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35c3 preroll music
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Angel: I'm very happy to be allowed to
announce the following talk. Hunting the
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Sigfox: Wireless IoT network security by
Florian. Some of you have might heard of
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the work of Florian already, because
sometime ago there was an article on a
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popular German website called "Furby from
hell" and somebody there hacked the Furby
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and there was also a video where you could
see the debug output on the displays which
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are the eyes of the Furby. It was a really
disturbing video and the guy who did this
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is exactly Florian. applause Today he's
gonna talk about Sigfox which is not
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another toy but a network technology for
IoT devices. And like it's always we see
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IoT word the security issues. So let's
hear a talk about the Internet of shit by
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Florian and welcome him with a big round
of applause.
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applause
Thank you for that introduction. So this
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talk will be targeted at the technical
audience which is the case here but you
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don't have to be RF experts on the trip in
order to understand this. So I will start
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by covering some basics of RF technology
and some basics about Sigfox. And just
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after that I'll start talking about an
analysis of the Sigfox protocol and its
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security. I'll mention the most important
thing first , which is that I didn't find
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any serious vulnerabilities in the Sigfox
protocol. But there are substantial weak
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spots and you should be aware of these if
you want to use Sigfox in your own
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application. But let me introduce myself
first. I don't think there's a lot of
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information you need to know about me, so
I figured I'd just show you this picture
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here of me instead. I'm not showing you
this picture because I think I look so
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fabulous but because I think that this cow
here in the background is amazing and this
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is not just any cow. This is Alice. Alice
the cow. And as you can see she has a
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great life, so she lives somewhere in the
mountains. And there's just one problem
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with her. She likes to break out of her
collar - her collar now her farmer which
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is called Bob doesn't like this very
much but he recently heard about something
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called the IoT. And he thinks that the IoT
is going to solve all of his problems. So
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he purchased this collar here for Alice.
So this collar does a couple of thing -
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couple of things. First of all, it
determines Alice's position based on GPS
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satellites. It also measures measures her
body temperature and then it transmits all
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of this information to Bob. So that's what
he wants to do. There's just one obvious
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problem: How do we even get this data from
Alice to Bob? Well, traditionally in the
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IoT there have been two solutions that
have often been employed. One of them is
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Wi-Fi and the other one is mobile
networks. Now Wi-Fi is not going to work
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in this application. Here we cannot cover
the whole country site with Wi-Fi there's
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just not enough range. Mobile networks,
they would theoretically work but they are
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just really expensive and they need a lot
of power. So you have to change the
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battery relatively often. Luckily, these
days there's a third option and it's
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called the LPWan. And this is short for
Low Power Wide Area Network. And the
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LPWan is great because it solves
all of these problems. Now, how is this
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possible? Why might we just - might have
we just discovered the LPWan so recently,
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why hasn't this been done before. What
kind of compromises do they make. And to
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understand the compromises that LP
networks make we have to look at the
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electromagnetic spectrum. So that's what
the electromagnetic spectrum of a Wi-Fi
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signal looks like. You can see that Wi-Fi
is fairly wide band and you have these
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tiny ripples on top of the signal that is
noise and we don't like this noise. In
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order to find the power that's contained
in one of these Wi-Fi transmissions, we
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have to look at the area underneath a
curve. So that's the power of the Wi-Fi
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signal. It's typically 20 MHz, that's the
bandwidth of Wi-Fi, and this red rectangle
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on on top of the signal, this is the noise
and we don't want this. Now what
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determines the range is not the absolute
value of the noise but the relative value
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of the noise compared to the single power.
And this root ratio is called the signal
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to noise ratio or SNR for short. Now if
you look at the blue and the red square
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you can see that the red square is very
big compared to the blue square, which
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means that our signal to noise ratio is
really bad. Now the solution to this is
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kind of obvious once you know it: You just
concentrate this whole signal power in a
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very narrow frequency range. Now this way,
you just have this tiny little ripple on
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top of the signal and that's all your
noise. So now your signal to noise ratio
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is a lot better. And this focusing of the
complete signal power in a very near
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frequency range that's called ultra
narrowband technology and Sigfox is one of
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these ultra narrowband technologies. Now
you might wonder why don't we do this with
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Wi-Fi as well. If the solution is so
simple why don't we always concentrate the
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complete signal power in a very narrow
frequency range. And the answer's kind of
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obvious. You can see it already. It's that
bandwidth is proportional to data rate.
