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The Ascent of Money by Niall Ferguson - full 4hr 48min (minus E06)

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    HELICOPTER ROTORS THRUM
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    THUNDER RUMBLES
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    Welcome to the world of money,
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    lt's the English-speaking world's
    favourite game...property.
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    The most basic financial impulse of all
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    We may think power resides
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    ln our time, we've witnessed
    the zenith of global finance.
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    bread, cash, dosh,
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    is to save for a rainy day.
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    with presidents and prime ministers
    in palaces and parliaments. Not so.
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    dough, loot, lucre, moolah,
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    Some people today say that companies -
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    Because, as we've been painfully reminded
    by the recent months of financial turmoil,
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    And today the stakes in the game
    are higher than ever.
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    ln 2006, the world's total economic
    output was worth around $47 trillion -
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    the readies, the wherewithal.
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    and particularly multinational
    corporations - rule the world.
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    ln today's world, real power lies in the
    hands of an elite group of unassuming men
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    the future is so unpredictable.
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    Call it what you like,
    money can break us or it can make us.
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    lt's pretty hard to believe
    that any kind of human organisation
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    The world really can be a dangerous place.
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    that's 47 followed by 1 2 zeroes.
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    in anonymous, open-plan offices...
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    The original property game we know
    today as Monopoly was actually
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    could tame the vast natural barriers
    of South America.
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    ..the men who control
    the world's bond market.
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    Not many of us get through life
    without a little bad luck.
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    The total value of stock
    and bond markets
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    invented back in 1 903 to expose
    the unfairness of a social system
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    ln the past year, it's certainly broken
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    But one company believed it could.
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    more than a few of the biggest names
    on Wall Street
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    was roughly $1 1 9 trillion -
    more than twice the size.
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    Some of us get a lot.
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    where a small minority of landlords
    screwed the majority of tenants.
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    and in the City of London.
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    lt's all about being in the wrong place
    at the wrong time,
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    And the amount outstanding
    of the strange new financial life form
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    Bill Gross is the boss of PlMCO,
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    By constructing a 1.5 billion dollar
    gas pipeline from Bolivia
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    like New Orleans
    when Hurricane Katrina hit.
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    the world's biggest
    bond-trading operation,
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    And while former masters of the universe
    crash and burn,
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    30 years later, an unemployed
    plumber named Charles Darrow
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    known as derivatives
    was $47 3 trillion - ten times larger.
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    which manages a portfolio of bonds
    worth $7 00 billion.
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    right across the South American continent
    to the Atlantic coast of Brazil.
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    the rest of us are left worrying if our
    savings would be safer in a mattress
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    patented a new version of the game,
    with the board based on
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    The question is, how shouId we deaI with
    the risks and uncertainties of the future?
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    Gross is widely regarded
    as the king of the bond market.
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    the streets here in Atlantic City.
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    than in a bank.
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    By running gas along
    the longest pipeline in the world
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    By the summer of 2007, it seemed as if
    the Earth had turned into Planet Finance.
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    ShouId the onus be on the individuaI
    to insure against disaster?
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    Just call him Mr Bond.
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    4,000 miles from the tip of Patagonia
    to the Argentine capital Buenos Aires.
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    The great financiaI crisis that began
    in the summer of 2007
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    lt was Darrow who introduced
    the little houses and hotels.
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    ShouId we be abIe to reIy on the voIuntary
    charity of our feIIow human beings
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    As never before,
    the world was interconnected,
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    has most of us utterIy baffIed.
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    How on earth
    couId a IittIe IocaI difficuIty
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    but not just by cabIes,
    container ships and jet pIanes.
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    when caIamity strikes?
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    Bonds are the magical link
    between the world of high finance
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    What the game of Monopoly tells us,
    contrary to its inventor's intentions.
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    Or shouId we be abIe
    to count on the state -
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    with sub-prime mortgages
    in the United States
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    Such schemes exempIify the vauIting
    ambition of modern capitaIism,
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    and the worId of poIiticaI power.
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    By 24/7 deaIing rooms
    and internationaI investment banks.
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    is that it's smart to own property.
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    in other words, the compuIsory
    contributions of our feIIow taxpayers -
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    unIeash an economic tsunami big enough
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    Governments wiII aIways spend more
    than they raise in taxation -
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    And if it's smart to own property,
    it's even smarter
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    but they're onIy possibIe
    because of one invention -
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    to obIiterate some of WaII Street's
    most iIIustrious names,
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    to baiI us out when the fIood comes?
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    ln this series, we've seen how
    the markets for credit, bonds, stocks,
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    sometimes shed-Ioads more -
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    to Iend money
    to the peopIe who own property.
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    the joint stock company.
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    THUNDER RUMBLES
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    and they make up the difference
    by seIIing bonds that pay interest.
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    to force nationaIisations of banks
    on both sides of the AtIantic
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    insurance and real estate all evolved
    in Europe and North America.
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    That's because the phrase,
    ''Safe as houses''
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    But - and here's the magic -
    if you want to get rid of a bond,
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    has a rather speciaI meaning in
    the worId of finance. What it means
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    That's a long way of asking
    a simple question -
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    and to bring the entire worId economy
    to the very brink of recession,
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    lf the 1 6th century had seen
    a revolution in money and credit,
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    the government doesn't have
    to give you the cash back.
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    are you insured?
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    is there's nothing safer than to Iend
    money to peopIe who own reaI estate.
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    Well, now it's time to tell the story
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    and the 1 7th had witnessed
    the birth of the bond market,
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    if not downright depression?
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    You just take it to a bond market,
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    of how those financial innovations
    conquered the world.
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    ShouIdn't this series be caIIed
    The Descent Of Money?
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    Iike the one here at
    Tokyo Stock Exchange, and seII it.
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    then the next step in the story
    of the ascent of money
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    The British certainly think they are.
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    Why? WeII, because if they
    defauIt on the Ioan,
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    WeII, I want to expIain to you
    just how money rose
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    This is the story
    of financial globalisation.
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    was the rise of the joint stock
    limited liability company.
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    GULLS CRY
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    you can aIways repossess the property.
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    After the rise of banks,
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    Today, we pay a larger proportion
    of our income on insurance
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    Even if they run away,
    the house can't.
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    to pIay such a terrifyingIy dominant roIe
    in aII our Iives.
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    the birth of the bond market was the next
    big revolution in the history of finance.
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    than any other people in the world.
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    What's more, the English-speaking
    world's obsession with property
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    Globalisation is something
    we take for granted today.
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    But the ability of the company
    to transform our lives
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    lt's rather odd, because Britain is
    one of the safest countries on Earth.
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    lt created a whole new way
    for governments to borrow money.
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    What's more,
    l want to reveal financial history
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    And yet for all the advantages
    of an interconnected world,
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    has been the foundation for a unique
    economic and political experiment -
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    would depend on another innovation...
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    as the essential back story
    behind all history.
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    The bond market funded the wars
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    perfectIy exempIified by Hong Kong's
    astonishing humming container port,
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    The struggle to overcome risk has been
    a constant theme of the history of money,
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    the property-owning democracy.
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    that plagued northern ltaly
    600 years ago.
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    The stock market.
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    Some say it's a model
    the whole world should adopt.
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    Banks financed the Renaissance
    while the bond market decided wars.
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    there's a downside to gIobaIisation,
    and that is its vuInerabiIity -
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    from the invention of life insurance
    by two hard-drinking Scots clergymen,
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    GUNSHOT ECHOES
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    lt dictated the outcome
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    The price that people are prepared to pay
    for a company's shares in the market
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    The growth of property ownership
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    its vuInerabiIity to financiaI shocks,
    because finance isn't an exact science,
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    of the Battle of Waterloo
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    to the rise and fall of the welfare state,
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    gave rise to a new era
    in the history of finance.
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    and created the world's greatest
    financial dynasty.
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    tells you how much money
    they think it'll make in the future.
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    and its vuInerabiIity to poIiticaI forces
    beyond the controI of the bankers.
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    to the explosive growth of hedge funds
    and their multi-billionaire owners.
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    On the back of property,
    literally trillions of dollars
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    Stock markets built empires...
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    lt ensured the defeat of the South
    in the American Civil War.
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    have been borrowed, some of it by
    so-called sub-prime borrowers -
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    ..and monetary meltdowns made revolutions.
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    But as we have discovered
    in recent months of financial turmoil,
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    And in modern times, the bond market
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    The ascent of money
    has seldom been smooth.
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    At the core of our struggle with risk
    is an insoluble conflict -
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    has brought once wealthy nations,
    like Argentina, crashing to their knees.
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    stock markets can also be shock markets.
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    people who'd previously been content
    to rent rather than own their homes.
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    Time and again, it's been punctuated
    by big and painful crises.
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    we want to be financially secure,
    and so we yearn for a predictable world.
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    From Ancient Mesopotamia
    right down to present day London,
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    The future is aIways uncertain.
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    Today, governments and companies
    use bonds to borrow
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    So it's come as rather a shock
    to millions of people that real estate
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    But we human beings
    are prone to over-optimism.
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    the ascent of money has been an
    indispensable part of the ascent of man.
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    But the future always seems to come up
    with new and unpleasant ways
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    Just ten years ago,
    it seemed that these crises
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    on an unimaginably vast scale.
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    When prices here on the New York Stock
    Exchange surge upwards in synch,
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    is fundamentally no different
    from any other financial asset.
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    All told,
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    were more likely to blow up
    in emerging markets, like Asia.
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    But money's rise has never been
    a smooth, upward ride.
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    to take us by surprise.
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    there are bonds out there
    worth around $85 trillion.
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    it's as if investors are gripped
    by a kind of coIIective euphoria -
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    lts price can go down as well as up.
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    As we'II see, financiaI history
    has repeatedIy been interrupted
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    We want calculable risk.
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    Yet today, it's the West that's caught up
    in a full-blown credit crunch,
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    what the former chairman of
    the FederaI Reserve, AIan Greenspan,
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    The fortunes of most of us,
    whether we like it or not,
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    lt turns out that no amount
    of financial alchemy
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    We're stuck with random uncertainty.
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    by gut-wrenching crises
    of which today's is just the Iatest.
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    once famousIy caIIed
    ''irrationaI exuberance''.
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    are directly linked to the bond market.
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    can turn little suburban boxes
    into treasure chests with roofs.
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    while Asia seems
    scarcely to have noticed.
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    So stock markets reaIIy can be
    Iike soap bubbIes.
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    From the fluctuating prices
    of the homes we own
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    lndeed, a new phenomenon
    has come to define the world economy.
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    lf the bond market tanks,
    then down goes the value of our pensions -
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    We never quite know
    when they're gonna burst.
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    to the high-speed industrialisation
    of China,
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    Which raises the question,
    is property really as safe as houses?
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    American borrowers have come
    to rely on Chinese savers -
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    and that's a huge part
    of our wealth as individuals.
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    the power of finance is everywhere we look
    and it affects all of our lives.
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    The exuberance was especially irrational
    and the burst especially painful
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    ln the financial crisis that has gripped
    the world since the summer of 2007,
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    a symbiotic relationship between China
    and America that l call ''Chimerica''.
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    Or couId it be that we've Iet
    our Iove affair with reaI estate
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    for the company that proposed
    those vast projects in Latin America.
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    US government bonds have been seen as
    a safe haven for investors seeking shelter
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    SEAGULLS CRY
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    get compIeteIy out of proportion?
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    But can we be sure
    that Chimerica will save
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    But are you in on the secret?
    Do you know what causes a bank run
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    from the storm
    of falling property and share prices.
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    Enron became the biggest corporate fraud
    in modern American history.
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    this era of financial globalisation?
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    or a monetary meItdown
    or a stock market crash?
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    The chiIIing reaIity
    is that a hundred years ago,
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    So if Bill Gross were to lose faith
    in those bonds,
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    Can you teII the difference
    between a sub-prime Ioan and a prime Ioan?
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    But Enron was very far
    from the only corporate scam
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    another age of financiaI gIobaIisation
    ended not with a whimper, but with a bang.
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    it would hit the financial world like...
    well, a thunderball.
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    When Hurricane Katrina hit New Orleans
    in the last week of August 2005,
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    since shares were first bought and sold
    400 years ago.
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    WeII, I think these financiaI
    technicaIities onIy reaIIy make sense
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    That's why this ''Mr Bond''
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    And there's no reason why that
    shouIdn't happen again in our time.
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    it caused death and destruction.
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    once you know where they came from.
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    And the shady practices
    it epitomised live on.
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    has become so much more powerful
    than the Mr Bond created by lan Fleming.
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    And that's why financiaI history
    is of more than mereIy academic interest.
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    lndeed, they've been a key cause of the
    financial crisis we're living through now.
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    Property ownership was once
    the preserve of an aristocratic elite.
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    Not knowing this stuff can seriousIy
    damage your weaIth.
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    And that's why both kinds of bond
    have a licence to kill.
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    Yet it's not a natural catastrophe that
    now threatens the survival of the city.
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    Cooked books? Stock prices rigged?
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    Been there. Done that.
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    The real lesson of the disaster
    is about money.
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    Estates were passed down from
    father to son, along with titles
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    For centuries.
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    TRADERS SHOUT
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    How the risk management system
    we call insurance
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    Nothing illustrates more clearly
    than the history of stock market bubbles
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    and political privileges.
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    Everyone else was a mere tenant,
    paying rent to their landlord.
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    simply failed when faced
    with a calamity on this scale.
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    how hard human beings find it
    to learn from history.
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    Even the right to vote in elections
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    lt used to be said
    that ''emerging markets''
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    The hurricane didn't hit
    New Orleans directly.
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    was originally
    a function of property ownership.
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    were places where
    they have emergencies.
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    HORN BLARES
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    The main force of the storm
    passed to the north-east of the city.
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    In one respect, not much has
    changed in Britain since those days.
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    lnvesting in faraway places
    can make you rich,
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    But just as the residents
    breathed a sigh of relief,
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    Crisis or no crisis, the amount of money
    sloshing around planet finance
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    STOCK MARKET HUBBUB
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    Of 60 miIIion acres of British Iand,
    around 40 miIIion
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    ''War, '' declared the ancient Greek
    philosopher Heraclitus,
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    but when things go wrong, it's often
    been a fast track to financial ruin.
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    the real catastrophe began.
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    still boggles the mind.
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    ''is the father of all things. ''
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    This IndustriaI CanaI Iinks
    Lake Pontchartrain to the Mississippi.
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    are owned by just 189,000 famiIies.
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    By one measure, the US stock of money
    is now $8, 7 00,000,000,000,
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    lt was certainly the father
    of the bond market.
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    The difference is that they no Ionger
    monopoIise the poIiticaI system.
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    After the hurricane,
    the huge storm surge
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    up 1 2% since last year.
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    raised the water IeveI
    in the canaI so high
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    That's why many of today's apparently
    unstoppable emerging markets
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    Indeed, thanks to reform
    of the House of Lords,
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    For much of the 1 4th and 1 5th centuries,
    the medieval city-states of Tuscany -
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    And some people are still pocketing
    a huge share of that cash.
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    that it broke the Ievee,
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    the hereditary peerage
    is being phased out of ParIiament.
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    pouring umpteen gaIIons of the Iake over
    here, into the Ninth Ward of New OrIeans.
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    are really re-emerging markets.
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    Hidden away among
    the many splendours of Venice
  • 19:47 - 19:51
    Florence, Pisa and Siena -
    were at war with each other.
  • 19:48 - 19:53
    Now, you can expIain the decIine
    of the aristocracy in many ways.
  • 19:57 - 20:02
    is a small clue to one of the most
    astonishing tales of adventure
  • 20:07 - 20:11
    But, as far as I'm concerned,
    the main driver was finance.
  • 20:08 - 20:12
    Last year, despite the onset
    of the biggest financial crisis
  • 20:15 - 20:18
    This was war waged
    as much by money as by men.
  • 20:16 - 20:17
    in all financial history.
  • 20:20 - 20:23
    Just to the east of the Ninth Ward
    is St Bernard,
  • 20:24 - 20:29
    since the Depression, his hedge fund paid
    George Soros a cool $2.4 billion.
  • 20:33 - 20:36
    a blue-collar community of homeowners
  • 20:35 - 20:39
    These days, of course, the uItimate
    re-emerging market is China.
  • 20:50 - 20:54
    all, on paper at least,
    covered by private insurance.
  • 20:53 - 20:54
    To taIk to some peopIe,
  • 20:59 - 21:04
    In Pieter van der Heyden's BattIe
    Of The Money-Bags And Strong-Boxes,
  • 20:59 - 21:03
    ''To the honour and memory
    of John Law of Edinburgh,
  • 21:00 - 21:04
    there's simpIy no Iimit to the amount
    of money to be made here.
  • 21:02 - 21:07
    Until the 1 830s, fortune smiled
    on the British land-owning elite -
  • 21:04 - 21:09
    That's roughly 41,000 times more than
    the average American family earned.
  • 21:16 - 21:20
    And it's certainIy true
    that over the past 20 years,
  • 21:19 - 21:25
    ''most distinguished controIIer of
    the treasury of the Kings of the French.''
  • 21:20 - 21:24
    piggy banks, treasure chests
    and barreIs fuII of coins
  • 21:27 - 21:31
    the 30 or so families with gross
    annual income from their lands
  • 21:31 - 21:36
    the mainIand has foIIowed the exampIe
    set here in Hong Kong, and boomed.
  • 21:32 - 21:36
    As they say on Wall Street,
    ''Way to gol''.
  • 21:42 - 21:47
    Iay into one another with Iances
    and swords in a chaotic free-for-aII.
  • 21:48 - 21:50
    above Ł60,000 a year -
  • 21:53 - 21:57
    Councillor Joey DiFatta
    refused advice to leave the city,
  • 21:53 - 21:59
    This is the finaI resting pIace of the man
    who invented the stock market bubbIe.
  • 21:56 - 22:02
    And yet this isn't the first time that
    foreign investors have piIed into China,
  • 21:59 - 22:02
    roughly Ł 1 50 million pounds today.
  • 22:04 - 22:07
    The Dutch verses
    inscribed at the bottom read,
  • 22:13 - 22:15
    staying put during the storm.
  • 22:18 - 22:23
    ''It's aII for money and goods,
    this fighting and quarreIIing.''
  • 22:18 - 22:21
    An ambitious Scot, a convicted murderer,
  • 22:19 - 22:24
    aiming to make megabucks from
    the worId's most popuIous nation.
  • 22:25 - 22:28
    With such vast property assets
    backing them
  • 22:30 - 22:35
    Eventually, he was forced to retreat
    to the roof of the town hall
  • 22:36 - 22:39
    a compuIsive gambIer
    and a fIawed financiaI genius,
  • 22:37 - 22:40
    But what they might
    just as easiIy have said
  • 22:37 - 22:38
    And the Iast time,
  • 22:40 - 22:42
    and income from agriculture booming,
  • 22:45 - 22:48
    those foreign investors
    Iost aImost as many shirts
  • 22:48 - 22:50
    as the waters kept rising.
  • 22:48 - 22:53
    is that war is impossibIe
    if you don't have the money to pay for it.
  • 22:53 - 22:57
    it was hard to see how
    the aristocracy could fail to flourish.
  • 22:56 - 23:01
    he not onIy caused the first true
    boom and bust in asset prices,
  • 22:58 - 23:01
    Now, however,
    imagine a world with no money.
  • 22:58 - 22:59
    ..And as you can see,
  • 23:00 - 23:04
    as the IocaI taiIors here
    can stitch together in a week.
  • 23:12 - 23:13
    BELL TOLLS
  • 23:14 - 23:17
    - this is the water Iine.
    - That's the water Iine.
  • 23:18 - 23:21
    he aIso indirectIy caused
    the French RevoIution.
  • 23:25 - 23:29
    Yet, by ignoring a fundamental truth
    about property,
  • 23:27 - 23:30
    (Joey DiFatta) Where it came up to.
  • 23:34 - 23:36
    And the way to do that -
  • 23:37 - 23:40
    The water came in this buiIding in, er...
  • 23:38 - 23:42
    The key problem with overseas
    investment, then as now,
  • 23:43 - 23:49
    There was a time when John Law owned a
    quarter of what is now the United States,
  • 23:43 - 23:47
    the ability to finance war
    through the bond market -
  • 23:45 - 23:47
    they ensured their own decline.
  • 23:46 - 23:50
    500 years ago, the most powerful society
    in South America,
  • 23:56 - 23:59
    - 1 4 feet of water in 15 minutes.
    - Wow.
  • 23:56 - 24:00
    is that it's hard for an investor
    in London or New York
  • 23:59 - 23:59
    GUNSHOT
  • 24:04 - 24:08
    the lnca Empire,
    had no real concept of money.
  • 24:05 - 24:09
    was, like so much else,
    an invention of the ltalian Renaissance.
  • 24:08 - 24:09
    CROWS CAW
  • 24:10 - 24:14
    only to lose it all in history's
    first great crash.
  • 24:15 - 24:19
    to see what a foreign government
    or company is up to
  • 24:24 - 24:29
    The lncas appreciated the aesthetic
    qualities of rare metals -
  • 24:27 - 24:29
    From the second fIoor of this buiIding,
  • 24:27 - 24:31
    Like many of us today,
    the great magnates saw the value
  • 24:32 - 24:35
    when they're an ocean or more apart.
  • 24:32 - 24:37
    From Edinburgh to Amsterdam to Paris,
    all the way here to New Orleans,
  • 24:40 - 24:44
    I couId see, coming down
    Judge Perez, a waII of water.
  • 24:41 - 24:46
    of their property as a cash cow
    and used it to borrow to the hilt...
  • 24:42 - 24:47
    Rather than require their own citizens
    to do the dirty work of fighting,
  • 24:45 - 24:49
    lf the foreign borrower
    decides to default on its debts,
  • 24:55 - 24:59
    gold was the sweat of the sun,
    silver the tears of the moon -
  • 24:58 - 25:03
    and finally to Venice, Law's story
    is a classic tale of boom and bust.
  • 25:00 - 25:05
    In that waII of water was debris -
    cars, vehicIes, pieces of roofs.
  • 25:01 - 25:03
    what's an investor to do?
  • 25:07 - 25:11
    each city hired military contractors -
    condottieri -
  • 25:13 - 25:16
    ..often more than
    the property was worth.
  • 25:14 - 25:18
    The answer before 1 91 4
    was brutally simple but effective.
  • 25:21 - 25:25
    labour was the unit of value
    in the lnca Empire,
  • 25:23 - 25:27
    And this waII of water,
    you know, you guestimate,
  • 25:26 - 25:29
    lt's also very much a story
    for our own times.
  • 25:29 - 25:34
    What they'd failed to understand
    is that property is only a security
  • 25:30 - 25:34
    who raised armies to annex land
    and loot treasure from the others.
  • 25:37 - 25:42
    just as it was later supposed to be
    in a communist society.
  • 25:41 - 25:43
    had to be maybe 15 to 20 feet taII.
  • 25:52 - 25:54
    to the person who lends you money.
  • 25:55 - 25:58
    - And moving fast.
    - Moving quickIy.
  • 25:56 - 26:00
    Hidden away here in the warehouse
    of the Louisiana State Museum
  • 26:00 - 26:04
    Among the condottieri
    of the 1 360s and 1 37 0s,
  • 26:02 - 26:05
    Get your government
    to send in the navy.
  • 26:06 - 26:12
    Just coming down this bouIevard street,
    and taking everything with it as it came.
  • 26:07 - 26:12
    As a borrower, you still have to
    earn the money to pay back the loan.
  • 26:13 - 26:16
    is the onIy known painting of John Law.
  • 26:16 - 26:19
    But in 1 532, the lncas ran into a man
  • 26:20 - 26:23
    one stood head and shoulders
    above the others.
  • 26:23 - 26:26
    By guaranteeing European
    political control,
  • 26:30 - 26:32
    And for the great landowners
  • 26:32 - 26:36
    whose hunger for money
    had led him across an ocean.
  • 26:34 - 26:35
    Here he is.
  • 26:41 - 26:46
    of Victorian Britain, that suddenly
    became a very difficult thing to do.
  • 26:42 - 26:46
    gunboat diplomacy provided
    reassurance for British investors
  • 26:51 - 26:55
    The whole of St Bernard Parish
    was inundated in just 1 5 minutes.
  • 26:51 - 26:53
    With that Iean and hungry Iook,
  • 26:54 - 26:59
    This is his portrait in Florence's Duomo -
    a thank-you from a grateful public.
  • 26:58 - 27:02
    he reaIIy is, for aII the worId,
    a Scotsman on the make.
  • 27:01 - 27:05
    even at the remotest extremities
    of the world economy.
  • 27:03 - 27:08
    Francisco Pizarro and his fellow
    Conquistadores had come from Spain
  • 27:23 - 27:29
    Nowhere was the pain more acute than here
    in the heart of rural Buckinghamshire.
  • 27:26 - 27:29
    Only five houses out of 26,000
    weren't flooded.
  • 27:28 - 27:32
    to what they called Upper Peru
    inspired by the legend of El Dorado,
  • 27:33 - 27:38
    Unlikely though it may seem,
    this master mercenary was an Essex boy.
  • 27:44 - 27:47
    The Royal Navy provided the firepower
  • 27:50 - 27:53
    the realm of the gold-covered king.
  • 27:53 - 27:58
    The path that led Law ''from obscurity
    to celebrity, to notoriety'' is a path
  • 27:59 - 28:03
    that underwrote the first age
    of globalisation...
  • 28:06 - 28:10
    More than 2,000 peopIe
    were kiIIed in Hurricane Katrina
  • 28:13 - 28:15
    So skilfully did he wage war
  • 28:20 - 28:24
    After defeating the lnca army
    at the Battle of Cajamarca
  • 28:21 - 28:23
    and the subsequent fIooding.
  • 28:22 - 28:26
    that many of the great stock market
    players have followed since.
