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Tamar Gendler: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Politics and Economics

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    My name is Tamar Gendler.  I'm professor
    of philosophy and cognitive science and chair
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    of the philosophy department at Yale University.
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    So philosophy comes from the Greek term meaning
    love of wisdom; philo, love; sophos, wisdom
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    and every culture from time immemorial has
    had a philosophical tradition.  There are
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    philosophical traditions in western culture
    that have their roots in ancient Greece.
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    There are philosophical traditions in eastern
    culture, great Chinese and Indian philosophical
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    traditions.  There are philosophical traditions
    in Africa.  There are philosophical traditions
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    in native cultures throughout the world. 
    What philosophy does in every society of which
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    it is a part is asks the question why, why
    are things that way they are and should they
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    be that way. 
    The western philosophical tradition to which
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    my comments today will be restricted can be
    divided into two main segments.  On the one
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    hand it has a descriptive component, which
    asks about how things are and how we know
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    that and on the other hand it has a normative
    component, a component which asks about how
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    things ought to be.  So into the first category
    fall questions like what is the fundamental
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    nature of reality, does God exist, do we have
    free will. 
    Those branches of philosophy are known as
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    metaphysics, fundamental questions about what
    there is, and epistemology, fundamental questions
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    about how we know things. On the other side
    of the divide are the questions that I've
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    called normative  questions, questions about
    values and that segment of philosophy has
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    three main parts.  One of them, aesthetics
    is concerned with the question what is beautiful
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    and what makes it so. The second part of
    that division of philosophy, moral philosophy
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    asks the question what is morally right or
    good and the third part of that division of
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    philosophy, political philosophy asks the
    question how should societies be structured
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    in order to allow human flourishing and what
    makes societal structures legitimate
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    Perhaps the most accessible and exciting part
    of philosophy for people who have never encountered
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    the discipline before is political philosophy,
    which asks questions that we as citizens of
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    a democracy need to ask ourselves in order
    to be responsible participants in our joint
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    governance, questions like what is the best
    way for society to be structured in order
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    to allow people to flourish, questions like
    what is the appropriate division of rights
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    and responsibilities in a society, questions
    like how should the legitimate concerns of
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    liberty on the one hand and equality on the
    other be balanced and for those of you who
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    are interested in studying a subject that
    has practical import it may be worth realizing
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    that political philosophy brought you the
    world as you know it today.  Political philosophy
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    brought the world Greek democracy.  It brought
    us the Magna Carta.  It brought us the French
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    Revolution and the American Revolution. 
    It brought us communism.  It brought us the
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    Civil Rights Movement.  It brought us feminism
    and libertarianism.  It even brought us the
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    Tea Party.  It was, as a result of thinking
    about these sorts of questions that these
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    movements came into being.
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    So I want you to start by asking yourself
    how you would answer these questions.  Should
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    the State guarantee universal healthcare? 
    Should there be an inheritance tax?  Should
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    there be a draft army and should you be allowed
    to sell your vote?
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    The three people we’ll meet in the lecture
    are Thomas Hobbes who wrote a great book called
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    Leviathan in 1651, John Rawls who wrote a
    book called Theory of Justice in 1971 and
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    Robert Nozick who wrote a book called Anarchy,
    State and Utopia in 1974. It has been said
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    that political philosophy asks two questions,
    who should get what and who says so and you
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    might think of the three authors that we’re
    going to discuss as answering those questions
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    in different ways. 
    Thomas Hobbes is primarily concerned with
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    the second question who says so, what makes
    the State legitimate and John Rawls and Robert
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    Nozick are in a conversation directly with
    one another about the question who gets what.
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    So Thomas Hobbes lived at the end of the 1500s
    and beginning of the 1600s roughly at the
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    time of Shakespeare and if you read Hobbes
    work in the original you’ll notice that
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    the language in which he wrote was somewhat
    archaic, but the questions with which he is
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    concerned in his great book Leviathan aren’t
    questions that just apply to his time, they’re
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    questions that concern us today as well. He
    asks the question what would the world be
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    like if there wasn’t a state and would that
    situation be better or worse than the situation
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    where there is some form of governance. 