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When I'm saying that is obvious, that's
because it's sort of ingrained in our
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language. So when I tell you that I have
broadband internet you think that my
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internet is fast. You don't think that my
internet uses a lot of frequency real
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estate. On the other hand if I tell you
that Sigfox is an ultra narrowband
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technology, you have to think Sigfox is
slow. And when I'm slow - things slow here
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- it's not just a bit slow but extremely
slow. So here on the right you can see a
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comparison between Sigfox and its very
fastest configuration and the 56k dial
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up modem. Now this means that we can only
transmit 140 uplinks per day and then
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uplink can contain up to 12 bytes so
uplink would be from Alice's collar to the
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Sigfox base station to Bob and we can only
receive four downings per day and they are
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not big either they are just 8 bytes. So
what I'm saying here is that you can
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forget everything you happen to know about
Internet protocol so there's no IP,
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there's no DNS, there's no HDTV or
anything like that. Sigfox is a completely
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separate protocol. Now even more than
that, there's not even any signaling or
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connection establishment. So when a Sigfox
device wants to transmit something, it's
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just - it's just transmittes it's just
broadcasting. So Sigfox device just sleeps
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all day long until some interrupt occurs
like some some timer overflows or some
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button is pressed and then it broadcasts
the information it has gathered. Sigfox
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base stations may pick it up or not, and
if they do, they just forward this
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information to Sigfox cloud. So we just
have to look at one uplink transmission
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and there's no, no long protocol on top of
that. Now that's cool and this only works
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if there's one device you may think. So
how is this possible if you don't just
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have one device but like ten devices or or
hundreds or thousands of devices. How can
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we make sure that these uplink
transmissions don't collide. And the
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reality is that these uplink transmissions
may actually collide. Again we have to
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look at the radio spectrum to understand
this - the sort of frequency multiplex our
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uplink. So this this is frequency and
time division multiple access. So you have
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Sigfox uplink at different frequencies at
the same time and whenever a Sigfox device
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wants to transmit an uplink, it first
chooses a frequency to transmit at
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randomly. And the likelihood of two of
these very narrow band signals colliding
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is just extremely slim. Now all of these
peaks you can see in this diagram, are not
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all cows. There are also a bunch
of other Sigfox devices. And for instance
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Sigfox is also used in areas like smart
homes, MARK metering, smart city, the
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agriculture industry 4.0. So essentially
we have the full range of buzzwords and
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this probably helps Sigfox raise 250
million euros during the last couple of
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years. And with all of that money they
already got pretty decent coverage, as you
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can see in the coverage map on the left.
Now one thing that's cool about Sigfox is
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that they use the unlicensed spectrum in
Europe. That's at 868 MHz. This is cool
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because it's free to use so Sigfox is
extremely cheap. Now just the downside of
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Sigfox is that Sigfox is completely
proprietary so we cannot verify whether
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it's secure or not. And this is the part
I'm trying to change with this
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presentation here. And look at a security
of the Sigfox protocol and see if it's if
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it's any good. I'll say Sigfox is not the
only LP of technology. There are a bunch
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of others. So here are a couple of names
but to be honest I'd say that these three
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here are the ones you should remember. So
that's all I have to say about the Sigfox.
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Sigfox technology and Sigfox basics. Let's
just do a quick refresher of RF basics
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first. So this is going to be extremely
short and many of you are going to know
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this already. So the basic idea is that I
want to transmit some information
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wirelessly and to do this I have to emit
an electromagnetic wave. So this is what
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an EM wave looks like. As you can see
there's no information on there. We have
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to put some information on there somehow
and this process is called modulation.
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There are different ways to modulate a
radio wave. And one of them is phase
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modulation. This means that in this case
here whenever the phase changes by 180
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degrees that's the one when if phase is
changed and stays the same. That's zero.