  • 28:22 - 28:23
    ..and its pioneers,
  • 28:24 - 28:28
    that the ltalians called Sir John Hawkwood
    Giovanni Acuto -
  • 28:30 - 28:34
    Here in St Bernard Parish,
    1 48 peopIe Iost their Iives,
  • 28:31 - 28:34
    like William Jardine...
    and James Matheson.
  • 28:35 - 28:39
    There's something undeniabIy
    magnificent about this huge,
  • 28:41 - 28:43
    their quest began in earnest.
  • 28:44 - 28:45
    John the Acute.
  • 28:50 - 28:53
    Law was born here
    in Edinburgh in 1 67 1,
  • 28:54 - 28:57
    mostIy because they became
    trapped in their houses
  • 28:54 - 28:56
    neocIassicaI paIace -
  • 29:00 - 29:03
    At Potosi, in what is now Bolivia,
  • 29:03 - 29:06
    Stowe House - arguabIy
    the greatest private residence
  • 29:07 - 29:10
    Jardine and Matheson
    were buccaneering Scots
  • 29:08 - 29:12
    This castle was one of many pieces
    of prime real estate
  • 29:08 - 29:10
    as the fIood waters rose.
  • 29:09 - 29:14
    the son of a successful goldsmith
    and heir to the estate of Lauriston.
  • 29:14 - 29:16
    the Spaniards struck it rich.
  • 29:17 - 29:20
    The painted signs
    on these abandoned houses
  • 29:22 - 29:24
    buiIt in EngIand in the 18th century.
  • 29:23 - 29:29
    who'd set up a trading company in the
    southern Chinese port of Canton in 1 832.
  • 29:27 - 29:31
    They discovered the Cerro Rico,
    literally the Rich Hill.
  • 29:27 - 29:31
    the Florentines gave him
    as a reward for his services.
  • 29:30 - 29:34
    say whether dead bodies were found
    after the fIood waters receded.
  • 29:33 - 29:37
    Just Iook at these extraordinary
    scagIioIa piIIars
  • 29:37 - 29:39
    ln 1 694, while living in London,
  • 29:48 - 29:52
    A IittIe bit Iike medievaI London
    in the time of pIague.
  • 29:49 - 29:52
    Law killed a man in a duel over a woman
  • 29:50 - 29:53
    or the stunning eIIipticaI
    pIaster ceiIing.
  • 29:53 - 29:56
    Towering nearly 1 6,000 feet
    above sea level,
  • 30:03 - 30:05
    Not to put too fine a point on it,
  • 30:05 - 30:07
    But Hawkwood was a mercenary
  • 30:11 - 30:13
    and was sentenced to death.
  • 30:15 - 30:19
    who was willing to fight
    for anyone who'd pay him -
  • 30:15 - 30:17
    it was a money mountain.
  • 30:16 - 30:20
    their most profitable line
    of business was drug dealing.
  • 30:22 - 30:25
    And yet there seems to be
    something missing.
  • 30:34 - 30:36
    Milan, Padua, Pisa or the Pope.
  • 30:35 - 30:40
    In their 250 years of Spanish ruIe,
    more than two biIIion ounces of siIver
  • 30:36 - 30:37
    Or rather many things.
  • 30:36 - 30:38
    Yet three years later,
  • 30:37 - 30:41
    Somehow, Law managed to escape
    from prison and fled to Amsterdam.
  • 30:38 - 30:43
    They shipped opium produced
    under British Government control in lndia
  • 30:43 - 30:48
    Because once in each of these aIcoves
    there was a Roman statue.
  • 30:47 - 30:51
    it's not flooding or plague
    that's killing New Orleans.
  • 31:01 - 31:03
    to China's population of addicts -
  • 31:02 - 31:06
    He couldn't have picked
    a better town to lie low in.
  • 31:05 - 31:10
    were extracted from mines Iike this one,
    1 4,000 feet up in the Andes.
  • 31:05 - 31:07
    A harsh financial reality has emerged.
  • 31:13 - 31:16
    a trade that China's Emperor
    had banned.
  • 31:23 - 31:25
    People can't live here any more
  • 31:30 - 31:34
    These dazzIing frescoes
    in FIorence's PaIazzo Vecchio
  • 31:36 - 31:41
    What the Incas couIdn't grasp was why
    the Europeans had such an insatiabIe Iust
  • 31:37 - 31:40
    because they can't insure their homes.
  • 31:37 - 31:42
    On March 1 0th, 1 839,
    an imperial official named Lin Zexu
  • 31:42 - 31:45
    The exquisite Georgian firepIaces
    have been ripped out
  • 31:44 - 31:49
    By the 1 690s, Amsterdam was
    the world capital of financial innovation.
  • 31:47 - 31:51
    show the armies of Pisa and FIorence
    cIashing in 1364.
  • 31:57 - 31:59
    One man made it his mission
  • 32:01 - 32:04
    and repIaced by
    bog-standard ones Iike this.
  • 32:05 - 32:06
    for goId and siIver.
  • 32:06 - 32:10
    At that time, Hawkwood was fighting
    on the side of Pisa.
  • 32:08 - 32:13
    arrived in Canton under orders from
    the Emperor to stamp out the trade.
  • 32:09 - 32:12
    to show the limits of private insurance
  • 32:13 - 32:15
    To help finance their war against Spain,
  • 32:13 - 32:17
    They couIdn't understand that to Pizarro
    and the Conquistadores,
  • 32:22 - 32:24
    when it comes to a really big crisis.
  • 32:24 - 32:27
    But 15 years Iater, he'd switched sides.
  • 32:25 - 32:30
    the Dutch had introduced one
    of the world's first national lotteries.
  • 32:26 - 32:27
    Why?
  • 32:32 - 32:35
    siIver was much more
    than just shiny metaI.
  • 32:33 - 32:36
    He besieged the British
    opium warehouses,
  • 32:37 - 32:43
    How did this most stately of stately homes
    become a mere shell of its former self?
  • 32:38 - 32:41
    Why? Because FIorence
    was where the money was.
  • 32:45 - 32:48
    To protect their merchants
    from dodgy coinage,
  • 32:46 - 32:48
    It couId be made into money...
  • 32:47 - 32:49
    blocking any further imports.
  • 32:58 - 33:01
    20,000 chests of opium
    valued at Ł2 million
  • 32:59 - 33:02
    they'd created the world's
    first central bank.
  • 33:03 - 33:07
    ..a store of vaIue, a unit of account,
    portabIe power.
  • 33:10 - 33:15
    The cost of these incessant wars
    plunged ltaly's city-states into crisis.
  • 33:16 - 33:21
    The answer is that this house beIonged
    to the principaI victim
  • 33:17 - 33:20
    He's former navy pilot
    Richard F Scruggs,
  • 33:20 - 33:24
    But the one that had
    the biggest impact on Law
  • 33:25 - 33:28
    were confiscated
    and literally thrown in the sea.
  • 33:35 - 33:39
    was the single greatest
    Dutch invention of them all -
  • 33:35 - 33:39
    one of those lawyers that only
    America seems to produce.
  • 33:38 - 33:40
    of the first modern property crash -
  • 33:41 - 33:45
    Expenditures, even in years of peace,
    were running
  • 33:46 - 33:50
    Faced with catastrophic losses,
    Jardine hurried to London
  • 33:53 - 33:57
    Richard PIantagenet
    TempIe-Nugent-Brydges-Chandos-GrenviIIe,
  • 33:55 - 33:56
    the company.
  • 33:59 - 34:01
    at double or more tax revenues.
  • 34:03 - 34:07
    Dickie Scruggs took $50 million
    off the asbestos industry,
  • 34:08 - 34:11
    to lobby the British Government
    to send a gunboat.
  • 34:09 - 34:13
    I must say,
    I find this pIace pretty harrowing.
  • 34:17 - 34:22
    To pay the likes of Sir John Hawkwood,
    Florence was drowning in deficits.
  • 34:17 - 34:19
    2nd Duke of Buckingham.
  • 34:28 - 34:33
    The story of the company had begun
    1 00 years before Law's arrival
  • 34:30 - 34:32
    then $248 billion
    off tobacco companies
  • 34:30 - 34:34
    The Spaniards
    had a system of forced Iabour
  • 34:37 - 34:41
    Stowe was only part of the Duke's
    vast empire of real estate.
  • 34:44 - 34:49
    which meant that every abIe-bodied maIe
    in the native popuIation
  • 34:51 - 34:54
    WeII, Jardine got his wish granted.
  • 34:52 - 34:56
    as Dutch traders spread out
    all over the world,
  • 34:54 - 34:58
    for failing to warn smokers
    of the danger of lung cancer.
  • 34:58 - 35:03
    ln all, he owned around 67,000 acres
    in England, lreland and Jamaica.
  • 35:01 - 35:06
    On August 23rd, 1840, British gunships
    Ianded here on Hong Kong IsIand.
  • 35:05 - 35:07
    had to do a stint down these mines.
  • 35:07 - 35:10
    from Manhattan lsland
    to the Cape of Good Hope.
  • 35:09 - 35:13
    This wonderfuI document
    in the FIorentine State Archive
  • 35:12 - 35:14
    This kind of work has its rewards.
  • 35:19 - 35:24
    And you can see why one in eight of them
    didn't survive the ordeaI.
  • 35:25 - 35:30
    But it was Asia that became the primary
    target of Dutch commercial expansion.
  • 35:27 - 35:31
    The Qing Empire
    was about to feeI the fuII force
  • 35:31 - 35:33
    shows how the city's debt had expIoded
  • 35:34 - 35:38
    Scruggs's share in fees
    on the tobacco case was $1.4 billion.
  • 35:38 - 35:42
    These immense properties
    seemed more than adequate
  • 35:44 - 35:48
    from around 50,000 fIorins
    at the beginning of the 1 4th century
  • 35:44 - 35:47
    of history's
    most successfuI narco-state.
  • 35:52 - 35:52
    Why?
  • 35:59 - 36:01
    to back his extravagant lifestyle.
  • 36:03 - 36:06
    The East Indies were so aIIuring
    because of these -
  • 36:05 - 36:07
    to five miIIion by 1 427.
  • 36:11 - 36:14
    And he spent money
    as if it might go out of fashion
  • 36:18 - 36:23
    Scruggs's latest target has been
    America's insurance companies.
  • 36:19 - 36:20
    spices -
  • 36:20 - 36:25
    It was quite IiteraIIy a mountain of debt,
    hence the name - the Monte Commune.
  • 36:24 - 36:25
    As Jardine had predicted,
  • 36:26 - 36:29
    on mistresses, on illegitimate children,
  • 36:26 - 36:28
    pepper, cIoves, nutmeg, ginger.
  • 36:35 - 36:38
    the Royal Navy made short work
    of the Chinese defences.
  • 36:38 - 36:44
    on anything that he felt was compatible
    with his standing as a Duke of the Realm.
  • 36:41 - 36:42
    Today, 500 years later,
  • 36:43 - 36:47
    Europeans craved them to fIavour
    their food, but aIso to preserve it.
  • 36:45 - 36:51
    But from whom couId the FIorentines
    possibIy have borrowed such a vast sum?
  • 36:46 - 36:51
    His clients, hundreds of homeowners
    whose houses were destroyed by Katrina,
  • 36:52 - 36:56
    conditions for miners in the Cerro Rico
    haven't improved much.
  • 37:05 - 37:09
    TraditionaIIy, they'd come overIand
    by the Spice Road.
  • 37:09 - 37:10
    PEACOCK CRIES
  • 37:09 - 37:14
    argued that the companies were refusing
    to pay up on genuine claims -
  • 37:15 - 37:19
    With south-western China
    under British control,
  • 37:18 - 37:21
    The answer is right here -
    from themseIves.
  • 37:21 - 37:25
    But at least they get paid
    for the work they do.
  • 37:22 - 37:27
    But the Dutch pIan was to fetch them
    the Ionger, but quicker way, by sea.
  • 37:29 - 37:31
    By 1 845, the jig was up.
  • 37:30 - 37:33
    the opium trade was given free rein.
  • 37:36 - 37:40
    ln those days, it was a way of making
    money that verged on genocide.
  • 37:36 - 37:38
    a view the insurers disputed.
  • 37:47 - 37:51
    And that pungent aroma
    was the smeII of money to be made.
  • 37:47 - 37:49
    Drug addiction exploded.
  • 37:49 - 37:50
    There was a house there?
  • 37:49 - 37:53
    Grain prices had begun
    their long slide downwards,
  • 37:53 - 37:58
    lt was a revolutionary idea that would
    change the world of money for ever.
  • 37:59 - 38:03
    Large tracts of the country
    slid into rebellion and anarchy.
  • 38:00 - 38:03
    There was a house here,
    a house next to it,
  • 38:10 - 38:14
    and so had the income
    from agricultural land.
  • 38:14 - 38:16
    where you see the traiIer.
  • 38:18 - 38:21
    Rather than paying direct tax,
    citizens were now
  • 38:25 - 38:27
    Rural property prices plummeted.
  • 38:26 - 38:29
    Scruggs had a dog of his own
    in this fight.
  • 38:29 - 38:35
    But for Jardine Matheson, with their head
    office now established in Hong Kong,
  • 38:32 - 38:35
    The silver ore was ground up,
    refined with mercury
  • 38:37 - 38:41
    effectively obliged to lend money
    to their own government.
  • 38:39 - 38:43
    Suddenly, the aristocracy found
    that their borrowings
  • 38:43 - 38:49
    This painting shows the return of one
    of the first Dutch fleets from the East.
  • 38:46 - 38:51
    His own home on Pascagoula's Beach
    Boulevard, here on the Mississippi coast,
  • 38:52 - 38:55
    the glory days of Victorian
    globalisation had arrived.
  • 38:56 - 38:59
    and then shipped to Europe
    as bars and coins.
  • 38:58 - 39:01
    had outrun the value of their estates.
  • 39:09 - 39:15
    The inscription reads, ''Four ships sailed
    to go and get the spices towards Bantam
  • 39:11 - 39:13
    was so badly damaged by Katrina
  • 39:12 - 39:16
    The Duke was spending
    far more than his income
  • 39:18 - 39:23
    Empire, it seemed, had made the Spanish
    crown rich beyond the dreams of avarice.
  • 39:26 - 39:28
    that it had to be demolished.
  • 39:33 - 39:37
    and most of that was being absorbed
    by interest payments.
  • 39:35 - 39:39
    ln return for these forced loans,
    they received interest.
  • 39:37 - 39:42
    By1 900, the firm had diversified into
    more respectable lines of business.
  • 39:37 - 39:40
    ''and also established trading posts.
  • 39:41 - 39:44
    - This is the...
    - The front door?
  • 39:51 - 39:55
    ''And came back richly laden
    to the poles of Amsterdam.
  • 39:51 - 39:53
    This is the front door, right here.
  • 39:54 - 39:58
    But there was to be one final bout
    of conspicuous consumption.
  • 40:07 - 40:11
    lt had its own breweries,
    its own cotton mills,
  • 40:10 - 40:12
    ''Departed 1 st May 1 598.
  • 40:10 - 40:13
    The edge of the sIab, if you wiII.
  • 40:18 - 40:22
    These debt instruments -
    simpIe Iines in a Iedger -
  • 40:22 - 40:24
    its own insurance company,
  • 40:23 - 40:26
    - You were sIabbed.
    - We were sIabbed.
  • 40:26 - 40:28
    ''Returned 1 9th July 1 599. ''
  • 40:28 - 40:32
    In preparation for a visit
    by Queen Victoria and Prince AIbert,
  • 40:33 - 40:38
    and its own railways, like the one
    they built from Kowloon to Canton.
  • 40:34 - 40:36
    were the originaI government bonds.
  • 40:37 - 40:39
    If you couId fix the system...
  • 40:45 - 40:51
    And the wonderfuI thing about them was
    that if you needed your money in a hurry,
  • 40:47 - 40:51
    But I'm fortunate enough
    that I have the means to...
  • 40:50 - 40:56
    the Duke decided to spIash out and
    refurbish Stowe House from top to bottom.
  • 40:56 - 41:00
    And yet, aII the siIver
    in the mines of Potosi
  • 41:03 - 41:06
    you couId seII your bonds
    to other citizens.
  • 41:06 - 41:10
    - To Iose a house and buiId it.
    - Most peopIe here don't.
  • 41:07 - 41:10
    The Asian spice trade was so profitable
  • 41:11 - 41:16
    couIdn't haIt the inexorabIe economic
    and poIiticaI decIine of Spain's empire.
  • 41:15 - 41:20
    15 saIoons were stuffed fuII
    of the most expensive furniture
  • 41:16 - 41:18
    They were Iiquid assets.
  • 41:21 - 41:25
    that just one return trip could pay
    for the construction costs
  • 41:24 - 41:29
    If you had the power to change the system
    so that peopIe really were insured,
  • 41:26 - 41:28
    What this record teIIs us
  • 41:32 - 41:36
    Back in 1913, an investor in London
    had an extraordinary range
  • 41:36 - 41:41
    is how FIorence turned its citizens
    into its biggest investors.
  • 41:40 - 41:45
    Why was that, when Pizarro seemed to have
    struck it so incredibIy rich?
  • 41:40 - 41:42
    that money couId buy.
  • 41:40 - 41:42
    of a ship like this.
  • 41:47 - 41:52
    The fIoorboards were groaning
    under the weight of Genoa veIvet,
  • 41:49 - 41:54
    But so prolonged was the journey round
    the Cape of Good Hope to the East
  • 41:55 - 41:56
    how wouId you do that?
  • 41:55 - 41:57
    of foreign opportunities,
  • 42:02 - 42:05
    Is there a way of making
    insurance work again?
  • 42:03 - 42:07
    The answer is that the Spaniards
    had dug up so much siIver
  • 42:03 - 42:08
    and nothing iIIustrates that better than
    the Iedgers of N M RothschiId & Sons.
  • 42:08 - 42:10
    embroidered satin and goId brocade.
  • 42:09 - 42:15
    and so hazardous that merchants had
    to pool their resources and their risk.
  • 42:17 - 42:21
    There is, and it's discIosure
    of what...what you're buying.
  • 42:21 - 42:23
    to finance their wars of conquest,
  • 42:23 - 42:28
    This wartime expedient marked the birth
    of the modern bond market.
  • 42:24 - 42:28
    When the Queen saw the resuIts,
    she commented rather waspishIy,
  • 42:29 - 42:31
    Just a singIe page from 1913
  • 42:32 - 42:37
    that the metaI itseIf suffered
    an extraordinary decIine in vaIue.
  • 42:38 - 42:42
    The result was around six fledgling
    East lndia enterprises.
  • 42:43 - 42:48
    ''I am sure I have no such spIendid
    apartments in either of my paIaces. ''
  • 42:44 - 42:47
    Iists no fewer than 20
    different foreign securities,
  • 42:48 - 42:49
    Everyone was a winner.
  • 42:48 - 42:49
    Er, so that, you know...
  • 42:55 - 42:58
    More siIver coins
    didn't make Spain richer.
  • 42:57 - 43:00
    Bonds had saved the city-state
    from bankruptcy.
  • 43:03 - 43:07
    incIuding bonds issues by ChiIe,
    Egypt, Germany, Hungary, ItaIy,
  • 43:03 - 43:05
    Iike...Iike a drug.
  • 43:09 - 43:14
    SadIy, the cost of this mega-makeover
    proved to be the finaI straw
  • 43:10 - 43:14
    They simpIy made prices higher
    as an increased quantity of money
  • 43:13 - 43:16
    The citizens were happy
    earning their interest.
  • 43:17 - 43:20
    There's a bIack box warning on there.
  • 43:28 - 43:33
    And the bond market let them
    buy or sell as they saw fit.
  • 43:31 - 43:33
    chased the same amount of goods.
  • 43:31 - 43:36
    ''This is what it does, this is what
    you shouId watch out for.''
  • 43:32 - 43:35
    not forgetting 1 1 different
    raiIway companies,
  • 43:36 - 43:37
    for the ducaI finances.
  • 43:45 - 43:47
    What the Spaniards didn't get
  • 43:49 - 43:54
    As opposed to this device, which
    is caIIed a modern insurance poIicy,
  • 43:49 - 43:53
    incIuding four from Argentina,
    two from Canada and, down here,
  • 43:50 - 43:52
    lt seemed as if the problem
  • 43:54 - 43:59
    was that money is onIy worth what
    other peopIe wiII give in exchange for it.
  • 43:54 - 43:56
    ln August 1 848, to the Duke's horror,
  • 43:55 - 43:58
    In 1602, at the instigation
    of the Dutch government,
  • 44:00 - 44:05
    of public debt had been solved,
    allowing the citizens of Florence
  • 44:08 - 44:12
    his son had the entire contents
    of Stowe House auctioned off.
  • 44:10 - 44:13
    the good oId KowIoon to Canton
    raiIway Iine.
  • 44:12 - 44:15
    these various companies came together
  • 44:18 - 44:21
    which no-one can interpret or understand.
  • 44:21 - 44:24
    to turn their minds to higher things.
  • 44:24 - 44:28
    to form the United Dutch East India
    Chartered Company,
  • 44:34 - 44:37
    Now, his ancestral stately home
    was thrown open
  • 44:41 - 44:45
    But there was just one problem
    with this brilliant idea.
  • 44:42 - 44:46
    or Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie
    for short.
  • 44:44 - 44:49
    For the first time in history,
    the world economy was truly united
  • 44:53 - 44:58
    lt seemed as if the insurance companies
    had been well and truly ''Scrugged''.
  • 44:54 - 44:59
    for throngs of bargain-hunters to bid
    for the silver, the wine, the china.
  • 44:55 - 44:59
    And, whether money
    takes the form of silver coins,
  • 45:00 - 45:02
    And this is its originaI charter,
  • 45:08 - 45:12
    by a combination of low trade
    and high finance.
  • 45:12 - 45:15
    seashells, bars of gold or bank notes,
  • 45:14 - 45:19
    which speIIs out that the company
    was to enjoy a monopoIy on aII trade
  • 45:15 - 45:21
    One of America's biggest insurers settled
    hundreds of cases brought by Scruggs
  • 45:28 - 45:33
    that's been true from ancient times
    right down to the present day.
  • 45:28 - 45:31
    Today, Stowe is a private boarding school.
  • 45:29 - 45:32
    Yet this first era
    of financial globalisation
  • 45:34 - 45:39
    from the Cape of Good Hope aII the way
    east to the Straits of MageIIan.
  • 45:37 - 45:43
    There was a limit to how many more or less
    unproductive wars could be waged.
  • 45:42 - 45:46
    on behalf of clients whose claims
    had been turned down.
  • 45:44 - 45:50
    was to be brought to a violent halt by
    the world's first truly global conflict.
  • 45:48 - 45:52
    Even lumps of clay
    can work better than silver coins,
  • 45:58 - 45:59
    Pretty much haIf the worId.
  • 46:04 - 46:05
    THUNDER RUMBLES
  • 46:06 - 46:12
    The larger the debts of the ltalian cities
    became, the more bonds they had to issue,
  • 46:06 - 46:09
    if people have enough confidence in them.
  • 46:13 - 46:16
    The structure of the new entity was novel.
  • 46:14 - 46:17
    But in this bitter, high-stakes battle,
  • 46:16 - 46:20
    lt's a poignant symbol
    of the transience of landed wealth.
  • 46:21 - 46:24
    In Ancient Mesopotamia,
    nearIy 4,000 years ago,
  • 46:28 - 46:31
    the insurance companies
    had the last laugh.
  • 46:30 - 46:33
    The capital of the company
    was divided unequally
  • 46:32 - 46:38
    and the more bonds were issued, the less
    valuable they looked to investors.
  • 46:43 - 46:46
    peopIe used cIay tabIets Iike these ones
  • 46:46 - 46:48
    between all the major Dutch cities.
  • 46:46 - 46:51
    After winning the case, Scruggs was
    convicted and sentenced to five years
  • 46:51 - 46:54
    ln the modern world, it turned out,
  • 46:52 - 46:56
    On June 28th, 1 91 4,
    the heir to the Austrian throne,
  • 46:55 - 46:59
    to commit themseIves to particuIar
    financiaI transactions.
  • 46:59 - 47:04
    Citizens were invited to participate
    in the new venture by investing.
  • 47:02 - 47:07
    a regular job and a steady income
    mattered more than an inherited title -
  • 47:11 - 47:17
    for attempting to bribe a judge and
    influence the distribution of legal fees.
  • 47:13 - 47:17
    For exampIe, this one,
    found a IittIe south-west of Baghdad,
  • 47:17 - 47:21
    And that was exactly
    the sequence of events in Venice.
  • 47:18 - 47:20
    the Archduke Franz Ferdinand,
  • 47:22 - 47:27
    lt was the form of this investment
    that was the real novelty.
  • 47:29 - 47:33
    was assassinated
    in the Bosnian capital, Sarajevo.
  • 47:32 - 47:34
    no matter how many acres you owned.
  • 47:38 - 47:43
    specifies that a debtor wiII repay
    a Iender 330 measures of grain
  • 47:42 - 47:43
    By the early 1 6th century,
  • 47:49 - 47:52
    lnitially, financial markets
    shrugged off the news
  • 47:54 - 47:58
    the city had suffered
    a series of military reverses,
  • 47:57 - 48:02
    And the big insurance companies responded
    to the weight of post-Katrina claims
  • 47:59 - 48:03
    Divorced by his Iong-suffering
    and much-betrayed Scottish wife,
  • 48:01 - 48:06
    This rather wonderfuI painting is
    of the famiIy of one of the founders
  • 48:05 - 48:08
    as just another bout of Balkan bloodshed.
  • 48:09 - 48:13
    on the harvest day.
    But this one's even more fascinating,
  • 48:16 - 48:20
    and the value of Venetian bonds
    had taken a hammering.
  • 48:21 - 48:27
    by, in effect, declaring parts of the
    Gulf Coast a no-home-insurance zone.
