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36C3 - From Managerial Feudalism to the Revolt of the Caring Classes

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    36C3 preroll music
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    Herald: The next talk is by David Graeber,
    and he's an author, activist and
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    anthropologist. And he will be speaking
    about his talk "From managerial feudalism
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    to the revolt of the caring classes".
    Please give him a great
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    round of applause
    and welcome him to the stage.
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    Applause
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    David: Hello. Hi. It's great to be here. I
    wanted to talk. I've been in a very bad
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    mood this last week owing to the results
    of the election in the UK and I would
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    think very hard about what happened and
    how to maintain hope. Ah, there we go.
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    Good, good. I don't usually use visual
    aids, but actually assembled them. And the
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    thing is, what I want to talk about a
    little bit is what seems to be happening
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    in the world politically, that we have
    results like what just happened in the UK
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    and why there is nonetheless reason for
    hope, which I really think there is. In a
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    way, this is very much a blip. Probably
    the most... Um, and but there is a
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    strategic lesson to be learned, I think.
    Speaking as someone who's been involved in
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    attempts to transform the world, at least
    for the last 20 years since I was involved
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    in the global justice movement. I think
    that there is a real lack of strategic
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    understanding that there's a vast shift
    sort of happening to the world in terms of
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    central class dynamics that the populist
    right is taking advantage of and the left
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    is really being caught flat footed on. So,
    I want to make a case of what seems to be
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    going wrong and what we can do about it.
    First of all, in terms of despairing. I
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    was very much at the point of despairing.
    There's so many people put so much work
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    that I know into trying to turn around the
    situation. There seemed to be a genuine
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    possibility of a broad social
    transformation in England. And when we got
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    the results, I mean, there's a kind of
    sense of shock. But actually, if you look
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    at the breakdown of the vote, for example,
    it doesn't look too great for the right in
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    the long run. Basically, the younger you
    are, the more determined you are to kick
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    the Tories out. The core... Actually, I've
    never seen numbers quite like this. The
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    core... base of... electoral base of the
    right wing is almost exclusively old. And
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    the older you are, the more likely you are
    to vote conservative, which is really,
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    really kind of amazing because it means
    that the electoral base of the right is
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    literally dying off - a process which
    they're actually expediting by defunding
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    health care in every way possible. And
    normally you'd say, oh, yes, so what? As
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    people get older, they become more
    conservative. But there's every reason to
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    think that that's not actually happening
    this time around. Especially because
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    traditionally people who either had been
    apathetic or had voted for the left, who
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    eventually end up voting for the right, do
    so at the point when they get a mortgage
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    or when they get a sort of secure job with
    room for promotion and therefore feel they
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    have a stake in the system. Well, that's
    precisely what's not happening to this new
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    generation. So if that's the case, the
    right wing is actually in the long run in
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    real trouble. And to show you just how
    remarkable the situation is. Someone put
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    together a electoral map of the UK showing
    what it would look like if only people
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    over 65 voted and what it would look like
    if only people under 25 voted. Here's the
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    first one. Blue is Tory. If only people
    over 65 voted, I believe there would be
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    four or five Labor MPs, but otherwise
    entirely conservative. Now here's the map.
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    If only people under 25 voted, there would
    be no Tory MPs at all. There might be a
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    few Liberal Dems and Welsh candidates and
    Scottish ones. And in fact, this is a
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    relatively recent phenomena. Here's... if
    you look at the divergence. You know, it really
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    is just the last few years it started to
    look like that. So something has happened
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    that like almost all young people coming
    in are voting not just for the left, but
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    for the radical left. I mean, Corbyn ran
    on a platform that not just two or three
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    years before would have been considered
    completely insane and, you know, is
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    falling off the political spectrum
    altogether. Yet, the vast majority of
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    young people voted for it. The problem is
    that in a situation like this, the swing
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    voters are the sort of middle aged people.
    And for some reason, middle aged people
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    broke right. The question is, why did that
    happen? And I've been trying to figure
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    that out. Now, in order to do so, I think
    we need to really think hard about what
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    has been happening to social class
    relations. And the conclusion that I came
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    to is that essentially the left is
    applying an outdated paradigm. You know,
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    they're still thinking in terms of bosses
    and workers and a kind of old fashioned
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    industrial sense where what's really going
    on is that for most people, the key class
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    opposition is caregivers versus managers.
    And, essentially, leftist parties are
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    trying to represent both sides at the same
    time, but they're really dominated by the
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    latter. Now, I'm going to go through some
    basic political economy stuff as in way of
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    background. And this is a key statistic,
    which is the kind of thing we were looking
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    at when we first started talking about the
    99 percent of the 1 percent are the
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    beginning of Occupy Wall Street.
    Essentially until the mid 70s, there was a
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    sort of understanding between 1945 and
    1975, say, there was an understanding that
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    as way of productivity increases, wages
    will go up, too. And they largely went up
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    together. This only takes it from 1960,
    but it goes back to the 40s. More
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    productivity goes up. A cut of that went
    to the workers. Around 1975 or so it
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    really splits. And since then, if you see
    what's going on here, productivity keeps
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    going up and up and up and up, whereas
    wages remain flat. So, the question is,
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    what happens to all that money from the
    increased productivity? Feasibly, it goes
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    to one percent of the population. And
    that's what we were talking about when we
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    talked about the 1 percent. The other
    point, which was key to the notion of 99
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    and 1 percent when we developed that, was
    that the 1 percent are also the people who
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    make all the political campaign
    contributions. These statistics are from
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    America, which has a unusually corrupt
    system, but pretty much all of them...
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    Bribery is basically legal in America. But
    essentially it's the same people who are
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    making all the campaign contributions who
    have collected all of the profits from
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    increased productivity, all the increased
    wealth. And essentially, they're the
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    people who managed to turn their wealth
    into power, and their power back into
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    wealth. So. Who are these people want and
    how does this relate to changes in the
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    workforce? Well, the interesting thing
    that I discovered when I started looking
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    into this, is that the rhetoric we used to
    describe the changes in class structure
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    since the 70s is really deceptive.
    Because, you know, since really since the
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    80s, everybody has been talking about the
    service economy. What we're shifting from
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    an industrial to a service economy. And
    the image that people have is that, you
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    know, we've all gone from being factory
    workers to serving each other lattes and
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    pressing each other's trousers and so
    forth. But actually, if you look at the
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    actual numbers of people in retail. People
    who are actually serving food. I don't
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    have a, you know, detailed breakdown here,
    but they remain pretty much constant. In
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    fact, I've seen figures going back 150
    years which show that it's pretty much 15
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    percent of the population that does that
    sort of thing. It has been for, you know,
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    over a century. It doesn't really change.
