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Stories from the Life of an Incident Responder

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    Hello and good evening on day two of the chaos communication Camp 2023 Translated by {Yang}{Li} (ITKST56 course assignment at JYU.FI)]
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    it's late in the evening this is meleeway stage in case you're wondering
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    and the next talk is going to be about incident report responses
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    so if you're curious about how to even get there to have an incident response how you could
    prepare for an incident response and how you could support a new organization
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    uh, the incident response team in doing the job and trying to fix whatever broke
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    let's put it that way um we have the right talk for you
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    this is stories from the life of an incident from incident responders Harry and Chris
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    please a very warm Round of Applause [Applause]
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    so, good evening and thank you for joining us today um we will tell you a little bit of our
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    life as incident responders and I'm Chris I did my computer science
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    studies at the University of alang and Nuremberg I do this security stuff for
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    over 10 years now so my CV is a little bit longer at the moment I'm a detection
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    engineer before that I was a long time working in dfir so digital forensic incident
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    response in different organizations and
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    yeah I'm Harryr I studied electrical and computer engineering at RWTH
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    University and I played a lot of CTF and did some hacking stuff at chaos computer club RWTH
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    during my masters I worked at x41 dsac doing pen testing patch analysis
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    so I also have some kind of offensive security background on for around one year now I'm working at G data Advanced
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    analytics doing digital forensics and incident handling
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    first Christian will give you a short introduction and then he will tell you how a classical ransomware attack looks
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    like and in the second part of the talk I will tell you how the incident
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    responders work and what you can do in advance to make it go as smooth as possible and support the incident
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    response team so as Harryr told you I will probably
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    we'll talk about ransomware because the customers we usually have are small and
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    medium-sized businesses universities and hospitals and those are regularly
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    unfortunately regularly hit by um um
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    ransomware gangs the main reason for this and that's if you heard the last
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    talk um why they maybe not that responsive
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    and are not so interested in they just lack the resources so the manpower to do
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    uh proper security measurements to secure their systems especially in in erm
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    situations where you are for example in a hospital have medical devices
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    um which where you cannot simply install an AV on or even patch the system
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    because you lose the certification as a medical device then but also in in
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    companies manufacturing companies on the shop floor we're talking about systems
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    that have run times of 25 plus years so if you look back now 2023
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    we're talking about XP and older systems fun fact I was in a ransomware case and
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    Wannacry in 2017 when I got a call from from a person from the shop floor
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    asking me if we have a nt4 expert, um
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    that can tell us if WannaCry is affecting nt4 of course you don't need
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    to be a expert for NT-4 this one requires of course not affecting nt4
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    systems so due to the time uh slot we thought
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    memes are the best way to to tell you those stories and we have a lot of them
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    so in the first uh um section I tell you a little bit of how an attack Works
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    um there are a lot of different possibilities how you can describe and how to structure the how an attack works
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    there's the miter attack framework for example there was for example a talk Yesterday by Maker Salko
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    um here on the stage there's the original cyber kill chain from from Lockheed Martin you have
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    stuff from from companies like Mandy and their targeted the tech life cycle but
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    that's all in my opinion two two fine-grained it's that's the reason I
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    just take three simple steps yeah get a foothold in the door
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    look move play around and cash out those three uh I will just go over
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    so start with uh get a foot in the door so normally we
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    see three ways how attackers can can get into the environment in the ransomware
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    cases you have vulnerabilities in uh remote uh internet facing systems you
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    have the remote Services itself and you have malware
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    starting with the with the the vulnerabilities and um I just looked uh up the last four
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    years and maybe somebody remembers netscaler the the so-called Citrix
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    vulnerability in December 2019 um it was released mid of uh 2019 uh
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    December 2019 the first POC publicly available POC was in beginning of
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    January and the patch was available in middle of January so there was a round one week to one and a half weeks between
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    a public proof of concept for the vulnerability and uh patch for the vulnerability and what we saw
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    during 2020 a lot of companies patched but the patch didn't remove the the
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    compromise so they were already compromised and um yeah with it with the patch they
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    didn't remove the compromise so what we found what we could provable
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    see or proof evidence for uh was nine
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    month uh customer was breached after nine months using this this vulnerability
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    and we had other customers where we could see that the netscaler was affected after two years but we couldn't
