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Geolocation methods in mobile networks (33c3)

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    music
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    Herald: so the NSA is spying, and was
    spying, and we had Snowden, we have a lot
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    of documents to look at, and there is some
    new research on how they used geolocation
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    methods in mobile networks. It is done by
    the University of Hamburg and we have here
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    Erik who will present this research to you
    and he has done this for the German
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    government and for the NSA
    Untersuchungsausschuss which we call "NS
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    Aua", which means "NS Ouch", kind of. He
    is a PhD student and holds a master's in
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    physics so give him a warm applause
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    applause
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    Herald: And for those coming later please
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    go to your seats and try to be quiet. Yep,
    thank you.
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    Erik Sy: Hello. I'm really happy to have
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    you all here and I welcome you to my talk
    about geolocation methods in mobile
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    networks. My name is Eric Sy and I'm a PhD
    student at the University of Hamburg. So,
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    at the beginning I want to point out why
    I'm giving this talk. So the German
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    parliamentary investigative committee
    wanted to find out about the German
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    involvement in US drone strikes and then
    the German government officials claimed
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    that they do not know anything or they do
    not know any possibility how to use a
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    phone number for targeting drone strikes
    and the investigative committee did not
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    really believe this statement and so they
    asked our research group at the University
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    of Hamburg to prepare a report and we
    handed in that report to the Bundestag and
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    it was very soon after what's also
    published by netzpolitik.org
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    thank you for that
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    Applause
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    E: And it contains like technical
    methods and approximates the accuracy to
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    localise mobile phones and it also points
    out which technical identifiers are
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    required to conduct such geolocation. Now
    I give you my agenda for today. First I
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    will speak about the purpose of
    geolocation data and then we are looking
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    into a broad variety of different
    approaches to conduct such a geolocation
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    in mobile networks, and then we specify on
    drones and look into the technical methods
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    which can be conducted with drones, and
    and then I'm going to point out which
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    technical identifiers we can use for such
    a geolocation. And lastly I'm going to sum
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    up. So, the purpose of geolocation data:
    it is a neutral technology, so we can use
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    it for rescue missions, for example if
    somebody got lost in the forest or in the
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    mountains, we can use geolocation data to
    find that person and rescue the person.
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    Or, if you ever used Google Traffic, there
    you you can profit from monitoring traffic
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    conditions. But we can also use it to
    invade the privacy of persons, for example
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    if we identify people on surveillance
    footage, or if
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    we track the location of a certain
    individual over a longer period, and
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    certainly we can use this data for
    targeting drone strikes. However I want to
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    point out that this data, that they are
    not suitable to prove the identity of a
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    person. So if somebody is conducting a
    drone strike based on this data, then he
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    is actually not knowing who he is going to
    kill. So, on the right side you see an
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    image of an explosion site from a Hellfire
    missile. A Hellfire missile is usually
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    used by these drones and you can
    approximate that the blast radius is
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    around 20 meters. So we would consider a
    targeted drone strike if we have a
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    geolocation method which can determine the
    position of a person more precise than 20
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    meters in radius. So, the first approach
    which I want to present are time
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    measurements and the symbol which you will
    see down there it's a base station, for
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    for the next couple of slides. And a base
    station... this is the point in a mobile
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    network where your phone connects to. On
    the slides you can certainly interchange
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    this base station with an IMSI-catcher.
    IMSI-catcher is something like a fake base
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    station from a third party and you could
    even build it yourself. So, the method
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    used to calculate the position of a phone
    is for time measurements trilateration.
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    You have to know that that signal is
    usually traveling with the speed of light,
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    so when you measure the time you can also
    measure the distance. And here there are
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    three methods presented. There are "Time
    of Arrival", where the signal moves from
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    the hand phone to the three base stations
    and the accuracy is between 50 and 200
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    meters. This really depends on the cell
    size and they can be more precise or less
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    precise. So, then we have "Time Difference
    of Arrival," which is like a round-trip
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    measurement, and we have an "Enhanced
    Observed Time Difference," where the
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    mobile phone actually computes the
    location within the cell, and the accuracy
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    is between 50 to 125 meters.