    In particular, Hobbes famously asks people
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    to imagine what life would be like in what
    he calls the state of nature,
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    a situation in which there is no external
    governing body and Hobbes points out that
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    in the state of nature people are all roughly
    equal in the following relevant way.  All
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    of us, no matter how physically strong or
    intellectually clever are at risk of having
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    the work that we do disrupted by others, at
    risk of having the property that we’ve acquired
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    taken by others, at risk of having the things
    that we see as important to our lives destroyed
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    by others because all of us sleep and all
    of us go away from things that are important
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    to us. 
    As a result says Hobbes, in the state of nature
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    people need to expand a tremendous amount
    of energy protecting their goods.  there
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    is no opportunity in the state of nature to
    do the sorts of things which human beings
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    think makes life valuable, things like develop
    relationships to individuals far from us,
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    things like Hobbes mentions creating the skills
    of navigation, writing poetry, making music
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    or any of the things that you find valuable
    in your life. All of those things Hobbes
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    point out are possible only because you have
    a kind of security and safety.

By contrast,
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    life in the state of nature says Hobbes, is
    solitary, poor, nasty, broodish and short.
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    The question is how can we get out of the
    state of nature?  How can we get out of this
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    situation of perpetual fear, for as Hobbes
    point out active war isn’t what disrupts
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    human activity.  The fear of war is sufficient
    to disrupt human activity.  Think of the
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    ways in which after 9/11 your anxiety about
    your security was raised so that at every
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    moment you were attentive to things around
    you, hyper vigilant to what risks you might
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    face. So Hobbes’ idea in arguing for the
    legitimacy of government is to begin by asking
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    what would it be like if there were no government
    and to point out that that’s a state which
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    all of us find undesirable.
    There are says Hobbes, three things which
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    motivate people to try to leave the state
    of nature.  They are, to quote directly,
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    “fear of death, desire of such things as
    are necessary for commodious living and the
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    hope by their industry to obtain them”.
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    So the puzzle the Hobbes raises is how can
    we get out of the state of nature and in subsequent
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    years game theorists who work at the intersection
    of what you might think of as philosophy and
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    economics have developed a way of representing
    the problem which Hobbes thinks we face in
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    the state of nature.
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    Life in the state of nature, according to
    Hobbes, embodies what is sometimes called
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    a prisoner’s dilemma. The prisoner’s
    dilemma gets its name from a famous example
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    .  A small town police officer has captured
    two criminals and he wants to entice them
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    to confess, so what he does is he creates
    a structure of prison sentences where it’s
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    advantageous for each of the prisoners to
    confess regardless of what the other one does.
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    We can illustrate a prisoner’s dilemma by
    thinking about the situation of the United
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    States and the Soviet Union during the Cold
    War.  Both sides would have preferred de-escalation
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    in terms of armament.  Both sides would have
    been happy to use the money that they were
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    building missiles with to build schools and
    highways and hospitals, but both sides also
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    realized that if they engaged in unilateral
    disarmament they would be at risk.  Let’s
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    look at the structure that governed the choice
    that those two countries faced.
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    The United States couldn’t choose whether
    the Soviet Union disarmed or not.  It could
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    only choose whether it disarmed.  The Soviet
    Union couldn’t choose whether the United
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    States disarmed or not.  It could only choose
    whether it disarmed.  For both countries
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    their first choice was that the other country
    disarmed while they kept their weapons.
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    Because of that what was
    rational for both countries to do was to keep
    their arms.
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    What that meant is that
    the rational choice for both parties was to
    keep their arms rather than ending up in their
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    second choice situation, the situation where
    I have money to spend on my schools and hospitals
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    and Russia has money to spend on its schools
    and hospitals both countries in order to be
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    rational needed to spend resources on armament. 
    This structure occurs over and over again
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    in human transactions. So unless there is
    some sort of enforcement mechanism in place
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    we will end up like the US and the Soviet
    Union during the arms race, with our third
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    choice situation.

So the general problem
    with which the prisoner’s dilemma confronts
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    us is that if we behave in rational ways we
    will always end up not cooperating and the
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    puzzle that Hobbes’ confronts in his political
    philosophy is the question how is it possible
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    to bring human beings into their second choice
    situation, where they cooperate with one another
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    rather than competing.
