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Using Models to Decide, Strategize, and Design

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    Hi, in this lecture we are going to look
    at our fourth category of reasons about why
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    you'd want to take a course in modeling,
    why modeling is so important. And that is
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    to help you make better decisions,
    strategize better, and design things
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    better. So lets get started, this should
    be a lot of fun. Alright, so first reason
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    why models are so useful. They are good
    decision aides, they help you make better
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    decisions. Let me give you an example.
    These get us going here. So what you see
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    is a whole bunch of different financial
    institutions, these are companies like
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    Bear Sterns, AIG, CitiGroup, Morgan
    Stanley and this represents the
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    relationship between these companies, in
    terms of how one of their economic success
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    depends on another. Now imagine you are
    the federal government and you've got a
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    financial crisis. So a lot of these
    companies, or some of these companies are
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    starting to fail and you've got to decide
    okay do I bail them out, do I save one of
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    these companies? Well now lets use one of
    these very simple models to help make that
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    decision. So to do that we need a little
    more of an understanding of what
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    these numbers represent. So lets look at
    AIG which is right here. And JP Morgan
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    which is right here So now we see a number
    of 466 between the two of those. What that
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    number represents is how correlated JP
    Morgan success is with AIG success. In
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    particular how correlated their failures are. So if
    AIG has a bad day, how likely is it that
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    JP Morgan has a bad day? And we see that
    it is a really big number. Now if you look
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    up here at this 94, this represents the link between Wells
    Fargo and Lehman Brothers. What that tells
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    us is that Lehman Brothers has a bad day,
    well it only has a small effect on Wells
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    Fargo and vice versa. So now you are the
    government and you got to decide, okay who do I
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    want to bail out? Nobody or somebody? Lets
    look at Lehman Brothers. There's only
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    three lines going in and out of Lehman
    Brothers and one is a 94. I guess four
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    lines, one is a 103, one is a 158 and one
    is a 155. Those are relatively small
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    numbers. So if you're the government you
    say, okay Lehman Brothers has been around
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    a long time and its an important company,
    these numbers are pretty small, if they
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    fail it doesn't look like these other
    companies would fail. But now lets look at
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    AIG. We've got a 466, we've got a 441,
    we've got a 456, we've got a 390 and a
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    490. So there are huge numbers associated
    with AIG. Because there is a huge number
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    you basically have to figure, you know
    what we probably have to prop AIG back up.
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    Even if you don't want to because if you
    don't there is the possibility that this
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    whole system will fail. So what we see
    here is the incredible power of models,
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    right to help us make a better decision.
    The government did let Lehman Brothers
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    fail, and terrible for Lehman
    Brothers, but the economy sort of
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    soldiered on. They didn't let AIG fail and
    we don't know for sure that it would've
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    and we don't know for sure that the whole
    financial you know apparatus United
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    States, they propped up AIG and you know
    we made it, the country made it. It looks
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    they've made a reasonable decision.
    Alright so that is big financial
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    decisions. Lets look at something more
    fun. This is a simple sort of logic puzzle
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    that will help us see how models can be
    useful. Now this is a game called, The
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    Monty Hall Problem and its named after
    Monty Hall was the host of a game show
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    called, Lets Make a Deal that aired during
    the 1970's. Now the problem I'm going to
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    describe to you is a characterization of a
    event that could happen on the show. Its
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    one of several scenarios on the show.
    Here's basically how it works. There's
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    three doors. Behind one of these doors is
    a prize, behind the other two doors there's some, you
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    know, silly thing like a goat right, or a
    woman dressed up in a ballerinas outfit.
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    So one of them had something fantastic
    like a new car or a washing machine. Now
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    what you get to do is you pick one door.