    So, and the next method which I want to
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    present are angular measurements. When you
    conduct angular measurements, then you
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    determine the direction of arrival from
    the signal and afterwards you do a
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    calculation which is called triangulation
    and therefore you have to know the
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    position of the base station, but also the
    alignment of your antenna and for this
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    method there's certainly two base stations
    or IMSI-catchers sufficient to determine
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    the position of the mobile phone. The
    accuracy is usually in field experiments
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    between 100 and 200 meters and the
    challenge for this method but also for the
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    ones on the previous slides is that on the
    normal mobile cells you don't have a line
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    of sight to each base station from your
    mobile phone and so the signal gets
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    disturbed by buildings in the way and then
    the accuracy becomes worse. So the next
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    method I want to show you, I think most of
    you will know a little bit about GPS and
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    how it's calculated. So satellites, GPS
    satellites, broadcast their time and their
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    position, and the mobile phone uses again
    trilateration to calculate its position
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    and the accuracy is usually below 10
    meters, but it depends a little bit on the
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    chipset within the mobile phone, and then
    the base station can request the position
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    of the phone by issuing a radio... or by
    issuing a request with the radio resource
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    location service protocol. So another
    method which I want to present is the
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    mining of Internet traffic. Some
    smartphones send GPS coordinates or the
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    names of nearby Wi-Fi networks, which are
    also called SSIDs, to online services, and
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    usually these allow the determination of
    the position around or below 10 meters,
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    and it is certainly possible to intercept
    this traffic and evaluate the geolocation.
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    So here I have two quotes for you, and the
    first one it effectively means that anyone
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    using Google Maps on a smartphone is
    working in support of a GCHQ system. This
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    quote comes from the Snowden archive and
    was issued in the year 2008. So we
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    certainly see that there's
    some proof that at least at those days,
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    that they enter, some third parties
    intercepted those traffic and use it for
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    determining the geolocation, and if you
    want to work with, or determine the
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    location with the SSIDs, it is necessary
    that you have a map where a certain Wi-Fi
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    access points are located. And therefore
    we have also something like... like a
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    proof that this has been done by the NSA
    and this is the mission victory dance,
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    where they are mapping the Wi-Fi
    fingerprint in every major town in Yemen,
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    and in Yemen also a lot of drone strikes
    are conducted. So, let's go to next
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    method. Signalling System No. 7 is a
    protocol which is used for communication
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    between network providers, and network
    providers need to know where, in which
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    cell, a mobile phone is located to... to
    enable the communication, and these
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    informations are saved in location
    registers, and a third party can easily
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    request these location informations. I
    want to refer to the talk by Tobias Engel,
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    which... he gave a talk two years ago
    which really goes into the details of this
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    method, and maybe if you like to, there
    are also commercial services available to
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    access this data. So, let's talk about
    drones. We do not have very solid proofs
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    that geolocation methods are conducted by
    drones, but we have certainly hints. A
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    hint is this GILGAMESH system, which is
    based on the PREDATOR drones, and is a
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    method for active geolocation, which
    describes an IMSI-catcher so... but if
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    anybody of you has access to more
    documents... yeah it would be nice to have
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    a look. So...
    applause
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    E: So, the easiest method would be
    certainly to request for GPS coordinates,
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    and there you just replace the base
    station with a drone. But the method which
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    is better, or which I think is the
    preferred one: Angular measurements.
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    Angular measurements, if you have a look
    in our report, there we approximated that
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    the accuracy of these methods are between
    five and thirty five meters in radius from
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    an altitude of two kilometers, and if you
    get closer to the mobile phone it becomes
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    more accurate. So, it would be, to some
    extent, sufficient to conduct a targeted
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    drone strike on this data, and in the
    meantime, since this report was handed
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    over to the Bundestag, I also found other
    work which described that they are able to
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    achieve an accuracy of one meter from
    three kilometers altitude for small
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    airplanes. You have to know that those
    sensors to measure the angle of arrival,
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    that they are usually located within the
    wings and within the front of the plane,
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    and when the plane becomes larger it's
    also easier to have a more accurate
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    measurement. Then I want to point out that
    a single measurement can be sufficient to
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    determine the location of a mobile phone.
    If we can assume that the target is on the
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    ground. So if you assume that the target
    is maybe in a building in Yemen, so a
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    single measurement would be sufficient on
    a low building in Yemen. And a sky scraper
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    would be more difficult. So, and the big
    advantage of these methods is that
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    environmental parameters have a very low
    influence, since we can have a almost line
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    of sight, which allows a better accuracy.