    It turns out that in lots of small local interactions
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    human beings do manage to find a way out of
    this scenario.  Famously, during the First
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    World War when soldiers were engaged in trench
    warfare the Germans and the Americans developed
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    a kind of truce whereby soldiers from one
    side could leave their trenches and get some
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    fresh air without getting shot and then soldiers
    from the other side would leave their trenches
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    and get some fresh air without getting shot. 
    The idea was that as long as the other side
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    was behaving peacefully it was rational for
    you to behave peacefully as well
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    If you fail to cooperate or if it seems to
    me that you have failed to cooperate I will
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    retaliate by not cooperating.  Because of
    the possibility that informal modes of cooperation
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    can breakdown Hobbes insisted that in order
    to get out of the state of nature we need
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    not only informal arrangements with one another,
    but a body that regulates human interactions.
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    Hobbes concludes that it’s in our rational
    self interest to submit our will to a sovereign
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    whom he calls the Leviathan and thereby to
    get ourselves out of the state of nature.
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    Let’s fast forward 300 years. A half century
    later philosopher John Locke writes another
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    book about social contract theory and 50 or
    so years after that the philosopher John Jacques
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    Rousseau writes a similar work, each of them
    refining Hobbes’ notion of the social contract.
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    Together these three pictures of what makes
    a state legitimate allow the thinkers who
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    lie at the heart of the American and French
    Revolutions to articulate a picture of human
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    rights that makes those revolutions legitimate. 
    From the French and American Revolutions which
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    give voice to the citizens we move through
    the 18th century to the emancipation of the
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    serfs in Russia and a general democratization
    of society, a recognition that individual’s
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    votes should not be dependent upon them being
    landholders, but should rather be open to
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    people of all social classes. 
    Extending this idea Karl Marx writes the Communist
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    Manifesto and an entire enormous nation, Russia
    in 1917 reshapes the fundamental structure
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    of its society in response to a work of political
    philosophy.  At the same time the tradition
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    which gave rise to the revolutions in the
    18th century, one that says all human beings
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    have the right to have their voices heard,
    gives rise on the one hand to the women’s
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    voting movement in England and America and
    then to the Civil Rights movement on United
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    States’ soil expanding and expanding out
    of Hobbes’ fundamental idea that a government
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    to be legitimate, must be in response to the
    needs of its people.  We get during this
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    300 year period an incredible opening up of
    political rights of a sort unknown in the
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    history of civilization.
    Political philosopher John Rawls was born
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    in the early 20th century in the American
    south.  He was of a generation where he and
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    all his friends went off to serve in the Second
    World War and returned from that war concerned
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    with how it’s possible to create a stable
    and just society.  Rawls spent most of his
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    academic career thinking about that question
    as a professor of philosophy at Harvard University
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    and when he was in his early 50s in the middle
    of the 1960s and early 1970s as the Vietnam
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    War was raging, as social protests were going
    on around him, as American society was reshaping
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    itself in ways that voice was given to the
    needs of the disenfranchised, Rawls tried
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    to articulate in the great social contract
    tradition a picture of what a just society
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    looks like and how a just society should be
    structured.
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    It’s in this time that John Rawls sets out
    to write his work, The Theory of Justice. It’s
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    worth listening to the extraordinary opening
    words of Rawls’ book.  He says, “Justice
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    is the first virtue of social institutions
    as truth is of systems of thought.”
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    Rawls’ fundamental assumption in articulating
    what a just society looks like is that each
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    person possesses a certain inviolability which
    cannot be overridden even if doing so would
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    be of greater benefit to the society as a
    whole.  In so doing he challenges what had
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    become a dominant picture of what justice
    and morality demand.  That picture can be
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    traced to the 19th century works of the British
    philosophers Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart
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    Mill and is known and utilitarianism.  It’s
    an incredibly appealing view.
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    What the view says is that an act is morally
    right if it produces the greatest good for
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    the greatest number of people.  If I face
    a choice between saving one person and saving
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    five where I can save only one group or the
    other, utilitarianism gives what many people
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    find to be the intuitive answer that I should
    save the five, thereby bringing about more
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    happiness rather than the one. 