    It goes up and down a little bit. But
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    basically, the amount of people who are
    actually providing services, haircuts,
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    things like that, is pretty much the same
    as it's always been. What's actually
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    happened is that you've had a growth of
    two areas. One is providing, you know,
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    what I would call caregiving work. And I
    would include education and health, but
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    basically taking care of other people in
    one way or another. In the statistics you
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    have to look at education. Health is only
    have a category of caregiving in economic
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    statistics. On the other hand, you have
    administration and the number of people
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    who are doing clerical, administrative and
    supervisory work has gone up enormously to
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    some degree. So according to some
    accounts, it's gone up from maybe 20
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    percent of the population in, say, UK or
    America in 1900 to 40, 50, 60 percent. I
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    mean, even a majority of workers. Now, the
    interesting thing about that is that huge
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    numbers of those people seem to be
    convinced they really aren't doing
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    anything and that essentially if their
    jobs didn't exist, you would make no
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    difference at all. It's almost as if they
    were just making up jobs in offices to
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    keep people busy. And this was the theme
    of my book I wrote on bullshit jobs. And
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    just to describe the genesis of that book,
    essentially, I don't actually myself come
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    from a professional background. So, as a
    professor, I constantly meet people, sort
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    of spouses of my colleagues, the sort of
    people you meet when you're socializing
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    people in professional backgrounds. Well,
    I keep running into people of parties and
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    saying, well, who work in offices and...
    you know, I'm an anthropologist, right. I
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    keep asking, well, what do you actually
    do? I mean, what does a person who is a
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    management consultant, you know, actually
    do all day? And very often they will say,
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    well, not much. Or you ask people, I am an
    anthropologists, what do you do? And
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    they'll say, well, nothing, really. And,
    you know, you think they're just being
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    modest, you know. So, you kind of
    interrogate them by a few drinks later.
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    They admit that actually they meant that
    literally, they actually do nothing all
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    day. You know, they sit around and they
    adjust their Facebook profiles. They play
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    computer games. They were like, you know,
    sometimes I'll take a couple of calls a
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    day. Sometimes I'll take a couple of calls
    a week. Sometimes they're just there in
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    case something goes wrong. Sometimes they
    just don't do anything at all. And you
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    ask, what? Does your supervisor know this?
    And they say, you know, I often wonder. I
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    think they do so. So, I began to wonder
    how many people are there like this? Is
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    this some weird coincidence that has
    happened to run into people like this all
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    the time? What section of the workforce is
    actually doing nothing all day? So I wrote
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    a little article. I had a friend who is
    starting a radical magazine, said you
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    write something provocative, you know,
    something you'd never be able to get
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    published elsewhere. So I wrote a little
    piece called "On the phenomenon of
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    bullshit jobs" where I suggested that, you
    know, back in the 30s, Keynes wrote this
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    famous essays predicting that by around
    now we would all be working 15 hour weeks
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    because automation would like get rid of
    most manual labor. And if you look at the
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    jobs that exist in the 30s, you know,
    that's true. So I said, well, maybe what's
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    happened is the reason we're not working
    15 hour weeks is they just made up
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    bullshit jobs. And just to keep us all
    working. And I wrote this piece as just
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    kind of a joke, right? Within a week, this
    thing had been translated into 15
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    different languages. It was circulating
    around the world because the server kept
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    crashing, it was getting millions and
    millions of hits. I was like, oh, my god,
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    do you mean it's true? And eventually
    someone did a survey, YouGov, I think, and
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    they discovered that of people in the UK,
    37 percent agreed that if their job didn't
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    exist either would make no difference
    whatsoever or the world might be a
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    slightly better place. I thought about
    that. What must that do to the human soul?
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    You imagine that, you know, waking up
    every morning and going to work, thinking
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    that you're doing absolutely nothing if,
    you know. No wonder people are angry and
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    depressed. And I thought about it, it explains a
    lot of social phenomena that if people are
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    just pretending to work all day and then,
    you know, it actually really touched me.
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    It's strange because I come from a working
    class background myself. So you'd think
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    that, you know, oh, great. So, lots of
    people are paid to do nothing all day and
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    get good salaries, like, my heart bleeds,
    you know? But actually, if you think about
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    it, it's actually a horrible situation
    because, you know, as someone who has had
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    a real job knows, the very, very worst
    part of any real job is when you finish
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    the job but you have to keep working
    because your boss will get mad. You know,
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    you have to pretend to work because it's
    somebody else's time. It's very strange
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    metaphysical notion we have in our society
    that someone else can own your time. You
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    know, so since you're on the clock, you
    have to keep working or pretend to be,
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    make up something to look busy. Well,
    apparently, at least a third of people in
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    our society, that's all they do. Their
    entire job consists of just looking busy
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    to make somebody else happy. And that
    must be horrible. So. And it made a lot of
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    political sense. Why is it the people seem
    to resent teachers or autoworkers? After
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    the 2008 crash, the people who really had
    to take a hit were teachers and auto
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    workers. And there was a lot of people
    saying, well, these guys are making 25
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    dollars an hour, you know? Well, yeah,
    that's they're providing useful service or
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    making cars. You're American. You're
    supposed to like cars. You know, cars is
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    what makes you what you are if you're
    American. How would they resent
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    autoworkers? And I realize that it only
    makes sense if there's huge proportions of
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    the population who aren't doing anything
    and were totally miserable and are
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    basically saying, like, yeah, but you get
    to teach kids, you get to make stuff. You
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    get him in a car. And then you want
    vacations, too? That's not fair, you know?
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    It's almost as if the suffering that you
    experience doing nothing all day is itself
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    a sort of validation of... It's like this
    kind of hair shirt that makes you
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    justifies your salary. Whereas people and
    I truly hear people saying this logic all
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    the time that while teachers, you know, I
    mean, they get to teach kids. You don't
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    want people pay them too much. You don't
    want people who are just interested in
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    money taking care of our kids, do we?
    Which is odd because you never hear people
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    say you never want greedy people. People
    are just interested in money taking care
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    of our money. So therefore, you shouldn't
    pay bankers so much. Though you'd think
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    that would be a more serious problem,
    right? Yeah. So there is this idea that if
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    you're doing something that actually
    serves a purpose, somehow that should be
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    enough. You shouldn't get a lot of money
    for it. All right. So so. As a result of
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    this there is actually an inverse
    relationship, that I don't have actual
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    numbers for this, but there's actually an
    inverse relationship, and I have seen
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    economic confirmation of this, between how
    socially beneficial your work is and how
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    obviously your work benefits other people
    and how much you get paid. There's a few
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    exceptions like doctors, which everybody
    talks about. But generally speaking, the
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    more useful your work, the less they'll
    pay you for it. Now, now. This is
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    obviously a big problem already, but
    there's every reason to believe that the
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    problem is actually getting worse. And one
    of the fascinating things I discovered
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    when I started looking at the economic
    statistics is that if you look at jobs
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    that actually are useful and let's again
    look at caregiving. Remember, the big
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    growth in jobs over the last 30 years has
    been in two areas which have collapsed in
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    the term service, but are really actually
    totally different. One is these sort of
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    administrative, clerical and supervisory
    work and the other is the actual
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    caregiving labour, the work where you're
    actually helping people in some way. So,
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    education and health are the two areas
    which show up on the statistics. Okay, if
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    you look at these statistics, you discover
    that productivity in manufacturing, as we
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    all know, is going way up. Productivity in
    certain other areas, wholesale, business
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    services are going up. However,
    productivity in education, health and...