    So now I'm going to talk about the
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    identifiers which can be used for
    geolocation. Certainly the phone number
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    and each IMSI-catcher or base station can
    request, can issue an identity request to
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    a mobile phone, and then receive the IMSI
    or EMI. The IMSI is something like a
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    unique description for a certain customer
    in the the mobile network and the EMI is
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    like a unique serial number for an device.
    So, when we include those methods of
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    mining Internet traffic, then we can also
    add a lot of more identifiers, for example
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    an Apple ID or Android ID, MAC address,
    even cookies or user names. If you are
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    interested in this, you can have a look at
    the link I provided there. That there's a
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    very interesting paper about this. So I
    come to my last slide, my summary. I
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    showed you multiple, or a lot of different
    methods to localize a mobile phone, and I
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    pointed out that a single drone can
    localize a mobile phone with accuracy
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    which is sufficient to conduct a targeted
    drone strike. Since this document was
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    handed over to the Bundestag, they also
    never denied that these methods can be
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    used for... or that the accuracy of these
    methods... is true. So then I pointed out
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    that as an identifier the phone number,
    the IMSI, and the EMI each can be used for
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    the geolocation of a mobile phone, and the
    last information which I want to give you
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    is that geolocation methods cannot prove
    the identity of a person, and this is
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    really important to know, that we are
    not... yeah. That when we conduct, or when
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    somebody is conducting these drone
    strikes, that they are not aware who is
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    actually using the phone, and so and I can
    happen that they are killing the wrong
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    person. So I thank you very much, I thank
    my colleagues and my family and everybody.
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    applause
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    Herald: Thank you.
    applause
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    H: That's great. Thank you very much. It's
    the first talk we have here today where we
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    can have a lot of questions. So come on.
    You have the microphones, number 1, number
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    2, number 3, number 4, and ask your
    questions. It's the only chance to have
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    this man answering them. No questions?
    Here's someone. No. Yeah. Sorry!
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    Microphone: No problem.
    H: Number 4.
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    Microphone 4: Hello. Do you know why we
    are located in London right now when we
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    use Google Maps here?
    H: "Do you know", can you ask me again,
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    "do you know why we are located in
    London?"
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    M4: Yes.
    H: Here?
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    M4: When we use Google Maps, we are
    located in London.
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    H: Do you know that? The Congress is
    located in London. Do you know why?
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    E: I'm not aware.
    M4: Okay, I thought this was on plan.
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    H: Okay.
    M4: Thank you
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    H: Number 1.
    Microphone 1: Okay, so on slide 12 you
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    showed this angle of arrival-
    H: Can you please be quiet, we can't
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    understand the questions unless you're
    quiet. Sorry.
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    M1: Okay, so, on slide 12 you showed the
    angle of arrival method executed by a
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    drone. Is this a passive method or does it
    require some cooperation by either the
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    phone company or by the targeted mobile
    phone?
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    E: It can be conducted passively. Like, if
    you call the phone or page the phone
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    multiple times and you see which phone is
    answering this paging... okay, it needs to
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    be active in a way that you contact the
    phone, but you don't need an active IMSI-
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    catcher for it. You just phone or call the
    phone, and then you see which phone is
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    answering, and then you know where the
    phone is situated.
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    M1: Thanks.
    E: Yeah.
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    H: I see that we have a question over
    there so can you just ask your question
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    please?
    M8: Here?
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    H: Yes, number 8, please.
    M8: Thank you for the talk. I'd like to
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    ask a question about tracking unpowered
    mobile phones: I mean you mentioned lots
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    of methods for phones which are both...
    with both have their batteries inserted
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    and are actively operating. Could you
    elaborate a bit about the methods of
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    tracking phones, which seem to be off
    turned off from the users point of view,
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    and maybe also something about those who
    have their batteries removed?
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    E: Actually, if you really turn off your
    phone over a long period, let's say a
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    couple of months, I think you are safe,
    but... laughter Buf if you...
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    M8: That's good to know.
    E: But, actually, like if you have a base
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    station and somebody is switching off his
    phone and maybe he is meeting somebody
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    else at that point and somebody else is
    also switching off his phone, then it can
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    be suspicious, but it really depends
    whether somebody is looking into this data
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    or not.
