    “Law Enforcement Are Hacking the Planet”
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    by Joseph Cox. Joseph is an investigative
    journalist for Vice’s Motherboard,
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    covering hackers, data breaches
    and digital security. When I went
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    to check him out and looked at his Twitter
    account I discovered I already follow him.
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    Which is funny, or it was for me
    a little anecdote about the modern world.
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    I recognized his avatar immediately
    but not his name.
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    I guess that's just something
    about how we live these days.
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    So then with no further ado, Joseph,
    I’d like to give it over to you.
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    applause
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    Joseph Cox: Hello, hello hello.
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    How would you react if the FBI
    came over from the United States,
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    came into Germany, went to an apartment
    in, say, Hamburg, kicked down the door
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    and then started searching the apartment?
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    They haven’t been invited
    by German law enforcement,
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    they’re acting on their own accord.
    They then seize a load of evidence
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    and go back to the States.
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    You might think this isn’t a great thing,
    I mean what does the FBI have to do
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    coming in to another country and then
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    searching buildings or arresting suspects?
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    But the searching is essentially
    what the FBI is doing, but digitally
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    with malware and hacking tools. Breaching
    into computers in other countries,
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    extracting evidence from them
    and then sending them back to
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    a government server in Virginia,
    or wherever it may be.
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    To clear, we’re not talking
    about a normal intelligence agency here
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    like the NSA or GCHQ. They’re
    gonna hack computers internationally
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    all the time as part of espionage,
    we expect that, maybe that’s a good thing.
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    Here we’re talking about
    an agency that’s predominantly
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    focused with the law enforcement
    hacking to computers in other countries
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    as part of criminal investigations.
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    I’m gonna talk about one FBI case in
    particular, briefly touch upon another one
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    and then just explain an operation
    that was led by local Australian
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    law enforcement which hacked
    computers in the United States.
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    At the moment, typically, these sort of
    investigations are done to counter
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    child sexual exploitation
    or child abuse on the Darkweb.
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    Just about me, briefly:
    Journalist for Motherboard as mentioned,
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    which is the Technology and Science
    part of Vice. Hackers, cybercrime,
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    the Darkweb drug trades or
    stuff like Silk Road or the usual stuff.
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    But for the past year I’ve been really
    interested in law enforcement’s
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    international use of malware.
    Which brings us to
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    “Operation Pacifier”.
    The FBI is not very good at naming
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    its child sexual exploitation
    investigations.
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    So in August 2014 a new Darkweb child
    abuse site was launched, called “Playpen”.
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    It was a Tor hidden service,
    meaning that the majority of people
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    who connect to it would do so
    over the Tor anonymity network,
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    masking their real IP address.
    But because it ran as a hidden service
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    the physical location of the server itself
    was also protected.
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    Meaning that the FBI couldn’t just go and
    immediately subpoena the hosting company
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    or seize the server whatever may be,
    because they didn’t know where it was.
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    A few months passed and Playpen is a
    really, really big deal. It’s the largest
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    child pornography site on the Darkweb.
    215.000 members,
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    117.000 posts, and an average
    11.000 unique people
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    were visiting every week.
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    The FBI was trying to find a way in,
    they were acting in an undercover capacity
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    on the site as law enforcement often do
    with these sorts of hidden services.
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    But at one point a foreign law enforcement
    agency, and we don’t know which one,
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    provided the real IP address
    of the Playpen server to the FBI.
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    It turned out that Playpen’s administrator
    who’s now been convicted, Steven Chase,
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    he’d misconfigured his server
    so the real IP address was exposed
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    in the normal internet.
    So in February 2015
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    the FBI go to the North Carolina
    Data Centre, they seize the server
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    and they take control of Playpen.
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    Just as a side note:
    Steven Chase, the administrator,
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    he had paid for the hosting via a Paypal
    account in his own name.
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    So it was incredibly easy to convict him.
    If you’re gonna run
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    an illegal Tor hidden service,
    don’t use Paypal!
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    And this is where the hacking comes in.
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    Even though the FBI is in control of the
    site – they can see what people are doing,
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    what videos they’re watching,
    as mentioned – they can’t see
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    where these people are coming from
    and they can’t identify them.
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    So they need another way,
    and what they decided to do
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    is hack the computers of individual users.