    The problem with utilitarianism that Rawls
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    is concerned with is that it seems that in
    farfetched and typical circumstances utilitarianism
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    could demand that we violate the rights of
    the one to help the many.  A famous counter
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    example to utilitarianism is that a healthy
    man walks into a hospital where there are
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    five dying individuals, one in need of a heart,
    one in need of a kidney, one in need of a
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    liver and two others each in need of parts
    that he has.  The utilitarian rubric would
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    seem to suggest that if those five can be
    saved by harming him that that’s what morality
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    demands. This picture that each of us has
    inviolable rights and that those rights can’t
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    be overridden by the needs of others is part
    of what is new and exciting in Rawls’ discussion.
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    Taking as his premise the idea that justice
    is the first virtue of social institutions
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    that is that no unjust society is a legitimate
    one Rawls asks the following question.  How
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    should the benefits and burdens of living
    together in a community be distributed so
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    as to best realize what justice requires? 
    In particular, he asks what should the fundamental
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    institutional structures look like to allow
    a society to be a just society.
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    Rawls sees himself as the inheritor of the
    social contract tradition of which Hobbes
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    was the initial voice in the western tradition. 
    Like Hobbes, Rawls asks what would people
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    choose to have their society look like if
    they were building it from the ground up.
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    Rawls says a just society is one that rational,
    free and equal people would choose to contract
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    into, but we enter our interactions with one
    another will all sorts of inequalities in
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    place.  Some of us are wealthy.  Some of
    us are poor.  Some of us are endowed with
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    certain kinds of intellectual or physical
    skills that others lack. If we try to build
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    our society taking into consideration those
    facts about ourselves we aren’t doing it
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    from a position of equality, so Rawls’ insight
    is that sometimes the fairest way to make
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    a decision is to put yourself in a position
    where you have less information.
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    Think about what the fairest way to divide
    a cake is.  The fairest way to divide a cake
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    is to ask you to divide it not knowing which
    piece you’re going to get.  If you divide
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    the cake unaware of which part will be yours
    you will be inclined to divide it in a fair
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    way. This is the veil of ignorance
    Let’s go behind the veil of ignorance and
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    ask a question that Rawls asks, namely, which
    of the two principles that he has derived
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    ought to take priority over the other?  Do
    we care more about fundamental rights or do
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    we care about the distribution of income? 
    So suppose you’re faced with a choice of
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    three societies in which you can live not
    knowing what role you will play in the society.
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    In society number one the average income is
    $100,000, but only 85% of the people have
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    fundamental rights, only 85% of the people
    have the right to vote, liberty of conscience,
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    the right to a fair trial.  In the second
    society the average salary—in the second
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    society the average salary is $70,000 and
    only 85% of people have fundamental rights.
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    In the third society the average salary is
    $70,000, but 100% of people have the right
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    to vote, freedom of expression, the right
    to a fair trial.  Which society would you
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    choose to live in, average income of %100,000,
    85% free, average income of $70,000, 85 % free
  • 24:41 - 24:45
    or average income $70,000, 100% free?  When
    confronted with this choice set anybody who
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    is paying attention rejects the second option. 
    It has all of the disadvantages of the first
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    and all of the disadvantages of the third,
    but it’s also true that when confronted
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    with this choice almost everybody rejects
    the first option as well.  If you don’t
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    know whether you’re going to be one of the
    ones with freedom then even though you’re
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    guaranteed to have a higher income in the
    first society than the third more than 95%
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    of people choose to live in the third society.
    This idea that when you don’t know where
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    you’re going to end up you have an inclination
    to be risk adverse is what lies behind Rawls’
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    conclusions about what would be chosen from
    behind the veil of ignorance.
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    People want to make sure that the bottom is
    safe before they worry about what the top
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    looks like, so Rawls suggests that to the
    extent there are inequalities in a society
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    they should satisfy two conditions.
    So the first condition is that the benefits
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    of those inequalities be accessible to all
    and the second and perhaps most controversial
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    part of Rawls’ theory is that to the extent
    that there are inequalities in a society they
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    should be distributed in such a way that they
    are to the benefit of the least well off,
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    so if it turns out that having a lower tax
    rate in the highest bracket produces wealth
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    and income in a way that leads those in the
    poorest quintile to benefit Rawls says that’s
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    okay, but if it turns out that that’s advantageous
    only to those in the highest segment of society
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    that inequality, says Rawls wouldn’t be
    countenanced from behind the veil of ignorance.
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    It isn’t a way that people would choose
    for a society to be structured if their fundamental
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    concern was with justice.