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    prove that this this compromise was the reason for the actual ransomware case
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    and of course such vulnerabilities happen not that often
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    yeah so 2021 gave us uh hafnium exchange
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    vulnerability also a similar situation the patch
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    appeared as an out-of-band patch from Microsoft on a Tuesday evening 10 o'clock in German time
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    we saw during our uh incidents or the the assessments we did that
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    um the first exploit exploitation attempts were seen on Wednesday in the morning at
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    5:00 am so around seven eight hours later um I know one guy who could patch
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    because he was online when the patch was released otherwise Germany was unable to patch in
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    time and of course we can go on with 2021 proxy shell also
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    exchange vulnerability proxy nutshell also exchange vulnerability
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    we have uh in 2022 VMware Horizon the the virtual desktop infrastructure
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    from VMware just to name also open source stuff Zimbra a collaboration platform
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    including an email server uh has had a vulnerability actually the vulnerability
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    was in cpio from 2015 I think which led
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    to a compromise using via email so you send an email
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    with a cpio with a specially crafted archive file and you could drop a web
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    shell in one of the directories yeah you have of course 40 OS which is a
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    40 gate VPN and firewall operating system
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    and if you read the news we start at the beginning again
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    netscaler had some issues several weeks ago according to foxIT we have 1900
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    still unpatched net scalers worldwide how many patched
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    was netscale has exists that um have not been checked for compromise we
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    don't know of course so that will be a nice year probably
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    um so what can you can you do against this kind of of attack vector patch your systems is one thing as you
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    see this that doesn't lead to the the um or what you need to do afterwards in
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    such cases you need to check your systems for possible compromise
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    that is important to reduce this I highly suggest put your
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    uh Services behind some VPN so that only people who already have
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    connection to the VPN um can access your services or the services
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    they need and that would reduce the attack surface
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    at least to the VPN server so but I
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    of course we can also think about remote services without vulnerabilities
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    um there can be configuration mistakes so the admin does something wrong there can
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    be insecure default configurations like this um I don't know if you know it but the
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    local admins or the administrators on the Windows system are are
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    automatically in the remote desktop users group you know and so
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    we had several cases especially in the beginning of the pandemic when everybody moved from uh to the home offices and
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    they needed to put people fast in the position to to access their the assist
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    the internal systems again they just put a RDP server on the internet and hope for the best
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    um additionally if you put services on the internet of course brute forcing and
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    credential uh stuffing are attacks that are possible so brute forcing just trying the the
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    username and password combinations uh credential stuffing using already leaked
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    passwords or credentials from leaks you find on the internet
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    what you can do about this kind of of attack Vector is uh just as I said use
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    multi-factor Authentication and reduce the attack surface as in the
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    point with the vulnerabilities before by moving the services behind a VPN and
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    then use multi-factor authentication on VPN of course
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    the last Vector that we see normally that the attackers can get in the
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    network is malware we all know this about
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    those funny emails you get with the attachments
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    um include that have either Word documents
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    attached either zip files with with Visual Basic scripts javascripts and
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    what you can get isos you see a lot these days
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    um or what you can also have that you can have just a link inside the email and
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    you download the respective file from some some shady file sharing website
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    um what we saw over the last year was uh USB sticks again funnily
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    um I'm not sure if you have heard about raspberry Robin which is a malware that
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    warms via USB sticks um but I haven't seen it as a vector for
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    ransomware yet on my own but there are people who said that it's
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    an initial access broker for some of the ransomware gangs
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    so what can you do about this if you think the
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    you can of course ban simply some file extensions in your mail server or you
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    change the file Association types in your operating system meaning that you
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    don't open the JavaScript and Visual Basic script files using for example the
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    windows scripting host but open it with notepad and that will
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    of course some people will be
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    uh some people will think about what this this is then and ask the IT guys
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    but it's better than running the the script itself
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    one thing I I I don't like to to say it but keep your AV updated
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    um uh this is one thing keep it updated and read the logs
Title:
Stories from the Life of an Incident Responder
Description:

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Video Language:
English
Duration:
45:33

English, British subtitles

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