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    What's this other services? Basically
    caregiving in general insofar as it shows
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    up on the charts, productivity is actually
    going down. Well, why is that? That's
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    really interesting. Yeah, well, we'll talk
    in a moment about what productivity
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    actually even means in this context. But
    here's a suggestion as to why. This is the
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    growth of physicians on the bottom versus
    the growth of actual medical
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    administrators in the United States since
    1970. That's a fairly impressive looking
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    graph there. Basically, what that sort of
    a giant mountain there is what I called
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    the bullshit sector. There's absolutely no
    reason why you'd actually need that many
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    people to administer doctors. And actually
    the real effect of having all those people
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    is to make the doctors and the nurses less
    efficient rather than more. Because I know
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    this perfectly well from education,
    because I'm a professor. That's what I do
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    for a living. The amount of actual
    administrative paperwork you have to do
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    actually increases with the number of
    administrators over the last 30, 40 years.
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    You know, something similar has happened,
    isn't quite as bad as this, but something
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    very similar has happened in America, in
    universities, that the number of
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    professors has doubled but the number of
    actual administrators has gone up by 240,
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    300 percent. So. Well, more than that,
    actually. Yeah, I mean. So, suddenly you
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    have like twice as many administrators for
    professors as you had before. Now, you
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    would think that that would mean that
    professors have to do less administration
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    because you have more administrators.
    Exactly the opposite is the case. More and
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    more of your time is taken up by
    administration. Well, why is that? The
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    major reason is because the way it works
    is if you are hired, as you know, vice
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    provost, executive vice provost or
    assistant dean or something like that.
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    Some big shot administrative position at a
    virtual American university. Well, you
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    want to feel like an executive and they
    give these guys these giant six figure
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    salaries. They treat them like they're an
    executive. So if you're an executive, of
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    course, you have to have a minor army of
    flunkies of assistants to make yourself
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    feel important. The problem is they give
    these guys five or six assistants, but
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    then they figure out what those five or
    six assistants are actually going to do,
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    which usually turns out to be make up work
    for me. Right. The professor. So suddenly
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    I have to do time allocation studies.
    Suddenly I have to do. I have to do, you
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    know, learning outcome assessments where
    I describe what the difference with the
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    undergraduate and graduate section of the
    same course is going to be. Basically
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    completely pointless stuff that nobody had
    to do 30 years ago and made no difference
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    at all, to justify the existence of this
    kind of mountain of administrators and
  • 22:27 - 22:34
    just give them something to do all day.
    Now, the interesting result of that is
  • 22:34 - 22:40
    that, and this is where this sort of stuff
    comes in, it's actually the numbers are
  • 22:40 - 22:44
    there. But it's very, very difficult to
    interpret. So I had to actually get an
  • 22:44 - 22:48
    economist friend to sort of go through all
    this with me and confirm that what I
  • 22:48 - 22:52
    thought was happening was actually
    happening. Essentially, what's going on is
  • 22:52 - 22:57
    just as manufacturing, digitalization is
    being employed to make it much more
  • 22:57 - 23:02
    efficient. Productivity goes up, the
    number of workers go down, the number of
  • 23:02 - 23:06
    payment that, you know the wages are
    actually going way up in manufacturing,
  • 23:06 - 23:11
    but it doesn't really make a dent in
    profits because there's so few workers.
  • 23:11 - 23:16
    So, OK, that we kind of all know about. On
    the other hand, in the caring sector, the
  • 23:16 - 23:23
    exact opposite has happened. Digitalization
    is being used as an excuse to make lower
  • 23:23 - 23:29
    productivity so as to justify the
    existence of this army of administrators.
  • 23:29 - 23:36
    And if you think about it, you know,
    basically, you know, in order to translate
  • 23:36 - 23:40
    a qualitative outcome into a form that a
    computer can even understand, that
  • 23:40 - 23:44
    requires a large amount of human labor.
    That's why I have to do the learning
  • 23:44 - 23:48
    outcome studies and the time allocation
    stuff, right. But really, ultimately,
  • 23:48 - 23:58
    that's to justify the existence of this
    giant army of administrators. Now, as a
  • 23:58 - 24:03
    result of that, you need to have actually
    more people working in those sectors to
  • 24:03 - 24:06
    produce the same outcome. These are
    becoming less and less productive, more
  • 24:06 - 24:13
    and more of your time has to be spent. Oh,
    yes. This is for the average company now
  • 24:13 - 24:20
    looks like. More and more of your time
    ends up being spent sort of making the
  • 24:20 - 24:25
    administrators happy and giving them an
    excuse for their existence. This is a
  • 24:25 - 24:29
    breakdown I saw in a report about American
    office workers, where they compared
  • 24:29 - 24:38
    2015 and 2016. In 2015 only 46 percent of
    their time was spent actually doing their
  • 24:38 - 24:45
    job. That declined by 7 percent in one
    year to 39 percent. That's got to be some
  • 24:45 - 24:49
    kind of statistical anomaly, because if
    that were actually true in about a decade
  • 24:49 - 24:55
    and a half, nobody will be doing any work
    at all. But it gives you an idea of what's
  • 24:55 - 25:01
    happening. So if productivity is going
    down, these people are just sort of
  • 25:01 - 25:05
    working all the time to satisfy the
    administrators. So the creation of
  • 25:05 - 25:09
    bullshit jobs essentially creates the
    bullshitization of real jobs. There is a
  • 25:09 - 25:14
    huge, there's both a squeeze on profits
    and wages. More and more money is going to
  • 25:14 - 25:20
    pay the administrators. And you need to
    hire more and more people. So what do you
  • 25:20 - 25:25
    get? Well, if you look around the world,
    whereas labor action happening, basically
  • 25:25 - 25:30
    you have teachers strikes all over America
    and professors strikes in the UK. You have
  • 25:30 - 25:34
    care home workers, I believe, in France.