    So maybe you pick door number one, right,
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    so you pick door number one. Now Monty
    knows where the prize is so the two doors
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    you didn't pick, one of those always has
    to go behind it, where you know, silly
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    prize behind it. So because one of us
    always has a silly prize behind it, he
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    can always show you one of those other two
    doors. So you pick door number one, right,
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    and what Monty does, you picked one and
    what Monty does is he then opens up door
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    number three and says, here's a goat, then
    he says, hey, do you want to switch to
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    door number two? Well, do you? Alright,
    that's a hard problem so let's first try
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    to get the logic right then we'll right
    down a formal model. So, it's easier to
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    see the logic for this problem by
    increasing the number of doors. So let's
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    suppose there's five doors, and now
    there's five doors, let's suppose you pick
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    this blue door, this bright blue door. The
    probability that you're correct is 1/5th.
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    Right, one of the doors has prize, the
    probability you're correct is 1/5th. So
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    the probability that you're not correct Is
    4/5ths. So, there's a 1/5th chance you're
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    correct. There's a 4/5ths chance you're
    not. Now let's suppose that Monty
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    [inaudible] is also playing this game,
    because he knows again, he knows the
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    answer. So Monty is thinking, okay, well,
    you know what, I'm gonna show you that
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    it's not behind the yellow door. And then
    he says, you know what else I'm going to
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    show you, that it's not behind the pink
    door. [inaudible]. I'm gonna be nice, I'm
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    gonna show you it's not behind the green
    door. Now he says, do you want to switch
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    to the light blue door to the dark blue
    door. Well in this case, you should start
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    thinking, you know initially the
    probability I was right was only 1/5th And
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    he revealed all those other doors that
    doesn't seem to have the prize. It seems
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    much more likely that this is the correct
    door than mine's the correct door and in
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    fact it is much more [inaudible]. The
    probability is 4/5ths it's behind that
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    dark blue door and only 1/5th it's behind
    your door. So you should switch and you
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    should also switch in the case of two. Now
    let's formalize this. This isn't so much,
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    this is, we'll use the simple decision
    three model. To show why in fact you
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    should switch. Alright, so let's start
    out, we'll just do some basic probability.
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    There's three doors, you pick door number
    one, the probability you're right is a
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    third and the probability that it's door
    number two is a third and the probability
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    that it's door number three is a third.
    Now, what we want to do is break this into
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    two sets. There's a 1/3rd chance that
    you're right and there's a 2/3rds chance
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    that you're wrong. After you pick door
    number one, the prize can't be moved. So
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    it's either behind door number two, number
    three or if you got it right, it's behind
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    door number one. So let's think about what
    Monty can do. Monty can basically show you
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    if it's behind door number one or door
    number two, he can show you door number
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    three. He can say look, there's the goat.
    Well if he does that, because he can
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    always show you one of these doors,
    nothing happened to your probability of
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    1/3rd. There's a 1/3rd chance you were
    right before since he can always show you
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    a door, there's still only a 1/3rd chance
    you're right. Right, alternatively,
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    suppose that, It was behind door number
    three well then he can show you door
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    number two. He can say the goat's here.
    So, it's still the case that nothing
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    happens to your probability. The reason
    why when you think about these two sets,
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    you didn't learn anything. You learn
    nothing about this other set right here,
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    the 2/3rds chance you're wrong because he
    can always show you a goat. So your
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    initial chan-, your initial probability
    being correct was 1/3rd, your final chance
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    of being correct was probably 1/3rd. So
    just this sort of idea of drawing circles
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    and writing probabilities allows us to see
    that the correct The correct decision on
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    the [inaudible] problem is to switch,
    right. Just like when we looked at that
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    financial decision that the Federal
    Government had to make with the circles
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    and the arrows, you draw that out, and you
    realize the best decision is to let the
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    [inaudible] fail. Bailout AIG. Alright so
    lets move on a look sort of the next
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    reason that models can be helpful and that
    is comparative statics. What do I mean by
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    that? Well here is a standard model from
    economics, what we can think of is
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    comparative statics means you know you
    move from one equilibrium to another. So
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    what you see here is that S is a supply
    curve, that is a supply curve for some
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    good, and D, D1 and D2 are demand curves.