    In 2005 two psychologists inspired by the
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    work of John Rawls decided to survey several
    thousand randomly selected Americans about
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    what they thought the distribution of income
    would look like in a society of which they
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    would want to be a part and they presented
    those citizens with two different pie graphs.
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    In the one, which you can see on the top the
    vast majority of wealth was held by the top
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    quintile of society and a small amount by
    the second quintile with virtually none held
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    by the remainder of the society. In the other
    the distribution was more equal.  Roughly
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    a third of the wealth was held by the top
    quintile and the remainder was distributed
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    among the remaining four.  Given the choice
    between those two social structures 92% of
  • 28:21 - 28:32
    Americans chose the bottom.  As a matter
    of fact the top graph, which only 8% of subjects
  • 28:32 - 28:40
    chose represents the actual distribution of
    wealth in contemporary America, whereas the
  • 28:40 - 28:44
    bottom graph represents the actual distribution
    of wealth in contemporary Sweden.
  • 28:44 - 28:48
    The distribution of wealth where no more than
    60% of the wealth is held by the top fifth
  • 28:48 - 28:52
    and where at least some of the wealth is held
    by the bottom two-fifths seems to be an ideal
  • 28:52 - 28:53
    for all Americans, not just for those who
    would benefit thereby.
  • 28:53 - 28:56
    Rich people and poor people give the same
    answer from behind the veil of ignorance.
  • 28:56 - 29:02
    Men and women give the same answer from behind
    the veil of ignorance.  Religious and nonreligious
  • 29:02 - 29:08
    people give the same answer from behind the
    veil of ignorance and perhaps most strikingly
  • 29:08 - 29:12
    democrats and republicans give roughly the
    same answer from behind the veil of ignorance.
  • 29:12 - 29:16
    As a matter of fact, 85% of the nation’s
    wealth is held by the top quintile, roughly
  • 29:16 - 29:21
    10% by the second, roughly 5% by the middle
    and virtually none of the nation’s wealth
  • 29:21 - 29:28
    by 40% of the country.
    Does that mean our society is fundamentally
  • 29:28 - 29:39
    unjust?  John Rawls would give the answer
    yes.  By contrast Robert Nozick would give
  • 29:39 - 29:42
    the answer no. because the structure of society
    in which we find ourselves is one that has
  • 29:42 - 29:44
    arisen as the result of voluntary interactions,
    of human beings engaged in legitimate transactions
  • 29:44 - 29:46
    whatever distribution results, says Nozick,
    is a just one.
  • 29:46 - 29:53
    While John Rawls was writing Theory of Justice
    as a distinguished philosopher in his mid
  • 29:53 - 29:59
    50s having fought in the Second World War
    and then taught philosophy for many decades
  • 29:59 - 30:06
    thereafter.  Down the hall from him was a
    precocious young man in his late 20s who had
  • 30:06 - 30:15
    recently started teaching at Harvard.  That
    young man by the name of Robert Nozick took
  • 30:15 - 30:24
    upon himself the task of writing a rebuttal
    to Rawls’ Theory of Justice. And three years
  • 30:24 - 30:35
    after Theory of Justice was published Nozick
    published his retort, Anarchy, State and Utopia.
  • 30:35 - 30:43
    Nozick was concerned that Rawls had placed
    the wrong fundamental notion at the center
  • 30:43 - 30:53
    of his theory.
    Nozick writes:  “Individuals have rights
  • 30:53 - 31:01
    and there are things that no person or group
    may do to them without violating those rights.
  • 31:01 - 31:13
    The minimal state limited to narrow functions
    of protection against force, theft and fraud,
  • 31:13 - 31:22
    enforcement of contracts and so on is the
    most extensive state that can be justified.”
  • 31:22 - 31:34
    Like Rawls, Nozick is challenging the utilitarian
    picture.  Like Rawls, Nozick thinks the goods
  • 31:34 - 31:42
    of one person can’t be traded off the goods
    of the community, but unlike Rawls Nozick
  • 31:42 - 31:51
    places at the center of his political philosophy
    not the notion of equality or justice, but
  • 31:51 - 31:58
    rather the notion of liberty.
