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34C3 - BGP and the Rule of Custom

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    34c3 intro
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    Herald: And now please join me in welcoming
    Caleb, for his talk BGP and the Rule of Custom
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    Applause
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    Caleb James DeLisle: Thank you.
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    Thank you and thanks for
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    coming. Tonight I'm going to speak to you
    about the BGP protocol but it's not going
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    to be that technical. Specifically I'm
    going to concentrate on the way that BGP
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    molds human interactions. So there I'm
    aiming at making this a reasonably
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    accessible talk so if you catch me using
    slightly incorrect terms for something
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    consider that I'm optimizing not only for
    the clarity of the correctness but also
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    for the widest possible audience. So
    protocols that are at their root systems
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    of governance. So I'm gonna propose a
    framework to think about governance and
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    then as I describe BGP we can we will be
    able to analyze it through the lens of
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    that framework and so as my slide shows
    here I find it useful to dichotomize
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    governance systems into either
    institutional like democracy or network
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    like the family or like the CCC, and when
    you think about institutional governance
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    think about democracy, think about law,
    think about rights, equality, these are
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    all concepts which are protected for us by
    an institution in this case it's the state
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    and when you think about networks think
    more about the family, think about
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    reputation, honor, mutual respect. These
    are representations of the network
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    governance model, and the network
    governance model turns out to be very
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    important to BGP. Now I'm gonna argue that
    we need both institutional and networks
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    governance and each one should be used for
    what it's best for. So but first I'm going
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    to talk about where BGP came from. The
    year was 1989 and there were two people
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    named Kirk Lougheed and Yaakov Rekhter and
    they were having lunch and at the time the
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    Internet of the day, then known as NSFNET
    was facing impending collapse let's say.
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    The NSFNET was at the time, experiencing
    explosive growth and the EGP
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    routing protocol was reaching the point
    where it just could no longer work. So
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    during that lunch they defined a new
    protocol, which they jokingly referred to
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    as a two napkin protocol, because they had
    drawn their
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    diagrams out on those napkins. And we have
    here some photographs of those napkins.
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    Something to understand about BGP at the
    time, and it was that at this time the so-
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    called Internet was considered kind of
    this weird anarchist experiment. You see
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    real networks used grown-up protocols such
    as X.25 which among other things made sure
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    at the protocol level that when you sent a
    piece of data it would actually reach its
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    destination. By contrast, Internet Protocol
    was what we call a best-effort protocol
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    meaning that sometimes a packet might
    arrive mangled or maybe it wouldn't arrive
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    at all. Computers on the Internet usually
    just use the TCP protocol to put the
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    pieces back together and to resend the
    broken ones but TCP is not really part of
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    the Internet itself. It's more an
    application that runs over it and it's
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    telling that in this era the Internet was
    referred to as TCP / IP because at the
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    time it was expected that any network must
    be providing reliable transport. Now the
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    effect of IP's simplicity as compared to
    other networking protocols cannot be
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    overstated and to consider a different
    protocol even the one used in telephone
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    networks even to this day it's so mind-
    numbingly complex that it actually
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    encourages the telephone companies to
    monopolize in order to manage the protocol
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    that they use. In fact the SONET protocol
    that's used in the American telephone
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    companies - there's an equivalent one here
    in Europe - it actually requires
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    synchronized atomic clocks in the routers
    in order to schedule the messages so that
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    there's an empty moment in each line
    that's just for the message to pass
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    through. And in contrast the simplicity of
    IP and the political design of BGP have
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    allowed for just about anybody to become a
    network operator. So what is BGP? BGP is
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    a protocol which every Internet router
    uses to talk to other routers when they're
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    talking across an organizational boundary.
    See inside an organization you control all
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    the computers so you can have them talk
    any way they want
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    but when you talk across boundaries
    the lingua franca of
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    routing protocols is BGP. And BGP involves
    two types of identifiers which
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    organizations need to apply for. These are
    IP addresses which most people know about
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    and there are the lesser-known autonomous
    system numbers and each network provider
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    has an AS number. Both IP addresses and
    AS numbers are issued by ICANN through its
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    regional registries which manage this an
    issuance kind of in accordance to need.
