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O-Ring Model

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    Welcome everyone.
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    Today, we're going to be
    talking about O-ring theory.
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    Turns out O-ring theory has
    implications for development,
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    but also has implications for
    the industrial organization
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    of developed economies,
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    that is, for how firms
    and workers are organized --
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    when maximizing the value of production
    requires that we work as a team.
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    O-ring theory is also
    going to have implications
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    for our understanding of inequality.
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    Let's take a look.
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    The O-ring theory of development
    is primarily due to
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    a very creative economist
    called Michael Kremer.
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    Now, we're going to call O-ring production
    or an O-ring production function --
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    if the production task
    has the following attributes:
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    It's going to depend upon
    completing a series of tasks.
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    Moreover, failure
    at any one of these tasks
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    is going to reduce the value
    of the entire product,
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    perhaps to zero.
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    So, this is the weakest link problem.
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    One weak link in a chain destroys
    the entire value of the chain.
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    It's also going to be the case,
    with an O-ring production function,
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    that we can't substitute
    quantity for quality.
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    I'll come back to that in a minute.
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    Let me give you some examples:
    Take microchips.
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    A single spec of dust on a microchip run
    ruins all of those microchips.
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    Or think about a souffle.
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    To make a souffle, you've got
    to get the ingredients right,
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    you've got to get the temperature right,
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    you've got to take the souffle
    out of the oven at just the right time.
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    Mess up on any one of these tasks
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    and the souffle will collapse.
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    What about a musical?
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    To make a great musical, you're going
    to require an excellent lyricist,
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    a wonderful composer,
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    a great director,
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    superb performers.
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    You need an entire team --
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    and the talents of that team
    must all come together
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    at the right time, at the right place.
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    Notice what we mean here by:
    You can't substitute quantity for quality.
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    Two mediocre chefs are
    not going to be better
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    at making a wonderful souffle --
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    than one great chef.
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    For a musical, --
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    if you don't have Stephen Sondheim, --
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    then you can't replace him by saying,
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    "We'll add three, or four, or five,
    or more mediocre composers,
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    to make up for the fact that
    we don't have one great composer."
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    It doesn't work that way.
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    Now, why do we call this
    O-ring production?
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    Well, as you probably know,
    this is due to the destruction, --
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    the explosion of
    the Challenger space shuttle.
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    As famously shown by
    the physicist Richard Feynman, --
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    the mayor cause of that explosion
    was the failure of a very simple product,
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    a failure of the O-ring to expand
    because it was too cold.
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    So, this cheap really
    inconsequential product;
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    it was only worth, you know,
    ten dollars or something like that;
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    because it didn't expand
    at the right time,
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    because this one piece
    of the puzzle didn't work right,
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    the entire spacecraft along
    with seven people was lost.
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    So, that's O-ring production.
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    Let's formalize this model a little bit.
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    Assume that there are N tasks,
    one worker per task.
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    Doesn't have to be that way,
    but simplifies things.
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    We're going to let qi be
    the quality level of worker i or task i.
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    So, qi equal to .9;
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    this can be interpreted
    in different ways
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    but an easy interpretation
    is to think that --
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    .9 means there's 90% chance
    of completing the task perfectly
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    and a 10% chance of complete failure.
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    It could also mean, --
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    there's a 50% chance of
    completing the task perfectly --
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    and a 50% chance of
    reducing the value by 20%.
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    That is, 1/2 times 1
    plus 1/2 times .8,
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    reducing the value of the entire
    product by 20% equals .9.
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    So, there are different ways of
    interpreting these quality levels.
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    Output is going to equal
    the number of tasks --
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    times the quality level in each task, --
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    all multiplied together.
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    So, this is really the key to the model,
    to multiply these quality levels
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    in each task altogether.
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    So, for example, --
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    if there are ten tasks --
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    and the quality level of
    every worker is point .99, --
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    then output will be equal to
    10 times .99 to the power of 10 --
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    or 9.04.
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    So, notice that if each worker
    were perfect, at a equality level of 1,
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    then the output would be 10,
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    because each worker has
    a 1% chance of messing up, --
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    the output of
    the expected output is 9.
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    If the quality level of
    the workers went down to .95,
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    notice that the output would fall to 6.
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    So, just a small decrease
    in the quality level --
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    decreases the output by a lot.
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    If the quality level went down to .9; --
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    again, not that big a drop;
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    the output level goes down to 3.5, --
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    an awfully big drop in output
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    for a relatively small drop
    in the quality level.
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    One of the most important
    implications of the O-ring model
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    is that we'll have quality matching.
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    That is, output will be higher if we put
    all the high-quality workers together
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    and all the low quality workers together
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    compared with if we mixed the workers up.
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    Let's do a simple example.
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    Suppose we have two high-quality workers
    and two low quality workers.