    They had nursing home workers first time
  • 25:34 - 25:40
    ever on strike, nurses strikes all over
    the world. Basically, caregivers are are
  • 25:40 - 25:48
    at the sort of cutting edge of industrial
    action. The problem, of course, and this
  • 25:48 - 25:55
    is the problem for the left is that the
    administrators, who are in the basic class
  • 25:55 - 25:59
    enemy of the nurses, and I believe in New
    Zealand, the nurses wrote a very clear
  • 25:59 - 26:04
    manifesto stating this. They said, you
    know, the problem we have is that there's
  • 26:04 - 26:10
    all of these hospital administrators,
    these guys, not only are they taking all
  • 26:10 - 26:14
    the money, so we haven't got a raise in 20
    years. They give us so much paperwork, we
  • 26:14 - 26:19
    can't take care of our patients. So that
    is the sort of class enemy of what I call
  • 26:19 - 26:25
    the caring classes. The problem for the
    left is that often those guys are in the
  • 26:25 - 26:31
    same union and they're certainly in the
    same political party. Tom Frank wrote a
  • 26:31 - 26:38
    book called "Listen Liberal", where he
    documented what a lot of us had kind of
  • 26:38 - 26:44
    had a sense of intuitively for some time,
    that what used to be left wing parties,
  • 26:44 - 26:52
    essentially the Clintonite Democrats, the
    Blairite Labor Party. Talk about people
  • 26:52 - 26:59
    like Macron, Trudeau, all of these guys, at
    essentially the head of parties, that used
  • 26:59 - 27:07
    to be parties based in labor unions and
    the working classes and by extension the
  • 27:07 - 27:12
    caring classes, as I call them. But
    have shifted to essentially be the classes
  • 27:12 - 27:18
    of the professional, I mean, the parties
    of the professional managerial classes. So
  • 27:18 - 27:22
    essentially, they are the, you know, they
    are the representatives of that giant
  • 27:22 - 27:27
    mountain of administrators. That is their
    core base. I even caught a quote from
  • 27:27 - 27:33
    Obama where he pretty much admitted it,
    where he said, you know, while people ask
  • 27:33 - 27:39
    me why we don't have a single payer health
    plan in America, would that be simpler?
  • 27:39 - 27:44
    Wouldn't that be more efficient? And he
    said, you know, well, yeah, I guess it
  • 27:44 - 27:48
    would. But that's kind of the problem. You
    know, we have at the moment, like, what is
  • 27:48 - 27:52
    it to 3 million people working for Kaiser,
    Blue Cross, Blue Shield, all these
  • 27:52 - 27:55
    insurance companies. What are we going to
    do with those guys, if we have an
  • 27:55 - 28:03
    efficient system? I mean, so essentially
    he admitted that it is intentional policy
  • 28:03 - 28:12
    to maintain the marketization of health in
    America because it's less efficient and,
  • 28:12 - 28:17
    you know, allows them to maintain a bunch
    of paper pushers in offices doing
  • 28:17 - 28:20
    completely unnecessary work, who are
    essentially the core base of the
  • 28:20 - 28:24
    Democratic Party. I mean, those guys, you
    know, they don't really care if they shut
  • 28:24 - 28:28
    down auto plants, do they? In fact, they
    seem to take his glee. They say, well, you
  • 28:28 - 28:31
    know, economy's changing. You just gotta
    deal with it. But the moment look at
  • 28:31 - 28:34
    those guys and the officers who were doing
    nothing are threatened, the political
  • 28:34 - 28:39
    parties leap into action and get all
    excited. All right. So if you look at what
  • 28:39 - 28:48
    happened in England. Well, it's pretty
    clear that the conservatives won because
  • 28:48 - 28:53
    they maneuvered the left into identifying
    itself with the professional managerial
  • 28:53 - 28:59
    classes. There is a split between the sort
    of labor union base, which is increasingly
  • 28:59 - 29:06
    unions representing very militant carers
    of one kind or another. And the
  • 29:06 - 29:09
    professionals, managers and the
    administrators, both of whom are
  • 29:09 - 29:18
    supposedly represented by the same party.
    Now, Brexit was a perfect issue to sort of
  • 29:18 - 29:21
    make the bureaucrats and the
    administrators and the professionals into
  • 29:21 - 29:25
    the class enemy. Now, it's very ironic
    because of course, in the long run, the
  • 29:25 - 29:30
    people were really going to benefit from
    Brexit are precisely lawyers, right.
  • 29:30 - 29:36
    Because they got to rewrite everything in
    England. However, this is not how it was
  • 29:36 - 29:39
    represented. It was represented your
    enemies. I mean, there was an appeal to
  • 29:39 - 29:45
    racism, obviously, but there was also an
    appeal: your enemies are these distant
  • 29:45 - 29:54
    bureaucrats who know nothing of your
    lives. The key moment in terms of where
  • 29:54 - 29:58
    essentially the Tories managed to
    outmaneuver Labor and guaranteed their
  • 29:58 - 30:04
    victory was precisely by forcing Labor
    into an alliance with all the people like
  • 30:04 - 30:08
    the Liberal Democrats and the other
    remainers, who then use this incredibly
  • 30:08 - 30:14
    complicated constitutional means to try to
    block Brexit from happening. 20 minutes?
  • 30:14 - 30:23
    Okay, that's easy. And it was fun to watch
    at the time on TV were all these you know,
  • 30:23 - 30:29
    like all these guys in wigs and strange
    people called Black Rod and, you know, in
  • 30:29 - 30:34
    odd costumes, appealing to all sorts of
    arcane rules from the 16th century. And it
  • 30:34 - 30:38
    was great drama. You know, it was like
    costume drama come to life on television.
  • 30:38 - 30:44
    But in effect and you know, it seemed like
    Boris Johnson was just being constantly
  • 30:44 - 30:48
    humiliated. Everything he did didn't work.
    His plans collapsed. He lost every vote he
  • 30:48 - 30:53
    tried. But in fact, what it ended up doing
    was it forced what was actually a
  • 30:53 - 31:03
    radical party which represented the angry
    youth in the U.K. into alliance with
  • 31:03 - 31:09
    professional managerials, who live by
    rules and whose entire idea of democracy
  • 31:09 - 31:15
    is of a set of rules. This is very
    clear in America. And again, you could see
  • 31:15 - 31:23
    this in the battle of Trump versus Hillary
    Clinton. Clinton was essentially accused
  • 31:23 - 31:27
    of being corrupt because she would do
    things like, you know, get hundreds of
  • 31:27 - 31:33
    thousands of dollars for speeches for
    investment firms like Goldman Sachs, who
  • 31:33 - 31:37
    obviously aren't paying politicians that
    kind of money unless you expect to get
  • 31:37 - 31:42
    some kind of influence out of it. And
    constantly like Clinton's defenders would
  • 31:42 - 31:46
    say. Yes, but that was perfectly legal.
    Everything she did was legal. Why are
  • 31:46 - 31:50
    people getting so upset? She didn't break
    the law. And I think that if you want to
  • 31:50 - 31:58
    understand class dynamics in a country
    like England or America today, that phrase
  • 31:58 - 32:03
    kind of gives the game away, because
    people of the professional managerial
  • 32:03 - 32:09
    classes are probably the only people
    alive, who think that if you make bribery
  • 32:09 - 32:20
    legal, that makes it OK. It's all about
    form versus, against content.
  • 32:20 - 32:24
    Democracy isn't the popular will.
    Democracy is a set of rules and
  • 32:24 - 32:29
    regulations. And if you follow the rules
    and regulations, well, you know, that's
  • 32:29 - 32:33
    fine no matter. And these guys, that kind
    of mountain of administrators are the
  • 32:33 - 32:38
    people who think that way. And they've
    become the base of parties, you know, they
  • 32:38 - 32:44
    are the electoral base of people like
    Clinton, people like Macron, people like
  • 32:44 - 32:57
    Tony Blair had been, people like Obama.