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    And an autonomous system is a network
    operator such as an ISP or hosting
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    provider and having the AS number
    means that they're able to speak as equals
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    with all the other network operators. It
    also means that when they interconnect
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    with another network operator the fact
    that they're interconnected is public and
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    that's a very important little piece of
    BGP. Now BGP is unlike the EGP routing
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    protocol before it, a mesh protocol and
    this fact has proven highly significant
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    because it's created what I call the
    imperative to peer. And to understand the
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    imperative to peer, I'll give you a scenario.
    Let's say that you and I are each
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    a medium-sized network operator. So your
    customers want to talk to my customers, my
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    customers want to talk to your customers
    but as medium-sized network operators we
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    both need to buy Internet from somebody
    else that's bigger than us. In the
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    industry we call this the upstream
    provider and if my customers are asking
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    for web sites hosted by your customers
    normally what's going to happen is I'm
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    going to get those requests and I'm gonna
    have to send them to my upstream provider,
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    they're going to give them to your
    upstream provider who is going to give
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    them to you. But since we're both paying
    for those links to our upstream providers
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    there's, we're sort of paying for that
    traffic in a way, and now if you and I
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    happen to have routers in the same
    datacenter then we could just run a wire
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    across the room and then peer with one
    another and BGP will bypass our upstream
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    providers and route the traffic between me
    and you and
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    you and me. And it's much more
    efficient. Now it's important to
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    understand that peering means you and your
    customers will talk directly to me and my
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    customers. What it doesn't mean is that you
    can use me to reach my other peers, or
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    my peers peers, or my upstream, or someone
    else. To have to do that, you'd have to be
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    my customer because peering has this
    limitation it's usually mutually
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    beneficial for two ISPs to just peer and
    usually it happens with no money changing
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    hands and in fact it almost always happens
    there's not even any paper contract
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    that they just say that makes sense let's
    run a wire. Now in this scenario you and I
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    needed to have the upstream provider and
    you might wonder well who doesn't need an
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    upstream provider there must be someone at
    the top where is the core. Well the core
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    is a series of what we call Tier 1
    providers. And in this picture we have
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    white lines which represent the peering
    agreements and the red lines represent the
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    customer agreements. The Tier 1's are the
    people up at the top and they can reach
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    anywhere on the Internet using a peering
    agreement or a customer. They don't need
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    to buy Internet from anyone. However they
    do need to pay the upkeep on their massive
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    fiber-optic networks which give them the
    global reach to get these peering
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    agreements and to get these customers
    which makes them a Tier 1 in the first
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    place. And you can also see some
    interesting things in the case you can
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    have you can be a customer and also a peer
    and you can also have multiple upstream
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    providers. But with Tier 1 there's a bit
    of politics, see Tier 1's are hesitant to
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    peer with smaller operators if there is a
    chance that if they refuse to peer the
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    smaller one might alternatively become a
    customer and so it's a bit like marriages
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    between wealthy families because peering
    between Tier 1's it's a complex process and
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    they're each striving to ensure reciprocity
    of value. Now small networks
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    on the other hand they're not so concerned
    about this and so they're ready
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    to peer with each other quite liberally
    and this has created a situation known in
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    the industry as doughnut peering where in
    the Tier 1's are actually increasingly
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    being routed around and it's worthy of
    reflection the fact that while SONET with
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    a synchronized atomic clocks has made an
    incentive to monopoly. BGP with it's
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    imperative to peer has created a situation
    where monopoly is discouraged. However
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    this system also has means of preventing
    bad behavior on the Internet which it
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    works astonishingly well while at the same
    time preserving almost absolute free
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    expression. So this is a chart of the
    percentage of all email that is spam and
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    to understand why this chart is remarkable
    consider what a bad protocol email
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    is. Email is basically a push protocol
    with an unlimited free speech. So all you
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    got to do is get on the Internet, fire up a
    mail server and you can just send spam to
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    anyone. It's magic. So really this
    percentage should be like over 99% but
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    it's not. Well email is an old and heavily
    used protocol and the network operators
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    have made it kind of a special case. Email
    is actually one of the few protocols where
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    messing with it can get you kicked off the
    whole Internet even if you have your own
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    network AS number even if you are a
    network operator with peers and everything
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    you can still get chucked off the Internet
    if you mess around with mail. So I'm gonna
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    try to explain how this works and I'm
    going to do it by trying to think of
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    different types of actors that are, that
    exist in the Internet service sphere. So
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    there is a lot of actors of course but
    I've made these four main categories which
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    I think helps to explain the situation.