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    Very, very shortly after the FBI seized
    the server they started to run it
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    from a government facility in Virginia.
    So the site is fully functioning,
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    except one section that encourages people
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    to produce more child porn. It’s still
    a fully functional website, though.
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    They run that and the FBI deploys what
    it calls a “Network Investigative Technique”,
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    an NIT or nit or what we would probably
    just call “a piece of malware”.
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    In short, and this is a really, really basic
    overview the nit just did several things.
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    First somebody would log in to Playpen
    and then go visit a specific
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    child porn related forum.
    The exploit is then automatically
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    delivered to that computer.
    This exploit certainly affected…
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    and the underlying vulnerability
    certainly affected the Tor browser.
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    We don’t know if it affected Mozilla
    Firefox. As many of you will know,
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    Tor browsers are oftenly based on Firefox,
    and they share much of the same code base.
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    But we don’t actually know
    much about the vulnerability
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    or the exploit at all.
    All that we know is that they used
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    a non publicly known vulnerability.
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    And then when the exploit is delivered the
    rest of the code causes the target machine
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    to phone home outside of the Tor network
    to a government server, and now the FBI
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    has a real IP address.
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    Armed with that the FBI just goes to the
    ISP, Comcast, Verizon, gets a name,
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    subscriber details and address,
    kicks down a door, arrests the person
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    – if there’s enough evidence – and
    presumably, and in many many of the cases
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    if not all of them, find a lot of child
    porn on the suspect’s machine.
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    But that’s not everything
    the FBI collected with a nit,
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    it also got the username,
    the host name, the MAC address.
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    And it also generated a unique code
    per unique infection, I think
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    that you could then use to correlate
    activity on the site with an IP address.
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    And just remember this whole time
    the FBI could see what people
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    were doing on the site, so “user Jimmy
    went onto this section of the site
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    and looked at this thread,
    now we have his IP address,
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    we can link it to that”.
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    So the FBI deploys its malware,
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    for 13 days it runs the site.
    Over that amount of time,
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    100.000 users log into Playpen,
    which as you’ll notice
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    is a lot more than 11.000, which
    was apparently the average login rate.
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    For some reason the site became a lot more
    popular when the FBI was running it.
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    You can hear whatever you want from that. (?)
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    So in the U.S. the FBI gets around 1300
    IP addresses of U.S. users of the site.
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    Europol say they generated 3229 cases
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    – I haven’t highlighted it, but it’s
    in the middle column at the bottom –
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    and 34 of those were in Denmark.
    This is a presentation I just found online
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    when I found out it was called
    “Pacifier”.
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    I searched that, filetype:pdf and
    someone from law enforcement had
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    left this online, so that was convenient.
    laughter
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    Austria, staying with this
    part of the world,
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    I think this is a letter from an MP
    to a group of politicians
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    just talking about the country’s
    child porn investigations
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    and it mentions Operation Pacifier
    and 50 IP addresses so the FBI hacked
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    at least 50 computers in Austria.
    Latin America as well.
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    Again, this is another presentation
    that I found online,
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    law enforcement are really, really sloppy
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    with just leaving all this stuff
    online, which is great.
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    And you can just see Operation Pacifier
    there. As for Chile it was
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    local media reports that just said
    ‘Pacifier’, ‘Playpen’, ‘child porn arrests’
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    so it was pretty easy to infer that
    computers were hacked there as well.
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    Australia – this is part of a
    freedom of information request
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    I made with the Australian federal police,
    asking for documents and communications
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    about Operation Pacifier. This isn’t
    actually the result of the request
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    this is them saying “Hey, we have
    too much stuff on Operation Pacifier,
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    so we can’t give it to you” which
    obviously already gave me
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    enough information to confirm that
    Pacifier hit Australia as well.
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    Anyway, you get the idea. I’m not
    just gonna list all these countries
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    apart from them. The U.K. and Turkey
    were probably hacked as well.
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    But it turns out the FBI hacked computers
    in many, many more countries.
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    And this just came out
    end of last month, I think.
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    In total the FBI hacked
    8.700 computers in 120 countries.
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    8.700 in 120 countries with one warrant.
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    And arguably that warrant was illegal.
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    But we have to back up a little bit,
    just to see what that is.
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    Right, okay.