    So what you see is demand shifting out. So
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    when this demand shifts out. In this way
    what we get is that more goods are sold
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    the quantity goes up, and the price goes
    up so people want more of something, more
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    is gonna get sold and the price is up. So
    this is where you start seeing how the
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    equilibrium moves so this is again a
    simple example of how. Models help us
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    understand how the world will change,
    equilibrium world, just by drawing some
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    simple figures. Alright, reason number
    three. Counter factuals, what do I mean by
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    that? Well you can think you only get to
    run the world once, you only get to run
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    the tape one time. But if we write models
    of the world we can sort of re-run the
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    tape using those models. So here is an
    example, in April of 2009, The spring of
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    2009, the Federal Government decided to
    implement a recovery plan. Well what you
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    see here is sort of the effect, this line
    right here shows the effect with the
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    recovery plan, and this line shows, says,
    this is what a model shows what would of
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    happened without the recovery plan. Now we
    can't be sure that, that happened, but,
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    you know, at least we have some
    understanding, perhaps, of what the effect
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    of recovery plan was, which is great. So
    these counter factuals are not going to be
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    exact, there going to be approximate, but
    still they help us figure out. After the
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    fact whether a policy was a good policy or
    not. Reason number four. To identify and
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    rank levers. So what we are going to do is
    look at a simple model of contagion of
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    failure, so this is a model where one
    country might fail, so in this case that
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    country is going to be England. Then we
    can ask what happens over time, so you can
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    see that initially after England fails, we
    see Ireland and Belgium fail, and after
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    that we see France fail. And after that we
    see Germany fail. So what this tells us is
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    that in terms of its effect on the worlds
    financial system, London is a big lever,
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    so London is something we care about a
    great deal. Now lets take another policy
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    issue, climate change. One of the big
    things in climate change is the carbon
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    cycle, its one of the models that you use
    all the time, simple carbon models. We
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    know that total amount of carbon is fixed,
    that can be up in the air or down on the
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    earth, if it is down on the earth it is
    better because it doesn't contribute to
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    global warming So if you want to think
    about, where do you intervene, you wanna
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    ask, where in this cycle are there big
    numbers? Right, so you look here in terms
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    of surface radiation. That's a big number.
    Where you think of solar radiation coming
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    in, that's a big number coming in. So, you
    wanna, you think about where you want to
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    have a policy in fact, you want to think
    about it in terms of where those numbers
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    are large. So if you look at number, the
    amount of [inaudible] reflected by the
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    surface, that's only a 30, that's not a
    very big leber. Okay reason five,
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    experimental design. Now, what i mean by
    experimental design, well, suppose you
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    want to come up with some new policies.
    For example, when the Federal Government,
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    when they wanted to, when they were trying
    to decide how to auction off the federal
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    airwaves, right, for cell phones, they
    wanted raise as much money as possible.
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    Well to test auction designer were best
    they ran some experiments. Well the thing
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    you want to do, you want to think about,
    so here is the example of the experiment
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    and what you see is, this is a round from
    some auction and these are different
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    bidders and, you know, the cost for. That
    they paid. What you can do, you want to
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    think, how do I run the best possible
    experiment, the most informative possible
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    experiment? And one way to do that, right,
    is to construct some simple models.
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    Alright, six, reason six. Institutional
    design, now this is a biggie and this is
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    one that means a lot to me. The person you
    see at the top here, this is Stan Rider he
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    was one of my advisors in graduate school
    and the man at the bottom is Leo Herwicks,
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    he was one of my mentors in graduate
    school and Leo won the nobel prize in
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    economics. Leo won the nobel prize for,
    which is A field known as mechanism
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    design. Now this diagram is called the
    Mount Rider, named after Stan Rider in the
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    previous picture and Ken Mount, one of his
    co-authors. And let me explain this
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    diagram to you because it's very
    important. What you see here is this
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    theta, here. What this is supposed to
    represent is the environment, the set of
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    technologies, people's preferences, those
    types of things. X over here represents
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    the outcomes, what we want to have happen.