    And they're the customer, the provider,
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    the network operator and the civil society
    organization. So the customer is someone
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    like me. I take an IP address on loan from
    my cable provider at home and I take one
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    from my web hosting provider. It's not my
    IP address and it's not assigned to me. It
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    doesn't have my name on it and they can
    take
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    it back when I stop working with them.
    But that means I have relative anonymity
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    because I'm not out there looking for
    peers I have my provider they know who I
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    am, they know me, I know them, nobody else
    needs to know who that IP address is
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    associated with. However my provider can
    trivially turn off my access to the
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    Internet but by the same token I can
    usually choose which provider to patronize
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    as well modulo the monopolies in the cable
    companies. Providers on the other hand
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    they are not anonymous they have to
    maintain relationships with network
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    operators, they have to seek customers.
    They're out in the public. Providers also
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    have an incentive to keep customers so
    they can't be obviously scammy and they
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    shouldn't, they can't provide bad service.
    They probably shouldn't be scummy
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    and they can't provide bad service. They
    also have an imperative to stay friendly
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    with at least one network operator. If all
    the network operators just hate them then
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    they can't find Internet. Providers have
    their own IP addresses they're assigned to
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    them from the Internet registries and so
    they can connect with multiple network
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    operators including even having peers
    although in practice they often keep their
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    networks fairly simple. But because of the
    way BGP exchanges information, their peers
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    and their providers are publicly known,
    whereas me the little customer borrowing
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    an IP address I'm fairly opaque. Now
    network operators they're somewhat like
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    providers, they provide a service but in
    general they make their business around
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    providing raw Internet access to smaller
    providers and that's why I've
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    differentiated them. Network operators are
    very much not anonymous they have to have
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    large numbers of peering agreements and
    customers which again all of these
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    connections are transparent, because of the
    way BGP works and they're strongly
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    pressured by the imperative to peer. If
    they're not able to find peers then all
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    the network traffic will have to be paid
    for. It can even squeeze them out of the
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    market. They do have som
    powers though they can
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    refuse to peer with a network operator and
    they can even disconnect a customer which
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    they might do to maintain their
    reputation. Last group here is civil
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    society these are organizations like Team
    Cymru and Spamhaus. They dedicate their
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    time to shedding light on the bad guys of
    the Internet. They're not anonymous as
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    organisations although their members can
    be hidden and they also maintain lists of
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    IP addresses and AS numbers which are
    either known to be operated by spam
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    organizations or which are just unused and
    shouldn't be existing. Internet civil
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    society doesn't have any direct power but
    their power comes from their reputation
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    for providing valid and useful data.
    They're also able to do their job because
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    of the transparency of providers and
    network operators which is built into BGP.
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    I'm going to tell you a story about two
    providers. One is called McColo and the
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    other is called PRQ, both of these
    organizations were founded in 2004 and
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    both of them have been subject to certain
    controversy but tellingly one of them
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    still remains with us and the other one is
    long gone. So this is a splash page of
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    McColo back in 2008 before it went dark.
    McColo was founded by a 19 year old
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    student named Nicola McColo and it thrived
    for four years before being taken down.
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    McColo provided what's known as
    bulletproof hosting. That means hosting
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    where the provider will keep your server
    online no matter what you do with it.
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    Bulletproof hosting providers choose not
    to cooperate with civil society or even
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    law enforcement unless they're forced to.
    And in November of 2008 the Washington
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    Post gathered some damning evidence that
    McColo was a hosting provider mostly
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    interested in providing service for
    spammers. What's interesting is that
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    rather than send this evidence to the
    police they sent it to McColo's network
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    operators. Like many providers McColo
    bought Internet access from two major
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    network operators. In this case it was a
    Hurricane Electric and Global
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    Crossing. When Hurricane and Global
    Crossing were given this information from
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    The Washington Post they voluntarily chose
    to abruptly ceased doing business with
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    McColo and the provider was caught off
    guard and it and all of its customers went
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    offline. Here is the global volume of spam
    which dropped to that day by as much as
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    75%. Needless to say no other network
    provider was beginning or ready to begin
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    selling service to McColo and their
    business crumbled. Now PRQ is in some ways
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    similar to McColo heeey and in some ways
    they're quite different. PRQ was founded
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    by two Swedish guys known in BitTorrent
    circles as anakata and Tiamo and they
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    provide what I call last resort hosting.
