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Surveilling the surveillers (33c3)

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    Music
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    Herald: The man standing right from me is
    Martin Reiche. Martin Reiche is a former
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    computer scientist with Karlsruhe
    Institute for Technology. He went to study
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    media art and now is a self-employed media
    artist covering space perception,
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    digitalization, power relations, and
    minimal aesthetics. That sounds a bit arty
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    and it will be arty laughs in the best
    way. His work was seen at exhibitions
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    festivals worldwide like in Spain, in
    Russia, and of course, in Germany. For
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    example he used a border barbed wire fence
    to accommodate Wi-Fi modems and connecting
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    people by a fence that's not supposed to
    connect people. We're living in times
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    where there is architecture that's purpose
    only seems to be to disconnect people or
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    for surveillance purposes or both, and
    Martin Reiche here shows how to connect
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    this architecture with the arts and thus
    reclaiming them against the actual
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    purpose. Please welcome Martin Reiche!
    applause
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    Oh I'm sorry, it's been late yesterday!
    The closing ceremony will be streamed
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    into this hall so you can just stay sit
    until 18:30. Now Martin Reiche! Try this
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    with the applause again. applause
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    Martin Reiche: Thank you and thanks
    everybody for coming, especially against
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    this other talk in the other room it's
    quite a hard, yeah quite a hard thing to
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    compete against that, yeah. My name is
    Martin Reiche, I'm from Berlin, I'm a
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    media artist. We just had that all
    introduction thing, so I'm just going to
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    talk about what this talk will be about,
    this talk, "Surveilling the Surveillers",
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    which is maybe more of a provocative call
    for action than really an actual
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    description of what I'm going to talk
    about. But don't run away because you will
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    understand in the end why I'm giving you
    this disclaimer right now. Because I will
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    talk about current important critical
    topics that are important for my own
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    practice and I'm gonna give some examples
    not only from my own artistic practice but
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    also from other people's work that deal
    with the same topics and I think it's
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    always important to really understand the
    context where artistic work is situated in
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    order to understand the work itself. I
    will also talk a bit about modern form of
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    activism and that I see computer science
    and computer programming as this modern
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    form of activism. I will talk about
    regulation of technology and the policies
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    concerning technology and the institutions
    that make these policies. I will also talk
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    about quantification of the world,
    somehow, and I will finish with a
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    something like a closed formula to
    describe the whole world; which sounds a
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    bit impossible and it actually is, but
    well that's where it will be going and
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    we'll see how that will evolve. So my
    background, so we don't really need this
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    again, but I want to tell you a little bit
    about some works that I did because it's a
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    variety of works that I'm dealing with, in
    a variety of topics, for example topics
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    like electronic waste, digital footprints,
    complexity, visual or conceptual glitch,
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    generative systems, generative
    architecture, cybernetics, belief systems,
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    so it's a lot of buzzwords somehow
    that always come up when you talk about
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    critical art.
    But before starting with that I will tell
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    you a little story or we gonna talk about
    this concept of the Laplace's demon which
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    will be important for the general scope of
    this talk. Laplace's demon has been
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    postulated by Pierre-Simon Laplace in 1814
    and it's basically an articulation of
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    scientific determinism and I'm starting to
    quote this he Pierre-Simon Laplace says an
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    intellect which at a certain moment would
    know all forces that set nature in motion
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    and all positions of all items of which
    nature is composed if this intellect were
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    also vast enough to submit these data to
    analysis for such an intellect nothing
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    would be uncertain and the future just
    like the past would be present before its
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    eyes. I would just leave this here and I
    will come back to that at the end of the
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    talk to have something like a closed loop
    for this talk and I will start to talk
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    about critical topics which is topics that
    are right now interesting especially also
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    for the arts which deal with
    technology or with technological artifacts
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    and I will just start with something that
    always comes up it's surveillance of
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    course surveillance and reconnaissance.
    I'm putting this here together not because
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    I think it's the they are identical things
    but because both topics have been I would
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    say far too widely discussed already in an
    artistic context. So I'm just going to
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    show you some examples of artistic works
    that deal with surveillance and
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    reconnaissance and especially works that
    are important to me.
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    So yeah I just said that I'm not gonna
    talk that much about surveillance which
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    sounds counterintuitive if I call this
    talks surveilling the surveyors but it's
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    not really the optical surveillance like
    taking a nice panchromatic shot of the
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    Earth's surface that I'm interested or
    this is a work by me it's called scan
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    lines of Aleppo that's also consisting of
    panchromatic satellite imagery from a
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    former classified now declassified US
    reconnaissance satellite used by the
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    military they now have a vast archive
    where they publish these old well data
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    from overflights and you can
    basically take them from different times
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    in different years you can stack them upon
    each other which I did here and I was also
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    producing this work it has a glass on top
    of it and I was basically engraving the
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    flight path of the satellite in order to
    give somehow a physical idea of the
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    trajectory of an actual satellite that is
    flying over the Earth's surface. I'm also
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    going to talk a bit about electronic
    tracking especially electronic tracking
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    through unique identifiers so well that's
    SIM cards at least in Germany they are
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    mapped to a person's identity by law so if
    you buy SIM cards you have to give away
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    parts of the data about your identity in
    order to be allowed to have one. So these
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    SIM cards are unique identifiers to your
    person and make it very easy of course to
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    track you and your behavior and so on.