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    If we put the high-quality workers
    together in one firm,
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    then the output we get is
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    2 the number of tasks times
    qh times qh or 2qh quared.
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    The low quality workers then are
    2ql squared for the same reasons.
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    If we mix, we then have again two firms.
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    In one firm we get 2 the number
    of tasks times qh times ql
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    and same thing for the second firm.
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    Okay. Which one of these is bigger?
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    Well, we can get rid of the 2s.
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    That gives us qh squared plus ql squared
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    compared with getting rid of the 2s here;
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    we still have 2qhql.
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    Which one of those is bigger?
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    Let's just put into numbers.
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    So, suppose that qh is 1 and ql is 1/2.
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    Therefore, for the match group,
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    we get 1 squared plus 1/2 squared,
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    and for the mix group
    we get 2 times 1 times 1/2.
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    Let's see.
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    Well, that's a quarter, one and
    a quarter for the match group
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    and just one the mix group.
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    Therefore, you won a match.
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    What about other examples?
    Okay, let's do a general proof.
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    If qh is bigger than ql,
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    then notice that qh minus ql squared
    is certainly bigger than 0.
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    Well, just using FOIL,
    multiplying these out,
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    we get qh squared plus
    ql squared minus 2qhql.
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    Let's put the 2qhql on the other side,
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    we get qh squared plus ql squared
    is bigger than 2qhql.
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    But notice that this is just exactly
    our statement here
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    for comparing the match output
    with the mix output.
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    So, this tells us that,
    for any qh and any ql,
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    the match output is bigger
    than the mix output.
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    Now, it's not too hard to show
    that in a competitive economy,
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    with quality matching, higher output
    is going to mean higher wages.
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    So, remember now that the effect
    of quality on output, which we now know,
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    is going to be the same as
    the effect of quality on wages
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    this is highly non-linear.
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    So, if all the out-workers
    have a quality level of 1,
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    then output is going to be 10, up here.
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    Notice that if quality falls
    just a little bit to .9, --
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    output falls a huge amount
    to less than 4.
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    So, you get a big drop in quality,
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    big drop in output with
    a fairly small drop in quality.
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    Indeed, notice that
    if quality falls in half, --
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    output is basically going to zero.
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    You can't even see in this graph
    how small output is
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    with a drop in quality of a half.
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    So, what this says is that, --
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    if there are differences in
    quality levels across countries,
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    then one country may have much,
    much smaller GDP per capita
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    than the other country
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    even though the quality levels
    are not that different.
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    A fairly small decrease in
    the quality levels of the workers
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    creates a big decrease in wages.
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    We can also this at a national level.
    There's slightly different way.
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    Suppose the talent distribution
    is something like this --
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    on the left hand side,
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    that is, most of the workers
    have a talent level of 1,
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    this is an arbitrary number here.
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    I don't think of it as all being perfect,
    just think of it as an arbitrary scale.
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    But suppose most of the workers
    have this talent distribution
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    somewhere around here. Okay?
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    When you map that into
    the wage distribution,
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    taking into account the fact
    we have O-ring production, --
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    what you get is wages,
    you get a big right hand tail.
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    You get wages are much more
    unequal than talent.
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    So, a fairly equal distribution of talent
    when you map that into the O-ring model,
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    turns into an unequal distribution of wages.
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    So, in particular,
    notice that over here, --
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    there's hardly anybody who has
    a talent level of 2 or greater.
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    Very very few people in this economy
    have a talent level of 2 or greater
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    and yet, wages, --
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    a large fraction of the wages
    are going to go to people
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    who have a talent level of 2 or more.
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    So, this shows you how an O-ring model
    magnifies the distribution of talent --
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    turning it into a much more
    unequal distribution of wages.
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    Here's another implication of the model.
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    In an O-ring model, workers
    performing the same tasks --
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    will earn higher wages
    in a high-skill firm
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    than in a low-skill firm.
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    So, for example,
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    highest quality secretaries will work
    with the highest quality CEO's
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    simply because a mistake by
    one of those secretaries
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    is going to be so much more damaging
    when she works for a high-quality CEO
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    than for a low quality CEO.
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    Apple.
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    They'll hire the best programmers
    and the best designers.
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    They'll also want to hire the best janitors
    and they'll pay them the most,
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    at least to the extent that the output
    of those janitors contributes
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    to the output of the entire product.
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    The same idea applies
    with the economy as a whole.
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    High-quality workers will be paid more
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    when there are more high
    quality workers to work with.
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    Talent likes to work with other talent.
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    There's a multiplier effect here.
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    The more high-talented, high-quality
    workers you're surrounded with, --
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    the more your earnings are going to be.
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    That's one reason
    I like to work with Tyler.