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So this is a special kind of phase
modulation that Sigfox uses. So you can
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see these knees in the sine wave. Now this
is not the only modulation technique.
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There's also frequency modulation. You
probably know this from your car radio for
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instance. So this is frequency modulation
- frequency modulation just means that
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whenever the frequency is a bit higher
then that's the one. And when the
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frequency is a bit lower that's a zero.
Like your car radio uses the analog
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version of this but this just frequency
shift keying which is a very similar
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technique. Let's actually get started with
the Sigfox uplink. At this point I want to
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thank Paul Pino. He did some really
amazing reverse engineering work of some
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basic reverse engineering work of the
Sigfox protocol and published it on his
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blog. And this really helped me get
started with my own analysis. So to
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analyze the Sigfox protocol myself, I
first wanted to record one of these uplink
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frames. So I got two Sigfox devices, one
of them is the pycom SiPy and the other
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one is a development kit by FC micro
electronics. And I also had a software
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defined radio so for those of you who
don't know a software defined radio or as
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SDR for short is just a device that's
pretty much a microphone but not for
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sound, for sound waves, but for
electromagnetic waves. So we can use this
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to record electromagnetic waves into
something that's very similar to a sound
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file. And I just want you to listen to one
of these sound files first and I want you
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to know that this is going to be in real
time. And it's also just one piece of
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information that I'm transmitting, so this
is not a couple of transmissions but just
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one transmission. The interesting part
here is that even though I was just
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transmitting one piece of information, we
have three uplinks at different
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frequencies apparently. Now I wanted to
find out what's the relationship between
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these these different Sigfox uplinks and
to find this out I had to demodulate it,
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so demodulation means that I know that Fox
uplink uses D-BPSK, thats differential
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binary phase shift keying, which is a
special kind of the phase modulation I've
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been talking about and using this
information I can write a demodulator
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software and this outputs a hexadecimal
representation of the Sigfox uplink; so
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just binary representation. And that's
what it looks like. So I've colored these
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three uplink frames in different colors so
that you can distinguish them. Now let's
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have a close look at these and see what
they have in common. So the one thing they
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have in common is this preamble here but
everything else appears to be completely
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uncorrelated. That's what I thought at
first, but eventually it turned out that
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this is convolution or coding. I guess if
you're a coding person it's enough for me
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to tell you that this is a (5,7)
convolutional code and if not you probably
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don't know what these words even mean. So
this is a convolutional code. It just
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means that I take this unencoded input,
which is the red frame, and feed it into
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these schematic diagrams here which are
made up of shift registers and XOR
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operations and out comes the encoded data.
That's that's all there is to have (5,7)
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convolutional code. Now this means that
the first, second and third transmission
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all contain the exact same information. So
why am I transmitting this information
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three times? The technical term for this
is coding gain. So coding gain is just a
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fancy way of saying that this helps us
correct bit errors or transmissions errors
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if they happen to occur in the uplink
transmission. But to continue I just have
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to focus on this initial transmission here
which is the one that's unencoded, and I
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can just ignore the other ones because
they are just the same information anyway,
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just encoded differently. So of course I
captured a couple of these first
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transmissions just ignored the rest and
they were all with the same payload so
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that I can find some similarities. Now
let's look at a bunch of these. So the
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whole trick to analyzing these wireless
protocols is just to keep staring at these
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hex dumps for a very long time until you
see some patterns. And I think you can
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already spot some of them. So that's the
preamble, we already talked about that.
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Then here we have some header. Then this
is a sequence number. This is especially
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easy to spot because the number is
incremented after every transmission. Then
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here that's the device ID. So this is a
unique identifier for every Sigfox device
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which tells us that this uplink
transmission was from Alice and not from
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some other cow or some other device, and
that is the payload. And as you can see
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it's completely unencoded and unencrypted.