    And I just want to start with one work of
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    friends of mine that, at least Dania was
    here at this conference he's now not here
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    anymore. This work is called prism
    the beacon frame and it's a work that
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    takes this idea of I have a SIM card and
    it identifies me somehow and it takes also
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    the idea of the authority that actually is
    allowed to put cell phone towers it takes
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    this they just create their own cell phone
    tower and they send you messages when you
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    come close to these cell phone towers like
    this welcome to a new NSA partner Network
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    so this is basically produced IMSI catcher
    that just tells you very decently that
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    well you're just being surveilled in a
    sense. It's a work that's been also
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    legally problematic of course because
    usually in Germany you are not allowed to
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    do these things in an artistic context you
    have a bit more freedom to deal with these
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    kind of things. So that's maybe an example
    for surveillance in a sense that you
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    already know it's the no longer in
    effect actually directive 2006 24 EC which
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    is a well European Union directive that we
    just tend to call the
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    "Vorratsdatenspeicherung".
    In Germany we now have unfortunately since
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    December 2015 the "Gesetz zur Einfuehrung
    einer Speicherpflicht und einer
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    Hoechstspeicherpflicht fuer
    Verkehrsdaten". We just heard a very
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    interesting talk in the first hall also
    about how this now developed in the last
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    couple of months on also the last couple
    of days unfortunately and you can see
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    this as the National predecessor of this
    directive so here I put this in the same
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    corner as also the
    artworks about surveillance because I
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    think one thing is very important is these
    things about policies because policies are
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    basically the rules that
    define how we live together but they're
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    also the rules that are mostly well
    problematic for us as people working in
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    technology because they somehow have to
    adhere to them even if you do not
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    ethically agree to them.
    That's another maybe nice example for that
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    biometric surveillance is something very
    prevalent right now especially taking
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    fingerprints for example at airports
    International airports or getting DNA or
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    having a DNA screening of your person
    and these things are usually right now
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    unfortunately mostly taken from immigrants
    and especially we have this
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    problem in Germany with the influx of
    immigrants where at what the first thing
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    of course that came up was well how do we
    identify them and how do we make this
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    basically as smooth as possible which of
    course the easiest way to do it is just to
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    take as much data from the people as
    possible which is of course ethically a
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    bit problematic, a lot.
    So another topic that falls in this
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    category of surveillance and
    reconnaissance is predictive analysis and
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    that's not the computer scientist in me
    speaking because that's where I'm coming
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    from. I was dealing with machine learning
    and distributed algorithms so predictive
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    analysis is something that I think is
    extremely important and like three
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    examples of predictive analysis is for
    example prediction of the user behavior
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    which goes directly hand-in-hand with user
    tracking but also market prediction
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    through for example if you have a high-
    frequency trading algorithm you want to
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    predict the the future development of the
    market to make very fast decisions on
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    these predictions and these brought
    us a lot of problems lately. This is an
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    example for such a problem they're usually
    called flash crashes which is very short
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    time frames in which some stocks lose a
    lot of value this is a thing the stock of
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    natural gas around 2011 in June and what
    you can see here in this stock market
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    development over time and this is just a
    couple of minutes, this is 1940 until
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    1955, so that's 15 minutes of market
    movement data. And you see these nice
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    oscillations that get worse and worse so
    there's something that doesn't look very
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    natural and at some point it just ends in
    a crash which
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    is, I think, a loss of 20% of equity for
    the company, which is quite a lot and it's
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    actually in 15 seconds, happening around
    15 seconds, so your predictive analysis is
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    a problem. You can go even further and
    say, "Well predictive analysis also right
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    now is used for crime prediction." So
    there's companies selling software to
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    cities in order to predict where the next
    crime is supposed... or is probably
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    happening and take some pre-cautionary
    measures to make sure that the crime is
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    actually not happening or just go and
    catch somebody and just see what happens.
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    So yeah, that again, of course, is
    ethically problematic. So, coming to the
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    next topic would be regulations and
    policies... and especially enforcing
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    policies on citizens. What does that mean?
    Well, the easiest way how to understand it
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    is laws. The laws of a country are
    basically the easiest and the easiest-to-
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    comprehend way to enforce a policy upon
    your citizens, but it's not only these
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    kind of laws, but then you have some
    policy, some regulations, which are a bit
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    harder to grasp or harder to get
    access to. So you really have to do a lot
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    of research to understand what is actually
    going on here, but it still has an effect
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    on you. This, for example, is a NATO
    document, which shows the basic military
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    allocation for the radio frequency
    spectrum and I'm showing you this, because
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    it will get a little bit more important
    for a work that I did on some research on
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    these military regulations for the radio
    frequency spectrum. And I'm staying in
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    this realm of radio frequency, I'm
    actually going to show you... If that
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    works... No, I don't have the other
    screen; that's very nice... Show you some
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    example.
    [Music]
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    So, this is a recording at 13.3 megahertz.
    The recording is somewhere in Germany and
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    it's the so called "Chinese firedrake
    AM jammer" It's a jammer that is used
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    by... or has been used by the government
    of the People's Republic of China and they
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    use it against other states' radio
    stations. So, they basically use it to jam
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    the stations of other countries. For
    example, this was the sound of Hope Taiwan
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    Radio, which you cannot really hear
    anymore, because the only thing you hear
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    is this strange Chinese folk song. And
    that's somehow also a way to enforce a
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    policy on your people by just blocking
    access to something that the people could
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    have access to if you wouldn't enforce
    your policy on there... That doesn't work
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    now... Another example here is an artwork:
    It's an artwork called "All about you".
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    It's by Janez Janša, Janez Janša and Janez
    Janša, which is an artist group from
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    Slovenia, that... It's an artist
    collective, that at some point decided, as
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    an artwork, to all change their names to
    "Janez Janša", who is a former Slovenian
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    prime minister, so they now all have the
    same name and it's the same name as the
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    prime minister, which is in itself a...
    quite an interesting work of art. And this
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    is one of their newer works, where they
    basically had this contract with one
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    Slovenian bank, where they could, whenever
    they lose a credit card, they can just
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    replace it with a new one and they can, at
    the same time, also just specify the
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    photograph that they want to have on their
    credit card, so they decided to make...