    So the U.S. has something called Rule 41,
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    which dictates when a judge
    can authorize searches
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    including remote searches, so hacking.
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    A judge can only authorize a search
    within his or her own district.
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    So if the judge is in the
    western district of Washington,
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    he or she can only sign a warrant
    that’s gonna search stuff
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    within that district. With a few
    exceptions. I think, terrorism,
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    and if there’s a tracking device
    and then the person moves out of state
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    it’s still okay.
    In the case of Playpen,
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    Judge Theresa Buchanan
    was in the Eastern district of Virginia,
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    as you can see at the top.
    Clearly, the vast majority of computers
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    were not in the Eastern
    district of Virginia.
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    The search warrant application which is
    that document that the FBI presents
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    to a judge, and say “Here’s our reasons,
    please sign our search warrant!”,
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    it said that what was gonna be searched
    was computers logging into Playpen,
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    wherever located. It’s pretty
    debatable how explicit that is.
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    I mean, the FBI did not write “Hey we’re
    gonna hack into computers no matter
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    what state they’re in, what country
    they’re in, anything like that, and
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    we’re gonna hack into them”. The word
    ‘hack’ is obviously never ever used in the
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    search warrant application.
    So with that in mind it’s kind of unclear
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    if Judge Theresa Buchanan would have
    actually understood that she was signing
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    a global hacking warrant. And this isn’t
    castaging the judge, at all. It’s more
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    that these warrants applications aren’t
    very explicit. And it’s still unclear
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    because Judge Buchanan won’t respond
    to my requests for comment.
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    So wherever operation Pacifier violated
    rule 41 has probably been the central
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    component of all the legal cases that came
    out after the FBI started dusting people.
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    Defense lawyers have brought it up, saying
    “Hey, this judge did not have authority,
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    you now need to throw out all the
    evidence against my client”.
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    According to the most recent figures, and
    this might be very, very slightly out-of-date
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    21 decisions have found the operation
    did violate rule 41. Out of those,
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    judges in four cases have thrown out all
    evidence obtained by the FBI’s malware.
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    So that obviously includes the main bit
    of evidence which to the IP address
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    but then also everything that came after
    that. I mean the only reason the FBI
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    found child porn on people’s devices is
    because the IP address led them there.
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    So all of that child porn is also struck
    from the record as well.
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    And those people are essentially free,
    by DOJ appeals which are ongoing.
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    Whether people based outside the United
    States will have a similar sort of defense
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    is kind of unclear at the moment. The
    IP address could fall under something
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    like the Third-Party Doctrine, whereas in:
    if there’s a German suspect,
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    and they tried to challenge the legality
    of the search the German police may say:
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    “Hey, look, we didn’t do the hacking,
    we just got given this IP address
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    by third party”. And then the defense
    might not have much like to stand on.
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    But I do know of one lawyer in a country
    outside the U.S. who is going to challenge
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    the legality of that hacking operation.
    I can’t really say where he is right now
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    because I think that’s still sourcing out (?)
    but that’s gonna be really, really interesting
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    when that happens, hopefully in the new
    year. So forget everything I just told you
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    about Rule 41 because it doesn’t matter
    any more. Earlier this month changes
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    to Rule 41 came into place. Meaning that
    judges now can authorize searches
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    outside of their district. So if the Playpen
    warrant was signed today it probably
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    would not violate Rule 41, and the FBI
    wouldn’t have done anything wrong.
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    Or the DOJ wouldn’t have done anything
    wrong. And I just wanna emphasize that
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    these changes to Rule 41 came about
    in part, specifically because of
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    the problem that anonymity networks and
    Tor present to law enforcement.
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    It’s not like Operation Pacifier was over
    here, FBI doing its thing, and the DOJ
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    was sorting out these Rule 41 changes. The
    changes have come specifically in response
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    to criminal investigations
    on the so-called “Darkweb”.
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    And that’s just this Department quote
    here: “We believe technology should
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    not create a law-less zone merely because
    a procedure rule has not kept up
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    with the times”. Their argument is that
    the Rule 41 is basically an antique,
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    and they need to change the rules to keep
    up with criminals that are using stuff
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    like Tor or VPNs. So that was Pacifier.
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    That’s the largest law enforcement hacking
    operation to date that we know about.