    And now. And Corbyn was not at all like
  • 32:57 - 33:01
    that. He is this person who had been a
    complete rebel against his own party for
  • 33:01 - 33:04
    his entire life, but what they did, was
    they maneuvered him into a position where
  • 33:04 - 33:09
    there had been a Brexit vote which
    represented substance: the popular will.
  • 33:09 - 33:13
    And he was forced into a situation where
    he had to, like align with the people who
  • 33:13 - 33:19
    are trying to block it through legalistic
    regulation, essentially by appeal to
  • 33:19 - 33:26
    endless arcane laws. Thus identifying his
    class with the professional managerials
  • 33:26 - 33:30
    and a lot of my friends who actually were
    out on doorsteps. You know, they actually
  • 33:30 - 33:34
    seem to think of Boris Johnson as a
    regular guy. I mean, this guy, his actual
  • 33:34 - 33:39
    name is Alexander Boris de Pfeffel
    Johnson. He is an aristocrat going back
  • 33:39 - 33:44
    like 500 years. But they seem to think he
    was a regular guy. And Corbyn, who hadn't
  • 33:44 - 33:51
    even been to college and was was sort of a
    member of the elite, based almost entirely
  • 33:51 - 33:57
    on that. And if you look at people like
    Trump and people like Johnson, how did
  • 33:57 - 34:03
    they manage to pull off being populist in
    any sense? You know, they're born to every
  • 34:03 - 34:10
    conceivable type of privilege. Basically,
    they do it by acting like the exact
  • 34:10 - 34:15
    opposite of the annoying bureaucratic
    administrator, who is your kind of enemy
  • 34:15 - 34:21
    at work? That's the game of images they're
    playing, you know. So Johnson is clearly
  • 34:21 - 34:25
    totally fake. He fakes disorganization.
    He's actually a very organized person
  • 34:25 - 34:31
    according to people who acutally know him.
    But he's developed this persona. This guy
  • 34:31 - 34:36
    is all about content over form. And he's
    sort of chaotic and disorganized. And so
  • 34:36 - 34:40
    they're basically playing the role of
    being anti-bureaucrats and they maneuver
  • 34:40 - 34:44
    the other side into being identified with
    administration, rules and regulations and
  • 34:44 - 34:48
    those guys who basically drive you crazy.
    The question for the left, then is how to
  • 34:48 - 34:53
    break with that. So I have, what is it, 15
    minutes in order to propose how we can
  • 34:53 - 35:01
    break...? It strikes me that that we need
    to kind of rip up the game and start over.
  • 35:01 - 35:09
    We're in another world economically than
    we used to be. And perhaps the best way to
  • 35:09 - 35:13
    do it is to think about what when people
    say their jobs are bullshit, you know,
  • 35:13 - 35:19
    when people say that 37 percent of people
    who say, if my job didn't exist, probably
  • 35:19 - 35:23
    the world be better off, I'm not actually
    doing anything. What do they actually mean
  • 35:23 - 35:27
    by that? In almost every case, what they
    say is that it doesn't really benefit
  • 35:27 - 35:35
    anymore. There is a principle that
    ultimately work is meaningful if it helps
  • 35:35 - 35:42
    people and improves other people's lives.
    Thus caring labor in a sense has become
  • 35:42 - 35:47
    the paradigm for all forms of labor. And
    this is very, very interesting because I
  • 35:47 - 35:54
    think that to a large degree, the left is
    really stuck on the notion of production
  • 35:54 - 35:59
    rather than caring. And and the reason we
    have been outmaneuvered in the past has
  • 35:59 - 36:03
    been precisely because of that. I could
    talk about the, you know, how this
  • 36:03 - 36:07
    happened. I think it really a lot of
    economics is really theological. It's a
  • 36:07 - 36:13
    transposition of old religious ideas about
    creation, where human beings are sort of
  • 36:13 - 36:20
    forced to feel like the story of
    Prometheus, the Bible, you know, the human
  • 36:20 - 36:26
    condition. Our fallen state is one where
    God is a creator. We tried to usurp his
  • 36:26 - 36:30
    position. So God punishes us by saying,
    OK, you can create your own lives, but
  • 36:30 - 36:36
    it's being miserable and painful. So work is
    both is both productive, it's creative.
  • 36:36 - 36:43
    But at the same time, it's also supposed
    to be suffering. Whereas so we have an
  • 36:43 - 36:48
    idea of work as productivity. So I was
    actually looking at these charts. You're
  • 36:48 - 36:52
    talking of the different productivity of
    different types of work. Now I can see
  • 36:52 - 36:57
    where productivity of construction comes
    in. But according to this, you can even
  • 36:57 - 37:03
    measure the productivity of real estate,
    productivity of agriculture. Okay.
  • 37:03 - 37:08
    Productivity, I mean, everything is
    production. What does productivity of real
  • 37:08 - 37:12
    estate...doesn't make any sense, you're
    not producing anything, it's land. It sits
  • 37:12 - 37:18
    there. Our paradigm for value is
    production. But if you think about it,
  • 37:18 - 37:22
    most work is not productive. Most work is
    actually about maintaining things. It's
  • 37:22 - 37:28
    about care. If you think whenever I see,
    talk to a Marxist theorist, wherever, they
  • 37:28 - 37:32
    try to explain value, which is what they
    always like to do. They always take the
  • 37:32 - 37:36
    example of a teacup. They say, well,
    usually they're sitting there with a glass
  • 37:36 - 37:44
    bottle, a cup. Well, look at this bottle,
    you know. You know, it takes a certain
  • 37:44 - 37:49
    amount of socially necessary labor time to
    produce this, say it takes, you know, this
  • 37:49 - 37:54
    much time, this much resources. It's
    always about production of stuff. But a
  • 37:54 - 38:02
    teacup or a bottle. Well, you know. You
    produce a cup once, you wash it like 10000
  • 38:02 - 38:06
    times. Most work isn't actually about
    producing new things, it's about
  • 38:06 - 38:14
    maintaining things. We have a warped
    notion, which really, it's a very
  • 38:14 - 38:19
    gendered. Real work is like male craftsman
    banging away or some factory worker making
  • 38:19 - 38:23
    a car or something like that. It's almost
    a paradigm for childbirth, right? Because
  • 38:23 - 38:29
    labor is supposed to be, the word labor is
    very interesting, right? Because in the
  • 38:29 - 38:33
    Bible they say, they curse Adam to work
    and they curse Eve have pain of
  • 38:33 - 38:38
    childbirth, but that's called labor. So
    there's the idea that, you know, there's
  • 38:38 - 38:42
    this. Factories are like these black boxes
    where you're kind of pushing stuff out
  • 38:42 - 38:48
    like babies through a painful process that
    we don't really understand. And that's
  • 38:48 - 38:52
    what work mainly consists of. But
    actually, that's not what work mainly
  • 38:52 - 38:58
    consists of. Most work actually consists
    of taking care of other people. So I think
  • 38:58 - 39:04
    that what we need to do is we need to
    start over. We need to realign. First of
  • 39:04 - 39:09
    all, think about the working classes, not
    as producers, but as carers. And working
  • 39:09 - 39:14
    classes are basically people who take care
    of other people and always have been.