    They've hosted highly controversial
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    websites such as WikiLeaks but they're
    probably best known for hosting The Pirate
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    Bay. The Pirate Bay stands out is probably
    one of the most famous websites to
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    publicly flaunt copyright. Going to the
    extent of actually publishing abuse
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    complaints along with their sarcastic and
    humiliating responses. This is something
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    that the copyright industry had never seen
    before. High-power lawyers are just not
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    accustomed to getting replies signed go
    fuck yourself. So all four of the founders
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    have spent some time in prison and the
    site's data centers have been raided
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    multiple times and supposedly Hollywood
    even use threats of trade sanctions
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    against Sweden to force them to shut this
    thing down. But we find that as McColo has
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    drifted into historical obscurity, The
    Pirate Bay is still alive and has even
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    become something of a cultural
    institution. And we also find that unlike
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    McColo, PRQ and The Pirate Bay have never
    had any problem with their network
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    operators. So one of the fundamental
    tenets of the Internet is that network
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    operators are morally but not legally
    responsible for the activities of their
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    customers and peers. So they may choose
    who they do business with and they will
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    not be held to legal account for these
    decisions. What are the lessons that we
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    can take away from this?
    Recently there's been a lot of
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    work done on federated social networking
    protocols. I'm sure some of you will take
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    part in this development but the vast
    majority of you will be evaluating them to
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    make decisions about which technology to
    adopt and I urge you to give some thought
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    toward the political identities of the
    protocols which you make or which you
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    choose to make your own. Like many things
    systems of communication are defined
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    largely by what they reject, whether that
    be packets larger than 1500 bytes or Nazi
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    propaganda. And in a protocol I identify
    three main ways that these rules can be
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    defined. The first is what we hard code
    into the software source code. Some
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    examples are message formats and
    permission systems but hardcoded rules
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    can be extended further with cryptography
    and especially with block chains. Hard
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    coded rules are a perfect example of
    institutional governance they can be very
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    fair. They are very fair because code
    applies the rules equally to everyone and
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    for things which we consider a basic human
    right such as private communications and
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    things which are easily quantifiable in
    software, hardcoding can be the best
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    solution. However hard rules do have a
    downside, Ethereum a cryptocurrency based
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    heavily on the libertarian philosophy of
    freedom of contract found itself in a bit
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    of a quandary when a bug was discovered in
    one of the very significant contract
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    allowing for all the money to be stolen
    out of that contract. For those who don't
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    follow the topic Ethereum was hard forked
    in order to stop the errant contract and
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    everybody had to update and while the fork
    itself protected the participants in the
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    contract it struck a serious blow to the
    fundamental philosophy of Ethereum and it
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    serves as a warning that we have a
    downside to hardcoding. The second source
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    is of course the central authority. The
    Internet uses ICANN as a central authority
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    to manage allocation of domain names, IP
    addresses and autonomous system numbers.
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    The central authority
    is kind of a poster child of institutional
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    governance. Like hardcoded rules, rule by
    central authority also tends to be
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    egalitarian. Moreover a central authority
    is actually capable of equity because it
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    can comprehend people's different
    situations and adapt to them. Something
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    that a hardcoded rule cannot do but a
    central authority like a hardcoded rule
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    is prone to coldness and bureaucracy and
    moreover it's quite difficult to create
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    central authorities which do not give
    certain individuals unaccountable power
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    over others. The third source of rules or
    in this case customs where this talk gets
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    its name is from the network and this is
    how the network operators and how BGP
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    mostly managed to keep email spam and
    other bad things off the Internet. The
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    network is by far the most humane form of
    governance. Social norms are passed along
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    from friend to friend rather than rules
    being forced down upon people by central
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    authority or source code. And we see
    network-like systems in families ancient
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    tribal societies as well as royalty and
    elite in kingdoms and of course online.