    Let’s look at what a society governed by
  • 31:58 - 32:07
    Nozick’s principles might look like.  Nozick
    famously articulates a view of the conditions
  • 32:07 - 32:14
    under which property is legitimately held
    and his view is this.  It’s legitimate
  • 32:14 - 32:23
    for you to own something if you acquired it
    in a legitimate way when it was un-owned or
  • 32:23 - 32:30
    if you acquired it in a legitimate way from
    somebody else who already owned it.  If I
  • 32:30 - 32:38
    got the property from you as the result of
    your having given it to me then no one can
  • 32:38 - 32:47
    legitimately take that property away from
    me.  This may sound relatively uncontroversial,
  • 32:47 - 32:54
    but let’s look and see what it implies. 
    Suppose each of us starts out with the same
  • 32:54 - 33:05
    amount of money.  Say each of us has $100
    and there are thousands and thousands of us
  • 33:05 - 33:14
    all of whom are fans of the great 1970s basketball
    star Wilt Chamberlain, so suppose you give
  • 33:14 - 33:21
    25 cents of your money to Wilt Chamberlain
    and I give 25 cents of my money to Wilt Chamberlain
  • 33:21 - 33:27
    and our friend gives 25 cents of his money
    to Wilt Chamberlain and so on thousands and
  • 33:27 - 33:32
    thousands of times until Wilt Chamberlain
    comes to have not the $100 with which each
  • 33:32 - 33:41
    of us started out, but thousands and thousands
    and thousands of dollars.  On Nozick’s
  • 33:41 - 33:50
    picture any decision to take away any of the
    money which Wilt Chamberlain got through this
  • 33:50 - 33:57
    voluntary and legitimate transaction is a
    violation of rights. Then no distribution
  • 33:57 - 34:07
    of income, including one in which 1% of the
    people own 99% of the wealth could ever be
  • 34:07 - 34:17
    illegitimate because what matters is how it
    actually came into being.  If all that 99%
  • 34:17 - 34:26
    of the wealth came to those individuals as
    the result of legal transactions then nothing
  • 34:26 - 34:33
    can be done without violating rights to redistribute
    it.
  • 34:33 - 34:41
    There is no easy answer to this question. 
    There is a strong intuitive pull to the view
  • 34:41 - 34:48
    that Nozick advocates—it is in some sense
    theft to take from Wilt Chamberlain what each
  • 34:48 - 34:57
    of us has voluntarily given to him.  On the
    other hand without such theft, more commonly
  • 34:57 - 35:06
    known by the term taxation, we will find ourselves
    perhaps in the sort of situation that neither
  • 35:06 - 35:10
    Rawls nor Nozick wants to be in.
    If all of us give our quarters to Wilt Chamberlain
  • 35:10 - 35:12
    and his companions.
    Instead of having a society of which we’re
  • 35:12 - 35:23
    all equally a part Wilt and his wealthy friends
    are able to buy access to the media, are able
  • 35:23 - 35:30
    to buy advertising time for candidates that
    they support, are able to send their children
  • 35:30 - 35:37
    to schools where they gain power and advantage
    and access to resources with the result that
  • 35:37 - 35:44
    the fundamental rights which Nozick as well
    as Rawls was concerned with preserving become
  • 35:44 - 35:51
    difficult for people to exercise.  
    The Wilt Chamberlain example illustrates a
  • 35:51 - 35:56
    general phenomenon which we face in a society,
    one which was foreshadowed in our discussion
  • 35:56 - 36:03
    of prisoner’s dilemma.  Individual decisions
    that are acceptable may be problematic if
  • 36:03 - 36:12
    large numbers of people make those decisions. 
    The problem that this gives rise to is sometimes
  • 36:12 - 36:21
    called the Tragedy of the Commons,
    so suppose there is a green area where I let
  • 36:21 - 36:30
    my cow graze and you let your cow graze and
    our neighbor lets his cow graze.  So far
  • 36:30 - 36:36
    no problem, for each of our cows there is
    enough to eat, but suppose that each of us
  • 36:36 - 36:45
    instead of having one cow has 50.  If you
    alone had 50 cows there would be no problem.