  • 39:14 - 39:19
    Actually, psychological studies show this
    really well, that you know, the poorer you
  • 39:19 - 39:23
    are, the better you are reading other
    people's emotions and understanding what
  • 39:23 - 39:30
    they're feeling. That's because, you know,
    it's actually the job of people to take
  • 39:30 - 39:34
    care of others. All rich people just don't
    have to think about what other people are
  • 39:34 - 39:40
    thinking or they don't care, literally.
    And so I think we need to A: redefine the
  • 39:40 - 39:47
    working classes as caring classes. But
    second of all, we need to move away from a
  • 39:47 - 39:51
    paradigm of production and consumption as
    being what an economy is about is if we're
  • 39:51 - 39:57
    going to save the planet, we really need
    to move away from productivism. So I would
  • 39:57 - 40:03
    propose that we just rip up the discipline
    of economics as it exists and start over.
  • 40:03 - 40:04
    Chuckles
  • 40:04 - 40:09
    Applause
  • 40:09 - 40:13
    So this is my proposal in this regard. I
    think that we should take the ideas of
  • 40:13 - 40:18
    production and consumption, throw them
    away and substitute for them the idea of
  • 40:18 - 40:28
    care and freedom. Think about it. You
    know, thank you. I mean, even if you're
  • 40:28 - 40:31
    making a bridge, right, you make a bridge,
    as feminists constantly point out,
  • 40:31 - 40:35
    you know, you're making a bridge because
    you care that people can get across the
  • 40:35 - 40:40
    river. You know, you make a car because
    you care that people can get around. So
  • 40:40 - 40:46
    even like production is one subordinate
    type of care. What we do is, you know, as
  • 40:46 - 40:51
    human beings, as we take care of each
    other. But care is actually and this is, I
  • 40:51 - 40:57
    think, something that we don't often
    recognize closely related to the notion of
  • 40:57 - 41:07
    freedom, because normally care is defined
    as answering to other people's needs. And
  • 41:07 - 41:12
    certainly that is an important element in
    it. But no, it's not just that. Like if
  • 41:12 - 41:17
    you're in a prison. Right. They take care
    of the needs of the prisoners, usually at
  • 41:17 - 41:21
    least to the point of giving them basic
    food, clothing and medical care. But you
  • 41:21 - 41:26
    can't really think of a prison as caring
    for prisoners. Right. Care is more than
  • 41:26 - 41:33
    that. So why isn't a prison a caregiving
    institution, whereas something else might
  • 41:33 - 41:40
    be? Well, if you think about care, what is
    the the kind of paradigm for carrying
  • 41:40 - 41:46
    relations? A mother and a child. Right. A
    mother takes care of a child, or a parent
  • 41:46 - 41:52
    takes care of a child so that that child
    can grow and be healthy and flourish.
  • 41:52 - 41:56
    That's true. But in an immediate level,
    you know, you take care of a child so the
  • 41:56 - 42:01
    child can go and play. That's what
    children actually do when you're taking
  • 42:01 - 42:06
    care of them. What is play? Play is like
    action done for its own sake. It's in a
  • 42:06 - 42:10
    way the very paradigm of freedom, because
    action done for its own sake is what
  • 42:10 - 42:16
    freedom really consists of. Play and
    freedom are ultimately the same thing. So,
  • 42:16 - 42:22
    a production-consumption paradigm for what
    an economy is, is a guarantee for
  • 42:22 - 42:27
    ultimately destroying the planet and each
    other. I mean, even when you talk about
  • 42:27 - 42:34
    de-growth, you know, if you're working
    within that paradigm, you are essentially
  • 42:34 - 42:40
    doomed. We need to break free away from
    that paradigm entirely. Care and freedom,
  • 42:40 - 42:44
    on the other hand, are things you can
    increase as much as you like without
  • 42:44 - 42:51
    damaging anything. So we need to think:
    what are ways that we need to care for
  • 42:51 - 42:54
    each other that will make each other more
    free? And who are the people who are
  • 42:54 - 43:00
    providing that care? And how can they be
    compensated themselves with greater
  • 43:00 - 43:08
    freedom? And to do that, we need to like
    actually scrap almost all of the
  • 43:08 - 43:13
    discipline of economics as it currently
    exists. We're actually just starting to
  • 43:13 - 43:20
    think about this. I mean, because
    economics as it currently exists is based
  • 43:20 - 43:26
    on assumptions of human nature that we now
    know to be wrong. There have been actual
  • 43:26 - 43:31
    empirical tests of the basic fundamental
    assumptions of the maximizing individual
  • 43:31 - 43:36
    that economic theory is based on. It turns
    out they're not true. It tells you
  • 43:36 - 43:41
    something about the role of economics that
    this has had almost no effect on economic
  • 43:41 - 43:50
    teaching whatsoever. They don't really
    care that it's not true. But one of the
  • 43:50 - 43:55
    things that we have discovered, which is
    quite interesting, is that human beings
  • 43:55 - 44:00
    have actually a psychological need to be
    cared for, but they have an even greater
  • 44:00 - 44:05
    psychological need to care for others or
    to care for something. If you don't have
  • 44:05 - 44:11
    that, you basically fall apart. It's why
    old people get dogs. We don't just care
  • 44:11 - 44:17
    for each other because we need to maintain
    each other's lives and freedoms. But our
  • 44:17 - 44:21
    own very psychological happiness is based
    on being able to care for something or
  • 44:21 - 44:29
    someone. So what would happen to
    microeconomics if we started from that?
  • 44:29 - 44:34
    We're doing actually a workshop tomorrow
    on the Museum of Care, which we're going
  • 44:34 - 44:44
    to imagine in Rojava, which is in
    northeastern Syria, where there is a
  • 44:44 - 44:50
    women's revolution going on, as you might
    have heard. But it's in places like that
  • 44:50 - 44:54
    where they're trying to completely
    reimagine economics, the relation of
  • 44:54 - 45:01
    freedom, aesthetics and value. Because at
    the moment, the system of value that we
  • 45:01 - 45:06
    have is set up in such a way that this
    kind of trap that I've described, and the
  • 45:06 - 45:13
    gradual bullshitization of employment,
    where essentially production work has
  • 45:13 - 45:16
    become a value unto itself in such a way
    that we're literally destroying the
  • 45:16 - 45:23
    planet. And in order to actually reimagine
    a type of economics that wouldn't destroy
  • 45:23 - 45:29
    the planet, we have to start all over
    again. So I'm going to end on that note.
  • 45:29 - 45:36
    Applause
  • 45:36 - 45:45
    Herald: David, thank you so much. I think
    it's very interesting to also have some
  • 45:45 - 45:50
    political views now that we mix in all
    sorts of technology and it goes very good
  • 45:50 - 45:55
    in the theme of Congress. Please, if
    anyone has any questions line up by the
  • 45:55 - 45:59
    microphones and we'll go for that.