  • 48:21 - 48:26
    whose entire wardrobe had been seized
    by Sheriffs Officers in London,
  • 48:23 - 48:26
    of the Dutch East India Company,
    Dirck Bas.
  • 48:30 - 48:34
    because what is says is that
    a debt of four measures of barIey
  • 48:34 - 48:36
    ln reality, the assassination
  • 48:41 - 48:45
    For 6,000 guiIders,
    he and 16 other so-caIIed ''participants'',
  • 48:44 - 48:47
    the Duke was finaIIy forced
    to reIinquish Stowe
  • 48:48 - 48:52
    had sparked off a chain reaction
    in the world's financial markets.
  • 48:49 - 48:53
    shouId be repaid
    to the bearer of the cIay tabIet
  • 49:01 - 49:05
    Today, as Councillor Joey DiFatta
    has found out,
  • 49:01 - 49:04
    and move into rented accommodation.
  • 49:05 - 49:08
    became the firm's managing directors,
    the bewindhebber.
  • 49:06 - 49:11
    and it's that idea of repayment
    to the bearer that reaIIy fascinates me.
  • 49:07 - 49:09
    At their nadir between 1509 and 1529,
  • 49:11 - 49:16
    As investors belatedly grasped the
    likelihood of a full-scale European war,
  • 49:14 - 49:17
    He eked out his days
    at his cIub, the CarIton,
  • 49:20 - 49:25
    insuring a house in this part of
    New Orleans is virtually impossible.
  • 49:24 - 49:29
    After 1606, however, anyone who put
    his money into the East India Company
  • 49:25 - 49:31
    Venetian Monte Nuovo bonds were trading
    at just 10% of their face vaIue.
  • 49:32 - 49:35
    writing a succession
    of highIy unreIiabIe memoirs
  • 49:36 - 49:40
    liquidity - the ability to borrow
    money or sell assets -
  • 49:47 - 49:51
    received an ''aktie'' -
    IiteraIIy an ''action'',
  • 49:48 - 49:52
    and incorrigibIy chasing actresses
    and other men's wives.
  • 49:49 - 49:53
    - They can't get a mortgage either?
    - (Joey DiFatta) That is correct.
  • 49:51 - 49:54
    lf the phrase sounds familiar,
    then it should.
  • 49:53 - 49:58
    was sucked out of the world economy as if
    the bottom had dropped out of a bath.
  • 49:56 - 50:00
    Now, if you buy a bond when war is raging,
    you're taking a risk -
  • 50:03 - 50:06
    or as we wouId say,
    ''a piece of the action'' -
  • 50:04 - 50:08
    They have to make a choice.
    Do I buiId a house here?
  • 50:09 - 50:11
    Just take a look at a Ł20 note.
  • 50:13 - 50:18
    The fall of the Duke of Buckingham
    was a kind of harbinger
  • 50:15 - 50:18
    a share in the company's future profits.
  • 50:18 - 50:23
    Or do I reIocate to an area where
    insurance may be a IittIe cheaper
  • 50:20 - 50:26
    the risk that the city won't pay you back
    or pay your interest. On the other hand,
  • 50:28 - 50:32
    And here it is, the worId's
    very first share certificate,
  • 50:30 - 50:35
    for a new democratic age in which
    every adult would be given the vote
  • 50:37 - 50:41
    The resulting disruption
    to international finance
  • 50:38 - 50:39
    and I can afford it?
  • 50:38 - 50:41
    Bank notes have next
    to no intrinsic worth.
  • 50:44 - 50:49
    remember that the interest is paid
    on the face vaIue of the bond,
  • 50:45 - 50:49
    issued by the worId's
    very first muItinationaI company.
  • 50:46 - 50:50
    That is hurting our community,
    it's taking our peopIe away,
  • 50:53 - 50:55
    They're simply promises to pay,
  • 50:53 - 50:55
    shattered globalisation.
  • 50:55 - 51:00
    whether they owned a stately home
    or paid rent for a humble flat.
  • 51:02 - 51:06
    the nucIeus of this parish,
    and puIIing them away.
  • 51:03 - 51:07
    so if you can buy it
    at just 10% of its face vaIue,
  • 51:05 - 51:10
    just like the clay tablets of
    ancient Babylon four millennia ago.
  • 51:07 - 51:10
    AImost exactIy four centuries ago.
  • 51:17 - 51:21
    As aristocratic fortunes
    from agriculture declined,
  • 51:18 - 51:18
    SHIP HORN
  • 51:19 - 51:23
    you're earning a handsome return
    of maybe 50%.
  • 51:24 - 51:29
    It's absoIuteIy fascinating to foIIow
    the outbreak of the First WorId War
  • 51:29 - 51:33
    On the back of the $1 0 bill
    it says, ''ln God We Trust''.
  • 51:31 - 51:34
    Three years after disaster struck,
  • 51:37 - 51:39
    so the franchise was widened.
  • 51:40 - 51:43
    And that is how the bond market works.
  • 51:43 - 51:47
    St Bernard Parish has only a third
    of its pre-Katrina population.
  • 51:45 - 51:48
    through the financiaI pages
    of the London Times.
  • 51:48 - 51:52
    Three years later,
    Bas and his fellow directors declared
  • 51:51 - 51:56
    Yet the advent of universaI suffrage
    didn't mean that property ownership
  • 51:53 - 51:58
    In a sense, you get return
    for the risk you're prepared to take.
  • 51:59 - 52:03
    It wasn't untiI JuIy 22nd, 191 4,
    that anybody appreciated
  • 52:04 - 52:10
    that any shareholders who wanted their
    cash back could not have it refunded,
  • 52:06 - 52:10
    But it's not really God
    you're trusting in.
  • 52:14 - 52:15
    had become universaI.
  • 52:14 - 52:17
    At the same time, it's the bond market
  • 52:22 - 52:25
    On the contrary, as recentIy as 1938,
  • 52:25 - 52:30
    By swapping your goods or your Iabour
    for a fistfuI of these things,
  • 52:27 - 52:30
    that sets interest rates
    for the economy as a whoIe.
  • 52:30 - 52:34
    but would have to sell their shares
    to another investor.
  • 52:30 - 52:31
    THUNDER RUMBLES
  • 52:30 - 52:35
    that the assassination of the
    Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo,
  • 52:39 - 52:44
    Iess than a third of the UK housing stock
    was in the hands of owner-occupiers.
  • 52:42 - 52:47
    If the state has in effect to pay 50%,
    then so do aII the other borrowers.
  • 52:42 - 52:44
    Of course, life has always been dangerous.
  • 52:46 - 52:51
    you're trusting the US Treasury Secretary
    not to repeat Spain's mistake
  • 52:51 - 52:55
    three weeks before, might have
    some financiaI repercussions.
  • 52:57 - 53:00
    The real lesson of Katrina,
    or any big disaster,
  • 53:02 - 53:06
    Overnight, a market for
    the company's shares was born -
  • 53:06 - 53:08
    It was on the other side of the AtIantic
  • 53:09 - 53:15
    and produce so many of the damn things
    that by the time you come to spend them,
  • 53:12 - 53:16
    Just ten days Iater,
    on August 1st, 191 4,
  • 53:19 - 53:23
    that the first true property-owning
    democracy wouId emerge.
  • 53:19 - 53:23
    is that even when we think
    we're protected against risk,
  • 53:24 - 53:27
    the worId's first true stock market.
  • 53:27 - 53:32
    The bond market had been invented
    to help pay for ltaly's wars.
  • 53:28 - 53:33
    they're worth even Iess
    than the paper they're printed on.
  • 53:31 - 53:35
    the Times had to report the cIosure
    of the Stock Exchange,
  • 53:36 - 53:38
    sometimes it turns out we're not.
  • 53:40 - 53:45
    And it wouId emerge from
    the biggest financiaI crisis ever seen.
  • 53:47 - 53:51
    But now it was setting interest rates
    for everyone.
  • 53:50 - 53:53
    and cIosed it remained
    untiI January 4th, 1915.
  • 53:51 - 53:55
    This invention was to change
    the face of finance for ever,
  • 53:55 - 53:58
    Even making quite modest insurance claims
  • 54:07 - 54:09
    lts rise to power had begun.
  • 54:10 - 54:13
    can seem more trouble than it's worth.
  • 54:11 - 54:15
    Why were investors so seemingIy
    obIivious to Armageddon
  • 54:11 - 54:16
    because it created a mechanism whereby
    the price of shares was determined
  • 54:27 - 54:30
    lt leaves you wondering why we bother
  • 54:32 - 54:37
    Over the next two centuries,
    bonds would come to rule the world.
  • 54:33 - 54:36
    just days before
    the outbreak of worId war?
  • 54:35 - 54:38
    by the laws of supply and demand,
    sellers and buyers.
  • 54:36 - 54:39
    Today we're quite happy with paper money.
  • 54:40 - 54:43
    spending so much
    on insurance policies every year.
  • 54:49 - 54:54
    WeII, the answer is that a combination
    of financiaI innovation
  • 54:57 - 54:59
    Where did this strange habit come from?
  • 55:02 - 55:07
    And as the renegade Scotsman
    John Law couldn't help but notice,
  • 55:08 - 55:12
    and gIobaI integration had made
    the worId seem reassuringIy safe.
  • 55:14 - 55:19
    Even more amazingly, we're happy
    with money we can't even see.
  • 55:22 - 55:27
    Saving up for the proverbiaI rainy day
    is the first principIe of insurance,
  • 55:22 - 55:25
    the trading of these company stocks
  • 55:34 - 55:38
    was making the world's
    first shareholders very rich indeed.
  • 55:37 - 55:41
    Millions of dollars pass through
    this woman's hands every day...
  • 55:38 - 55:40
    An EngIishman's home is his castIe
  • 55:45 - 55:48
    This house was built
    by the financial dynasty
  • 55:45 - 55:49
    but the trick is knowing
    what to do with your savings
  • 55:48 - 55:52
    The lights in financial markets
    were flashing green, not red,
  • 55:51 - 55:55
    and Americans know that
    there's no pIace Iike home too,
  • 56:00 - 56:03
    that helped decide
    the Battle of Waterloo -
  • 56:01 - 56:04
    so that, unIike in New OrIeans
    after Katrina,
  • 56:08 - 56:11
    even if aII the homes are rather simiIar.
  • 56:10 - 56:12
    until the very eve of destruction.
  • 56:13 - 56:16
    ..or rather, across her computer screen.
  • 56:14 - 56:18
    they're in the kitty
    when you reaIIy need them.
  • 56:15 - 56:20
    the dynasty that produced the man
    they called the Bonaparte of finance,
  • 56:26 - 56:29
    There may be a lesson
    here for our time, too.
  • 56:27 - 56:31
    But to do that, you need to be
    more than usuaIIy canny,
  • 56:29 - 56:34
    Today we take the universal right
    to own our own home for granted.
  • 56:39 - 56:41
    She's a foreign exchange dealer,
  • 56:39 - 56:43
    the emperor
    of the 1 9th-century bond market.
  • 56:44 - 56:48
    Financial globalisation mark one
    took a generation to engineer.
  • 56:45 - 56:47
    and that gives us a vaIuabIe cIue
  • 56:53 - 56:57
    whose business is literally
    buying and selling money.
  • 56:55 - 56:59
    as to where the history
    of modern insurance has its origins.
  • 57:06 - 57:07
    But before the 1 930s,
  • 57:08 - 57:11
    Each day around $3 trillion changes hands
  • 57:11 - 57:14
    ''He is master of unbounded wealth,
  • 57:13 - 57:16
    Where eIse but in bonny, canny ScotIand?
  • 57:14 - 57:19
    no more than two-fifths of American
    households were owner-occupiers.
  • 57:16 - 57:19
    But it was blown apart
    in a matter of days.
  • 57:19 - 57:24
    By 1 61 0, the world's first joint stock
    company, the Dutch East lndia Company,
  • 57:25 - 57:28
    ''he boasts that he is the arbiter
    of peace and war,
  • 57:29 - 57:32
    in transactions like these
    around the world.
  • 57:30 - 57:35
    And it would take more than a generation
    to repair the damage done
  • 57:36 - 57:36
    BELL TOLLS
  • 57:43 - 57:46
    ''and that the credit of nations
    depends upon his nod.
  • 57:48 - 57:50
    was ready to conquer the world.
  • 57:52 - 57:54
    by the guns of August 1 91 4.
  • 57:55 - 57:57
    lf the old class system,
  • 57:58 - 58:04
    And it's all built on trust. lt has to be
    when you can't even touch the stuff.
  • 58:00 - 58:06
    lt had a new charter, new shareholders
    and a burgeoning trade in these shares.
  • 58:01 - 58:04
    ''Ministers of state are in his pay. ''
  • 58:07 - 58:11
    based on elite property-ownership
    was distinctively British,
  • 58:20 - 58:23
    They say the Scots
    are a pessimistic people.
  • 58:27 - 58:31
    the revolution that created
    a new property-owning democracy
  • 58:40 - 58:44
    Maybe it's the weather -
    all those hundreds of rainy days.
  • 58:40 - 58:43
    That's what the Conquistadores got wrong.
  • 58:43 - 58:45
    But it had to fight to survive,
  • 58:47 - 58:51
    was born out of a great
    American financial crisis.
  • 58:49 - 58:54
    The First World War had put an end
    to the first age of globalisation.
  • 58:50 - 58:56
    Those words, spoken in 1 828 by the Radical
    Member of Parliament Thomas Duncombe,
  • 58:58 - 58:58
    literally.
  • 59:00 - 59:04
    They failed to see that money
    is about trust - even faith.
  • 59:02 - 59:06
    Maybe it's the endless years
    of sporting disappointment.
  • 59:14 - 59:18
    Until the late 1 960s,
    international finance slumbered.
  • 59:18 - 59:22
    were describing Nathan Rothschild,
    bond trader extraordinaire
  • 59:20 - 59:25
    Or maybe it was the Calvinism we picked up
    at the time of the Reformation.
  • 59:21 - 59:24
    Trust in the person paying you the money,
  • 59:29 - 59:33
    When the Depression struck in 1 929,
    the US economy nose-dived.
  • 59:32 - 59:37
    Having established a string of factories
    and warehouses across South Asia
  • 59:32 - 59:35
    trust in the centraI bank
    issuing the money,
  • 59:40 - 59:46
    and founder of the London branch of what
    became the biggest bank in the world.
  • 59:44 - 59:46
    Some even considered it dead.
  • 59:45 - 59:48
    trust in the commerciaI bank
    that honours the cheque.
  • 59:52 - 59:57
    from Java to lndia, the company
    had to struggle to keep the Spaniards
  • 59:54 - 59:57
    Certainly, it's two
    Church of Scotland ministers
  • 59:56 - 60:00
    The minority of people
    who did own their own homes
  • 60:00 - 60:02
    Money isn't metaI. It's trust inscribed.
  • 60:04 - 60:07
    ln 1 944,
    the soon-to-be-victorious Allies
  • 60:08 - 60:12
    The bond market made the Rothschilds
    stupendously rich -
  • 60:10 - 60:15
    who deserve the credit for inventing
    the first true insurance fund,
  • 60:12 - 60:15
    couldn't afford the mortgage payments.
  • 60:13 - 60:16
    and their English competitors at bay.
  • 60:16 - 60:21
    And it doesn't much matter what
    it's inscribed on - paper, siIver, cIay,
  • 60:25 - 60:29
    gathered to devise a new financial
    architecture for the world.
  • 60:26 - 60:32
    Tenants too struggled to pay the rent
    when all they had coming in was the dole.
  • 60:29 - 60:33
    With 40 warships and a private army
    of 1 0,000 soldiers,
  • 60:30 - 60:35
    so rich that they could afford to build
    41 stately homes all over Europe.
  • 60:33 - 60:34
    back in 1 7 44,
  • 60:41 - 60:45
    or a screen -
    provided the recipient beIieves in it.
  • 60:44 - 60:47
    and fathering
    a multi-billion-pound industry.
  • 60:48 - 60:53
    the directors of the East lndia Company
    were the original corporate raiders.
  • 60:48 - 60:50
    Trade wouId be free,
  • 60:56 - 61:00
    but capitaI movements wouId be
    subject to tight reguIation.
  • 61:01 - 61:06
    Nowhere were the effects of the Depression
    more painful than in Detroit.
  • 61:01 - 61:05
    This is number 29 -
    Waddesdon Manor in Buckinghamshire,
  • 61:15 - 61:18
    When money did fIow
    across nationaI borders,
  • 61:24 - 61:28
    which has been restored
    in all its gilded glory
  • 61:30 - 61:33
    it wouId go from government
    to government.
  • 61:35 - 61:38
    There was one huge possibility created
  • 61:41 - 61:46
    The Kirkyard of Greyfriars
    is best known for the grave-robbers,
  • 61:43 - 61:45
    Soon the automobile industry here
  • 61:45 - 61:49
    by Jacob Rothschild,
    Nathan's great-great-great-grandson.
  • 61:48 - 61:52
    by the emergence of money
    as a system of mutual trust -
  • 61:49 - 61:51
    For the Dutch East India Company,
  • 61:53 - 61:57
    employed only half the number
    of workers it had in 1 929,
  • 62:01 - 62:04
    firepower and foreign trade
    went hand in hand.
  • 62:04 - 62:08
    the Resurrection Men, who came here
    in the late 1 8th century
  • 62:09 - 62:13
    a possibility that would
    revolutionise world history.
  • 62:13 - 62:15
    and at half the wages.
  • 62:16 - 62:20
    This new financial order
    was to have two guardian sisters,
  • 62:17 - 62:19
    WeII, he was short, fat,
  • 62:19 - 62:23
    But the key to the company's success
    wasn't just its cannons
  • 62:23 - 62:27
    to supply the Medical School
    at Edinburgh University
  • 62:31 - 62:35
    By 1 932, the dispossessed of Detroit
    had had enough.
  • 62:31 - 62:33
    established here in Washington DC -
  • 62:32 - 62:34
    obsessive, extremeIy cIever,
  • 62:38 - 62:43
    lt was the idea that you could rely on
    people to borrow money from you
  • 62:39 - 62:41
    with corpses for dissection.
  • 62:39 - 62:43
    Iike these ones aboard The Batavia,
    the pride of its fIeet.
  • 62:50 - 62:52
    the lnternational Monetary Fund
  • 62:56 - 62:57
    whoIIy focused.
  • 62:57 - 63:02
    Like aII big companies, it was abIe
    to combine economies of scaIe
  • 63:00 - 63:02
    But Greyfriars' lasting importance
  • 63:04 - 63:08
    and the lnternational Bank for
    Reconstruction and Development,
  • 63:05 - 63:11
    I can't imagine he wouId have been a very
    pIeasant person to have had deaIings with.
  • 63:06 - 63:09
    and pay it back at some future date.
  • 63:13 - 63:17
    comes from the work of the minister
    here, Robert Wallace,
  • 63:17 - 63:19
    with reduced transaction costs
  • 63:20 - 63:22
    later known as the World Bank.
  • 63:20 - 63:25
    On March 7th, 5,000 workers
    laid off by the Ford Motor Company
  • 63:28 - 63:34
    That's why the root of ''credit''
    is ''credo'', the Latin for ''I beIieve''.
  • 63:30 - 63:33
    and what economists caII
    ''network externaIities'' -
  • 63:31 - 63:34
    and his friend, Alexander Webster.
  • 63:45 - 63:50
    the abiIity to pooI information between
    muItipIe empIoyees and agents.
  • 63:49 - 63:53
    marched to the factory
    to demand unemployment relief.
  • 63:56 - 64:01
    By the 1 97 0s, however, vast sums
    of money were being accumulated
  • 64:00 - 64:03
    It's somehow appropriate
    that it was Scottish ministers
  • 64:03 - 64:09
    Between around 1 81 0 and 1 836, the five
    sons of Mayer Amschel Rothschild
  • 64:07 - 64:12
    The Batavia was part man-of-war,
    part muItinationaI corporation.
  • 64:16 - 64:18
    Without the invention of credit,
  • 64:17 - 64:19
    who invented modern insurance.
  • 64:19 - 64:23
    What followed would force Americans
    to completely rethink
  • 64:23 - 64:25
    by the oil exporters of the Middle East.
  • 64:25 - 64:30
    the entire economic history of our world
    would have been impossible.
  • 64:27 - 64:32
    After aII, we tend to think of them as
    the embodiment of prudence and thrift,
  • 64:31 - 64:36
    rose from the obscurity of
    the Frankfurt ghetto to attain a position
  • 64:34 - 64:38
    With Western bankers desperate
    to reinvest the money as loans,
  • 64:44 - 64:46
    their attitude to property ownership.
  • 64:54 - 64:59
    weighed down with an anticipation
    of impending divine retribution
  • 64:55 - 64:58
    The big networked company
    was simply more efficient.
  • 64:57 - 65:00
    of unequalled power
    in international finance.
  • 65:00 - 65:03
    the guardian sisters relaxed their grip.
  • 65:16 - 65:19
    That was why, by the 1 620s,
  • 65:17 - 65:19
    for every tiny transgression.
  • 65:17 - 65:19
    Financial globalisation was reborn.
  • 65:27 - 65:31
    But, in fact, Robert WaIIace
    was a hard drinker,
  • 65:29 - 65:35
    it had established a virtual monopoly
    on spice exports from Asia to Europe.
  • 65:31 - 65:33
    lt was the third son, Nathan,
  • 65:31 - 65:33
    As the unarmed crowd reached Gate 4
  • 65:37 - 65:40
    Because we take it for granted,
  • 65:41 - 65:44
    who orchestrated
    this family triumph from London.
  • 65:43 - 65:46
    of the company's River Rouge
    plant in Dearborn,
  • 65:49 - 65:51
    as weII as a mathematicaI prodigy,
  • 65:53 - 65:59
    we tend to underestimate the extent to
    which our entire civiIisation is based on
  • 65:54 - 65:58
    The region where the bankers
    chose to lend the petrodollars
  • 65:56 - 66:02
    The world's first multinational was making
    its shareholders enormously wealthy.
  • 65:59 - 66:00
    scuffles broke out.
  • 66:00 - 66:04
    who Iiked nothing better than
    knocking back magnums of cIaret
  • 66:02 - 66:06
    Evelyn de Rothschild
    is Nathan's great-great-grandson.
  • 66:10 - 66:12
    Suddenly, the factory gates opened
  • 66:14 - 66:16
    seemed to promise the best returns.
  • 66:15 - 66:21
    the borrowing and Iending of money. No, it
    doesn't IiteraIIy make the worId go round.
  • 66:17 - 66:18
    with his bibuIous buddies.
  • 66:19 - 66:22
    He recently retired
    as chairman of Rothschild's -
  • 66:22 - 66:26
    and a phalanx of police
    and security men rushed out
  • 66:25 - 66:28
    Not for the first time
    in financial history,
  • 66:31 - 66:35
    I'm Iooking here
    at the originaI sharehoIders' register
  • 66:35 - 66:37
    the bank that Nathan built.
  • 66:37 - 66:39
    Wallace and Webster were unhappy
  • 66:37 - 66:39
    and fired into the crowd.
  • 66:40 - 66:44
    But it does makes vast quantities
    of peopIe, goods and services
  • 66:40 - 66:43
    it also posed the biggest risks.
  • 66:45 - 66:47
    He was very ambitious
  • 66:47 - 66:49
    of the Dutch East India Company,
  • 66:47 - 66:47
    GUNSHOTS
  • 66:48 - 66:52
    at the way the widows and children
    of their fellow clergymen
  • 66:54 - 66:56
    and he moved to London.
  • 66:56 - 66:59
    and IiteraIIy every name in here
    was a winner.
  • 67:00 - 67:03
    go around the worId
    from BabyIon to BoIivia.
  • 67:02 - 67:06
    I think he was determined.
    I don't think he suffered fooIs IightIy.
  • 67:04 - 67:09
    ln seven years, Latin America
    quadrupled its borrowings from foreigners
  • 67:07 - 67:10
    were treated when the Grim Reaper struck.
  • 67:09 - 67:14
    If you'd put 1 ,000 guiIders
    into the company at its very inception,
  • 67:20 - 67:22
    Maybe that's a famiIy trait.
  • 67:27 - 67:29
    to more than $31 5 billion.
  • 67:28 - 67:32
    by 1 736, your investment
    wouId have been worth 7,000.
  • 67:29 - 67:32
    They often found themselves
    homeless and penniless.
  • 67:30 - 67:35
    The puzzle is that the early moneylenders
    got so little thanks for their services.
  • 67:31 - 67:33
    Five workers were killed.
  • 67:41 - 67:47
    This is one of the few surviving Ietters
    from Nathan RothschiId to his brothers
  • 67:45 - 67:46
    Then, in 1 982,
  • 67:53 - 67:58
    Days later, 60,000 people sang
    The lnternationale at their funeral.
  • 67:56 - 68:00
    On the contrary,
    they were widely reviled as pariahs.
  • 67:58 - 68:02
    Mexico declared that it would
    no longer be able to service its debt.
  • 68:02 - 68:07
    Over its entire Iifetime, the company
    paid an average annuaI dividend of 16.5%.
  • 68:02 - 68:06
    The plan Wallace and Webster
    came up with was ingenious -
  • 68:02 - 68:05
    written, as aIways, in Judendeutsch -
  • 68:16 - 68:19
    that was German transIiterated
    into Hebrew characters -
  • 68:23 - 68:26
    the first true insurance fund in history.
  • 68:23 - 68:28
    Soon, the entire continent teetered
    on the verge of bankruptcy.
  • 68:28 - 68:29
    Why was that?
  • 68:32 - 68:37
    and it gives you an idea of what
    an extraordinary work ethic the man had
  • 68:34 - 68:38
    VirtuaIIy aII its profits were paid back
    to the sharehoIders.
  • 68:52 - 68:57
    and how he tried to impose it on his poor,
    Iong-suffering brothers.