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    Just very, very briefly I’m gonna talk
    about another FBI one where they likely
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    hacked into computers abroad. This one
    is called “Torpedo” which is even worse
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    than Operation Pacifier when it comes
    to child porn names.
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    In 2012 or 2013 the FBI take over
    Freedom Hosting which is
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    sort of a turnkey hosting provider.
    You sign up to the service
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    that hosts your Darkweb site. It doesn’t
    matter if it’s legal or not, whatever.
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    The FBI sees it, they deploy an NIT
    again, a piece of malware.
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    And this time the FBI trying (?) identify
    users of 23 different child pornography sites.
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    In the warrant application there’s
    a section specifically about
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    a Hungarian language site.
    I mean even the FBI officer
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    – I think it’s the FBI writing it – says:
    “Oh, if you put this into Google Translate
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    it means this, it’s Hungarian, blablabla”.
    As I mentioned in the Playpen example
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    the FBI did not know where the computers
    that they were going to hack
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    were located. This is an interesting case
    because I’m going to guess
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    that a lot of the users of a Hungarian
    language site are probably in Hungary.
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    So the FBI might have had some idea
    that they were gonna hack computers there.
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    Did the FBI warn Hungarian law
    enforcement? Did they get permission
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    of the Hungarian authorities to hack
    computers in their country?
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    We don’t know yet.
    And I somehow doubt it.
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    And then just finally it’s – excuse me –
    it’s not just the FBI
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    that’s using hacking tools
    to target suspects overseas.
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    A local Australian police department,
    Queensland Police,
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    has a specialized task force
    for child sexual exploitation,
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    Taskforce Argos.
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    And they were the ones that led this
    operation. There wasn’t any sort of
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    an official statement from Queensland
    Police saying: “Hey look, we unmasked
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    all of these criminals in the U.S.”.
    It was only by piecing together
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    pretty spread-out (?) U.S. court documents
    that I could map the contours of this
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    hacking operation that everyone
    kind of wants to keep quiet about.
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    So in 2014 Taskforce Argos take over
    another Darkweb child porn site
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    called ‘The Love Zone’. They run it – not
    for 13 days like the FBI but for 6 months,
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    posing as the site’s administrator
    who they’d already arrested.
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    According to one document – not this one –
    the Australians obtained at least
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    30 IP addresses of U.S. based
    users of the site. I don’t know
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    about other countries yet, it’s only
    through these U.S. court documents
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    that we’ve been able to figure this out.
    And the way they did it was
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    pretty different to the FBI. What they
    would do is they would send a link
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    to a suspect, for a video file.
    The suspect would click the link,
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    they will get a warning, saying: “Warning,
    you’re opening a file on an external site,
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    do you want to continue?” Something to
    that effect. If the person ignored
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    the warning and clicked “Yes”
    a video of real child pornography
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    played on the supect’s machine,
    and then that video phoned home
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    to an Australian server. I mean, you can
    debate whether this is hacking or not.
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    I mean the FBI weren’t clearly delivering
    a Tor browser exploit with malware etc.
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    Is this hacking? I would say so. If we
    think the phishing for Government e-mails
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    is hacking – sure. But that’s kind of the
    trivial debate, anyway. The real debate
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    is: was this a search in illegal sense of
    the word? Did the Australians obtain
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    information from a private place, namely
    a private computer, in a private residence,
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    and did they get a search warrant to do
    that? And again, we don’t know,
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    because they wont't talk to me.
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    So clearly, that was all about child abuse
    and child pornography investigations.
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    Insofar this sort of international hacking,
    as far as we know, as far as I know,
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    has only been used for those sorts of
    investigations. But as for the future
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    with Rule 41, the changes there, we could
    presumably see it to go to other types
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    of investigations, maybe Darkweb drug
    markets. Plenty of these markets have
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    dedicated vendor-only sections that you
    can only login to if you are a drug dealer
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    on the site. I mean here, this isn’t from
    NIT or a malware investigation.
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    This is when Carnegie Mellon University
    attacked the Tor network, obtained
  • 20:45 - 20:49
    IP addresses, and then gave those – well,
    was subpoenaed for those and gave them
  • 20:49 - 20:55
    to the FBI. But the key part is that in
    this search warrant it’s saying: “Hey look,
  • 20:55 - 20:58
    there’s probable cause because this
    suspect was logging in to the
  • 20:58 - 21:04
    drug dealer-only section of Silk Road 2.0
    so we have reason to raid his house”.