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    However in electronic networks we tend to
    associate it with, we get to choose who
  • 22:54 - 23:00
    we associate with from any connected
    person in the world and but networks also
  • 23:00 - 23:05
    have a downside they're not egalitarian in
    any way. Those central in the network are
  • 23:05 - 23:10
    simply more powerful than those on the
    edges. In the feudal system law was often
  • 23:10 - 23:14
    applied differently to a person based on
    how they were dressed or what family they
  • 23:14 - 23:21
    were from. And the origin of the term rule
    of law it was initially described as a
  • 23:21 - 23:27
    better alternative to rule of the king or
    rule of man. We have the law we
  • 23:27 - 23:33
    have the state because people demanded
    them as in this case the inequity of the
  • 23:33 - 23:38
    network rule proved unacceptable. But
    there's an important difference between
  • 23:38 - 23:46
    BGP's rule of custom and the patently
    unjust feudal system. BGP is transparent.
  • 23:46 - 23:50
    We know which network operators are
    interconnected with whom and we know who
  • 23:50 - 23:55
    is protecting the bad actors
    and in every case we find dystopia
  • 23:55 - 24:00
    whenever there's power without
    transparency either in opaque proprietary
  • 24:00 - 24:05
    code, unaccountable central authorities or
    in networks which form mafias, secret
  • 24:05 - 24:11
    societies in the feudal system. And I
    think the key message from BGP has to be
  • 24:11 - 24:18
    that whether in central authorities or in
    networks. Power and privacy do not mix.
  • 24:18 - 24:24
    With any measure of power there must be
    equal transparency and accountability.
  • 24:24 - 24:30
    Applause
  • 24:30 - 24:36
    So in closing. I hope you go out there and
    make protocols and make systems which far
  • 24:36 - 24:44
    surpass what we have today and to do that
    I suggest looking at the past and what
  • 24:44 - 24:49
    protocols have been highly successful and
    try to identify why they worked. Also look
  • 24:49 - 24:57
    at the ones that didn't work. Look at the
    things that died in a hell storm of spam
  • 24:57 - 25:02
    and try to keep it simple. I developed
    some software before and something I
  • 25:02 - 25:07
    learned the hard way is that complexity
    becomes the enemy of adoption so maybe
  • 25:07 - 25:11
    it's a good idea we all write our
    protocols on napkins. Thank you.
  • 25:11 - 25:22
    Applause
  • 25:22 - 25:24
    Herald: Thank you Caleb.
    We now have five minutes
  • 25:24 - 25:28
    for questions you know the drill. Please
    line up at the microphones there's four
  • 25:28 - 25:32
    microphones two in the middle, one there,
    one there. please don't leave the room
  • 25:32 - 25:36
    until the talk is over. If you stood up
    you can leave but the rest please
  • 25:36 - 25:39
    stay seated you can spare five minutes
    it's a lot of noise that people keep
  • 25:39 - 25:43
    leaving during the Q&A.
    Microphone number one please.
  • 25:43 - 25:50
    Question: Hello I'm from Sweden. I
    really like to talk to have a overview of
  • 25:50 - 25:57
    this I think it was mostly correct. I
    would say that I'm working with both the
  • 25:57 - 26:06
    BGP and DNS and those association with
    ICANN but I think you put them all on the
  • 26:06 - 26:10
    you give them a bit too much power they
    are not that powerful unless you describe
  • 26:10 - 26:16
    them. They don't decide everything about
    DNS and everything. They're running the
  • 26:16 - 26:21
    IANA contract for these domain names and
    numbers and stuff like that. On behalf of
  • 26:21 - 26:27
    the community like the IETF and other
    multi-stakeholder organizations. So they
  • 26:27 - 26:33
    only have the power over the new top-level
    domains they don't have the power over the
  • 26:33 - 26:41
    common domain or .se domain in Sweden or
    .ch in Switzerland so if .se or .ch would
  • 26:41 - 26:46
    like to have The Pirate Bay, ICANN has
    nothing to do with that.
  • 26:46 - 26:48
    Herald: Could you get to the question please?
  • 26:48 - 26:51
    Question: No it's not a question.
    More to show that ICANN is
  • 26:51 - 26:56
    not the king.
    Herald: There are other people queueing please.
  • 26:56 - 27:00
    Herald: Microphone number two please.
    Question 2: Thank you. Great great
  • 27:00 - 27:09
    lecture. So what actually is the reason
    why some illegal activities are tolerated
  • 27:09 - 27:17
    by ISPs and some like child abuse is not?