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    It's not just; --
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    we have to take a longer
    picture view of this as well; --
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    is when there's a lot of
    high-quality workers around,
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    it pays you to invest in being
    a high-quality worker.
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    Similarly, if there's just a lot
    of low-skill workers around,
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    it doesn't pay you to be
    a high-quality worker.
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    So, if we think about a very smart
    person in a poor country
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    surrounded by low quality workers,
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    that person isn't going to earn a lot.
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    They, in fact, may not want
    to invest in an education,
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    or in building up their skills
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    because the skills won't pay very much
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    when they don't have those people
    to work on their team, --
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    when they can't combine
    with other high-quality people,
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    when they can't get that high pay-off
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    which comes with multiplying
    high quality by high quality.
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    This indicates that, in this model,
    there's a potential for multiple equilibrium.
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    You can have a high-quality --
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    equilibrium where everyone
    wants to be high skilled,
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    but you could also have
    for the exact the same people,
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    for exactly the same people,
    you might also end up
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    in a low quality equilibria
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    where no one is getting high skilled
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    and no one thinks it's worthwhile
    to become a high-skilled worker.
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    In an O-ring model, --
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    capital wants to work with
    high-quality workers
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    for exactly the same reasons that
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    high-quality workers want
    to work with each other.
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    In particular, note that --
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    more capital in these models
    doesn't substitute --
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    for lower-skilled workers.
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    So, if you give me a Stradivarius,
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    I'm not going to be
    a better violin player.
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    You don't want to do something
    like this, therefore,
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    you don't want to have Homer Simpson
    running the nuclear power plant.
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    This a failure of quality matching.
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    Don't do that.
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    Instead, what you want to do
    is you want to match
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    the best workers with the most
    expensive machines.
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    So, what you want Itzhak Perlman
    with a Stradivarius.
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    Implication of this --
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    is that poor countries
    will have more workers
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    in less capital intensive
    primary productions,
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    so, for example, agriculture.
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    This force magnifies all the other forces
    we're talking about earlier.
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    So, in particular, --
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    capital is going to flow away
    from countries
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    which have low-skilled workers
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    could want to go to countries
    which have high-skilled workers.
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    This means that --
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    you're going to have lower
    income and wages
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    in countries with
    low-skilled workers.
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    This magnifies all the effects
    we're talking about earlier.
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    Similarly, poor countries will have
    more workers in production tasks
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    or production jobs that are simpler, --
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    that require fewer tasks.
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    Let's take a closer look at this.
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    So, what we're showing here
    is three jobs scaled
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    so that you get the 100% of output when
    the workers are perfectly high quality.
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    Job 1 requires the workers
    to get 5 tasks right.
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    Job 2, that they get 10 tasks
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    and Job 3 that they get 40 tasks right.
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    Now, here's point.
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    If you take workers of
    reasonably high skilled level, .9,
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    but you assign them to a job which
    requires that they get 40 things right,
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    where getting 1 thing wrong,
    one of those tasks wrong
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    can reduce the value
    of the entire product, --
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    then your chances of getting
    full output are virtually nil.
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    On the other hand, --
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    if you take those same workers
    and you assign them to a job
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    which requires that
    they just get 5 things right,
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    then your chances of getting
    full output are much higher.
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    So, think about this as being
    bicycle production, car production
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    and space shuttle production.
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    What it says is that countries with
    lower-skilled work forces;
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    they're going to specialize in things
    like bicycle production --
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    which tend to be lower paid.
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    The value of the entire product
    tends to be lower
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    when the number of tasks
    required is lower.
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    What this also says is that, --
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    if you have a job requiring
    a lot of tasks, --
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    like a space shuttle,
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    where you've got to get
    even hundreds of tasks right
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    in order to get the full
    value of the product.
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    Then you really want to be working with
    workers of the very highest skill level
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    to have any chance of producing
    that high-quality product.
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    We can apply many of these ideas
    at the level of the economy as whole,
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    in which case it becomes
    a theory of bottlenecks, linkages
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    and complementarities.
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    So, let's think about N industries
    each performing a single task.
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    In following Kremer, --
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    let's suppose the quality falls by half
    in just of these tasks or industries.
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    So, for example,
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    the electricity production becomes
    more spotty and subject to blackouts.
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    Corruption increases
    at the licence bureau
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    requiring us to spend
    a lot more to get a licence.
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    Well, even though, quality has
    fallen in just 2 of the many tasks
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    which we need to complete,
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    output is going to fall
    immediately by 75%.
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    Moreover, there are going
    to be knock-on effects.
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    Wages in every other sector of
    the economy are also going to fall
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    because the total value
    of the product has fallen.
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    And this fall in wages is
    going to greatly reduce
  • 16:16 - 16:20
    the incentive to invest in quality
    in all those other sectors
  • 16:20 - 16:24
    and that reduces output
    further in the long run.