    Unfortunately, in the beginning, I forgot
  • 45:59 - 46:04
    to mention that you can ask questions over
    the Internet through IRC, Mastodon or
  • 46:04 - 46:09
    Twitter. And remember to use the channel
    #borg and we'll make sure that they get
  • 46:09 - 46:12
    answered. So please microphone number
    1
  • 46:12 - 46:20
    Q: When you when you observe the
    productivity in healthcare going down, do
  • 46:20 - 46:30
    you have an explanation, according to new
    liberal thinking, why hospitals, one with
  • 46:30 - 46:35
    more administrators, one with less
    administrators, don't have competition
  • 46:35 - 46:38
    outcome that the hospital with less
    administrators wins?
  • 46:38 - 46:45
    David: Haha, yeah. Well, one of the
    fascinating things about the whole
  • 46:45 - 46:50
    phenomena of bullshitization and bullshit
    jobs is that it's exactly what's not
  • 46:50 - 46:54
    supposed to happen under a competitive
    system. But it's happened across the board
  • 46:54 - 46:59
    in every, equally in private sector and
    public sector.
  • 46:59 - 47:04
    Q: Why?
    A: That's a long story. But one reason
  • 47:04 - 47:09
    seems to be that, and this is why I
    actually had managerial feudalism in the
  • 47:09 - 47:23
    title, is that the system we have, is
    essentially not capitalism as it is
  • 47:23 - 47:27
    ordinarily described. The idea that you
    have a series of small competing firms is
  • 47:27 - 47:33
    basically a fantasy. I mean, you know,
    it's true of restaurants or something like
  • 47:33 - 47:38
    that. But it's not true of these large
    institutions. And it's not clear that it
  • 47:38 - 47:42
    really could be true of those large
    institutions. They just don't operate on
  • 47:42 - 47:48
    that basis. Essentially, increasingly,
    profits aren't coming from either
  • 47:48 - 47:54
    manufacturing or from commerce but from
    rather redistribution of resources and
  • 47:54 - 48:02
    rent, rent extraction. So that and when
    you have a rent extraction system, it much
  • 48:02 - 48:07
    more resembles feudalism than capitalism
    is normally described. You want to
  • 48:07 - 48:10
    distribute you know, if you're taking a
    large amount of money and redistributing
  • 48:10 - 48:15
    it, well, you want to soak up as much of
    that as possible in the course of doing
  • 48:15 - 48:20
    so. And that seems to be the way the
    economy increasingly works. I mean, if you
  • 48:20 - 48:26
    look at anything from Hollywood to the
    healthcare industry, you know what you've
  • 48:26 - 48:30
    seen over the last 30 years, the creation
    of endless intermediary roles, which sort
  • 48:30 - 48:37
    of grab a piece of the pie as being
    distributed downwards. It's... I mean, I
  • 48:37 - 48:43
    could go into the whole mechanisms, but
    essentially the political and the economic
  • 48:43 - 48:53
    have become so intertwined that you can no
    longer make a distinction between the two.
  • 48:53 - 48:56
    So you have a problem and this is where
    you go back to the whole thing about the 1
  • 48:56 - 49:01
    percent. You're using political power to
    accumulate more wealth, using your wealth
  • 49:01 - 49:08
    to create more political power. An engine
    of extraction whereby the spoils are
  • 49:08 - 49:14
    increasingly distributed: we get these
    very, very large bureaucratic
  • 49:14 - 49:19
    organizations and that's essentially how
    our economy works.
  • 49:19 - 49:22
    Herald: Great thank you.
    A: I mean, I could talk for an hour about
  • 49:22 - 49:26
    the dynamics, but that's that's basically
    at it. You know, you could call it
  • 49:26 - 49:31
    capitalism if you like, but it doesn't in
    any way resemble capitalism the way that
  • 49:31 - 49:34
    people like to imagine capitalism would
    work.
  • 49:34 - 49:39
    Herald: Great. Awesome. Questions from the
    Internet, please.
  • 49:39 - 49:46
    Q: How to best address this
    caregiver class when the context of the
  • 49:46 - 49:53
    proletariat is no longer given to awake
    their class consciousness?
  • 49:53 - 49:59
    A: How to address the caregiver when the
    proletariat is no longer what?
  • 49:59 - 50:03
    Herald: Please repeat the question.
    Q: How to best address the caregiver class
  • 50:03 - 50:08
    when the context of the proletariat is no
    longer given to awake their class
  • 50:08 - 50:10
    consciousness?
    A: Given to awake?
  • 50:10 - 50:17
    Q: I'm not sure what they're asking.
    A: Yeah. I mean the question is how do you
  • 50:17 - 50:25
    create a class consciousness for that
    class? Yeah. Well, that is the question. I
  • 50:25 - 50:30
    mean, first of all, you need to actually
    think about who your actual class enemy
  • 50:30 - 50:38
    is. And I mean, I don't mean to be too
    blunt about it, but the problem we have,
  • 50:38 - 50:43
    why is it that people are suspicious of
    the left? And people like Michael Albert
  • 50:43 - 50:50
    were pointing this out years ago, that one
    reason that actual proletarians were very
  • 50:50 - 50:54
    suspicious of traditional socialists in
    many cases is because their immediate
  • 50:54 - 51:00
    enemy isn't actually, you know, the
    capitalist who he rarely meets, but the
  • 51:00 - 51:09
    annoying administrator upstairs. And, you
    know, to a large extent, traditional
  • 51:09 - 51:14
    socialism means giving that guy more power
    rather than less. So I think we need to
  • 51:14 - 51:19
    actually look at what's really going on in
    a hospital, in a school. And I use
  • 51:19 - 51:23
    hospitals and schools as examples, but
    they're actually very important ones
  • 51:23 - 51:30
    because people have shown that in most
    cities in America now, hospitals and
  • 51:30 - 51:36
    schools are the two largest employers:
    universities and hospitals. Essentially
  • 51:36 - 51:42
    work has been reorganized around working
    on the bodies and minds of other people
  • 51:42 - 51:48
    rather than producing objects. And the
    class relations in those institutions are
  • 51:48 - 51:55
    not, you can't use traditional Marxist
    analysis. You need to actually reimagine
  • 51:55 - 51:59
    what it would mean. Are we talking with
    the production of people? If so, what are
  • 51:59 - 52:03
    the class dynamics involved in that? Is
    production the term at all? Probably not.
  • 52:03 - 52:09
    Why not? That's why I say we need to
    reconstitute the language in which we are
  • 52:09 - 52:14
    using to describe this, because we're
    essentially using 19th century terminology
  • 52:14 - 52:19
    to discuss 21st century problems. Both
    sides are doing that. The right wing is
  • 52:19 - 52:24
    using like, you know, neoclassical
    economics, which is basically Victorian.
  • 52:24 - 52:28
    It's trying to solve problems that no
    longer exist. But the left is using a 19th
  • 52:28 - 52:32
    century Marxist, you know, critique of
    that, which also doesn't apply. We just
  • 52:32 - 52:35
    need new terms.