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    How many are there? I think about 120,
    150... to reproduce the Slovenian passport
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    of one of the members of Janez Janša. And
    there actually exist 3 of these collages
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    for all the 3 members of the artist
    collective and I think they're not yet
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    complete or some got lost, I'm not sure
    what's the reason that some are missing,
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    but it's a nice way to subvert this idea
    that there is this policy that also says
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    that every...
    there's one identity mapped to one person,
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    especially if you think about what a name
    means. Now you have 4 people having the
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    same name, also kind of having a very
    similar, at least these three people, kind
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    of similar biography by working together,
    so if you see a work of art, you don't
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    even know who it was, that was the
    first... maybe the first person that came
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    up with the idea. And even if they tell
    you, you don't really know what that
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    means, because everybody has the same
    name; it doesn't really make sense.
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    Thinking more about policies: Another
    interesting important work here is
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    "Loophole4All" by Paolo Cirio. He got, I
    think, the Golden Nica 2014 for this work,
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    where he basically sold for very cheap, I
    think for 99 cents, these certificates of
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    incorporation from some companies in the
    Cayman Islands. I think, basically all
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    companies in the Cayman Islands, they are,
    of course, not valid, but they also, which
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    is interesting in these certificates, they
    don't really need official stamps or
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    anything. You can basically also
    incorporate a company there extremely
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    easily and, of course, it's a loophole for
    tax evasion that's used by companies
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    worldwide, and he wanted to make it more
    accessible to people, so he just thought
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    about "Why not sell that for a dollar to
    people?" or "a dollar, then you can
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    download it and $2 or $3 and then you get
    a real certificate out of it". So that's
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    also quite an artistic way to deal with
    policy.
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    And probably another quite prominent
    picture is this of the Liberator gun I
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    think you've probably all heard of this
    one it's been around for a couple of years
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    now and popped up on on the Pirate Bay and
    it's basically a completely 3D-printed
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    working one-shot gun and, yeah, it
    actually has a predecessor which is
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    interesting which a lot of people don't
    know which was also called liberator. It's
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    called FP 45 liberator and it's from World
    War II and it had, it also was a one-shot
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    gun, and the idea there was a little bit
    different though. It was
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    produced for around 2 US dollars, so it
    was a very, very cheap cheap gun, just
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    created out of scrap metal parts and it
    had one shot and it was given out to
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    resistance forces in the occupied
    territories and the idea was that one shot
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    is enough to kill an enemy and take his
    weapon so we can basically rearm yourself.
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    Hence the name Liberator. So I was talking
    about enforcing policies on citizens but
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    there's not only citizens but there's also
    the others not saying the others the
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    non-citizens of your country, so enforcing
    policies on others is also obviously an
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    important thing to talk about and I'm just
    going to show you one picture which sums
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    up enforcing policies on non-citizens
    which is the US drone program bringing
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    democracy to a country near you. So
    another topic is the obsolescence of
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    political borders and that's also now
    we're where my work comes up and I was
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    very happy to be able to take part in a
    project that was initiated by two artists
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    that gave a talk last year here. It's an
    artist collective, KairUs, they gave a
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    talk because they went to Ghana to a
    site called Agbogbloshie, which is an
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    electronic waste dump, it's actually, I
    think right now the biggest electronic
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    waste dump in the world and they were
    collecting hard drives. They were buying
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    hard drives, basically, from this e-waste
    dump. And it's quite cheap you can get a
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    hard drive for a dollar and they sell them
    usually in bulk, like you get a big box
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    and supposedly take a big box with you and
    they also tell you this story that usually
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    people come and buy, well a lot of them,
    not one box but 20 boxes. Of course not to
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    have in the end these old hard drives
    because they're like, from a technical
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    perspective quite useless, but because of
    the data that's on the hard drive that's
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    potentially useful because you can use it
    for abuse schemes against the previous
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    owners. So, they brought 22 hard drives
    back to Europe, to Austria and then did a
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    forensic analysis and were able to recover
    a couple of, I don't know,
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    it was something about
    200 gigabytes of data. And it was a bit
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    too much for them, so they decided to give
    it out to other artists and to somehow
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    deal with it, to dig through it, and we
    somehow did and it ended up in having, we
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    had a nice exhibition about electronic
    waste and the remainders of data that you
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    will find in this electronic waste. And
    just saying that what I've seen cannot be