    H: Thank you. Number 8 again.
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    M8: I had a short question: As you
    described, we are somehow dependent on the
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    good winning of the NSA, for instance, and
    I wanted to ask if there's some way to
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    avoid geolocation or use Google Maps
    without sending identity to location
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    services.
    E: That is fairly difficult. I would
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    assume that GPS phones are a little bit
    better to avoid geo-locationing,
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    especially if you add additional GPS
    spoofing, because they are... The network
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    cells are really large and so it's more
    difficult to track you within the network
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    cell, but if you have a drone right above
    you and you emit a physical signal, then
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    the drone will always be able to localize
    where the signal came from. So it's
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    difficult, because it's physically
    difficult.
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    M8: Okay.
    H: Thanks. Number 1, please.
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    M1: So, I have a question about the
    physicalities of receiving a... or
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    localizing or making angular measurement
    of a phone within a densely populated
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    area, where there's possibly tens of
    thousands of phones within the receptional
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    area of a 3-kilometer-high drone. That
    would obviously require you to be more
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    sensitive on one hand than this cell tower
    and on the other hand also receive at the
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    same time and sort out all kinds of
    interference.
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    E: You usually a cell can be between,
    let's say 200 meters, and 3 or 30
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    kilometers in size, so 3 kilometers in
    altitude it's not very high.
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    M1: So you assume that the drone does a
    pre-selection. We are digital beamforming
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    on the ground path and only looks at a
    cell of interest, because it knows from
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    the network, the suspect is in that cell.
    E: It depends on the area: In an urban
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    area you have to reduce the size of the
    cell, otherwise you would receive too many
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    signals, but in a countryside you can have
    larger cells or you can cover a larger
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    area.
    M1: Regarding covering larger areas: Did
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    you take, considering that these drones
    aren't really like our quadcopter size,
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    they're more airplane-sized, proper
    airplanes, did you take the classical
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    synthetic aperture radar techniques of
    observing something for a long time while
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    flying straight over it and then
    integrating over it into account? Because
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    that's usually where we get our high-
    resolution radar imagery of the earth.
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    E: You can conduct multiple measurements
    or you just conduct one, if you know that
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    the target is on the ground.
    M1: So, did that account for your
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    estimated accuracy?
    E: It's not necessary to integrate.
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    M1: Okay, thanks.
    H: Thank you. We have a question from the
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    internet.
    Signalangel: Yes, the internet wants to
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    know if there are attributes, which you
    can change of the phone, to stop
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    surveillance. Attributes like the email,
    for example.
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    E: Can you please repeat the question?
    S: Are there attributes of the phone,
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    which you can change, to stop
    surveillance?
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    E: Yes, certainly you can fake the IMEI
    or the IMSI. That is also another reason why
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    it's not sufficient to prove the identity,
    because any phone can just take these
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    data.
    S: And we have a second question, which
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    is: Does the GSM network have a feature
    which allows anyone to get the GPS data
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    from the phone?
    E: Yeah..., it would be..., that.., and
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    the radio resource location service
    protocol.
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    S: So, thank you.
    laughter
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    E: Yeah.
    H: Okay, number five.
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    Microphone 5: Hello, you delivered you
    work to the NSA Untersuchungsausschuss and
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    they, the Bundestag did not say anything
    about it, but is there a statement from
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    the NSA Untersuchungssausschuss?
    E: And the government said something about
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    it. They said that, that they washed their
    hands and said we did everything nicely
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    because we added also a disclaimer to the
    data we provided and that the disclaimer
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    says that the NSA is forced to, to stick
    to the German law and that they are not
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    allowed to do whatever they want with this
    data.
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    M5: Thank you.
    H: Very nice, number 6, please.
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    M6: Hello, on slide 12, you got, you
    specify the accuracy of about five meters
  • 26:38 - 26:44
    for two drones. So how does it scale if
    you would use more than two drones? For
  • 26:44 - 26:49
    example 10 or whatever.
    E: I think that there was a small
  • 26:49 - 26:53
    misunderstanding. Actually, one drone is
    sufficient.
  • 26:53 - 26:57
    M6: Okay, so could you use more than one
    drone?