    Herald: Thank you. I hope that answered
  • 52:35 - 52:39
    the question from the Internet. Microphone
    number two, please.
  • 52:39 - 52:47
    Q: So, the question is basically, to what
    extent can technology help? And the
  • 52:47 - 52:53
    subtext here is there's actually really
    lots of projects now whose function at
  • 52:53 - 52:58
    some level is to automate management and
    to the extent to which that can be molded
  • 52:58 - 53:03
    into removing this class that you're
    talking about or somehow making it too
  • 53:03 - 53:07
    painful for them to exist. And some of
    these projects are companies but some of
  • 53:07 - 53:11
    them are very independent things that have
    very soft Marx ideas, but with tens of
  • 53:11 - 53:15
    millions in funding.
    A: Well, that's the interesting thing,
  • 53:15 - 53:20
    that people talk about it all the time.
    And there's this, but this is where power
  • 53:20 - 53:29
    comes in, right? I mean why is it that
    automation means that if I'm working for
  • 53:29 - 53:37
    UPS, the delivery guy gets like tailorized
    and downsized and super-efficient to the
  • 53:37 - 53:42
    point where our life becomes a living hell
    basically. But somehow the profits that
  • 53:42 - 53:47
    come from that, end up hiring like, dozens
    of flunkies who sit around in offices
  • 53:47 - 53:56
    doing nothing all day. One of the guys,
    when I started gathering testimonies, I've
  • 53:56 - 53:59
    actually gathered several hundred
    testimonies of people with bullshit jobs
  • 53:59 - 54:03
    or people who thought of themselves as
    having bullshit jobs. And one of the most
  • 54:03 - 54:08
    telling was a guy who was an efficiency
    expert in a bank. He estimates that 80%
  • 54:08 - 54:11
    of people who work in banks are
    unnecessary. Either they do nothing or
  • 54:11 - 54:18
    they could easily be automated away. And
    what he said was it was his job to figure
  • 54:18 - 54:22
    that out. But then he gradually realized
    that he had a bullshit job because every
  • 54:22 - 54:29
    single time he proposed a plan to get rid
    of them, they'd be shot down. He never got
  • 54:29 - 54:34
    a single one through. And the reason why
    is because if you're an executive in a
  • 54:34 - 54:39
    large corporation, your prestige and power
    is directly proportional to how many
  • 54:39 - 54:44
    people you have working under you. So, no
    way are they going to get rid of flunkies.
  • 54:44 - 54:47
    That's just going to mean, the better they
    are at it, the less important they'll
  • 54:47 - 54:54
    become in the operation. So somebody
    always blocked it. So this is a basic
  • 54:54 - 54:58
    power question. You can come up with great
    technological ideas for eliminating
  • 54:58 - 55:02
    people. People do all the time. But who
    actually gets eliminated and who doesn't
  • 55:02 - 55:10
    has everything to do with power.
    Herald: Great. Thank you. And last
  • 55:10 - 55:12
    question, please, from
    microphone number 5.
  • 55:12 - 55:16
    Q: Can we maybe have one question
    from a non-male person?
  • 55:16 - 55:23
    A: Yeah, that'd be nice.
    Herald: Non-male person? Sorry, I am not
  • 55:23 - 55:26
    choosing questions based on stuff. We're
    kind of choosing all around the hall.
  • 55:26 - 55:30
    Q: Ok, have fun.
    Herald: Please, microphone number 5.
  • 55:30 - 55:39
    Q: Thank you for the opportunity to speak.
    I really like your description of a
  • 55:39 - 55:45
    paradigm or that people are stuck on
    production and consumption, and that you
  • 55:45 - 55:50
    would like to change the paradigm to a
    paradigm towards more care and freedom, et
  • 55:50 - 56:00
    cetera. And for me, it kind of sounds a
    little vague. And that's why I myself
  • 56:00 - 56:08
    think of basic income as a human right. As
    the actual mean to break with the current
  • 56:08 - 56:14
    hegemonic, macroeconomic paradigm, so to
    speak. And I was interested in your point
  • 56:14 - 56:20
    of view of that, of basic income.
    A: Well, I actually totally support that.
  • 56:20 - 56:30
    I think that one of the major objections
    that people have to universal basic income
  • 56:30 - 56:35
    is essentially people don't trust people
    to come up with useful things to do with
  • 56:35 - 56:41
    themselves. Either they think they'll be
    lazy, right, and won't do anything, or
  • 56:41 - 56:46
    they think if they do do something, it'll
    be stupid. So we're going to have millions
  • 56:46 - 56:51
    of people who are trying to create
    perpetual motion devices or becoming
  • 56:51 - 56:58
    annoying street mimes or bad musicians or
    bad poets or so forth and so on. And I
  • 56:58 - 57:04
    think it actually masks an incredible
    condescending elitism a lot of people
  • 57:04 - 57:08
    have, which is really the mindset of the
    professional managerial classes who think
  • 57:08 - 57:15
    that they should be controlling people. If
    you think about the fact that huge
  • 57:15 - 57:19
    percentages, perhaps a third of people,
    already think that they're doing nothing
  • 57:19 - 57:24
    all day and they're really miserable about
    it, I think that demonstrates quite
  • 57:24 - 57:31
    clearly why that isn't true. First of all,
    the idea that people, if given a basic
  • 57:31 - 57:35
    income, won't work. Actually, there are
    lots of people who are paid basically to
  • 57:35 - 57:38
    sit there all day and do nothing and
    they're really unhappy. They'd much rather
  • 57:38 - 57:46
    be working. Second of all, if 30 to 40%
    of people already think that their
  • 57:46 - 57:52
    jobs are completely pointless and useless,
    I mean, how bad could it be? It's like,
  • 57:52 - 57:56
    you know, even if everybody goes off and
    becomes bad poets, well, at least they'll
  • 57:56 - 58:00
    be a lot happier than they are now. And
    second of all, one or two of them might
  • 58:00 - 58:08
    really be good poets. If just 0.001%
    of all the people on basic income who
  • 58:08 - 58:15
    decide to become poets or musicians or
    invent crazy devices, actually, do become
  • 58:15 - 58:22
    Miles Davis or Shakespeare or actually do
    invent a perpetual motion device, well,
  • 58:22 - 58:25
    you've got your money back right there,
    right?
  • 58:25 - 58:29
    Herald: Great. Thank you so much.
    Unfortunately, that was all the questions
  • 58:29 - 58:34
    that we had time to. If you have any more
    questions, please, I'm sure that David
  • 58:34 - 58:39
    will answer them if you come up here.
    Thank you so much, David, for your time.
  • 58:39 - 58:41
    Please give him a great round of applause.
  • 58:41 - 58:45
    Applause
  • 58:45 - 58:51
    Outro
  • 58:51 - 59:11
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Title:
36C3 - From Managerial Feudalism to the Revolt of the Caring Classes
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Video Language:
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Duration:
59:11

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