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    unseen you don't really want to deal or to
    dig through the private data of a lot of
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    people that you don't know, especially
    because I was interested especially in
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    video and images. Um, yeah, I made a work
    out of it I will tell you about it in a
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    second. What we also did in this project
    was to try to get a understanding for what
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    are the problems of this whole electronic
    lifecycle. So, before you have your phone
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    in your hand of course, well, it was
    assembled somewhere and before it was
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    assembled, you needed to have the
    resources in very physical terms, the
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    rare earths that you need to produce the
    components and you have to
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    mine them somewhere and usually it happens
    in countries which are rather poor and it
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    happens under extreme conditions. People
    that work there are dying very fast, so we
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    created a project that tries to map this,
    well, what is behind this smart world,
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    like all this life cycles of
    electronic components and
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    exhibited at US Electronica this year. So,
    that was actually quite a nice project,
  • 24:18 - 24:22
    also to just get an overview that this is
    really a global problem and a global
  • 24:22 - 24:28
    phenomenon. Yeah, what I wanted to tell
    you, is this, about this project called
  • 24:28 - 24:33
    Shell Performance. That's one of the
    projects that I did based on the data, so
  • 24:33 - 24:40
    you already see someone in the middle of
    the, of the the middle screen to the the
  • 24:40 - 24:48
    lower part is something that well you
    could probably identify as a female
  • 24:48 - 24:55
    person, and I was interested in the
    private data and especially the private
  • 24:55 - 25:02
    videos and images that were still
    available on these hard drives. And the
  • 25:02 - 25:06
    more I was interested in it, the more
    I was disgusted by it, a disgust that is
  • 25:06 - 25:13
    specifically
    because it's one of these things that
  • 25:13 - 25:17
    sounds interesting when you think about it
    and sounds like you really learn something
  • 25:17 - 25:22
    from it. But you learn too much, too fast,
    you kind of start to feel into the
  • 25:22 - 25:27
    identity of, not only one identity, but
    sometimes more identities of the people
  • 25:27 - 25:34
    that were the former owners of the hard
    drives and so I decided to just work with
  • 25:34 - 25:39
    the material that I found on the hard
    drives that I could definitely make out to
  • 25:39 - 25:49
    be commercial productions. Which was still
    a lot. So I'm going to show you a video, I
  • 25:49 - 26:04
    hope it works. Internet. Yeah, there's no
    sound. So the work is, it's basically a
  • 26:04 - 26:08
    shell script, so it's a program that runs
    through the contents of the hard drives
  • 26:08 - 26:15
    which are attached to, to the, to the
    computer and spits away, basically puts
  • 26:15 - 26:22
    out images or stills of videos and renders
    them as, in ASCII fashion, just on that
  • 26:22 - 26:26
    screen and it looks a bit like matrix
    tiles, so we have a little, well that's
  • 26:26 - 26:32
    quite hard, quite easy to understand
    what's happening there and it puts out all
  • 26:32 - 26:37
    these files which at some point are
    pornographic, mainstream pornographic
  • 26:37 - 26:42
    images. The other side are sometimes just
    party photos of the former owners, so it's
  • 26:42 - 26:51
    a very diverse and a bit strange collage
    of a person's life, of a person's digital
  • 26:51 - 26:56
    life that you get and it's quite
    unsettling in what it evokes in you I
  • 26:56 - 27:09
    think when you look at it. So and in this,
    I hope, and in this exhibition there were
  • 27:09 - 27:12
    also a couple of other projects that
    happened, for example of that group
  • 27:12 - 27:19
    KairUs, that actually got us the hard
    drives, they were able with actually a lot
  • 27:19 - 27:25
    of effort to identify or personally
    identify one of the former owners of one
  • 27:25 - 27:30
    of the hard drives and decided to create a
    project in which they hypothetically sent
  • 27:30 - 27:36
    back this hard drive to the former owner.
    They knew that the hard drive has been
  • 27:36 - 27:41
    discarded about ten years ago, they still
    were able to figure out the new address
  • 27:41 - 27:46
    because they were able to figure out the
    new employer of that specific person and
  • 27:46 - 27:50
    they named this project Not
    A Blackmail because, well, they actually
  • 27:50 - 27:56
    don't want to send it to the person, but
    in a gallery you see it as, like the work
  • 27:56 - 28:04
    already basically having the stamps and
    and address of the person on it. But
  • 28:04 - 28:09
    they're not sending it, unfortunately. So,
    if I'm talking about the obsolescence of
  • 28:09 - 28:13
    national borders, one thing that
    immediately comes to mind is satellites.
  • 28:13 - 28:21
    Yeah, satellites. But then if you think
    about a much, much older concept than
  • 28:21 - 28:26
    satellites, there's short wave propagation
    so that's it's our nice radio frequency
  • 28:26 - 28:33
    phenomenon that or shortwave radio, you
    know it's AM radio for example, so the old
  • 28:33 - 28:43
    school radio that some people still have
    in their cars for example. This technology
  • 28:43 - 28:50
    is interesting because its, first it's
    meant to be for a, let's say a closer
  • 28:50 - 28:56
    space, like for example a little, little
    country or a state so you can have a
  • 28:56 - 29:03
    statewide radio program. But it also has
    this property that it gets reflected from
  • 29:03 - 29:08
    the ionosphere if you just have an angle
    which is high enough and you just sent the
  • 29:08 - 29:12
    signal basically to the sky. It gets
    reflected there and it comes back to earth
  • 29:12 - 29:17
    and it also gets reflected there again and
    then you can, you can basically hop quite
  • 29:17 - 29:24
    far up to a couple of thousand kilometres
    across earth. So it's one of the reasons
  • 29:24 - 29:29
    why you sometimes, especially at night
    where propagation of radio frequency is,
  • 29:29 - 29:35
    it's much better than at day, you're able
    to listen to Chinese radio here for
  • 29:35 - 29:44
    example, like the Fire, FireDragon, Fire
    Drake Jammer. So, and then based on this
  • 29:44 - 29:48
    technology, you have some other
    technology. It's called Over-the-Horizon
  • 29:48 - 29:56
    Radar, for example. Which is interesting,
    somehow obsolete now after having
  • 29:56 - 30:02
    satellites for reconnaissance, but it's
    still widely used. And Over-the-Horizon
  • 30:02 - 30:08
    Radar is interesting because it uses this
    short wave propagation characteristics in
  • 30:08 - 30:16
    order to locate enemy troops on the
    ground. And one way how you can use it
  • 30:16 - 30:22
    basically, is you create these stations in
    your own territory, you just point them to
  • 30:22 - 30:27
    your enemy territory or just
    other territory and you get quite a good
  • 30:27 - 30:32
    and close look of
    what's happening there. It's not only the
  • 30:32 - 30:39
    US that's doing this, it's also I think,
    Russia, Japan and Australia have active
  • 30:39 - 30:45
    systems. And right now it's actually quite
    active, one of these systems is quite
  • 30:45 - 30:51
    active here in in Germany but it's coming
    over the horizon from the Russian
  • 30:51 - 31:03
    Federation. So, yeah, this is a also VLF
    transmitter, it's called Cutler, it's also
  • 31:03 - 31:07
    a US Navy transmitter.