Now this may seem bad but it's not really
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a problem in terms of security issues
because this is documented behavior. So
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when you look at Sigfox security white
paper they say that data is conveyed over
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the air without any encryption. So that's
strange, but it's not really really a
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problem as long as it's documented. But
eventually after staring at these frames
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for some more time I figured out this
frame structure here. So you don't have to
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remember all of this. I'm going to publish
an 80 page document that contains all of
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the boring protocol details and you can
read up what every flag bit means later
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on. But for now I just want to focus on a
couple of things. First one to wrap this
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up a bit. So whenever we receive an uplink
frame from Alice the cow this is
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essentially what she's telling us. So most
importantly that's the payload. What she's
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doing right now for instance. And then
there's also the device ID which tells us
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that this is Alice. And there's also a
bunch of more information in there. Now
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again I want to focus on two fields here
that are a bit more interesting. One of
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them is the CRC and the other one is the
MAC. Now, CRC, if you're a coding person
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again you probably know what to do with
this information here for everyone else
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you might know this already, but this is
just the checksum so this helps us detect
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bit errors in the uplink frame and correct
... not correct them, but to discard the
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uplink frame in case these bit errors
occur. Now this here, the MAC is a bit
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more interesting. So in this case MAC does
not stand for an Apple computer. It also
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doesn't stand for a MAC address so it has
nothing to do with medium access control
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or Ethernet or anything. It stands for
message authentication code. Now as the
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name says a message authentication code is
for authenticity protection. So this is
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something that's very similar to digital
signatures. So you might know digital
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signatures just from PGP e-mails and so
on. But it doesn't use ... like PGP
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e-mails use something like RSA so they
have an asymmetric scheme, whereas message
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authentication codes they use a symmetric
encryption scheme like for instance AES.
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Now this slide is not that important. The
only important part is that I wanted this
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algorithm here. So I wanted the algorithm
that I can use to generate one of these
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MACs. I already have the payload and all
of the message I'm transmitting. I didn't
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have the key yet so I wanted the key. Now
at first I thought it was impossible to
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get the key from a Sigfox device because
if you watch Sigfoxes YouTube video on
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security, they say that the secret key is
stored in non accessible memory. So this
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sounds secure right? But it turns out that
when I first got the pycom SiPy, this
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development kit here, it wanted to update
the firmware and it didn't just update the
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firmware, but this is a section of the
SiPys flash memory before the so-called
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firmware update, and this is the same
section after the firmware update and it
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totally provisioned the device ID, some
other code and that's the secret key.
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applause
So the secret key is in plain text in
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flash memory.
applause continues
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You might say that's not really a problem
because you need physical access to this
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device in order to to get the secret key.
But still I confronted Sigfox about this
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issue and their response was that yeah
they do offer solutions where the secret
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key is not stored in plain text but it
costs some money and many manufacturers
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don't choose to use it. So pycom for
instance didn't have this secure element
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chip. But at this point I had the key, So
just based on some educated guessing I was
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able to find the algorithm that's used for
calculating the MAC, and many of you
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probably know this already, so this is
CBC-MAC which is just a AES in chiper block
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chaining mode, so can we can use the
structure to generate a MAC. The input to
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this algorithm is not just the payload but
also some other information like the flag
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bits, the sequence number, the device ID
and the payload of course. So yeah that's
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that's how it should be. So let's look at
the security of the uplink. It looks
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pretty good at this first glance. So they
use well-established algorithms like CBC-
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MAC. So CBC-MAC is also used in Wi-Fi, so
it's tried and true. I didn't find any
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obvious implementation flaws in the uplink
so I tried to fuzz the uplink but it
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didn't get accepted. Now one problem is
that we don't have any payload
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confidentiality, so this is documented but
still I wondered why would you design a
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protocol in 2018 or a couple of years ago
without any encryption? And their response
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was that they do offer an encrypted
solution, but of course it takes some
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energy to calculate encryption and it
really matters if you're talking about
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devices with tens of years of battery
life, than just performing this one
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encryption can make a difference. Now this
is not a real problem in my opinion. I
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think the real problem with the Sigfox
uplink are these two here. I think the MAC
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is just way too short and the sequence
number is extremely short and this makes
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brute force and replay attacks possible.