  • 21:04 - 21:08
    I can easily see this sort of section
    being in a malware warrant or an NIT
  • 21:08 - 21:14
    warrant, as well. And then I suppose the
    other more obvious example
  • 21:14 - 21:19
    – if that hasn’t happened already –
    is putting a piece of malware to hack
  • 21:19 - 21:23
    suspects internationally on a Jihadi
    forum. Maybe in administrator or moderator
  • 21:23 - 21:29
    sections, so you know you’re gonna be
    targeting high-ranking members of the forum.
  • 21:29 - 21:31
    I mean I personally don’t know if that
    would be the FBI or another agency
  • 21:31 - 21:36
    doing that. But that’s clearly somewhere
    where malware can be useful
  • 21:36 - 21:43
    in international context. But apart from
    predicting where this might go, I mean,
  • 21:43 - 21:47
    clearly this is gonna continue, just a few
    weeks ago there was a Firefox zeroday
  • 21:47 - 21:53
    out in the wild. Me and my colleague
    Lorenzo tracked it back to a specific
  • 21:53 - 21:57
    child porn site in the Darkweb where
    that 0-day had been deployed.
  • 21:57 - 22:02
    So this is an active thing.
    This is still going on.
  • 22:02 - 22:07
    And that’s it. But… just a last thing
    if you have any documents, data,
  • 22:07 - 22:12
    information, tips on FBI malware,
    law enforcement malware, who is using it,
  • 22:12 - 22:18
    who is buying it, how they’re using it –
    these are my various contact channels.
  • 22:18 - 22:19
    Thanks a lot!
    applause
  • 22:19 - 22:30
    ongoing applause
  • 22:30 - 22:35
    Herald: Thank you, Joseph.
    Thank you.
  • 22:35 - 22:42
    Any questions from the audience?
  • 22:42 - 22:46
    Oh, we got one on [microphone] 4.
  • 22:46 - 22:49
    Question: Thanks for the talk.
    Really nice. Quick question,
  • 22:49 - 22:54
    you’ve presented
    some pretty illegal things.
  • 22:54 - 22:59
    On both sides.
    On child pornography,
  • 22:59 - 23:04
    and all of those things.
    And on the law enforcer’s side.
  • 23:04 - 23:10
    Now my question is, did you intentionally
    mention those really illegal aspects
  • 23:10 - 23:16
    like child pornography to justify the
    actions of the FBI in any way?
  • 23:16 - 23:20
    Joseph: You mean, did I specifically
    speak about child pornography
  • 23:20 - 23:22
    to justify the FBI’s actions?
    Question: Yes.
  • 23:22 - 23:28
    Joseph: No. This is just… I mean child
    pornography and child sexual exploitation
  • 23:28 - 23:32
    is where law enforcement are using the
    really cool stuff. This is where they’re
  • 23:32 - 23:37
    using their Tor Browser exploits. This is
    where they’re using their Firefox zerodays.
  • 23:37 - 23:41
    And I’m just attracted to where the cops
    are doing interesting things.
  • 23:41 - 23:47
    So, if it was on drug markets I’d cover
    that as well. But at the moment,
  • 23:47 - 23:52
    at least to my knowledge, it’s just
    localized to the child pornography
  • 23:52 - 23:56
    investigations. Presumably, because law
    enforcement feel like not many people
  • 23:56 - 24:00
    are going to argue with them with maybe
    doing illegal search for child porn
  • 24:00 - 24:04
    because everybody finds that crime
    abhorrent. But, no, that’s just
  • 24:04 - 24:05
    how it is at the moment.
  • 24:05 - 24:09
    Question: Okay, let me rephrase that.
    Do you feel it’s justified for them
  • 24:09 - 24:11
    to use exploits?
  • 24:11 - 24:13
    Joseph: Do I feel it’s justified for
    them to use exploits? I don’t think
  • 24:13 - 24:19
    it’s anything intrinsically wrong
    with law enforcement hacking.
  • 24:19 - 24:25
    But even though child pornography is
    an absolutely disgusting crime
  • 24:25 - 24:29
    and I can’t find it, obviously, any way
    to justify it I also want law enforcement
  • 24:29 - 24:32
    to follow the law.