    By the way all these images are also taken
  • 31:07 - 31:12
    from the US Navy. So, one of the reasons
    why I can use them here, because
  • 31:12 - 31:16
    everything that's produced by a
    governmental agency in the United States
  • 31:16 - 31:24
    is in directly public domain, which is
    very nice also to to work with the
  • 31:24 - 31:26
    interesting thing with these very low
    frequency transmitters which are usually
  • 31:26 - 31:31
    used to communicate to submarines at the
    other side of the world and it works quite
  • 31:31 - 31:38
    well is that they have a very nice
    geometric structure like this one, for
  • 31:38 - 31:44
    example. So, this geometric structure is
    usually important for the correct
  • 31:44 - 31:51
    functioning of this transmitter and I was
    quite happy to see this nice geometry
  • 31:51 - 31:58
    especially coming from computer science
    being kind of mathematically educated and
  • 31:58 - 32:04
    I somehow wanted to work with that. That's
    what was coming out of it. It's not that
  • 32:04 - 32:10
    geometrically sound I would say, but it's
    a project that's now been going on since
  • 32:10 - 32:19
    2015. It's called “Kilohertz” and it's
    quite an international project I would say
  • 32:19 - 32:28
    and this site is right now in Brazil. It's
    somewhere between São Paulo and Rio de
  • 32:28 - 32:34
    Janeiro. There's not that much going on
    there, so it's quite a rural place to be.
  • 32:34 - 32:42
    I created this installation in order to
    listen to specific frequency ranges. So
  • 32:42 - 32:47
    kilohertz is an antenna and that's
    something that is quite hard to see even
  • 32:47 - 32:51
    quite harder to see even if you're
    standing in front of it, because the the
  • 32:51 - 32:59
    antenna is – looks a bit like this. The
    antenna is comprised of very fine copper
  • 32:59 - 33:05
    wire which has a diameter of about 0.3
    millimeter, so it's almost not – you can
  • 33:05 - 33:08
    almost not see it if you're not standing
    in front of it and actually know where it
  • 33:08 - 33:16
    is and you can focus with your eye on it.
    But it apparently is quite good in order
  • 33:16 - 33:23
    to receive military radio communications
    and transmissions and that is what I'm
  • 33:23 - 33:34
    interested in this project is to receive
    these military radio communications I was
  • 33:34 - 33:39
    just talking about that shortwave radio,
    because of the propagation characteristics
  • 33:39 - 33:45
    is an interesting thing to use for the
    military, not only for this radar, but
  • 33:45 - 33:53
    also, for example, to have a uni-
    directive call – a channel – to, for
  • 33:53 - 34:00
    example, submerged submarines and it's
    also quite actively still used for
  • 34:00 - 34:08
    communications between military bases. So
    this happened to be just about 60
  • 34:08 - 34:13
    kilometers away from a federal police /
    military. That's kind of the same thing in
  • 34:13 - 34:20
    there in Brazil. Complex that most people
    don't really know what's going on there,
  • 34:20 - 34:27
    but when I was there I was interested to
    see if I can actually somehow get
  • 34:27 - 34:32
    something out of there – if I can actually
    prove at least that there's some military
  • 34:32 - 34:39
    communication towards the space going on.
    And it turns out to be, of course, quite
  • 34:39 - 34:45
    hard to do so, but what I was really
    interested in is not only to see how this
  • 34:45 - 34:54
    happens in Brazil, but how is that
    everywhere else in the world – because
  • 34:54 - 35:00
    listening or trying to listen to military
    communications is legally always a kind of
  • 35:00 - 35:05
    complicated thing in Brazil. Usually, when
    I give these kind of talks that say in
  • 35:05 - 35:10
    Brazil they have other problems they don't
    need to think about somebody receiving
  • 35:10 - 35:16
    military transmissions. They should work
    on other problems, but in other countries
  • 35:16 - 35:21
    that might be seen in a different way. So
    I executed this project also in Estonia
  • 35:21 - 35:28
    just 20 kilometers to the Russian border.
    I also executed this project in Norway and
  • 35:28 - 35:33
    in Berlin. Actually, there is one active
    instance running right now in Berlin
  • 35:33 - 35:41
    always listening to the same basically
    frequency ranges which are military
  • 35:41 - 35:47
    classified, well, classified military
    frequency ranges that you could see or you
  • 35:47 - 35:52
    were able to see just longer ago on one of
    these slides.
  • 35:52 - 35:57
    So, the way how these things, these
    antennas work is very, very simple. So, I
  • 35:57 - 36:02
    take the, basically, simplest way how to
    build an antenna and build it. This is a
  • 36:02 - 36:08
    very, very easy setup. So, it looks like
    an inverted “V”. It works quite well for
  • 36:08 - 36:13
    very potent signals and the rest of the
    hardware that you need is very cheap and
  • 36:13 - 36:18
    the antenna itself is very cheap, because
    the only thing you need for the antenna is
  • 36:18 - 36:27
    basically copper wire and for the rest of
    the station a Raspberry Pi – with a little
  • 36:27 - 36:35
    bit of software and a RTL SDR dongle is
    enough to do it. So it costs less than 50
  • 36:35 - 36:40
    bucks to create a surveillance or counter-
    surveillance station against these
  • 36:40 - 36:44
    military facilities. There's a couple of
    other ways how you can actually build
  • 36:44 - 36:51
    these antennas. Some this again, these
    images are now taken from, I think, it's a
  • 36:51 - 36:58
    navy field manual. So, it's a manual
    that's given to people in the field for
  • 36:58 - 37:03
    the scenario that their antenna is broken,
    so they need to build a new one and I'm
  • 37:03 - 37:08
    kind of using this knowledge against them,
    which is just a interesting sidenote, I
  • 37:08 - 37:13
    think. So, there's different ways how to
    build these antennas. They even have that
  • 37:13 - 37:20
    military radio transmitter. That's another
    way how you could potentially build that
  • 37:20 - 37:27
    and in the end you get very interesting
    nice power sweeps, nice images out of it.