So let's look at the brute force attack
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first and let's just look at the ideal
scenario. So this is an ideal world - just
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Alice transmitting her uplink frame to the
Sigfox cloud. That's what we want. No
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attacker here. Now when she's transmitting
this uplink frame she's also transmitting
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a MAC and in a worst case scenario this
Mac is just 16 bits long. So if you do the
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math, the number of possible values for
the MAC is very limited. So the idea would
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be to just try one Mac after the other...
laughter
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...that's brute-forcing, right. Now with
most protocols this is not very practical
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because this takes a lot of time. Again
looking at the worst case scenario if we
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do the math it's possible in just less
than four hours. So that's not great. And
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remember in the beginning I told you
something about frequency Multiplexing and
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these multiple uplinks that can coexist at
the same time, we can even do this for the
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attack. We can just frequency multiplex
our attack and we can do this at not just
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at four frequencies like it's shown here
but at 300 frequencies. And then we're not
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talking about a couple of hours to try all
possible MACs, but it's a matter of
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minutes so that sounds bad. So I
confronted Sigfox about this and their
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response was that yes they are aware of
this issue but they have implemented some
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kind of blacklist. Now I wasn't able to
confirm this information because I only
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had development kits and they say that
development kits are exempt from this
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regulation. Now, this is great if they
have implemented this blacklist, but on
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the other hand this also means that now we
have a conflict between two security
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goals. One of them is authenticity
protection and the other one is
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availability. So you're not going to have
perfect availability if you're using
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Sigfox. But on the other hand maybe if you
want perfect availability maybe you just
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shouldn't use a wireless system in the
first place. Now, the other attack is the
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replay attack. This just means that I
capture an uplink frame from Alice and at
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some later point in time I just replay it
to the Sigfox base station and hope it
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gets accepted. But usually it doesn't get
accepted because the sequence number is a
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replay protection. But again in the case
of Sigfox the sequence number is very
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short just 12 bits long. So it's going to
overflow eventually. And again looking at
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the worst case scenario this is after less
than 30 days. I had to ask Sigfox about
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this as well, and their response was that
if you choose their so-called encrypted
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solution. So that was the one that also
does the payload encryption, then you're
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going to have a 20 bit sequence number. So
you should probably use that if you if you
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don't want to have replay attacks. So in
summary if all you want to do is create a
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device that tracks cows you're probably
going to be fine with just normal Sigfox
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without the encrypted solution and you
don't need perfect authenticity and no
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perfect confidentiality protection. But on
the other hand if you have a money
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transporter or a security system where you
need confidentiality or authenticity, then
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you should probably think about using
Sigfox or implement your own checks or use
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Sigfoxs encrypted solution. So that's all
for the uplink. Now, I'm just going to
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quickly talk about the downlink. This is
going to be extremely short because the
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downlink protocol is so much simpler. So I told
you that a Sigfox device sleeps all day. This
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means that the Sigfox base station cannot
just transmit a downlink, but the Sigfox
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device has to request it first. So it
sends an uplink that contains a downlink
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request and the Sigfox base station, uhm
Sigfox cloud then decides which base
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station is going to answer with a
downlink. Now, of course I want to record
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one of these downlink transmissions so I
had to find a base station at some point a
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friend of mine hinted me that there was
this omnidirectional antenna here on a
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cell tower in Grafenberg. And it turns out
that this antenna was actually a Sigfox
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base station. Now if you want to find your
own Sigfox base station you don't have to
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go around hunting for omnidirectional
antennas on cell towers. You can just go
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to the website of the Bundesnetzagentur.
And I figured out that whenever there is
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something called a 'sonstige Funkanlage'
and it has these specific security
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clearances, then that's Sigfox.
laughter
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So here's another one.
applause
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So let's just listen to one of these
downlinks.
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short signal noise
Again that was in real time and it was
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really short and it sounded differently.