    And to respect the law as well.
  • 24:32 - 24:37
    applause
  • 24:37 - 24:43
    Question: Thank you.
    ongoing applause
  • 24:43 - 24:50
    Herald: Any other questions?
    Anybody from IRC?
  • 24:50 - 24:53
    The (?) on 5, go ahead.
  • 24:53 - 24:57
    Question: Well, I wanted to ask probably
    the same question whether it’s dubious
  • 24:57 - 25:01
    from the moral point of view?
    And you already answered it.
  • 25:01 - 25:05
    You don’t see it dubious as I understand,
    right? As the legislation can be questioned,
  • 25:05 - 25:11
    and should be rearranged there is not much
    ethical discussion whether this should be
  • 25:11 - 25:16
    done or not. But while you were at the
    topic for a while: do you have any other
  • 25:16 - 25:20
    proposals how to resolve this issue,
    maybe? Technically,
  • 25:20 - 25:22
    from the technical point of view.
  • 25:22 - 25:25
    Joseph: Sure. So I mean, just before
    I answer that I just wanna make clear
  • 25:25 - 25:30
    that I’m, like a journalist,
    not an activist or a technologist.
  • 25:30 - 25:34
    I don’t think it will be right for me to
    say this is how we should combat this.
  • 25:34 - 25:38
    I’m just saying, hey, that’s what
    the FBI did. That sort of thing.
  • 25:38 - 25:45
    But to answer the question, I think
    Mozilla and Tor have been working
  • 25:45 - 25:51
    on a way to stop this sort of
    de-anonymization attack, that,
  • 25:51 - 25:56
    when the FBI would hit a computer with
    their exploits and then the NIT code
  • 25:56 - 26:01
    would deploy, that’s not enough. I really
    can’t remember the technical details
  • 26:01 - 26:05
    off the top (?) in my head, but there is an
    article online that I wrote.
  • 26:05 - 26:08
    But then they would have
    to break out of the sandbox as well.
  • 26:08 - 26:12
    But more to answer your question
    generally: there are technological solutions
  • 26:12 - 26:17
    that people are making here. And they
    could be live pretty soon. But then
  • 26:17 - 26:20
    what is the FBI gonna do after that?
    They’re not gonna stop making malware.
  • 26:20 - 26:25
    They’re gonna… they’ll deploy a nit that
    will then rummage through your computer
  • 26:25 - 26:29
    and find incriminating documents and then
    phone home. If they can’t get your real
  • 26:29 - 26:34
    IP address they’re gonna
    get evidence somehow.
  • 26:34 - 26:36
    Herald: No.1 was up next.
  • 26:36 - 26:41
    Question: Hi Joseph. In your background
    research on law enforcement
  • 26:41 - 26:46
    using technology like this to target child
    porn sites. So you profiled the FBI
  • 26:46 - 26:49
    on how they may have (?)(?) around
    some of the letter of the law
  • 26:49 - 26:53
    in order to get done the job they needed
    to get done. Are the other law enforcement
  • 26:53 - 26:58
    agencies you found that are kind of like
    a gold standard in their approach
  • 26:58 - 27:02
    to solving this problem that abide
    by the rules, and maybe
  • 27:02 - 27:04
    solve this problem in a different way?
  • 27:04 - 27:07
    Joseph: When you say… so the question
    was, are there other law enforcement
  • 27:07 - 27:12
    agencies who may be better or the same
    sort of standard (?) as the FBI this problem.
  • 27:12 - 27:15
    When you say “this problem” you mean
    “combating child porn on the Darkweb”?
  • 27:15 - 27:18
    Question: Yeah, clearly something needs to
    be done about these sites. And there’s
  • 27:18 - 27:24
    a limited number of options available.
    So the FBI is kind of busted out (?)
  • 27:24 - 27:27
    in trying every single piece of technology
    they can to solve it. But are there others
  • 27:27 - 27:32
    that maybe take a more restraint approach
    but still solve the problem?
  • 27:32 - 27:38
    Joseph: When it specifically comes
    to malware I haven’t seen much
  • 27:38 - 27:44
    in the wild or publicly but in the U.K.