    Speaker: That's a great question. I
  • 27:17 - 27:27
    think that what it comes down to is what
    is socially acceptable. So when you have
  • 27:27 - 27:31
    why does some activity, why does some
    illegal activity like smoking a joint
  • 27:31 - 27:38
    outside, not cause you to have the police and
    other activity like murdering somebody
  • 27:38 - 27:43
    would. It's all about what is socially
    acceptable to the people around you and
  • 27:43 - 27:47
    what is socially acceptable to the people
    around them and in the case of ISPs
  • 27:47 - 27:51
    somebody is peering with the the people
    that serve The Pirate Bay somebody else
  • 27:51 - 27:55
    looks at that and says it's not, I don't
    feel that that's a problem somebody else
  • 27:55 - 27:59
    looks at them and says I don't feel but
    people who think that is a problem and so
  • 27:59 - 28:02
    it's okay. I hope this answers your
    question.
  • 28:02 - 28:07
    Herald: Do we have an Internet question?
    No. Okay microphone number one please.
  • 28:07 - 28:14
    Question 3: Why do you think network
    operators being morally but not literally
  • 28:14 - 28:18
    responsible for what content they accept
    on the network worked so well for McColo
  • 28:18 - 28:23
    and PRQ and doesn't work at all for social
    media?
  • 28:23 - 28:27
    Speaker: Oh great great question. Why it
    doesn't work. If I understand you
  • 28:27 - 28:35
    properly? Why Twitter is still a crap
    hole. It is. Well here's the thing Twitter
  • 28:35 - 28:42
    has it's - I am probably getting sued
    - it's a, it's basically an
  • 28:42 - 28:46
    institutional governance system. They said
    like we're in charge everybody is flat on
  • 28:46 - 28:53
    here so on top of a network governance
    system they built in a institutional
  • 28:53 - 28:57
    governance system and the institutional
    governance system it's like a high school
  • 28:57 - 29:05
    it's just it's terrible. So I should use
    this opportunity to plug Mastodon because
  • 29:05 - 29:10
    Mastodon is an example of a system which
    is federated and looks well it doesn't
  • 29:10 - 29:16
    look exactly like BGP but I think it will
    in five years.
  • 29:16 - 29:23
    Applause
  • 29:23 - 29:25
    Herald: One hopefully brief question from
    two please.
  • 29:25 - 29:29
    Question 4: Yes. Hi. Thank you very much
    for talking about BGP. As someone who
  • 29:29 - 29:33
    knows a lot about BGP and I was kind of
    wondering if you could help answer a
  • 29:33 - 29:38
    question and that's that I kind of view
    BGP is kind of like a static protocol and
  • 29:38 - 29:42
    it was stuck it was written on two napkins
    and it's been a little bit expanded beyond
  • 29:42 - 29:48
    that. My concern is like with, with rogue
    countries or someone else harnessing IP
  • 29:48 - 29:54
    blocks and like sync holding traffic for
    google.com or facebook.com which has
  • 29:54 - 29:58
    happened several times in the last couple
    years can you think of a way where you can
  • 29:58 - 30:04
    either get BGP to conquer that problem or
    with the new decentralized protocol to
  • 30:04 - 30:08
    conquer that problem?
    Speaker: Filters, filters, filters.
  • 30:08 - 30:14
    Basically. I don't know that much about
    BGP but I know that some people are in the
  • 30:14 - 30:18
    business of making their filters from the
    data that's in the WHOIS database that
  • 30:18 - 30:22
    just say this is what you're allowed to
    announce cool this is we'll build a filter
  • 30:22 - 30:27
    that's what your your box can send to us.
    The problem is that ISPs are lazy and we
  • 30:27 - 30:33
    don't have we don't have standardized
    stuff for making these filters so we end
  • 30:33 - 30:37
    up with a lot of people just sit putting
    no filter and saying yeah announce
  • 30:37 - 30:41
    whatever you want and then you know China
    announces Google and all the traffic goes
  • 30:41 - 30:45
    like this.
    Herald: And that's all for today.
  • 30:45 - 30:48
    Thank you Caleb.
  • 30:48 - 30:50
    Applause
  • 30:50 - 30:55
    34c3 outro
  • 30:55 - 31:12
    subtitles created by c3subtitles.de
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Title:
34C3 - BGP and the Rule of Custom
Description:

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Video Language:
English
Duration:
31:12

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