  • 68:56 - 68:59
    The Communist Party newspaper
    accused Edsel Ford,
  • 69:02 - 69:07
    These are some of the voIuminous
    caIcuIations that Robert WaIIace did,
  • 69:08 - 69:14
    But the days had gone when investors
    could confidently expect their governments
  • 69:11 - 69:14
    Dirck Bas's original shareholding
    of 6,000 guilders
  • 69:12 - 69:13
    Just Iisten to this.
  • 69:12 - 69:16
    son of the firm's founder, Henry,
    of allowing a massacre.
  • 69:21 - 69:27
    ''Dear AmscheI, I am writing you my opinion
    because it's my damned duty to do so.
  • 69:21 - 69:24
    now housed at
    the NationaI Archives Of ScotIand.
  • 69:31 - 69:36
    to send a gunboat to get their money back
    when foreign borrowers misbehaved.
  • 69:31 - 69:34
    Welcome to Northern ltaly
    in the year 1 200AD.
  • 69:31 - 69:35
    had been transformed
    into a 500,000 guilder fortune.
  • 69:35 - 69:39
    You can see how he ran the numbers
    over and over again,
  • 69:52 - 69:56
    making very carefuI assumptions
    about the maximum number
  • 70:02 - 70:06
    ''I read your Ietters, not once,
    but often 100 times,
  • 70:04 - 70:05
    Could anything be done
  • 70:08 - 70:13
    Now responsibility for such debt crises
    fell on the lMF and the World Bank.
  • 70:08 - 70:12
    of widows and orphans
    that wouId have to be provided for.
  • 70:15 - 70:20
    to defuse what was beginning
    to seem like a revolutionary situation,
  • 70:18 - 70:21
    A land divided into multiple
    feuding city states.
  • 70:21 - 70:26
    ''because you can weII imagine
    that after dinner I don't read books,
  • 70:25 - 70:30
    The key point was that, from now on,
    ministers wouIdn't just pay money in
  • 70:33 - 70:38
    pitting the seriously propertied Fords
    against their property-less ex-employees?
  • 70:41 - 70:46
    To John Law, lying low in Amsterdam
    having escaped the gallows in London,
  • 70:44 - 70:48
    ''I don't pIay cards,
    I don't go to the theatre.
  • 70:48 - 70:52
    that wouId be paid out
    when one of their number died.
  • 70:54 - 70:56
    They didn't have gunboats.
  • 70:55 - 70:58
    A land where trust
    was in rather short supply.
  • 71:01 - 71:04
    ''My onIy pIeasure is my business.''
  • 71:03 - 71:08
    Rather, they wouId pay premiums
    that wouId be used to create a fund,
  • 71:05 - 71:10
    the workings of the Dutch East lndia
    Company came as a revelation.
  • 71:06 - 71:09
    ln a remarkable gesture of conciliation,
  • 71:07 - 71:09
    But in return for new loans,
  • 71:15 - 71:19
    they could insist that
    Latin American governments
  • 71:19 - 71:24
    Among the many remnants of the defunct
    Roman Empire was a numerical system
  • 71:21 - 71:25
    Edsel Ford turned to a Mexican artist
    named Diego Rivera.
  • 71:25 - 71:29
    and the fund wouId then be invested
    for profitabIe purposes.
  • 71:29 - 71:33
    adopt painful ''structural
    adjustment programmes'' -
  • 71:31 - 71:35
    Law was living off his winnings
    at the gambling table.
  • 71:36 - 71:37
    PHONES RING
  • 71:42 - 71:46
    He invited him to paint a mural
    that would show Detroit's economy
  • 71:42 - 71:48
    The widows and orphans, henceforth, wouId
    be paid out of the returns on that money,
  • 71:47 - 71:51
    But he was fascinated by the relationships
    between the company,
  • 71:49 - 71:53
    singularly ill-suited to complex
    mathematical calculation,
  • 71:52 - 71:56
    lt was this phenomenal drive,
    allied with innate financial genius,
  • 71:53 - 71:55
    impose fiscal discipline.
  • 72:03 - 72:06
    as a site of cooperation,
    not class conflict.
  • 72:04 - 72:09
    with its splendid offices in the
    Hoogstraat, the nearby stock exchange,
  • 72:08 - 72:10
    Ieaving the premiums to accumuIate.
  • 72:09 - 72:11
    let alone the needs of commerce.
  • 72:13 - 72:18
    To American economists, these
    programmes all made perfect sense.
  • 72:21 - 72:26
    that propelled Nathan from obscurity
    to mastery of the London bond market.
  • 72:28 - 72:34
    where dealers busily traded the company
    shares, and the Bank of Amsterdam.
  • 72:30 - 72:34
    Nowhere was this more of a handicap
    than in Pisa,
  • 72:44 - 72:45
    But not everyone agreed.
  • 72:46 - 72:49
    Diego Rivera was a IifeIong Communist.
  • 72:47 - 72:50
    All that was required
    for the scheme to work
  • 72:47 - 72:50
    where merchants struggled to do business
  • 72:52 - 72:54
    Once again, however,
  • 72:57 - 73:01
    with seven different forms of coinage
    in circulation.
  • 73:00 - 73:04
    was an accurate projection
    of how many widows and orphans
  • 73:02 - 73:08
    His ideaI was of a society in which
    there wouId be no private property,
  • 73:03 - 73:07
    the opportunity for
    a financial breakthrough came from war.
  • 73:11 - 73:14
    To the increasingly vocal
    critics of global finance,
  • 73:15 - 73:20
    Yet this Dutch financial system
    struck Law as not quite complete.
  • 73:16 - 73:21
    Even the simplest transaction could be a
    headache, requiring the use of an abacus.
  • 73:18 - 73:20
    there would likely be in the future.
  • 73:23 - 73:27
    in which the means of production
    wouId be commonIy owned.
  • 73:29 - 73:34
    A calculation which Wallace and Webster
    made with extraordinary precision.
  • 73:33 - 73:36
    the two guardian sisters
    of the post-war order
  • 73:40 - 73:43
    By comparison, economic life
    in the Eastern world -
  • 73:40 - 73:44
    In his eyes, Ford's River Rouge pIant
    was the very opposite,
  • 73:44 - 73:50
    To Law's financiaIIy supercharged mind,
    the Dutch were missing a trick, or two.
  • 73:45 - 73:48
    were being transformed
    into economic hit men.
  • 73:58 - 74:03
    in the Muslim caliphate or the Sung
    Chinese Empire - was far more advanced.
  • 74:01 - 74:05
    a capitaIist society
    in which the workers worked
  • 74:10 - 74:13
    For one thing, it seemed compIeteIy nuts
  • 74:11 - 74:16
    They were holding a financial gun to
    the heads of Third World governments...
  • 74:15 - 74:21
    On the morning of June 1 8th, 1 81 5,
    67,000 British, Dutch and German troops
  • 74:19 - 74:23
    and the property owners, who reaped
    the rewards of their efforts,
  • 74:20 - 74:24
    The creation of
    the Scottish Ministers' Widows' Fund
  • 74:22 - 74:25
    to restrict the number
    of East India Company shares
  • 74:27 - 74:31
    To discover modern finance,
    backward Europe needed to import it.
  • 74:35 - 74:38
    was a milestone in financial history,
  • 74:36 - 74:40
    when the markets
    were so cIearIy enamoured of them.
  • 74:37 - 74:38
    mereIy watched.
  • 74:44 - 74:49
    ..propping up dictators and furthering
    the interests of Yankee imperialism.
  • 74:51 - 74:56
    under the Duke of Wellington's command
    looked out across the fields of Waterloo,
  • 74:51 - 74:55
    for it provided a model
    not just for Scottish clergymen,
  • 74:53 - 74:58
    Law was also puzzled by the conservatism
    of the Bank of Amsterdam.
  • 75:09 - 75:14
    Enter a young mathematician called
    Leonardo of Pisa or Fibonacci.
  • 75:12 - 75:16
    but for everyone who aspired
    to provide for life's eventualities.
  • 75:14 - 75:19
    lt had created an internal system which
    allowed merchants to settle their accounts
  • 75:15 - 75:20
    not far from Brussels, towards an almost
    equal number of French troops
  • 75:30 - 75:36
    When the murals were unveiled in 1 933,
    the city's dignitaries were appalled.
  • 75:35 - 75:39
    And woe betide those
    who resisted the hit men.
  • 75:36 - 75:40
    commanded by the French Emperor,
    Napoleon Bonaparte.
  • 75:40 - 75:45
    The son of a Pisan customs official
    based in what is now Algeria,
  • 75:41 - 75:43
    by direct cashless transfers,
  • 75:53 - 75:57
    but it hadn't issued
    any real banknotes to the public.
  • 75:56 - 76:01
    By 1815, the principIe of insurance
    was sufficientIy widespread
  • 76:01 - 76:04
    Fibonacci is best remembered today
  • 76:03 - 76:07
    Conspiracy theories flourished
    in the anti-globalisation movement.
  • 76:04 - 76:09
    They saw them as Communist propaganda,
    ''a travesty on the spirit of Detroit''.
  • 76:12 - 76:17
    The BattIe of WaterIoo was the cuImination
    of more than two decades
  • 76:13 - 76:17
    for his sequence of numbers
    that mimic the properties of nature.
  • 76:13 - 76:18
    The idea was aIready taking shape
    of a breathtaking modification
  • 76:19 - 76:23
    to be adopted for the widows
    of men who Iost their Iives
  • 76:26 - 76:30
    According to one popular theory,
    two Latin American leaders -
  • 76:31 - 76:34
    of intermittent confIict
    between Britain and France.
  • 76:36 - 76:41
    of the institutions that Law
    had first encountered here in Amsterdam.
  • 76:36 - 76:38
    fighting against NapoIeon.
  • 76:43 - 76:46
    The power of art is a wonderful thing.
  • 76:45 - 76:49
    Jaime Roldos of Ecuador
    and Omar Torrijos of Panama -
  • 76:45 - 76:50
    But the famous sequence was onIy one
    of many Eastern mathematicaI ideas
  • 76:46 - 76:50
    But it was more than just a battIe
    between two armies.
  • 76:47 - 76:52
    At the BattIe of WaterIoo, your chances
    of getting kiIIed were up to one in four,
  • 76:57 - 77:02
    But it was clearly going to take something
    rather more powerful than art
  • 77:01 - 77:06
    OnIy combine the properties of a monopoIy
    trading company and a pubIic bank
  • 77:04 - 77:08
    It was aIso a contest
    between rivaI financiaI systems.
  • 77:05 - 77:10
    were actually assassinated for resisting
    the demands of American imperialism.
  • 77:12 - 77:15
    but at Ieast if you'd taken out insurance,
  • 77:14 - 77:19
    that Fibonacci introduced to Europe with
    his path-breaking book the Liber Abaci -
  • 77:16 - 77:19
    to heal a society so deeply split
    by the Depression.
  • 77:20 - 77:25
    One, the French, based on pIunder.
    The other, the British, based on debt.
  • 77:24 - 77:28
    you had the consoIation of knowing
    your wife and chiIdren
  • 77:27 - 77:29
    and the sky reaIIy wouId be the Iimit.
  • 77:35 - 77:40
    And yet there's something about
    this story of a WorId Bank-IMF pIot
  • 77:38 - 77:40
    The Book of Calculation.
  • 77:40 - 77:43
    wouIdn't be thrown out onto the street.
  • 77:40 - 77:44
    Law was preparing to unIeash
    a whoIe new system of finance
  • 77:40 - 77:44
    Other countries turned to the extremes
    of totaIitarianism.
  • 77:46 - 77:52
    Even more important was his demonstration
    of the superiority of Arabic numerals
  • 77:50 - 77:54
    Gives a whoIe new meaning
    to the phrase ''take cover''.
  • 77:52 - 77:54
    To pay for the war,
  • 77:59 - 78:03
    But in the United States
    the answer was the New DeaI.
  • 77:59 - 78:04
    the British government had sold
    an unprecedented amount of bonds.
  • 78:00 - 78:02
    on an unsuspecting nation.
  • 78:01 - 78:05
    against Third WorId Ieaders
    that doesn't quite add up.
  • 78:13 - 78:14
    over Roman numerals.
  • 78:15 - 78:18
    And that incIuded
    a New DeaI on housing.
  • 78:18 - 78:23
    After aII, it's not as if the
    United States had Ient that much money
  • 78:22 - 78:26
    And crucially, nearly all Fibonacci's
    examples related to business.
  • 78:24 - 78:26
    According to a long-standing legend,
  • 78:29 - 78:32
    In radicaIIy increasing
    the number of Americans
  • 78:36 - 78:37
    to Ecuador and Panama.
  • 78:39 - 78:42
    the Rothschild family
    made their first millions
  • 78:44 - 78:46
    who couId hope to own their own homes,
  • 78:45 - 78:50
    In the 1970s, they accounted for just
    0.4% of totaI US grants and Ioans.
  • 78:46 - 78:49
    ln 1 7 1 6, John Law arrived in Paris.
  • 78:53 - 78:57
    by speculating on how the outcome
    of the Battle of Waterloo
  • 78:56 - 79:01
    the RooseveIt administration pioneered
    the idea of a property-owning democracy.
  • 78:58 - 79:03
    The Scottish ministers' fund grew into
    the world-famous Scottish Widows.
  • 79:07 - 79:11
    He had identified France
    as the ideal laboratory
  • 79:10 - 79:13
    would affect the price of these bonds.
  • 79:15 - 79:19
    Nor were they particuIarIy big
    customers for the United States.
  • 79:15 - 79:16
    Since Roman times,
  • 79:22 - 79:26
    Europeans had been struggling to do
    simple arithmetic with these...
  • 79:22 - 79:26
    It proved to be the perfect antidote
    to Red revoIution.
  • 79:28 - 79:32
    Even novelists, not renowned
    for their financial prudence,
  • 79:33 - 79:36
    Again, Iess than 0.4%
    of totaI US exports.
  • 79:36 - 79:41
    for what would be the biggest experiment
    in the history of the stock market.
  • 79:39 - 79:42
    lt was this legend
    of Jewish profiteering
  • 79:48 - 79:49
    could join.
  • 79:52 - 79:56
    Now, those just don't strike me
    as figures worth kiIIing for.
  • 79:54 - 79:58
    that, a century later,
    the Nazis did their best to embroider.
  • 79:55 - 79:58
    Walter Scott took out a policy in 1 826,
  • 80:00 - 80:03
    But why did the French
    give him his chance?
  • 80:13 - 80:18
    to reassure his creditors they'd be paid
    in the event of his death.
  • 80:15 - 80:18
    ln effect, the government
    would rig the housing market
  • 80:18 - 80:22
    The Hindu or Arabic numerals
    made all kinds of calculation easier.
  • 80:20 - 80:22
    To say the least,
  • 80:23 - 80:28
    ln 1 940 Josef Goebbels approved
    the release of this film, Die Rothschilds.
  • 80:28 - 80:32
    the idea of lMF-sponsored
    assassinations is a stretch.
  • 80:31 - 80:35
    to incentivise Americans
    to become property owners.
  • 80:42 - 80:47
    By the mid-1 9th century, being insured
    was as much a badge of respectability
  • 80:43 - 80:48
    The answer is that France's fiscal
    problems were exceptionally desperate.
  • 80:52 - 80:53
    HE SPEAKS GERMAN
  • 80:54 - 80:58
    Nevertheless, this new phase
    in the story of globalisation
  • 81:07 - 81:09
    as going to church on Sunday.
  • 81:08 - 81:13
    Customers at local mortgage lenders,
    known as savings and loans,
  • 81:09 - 81:13
    The country was saddled
    with enormous public debts
  • 81:13 - 81:19
    Nathan is seen bribing a French general to
    ensure the Duke of Wellington's victory,
  • 81:14 - 81:19
    did see the emergence of a new and
    more plausible kind of economic hit man,
  • 81:25 - 81:26
    BELL TOLLS
  • 81:27 - 81:31
    ln particular, Fibonacci showed how
    the new methods of calculation
  • 81:27 - 81:30
    the equivalent of
    British building societies,
  • 81:29 - 81:32
    as a result of the wars of Louis XlV.
  • 81:36 - 81:41
    and then deliberately misreporting
    the outcome of the battle in London.
  • 81:41 - 81:44
    would have their deposits guaranteed
    by the Government
  • 81:43 - 81:46
    armed with a financially
    lethal weapon - the hedge fund.
  • 81:46 - 81:48
    When the Sun King died in 1 7 1 5,
  • 81:56 - 82:01
    could be applied to commercial
    bookkeeping, to currency conversions
  • 81:57 - 81:58
    even if a bank went bust.
  • 81:57 - 82:01
    This triggers panic selling
    of British bonds,
  • 82:00 - 82:06
    the Duke of Orleans, who was acting as
    Regent for the under-age king Louis XV,
  • 82:10 - 82:13
    What no-one anticipated back in 1 7 44
  • 82:13 - 82:17
    which Nathan then snaps up
    at bargain-basement prices.
  • 82:15 - 82:18
    and, crucially,
    to the computation of interest.
  • 82:25 - 82:29
    Crucially, a new
    Federal Housing Administration was set up
  • 82:27 - 82:32
    faced a country on the brink of its third
    bankruptcy in less than a century.
  • 82:27 - 82:31
    The men who ran the hedge funds
    were far more intimidating
  • 82:28 - 82:32
    was that the careful calculations
    of two Scottish ministers
  • 82:36 - 82:41
    Just imagine trying to work out
    percentages in Roman numerals.
  • 82:47 - 82:52
    precisely because they didn't even need
    to threaten violence to get their way.
  • 82:48 - 82:52
    to offer larger, longer
    and lower-interest loans.
  • 82:49 - 82:52
    would grow into today's
    huge insurance industry.
  • 82:56 - 83:00
    Fibonacci's Liber Abaci
    made it child's play.
  • 83:04 - 83:06
    lt was the perfect opportunity for Law,
  • 83:10 - 83:15
    After the 1 930s, most mortgages
    in the United States were fixed
  • 83:12 - 83:15
    What happened here
    in 1 81 5 was altogether different.
  • 83:13 - 83:18
    And their distinctive contribution
    to globalisation was to speed it up.
  • 83:24 - 83:28
    the maverick self-taught economist
    who'd developed his theories
  • 83:28 - 83:30
    for 20 or 30 years.
  • 83:32 - 83:35
    As Robert WaIIace
    understood 250 years ago,
  • 83:36 - 83:40
    Whereas the World Bank lends money
    to countries for periods of years,
  • 83:37 - 83:41
    Far from making money
    from WeIIington's defeat of NapoIeon,
  • 83:38 - 83:42
    This was to be the appIication
    of mathematics to making money.
  • 83:42 - 83:46
    somewhere between the casino
    and the stock market.
  • 83:45 - 83:49
    A new Federal National Mortgage
    Association, nicknamed Fannie Mae,
  • 83:50 - 83:51
    size matters in insurance,
  • 83:55 - 83:58
    the RothschiIds
    were very nearIy ruined by it.
  • 83:57 - 84:01
    hedge funds are more likely
    to put their money in for just weeks,
  • 84:04 - 84:07
    because the more peopIe
    are paying into a fund
  • 84:10 - 84:14
    was set up to create
    a nationwide market for home loans.
  • 84:11 - 84:15
    Their fortune was made
    not by WaterIoo, but despite it.
  • 84:12 - 84:16
    Law's ambition was to revive
    economic confidence in France
  • 84:18 - 84:19
    or even days.
  • 84:19 - 84:22
    the easier it becomes,
    by the Iaw of averages,
  • 84:29 - 84:33
    (TV REPORTER) This coupIe
    is going through a modeI house now.
  • 84:30 - 84:33
    by estabIishing a bank
    on the Dutch modeI,
  • 84:32 - 84:36
    to predict how much wiII have to be
    paid out each year.
  • 84:35 - 84:38
    The grandmaster of
    the new economic hit men
  • 84:37 - 84:40
    The most fertile soil
    for such financial seeds
  • 84:38 - 84:40
    This is how it really happened.
  • 84:42 - 84:47
    but with the difference that this bank
    wouId issue paper money
  • 84:48 - 84:52
    AIthough no individuaI's date of death
    can be known in advance,
  • 84:50 - 84:54
    The husband, apparentIy,
    isn't very keen about it aII,
  • 84:53 - 84:56
    proved to be the ltalian city states.
  • 84:55 - 84:56
    was George Soros.
  • 84:59 - 85:05
    Selling bonds to the public had raised
    plenty of cash for the British government.
  • 85:00 - 85:02
    Iike this 100 Iivres note.
  • 85:02 - 85:06
    but his wife is entranced
    by such convenient features
  • 85:05 - 85:11
    actuaries can caIcuIate the IikeIy Iife
    expectancy of a Iarge group of individuaIs
  • 85:07 - 85:10
    Fibonacci's home town of Pisa was one.
  • 85:17 - 85:20
    as the sturdy buiIt-in ironing board.
  • 85:19 - 85:24
    A Hungarian Jew by birth, but educated
    in London and based in New York,
  • 85:21 - 85:23
    As money was invested in the bank,
  • 85:24 - 85:26
    But it was above all Venice -
  • 85:28 - 85:32
    But neither bonds nor bank notes
    were any use to Wellington.
  • 85:30 - 85:34
    the government's huge debt
    wouId be consoIidated.
  • 85:33 - 85:35
    with quite astonishing precision.
  • 85:33 - 85:36
    By reducing the monthly cost
    of a mortgage,
  • 85:36 - 85:41
    more exposed than any of the others
    to Oriental influences -
  • 85:45 - 85:50
    But at the same time, and this was
    the reaIIy important part of Law's system,
  • 85:48 - 85:52
    To provision his troops
    and pay Britain's allies against France
  • 85:50 - 85:53
    these reforms made
    home-ownership possible
  • 85:50 - 85:55
    Soros brought to global finance
    a brand-new theory of economic behaviour
  • 85:55 - 85:58
    that became the great money-lending
    laboratory...
  • 86:04 - 86:07
    for many more Americans than ever before.
  • 86:05 - 86:08
    he needed a currency
    that was universally acceptable.
  • 86:06 - 86:11
    paper money wouId revive French trade,
    and with it French economic power.
  • 86:13 - 86:16
    that underlined
    the fallibility of human nature
  • 86:15 - 86:18
    ln other words, insurance is all about
  • 86:17 - 86:22
    (TV REPORTER) They both wouId Iike
    to have this pIace for their very own.
  • 86:26 - 86:31
    Nathan Rothschild was given the job of
    taking the money raised on the bond market
  • 86:27 - 86:30
    and the instability of financial markets.
  • 86:31 - 86:34
    trying to cope
    with the risks of the future.
  • 86:34 - 86:36
    Too bad they can't afford it.
  • 86:38 - 86:42
    ..and the home of literature's
    most notorious moneylender -
  • 86:39 - 86:42
    Your actions wiII have
    unintended consequences,
  • 86:40 - 86:43
    The Royal Government gained doubly.
  • 86:45 - 86:47
    Ah! But maybe they can.
  • 86:48 - 86:51
    lf, that is, you're insured
    in the first place.
  • 86:55 - 86:58
    and delivering it to Wellington -
    as gold.
  • 86:57 - 87:00
    Consolidation simply meant
    that its onerous debts
  • 86:58 - 87:02
    For according to this sign,
    they can buy this house
  • 86:59 - 87:03
    Shylock, in William Shakespeare's
    The Merchant of Venice.
  • 87:04 - 87:08
    so the outcome wiII not correspond
    to your expectations.
  • 87:12 - 87:17
    with monthIy payments that are Iess
    than they now spend for rent!
  • 87:17 - 87:20
    were magically transformed
    into shares in Law's bank.
  • 87:21 - 87:26
    No matter how many private funds
    like Scottish Widows were set up,
  • 87:27 - 87:33
    The success of this operation would
    determine the fate of the warring empires
  • 87:28 - 87:32
    At the same time,
    the monarch gained the ability
  • 87:31 - 87:34
    And that is the way
    human affairs generaIIy work.
  • 87:40 - 87:43
    May you stead me? WiII you pIeasure me?
  • 87:41 - 87:46
    there were always going to be people
    beyond the reach of insurance,
  • 87:50 - 87:51
    and of all Europe.
  • 87:50 - 87:53
    to print as much money as he liked.
  • 88:00 - 88:02
    ShaII I know your answer?
  • 88:01 - 88:06
    who were either too poor or too feckless
    to save for that rainy day.
  • 88:04 - 88:08
    lt's not too much to say
    that the modern United States,
  • 88:11 - 88:16
    As Law wrote - ''l maintain that an
    absolute prince who knows how to govern
  • 88:18 - 88:23
    This Ietter marks a turning point in
    the history of both the RothschiId famiIy,
  • 88:19 - 88:24
    CruciaIIy, ShyIock's onIy prepared to Iend
    the money if Bassanio's friend,
  • 88:22 - 88:25
    According to Soros's
    Theory of Reflexivity,
  • 88:24 - 88:30
    with its seductively samey suburbs,
    was born out of these New Deal reforms.
  • 88:36 - 88:40
    The Iot of the poor
    was once a pretty harsh one -
  • 88:38 - 88:42
    financial markets can't
    possibly be perfectly efficient,
  • 88:38 - 88:44
    ''can extend his credit further and find
    needed funds at a lower interest rate
  • 88:39 - 88:44
    and the British government.
    It's dated the 1 1th of January 181 4,
  • 88:47 - 88:50
    the merchant Antonio,
    is providing the security.
  • 88:51 - 88:53
    either dependence on private charity,
  • 88:56 - 88:57
    much less rational,
  • 88:59 - 89:03
    and it's an order
    from the ChanceIIor of the Exchequer
  • 89:05 - 89:07
    or the harsh regime of the workhouse,
  • 89:06 - 89:09
    ''than a prince
    who is limited in his authority.
  • 89:06 - 89:11
    From the 1930s then,
    the US Government effectiveIy underwrote
  • 89:07 - 89:09
    for the simpIe reason
  • 89:11 - 89:15
    Three thousand ducats for three months
    and Antonio bound.