    GCHQ, the country’s
  • 27:44 - 27:51
    signals intelligence agency has said,
    or a report said, it is using
  • 27:51 - 27:57
    bulk interception, so GCHQ’s mass
    surveillance capabilities, to do
  • 27:57 - 28:01
    traffic correlation attacks, and they
    can then unmask Darkweb users
  • 28:01 - 28:06
    and hidden service IP addresses.
    That’s not malware but that is
  • 28:06 - 28:11
    an extreme use of technological
    capability, I guess.
  • 28:11 - 28:17
    And yeah, we could definitely see
    more of that. I think in the report
  • 28:17 - 28:21
    the Home Office said the GCHQ had got
    something like 50 individuals
  • 28:21 - 28:26
    in the past 18 months through bulk traffic
    analysis. That’s not malware,
  • 28:26 - 28:28
    but yeah, that’s where stuff could go,
    definitely.
  • 28:28 - 28:30
    Question: Cool. Thanks.
  • 28:30 - 28:34
    Herald: I give you one last question,
    it will be number 4, over here.
  • 28:34 - 28:39
    Question: Hi, I was wondering, because you
    mentioned bulk analysis which I considered
  • 28:39 - 28:44
    to be significantly worse than targeted
    analysis, in the way that it violates
  • 28:44 - 28:48
    everybody’s liberties rather than specific
    individuals who are definitely engaging
  • 28:48 - 28:53
    in criminal activity.
  • 28:53 - 28:57
    So why is it you feel that there’s
    some kind of violation,
  • 28:57 - 29:02
    like these people they need to find
    these criminals, and the jurisdiction
  • 29:02 - 29:06
    needs to be significantly wider,
    and I understand that it’s terrible
  • 29:06 - 29:09
    that they’re hacking us. But at the same
    time they need to be caught. So how
  • 29:09 - 29:17
    can they make legislation that’s
    able to find these people legally
  • 29:17 - 29:21
    when it’s outside of their jurisdiction,
    and they might be targeting people,
  • 29:21 - 29:25
    if they’re doing a dragnet on a website,
    like you’re example. And they’re gonna be
  • 29:25 - 29:27
    hacking people that are not in their
    country. They can’t limit it to the people
  • 29:27 - 29:32
    that are in that country. And only hack
    those people. It’s technically impossible.
  • 29:32 - 29:37
    So what’s the solution for this?
  • 29:37 - 29:41
    Joseph: I mean, some senators in the US
    did propose a Stop Mass Hacking Act
  • 29:41 - 29:46
    which would have blocked the Rule 41
    changes. It was unsuccessful, and
  • 29:46 - 29:50
    in part – this is just my personal
    opinion – I think it’s because they
  • 29:50 - 29:55
    didn’t present a viable alternative.
    I mean, as you say, these people
  • 29:55 - 30:01
    need to be caught, I mean, that sort of
    thing, but when these senators said:
  • 30:01 - 30:05
    “Yeah, we need to stop all this global
    hacking” there was no alternative presented,
  • 30:05 - 30:11
    so we don’t know, basically.
    As for legislative changes
  • 30:11 - 30:16
    I think it’s more… it’s less the
    “Hey, here’s a concrete law or rule
  • 30:16 - 30:21
    that we need to fix right now”, it’s more
    like there’s a looming issue of
  • 30:21 - 30:27
    “What happens when the FBI hacks a child
    pornographer in Russia, or one who happens
  • 30:27 - 30:30
    to be a politician in another country?”
    Are they still gonna go, and then go
  • 30:30 - 30:34
    to local law enforcement, “Hey, we got
    this IP address of one of your senior
  • 30:34 - 30:38
    politicians who happens to be looking at
    child porn”. I mean what are the ramifications
  • 30:38 - 30:42
    of that gonna be? But to answer your
    question: we don’t really know.
  • 30:42 - 30:47
    It’s more of just this looming issue that
    law enforcements are firing malware
  • 30:47 - 30:52
    and asking questions later.
  • 30:52 - 30:55
    Herald: Thank you so much. If you got
    a round of applause for Joseph Cox!
  • 30:55 - 30:59
    applause
  • 30:59 - 31:02
    postroll music
  • 31:02 - 31:23
    Subtitles created by c3subtitles.de
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Title:
Law Enforcement Are Hacking the Planet (33c3)
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Video Language:
English
Duration:
31:23

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