  • 36:45 - 36:52
    If I alone had 50 cows there would be no problem,
    but if hundreds of us have 50 cows the entire
  • 36:52 - 37:00
    green space will disappear and all of our
    cows will die.  This structure manifests
  • 37:00 - 37:07
    itself in situation after situation.  Over
    fishing results from each of us taking what
  • 37:07 - 37:13
    would be a fine amount of fish if were the
    only ones doing it, but an amount that becomes
  • 37:13 - 37:21
    problematic if others are doing likewise. 
    Each of us polluting a small amount causes
  • 37:21 - 37:29
    no problem.  All of us polluting together
    can lead to drastic consequences.
  • 37:29 - 37:42
    Let’s return to our four opening questions
    and ask what Rawls and Nozick would say about
  • 37:42 - 37:49
    them. —with respect to the question of whether
    societies should guarantee universal healthcare
  • 37:49 - 37:57
    Rawls would say yes and Nozick would say no. 
    On Rawls’ picture health is a precondition
  • 37:57 - 38:05
    for participation in a civic society and from
    behind the veil of ignorance clearly everyone
  • 38:05 - 38:11
    would choose a society in which they had the
    guarantee of safety on Rawls’ picture.
  • 38:11 - 38:19
    By contrast, on Nozick’s this provision
    would be possible only as the result of illegitimate
  • 38:19 - 38:26
    interference in people’s lives. 
    With respect to the question of whether an
  • 38:26 - 38:36
    inheritance tax is legitimate Rawls would
    say yes, Nozick no.  Rawls says each of us
  • 38:36 - 38:46
    has the right to be born into a roughly equal
    community and those who inherit large amounts
  • 38:46 - 38:52
    at the moment of birth are disadvantaged in
    ways which presumably is not to the benefit
  • 38:52 - 39:00
    of the least well off.  Nozick by contrast
    wonders where Rawls gets the idea that it’s
  • 39:00 - 39:08
    anybody’s business to tell me whether I
    can give my money to my children.
  • 39:08 - 39:16
    With respect to the third question should
    the army be constituted by draft or by volunteers
  • 39:16 - 39:26
    Rawls would, at least in conditions of wartime,
    advocate a draft army.—just as the benefits
  • 39:26 - 39:33
    and rights of a society that are fundamental
    need to be distributed equally across all
  • 39:33 - 39:40
    so to on a Rawls’ picture must the burdens. 
    The only fair way to distribute those sorts
  • 39:40 - 39:48
    of responsibilities is as the result of a
    random process.  Nozick by contrast would
  • 39:48 - 39:55
    be happy with a volunteer army.  Individuals
    have the right to contract into risk and the
  • 39:55 - 40:01
    fact that most of the individuals who contract
    into risky situations are those for whom there
  • 40:01 - 40:08
    are not so many options isn’t something
    that would bother Nozick, though of course
  • 40:08 - 40:15
    under both circumstances there are many who
    would choose to serve their society—simply
  • 40:15 - 40:20
    out of a desire to protect it.
    Finally, with respect to the question should
  • 40:20 - 40:28
    it be legitimate to sell your vote Rawls gives
    the answer no.  That is a right that he considers
  • 40:28 - 40:34
    unalienable, unalienable because from behind
    a veil of ignorance we saw that no one would
  • 40:34 - 40:40
    choose to live in a society where such rights
    weren’t distributed equally.  Nozick by
  • 40:40 - 40:47
    contrast thinks that this, like everything
    else should be something which is your discretion
  • 40:47 - 40:54
    to choose and if you decide that one of the
    best ways for you to finance something that
  • 40:54 - 41:00
    you care about is by selling your vote to
    another person what business is it of anybody
  • 41:00 - 41:07
    else to tell you that you can’t. 
    You, I imagine, have your own answers to those
  • 41:07 - 41:13
    four questions.  Perhaps they line up completely
    with one or the other of the authors that
  • 41:13 - 41:19
    we’ve discussed, but what you now have in
    addition to your answers to those questions
  • 41:19 - 42:03
    are some tools for thinking about why you
    give those answers.
  • 42:03 - 42:08
    When I graduated from college I spent a couple
    of years doing education policy work and then
  • 42:08 - 42:16
    decided to go back to graduate school to study
    philosophy.  In 1990 I was lucky enough to
  • 42:16 - 42:23
    enroll as a graduate student at Harvard University
    where two of my teachers were the political
  • 42:23 - 42:30
    philosopher John Rawls and a man who ended
    up being my dissertation director Robert Nozick.