This is because this is not phase
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modulation but frequency modulation or in
this particular case GFSK that's Gaussian
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Frequency Shifting Keying. Again I
demodulated this uplink er this downlink
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frame that's what it looks like. I
captured a couple of these I looked at
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them that's the preamble, that's a garbled
mess. So what could that be? I thought
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that maybe suddenly they're using
encryption, or maybe some very smart error
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correction code scheme, but it turns out
that it's something much simpler called
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scrambling. So unfortunately I'm not going
to tell you the algorithm that's used for
-
scrambling here, but I can tell you that
the inputs to the scrambling algorithm is
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just the sequence number and the device ID
of the corresponding uplink. So you can
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totally reverse the scrambling or you can
even brute force it because these two
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numbers are very finite. So scrambling
does not provide any confidentiality. I
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can tell you what I figured out in the
end. So this is the complete frame
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structure of the downlink it's static so
very simple, think that two fields here
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are particularly interesting. One of them
is this one here so if you're a coding
-
person this is a BCH(15, 11, 1) code and
this is cool because this can correct
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correct up to 8 bit errors in the downlink
frame and the other interesting thing of
-
course is this message authentication
code, so we also have authenticity
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protection for the downlink. So in
summary, for the Sigfox downlink it looks
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pretty secure, again, the only real
problem I found is that there's scrambling
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but this scrambling doesn't provide any
confidentiality. But last week I figured
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out that if you use, or, Paul Pinault
hinted me that if you use Sigfox's
-
encrypted solution he figured this out,
then you're also going to have an
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encrypted downlink, so you should probably
use that. And this is also pretty much my
-
summary for you: If you are a device maker
and you want to build a Sigfox device and
-
add Sigfox connectivity to your device,
it's fine to use Sigfox but you should be
-
aware of the level of security it
provides, and most importantly this means
-
that if you need confidentiality and if
you need good authenticity protection you
-
should probably use Sigfox's encrypted
solution, and this means that you have to
-
buy one of the very few modems still that
support this encryption. This also kind of
-
puts some pressure on the manufacturers to
just start providing this modems and not
-
the old ones. Now if you don't buy a modem
with the encryption solution these are
-
your options: So you have to implement
encryption yourself if you need it. There is
-
some things you can do to improve the
authenticity protection that the Sigfox
-
uplink and downlink already provide, and
if you don't do that you're just going to
-
have to implement your own authenticity
checks. Now I want to thank a couple of
-
people most importantly that is Felix and
Marc and they didn't just help me with the
-
whole technical aspect of this
presentation here, but they also helped me
-
proofread the documentation I'm going to
publish soon and this presentation here. I
-
also want to thank Paul Pinault for
providing quite a lot of information and
-
you will see a link to his blog on the
website I'm going to show you in a second.
-
I also want to thank Mr. Lehmann from
Sigfox Germany. Even though there were
-
some screw ups in the communication with
Sigfox on our side. So none of that was
-
Sigfox's fault. He reacted really nicely
and handled it very nicely and responded
-
to all of our questions, And I also want
to thank Linus Neumann for organizing that
-
communication with Sigfox. Now when I
talked to Mr. Lehmann from Sigfox Germany
-
essentially I told him that there were
these weak spots, these substantial weak
-
spots but we didn't find any major issues,
and what he said then was that Sigfox is
-
planning to open source their device
library and I really hope that they carry
-
through with this, because if they do
that, that to me would signal that Sigfox
-
is a company that really cares about
security. Now if you want to find more, if
-
you want to find out more about Sigfox and
you don't want to wait for Sigfox to
-
release their device library you can just
go to this website here and download my
-
open source library instead. I'm also
going to publish these protocol
-
specifications and the reference
implantation is for software defined
-
radio. If you have any questions you can
contact me by email. You can also call me
-
on my DECT phone here during conference
and of course here's my Sigfox device ID
-
and my Sigfox secret key, so just send me
a Sigfox uplink. Thank you.
-
applause
Herald: Thank you Florian for this amazing
-
talk, and now we have time for some
questions. There's I think a lot of
-
microhones all around, so please line up
on the microphones if you want to ask a
-
question, and especially two tips for
that: First a question is in general just
-
one sentence long. Second if you want us
to hear you you have to speak into the mic
-
so get close to the mic, it doesn't bite
back. So I think we have somebody on the
-
mic there in the back. Yes that's mic, number
I can't read that from here, I'm too old
-
for that shit. Eight. Okay thanks. Number
eight you start.
-
Q: So Hi, is this on, yeah, so you said
scrambling didn't provide any
-
confidentiality, so what is it for?