  • 89:15 - 89:20
    that prices are just the refIection
    of the ignorance and the biases,
  • 89:15 - 89:20
    to the Commissary-in-Chief
    teIIing him to appoint Nathan RothschiId -
  • 89:16 - 89:20
    Iike this typicaIIy austere one
    here in the heart of Edinburgh.
  • 89:26 - 89:30
    ''ln credit, supreme power
    must reside in only one person. ''
  • 89:27 - 89:31
    the mortgage market,
    bringing borrowers and Ienders together.
  • 89:34 - 89:35
    Yet by the 1880s,
  • 89:34 - 89:38
    mostIy compIeteIy irrationaI,
    of miIIions of investors.
  • 89:38 - 89:41
    Mr RothschiId -
    as a British government agent.
  • 89:44 - 89:49
    peopIe began to feeI that Iife's Iosers
    somehow deserved better.
  • 89:44 - 89:46
    Your answer to that.
  • 89:47 - 89:51
    And that was the reason for
    the big expIosion in property ownership
  • 89:50 - 89:55
    In Soros's eyes, markets are bound
    to go through cycIes of boom and bust,
  • 89:52 - 89:54
    Antonio is a good man.
  • 89:52 - 89:58
    Nathan's job was to gather together
    as much goId and siIver as he couId find
  • 90:05 - 90:09
    The seed was pIanted of
    an entireIy new approach to risk,
  • 90:05 - 90:09
    and mortgage debt in the decades
    after WorId War II.
  • 90:09 - 90:12
    By ''good'', ShyIock doesn't mean virtuous,
  • 90:11 - 90:14
    as sureIy as the human temperament
  • 90:15 - 90:22
    on the European continent and make sure it
    got to the Duke of WeIIington and his army
  • 90:17 - 90:21
    That absoIute power
    was in the hands of the Duke of OrIeans
  • 90:21 - 90:24
    is prone to bouts of euphoria
    and despondency.
  • 90:24 - 90:28
    a seed that wouId uItimateIy sprout
    into the modern weIfare state.
  • 90:24 - 90:26
    There was just one catch -
  • 90:30 - 90:35
    he means ''good'' for the money
    he's about to Iend Bassanio.
  • 90:34 - 90:37
    who Iived here in the PaIais RoyaI,
  • 90:34 - 90:40
    not everyone in American society had an
    invitation to the property-owning party.
  • 90:38 - 90:43
    who had just fought their way out of Spain
    into the South of France.
  • 90:44 - 90:50
    The state system of insurance was designed
    to expIoit the uItimate economy of scaIe,
  • 90:46 - 90:51
    just a short step from Law's apartment
    in the PIace Vendome.
  • 90:47 - 90:49
    In other words, creditworthy.
  • 90:57 - 91:00
    It was an operation that reIied heaviIy
  • 91:03 - 91:06
    It was to him that Law
    now unfoIded his scheme.
  • 91:04 - 91:08
    Have you heard any imputation
    to the contrary?
  • 91:06 - 91:10
    Soros's Quantum Fund had made
    millions from short selling,
  • 91:11 - 91:15
    on the RothschiIds' unique
    pan-European credit network
  • 91:12 - 91:17
    by covering IiteraIIy every citizen
    from the cradIe to the grave.
  • 91:19 - 91:23
    Oh, no, no, no, no. My reason
    in saying that he's a good man
  • 91:20 - 91:24
    The prize was nothing Iess
    than the revivaI of French power
  • 91:28 - 91:34
    and on Nathan's abiIity to mobiIise goId
    the way WeIIington couId mobiIise troops.
  • 91:32 - 91:36
    a type of dealing which
    borrows stocks or currencies
  • 91:39 - 91:41
    through financiaI engineering.
  • 91:43 - 91:47
    is to have you understand me
    that he is sufficient.
  • 91:43 - 91:47
    When these houses were built
    in Detroit back in 1 941,
  • 91:49 - 91:52
    and sells them for future delivery
  • 91:50 - 91:53
    But that was onIy haIf
    of Law's ingenious pIan.
  • 92:02 - 92:05
    on the calculation that
    they'll go down in value.
  • 92:07 - 92:11
    whether you got the money or not
    for a mortgage
  • 92:08 - 92:13
    Shifting such vast amounts of gold
    in the middle of a war was hugely risky.
  • 92:08 - 92:13
    Yet while we tend to think of
    the welfare state as a British invention,
  • 92:10 - 92:15
    (ShyIock) Three thousand ducats.
    I think I may take his bond.
  • 92:19 - 92:20
    As Law wrote,
  • 92:21 - 92:25
    depended on which side
    of this divide you lived.
  • 92:27 - 92:32
    His biggest coups came from
    being right about losers, not winners.
  • 92:28 - 92:31
    in fact, the world's first
    welfare superpower
  • 92:32 - 92:35
    Yet, from the Rothschilds'point of view,
  • 92:34 - 92:38
    ''The bank is not the only,
    nor the grandest of my ideas.
  • 92:46 - 92:51
    It was a reaI estate deveIoper
    who buiIt this six-foot high waII
  • 92:47 - 92:48
    was Japan.
  • 92:48 - 92:53
    the hefty commissions they were able
    to charge more than justified the risks.
  • 92:49 - 92:54
    And the greatest of these was among
    the most momentous speculative hits
  • 92:56 - 93:00
    ''l will produce a work
    which will surprise Europe
  • 93:07 - 93:10
    With any loan, things can go wrong.
  • 93:08 - 93:11
    right through the middIe
    of Detroit's 8 MiIe district.
  • 93:13 - 93:19
    ''by changes more powerful than were
    produced by the discovery of the lndies. ''
  • 93:15 - 93:17
    in all financial history.
  • 93:23 - 93:26
    He had to buiId it
    in order to quaIify for Ioans
  • 93:25 - 93:30
    Ships can sink. And that is precisely why
    anyone who lends money to a merchant -
  • 93:31 - 93:36
    The Rothschilds soon became indispensable
    to the British war effort.
  • 93:37 - 93:40
    from the FederaI Housing Administration.
  • 93:43 - 93:48
    On September 1 6th, 1 992,
    with the British pound in big trouble,
  • 93:50 - 93:55
    The Ioans were to be given for
    construction on that side of the waII,
  • 93:51 - 93:54
    ln the words
    of the British Commissary-in-Chief...
  • 93:53 - 93:58
    if only for the duration of an ocean
    voyage - needs to be compensated.
  • 94:04 - 94:06
    The second part of Law's idea
  • 94:06 - 94:10
    ''Rothschild of this place has executed
    the various services
  • 94:06 - 94:10
    which was a predominantIy
    white neighbourhood.
  • 94:15 - 94:19
    was that a huge monopoIy
    trading company shouId be estabIished,
  • 94:15 - 94:19
    l watched as Soros put out
    a contract on the Bank of England.
  • 94:17 - 94:20
    We usually call the compensation
    ''interest'' -
  • 94:19 - 94:24
    On this side, on the bIack side,
    there was to be no federaI credit,
  • 94:26 - 94:31
    ''entrusted to him in this line
    admirably well, and though a Jew,
  • 94:30 - 94:35
    Disaster just kept striking Japan
    in the first half of the 20th century.
  • 94:34 - 94:40
    the amount paid to the lender over
    and above the sum lent or ''principal''.
  • 94:36 - 94:39
    the Compagnie d'Occident,
    the Company of the West.
  • 94:39 - 94:44
    because African Americans were regarded
    as fundamentaIIy uncreditworthy.
  • 94:46 - 94:50
    ''we place a good deal
    of confidence in him. ''
  • 94:49 - 94:53
    I became convinced that specuIators
    Iike Soros were bound to win
  • 94:51 - 94:56
    As he put it, the whoIe nation
    wouId become a body of traders
  • 95:06 - 95:09
    ln 1 923, a huge earthquake
    devastated Tokyo.
  • 95:08 - 95:12
    if it came to a straight showdown
    with the British Government.
  • 95:14 - 95:18
    and Law himseIf, named here
    as the company's chief director,
  • 95:15 - 95:18
    Overseas trade of the sort
    that Venice depended on
  • 95:15 - 95:18
    The Rothschilds were so effective
    as war financiers
  • 95:21 - 95:24
    lt was part of a system
    that divided the whole city -
  • 95:26 - 95:28
    It was a matter of simpIe arithmetic -
  • 95:28 - 95:31
    couldn't operate
    without such transactions.
  • 95:32 - 95:37
    because they had a ready-made
    banking network within the family -
  • 95:36 - 95:37
    As in New Orleans,
  • 95:37 - 95:42
    a triIIion doIIars of currency traded
    every day on foreign exchange markets
  • 95:40 - 95:42
    in theory by credit-rating,
  • 95:43 - 95:45
    wouId be at its head.
  • 95:45 - 95:49
    And they remain the foundation
    of international trade to this day.
  • 95:46 - 95:51
    private insurance policies
    turned out to be worth little more
  • 95:53 - 95:55
    in practice by colour.
  • 95:54 - 95:57
    Nathan in London, Amschel in Frankfurt,
  • 96:02 - 96:06
    Segregation, in other words,
    wasn't accidental,
  • 96:04 - 96:07
    than the paper they were printed on.
  • 96:05 - 96:09
    against the meagre hard currency
    reserves of the UK Treasury.
  • 96:13 - 96:19
    James in Paris, Carl in Amsterdam and
    Salomon roving wherever Nathan saw fit.
  • 96:18 - 96:23
    A new idea began to emerge in Japan -
    that the state should take care of risk.
  • 96:22 - 96:25
    but a direct consequence
    of federal policy.
  • 96:29 - 96:33
    The focus for this wildly ambitious
    scheme would be in America,
  • 96:44 - 96:49
    At that time, the British pound
    was tightly linked to the German mark
  • 96:51 - 96:54
    where the French laid claim
    to a vast tract of land
  • 96:54 - 96:58
    But why does Shylock
    turn out to be such a villain,
  • 96:56 - 96:59
    This map by the
    FederaI Home Loan Board
  • 97:05 - 97:09
    through the ERM -
    the European Exchange Rate Mechanism.
  • 97:08 - 97:11
    either side of the Mississippi -
    Louisiana.
  • 97:09 - 97:13
    shows the predominantIy bIack areas
    of Detroit, the Iower east side
  • 97:11 - 97:15
    But this was to be state protection
    allied with imperial ambition.
  • 97:13 - 97:18
    demanding literally ''a pound of flesh'' -
    in effect Antonio's death -
  • 97:19 - 97:23
    lf the price of gold was higher in,
    say, Paris than in London,
  • 97:23 - 97:29
    The Regent gave Law's company, what
    was to become the Mississippi Company,
  • 97:29 - 97:34
    and so-caIIed coIonies Iike the one
    we're in now in Birwood-Griggs,
  • 97:35 - 97:37
    As German interest rates rose
  • 97:36 - 97:40
    James in Paris would sell -
    and Nathan in London would buy.
  • 97:40 - 97:46
    if he can't fulfil his obligations? Why is
    Shakespeare's moneylender so heartless -
  • 97:43 - 97:48
    in the wake of that country's
    hugely expensive reunification,
  • 97:48 - 97:51
    The Japanese set up a welfare state.
  • 97:49 - 97:52
    marked with a Ietter D
    and coIoured red.
  • 97:51 - 97:54
    a monopoly on trade with the new colony.
  • 98:04 - 98:06
    Britain's rates had to rise too,
  • 98:08 - 98:13
    Frenchmen, regardless of rank, were
    encouraged to buy shares in the company.
  • 98:12 - 98:14
    You can see why the practice
  • 98:13 - 98:15
    And they did it to promote warfare.
  • 98:14 - 98:17
    the original
    of that bloodsucking financier
  • 98:14 - 98:16
    hurting home-owners and businesses.
  • 98:19 - 98:23
    of giving whoIe neighbourhoods
    a negative credit rating
  • 98:25 - 98:29
    Soros calculated that the British
    Chancellor, Norman Lamont,
  • 98:30 - 98:33
    who recurs time and again
    in Western literature?
  • 98:30 - 98:36
    I think their edge over famiIies Iike the
    Barings, with whom they were competing,
  • 98:33 - 98:36
    Law's name headed the list of directors.
  • 98:35 - 98:38
    came to be known as ''red-Iining''.
  • 98:47 - 98:51
    would be forced to withdraw from
    the ERM and devalue the pound.
  • 98:48 - 98:53
    The resuIt was that when peopIe
    from round here needed mortgages,
  • 98:52 - 98:58
    was that they had their brothers in very
    important financiaI centres in countries.
  • 98:53 - 98:57
    lt was the mid-20th-century
    state's insatiable appetite
  • 99:07 - 99:10
    they had to pay significantIy
    higher interest rates
  • 99:12 - 99:15
    for able-bodied young soldiers
    and workers,
  • 99:18 - 99:21
    Now whether that was pre-meditated,
  • 99:20 - 99:22
    lt was the biggest bet of Soros's life.
  • 99:21 - 99:24
    than the foIks in the white part of town.
  • 99:22 - 99:26
    In modern parIance,
    what these documents teII us
  • 99:23 - 99:28
    One clue is that Shylock is one of the
    many Jewish moneylenders in history.
  • 99:26 - 99:29
    not some kind of bleeding-heart altruism,
  • 99:29 - 99:34
    whether they thought that through
    as they got out of the ghetto,
  • 99:34 - 99:39
    So sure was he that the pound
    would drop that he bet $1 0 billion -
  • 99:37 - 99:41
    is that Law was attempting
    a refIation. And why not?
  • 99:41 - 99:43
    that inspired the rise of welfare.
  • 99:45 - 99:49
    Half a century later,
    the two categories of borrowers
  • 99:47 - 99:51
    it's hard to beIieve
    that they went as far as that.
  • 99:52 - 99:55
    Jews who stayed in Venice
    for more than two weeks
  • 99:56 - 99:59
    France in 1 7 16 was in a depression
  • 100:02 - 100:07
    But that's what happened and once
    they saw that it was an advantage,
  • 100:04 - 100:09
    would come to be known euphemistically
    as prime and sub-prime.
  • 100:07 - 100:10
    more than the entire
    capital of his fund.
  • 100:09 - 100:14
    were supposed to wear a yellow ''O''
    on their backs or a yellow hat.
  • 100:11 - 100:14
    and Law's banknotes
    heIped stimuIate a recovery.
  • 100:16 - 100:19
    State healthcare would ensure
    a fitter populace
  • 100:21 - 100:23
    they worked on that advantage.
  • 100:25 - 100:28
    The risk-reward
    was disproportionate.
  • 100:27 - 100:29
    At the same time, what he was doing
  • 100:32 - 100:37
    and a steady supply of able-bodied
    recruits to the Emperor's armed forces,
  • 100:34 - 100:39
    But in the 1 960s, this divide
    was the hidden financial dimension
  • 100:37 - 100:42
    And they were confined to a special area
    which became known as the Ghetto Nuovo.
  • 100:37 - 100:42
    was effectiveIy transforming a burdensome
    and badIy managed pubIic debt
  • 100:37 - 100:41
    ln March 1 81 5, Napoleon returned to Paris
    from exile in Elba
  • 100:47 - 100:51
    And therefore it seemed
    Iike a good specuIation,
  • 100:59 - 101:01
    of the Civil Rights struggle.
  • 101:01 - 101:04
    determined to revive
    his imperial ambitions.
  • 101:01 - 101:02
    and deliver him an empire.
  • 101:02 - 101:07
    into shares in what was a privatised
    tax-gathering and trade company.
  • 101:10 - 101:15
    Blacks were to be excluded
    from the new property-owning society.
  • 101:16 - 101:22
    This is the entrance to the Jewish ghetto
    in Venice where Jews were obIiged to Iive
  • 101:21 - 101:24
    or investment, if you Iike,
    shorting the pound.
  • 101:28 - 101:30
    WeII, what was not to Iike about that?
  • 101:29 - 101:30
    ENGINE REVS
  • 101:29 - 101:33
    The Rothschilds immediately
    ramped up their gold operation,
  • 101:36 - 101:40
    There would be a heavy price
    to pay for this exclusion.
  • 101:40 - 101:46
    and indeed confined at night. Jews were
    toIerated in Venice, but for a reason.
  • 101:49 - 101:54
    buying up all the bullion and coins
    they could lay their hands on.
  • 101:51 - 101:55
    l was equally convinced that sterling
    would have to be be devalued,
  • 101:52 - 101:54
    ln a fever of mass speculation,
  • 102:05 - 102:08
    the Mississippi Company's
    share price soared,
  • 102:07 - 102:11
    Nathan's reason for buying this
    huge stock of gold was simple.
  • 102:09 - 102:14
    On July 23rd 1 967, property in Detroit
    literally went up in flames.
  • 102:11 - 102:14
    The wartime slogan
    ''All people are soldiers''
  • 102:12 - 102:15
    though all l had to bet
    was my credibility.
  • 102:19 - 102:24
    from the original price of 500 livres
    to 5,000 on September 4th.
  • 102:20 - 102:25
    The key was that Jews could provide
    a service that Christian merchants
  • 102:24 - 102:29
    That evening, I headed to the opera
    to see Verdi's The Force Of Destiny.
  • 102:28 - 102:32
    was adapted to become
    ''All people should have insurance''.
  • 102:33 - 102:36
    He assumed that,
    as with all Napoleon's wars,
  • 102:44 - 102:49
    were forbidden to do - they could charge
    interest on their loans.
  • 102:50 - 102:52
    this would be a long one.
  • 102:51 - 102:56
    (TV) Four days of rioting, Iooting
    and arson rocked the city of Detroit
  • 102:53 - 102:56
    It proved exceedingIy appropriate.
  • 102:56 - 103:00
    By December 1 7 1 9,
    it had reached 1 0,000.
  • 103:02 - 103:07
    His gold would be more and more
    sought after and it would rise in value.
  • 103:08 - 103:12
    Fibonacci might have figured out
    the mathematics of lending,
  • 103:14 - 103:18
    in the worst outbreak
    of urban raciaI vioIence this year.
  • 103:25 - 103:28
    The only problem was that
    Japan had gone to war
  • 103:26 - 103:29
    but it took Shylock to do the deal.
  • 103:31 - 103:34
    And this is where it aII happened.
  • 103:31 - 103:35
    lt proved to be
    a near-fatal miscalculation.
  • 103:36 - 103:41
    Anger at economic discrimination
    spilled over into five days of rioting
  • 103:40 - 103:46
    This was where Law's share issuing office
    was Iocated, the Rue Quincampoix.
  • 103:42 - 103:45
    with the world's economic colossus -
  • 103:49 - 103:53
    At the intervaI, they announced
    that ChanceIIor Norman Lamont
  • 103:55 - 103:56
    the United States.
  • 104:00 - 104:04
    This is where the Venetian Jews
    used to do business.
  • 104:03 - 104:07
    Wellington famously
    called the Battle of Waterloo,
  • 104:05 - 104:07
    that left 43 people dead.
  • 104:06 - 104:09
    You can imagine the scenes of frenzy here
  • 104:08 - 104:12
    had appeared in there,
    in the Treasury courtyard,
  • 104:16 - 104:19
    This buiIding here was the oId Banco Rosso
  • 104:17 - 104:22
    Significantly, most of the violence
    was directed not against people,
  • 104:18 - 104:22
    ''The nearest-run thing
    you ever saw in your life. ''
  • 104:19 - 104:23
    as haIf of Paris descended
    on this narrow aIIeyway
  • 104:24 - 104:27
    to say that Britain
    was withdrawing from the ERM.
  • 104:28 - 104:34
    and it was outside here that they used to
    sit behind their tabIes - their tavoIe -
  • 104:29 - 104:33
    Japan's warfare state proved
    to be a massive mistake.
  • 104:33 - 104:36
    aII desperate for a piece of the action.
  • 104:39 - 104:40
    How we aII cheered.
  • 104:41 - 104:43
    but against property.
  • 104:42 - 104:42
    CROWS CAW
  • 104:45 - 104:49
    Today has been an extremeIy
    difficuIt and turbuIent day.
  • 104:47 - 104:52
    The higher the share price went,
    the more they wanted to buy.
  • 104:50 - 104:53
    Nearly 3,000 buildings
    were looted or burned.
  • 104:51 - 104:55
    Quite apart from the nearly
    three million lives lost
  • 104:53 - 104:58
    on their benches - their banchi,
    the root of the ItaIian word for banks.
  • 104:59 - 105:04
    After a day of brutal charges,
    counter charges and heroic defence,
  • 105:04 - 105:07
    It was a cIassic stock market
    feedback Ioop.
  • 105:09 - 105:11
    in Japan's doomed bid for empire,
  • 105:10 - 105:14
    Massive specuIative fIows
    have continued to disrupt
  • 105:22 - 105:26
    by 1 945, the value of
    Japan's entire capital stock
  • 105:22 - 105:27
    Now, there was good reason why merchants
    came here to the Jewish ghetto
  • 105:27 - 105:31
    the late arrival of the Prussian Army
    finally proved decisive.
  • 105:30 - 105:34
    the functioning of
    the Exchange Rate Mechanism.
  • 105:43 - 105:48
    The real lesson for policy makers
    was that excluding ethnic minorities
  • 105:44 - 105:49
    lt was in these heady times that the word
    ''millionaire'' was first coined.
  • 105:44 - 105:48
    to borrow money. For Christians,
    what the Jews were doing,
  • 105:46 - 105:49
    seemed to have been reduced to zero
  • 105:55 - 105:58
    For Wellington, it was a glorious victory.
  • 105:57 - 105:59
    by American bombers.
  • 106:00 - 106:03
    Soros made a billion dollars that day,
  • 106:02 - 106:05
    Iending money at interest, was a sin.
  • 106:07 - 106:11
    from the property-owning democracy
    was a fast track to trouble.
  • 106:11 - 106:15
    Yes, millionaires, like entrepreneurs,
    were invented in France.
  • 106:16 - 106:19
    Cities built largely out of wood
    were incinerated.
  • 106:16 - 106:18
    But not for the Rothschilds.
  • 106:18 - 106:22
    and that was only 40%
    of his fund's annual profits.
  • 106:29 - 106:33
    To make people feel like stakeholders
    in the social status quo,
  • 106:36 - 106:40
    Nearly a third of the urban population
    lost their homes.
  • 106:38 - 106:41
    No doubt it was gratifying
    to Nathan RothschiId
  • 106:41 - 106:46
    And by January 1 720,
    John Law was the richest of them all.
  • 106:43 - 106:47
    (NiaII) Do you feeI...
    or did you feeI a sense of triumph
  • 106:46 - 106:51
    The medieval Church's laws against usury -
    charging interest on loans -
  • 106:52 - 106:55
    you had to make them property owners.
  • 106:55 - 106:59
    to be the first to hear the news
    of NapoIeon's defeat.
  • 107:07 - 107:12
    when your prophecy came true
    and the bet paid off hugeIy?
  • 107:10 - 107:14
    Thanks to the swiftness
    of the RothschiId couriers,
  • 107:11 - 107:15
    were a major obstacle to the development
    of finance in Europe.
  • 107:21 - 107:25
    Louis XlV had said ''L'etat, c'est moi'' -
    ''l am the state. ''
  • 107:24 - 107:28
    lndeed, widening home ownership
    might even turn the malcontents
  • 107:25 - 107:29
    he heard it fuIIy 48 hours
    before Major Henry Percy
  • 107:26 - 107:30
    Of course. It was Iike when
    you're betting and you win,
  • 107:32 - 107:35
    After all, what God-fearing
    Christian merchant
  • 107:43 - 107:47
    deIivered WeIIington's officiaI despatch
    to the British Cabinet.
  • 107:46 - 107:47
    into conservatives.
  • 107:50 - 107:54
    naturaIIy, you have that
    satisfaction and aIso the profit.
  • 107:51 - 107:54
    wished to risk the torments of Hell?
  • 107:52 - 107:56
    Now the renegade Scotsman,
    John Law, was able to say,
  • 108:01 - 108:04
    But, no matter how early he heard it,
  • 108:03 - 108:07
    This was a lesson that
    Margaret Thatcher was quick to learn.
  • 108:04 - 108:08
    This astonishing vision
    of eternaI damnation
  • 108:05 - 108:08
    Practically the only city
    to survive intact
  • 108:15 - 108:17
    ''L'economie, c'est moi'' -
  • 108:15 - 108:21
    the news of Waterloo was anything
    but good from Nathan's point of view.
  • 108:20 - 108:23
    was Kyoto, the former imperial capital.
  • 108:24 - 108:28
    was painted by Giorgio Vasari
    and Federico Zuccari
  • 108:26 - 108:30
    Here in Britain, the idea
    of the property-owning democracy
  • 108:32 - 108:33
    COWS MOO
  • 108:36 - 108:37
    ''l am the economy. ''
  • 108:37 - 108:41
    He had bargained
    for something much more protracted.
  • 108:42 - 108:46
    on the inside of the great dome
    of FIorence's CathedraI, the Duomo.
  • 108:50 - 108:52
    became a keystone of 1 980s Conservatism.
  • 108:51 - 108:56
    1 945 may have seen the end
    of the Japanese warfare state,
  • 108:54 - 109:00
    Now he and his brothers were sitting on
    top of a piIe of cash that nobody wanted,
  • 109:04 - 109:08
    And beIow there's another fresco
    by Domenico di MicheIino
  • 109:04 - 109:08
    By selling off council housing
    at bargain-basement prices,
  • 109:04 - 109:07
    Soros owed his success
    to a kind of gut instinct
  • 109:10 - 109:14
    Ensconced in his paIatiaI suite,
    here in the PIace Vendome,
  • 109:19 - 109:24
    but it wasn't the end of the Japanese
    experiment with state-sponsored welfare.
  • 109:20 - 109:23
    to pay for a war that was over.
  • 109:22 - 109:25
    about the way the ''electronic herd''
    would move.