  • 16:24 - 16:26
    So, you could have a bottleneck,
  • 16:26 - 16:30
    and a bottleneck affects not just
    that sector of the economy,
  • 16:30 - 16:33
    but every other sector
    of the economy.
  • 16:34 - 16:36
    Because you have complementarities,
  • 16:36 - 16:40
    when one sector goes down,
    the other sectors also go down as well.
  • 16:41 - 16:43
    This shows, by the way,
    the importance of trade
  • 16:43 - 16:47
    as a method of avoiding those bottlenecks,
    of rooting around bottlenecks.
  • 16:48 - 16:50
    If you can import
    a fairly high-quality good,
  • 16:51 - 16:53
    perform just a few tasks in country,
  • 16:53 - 16:55
    and then export that good,
  • 16:55 - 16:59
    then you can root around the bottleneck
    and get some development
  • 16:59 - 17:02
    even when not every sector
    in your economy is working well.
  • 17:02 - 17:05
    If, instead, you've got to produce
    everything in house,
  • 17:05 - 17:06
    everything in the country,
  • 17:06 - 17:10
    then you need every sector
    in that economy to be working well
  • 17:10 - 17:12
    when you're working
    with O-ring production,
  • 17:12 - 17:16
    because you have all
    these complementarities across industries.
  • 17:18 - 17:21
    Okay, let's give some final thoughts
    about O-ring production.
  • 17:21 - 17:22
    First, --
  • 17:22 - 17:25
    not every industry is an O-ring industry,
  • 17:25 - 17:29
    but, perhaps in our modern world,
    more industries are moving in this direction.
  • 17:29 - 17:33
    That tells us something about
    the sources of growing inequality.
  • 17:34 - 17:37
    O-ring production also reminds us
    that production is complex,
  • 17:38 - 17:42
    that production often requires that
    every member of a team be working
  • 17:42 - 17:44
    in the same direction like a sports team.
  • 17:44 - 17:47
    Every member has got to be performing
    at their highest level of ability
  • 17:47 - 17:49
    in order to get those wins.
  • 17:49 - 17:52
    This tells us that organizational capital, --
  • 17:52 - 17:56
    the ability to bring together
    high-skilled workers --
  • 17:56 - 17:58
    with expensive capital, --
  • 17:58 - 18:02
    and to get all those workers
    into that capital working together
  • 18:02 - 18:05
    in a team at the highest level of skill.
  • 18:05 - 18:08
    The ability to do that
    is incredibly important, --
  • 18:09 - 18:12
    and the more complex production grows,
  • 18:12 - 18:17
    the more tasks that are required
    to achieve maximum production,
  • 18:17 - 18:20
    the more valuable organizational capital,
  • 18:20 - 18:22
    the ability to bring these workers
    and capital together,
  • 18:22 - 18:25
    the more valuable
    those skills are going to become.
  • 18:26 - 18:27
    In an O-ring model,
  • 18:27 - 18:30
    you can get virtuous
    and vicious cycles.
  • 18:30 - 18:33
    When one industry in a O-ring
    model increases its ability,
  • 18:33 - 18:37
    that increases the incentive
    of every other industry
  • 18:37 - 18:39
    to perform at its highest level of ability.
  • 18:40 - 18:42
    But the same thing
    is also true in reverse.
  • 18:42 - 18:43
    When one team member
  • 18:43 - 18:47
    or when one industry is
    performing at a low level,
  • 18:47 - 18:49
    that reduces the incentive
    of all the other industries
  • 18:49 - 18:51
    to perform at a high level.
  • 18:51 - 18:55
    Hence you can get growth
    miracles and growth disasters.
  • 18:56 - 18:59
    Now, what does it take
    to coordinate a team?
  • 18:59 - 19:03
    To coordinate an economy
    on a high-skilled equilibrium
  • 19:03 - 19:05
    where everyone is working
    at their maximum level?
  • 19:05 - 19:08
    Well this is an incredibly hard problem.
  • 19:08 - 19:10
    This is all about what culture is about.
  • 19:10 - 19:12
    It's an incredibly hard problem,
  • 19:12 - 19:17
    but also an incredibly important problem,
    something important to think about.
  • 19:17 - 19:18
    Thanks very much.
Title:
O-Ring Model
Description:

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Video Language:
English
Team:
Marginal Revolution University
Project:
Other videos
Duration:
19:29
Michel Smits edited English subtitles for O-Ring Model
Michel Smits edited English subtitles for O-Ring Model
Michel Smits edited English subtitles for O-Ring Model
Michel Smits edited English subtitles for O-Ring Model
Michel Smits edited English subtitles for O-Ring Model
Michel Smits edited English subtitles for O-Ring Model
Michel Smits edited English subtitles for O-Ring Model
Michel Smits edited English subtitles for O-Ring Model
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