A: It might be for, just for receiver
-
synchronization because it facilitates
receiver synchronization. I'm not sure
-
what what it's for. Now the scrambling
algorithm, it's not a very standard
-
algorithm. So this is why I'm not really
sure what it's good for. If it was a very
-
standard algorithm I would think that it's
just for receiver synchronization but
-
that's not the case. So maybe it's some
kind of security by obscurity but I'm not
-
sure I can tell you.
Herald: OK now we shift over there to the
-
mic, yes you exactly in the white shirt.
This was the mic. Okay, then I was then I
-
want to go to 7 sorry, the numbers are too
far away. It's just such such a big room,
-
number seven please.
Q: Hi. Thanks for the talk. My question is
-
what is the reason you cannot disclose the
scrambling algoritm?
-
A: I could disclose thie scrambling
algorithm but I have decided not to. So
-
there is no one forcing me to do this,
it's just based on the legal advice that I
-
have received, but I am going to publish
scrambled and unscrambled versions of
-
Sigfox downlinks so I cannot stop you from
reverse engineering this algorithm
-
yourself. Thank you.
Herald: OK, now we take a question from
-
the Internet.
Q: Yes, so one of the IRC users asks: Do
-
you think that it is possible to run your
own base stations in the future or will
-
they always be run by Sigfox?
A: Absolutely. It's just a matter of
-
intellectual property and whether that's
legal or not, I think they do have some
-
patents on their technology, but there's
nothing stopping you from running your own
-
base station. So you will have to have a
separate network from Sigfox with your own
-
secret keys, you you cannot get the
secret, well you could extract them from
-
the devices but you cannot get the secret
keys of all devices from Sigfox but of
-
course you could run your own parallel
Sigfox network.
-
H: OK. Mike. Number eight again. Thanks
for the talk. I have a student who wants
-
to fuzz LoRaWAN. You mentioned a few
times you fuzzed the uplink. Did you use
-
the ACR implementation for sending as well
or did you figure out how to manipulate
-
one of the existing radio transceivers.
A: I did manipulate the PI comp sci pi but
-
I didn't use that to fuzz the uplink so I
used the SDR implementation to fuzz the
-
uplink.
Herald: Okay. Sing a number 7. There's
-
another question.
Q: Hi. Can you tell us what an agency is
-
like on these networks.
A: Didn't get that. Sorry.
-
Q: Can you tell us what's the latency is
like on those networks.
-
A: The latency on these networks. (Q:
Yes.) Well it's like you have to go to a
-
website to to retrieve all of the
information from that the Sigfox base
-
Station has received. And I didn't really
test this because theoretically you could
-
also have some some API calls and have
Sigfax automaticly transmit this API calls
-
but I'd say it's in a matter of a couple
of seconds.
-
Like three seconds or so. I haven't tested
it.
-
Herald: Okay now I have to ask is there
somebody on mic eight. One more. Yes yes.
-
One more. Okay. Please. It's you.
Q: Yeah. So is the sigfox algorithms all
-
of these things are running on the companies
provided chips or is there some software
-
involved which could be potentially
reverse engineered?
-
A: So the software that is involved that
could be reverse engineered is the client
-
library. But this is already the part I am
publishing now. Also there's a couple of
-
more things that you can reverse engineer
about this. I don't think you're going to
-
be able to get a sigfox base station,
they're probably not giving one to you.
-
Herald: Okay. Yeah we have time for one
more question. We take one from the
-
Internet.
Q: What are the advantages of Sigfox
-
verses LoRaWAN.
A: I think that sigFox is even more low
-
power than LoRaWAN. There are also a
couple of other advantage, but in general
-
I think that it's good if we have two
competing providers in the LP events space
-
just to have some diversity. And yeah
there are advantages to both of them. So
-
but in general I think that that's greate
too to have both of them around. But as I
-
told you it's more low power. I also think
that it's a bit more scalable and also
-
from the perspective of someone that's
trying to deploy a sigfox device fleet
-
that you just have to take care of the
devices you don't have to take care of the
-
network. So that's another advantage.
Herald: Okay. So as time's up thank you
-
very much. And please another round of
applause for this amazing talk Florian.
-
applause
-
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