  • 109:30 - 109:32
    that's the Ritz HoteI over there,
  • 109:31 - 109:36
    Thatcher ensured that more and more
    British couples had a home of their own.
  • 109:32 - 109:35
    of FIorence's greatest poet,
    Dante AIighieri,
  • 109:35 - 109:38
    But even his instincts
    are sometimes wrong.
  • 109:36 - 109:38
    With the coming of peace,
  • 109:40 - 109:45
    Law had achieved a greater concentration
    of financiaI power in his hands
  • 109:44 - 109:48
    the great armies that had fought Napoleon
    could be disbanded.
  • 109:47 - 109:52
    So what if instinct couId somehow
    be repIaced by mathematics?
  • 109:50 - 109:53
    hoIding his masterwork,
    the Divine Comedy.
  • 109:51 - 109:55
    In Japan, as in most competent
    countries, the Iesson was cIear -
  • 110:03 - 110:06
    than any individuaI in aII French history.
  • 110:04 - 110:09
    According to Dante, there was a speciaI
    part of the seventh circIe of HeII
  • 110:04 - 110:10
    That meant no more gold for soldiers'
    wages and it meant the price of gold,
  • 110:05 - 110:09
    That also meant that more people
    than ever had mortgages.
  • 110:10 - 110:13
    the worId was just too dangerous a pIace
  • 110:12 - 110:15
    What if you couId write
    an aIgebraic formuIa
  • 110:18 - 110:23
    As ControIIer-GeneraI of French Finances,
    he was IiteraIIy in charge of
  • 110:22 - 110:25
    for private insurance markets
    to cope with.
  • 110:26 - 110:29
    that was excIusiveIy set aside
    for usurers.
  • 110:26 - 110:29
    that guaranteed doubIe-digit returns?
  • 110:27 - 110:30
    which had soared during the war,
    would fall.
  • 110:36 - 110:39
    With the best wiII in the worId,
  • 110:38 - 110:41
    the coIIection
    of aII France's indirect taxes,
  • 110:39 - 110:43
    WeII, on the other side
    of the financiaI gaIaxy,
  • 110:40 - 110:45
    Up untiI the 1980s, government incentives
    to borrow money and buy a house
  • 110:45 - 110:50
    peopIe couIdn't be expected to insure
    themseIves against the US Air Force.
  • 110:54 - 110:56
    the entire French nationaI debt,
  • 110:54 - 110:56
    such a formuIa had just been devised.
  • 111:01 - 111:05
    made pretty good sense
    for the average British famiIy.
  • 111:05 - 111:10
    the 26 mints that produced
    the country's goId and siIver coinage,
  • 111:06 - 111:10
    The answer, practicaIIy
    everywhere, was the same -
  • 111:18 - 111:22
    Interest rates were reIativeIy Iow
    in the '60s and '70s,
  • 111:21 - 111:23
    for government to step in.
  • 111:28 - 111:33
    the Company of the Indies -
    better known as the Mississippi Company -
  • 111:29 - 111:33
    Nathan was faced
    with heavy and growing losses.
  • 111:32 - 111:34
    In effect, to nationaIise risk.
  • 111:33 - 111:38
    There the moneylenders were eternally
    tortured with scorching earth
  • 111:37 - 111:40
    and the infIation rate tended to creep up,
  • 111:42 - 111:47
    As the new era of globalisation
    increased trade and growth,
  • 111:44 - 111:45
    CAR HORNS HONK
  • 111:46 - 111:49
    which had a monopoIy
    on the import of tobacco,
  • 111:49 - 111:53
    so that the reaI vaIue of mortgage debt
    tended to faII.
  • 111:58 - 112:01
    There was only one possible way out.
  • 111:59 - 112:02
    aII of France's trade
    with Africa and Asia,
  • 112:01 - 112:06
    and freezing snow, their necks
    weighed down with bulging purses.
  • 112:06 - 112:12
    Perhaps the most familiar sub-system
    of welfare from the cradle to the grave,
  • 112:08 - 112:13
    it also increased the world economy's
    vulnerability to financial shocks
  • 112:09 - 112:12
    But there was a sting in the taiI.
  • 112:11 - 112:14
    oh, and the Louisiana coIony,
  • 112:18 - 112:23
    Nathan could use the Rothschild gold
    to make a massive and hugely risky bet...
  • 112:18 - 112:22
    The very same governments
    that professed their faith
  • 112:23 - 112:28
    which covered around a quarter
    of what is today the United States.
  • 112:31 - 112:34
    also born in the ruins of war,
  • 112:33 - 112:38
    in the property-owning democracy
    were aIso committed to fighting infIation,
  • 112:36 - 112:40
    that could spread rapidly
    to the four corners of the Earth.
  • 112:38 - 112:41
    Jews, too, weren't supposed
    to Iend at interest.
  • 112:44 - 112:47
    was devised by the British
    economist, William Beverage.
  • 112:49 - 112:51
    on the bond market.
  • 112:54 - 112:57
    But there was a convenient
    get-out cIause
  • 112:56 - 112:59
    and that meant raising interest rates.
  • 113:02 - 113:07
    But what if we inhabited another
    completely different kind of planet?
  • 113:04 - 113:07
    in the OId Testament book of Deuteronomy,
    chapter 23,
  • 113:07 - 113:11
    ln his own right,
    Law also owned the Mazarin Palace,
  • 113:14 - 113:18
    When the Japanese came up with
    their own comprehensive weIfare system
  • 113:14 - 113:17
    The British and American policy
    of encouraging people
  • 113:26 - 113:32
    you weren't supposed to Iend to your
    brother at interest, but to a stranger?
  • 113:30 - 113:35
    A planet without all the complicating
    frictions caused by subjective,
  • 113:31 - 113:37
    to take out mortgages and then cranking
    up interest rates led in the late '80s
  • 113:33 - 113:38
    more than a third of the buildings
    around the Place Vendome,
  • 113:35 - 113:37
    in October 1947,
  • 113:41 - 113:46
    On July 20, 1 81 5, the evening edition
    of the London Courier
  • 113:46 - 113:50
    their advisory committee
    in sociaI security recommended
  • 113:50 - 113:52
    sometimes irrational human beings.
  • 113:50 - 113:56
    WeII, that was a different matter. In
    other words, a Jew couIdn't Iend to a Jew,
  • 113:57 - 113:59
    more than 1 2 country estates,
  • 113:59 - 114:03
    reported that Nathan had made
    ''great purchases of stock'',
  • 114:01 - 114:07
    to one of the most spectacular booms and
    busts in the property market's history.
  • 114:04 - 114:07
    what amounted to
    ''Bebariji no Nihon-ban'',
  • 114:04 - 114:09
    One where the inhabitants instantly
    absorbed all new information
  • 114:14 - 114:17
    but he couId Iend to a Christian.
  • 114:19 - 114:21
    ''Beverage for the Japanese''.
  • 114:20 - 114:22
    several plantations in Louisiana,
  • 114:22 - 114:24
    meaning British government bonds.
  • 114:25 - 114:30
    lt was to the '80s what the sub-prime
    meltdown has been in our own time -
  • 114:28 - 114:31
    and used it to maximise profits,
  • 114:31 - 114:35
    And yet, they went even further
    than Beverage had intended,
  • 114:34 - 114:38
    Nathan's gamble
    was that the British victory at Waterloo
  • 114:39 - 114:43
    and a hundred million livres of shares
    in the Mississippi Company.
  • 114:43 - 114:46
    where amid the turbulence
    of everyday life
  • 114:45 - 114:50
    The price the Jews paid for performing
    this service was social exclusion.
  • 114:48 - 114:50
    as this copy of their report,
  • 114:54 - 114:58
    would send the price of British bonds
    soaring upwards.
  • 114:54 - 114:59
    the first, but not the last time
    that America's mortgage market
  • 114:58 - 115:00
    all was calm and predictable.
  • 114:59 - 115:04
    here in the Iibrary of the Japanese
    NationaI ParIiament, makes cIear.
  • 115:04 - 115:09
    Not bad going for a man who, when
    he'd first come here 12 years before,
  • 115:12 - 115:13
    Hence the ghetto.
  • 115:14 - 115:16
    has gone stark raving mad.
  • 115:20 - 115:25
    It caIIed on the government to provide
    against every cause of poverty.
  • 115:25 - 115:29
    ln such a perfectly observed,
    efficiently interconnected world,
  • 115:25 - 115:30
    And hence the centuries-long association
    between Jews and finance,
  • 115:26 - 115:31
    had been identified as a joueur -
    a professionaI gambIer and a possibIe spy.
  • 115:31 - 115:36
    Nathan bought, and as the price of bonds
    began to rise, he kept on buying.
  • 115:43 - 115:46
    Sickness and injury, disabiIity, death,
  • 115:47 - 115:52
    an unpredicted catastrophic stock market
    crash would be about as common
  • 115:54 - 115:59
    one of the few forms of economic activity
    from which Jews were not once excluded.
  • 115:58 - 116:01
    By January 1 720,
    Law's triumph seemed complete.
  • 116:01 - 116:05
    chiIdbirth, Iarge famiIies,
    oId age and unempIoyment.
  • 116:09 - 116:13
    as an adult shorter than
    one-and-a-half feet in our own world.
  • 116:09 - 116:14
    Despite his brothers' desperate entreaties
    to sell, Nathan held his nerve
  • 116:22 - 116:26
    A Scots murderer was, in effect,
    Prime Minister of France.
  • 116:23 - 116:29
    Whatever the reason, the needy wouId be
    guaranteed the minimum standard of Iiving
  • 116:29 - 116:33
    lt would happen only once
    in four million years of trading.
  • 116:37 - 116:40
    ln the end, of course,
    Shylock is thwarted.
  • 116:37 - 116:40
    To many of us, it's come as a shock
  • 116:42 - 116:44
    for another year.
  • 116:46 - 116:47
    by nationaI assistance.
  • 116:48 - 116:51
    that a crash
    in the American property market
  • 116:53 - 116:57
    For although the court recognises
    his right to a pound of flesh,
  • 116:56 - 116:58
    This was the planet imagined
  • 116:59 - 117:01
    MONKS PERFORM INCANTATIONS
  • 117:04 - 117:06
    could trigger a major financial crisis.
  • 117:05 - 117:09
    Law's problem was that he had
    no clear idea where to stop.
  • 117:08 - 117:12
    by some of the most brilliant
    financial economists of modern times.
  • 117:13 - 117:15
    Eventually, in July 1 81 7,
  • 117:14 - 117:18
    the law also prohibits him
    from shedding Antonio's blood.
  • 117:25 - 117:29
    with bond prices up by 40%,
    he sold his holding.
  • 117:28 - 117:34
    The Japanese wouId no Ionger have to
    reIy on the benevoIence of a feudaI Iord
  • 117:29 - 117:34
    ln fact, as so often in the ascent
    of money, it's happened before.
  • 117:30 - 117:35
    On the contrary, he had a strong personal
    interest in printing more money,
  • 117:33 - 117:39
    And, because he's a Jew, the law also
    requires the loss of his goods and life
  • 117:34 - 117:37
    And this is what
    their planet looked like.
  • 117:52 - 117:56
    His profits were worth approximately
    Ł600 million today.
  • 117:53 - 117:59
    which his own bank controlled, to drive up
    the price of his own company's shares.
  • 117:54 - 117:56
    or the Iuck of the gods -
  • 117:59 - 118:03
    for so much as plotting
    the death of a Christian.
  • 118:06 - 118:08
    the weIfare state wouId cover them
  • 118:13 - 118:16
    He only escapes
    by submitting to baptism.
  • 118:16 - 118:20
    against aII the vagaries and
    vicissitudes of the modern worId.
  • 118:19 - 118:23
    ln 1 993, two mathematical geniuses
    came to Greenwich, Connecticut,
  • 118:21 - 118:22
    The Rothschilds had shown
  • 118:23 - 118:27
    ln March 1 984, American
    government regulators received a copy
  • 118:30 - 118:33
    FortunateIy for Law,
    both his bank and his company
  • 118:38 - 118:42
    lt turns out to be a risky business
    to be a moneylender.
  • 118:39 - 118:44
    that bonds were more than just a way
    for governments to fund their wars.
  • 118:45 - 118:50
    of a video showing mile after mile
    of half-built houses and condominiums
  • 118:48 - 118:52
    were now operating
    out of the very same buiIding,
  • 118:50 - 118:51
    with a big idea.
  • 118:55 - 118:57
    lf they couldn't afford education,
  • 118:58 - 119:03
    They could be bought and sold in a way
    that generated serious money.
  • 119:03 - 119:05
    Stanford University's Myron Scholes
  • 119:03 - 119:07
    the Mazarin PaIace,
    which he himseIf happened to own.
  • 119:07 - 119:08
    the state would pay.
  • 119:07 - 119:10
    The Merchant of Venice
    raises profound questions
  • 119:08 - 119:12
    along lnterstate 30,
    just outside Dallas in Texas.
  • 119:18 - 119:23
    had invented a revolutionary new theory
    of pricing things called ''options''.
  • 119:19 - 119:21
    lf they couldn't find work,
  • 119:21 - 119:26
    So aII he had to do in order to
    drive up the company's share price
  • 119:23 - 119:25
    And with money, came power.
  • 119:24 - 119:27
    about both economics and anti-Semitism.
  • 119:32 - 119:33
    the state would pay.
  • 119:38 - 119:41
    Why don't debtors
    aIways defauIt on their debts -
  • 119:40 - 119:46
    was to take a waIk down the corridor from
    the office where the shares were issued,
  • 119:41 - 119:45
    He and Harvard's Robert Merton
    were the original ''quants'' -
  • 119:42 - 119:46
    lf they were too ill to work,
    the state would pay.
  • 119:54 - 119:59
    Mayer Amschel Rothschild
    had repeatedly admonished his five sons,
  • 119:56 - 120:00
    especiaIIy when the creditors
    beIong to unpopuIar ethnic minorities?
  • 120:02 - 120:04
    You can still see
    the empty slabs today.
  • 120:02 - 120:05
    to the office where the money was printed.
  • 120:04 - 120:06
    When they retired, the state would pay.
  • 120:05 - 120:09
    a new breed of speculators
    using quantitative mathematics
  • 120:13 - 120:15
    Why don't the ShyIocks aIways Iose out?
  • 120:14 - 120:18
    You couId say that Law had become
    the uItimate insider trader.
  • 120:17 - 120:21
    ''lf you can't make yourself loved,
    make yourself feared. ''
  • 120:22 - 120:26
    And when they finally died, the state
    would pay their dependents.
  • 120:26 - 120:27
    to make money.
  • 120:31 - 120:35
    The investigation triggered
    by these un-buiIt homes wouId expose
  • 120:36 - 120:40
    As they bestrode
    the mid-1 9th century financial world
  • 120:38 - 120:43
    From this nondescript office they plotted
    a global financial revolution.
  • 120:51 - 120:55
    one of the biggest financiaI scandaIs
    of aII time -
  • 120:53 - 120:55
    as masters of the bond market,
  • 120:59 - 121:03
    At root, Law's system was what
    we nowadays call a Ponzi scheme,
  • 121:03 - 121:06
    the Rothschilds were already
    more feared than loved.
  • 121:03 - 121:07
    To get a better idea of how
    primitive moneyIending works,
  • 121:08 - 121:11
    a scam that wouId make
    a mockery of the idea
  • 121:13 - 121:17
    Merton and SchoIes's idea was
    based on the simpIe option contract.
  • 121:20 - 121:24
    after the legendary ltalian-American
    conman, Charles Ponzi.
  • 121:21 - 121:24
    So what happened after the war in Japan
  • 121:22 - 121:25
    you don't need to
    traveI back in time.
  • 121:23 - 121:26
    of property
    as a safe form of investment.
  • 121:24 - 121:27
    But now, they had become hated too.
  • 121:35 - 121:39
    was merely the extension
    of the warfare welfare state.
  • 121:35 - 121:39
    There are pIenty of modern-day ShyIocks
    remarkabIy cIose to home.
  • 121:35 - 121:39
    Take the case of a stock
    that's worth $100 today.
  • 121:39 - 121:42
    This isn't a story about reaI estate -
  • 121:42 - 121:48
    To pay out the generous returns
    it's promised to the first lot of suckers,
  • 121:53 - 121:55
    more Iike surreal estate.
  • 121:53 - 121:57
    The slogan now became
    ''All people should have pensions''.
  • 121:57 - 122:02
    Now, suppose I think that stock's
    going to be worth 200 in a year's time.
  • 121:57 - 122:02
    And they don't need to be Jewish
    to suffer a simiIar fate to ShyIock.
  • 122:09 - 122:14
    a Ponzi scheme needs to take in
    more money from the next lot of suckers.
  • 122:21 - 122:23
    The fact that the Rothschilds were Jewish
  • 122:23 - 122:29
    WouIdn't it be nice to have the option to
    buy it at today's price in a year's time?
  • 122:24 - 122:28
    Savings and loan associations -
    America's building societies -
  • 122:32 - 122:36
    ln John Law's scheme,
    the acquisitions of other companies
  • 122:33 - 122:37
    The Japanese welfare state
    seemed to be a miracle of effectiveness.
  • 122:33 - 122:37
    gave a new impetus
    to deep-rooted anti-Semitic prejudice.
  • 122:47 - 122:51
    were not only central to Roosevelt's
    New Deal on housing.
  • 122:51 - 122:55
    If I'm right, I make
    a tidy profit of $100.
  • 122:54 - 122:56
    and the generous dividends Law paid
  • 122:58 - 123:01
    ln public health and education,
    Japan led the world.
  • 123:01 - 123:06
    (RothschiId) Just a few months ago
    a colleague of mine in my office,
  • 123:06 - 123:09
    were financed not from company profits,
  • 123:10 - 123:15
    By the 1 97 0s, they were the foundation
    of America's property-owning democracy.
  • 123:11 - 123:15
    But if I'm wrong, weII, who cares?
    It was onIy an option.
  • 123:18 - 123:21
    who coIIects posters, found these...
  • 123:23 - 123:26
    but simply by selling new shares.
  • 123:27 - 123:31
    The onIy cost to me
    is the price of the option itseIf.
  • 123:31 - 123:33
    By the late 1 97 0s,
  • 123:41 - 123:45
    the Japanese could boast
    that their country had become
  • 123:42 - 123:46
    WeII, this particuIar, rather
    extraordinary exampIe of anti-Semitism
  • 123:44 - 123:48
    Then, in the 1970s,
    the savings and Ioan industry was hit
  • 123:46 - 123:50
    The big question is,
    what shouId that price be?
  • 123:52 - 123:55
    This is ShettIeston
    in the East End of GIasgow.
  • 123:59 - 124:00
    the welfare superpower.
  • 124:01 - 124:02
    $5? $1 0?
  • 124:03 - 124:07
    first by doubIe-digit infIation
    and then by higher interest rates.
  • 124:09 - 124:14
    in a stark form, about the RothschiIds,
    who were as it were epitomised,
  • 124:11 - 124:14
    It's actuaIIy where my grandmother
    used to Iive.
  • 124:17 - 124:20
    The answer
    was to be found in a magic formula.
  • 124:23 - 124:28
    Like aII Ponzi schemes, however,
    the effect of Law's system
  • 124:25 - 124:29
    And I think with its distinctive
    steeI shuttering,
  • 124:31 - 124:33
    to them and others at times,
  • 124:33 - 124:37
    Run Iike this, the weIfare state
    seemed to make so much sense.
  • 124:34 - 124:39
    lt was a lethal double punch for
    institutions that were forbidden by law
  • 124:37 - 124:41
    ''Quants'' sometimes refer
    to this formula as a ''black box''.
  • 124:43 - 124:48
    it's one of the grimmest pIaces
    in the whoIe of Western Europe.
  • 124:49 - 124:54
    the most extreme forms of undesirabIe
    capitaIism as practised by Jews.
  • 124:51 - 124:54
    was to generate an unsustainabIe bubbIe.
  • 124:53 - 124:56
    Japan had achieved security for aII,
  • 124:58 - 125:00
    Well, let's look inside the box.
  • 125:01 - 125:05
    In fact, average maIe Iife expectancy
    here is just 64,
  • 125:03 - 125:05
    to raise the rates they paid to savers,
  • 125:07 - 125:09
    Law had refIated the French economy
  • 125:08 - 125:10
    the eIimination of risk,
  • 125:14 - 125:18
    and which were receiving interest payments
    from local mortgage borrowers
  • 125:17 - 125:21
    whiIe at the same time
    growing so rapidIy that by 1968
  • 125:18 - 125:21
    with a combination of paper money
    and pubIic confidence.
  • 125:18 - 125:23
    The challenge Merton and Scholes
    faced was how to price an option
  • 125:22 - 125:24
    which is sIightIy worse than BangIadesh.
  • 125:22 - 125:27
    lt was, above all, the Rothschilds'
    seeming ability to permit or prohibit wars
  • 125:33 - 125:38
    That means that the average ShettIestonian
    doesn't actuaIIy Iive Iong enough
  • 125:35 - 125:39
    Now, unfortunateIy,
    his bubbIe was about to go pop.
  • 125:37 - 125:40
    it had the second-Iargest
    economy in the worId.
  • 125:38 - 125:40
    that had been fixed decades before.
  • 125:49 - 125:54
    to buy a particular stock
    on a particular date in the future,
  • 125:55 - 125:57
    to coIIect his state pension.
  • 126:01 - 126:03
    that aroused the most indignation.
  • 126:04 - 126:07
    You might think nobody wouId be mad enough
  • 126:05 - 126:10
    The response in Washington was
    to remove nearly all these restrictions.
  • 126:07 - 126:12
    taking into account the unpredictable
    movement of the price of the stock
  • 126:08 - 126:13
    One US economist even predicted
    that Japan's per-capita income
  • 126:16 - 126:21
    to try and provide financiaI services
    here. But someone does.
  • 126:28 - 126:31
    would overtake America's
    by the year 2000.
  • 126:30 - 126:32
    in the intervening period.
  • 126:36 - 126:40
    You might have thought that
    the RothschiIds actuaIIy needed war.
  • 126:44 - 126:47
    When deregulation
    was enacted in 1 982,
  • 126:48 - 126:54
    Work that option price out accurately,
    rather than just relying on guesswork,
  • 126:54 - 126:59
    After aII, some of Nathan's biggest deaIs
    had been produced by war.
  • 127:05 - 127:08
    President Reagan was cock-a-hoop.
  • 127:07 - 127:09
    By the beginning of 1 720,
  • 127:10 - 127:14
    WeIfare was working
    where warfare had faiIed -
  • 127:16 - 127:18
    AII in aII,
    I think we hit the jackpot.
  • 127:16 - 127:22
    If it hadn't been for war, 19th-century
    states wouIdn't have needed to issue bonds
  • 127:17 - 127:19
    That someone is a loan shark.
  • 127:18 - 127:22
    and you truly deserve
    the title ''rocket scientist''.
  • 127:19 - 127:23
    France was in the grip of a mania -
    the Mississippi Bubble.
  • 127:28 - 127:30
    to make Japan top nation.
  • 127:29 - 127:33
    You give him your benefit card as security
    and he gives you a loan.
  • 127:36 - 127:38
    Well, some people certainly did.
  • 127:40 - 127:42
    With wonderful mathematical wizardry,
  • 127:40 - 127:43
    for the RothschiIds to buy and seII.
  • 127:40 - 127:44
    The key turned out to be
    not a foreign empire,
  • 127:51 - 127:55
    On the day your benefit arrives,
    he gives you back the card
  • 127:51 - 127:56
    But the troubIe with war,
    and even more so with revoIution,
  • 127:55 - 127:57
    but a domestic safety net.
  • 127:55 - 128:01
    But the man responsible, the renegade
    Scots murderer and gambler, John Law,
  • 127:56 - 128:00
    the quants reduced the price
    of the option to this formula.
  • 128:07 - 128:09
    And yet, there was a catch,
  • 128:10 - 128:13
    and you go to the post office
    to get your money,
  • 128:12 - 128:18
    was that increased the risk that a debtor
    state might faiI to meet its commitments.
  • 128:12 - 128:17
    Liberated from the old constraints,
    the people running savings and loans
  • 128:16 - 128:20
    a fataI fIaw in the design
    of the post-war weIfare state.
  • 128:21 - 128:27
    repaying him the interest. lt's a modern
    version of Shylock's business model.
  • 128:23 - 128:27
    who'd risen to become master
    of the entire French economy,
  • 128:31 - 128:36
    FeeIing a IittIe bit baffIed? Finding
    the aIgebra rather tricky to foIIow?
  • 128:32 - 128:35
    suddenly saw a chance
    to make some serious money
  • 128:36 - 128:42
    Just what was it that caused those
    predictions of Japan's uItimate triumph
  • 128:37 - 128:40
    And that hit the price of existing bonds.
  • 128:41 - 128:45
    was about to discover
    an inviolable law of finance...
  • 128:50 - 128:53
    Usury is alive and well
    and living in Scotland.
  • 128:52 - 128:56
    from the once boring business
    of mortgage lending.
  • 128:53 - 128:58
    By the mid-19th century, the RothschiIds
    were no Ionger mere traders,
  • 128:56 - 128:59
    WeII, that was just fine by the quants.
  • 128:59 - 129:01
    to faiI to come true?
  • 129:06 - 129:10
    In order to make money
    from this kind of thing,
  • 129:09 - 129:11
    Trees don't grow to the sky.
  • 129:12 - 129:14
    they were fund managers,
  • 129:16 - 129:21
    By raising savings rates, they could
    attract much more money from depositors.
  • 129:19 - 129:25
    they needed markets to be fuII of peopIe
    who had no idea how to price options.
  • 129:21 - 129:26
    carefuIIy tending to a vast portfoIio
    of their own government bonds.
  • 129:21 - 129:26
    These are some pages from the Ioan book
    of a GIasgow Ioan shark.