  • 37:27 - 37:32
    They are power sweeps – what that means is
    I'm just defining a frequency range that
  • 37:32 - 37:37
    I'm interested in and then I basically
    have a computer program that just goes
  • 37:37 - 37:42
    just step by step and measures the
    intensity of signal that's there and in
  • 37:42 - 37:50
    the end, over time, which is the y-axis if
    you want. It creates these images which
  • 37:50 - 37:56
    don't tell you what exactly is going on
    there, but it gives you proof that
  • 37:56 - 38:00
    something is going on there and that some
    communication is taking place.
  • 38:00 - 38:06
    The only thing you have to do then is to
    verify that it's actually a military or
  • 38:06 - 38:13
    civilian usage and you can do that by
    looking into the policies, that have to be
  • 38:13 - 38:17
    somehow made available to the public
    usually through the regulatory
  • 38:17 - 38:24
    institutions in the specific countries,
    for example, the FCC in the US or – what
  • 38:24 - 38:29
    was it in Europe – the Bundesnetzagentur
    in Germany which have to publish it, in
  • 38:29 - 38:37
    order to make sure that nobody interferes
    with official signals military or
  • 38:37 - 38:44
    governmental or signals as part of a
    frequency bands which have been sold for a
  • 38:44 - 38:53
    lot of money to institutions in the
    country. So, publishing – I think, for the
  • 38:53 - 38:59
    first time now – an official call for
    participation and I'm doing this because
  • 38:59 - 39:04
    the “Kilohertz” project, I've talked about
    this project a couple of times already in
  • 39:04 - 39:09
    different countries and everybody at
    these places was interested somehow to
  • 39:09 - 39:16
    offer two square meters of space to build
    a little antenna somewhere and to push all
  • 39:16 - 39:20
    the information that this antenna spits
    out into a public GitHub repository and
  • 39:20 - 39:27
    just give out information to the rest of
    the world. And the reason is why should
  • 39:27 - 39:32
    you actually do that – like what is the
    real gain in doing that. And one gain is
  • 39:32 - 39:39
    to understand that some parts of the
    frequency spectrum that are reserved to
  • 39:39 - 39:44
    the military – and the military has most
    of the frequency spectrum reserved for it
  • 39:44 - 39:52
    – is actually never used and that could
    also be made available to the public. It
  • 39:52 - 39:58
    could also be made available for resale to
    commercial companies. I'm not in favor of
  • 39:58 - 40:03
    that, but I would like to be “Kilohertz” a
    project that's able to provide evidence
  • 40:03 - 40:13
    for non-usage of radio frequency bands in
    order to support groups that are active in
  • 40:13 - 40:19
    trying to reclaim parts of the RF-
    frequency spectrum for civilian usage.
  • 40:19 - 40:23
    That would be very nice to have and
    there's a couple of initiatives in other
  • 40:23 - 40:30
    countries that already start to deal
    with that, but what they always lack is
  • 40:30 - 40:37
    actual information about the usage of the
    frequency spectrum that they want to
  • 40:37 - 40:42
    reclaim for the public.
    So, yeah if you're interested in that you
  • 40:42 - 40:49
    can find everything. Well, you have that.
    So, I'm just moving on to the next section
  • 40:49 - 40:56
    which is a critical topic of protectionism
    and this is a new project. I'm presenting
  • 40:56 - 41:00
    to you, also, I think for the first time
    now, in Germany, it's a project which
  • 41:00 - 41:05
    stems from my idea that I actually wanted
    to go to these fences that are everywhere
  • 41:05 - 41:10
    right now in Europe. Fences that were
    supposed to protect us from an influx of I
  • 41:10 - 41:17
    don't know what and they are, well,
    especially prevalent in Slovenia and in
  • 41:17 - 41:26
    places around Slovenia. So, I went there
    for a residency and first went to the
  • 41:26 - 41:32
    fence between Slovenia and Austria. This
    is from the Slovenian side, obviously. So,
  • 41:32 - 41:37
    it has this police marker on there and
    it's quite a solid, if you want so,
  • 41:37 - 41:41
    fences. It actually says if you want to go
    through, please call us and we let you
  • 41:41 - 41:47
    through. it obviously is not valid for
    non-citizens, but it's interesting because
  • 41:47 - 41:53
    they really cut through all the very
    nice hiking trails and I'm an active hiker
  • 41:53 - 41:58
    I'm kind of saddened to see these kind of
    things. But at the same time you have a
  • 41:58 - 42:03
    street just 200 metres of that, which goes
    through the border and it doesn't have a
  • 42:03 - 42:07
    fence, so I don't really understand what's
    going on there, but they were very happy
  • 42:07 - 42:14
    to build these fence and now they have it
    there and don't know what to do with it.
  • 42:14 - 42:19
    So I took this trip to the fence and did
    some field research. What I'm doing there
  • 42:19 - 42:26
    is I was measuring conductivity of the
    fence, cause it's a metal construct,
  • 42:26 - 42:32
    right, and I was also measuring the
    potential towards ground to see if
  • 42:32 - 42:38
    I have a short-circuit there or not, if I
    can work with it somehow, just to give you
  • 42:38 - 42:42
    an idea of where that is: It's actually
    somewhere you see Ljubljana there in
  • 42:42 - 42:46
    Zagreb, it's kind of half the way it's in
    the middle of nowhere, it's a little
  • 42:46 - 42:55
    village called Lastnič and where the
    next, actually, the next video was taking
  • 42:55 - 43:00
    place. I'm now just gonna show you a
    little excerpt.