    So how we want to sort of use our
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    technologies and use our labor and use you
    know, whatever we have at our disposal to
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    create good outcomes. Now this arrow here
    is sort of , it's what we desire, it's
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    like if we could sit around and decide
    collectively what kind of outcomes we'd
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    like to have given the technology, this is
    what we collectively decide, this is
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    something called a social choice
    correspondence or a social choice
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    function. Sort of, what would be the ideal
    outcome for society? The thing is that
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    [inaudible] doesn't get the ideal outcome
    because what happens is [inaudible] wants
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    though. Because the thing is to get those
    outcomes you have to use mechanisms and
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    that what this m stands for, mechanisms.
    So a mechanism might be something like a
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    market, a political institution, it might
    be a bureaucracy. What we want to ask is,
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    is the outcome we get to the mechanism,
    right, which goes like this is that equal
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    to the outcome that we would get, right,
    ideally and the better mechanism is, the
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    closer it is to equal to what we ideally
    want. Example: so my with my undergraduate
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    students for a homework assignment one
    time I said, suppose we allocated classes
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    by a market So, you know, if you had to
    bid for classes, would that be a good
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    thing or a bad thing? Well, currently the
    way we do it is there's a hierarchy. So
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    seniors, you know fourth year students
    register first and then juniors then
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    sophomores and then freshmen. And the
    students were asking, should we have a
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    market? And their first reaction is yes,
    because markets work. Right. You have
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    this, you know, you have a market, what
    you get here is sort of what you expect to
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    get. Right, what you'd like to get, so
    it's sort of equal. But when they thought
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    about choosing classes, everybody goes,
    wait a minute, markets may not work well
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    and the reason why is, you need to
    graduate. And so seniors need specific
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    courses and that's why we let seniors
    register first and if people could bid for
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    courses then the fraction that had a lot
    of money might bid away the courses from
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    seniors and people might never graduate
    from college so a good institution markets
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    may be good in some settings they may not
    be in others. The way we figure that out
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    is by using models. Reason seven: To help
    choose among policies in institutions.
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    Simple example. Suppose [inaudible] a
    market for pollution permits or a cap and
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    trade system. We can write down simple
    model and you can tell us which one is
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    going to work better. Or here is another
    example, this is picture of the city of
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    Ann Arbor and if you look here you see
    some green areas, right, what these green
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    things are... Is green spaces. Their is a
    question should the city of Ann Arbor
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    create more green spaces. You might think
    of course, green space is a good thing.
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    The problem is when you, if you buy up a
    bunch of green space like this area here
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    is all green. What can happen is people
    could say lets move next to that, lets
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    build little houses all around here
    because it is always going to be green,
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    and that can actually lead to more sprawl.
    So what can seem like really good simple
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    ideas may not be good ideas if you
    actually construct a model to think
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    through it. [sound] okay, we've covered a
    lot. So, let's give a quick summary here.
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    How can models help us? Well first thing
    they can do is become real time decision
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    makers. They can help us figure out when
    we intervene and when we don't intervene.
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    Second, they can help us with comparative
    status. We can figure out, you know what,
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    what's likely to happen, right, if we make
    this choice. Third, they can help us with
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    counter-factuals, they can you know
    appresent a policy, we can sort of run a
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    model and think about what would have
    happened if we hadn't chosen that policy
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    Fourth, we can use them to identify and
    rank levers. Often as you've got lots of
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    choices to make models can figure out
    which choice might be the best or the most
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    influenced. Fifth, they can help us with
    experimental design. They can help us
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    design experiments in order to develop
    better policies and better strategies.
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    Sixth, they can help us design
    institutions themselves figuring out if we
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    have a market here, should we have a
    democracy, should we use a bureaucracy.
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    And seventh, finally, they can help us
    choose among policies and institutions so
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    if we are thinking about one policy or
    another policy we can use models to decide
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    among the two. All right. Thank you.
Title:
Using Models to Decide, Strategize, and Design
Video Language:
English

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