  • 129:22 - 129:27
    The welfare state looked to be working
    smoothly enough in 1 97 0s Japan.
  • 129:39 - 129:44
    And it's kind of interesting to see how
    the business modeI works.
  • 129:41 - 129:44
    Then they could use these deposits
  • 129:43 - 129:48
    Now, they stood to Iose much more
    than to gain from confIict.
  • 129:46 - 129:50
    ln its first two years,
    Merton and Scholes's company,
  • 129:51 - 129:55
    But elsewhere, there were signs
    that all was not well.
  • 129:53 - 129:56
    as the basis
    for as many loans as they liked.
  • 129:54 - 129:56
    You Iend out maybe Ł10 to someone
  • 129:58 - 130:00
    According to Law's PR campaign,
  • 130:04 - 130:08
    Long Term Capital Management,
    made megabucks by selling options
  • 130:06 - 130:10
    and you expect to be paid back Ł12.50
    at the end of the week.
  • 130:10 - 130:15
    the huge profits he was projecting would
    come from the French colony of Louisiana,
  • 130:11 - 130:16
    The Rothschilds had helped decide
    the outcome of the Napoleonic Wars
  • 130:27 - 130:31
    ln Britain
    and throughout the western world,
  • 130:28 - 130:31
    Crucially, though,
    one thing didn't change.
  • 130:28 - 130:33
    Now that's 25% a week,
    but if you work that out at an annuaI rate
  • 130:29 - 130:33
    by putting their financial weight
    behind Britain.
  • 130:33 - 130:37
    that were never exercised because
    the buyers had guessed wrong
  • 130:33 - 130:37
    which he painted as
    a veritable Garden of Eden,
  • 130:42 - 130:45
    the welfare state, it seemed,
    had removed the incentives
  • 130:44 - 130:49
    Now they would help decide the outcome
    of the American Civil War -
  • 130:44 - 130:48
    Savers' deposits were still insured
    by the government.
  • 130:51 - 130:53
    and Long Term had got it right.
  • 130:51 - 130:54
    inhabited by friendly noble savages
  • 130:55 - 130:57
    it comes to 1 1 miIIion per cent.
  • 131:00 - 131:04
    without which a capitalist economy
    simply cannot function -
  • 131:02 - 131:05
    by choosing to sit on the sidelines.
  • 131:04 - 131:09
    They also made a killing by buying up
    all kinds of different securities
  • 131:06 - 131:09
    willing to exchange
    a cornucopia of exotic goods.
  • 131:17 - 131:22
    lt was an invitation to a gigantic
    free lunch for financial cowboys.
  • 131:19 - 131:22
    the carrot of serious money
    for those who strive,
  • 131:20 - 131:21
    GUNSHOTS
  • 131:26 - 131:29
    These would flow to France
    through a new city
  • 131:27 - 131:31
    that the rocket scientists
    thought were mispriced.
  • 131:34 - 131:40
    Once again, it was the masters of the bond
    market who would be the arbiters of war.
  • 131:42 - 131:45
    the stick of hardship
    for those who are idle.
  • 131:44 - 131:47
    at the mouth of the Mississippi,
    New Orleans,
  • 131:48 - 131:51
    So why do people scraping by
    on just Ł5.90 a day
  • 131:51 - 131:55
    Greenwich's luxury car dealers
    had never had it so good.
  • 131:55 - 131:59
    This is the Wise Circle Grill
    just outside Dallas,
  • 132:00 - 132:06
    named to flatter the always susceptible
    French Regent, the Duke of Orleans.
  • 132:11 - 132:14
    pay such horrendous interest on loans?
  • 132:13 - 132:17
    filled every lunchtime with local
    citizens of unblemished integrity.
  • 132:18 - 132:23
    Admittedly, to generate these
    huge returns, Long Term had to borrow.
  • 132:22 - 132:24
    The result was stagflation -
  • 132:26 - 132:30
    These, surely, are loans
    you'd be mad not to default on.
  • 132:33 - 132:36
    All the colony lacked was settlers.
  • 132:36 - 132:38
    low growth and high inflation.
  • 132:44 - 132:46
    This additional ''leverage'',
  • 132:44 - 132:48
    Twenty years ago,
    the clientele was rather different.
  • 132:52 - 132:57
    or gearing, allowed them to bet
    more than just their own money.
  • 132:54 - 132:58
    But here in Glasgow, defaulting on
    your loan is highly inadvisable.
  • 132:55 - 132:56
    What was to be done?
  • 133:02 - 133:07
    Grasping that Frenchmen were more
    interested in stock market speculation
  • 133:03 - 133:09
    50 years after the Battle of Waterloo,
    and on the other side of the world,
  • 133:11 - 133:17
    The city of DaIIas had more than its fair
    share of frauduIent savings and Ioans,
  • 133:13 - 133:18
    By August 1 997, the fund's capital
    was just under $7 billion,
  • 133:15 - 133:18
    One man and his pupils
    thought they knew the answer.
  • 133:20 - 133:23
    You won't literally lose a pound of flesh,
  • 133:22 - 133:25
    than the hard graft of colonisation,
  • 133:30 - 133:35
    another great war would be decided
    by the power of the bond market.
  • 133:34 - 133:39
    Law launched a recruitment drive
    in the Franco-German borderlands.
  • 133:38 - 133:43
    and this was where the DaIIas
    property cowboys came to hang out.
  • 133:39 - 133:42
    but grievous bodily harm
    isn't an unknown consequence
  • 133:41 - 133:44
    Thanks in large measure
    to their influence,
  • 133:46 - 133:51
    but the assets funded by borrowing
    amounted to 1 26 billion.
  • 133:55 - 133:59
    one of the great economic trends
    of the past 25 years
  • 133:58 - 134:00
    of letting down the loan shark.
  • 134:01 - 134:05
    The Wise CircIe GriII
    was the pIace to have brunch
  • 134:05 - 134:10
    But this time, it would be the vanquished
    who made the big bet and lost.
  • 134:14 - 134:17
    has been for the welfare state
    to be dismantled -
  • 134:20 - 134:24
    Quite simply, individual loan sharks
    have to be rapacious and ruthless
  • 134:21 - 134:26
    Several thousand bold Germans signed up
    and set sail to the promised land.
  • 134:24 - 134:29
    You might have thought that a coupIe
    of academics Iike Merton and SchoIes
  • 134:26 - 134:31
    when they weren't whooping it up
    on their Southfork-styIe ranches.
  • 134:30 - 134:33
    reintroducing people with a sharp shock
  • 134:45 - 134:49
    wouId have been scared siIIy
    by this enormous piIe of debt.
  • 134:45 - 134:50
    to the unpredictable monster
    they thought they had escaped from...
  • 134:47 - 134:52
    because the costs to them
    of even a single defaulter are so high.
  • 134:57 - 134:59
    It was aII very, very 1980s.
  • 135:02 - 135:07
    But not a bit of it. According to
    their magicaI mathematicaI formuIa,
  • 135:11 - 135:11
    Risk.
  • 135:11 - 135:13
    They ended up here.
  • 135:11 - 135:17
    To one group of DaIIas deveIopers,
    the Empire Savings and Loan Association
  • 135:23 - 135:27
    there wasn't the sIightest risk
    in being so highIy geared.
  • 135:28 - 135:32
    And that explains why,
    from Renaissance ltaly to modern Scotland,
  • 135:33 - 135:38
    The traditional view is that the key
    turning point in the American Civil War
  • 135:35 - 135:40
    offered the perfect opportunity
    to make money out of thin air...
  • 135:41 - 135:45
    Apart from anything eIse,
    Long Term was pursuing muItipIe,
  • 135:41 - 135:45
    This was the unfortunate immigrants'
    first gIimpse of Louisiana,
  • 135:53 - 135:56
    the moneylender
    is so often a hated figure.
  • 135:56 - 135:59
    came in June 1 863,
    two years into the conflict.
  • 135:58 - 136:03
    supposedIy uncorreIated trading
    strategies, around a hundred in aII,
  • 136:00 - 136:03
    or rather, out of fIat, Texan Iand.
  • 136:04 - 136:06
    an insect-infested swamp.
  • 136:10 - 136:15
    He's providing a service,
    but at a socially unacceptable price.
  • 136:15 - 136:19
    Within a year, 80% of them
    had died of starvation
  • 136:19 - 136:23
    That was the month
    when Union forces captured Jackson,
  • 136:21 - 136:23
    with over 7,600 different positions.
  • 136:25 - 136:29
    ln 1 97 6, a diminutive professor
    called Milton Friedman,
  • 136:32 - 136:36
    The surreal saga
    of Empire Savings and Loans began
  • 136:35 - 136:38
    or tropicaI diseases Iike yeIIow fever.
  • 136:38 - 136:40
    the Mississippi state capital,
  • 136:42 - 136:45
    One of these might go wrong,
    or possibIy even two.
  • 136:47 - 136:51
    SadIy for Law,
    the Mississippi Company's principaI asset,
  • 136:48 - 136:52
    and forced a Confederate army
    to retreat westward to Vicksburg,
  • 136:48 - 136:51
    working here at the University of Chicago,
  • 136:50 - 136:53
    when chairman Spencer Blain teamed up
  • 136:57 - 137:02
    So how did Ienders Iearn to overcome
    this fundamentaI probIem?
  • 136:59 - 137:04
    But sureIy aII the bets they'd pIaced
    couIdn't possibIy go wrong simuItaneousIy.
  • 137:04 - 137:06
    won the Nobel Prize in Economics.
  • 137:04 - 137:09
    with a flamboyant high-school dropout
    turned property developer
  • 137:07 - 137:12
    its monopoIy on trade with Louisiana,
    Iooked Iike being more or Iess worthIess.
  • 137:08 - 137:10
    their backs to the Mississippi River.
  • 137:15 - 137:19
    If they were too generous,
    they didn't make any money,
  • 137:25 - 137:29
    MiIton Friedman won his pIace
    in the economic haII of fame
  • 137:26 - 137:31
    named Danny Faulkner, whose speciality
    was extravagant generosity...
  • 137:30 - 137:35
    Surrounded, with Union gunboats
    bombarding their positions from behind,
  • 137:31 - 137:36
    but if they were too hard-nosed,
    borrowers wouId eventuaIIy defauIt.
  • 137:33 - 137:37
    Long Term was trading
    in markets all over the world.
  • 137:41 - 137:43
    by restating this simpIe equation.
  • 137:50 - 137:52
    with other people's money.
  • 137:50 - 137:53
    But the firm's biggest business
  • 137:51 - 137:57
    The answer was to get bigger and more
    powerfuI. It was time to invent banks.
  • 137:53 - 137:54
    MV = PQ,
  • 137:54 - 137:58
    the Southerners held out for a month
    before laying down their arms.
  • 137:54 - 137:58
    As the inscription
    on this Dutch cartoon put it,
  • 138:00 - 138:01
    COINS CASCADE
  • 138:06 - 138:10
    was selling options on American
    and European stock markets...
  • 138:11 - 138:15
    The money in question
    came in the form of deposit accounts
  • 138:12 - 138:14
    where M is the money suppIy,
  • 138:12 - 138:17
    ''This is the wondrous Mississippi land
    made famous by her share dealings,
  • 138:23 - 138:25
    V is the veIocity at which it circuIates,
  • 138:33 - 138:37
    on which Empire paid
    alluringly high interest rates.
  • 138:35 - 138:39
    After Vicksburg, the Mississippi
    was firmly in the hands of the North.
  • 138:36 - 138:38
    P is the price IeveI
  • 138:39 - 138:44
    ''which through deceit and devious conduct
    has squandered countless treasures.
  • 138:44 - 138:46
    ..options that would be cashed in
  • 138:45 - 138:47
    and Q is the quantity of expenditures.
  • 138:51 - 138:55
    This is FauIkner Point,
    one of the very first deveIopments
  • 138:53 - 138:57
    if there were big future stock price
    movements, up or down.
  • 138:54 - 138:57
    The South was literally split in two.
  • 138:55 - 139:00
    ln 1 5th century ltaly, the key financial
    service of providing credit
  • 138:58 - 139:01
    Friedman's observation was simpIe -
  • 139:10 - 139:14
    if the money suppIy went up,
    then so did the price IeveI.
  • 139:11 - 139:16
    ''However men regard the shares,
    it is wind and smoke and nothing more. ''
  • 139:16 - 139:20
    that Danny FauIkner ever buiIt,
    and it spawned a veritabIe empire
  • 139:22 - 139:26
    At the time, the high prices
    these options were fetching
  • 139:23 - 139:27
    moved out of the ghetto to become
    the legitimate preserve of banks.
  • 139:30 - 139:33
    Hence, the Quantity Theory of Money.
  • 139:33 - 139:37
    Yet this military setback
    wasn't the decisive factor
  • 139:39 - 139:43
    implied that the markets
    would become particularly volatile.
  • 139:40 - 139:44
    of FauIkner Crest, FauIkner Creek,
    FauIkner Crescent,
  • 139:42 - 139:46
    But you needed much more than
    a piece of chaIk and a bIackboard
  • 139:49 - 139:54
    This transition was symbolised
    by the rise of one family - the Medici.
  • 139:56 - 139:59
    To Law, economic success
    was all about confidence.
  • 139:56 - 140:01
    in the South's ultimate defeat.
    The real turning point came earlier.
  • 140:01 - 140:06
    to answer the second cruciaI question
    of MiIton Friedman's career -
  • 140:02 - 140:04
    FauIkner Fountains, FauIkner Oaks.
  • 140:17 - 140:20
    But Long Term
    thought this was wrong.
  • 140:20 - 140:23
    Danny FauIkner's favourite trick
    was ''the fIip''.
  • 140:21 - 140:22
    And it was financial.
  • 140:22 - 140:24
    But this was a confidence trick.
  • 140:22 - 140:26
    what had gone wrong
    with the weIfare state?
  • 140:38 - 140:44
    He'd buy some parceI of Iand for peanuts,
    and then seII it on to naive investors
  • 140:39 - 140:42
    With their ascent, credit came of age.
  • 140:45 - 140:50
    According to their calculations,
    market volatility would actually decline,
  • 140:48 - 140:49
    THUNDER RUMBLES
  • 140:51 - 140:55
    ln Chile, he found the perfect
    laboratory to test his theories.
  • 140:53 - 140:56
    200 miles downstream from Vicksburg,
  • 141:03 - 141:06
    Moneylending ceased to be disreputable.
  • 141:10 - 141:15
    where the Mississippi joins the Gulf
    of Mexico, lies the port of New Orleans.
  • 141:10 - 141:13
    ln Paris, the first rumours
    began to circulate
  • 141:13 - 141:15
    who got the money Ient to them by -
  • 141:13 - 141:19
    and that meant the chances of investors
    exercising their options would be low too.
  • 141:17 - 141:21
    lt became glorious - and the foundation
    of a new kind of power.
  • 141:29 - 141:32
    you've guessed it -
    Empire Savings and Loans.
  • 141:30 - 141:32
    that all was not well with Law's system.
  • 141:36 - 141:40
    So Long Term piled the options
    high and sold them cheap.
  • 141:42 - 141:45
    ln September 1 97 3, tanks
    had rolled through Santiago
  • 141:44 - 141:48
    The share price of the Mississippi Company
    began to slide.
  • 141:58 - 142:02
    Danny FauIkner may have cIaimed
    that he was iIIiterate,
  • 141:59 - 142:03
    The dazzling legacy
    of the Medici family's power
  • 142:02 - 142:03
    This is Fort Pike,
  • 142:05 - 142:07
    to overthrow the government
  • 142:14 - 142:17
    of Chile's Marxist president,
    Salvador Allende,
  • 142:14 - 142:17
    still surrounds you in Florence today.
  • 142:15 - 142:20
    buiIt after 1812 to protect New OrIeans
    from a future British attack.
  • 142:16 - 142:17
    Sounds risky?
  • 142:18 - 142:20
    but he certainIy wasn't innumerate.
  • 142:28 - 142:33
    They estimated their risk of going bust
    at one in ten to the power of 24.
  • 142:31 - 142:35
    whose attempt to turn the country
    into a communist state
  • 142:32 - 142:37
    ln a desperate bid to avert meltdown,
    Law called on the Duke of Orleans
  • 142:39 - 142:43
    In the space of 400 years,
    two Medici became Queens of France,
  • 142:41 - 142:47
    But 50 years Iater, it wasn't abIe to
    protect the South from a Northern attack
  • 142:43 - 142:48
    Many investors never even got a chance
    to view their properties close up.
  • 142:49 - 142:51
    had ended in total economic chaos
  • 142:55 - 143:00
    to cut the official share price
    from 9,000 livres to 5,000.
  • 143:01 - 143:03
    three became Pope.
  • 143:01 - 143:04
    ln other words, virtually zero.
  • 143:02 - 143:06
    and a call by the Chilean Parliament
    for a military coup.
  • 143:07 - 143:12
    Faulkner would simply fly them over
    in his helicopter without landing.
  • 143:09 - 143:13
    when Captain David Farragut seized
    New OrIeans on ApriI 28th, 1862.
  • 143:14 - 143:18
    AppropriateIy, it was MachiaveIIi,
    the supreme theorist of power,
  • 143:30 - 143:33
    lt was as if they really were
    on another planet,
  • 143:31 - 143:34
    This was when the limits
    of royal absolutism,
  • 143:37 - 143:39
    who wrote their history.
  • 143:39 - 143:41
    It was a cruciaI moment in the CiviI War
  • 143:43 - 143:47
    By 1 984, property development
    in Texas was out of control,
  • 143:47 - 143:51
    the foundation of Law's system,
    suddenly became apparent.
  • 143:52 - 143:58
    as New OrIeans was the principaI outIet
    for the South's most important export...
  • 143:53 - 143:57
    far from the mundane
    ups and downs of terrestrial markets.
  • 144:00 - 144:04
    Perhaps no other family
    left such an imprint on an age
  • 144:08 - 144:10
    paid for by government-guaranteed deposits
  • 144:13 - 144:14
    ln October 1 997,
  • 144:19 - 144:21
    as the Medici left on the Renaissance.
  • 144:22 - 144:27
    that were effectively going straight
    into the pockets of the developers.
  • 144:26 - 144:29
    Within weeks, the share price
    was in freefall.
  • 144:27 - 144:32
    as if to prove that Long Term
    really was the ultimate Brains Trust,
  • 144:28 - 144:32
    Up there on the baIcony
    of the Carrera HoteI,
  • 144:32 - 144:36
    You might even say that they paid
    for the Renaissance,
  • 144:35 - 144:36
    ..cotton.
  • 144:42 - 144:45
    Angry crowds gathered outside Law's bank.
  • 144:42 - 144:46
    opponents of the AIIende regime
    ceIebrated with champagne
  • 144:45 - 144:49
    Without control over the cotton trade
    the South's cause was doomed -
  • 144:47 - 144:52
    Merton and Scholes were awarded
    the Nobel Prize in economics.
  • 144:50 - 144:55
    their patronage running the gamut of
    genius from Michelangelo to Galileo.
  • 144:55 - 144:58
    On paper at least,
    the assets of Empire had grown
  • 145:01 - 145:05
    as air force jets fIew overhead
    to bomb the Moneda PaIace.
  • 145:02 - 145:04
    Stones were thrown, windows broken.
  • 145:09 - 145:09
    APPLAUSE
  • 145:10 - 145:13
    because cotton had become
    the essential ingredient
  • 145:18 - 145:22
    from $1 2 million to $257 million
    in just over two years.
  • 145:20 - 145:21
    WHISTLING, EXPLOSION
  • 145:20 - 145:24
    By December, the shares had lost
    more than 90% of their value.
  • 145:29 - 145:34
    in an ambitious scheme to bring
    the bond market into the war.
  • 145:50 - 145:54
    The troubIe was that the demand
    for condos by Interstate 30
  • 145:53 - 145:58
    And this, in the Uffizi GaIIery,
    is the Medici's private art coIIection,
  • 145:56 - 146:00
    It seemed as if inteIIect
    had triumphed over intuition,
  • 146:11 - 146:14
    Like the ltalian city states
    500 years before,
  • 146:12 - 146:16
    couId never possibIy have kept up
    with the vast suppIy
  • 146:15 - 146:19
    as if rocket science
    had taken over from risk-taking.
  • 146:18 - 146:21
    one of the most spectacuIar
    ever assembIed.
  • 146:19 - 146:23
    Here in the paIace, AIIende prepared
    to make a desperate Iast stand,
  • 146:29 - 146:33
    that was being generated
    by FauIkner, BIain and their cronies.
  • 146:32 - 146:35
    Equipped with
    their magicaI bIack box,
  • 146:32 - 146:37
    the Confederate Treasury
    had initially raised money for the war
  • 146:33 - 146:39
    This French map from 1 730 gives an
    absoIuteIy wonderfuI visuaI representation
  • 146:41 - 146:46
    armed with an AK-47 presented to him
    by his Cuban roIe modeI, FideI Castro.
  • 146:44 - 146:48
    the partners in LTCM
    seemed poised to make money
  • 146:50 - 146:53
    When the reguIators finaIIy
    bIew the whistIe in 1984,
  • 146:50 - 146:53
    by selling bonds to its own citizens.
  • 147:02 - 147:05
    far beyond the wiIdest imaginings
    of even George Soros.
  • 147:03 - 147:06
    of the worId's first stock market bubbIe.
  • 147:06 - 147:08
    that reaIity couId no Ionger be escaped,
  • 147:12 - 147:17
    But there was a finite amount of capital
    available in the South.
  • 147:14 - 147:19
    What the millions of tourists
    who flock here generally forget to ask
  • 147:15 - 147:18
    Here at the top is the goddess Fortuna,
  • 147:17 - 147:20
    and hundreds of the buiIdings
    that they erected
  • 147:18 - 147:20
    And then, in the summer of 1998,
  • 147:26 - 147:29
    pouring down goodies
    from her horn of pIenty.
  • 147:30 - 147:33
    ended up being buIIdozed
    or burnt to the ground.
  • 147:33 - 147:36
    when every seIf-respecting
    hedge fund manager
  • 147:34 - 147:37
    To survive, the Confederacy
    looked to Europe
  • 147:40 - 147:43
    is how the Medici paid for all this.
  • 147:45 - 147:49
    Here are the happy investors
    receiving their shares
  • 147:46 - 147:47
    Today, 24 years on,
  • 147:46 - 147:49
    shouId have been pIaying with his yacht,
  • 147:55 - 148:00
    in the hope that the world's greatest
    financial dynasty might help them
  • 147:57 - 147:59
    it's stiII a Texan wasteIand.
  • 147:57 - 148:02
    something happened that
    threatened to bIow the Iid right off
  • 148:00 - 148:03
    in the Mississippi Company
    from fIying cherubs.
  • 148:02 - 148:06
    The simpIe answer is that they were
    foreign exchange deaIers,
  • 148:11 - 148:16
    Looking out the paIace window
    and seeing the tanks IiteraIIy roIIing in,
  • 148:15 - 148:17
    the NobeI Prize-winners' bIack box.
  • 148:15 - 148:19
    But down beIow, there are some
    other cherubs chopping up the shares
  • 148:17 - 148:21
    beat the North as they had helped
    Wellington beat Napoleon.
  • 148:19 - 148:24
    ln 1 991, Faulkner and Blain were both
    convicted and jailed for fraud.
  • 148:20 - 148:26
    members of the Arte de Cambio - the
    money changers' guiId - who made it big.
  • 148:25 - 148:27
    ReaIity started to misbehave.
  • 148:33 - 148:35
    beside a shattered printing press.
  • 148:36 - 148:41
    AIIende reaIised that it was aII over
    for his dream of a Marxist ChiIe.
  • 148:42 - 148:45
    And there are two more cherubs
    bIowing bubbIes.
  • 148:45 - 148:49
    One investigator called Empire
    ''one of the most reckless
  • 148:48 - 148:53
    They were known as banchieri or tavoIieri
    because, Iike the Jews of Venice,
  • 148:54 - 148:58
    lnitially, the Confederacy
    had grounds for optimism.
  • 148:56 - 149:00
    To the right, there are four
    very unhappy Iooking men,
  • 148:58 - 149:02
    Cornered here in what was Ieft
    of the presidentiaI quarters,
  • 149:00 - 149:05
    ln evolution, big extinctions
    tend to be caused by outside shocks,
  • 149:06 - 149:11
    ''and fraudulent land investment schemes
    in American history. ''
  • 149:13 - 149:17
    they IiteraIIy did their business
    sitting on benches behind tabIes.
  • 149:15 - 149:20
    one of whom is preparing to commit suicide
    by faIIing on his sword.
  • 149:19 - 149:21
    he took the decision to shoot himseIf.
  • 149:22 - 149:26
    ln New York, the Rothschilds' agent
    was sympathetic,
  • 149:25 - 149:28
    like an asteroid hitting the Earth.
  • 149:32 - 149:36
    ln all, nearly 500 savings and loans
    collapsed.
  • 149:35 - 149:38
    Indeed, the originaI Medici bank -
    or bench -
  • 149:40 - 149:43
    having opposed the North's leader,
    Abraham Lincoln
  • 149:46 - 149:48
    On Monday August 1 7th, 1 998,
  • 149:48 - 149:52
    As if pricked by a sword,
    the Mississippi Bubble had now burst.
  • 149:51 - 149:56
    was Iocated right here in the Via
    deII'Arte deIIa Lana - WooI GuiId Street.
  • 149:53 - 149:55
    According to one official estimate,
  • 149:56 - 149:59
    in the presidential election of 1 860.
  • 150:05 - 150:08
    nearly half had seen
    ''criminal conduct by insiders''.
  • 150:05 - 150:08
    a giant asteroid smashed
    into Planet Finance.
  • 150:10 - 150:12
    MILITARY BAND PLAYS
  • 150:24 - 150:30
    lt was at this moment that Law, vilified
    by the French people, fled the country.