  • 26:57 - 27:01
    E: Yeah, you can use as many as you want
    but one is sufficient.
  • 27:01 - 27:05
    laughter
    M6: Yeah, but that, of course. But does
  • 27:05 - 27:10
    the accuracy increase by using more than
    one?
  • 27:10 - 27:16
    E: Yeah if you go closer to the target and
    then their accuracy increases.
  • 27:16 - 27:23
    M6: Okay, but with the same distance but
    more than one drone?
  • 27:23 - 27:27
    E: Actually not.
    M6: Okay, thank you.
  • 27:27 - 27:33
    H: Number four, please.
    M4: Also referring to the accuracies, you
  • 27:33 - 27:38
    were talking about field experiments and
    so on. Did you conduct those yourself or
  • 27:38 - 27:40
    where did you get all the information
    from?
  • 27:40 - 27:44
    E: These are some references, there you
    can find the field experiments.
  • 27:44 - 27:47
    M4: Thank you very much.
    H: Number two, please.
  • 27:47 - 27:51
    M2: Thank you very much for the
    interesting talk. My question is regarding
  • 27:51 - 27:56
    the fingerprint which you can use on many
    phones to unlock the phone. Is there
  • 27:56 - 28:01
    currently and if not will there, do you
    think there will be a possibility that for
  • 28:01 - 28:05
    example an app which requires the
    fingerprint identification on the phone
  • 28:05 - 28:10
    that this is also passively read and by
    that you increase the identification of
  • 28:10 - 28:19
    persons? Did you understand the question?
    E: Yeah, but I think this is like based on
  • 28:19 - 28:26
    the GSM network and the other I think that
    that's based on the operating system.
  • 28:26 - 28:30
    M2: So currently using this technology,
    there they couldn't be, there, it's not
  • 28:30 - 28:33
    possible to link this?
    E: No.
  • 28:33 - 28:38
    M2: Ok, thank you.
    H: Ok, number one, please.
  • 28:38 - 28:41
    M1: My question is actually about the
    civil use of geolocation service not so
  • 28:41 - 28:45
    much about phones. So, you mentioned that
    every time you use an online service that
  • 28:45 - 28:51
    use geolocation you send the SSids of
    nearby Wi-Fi networks and with every
  • 28:51 - 28:58
    request you actually enrich a Wi-Fi map,
    Wi-Fi database of either Google, if it's
  • 28:58 - 29:04
    on Android, or Apple if it's on iOS. Now,
    there was a talk at CCC here in 2009 when
  • 29:04 - 29:09
    this technology was still nascent and that
    back then was called Skyhook but then the
  • 29:09 - 29:16
    speaker had this provocative question:
    Shouldn't this Wi-Fi map be public domain
  • 29:16 - 29:21
    instead of just a belonging proprietary
    and belonging either to Apple or Google
  • 29:21 - 29:26
    nowadays? So, haven't we lost that
    struggle? I mean we can't keep our SSids
  • 29:26 - 29:31
    private, so shouldn't it be public domain?
    E: Yeah it would be a good idea to make it
  • 29:31 - 29:36
    public domain I said since also a lot of
    positive things can be created with this
  • 29:36 - 29:40
    technology, like helping people in
    emergency situations.
  • 29:43 - 29:48
    H: Okay ...
    M1: I wanted to take the chance to say
  • 29:48 - 29:52
    thanks for this talk. I'm one of the
    people who actually commissioned the
  • 29:52 - 29:57
    analysis because I work in the inquiry,
    and it was extremely helpful for us to
  • 29:57 - 30:02
    have the analysis done because we, like
    you said, keep being confronted with
  • 30:02 - 30:08
    Secret Service people who tell us that no
    way can mobile phone numbers help in the
  • 30:08 - 30:12
    secret war. So yeah I just wanted to say
    thanks.
  • 30:12 - 30:20
    applause
    H: Yeah, thank you very much.
  • 30:20 - 30:26
    H: Great, so thank you also very, very
    much for your work and keep on going with
  • 30:26 - 30:27
    that.
  • 30:27 - 30:32
    music
  • 30:32 - 30:52
    subtitles created by c3subtitles.de
    in the year 2018. Join, and help us!
Title:
Geolocation methods in mobile networks (33c3)
Description:

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Video Language:
English
Duration:
30:52

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