  • 42:30 - 42:36
    It’s from the two of them that I learned
    what I know about political philosophy.
  • 42:36 - 42:37
    What political philosophy and philosophy in
    general encourages you to do is to step outside
  • 42:37 - 42:37
    the specificity of your own situation.  Hobbes
    and Rawls and Nozick all recognized that each
  • 42:37 - 42:37
    of us wants more rather than less of a share
    of the goods of our society, but what they
  • 42:37 - 42:37
    ask you to do is to think about how the fact
    that you want more rather than less suggests
  • 42:37 - 42:40
    that everyone else probably does too.
    Philosophy has always been connected to the
  • 42:40 - 42:46
    works that are going on in other fields at
    its time.  In ancient Greece the philosopher
  • 42:46 - 42:53
    Aristotle was not only doing work in metaphysics
    and epistemology.  He was collecting constitutions
  • 42:53 - 42:59
    from various other Greek city states to provide
    the first catalog of political systems.
  • 42:59 - 43:04
    He was doing biological experiments and thinking
    about the nature of physics.  In the early
  • 43:04 - 43:04
    modern period philosophers like Rene Descartes
    or Thomas Hobbes were major contributors not
  • 43:04 - 43:05
    just to the philosophical work of their time,
    but also to the scientific work.  Descartes
  • 43:04 - 43:04
    did work not just in the domain of political
    philosophy, but also work in the sciences.
  • 43:04 - 43:10
    This has been true throughout philosophy’s
    history that it’s great thinkers think not
  • 43:05 - 43:04
    invented coordinate geometry, which we still
    know by the name Cartesian geometry and Hobbes
  • 43:10 - 43:16
    only about questions central to the discipline,
    but also about how those questions relate
  • 43:16 - 43:18
    to the fields around them, so philosophers
    of mind right now contribute to debates about
  • 43:18 - 43:19
    the nature of consciousness thinking both
    about what it is for people to be conscious
  • 43:19 - 43:21
    and making use of the resources of a 500 year-old
    tradition of thinking about the relation between
  • 43:21 - 43:22
    mind and body.
    People who major in philosophy have gone
  • 43:22 - 43:27
    on to do a huge range of things. They go to
    law school.  They go to business school.
  • 43:27 - 43:32
    They go to medical school.  Some of them 
    go onto be philosophers in a professional
  • 43:32 - 43:38
    sense, but what philosophers typically go
    onto do is to be thoughtful, reflective participants
  • 43:38 - 43:44
    in whatever they end up doing whether that
    be working in real estate or working as a
  • 43:44 - 43:49
    nurse or being a fulltime parent or being
    mayor of their town.
  • 43:49 - 43:55
    The most profound questions of the world are
    the ones which philosophy gives you permission
  • 43:55 - 44:03
    to ask and to learn how to answer and it’s
    for that reason that the study of philosophy
  • 44:03 - 44:12
    can be an enormously illuminating and valuable
    part of anyone’s life.  Thank you.  Thank
  • 44:12 -
    you.  Thank you.
Title:
Tamar Gendler: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Politics and Economics
Description:

Tamar Gendler, Department of Philosophy Chair at Yale University, Cognitive Scientist

Who gets what and who says so? These two questions underlie and inform every social arrangement from the resolution of schoolyard squabbles to the meta-structure of human societies. They are also the basis of political philosophy. Professor Tamar Gendler uses the work of three titans of the discipline, Thomas Hobbes, John Rawls, and Robert Nozick, as a lens to guide us through the taut debate about the role of government in society, asking "Will we embrace the radical state of nature or will we surrender our freedom to the leviathan of the state?"

The Floating University
Originally released September 2011.

Additional Lectures:
Michio Kaku: The Universe in a Nutshell
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0NbBjNiw4tk

Joel Cohen: An Introduction to Demography (Malthus Miffed: Are People the Problem?)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2vr44C_G0-o

Steven Pinker: Linguistics as a Window to Understanding the Brain http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q-B_ONJIEcE

Leon Botstein: Art Now (Aesthetics Across Music, Painting, Architecture, Movies, and More.)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=j6F-sHhmfrY

more » « less
Video Language:
English
Duration:
44:26

English subtitles

Revisions