  • 43:00 - 43:07
    Person 1 in Video: As the migration summit
    kicks off in Malta, Slovenia has started
  • 43:07 - 43:12
    erecting a wire fence along it's border
    with Croatia, to help control the flow of
  • 43:12 - 43:15
    people arriving daily.
    Person 2 in Video: Last year authorities
  • 43:15 - 43:20
    rolled out more than 150 kilometers of
    barbed wire to stave off an influx of
  • 43:20 - 43:24
    migrants, which never came.
    Person 3 in Video: Stories abound in the
  • 43:24 - 43:31
    villages here, of farmers having lands cut
    into, of bears and deer cut to ribbons, of
  • 43:31 - 43:37
    kids falling off their bikes into the wire
    and nobody has ever seen a refugee.
  • 43:37 - 43:42
    Martin Reiche: So that last sentence is
    actually quite important, because they
  • 43:42 - 43:47
    built this barbed wire, razor wire fence,
    which is stacked razor wire, military
  • 43:47 - 43:56
    grade, for this border between Slovenia
    and Croatia, for zero refugees that
  • 43:56 - 44:02
    ever even attempted to cross the border
    there, so they now have this huge fence,
  • 44:02 - 44:09
    which is absolutely useless, and you just
    have animals that get somehow into the
  • 44:09 - 44:17
    fence and then die being inside of this
    fence or at least get hurt a lot, but
  • 44:17 - 44:20
    you still have this fence and everybody's
    kind of disgusted by this fence, so I
  • 44:20 - 44:25
    thought that's quite lovely, I just should
    just go there and see what I can do and if
  • 44:25 - 44:33
    I can do something, so I went to this
    fence, see that looks like this then, and
  • 44:33 - 44:37
    I did the same thing again: I measured
    conductivity, measured ground potential of
  • 44:37 - 44:43
    the fence, to get somehow an overview of
    how I could use the fence for an
  • 44:43 - 44:49
    electronic intervention, to say it like
    this and finally - this is almost a
  • 44:49 - 44:55
    religious position I like that somehow -
    finally I built a little device that's
  • 44:55 - 45:00
    something that's hanging around there,
    it's very very rudimental, has been almost
  • 45:00 - 45:07
    basically built on site, it's a little
    transmitter and an amplifier
  • 45:07 - 45:11
    hanging at the border fence and the
    other one in the ground, that's just one
  • 45:11 - 45:19
    meter there, doesn't really matter, was a
    proof of concept to send a signal over
  • 45:19 - 45:25
    this fence, so I was interested in
    seeing how can you use this defensive
  • 45:25 - 45:33
    architecture, which is really just there
    to make sure people can not be together,
  • 45:33 - 45:38
    basically how can you use that as a
    network infrastructure, just to be honest,
  • 45:38 - 45:41
    how can you just use that. Because it's
    conductive material, already lying there
  • 45:41 - 45:47
    for free, why not use it for something
    actually useful or at least try to see if
  • 45:47 - 45:49
    we could do something actually useful
    with it.
  • 45:49 - 45:58
    It ended up in a project called razor wire
    modem of this year. It's a still somehow
  • 45:58 - 46:04
    work-in-progress, because the modem part
    got a little omitted in the process of
  • 46:04 - 46:09
    being there in Slovenia. In Slovenia was
    really just a transmitter and one
  • 46:09 - 46:14
    receiver; the transmitter was sending some
    data on this fence and you had a receiver
  • 46:14 - 46:20
    taking the data from the fence. They were
    connected through a ground return in the
  • 46:20 - 46:24
    actual soil, so that you have the two
    connections that you need and I was
  • 46:24 - 46:30
    sending data through this fence and I
    actually sent the Universal Declaration of
  • 46:30 - 46:36
    Human Rights through the fence.
    Applause
  • 46:36 - 46:43
    Martin Reiche: Especially article 14:
    Everyone has the right to seek and to
  • 46:43 - 46:52
    enjoy in other countries Asylum from
    persecution. So I want to talk to you very
  • 46:52 - 46:57
    briefly about new modes of activism I
    already said that: It's
  • 46:57 - 47:01
    programming is the modern and the new form
    of activism and has to be understood as
  • 47:01 - 47:06
    that, programming is something that you
    should learn right now from primary
  • 47:06 - 47:11
    school as soon as possible, because it's
    just the way how to express in our modern
  • 47:11 - 47:19
    world and actually how to be a bit a step
    ahead of the regulators. And coming to
  • 47:19 - 47:24
    regulation that's going to get important.
    You have something I would call techno
  • 47:24 - 47:28
    regulation which is the regulation of
    technology, which plays a lot of roles
  • 47:28 - 47:33
    especially two: It's making sure
    technology functions as intended, so
  • 47:33 - 47:37
    planes should, for example, not fall from
    the sky, radio frequency radio
  • 47:37 - 47:41
    applications should not interfere with
    each other, and that's quite important,
  • 47:41 - 47:45
    also making sure technology will
    function in the future in somehow
  • 47:45 - 47:51
    predictive ways. So this is a problem for
    me, especially that predictive ways,
  • 47:51 - 47:56
    because it limits freedom of expression
    and it's also a future-oriented policy
  • 47:56 - 48:00
    that serves the goal, again, to predict
    some future scenarios.
  • 48:00 - 48:06
    So there's of course counter examples of
    things that oppose this techno regulation,
  • 48:06 - 48:11
    for example peer-to-peer protocols and
    anonymity networks or decentralized
  • 48:11 - 48:21
    cryptographic currencies as an example,
    but it's not enough yet. So the next topic
  • 48:21 - 48:29
    that directly speaks to me in that whole
    realm is quantification, because it is
  • 48:29 - 48:34
    directly related to the regulation of
    technology, because it's basically the
  • 48:34 - 48:39
    understanding or the trial to understand
    every occurrence of something in the world
  • 48:39 - 48:43
    and to understand that as a signal that
    has to be processed, stored and later
  • 48:43 - 48:48
    analyzed. And it happens on all levels,
    this quantification, not only analog to
  • 48:48 - 48:52
    digital conversion, but the creation of
    symbols from electronic impulses and then
  • 48:52 - 48:59
    to induce structure on the symbols, for
    example over predefined protocols or just
  • 48:59 - 49:06
    learned, like in predictive analysis; I
    just talked about that. The question is
  • 49:06 - 49:12
    here: Who is the enemy? I would say the
    enemy is everybody who sees us as their
  • 49:12 - 49:19
    enemy, which is not really a solid
    definition, but I want to make sure that
  • 49:19 - 49:23
    the enemy is not the institutions that
    create the policies, but it's the policy
  • 49:23 - 49:28
    itself, so I'm not against the state if
    I'm building a system that deals with the
  • 49:28 - 49:32
    policies that have been created by the
    people in this state, but I'm against that
  • 49:32 - 49:40
    policy in the first place and that's quite
    important to me. So I talked to you about
  • 49:40 - 49:43
    Laplace's daemon and I think if I stick
    together these two concepts of techno
  • 49:43 - 49:48
    regulation and quantification I get
    Laplace's demon.
  • 49:48 - 49:54
    It's an internal justification mechanism
    for complete surveillance, if you want, so
  • 49:54 - 49:58
    it's the old concept of the world formula
    and I was I was telling you I'm telling
  • 49:58 - 50:03
    you about the world formula and it's
    dangerous, because it creates a loop. I
  • 50:03 - 50:06
    will give you one example: If you have
    a predictive system, which is built on
  • 50:06 - 50:11
    some models of the world, it will predict
    somehow within this model and the more
  • 50:11 - 50:17
    correct the predictions get, the more you
    will understand that if we change the
  • 50:17 - 50:23
    world according to the prediction of this
    model then we will be better at
  • 50:23 - 50:31
    understanding our world, so why not just
    change the world to our model, at least in
  • 50:31 - 50:36
    some sense? Not very actively in saying:
    "Okay we should make our world a lot
  • 50:36 - 50:41
    easier or a lot more more formal" but I
    think that's something that happens
  • 50:41 - 50:47
    already and I said I'm coming from
    computer science, a bit mathematics and in
  • 50:47 - 50:51
    statistics we have a term for the outcome
    of this process and we call it
  • 50:51 - 50:56
    overfitting, so techno regulation and
    quantification somehow lead to an
  • 50:56 - 51:02
    overfitting of the world formula. I just
    want to show you two outcomes, what it
  • 51:02 - 51:07
    means to apply this world formula, which
    basically creates a justification for
  • 51:07 - 51:16
    everything, is something that we heard in
    the news for a long time: Iraq's weapons
  • 51:16 - 51:21
    of mass destruction.
    That's some of the or one outcome of the
  • 51:21 - 51:31
    application of the world formula that you
    trust a Secret Service, because it's the
  • 51:31 - 51:39
    Secret Service, it should know these
    kind of things. And the other thing that
  • 51:39 - 51:43
    can happen, if you apply this world
    formula, is of course also extremism in
  • 51:43 - 51:48
    the other way and in this sense I wanted
    to quote - not really quote but show you
  • 51:48 - 51:52
    this because I was interested when I
    read about that.
  • 51:52 - 51:56
    It's it's a kind of a security bulletin,
    published on the Internet Archive in
  • 51:56 - 52:01
    November 2016: The general scope I will
    tell you about it is: How can you use
  • 52:01 - 52:07
    information technology to conceal
    extremist activity and of course they are
  • 52:07 - 52:14
    using the same some of the same visual
    metaphors that also the Bundeswehr in
  • 52:14 - 52:19
    German is using. So but I don't want to
    end this talk on this very depressing
  • 52:19 - 52:22
    topic, because kind of the application of
    the world formula is actually a depressing
  • 52:22 - 52:27
    thing and I would urge you to understand
    that we have to do something against that.
  • 52:27 - 52:32
    I want to quote something against that:
    "We have grown, but there's still much to
  • 52:32 - 52:36
    be done. Many that live in darkness that
    must be shown the way, for it is the
  • 52:36 - 52:41
    dawning of a new day." Thanks.
    Applause
  • 52:41 - 52:48
    Herald: Martin Reiche. Martin Reiche.
    Jetzt geht's.
  • 52:48 - 52:56
    Martin Reiche: Jetzt geht's
    Herald: Jetzt geht's. Martin Reiche,
  • 52:56 - 53:00
    vielen Dank. Any questions?
    Martin Reiche: In German or English.
  • 53:00 - 53:07
    Herald: In German or in English, feel free
    to attend one of our microphone stands.
  • 53:07 - 53:09
    No questions?
    Martin Reiche: No questions
  • 53:09 - 53:12
    Herald: Well then, let's go home.
    both laugh
  • 53:12 - 53:15
    Martin Reiche: Thank you.
    Herald: Thank you.
  • 53:15 - 53:18
    Thank you for listening. Martin Reiche.
    Applause
  • 53:19 - 53:37
    music
  • 53:37 - 53:43
    subtitles created by c3subtitles.de
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Title:
Surveilling the surveillers (33c3)
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Video Language:
English
Duration:
53:43

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