  • 150:25 - 150:30
    And - surprise, surprise - it struck
    on the other side of the world
  • 150:28 - 150:32
    35 years later, you can still see
    the bullet holes
  • 150:39 - 150:41
    But still the Rothschilds hesitated.
  • 150:43 - 150:46
    in some of the buildings
    around the square.
  • 150:50 - 150:54
    The full cost of the crisis
    was $1 53 billion,
  • 150:54 - 150:59
    Lending to the British government to help
    defeat Napoleon had been one thing.
  • 150:54 - 150:57
    in an especially flaky emerging market.
  • 151:00 - 151:05
    Prior to the 1 390s, the Medici were
    Florence's answer to the Sopranos -
  • 151:03 - 151:06
    He never saw his wife and daughter again.
  • 151:16 - 151:19
    What happened here in September 1973
  • 151:20 - 151:25
    making it one of the most expensive
    financial crises in American history.
  • 151:21 - 151:26
    But buying bonds from a bunch of
    breakaway Southern slave states
  • 151:28 - 151:33
    a small-time clan notable more
    for low violence than for high finance.
  • 151:30 - 151:33
    He spent the rest of his life in Venice,
  • 151:33 - 151:36
    Weakened by political upheaval,
    declining oil revenues
  • 151:34 - 151:38
    in many ways epitomised
    a worIdwide crisis of the weIfare state,
  • 151:42 - 151:45
    And the federal government
    which had deregulated
  • 151:42 - 151:46
    dividing his time between writing
    long, self-justifying letters
  • 151:47 - 151:49
    seemed a risk too far.
  • 151:54 - 151:58
    and posed a stark choice between
    aIternative economic systems.
  • 151:54 - 151:59
    and a botched privatisation, the ailing
    Russian financial system collapsed.
  • 151:57 - 152:00
    the savings and loans in the first place
  • 151:59 - 152:01
    The Rothschilds decided to stay out.
  • 152:06 - 152:07
    and gambling.
  • 152:10 - 152:16
    ln a 1 7-year period, no fewer than
    five Medici were sentenced to death
  • 152:12 - 152:18
    had to pick up the bill, which is another
    way of saying that taxpayers forked out.
  • 152:16 - 152:19
    With output coIIapsing
    and infIation rampant,
  • 152:16 - 152:17
    He died in 1 729.
  • 152:21 - 152:25
    A desperate Russian government
    was driven to default on its debts,
  • 152:31 - 152:35
    ChiIe's system of universaI benefits
    was effectiveIy bankrupt.
  • 152:33 - 152:36
    by the criminal courts for capital crimes.
  • 152:43 - 152:48
    fuelling the fires of volatility
    throughout the world's financial system.
  • 152:46 - 152:47
    Yet despite this setback,
  • 152:46 - 152:50
    It was the first cIear sign
    that there might be a downside
  • 152:51 - 152:53
    For AIIende, the onIy soIution
  • 153:00 - 153:05
    the Confederate government
    had an ingenious trick up their sleeves.
  • 153:02 - 153:06
    was fuII-bIown, Soviet-styIe
    takeover of the entire economy.
  • 153:06 - 153:09
    Then came Giovanni di Bicci de' Medici.
  • 153:06 - 153:09
    to the idea
    of the property-owning democracy.
  • 153:07 - 153:09
    Stock markets plunged.
  • 153:13 - 153:17
    ln France, however,
    his devastating legacy lived on.
  • 153:22 - 153:26
    The generaIs and their supporters
    knew they didn't want that,
  • 153:22 - 153:26
    The trick, like the sleeves themselves,
    was made of cotton.
  • 153:23 - 153:27
    lt was his aim to make the Medici
    totally legitimate.
  • 153:26 - 153:30
    Remember all those low-cost
    options Long Term had sold
  • 153:29 - 153:33
    Yet the savings and loans crisis
    was a mere tremor
  • 153:38 - 153:42
    Law's bubbIe and bust fataIIy
    set back France's financiaI deveIopment,
  • 153:39 - 153:41
    but what did they actuaIIy want,
  • 153:43 - 153:47
    based on their prediction
    of low stock market volatility?
  • 153:44 - 153:49
    Part of the secret of his success was
    an ingenious bit of creative accounting
  • 153:49 - 153:52
    compared with the property earthquake
  • 153:50 - 153:53
    given that the status quo
    was unsustainabIe?
  • 153:59 - 154:04
    The South's idea was to use cotton
    as collateral to back its bonds.
  • 154:01 - 154:05
    that would strike the US market
    20 years later.
  • 154:02 - 154:05
    The ones they thought
    no-one would ever exercise?
  • 154:04 - 154:05
    Enter MiIton Friedman.
  • 154:04 - 154:10
    putting Frenchmen off paper money and
    stock markets for more than a generation.
  • 154:12 - 154:16
    that got the Medici off the hook
    of the anti-usury laws.
  • 154:23 - 154:25
    Well, now they did.
  • 154:30 - 154:35
    lnvestors would be comforted to know
    that if the interest payments dried up
  • 154:30 - 154:34
    The French monarchy's fiscaI crisis
    went unresoIved
  • 154:32 - 154:36
    The quants had predicted
    that Long Term was highly unlikely
  • 154:40 - 154:41
    ln March 1 97 5,
  • 154:41 - 154:44
    Savings and loans
    was an all-American crisis.
  • 154:45 - 154:49
    and for the rest of the reign of Louis XV
    and Louis XVI,
  • 154:52 - 154:56
    Friedman flew from Chicago
    to Chile to answer that question.
  • 154:53 - 154:56
    to lose more than $35 million
    in a single day.
  • 154:55 - 154:59
    they could still demand
    their cotton instead.
  • 154:59 - 155:01
    But the sub-prime quake
  • 155:01 - 155:04
    These Iedgers of the Medici bank
    make it cIear
  • 155:03 - 155:05
    the crown Iived from hand to mouth.
  • 155:10 - 155:14
    would shake the entire world of finance
    to its very foundations.
  • 155:13 - 155:14
    SOLDIER SHOUTS ORDERS
  • 155:18 - 155:23
    how important commerciaI biIIs for
    financing foreign trade were to the bank.
  • 155:18 - 155:21
    On Friday August 21 st,
    it lost $550 million -
  • 155:22 - 155:24
    The South's agents went to work
  • 155:28 - 155:32
    Eventually, France was driven
    by royal bankruptcy to revolution.
  • 155:32 - 155:36
    selling the bonds
    in the financial centres of Europe.
  • 155:39 - 155:44
    True, the Church prohibited
    the coIIection of interest on Ioans.
  • 155:42 - 155:44
    1 5% of its entire capital.
  • 155:53 - 155:56
    ln addition to giving
    lectures and seminars,
  • 156:01 - 156:06
    Now that, according to the Long Term
    risk models, was next to impossible.
  • 156:02 - 156:05
    But there was nothing to prevent
    a shrewd trader
  • 156:04 - 156:06
    When this wall was built
  • 156:05 - 156:09
    When the Confederacy tried to market
    conventional bonds
  • 156:07 - 156:10
    Friedman came here,
    to the Moneda Palace,
  • 156:14 - 156:19
    from making money on transactions Iike
    these, which invoIved muItipIe currencies.
  • 156:17 - 156:22
    to divide white homeowners
    from black renters in the 1 940s,
  • 156:21 - 156:26
    for a meeting with the new Chilean
    president, General Augusto Pinochet.
  • 156:23 - 156:26
    in European financial centres
    like Amsterdam's,
  • 156:28 - 156:30
    The traders in Greenwich stared
  • 156:37 - 156:41
    black families found it virtually
    impossible to get mortgages.
  • 156:40 - 156:43
    slack-jawed and glassy-eyed
    at their screens.
  • 156:41 - 156:44
    investors wouldn't touch them
    with a bargepole.
  • 156:41 - 156:46
    The Mississippi Bubble of 1 7 1 9 was
    the first stock market bubble in history.
  • 156:53 - 156:56
    There was no interest,
    and therefore no sin,
  • 156:54 - 156:59
    But when an obscure French firm
    named EmiIe ErIanger and Company
  • 156:56 - 156:58
    lt couldn't be happening.
  • 157:03 - 157:06
    Sixty years later,
    that had all changed.
  • 157:06 - 157:12
    simply a commission deducted for the
    conversion of one currency into another.
  • 157:07 - 157:11
    Friedman spent three-quarters
    of an hour with Pinochet,
  • 157:09 - 157:10
    But it was.
  • 157:15 - 157:18
    But it's been by no means the largest.
  • 157:19 - 157:23
    offered cotton-backed bonds,
    it was a compIeteIy different story.
  • 157:23 - 157:27
    urging him to reduce the government
    deficit that he'd identified
  • 157:27 - 157:31
    When we think of stock market bubbles,
    we think of this.
  • 157:34 - 157:38
    ''We want everybody in America
    to own their own home, ''
  • 157:39 - 157:43
    The key to the success
    of the ErIanger bonds
  • 157:41 - 157:45
    as the main cause of
    Chile's sky-high inflation -
  • 157:46 - 157:49
    By the end of the month,
    Long Term was down 45%.
  • 157:51 - 157:55
    President George WBush declared
    in October 2002, challenging lenders
  • 157:54 - 157:57
    was that they couId be
    converted into cotton
  • 157:57 - 158:01
    lf money was advanced to a particular
    trader for any length of time,
  • 158:00 - 158:03
    then running at
    an annual rate of 900%.
  • 158:07 - 158:11
    at the pre-war price of six pence a pound.
  • 158:11 - 158:14
    The nightmare
    that haunts the world of finance,
  • 158:15 - 158:18
    to create 5.5 million
    new minority homeowners
  • 158:18 - 158:20
    the commission was that bit larger.
  • 158:28 - 158:32
    which has returned to haunt us
    in the last few months,
  • 158:28 - 158:34
    The only chance of survival was to find
    a financial white knight to rescue them.
  • 158:29 - 158:32
    A month after Friedman's visit,
  • 158:36 - 158:41
    These cotton bonds formed the basis
    of the South's new financial strategy.
  • 158:38 - 158:39
    by the end of the decade.
  • 158:40 - 158:45
    the Chilean junta announced that inflation
    would be stopped at any cost.
  • 158:45 - 158:50
    is that there could ever be a bust
    to match the Great Wall Street Crash,
  • 158:52 - 158:57
    Positively encouraged by the federal
    government to relax lending standards,
  • 158:54 - 158:59
    ln the same way, depositors
    who put their money in the Medici bank
  • 158:59 - 159:03
    lf they could restrict
    the supply of cotton, its value,
  • 158:59 - 159:04
    And the most powerfuI knight in town
    was none other than George Soros.
  • 159:08 - 159:11
    which began on October 24th 1 929,
    Black Thursday.
  • 159:10 - 159:13
    The regime cut government
    spending by 27%.
  • 159:16 - 159:21
    were given 'discrezione' to compensate
    them for risking their money.
  • 159:19 - 159:23
    mortgage companies swarmed
    into areas like this one,
  • 159:20 - 159:24
    and the value of the bonds,
    would increase.
  • 159:23 - 159:25
    It was the uItimate humiIiation -
  • 159:33 - 159:37
    the quants from PIanet Finance
    begging for a baiI-out
  • 159:34 - 159:39
    Over the next three years, the US stock
    market declined a staggering 86%,
  • 159:34 - 159:38
    At the same time, the Confederates
    set out to use cotton
  • 159:38 - 159:41
    offering all kinds of alluring deals.
  • 159:39 - 159:41
    This was credit, in other words,
  • 159:51 - 159:54
    but with the interest payments
    discreetly concealed.
  • 159:52 - 159:56
    from the prophet of irrationaI,
    unquantifiabIe refIexivity.
  • 159:55 - 159:59
    to blackmail the most powerful country
    in the world -
  • 160:00 - 160:04
    ''This problem of inflation
    is not of recent origin.
  • 160:02 - 160:04
    reaching its nadir in June 1 932.
  • 160:09 - 160:10
    Britain.
  • 160:11 - 160:15
    Now, for the first time,
    moneylending had evolved into banking.
  • 160:20 - 160:23
    (NiaII) That must have been
    a very tense meeting.
  • 160:20 - 160:24
    Because so many of the new borrowers
    had patchy credit histories,
  • 160:21 - 160:26
    ''lt arises from trends towards
    socialism that started 40 years ago,
  • 160:31 - 160:35
    Do you remember the atmosphere
    in the room, or am I...?
  • 160:35 - 160:39
    (Tour guide) The routes
    to the United States of America
  • 160:42 - 160:46
    these loans came to be known
    as ''sub-prime''.
  • 160:46 - 160:51
    I remember he came for breakfast
    and it wasn't at aII tense, because...
  • 160:49 - 160:54
    ''and reached their logical and terrible
    climax in the Allende regime. ''
  • 160:51 - 160:54
    provided Liverpool
    with growing volumes of trade
  • 161:01 - 161:04
    What was worse,
    this asset price deflation
  • 161:05 - 161:10
    and new docks opened on the Mersey
    in quick succession during the 1 800s.
  • 161:09 - 161:13
    The reaI story of the success
    of the Medici bank
  • 161:17 - 161:20
    was accompanied by the worst
    depression in all history.
  • 161:18 - 161:20
    Of course, he was tense
  • 161:27 - 161:31
    can be found here in the Libro Segreto -
    the Secret Book -
  • 161:34 - 161:37
    but I wasn't because
    I wasn't putting in the money.
  • 161:34 - 161:39
    (Narrator) ln 1 860, the Port of Liverpool
    was the principal gateway
  • 161:44 - 161:48
    That made you a perfect candidate
    for a NlNJ A loan.
  • 161:46 - 161:52
    of Giovanni di Bicci de' Medici. The key
    was not so much size as diversification.
  • 161:49 - 161:52
    There was to be no
    white knight for Long Term.
  • 161:54 - 161:58
    for imports of cotton
    to the British textile industry,
  • 161:57 - 162:01
    For tendering this advice,
    Friedman found himself denounced
  • 161:58 - 162:02
    ln the United States,
    output collapsed by nearly a third.
  • 162:10 - 162:14
    then the mainstay
    of the Victorian industriaI economy.
  • 162:12 - 162:15
    The problem was that behind
    low introductory payments,
  • 162:16 - 162:19
    for acting as a consultant
    to a military dictator
  • 162:17 - 162:22
    I feIt that it was too dangerous
    and that I didn't have enough capitaI
  • 162:17 - 162:20
    EarIier ItaIian banks had been monoIithic
  • 162:18 - 162:23
    Unemployment reached a quarter
    of the civilian labour force.
  • 162:27 - 162:31
    these new mortgage loans
    were very different from the old,
  • 162:29 - 162:34
    More than 80% of the cotton
    came from the Southern United States.
  • 162:33 - 162:38
    responsible for the executions of more
    than 2,000 real and suspected communists,
  • 162:33 - 162:37
    and very vuInerabIe to defauIt
    by a singIe bad borrower.
  • 162:45 - 162:48
    and, in fact, it reaIIy required
    the coordinated actions
  • 162:48 - 162:51
    30-year fixed-rate repayment loans
    of the past.
  • 162:50 - 162:53
    Now that gave
    the Confederate Ieadership hope
  • 162:51 - 162:56
    But the Medici bank was made up
    of muItipIe interIocking partnerships,
  • 163:01 - 163:02
    Since the 1980s,
  • 163:01 - 163:04
    and the torture of nearly 30,000 more.
  • 163:03 - 163:08
    that they had the Ieverage to bring
    in Britain on their side in the CiviI War.
  • 163:10 - 163:12
    of aII the banks to baiI out LTCM.
  • 163:10 - 163:12
    Why did the 1 929 crash happen?
  • 163:13 - 163:19
    the housing game has radicaIIy changed
    throughout the EngIish-speaking worId.
  • 163:15 - 163:18
    each in some measure independent
    of the rest.
  • 163:28 - 163:32
    To ratchet up the pressure,
    they decided to impose an embargo
  • 163:29 - 163:34
    It was this decentraIisation that was
    the key to their astonishing profits.
  • 163:36 - 163:39
    Why, indeed,
    does any crash happen?
  • 163:36 - 163:39
    Mortgages are for shorter
    and shorter durations
  • 163:47 - 163:50
    on aII shipments of cotton to LiverpooI.
  • 163:48 - 163:51
    And that's precisely what happened.
  • 163:51 - 163:56
    and more and more borrowers are
    opting for interest-onIy mortgages.
  • 163:54 - 163:59
    This remains one of the most hotly
    debated questions in financial history.
  • 164:09 - 164:14
    Fearful that Long Term's failure could
    trigger a general financial meltdown,
  • 164:11 - 164:13
    Under Giovanni's guidance,
  • 164:11 - 164:17
    That makes househoIds far more sensitive
    than they were to interest-rate hikes.
  • 164:20 - 164:25
    the Medici banking network extended
    from Florence, to Venice, to Rome.
  • 164:22 - 164:25
    For a while, the South's strategy
    worked brilliantly.
  • 164:35 - 164:40
    the New York Federal Reserve hastily
    brokered a multi-billion-dollar bail-out
  • 164:38 - 164:43
    Cotton prices soared. So did the value
    of the Confederates' cotton-backed bonds.
  • 164:39 - 164:41
    Chicago's roIe in ChiIe's new regime
  • 164:42 - 164:47
    So how come the lenders didn't worry
    that these sub-prime borrowers
  • 164:48 - 164:53
    There are all kinds of technical
    explanations for stock market crashes.
  • 164:51 - 164:54
    The scale and diversity
    of the Medici's operations
  • 164:52 - 164:57
    consisted of more than just a visit
    by MiIton Friedman, however.
  • 164:57 - 164:59
    by 1 4 Wall Street banks.
  • 165:04 - 165:08
    were almost certain to default
    if interest rates rose?
  • 165:05 - 165:07
    What on earth had happened?
  • 165:07 - 165:11
    And the cotton embargo
    devastated the British economy.
  • 165:10 - 165:15
    Since the 1950s, there'd been a steady
    stream of bright, young economists
  • 165:11 - 165:15
    was the key to reducing the risks
    of moneylending,
  • 165:12 - 165:15
    But at root,
    it's all about herd psychology.
  • 165:18 - 165:22
    Why was Soros so right and
    the giant brains at Long Term so wrong?
  • 165:24 - 165:26
    The answer to that question
  • 165:26 - 165:29
    and therefore also the costs to borrowers.
  • 165:32 - 165:35
    Mills were forced to lay off workers.
  • 165:33 - 165:37
    going from this pIace,
    the CathoIic University in Santiago,
  • 165:39 - 165:43
    and the key to the sub-prime crisis
    was another ''S'' word...
  • 165:43 - 165:47
    That's the essential difference
    between loan sharks and banks -
  • 165:49 - 165:53
    Eventually, in late 1 862,
    production all but ceased.
  • 165:51 - 165:53
    to study in Chicago,
  • 165:53 - 165:57
    ln a bull market,
    that's when share prices are rising,
  • 165:58 - 166:03
    and they'd come back convinced
    of the need to baIance the budget,
  • 166:06 - 166:08
    between Shylock and the Medici.
  • 166:09 - 166:13
    For one thing, this wasn't
    a coolly logical Planet Finance.
  • 166:15 - 166:17
    even the smartest investors can succumb
  • 166:17 - 166:20
    tighten the money suppIy,
    and IiberaIise trade.
  • 166:28 - 166:32
    to what the former chairman
    of the American Federal Reserve,
  • 166:31 - 166:34
    These were the Chicago Boys,
    Friedman's foot soIdiers.
  • 166:32 - 166:37
    lt was still dear old Planet Earth,
    inhabited by emotional human beings
  • 166:39 - 166:42
    And here's the proof that it worked.
  • 166:43 - 166:47
    Alan Greenspan,
    famously called ''irrational exuberance''.
  • 166:46 - 166:52
    This cotton miII in StyaI, south of
    Manchester, empIoyed around 400 workers,
  • 166:48 - 166:51
    Instead of putting
    their own money at risk,
  • 166:50 - 166:52
    And yet the most radicaI of their ideas
  • 166:50 - 166:54
    Page after page of Giovanni's assets,
    decIared for tax purposes
  • 166:58 - 167:00
    with a stampede mentality.
  • 167:01 - 167:05
    sub-prime Ienders
    immediateIy soId the Ioans on
  • 167:05 - 167:09
    went beyond what Friedman
    had recommended to Pinochet.
  • 167:07 - 167:10
    But when the herd changes direction,
  • 167:16 - 167:20
    but that was just a fraction
    of the 500,000 peopIe
  • 167:17 - 167:21
    There was, however, another
    reason why Long Term failed.
  • 167:18 - 167:21
    to banks here, in and around WaII Street.
  • 167:18 - 167:23
    sometimes in reaction to nothing more
    than a change in the wind,
  • 167:21 - 167:25
    It amounted to a fuII-scaIe
    roIIing back of the weIfare state.
  • 167:22 - 167:27
    and cuIminating in the grand totaI
    of 91 ,089 fIorins. In those days
  • 167:29 - 167:32
    And the banks then
    securitized the Ioans,
  • 167:32 - 167:35
    empIoyed by King Cotton
    across Lancashire.
  • 167:36 - 167:40
    their mood can also change
    from euphoria to gloom.
  • 167:41 - 167:46
    Their risk models were working
    with just five years' worth of data.
  • 167:44 - 167:49
    The conservative economic revoIution
    didn't begin in Thatcher's Britain,
  • 167:44 - 167:49
    which means they bundIed them
    together and then sIiced and diced them
  • 167:48 - 167:52
    ObviousIy, with no cotton
    there was nothing for peopIe to do.
  • 167:58 - 168:00
    that was serious money.
  • 168:03 - 168:05
    The herd stampedes.
  • 168:04 - 168:06
    By the end of 1862,
  • 168:05 - 168:07
    so that at Ieast the top tier
  • 168:06 - 168:07
    or Reagan's America.
  • 168:06 - 168:09
    lf they'd gone back even 1 1 years,
  • 168:15 - 168:20
    couId be cIassified as tripIe-A-rated,
    ''investment grade'' securities.
  • 168:15 - 168:17
    It began right here in ChiIe.
  • 168:15 - 168:20
    haIf the entire workforce
    of Lancashire had been Iaid off.
  • 168:18 - 168:21
    they'd have captured
    the 1 987 stock market crash.
  • 168:26 - 168:27
    One cow gets scared,
  • 168:33 - 168:36
    A quarter of the popuIation
    was on poor reIief.
  • 168:36 - 168:38
    When Giovanni died in 1 429,
  • 168:36 - 168:41
    and that fear just transIates
    to the whoIe herd and they aII take off.
  • 168:37 - 168:43
    And the banks then soId these securities
    to investors 1 ,000 miIes away from Detroit
  • 168:41 - 168:43
    And if they'd gone back 80 years,
  • 168:46 - 168:50
    his last words were an exhortation
    to his heirs
  • 168:47 - 168:52
    The mastermind behind this wholesale
    dismantling of the welfare state
  • 168:49 - 168:54
    They caIIed it the ''Cotton Famine'',
    but this reaIIy was a man-made famine.
  • 168:57 - 169:00
    And the rest of them
    don't know why they're scared.
  • 168:59 - 169:02
    they'd have captured
    the last great Russian default
  • 168:59 - 169:01
    who were happy to pay
  • 169:07 - 169:10
    to maintain his standards
    of financial acumen.
  • 169:10 - 169:12
    They just feeI that fear and they run.
  • 169:10 - 169:15
    for just a few extra hundredths
    of a percentage point in interest.
  • 169:12 - 169:15
    was a young economist called Jose Pinera.
  • 169:14 - 169:16
    after the 1 91 7 revolution.
  • 169:25 - 169:29
    His funeral was attended by 26 men
    of the name Medici,
  • 169:26 - 169:28
    Fear overwheIms aII rationaI thinking.
  • 169:26 - 169:29
    To put it bIuntIy,
    the NobeI Prize-winners
  • 169:33 - 169:35
    Britain was in the doldrums.
  • 169:40 - 169:45
    ChiIe's economy was destroyed.
    We have had 50 years of protectionism,
  • 169:41 - 169:45
    had known pIenty of mathematics,
    but not enough history.
  • 169:44 - 169:47
    And the South's cotton bonds
    were riding high.
  • 169:46 - 169:52
    all paying homage to the man who had made
    the business of banking respectable -
  • 169:52 - 169:53
    UntiI it's over.
  • 169:56 - 169:59
    The key to securitization
    was the distance
  • 169:58 - 170:02
    They'd perfectIy grasped
    the beautifuI theory of PIanet Finance,
  • 170:00 - 170:04
    Yet the South's ability
    to manipulate the bond market
  • 170:08 - 170:13
    ln market jargon, the buyers have turned
    into sellers, the bulls into bears.
  • 170:11 - 170:15
    state intervention -
    Iike sociaIism, if you want -
  • 170:12 - 170:15
    and profitable -
    as it had never been before.
  • 170:13 - 170:17
    between the mortgage borrowers
    in, say, Detroit,
  • 170:20 - 170:23
    but not the messy reaIity
    of PIanet Earth.
  • 170:22 - 170:25
    depended on one over-riding condition -
  • 170:28 - 170:33
    and the people who ended up
    receiving their interest payments.
  • 170:30 - 170:34
    and that was exacerbated
    during the AIIende government.
  • 170:35 - 170:39
    And that, quite simpIy, is why
    Long Term CapitaI Management
  • 170:35 - 170:40
    that investors could be sure of taking
    physical possession of the cotton
  • 170:43 - 170:45
    Despite the zooIogicaI imagery,
  • 170:48 - 170:53
    By the time small towns in Norway
    bought these securities,
  • 170:51 - 170:56
    For his son Cosimo, the accumulation
    of wealth combined seamlessly
  • 170:52 - 170:55
    turned out to be Short Term
    CapitaI Mismanagement.
  • 170:53 - 170:56
    We had created a sort of weIfare state,
  • 170:58 - 171:04
    which underpinned the bonds if the South
    failed to make its interest payments.
  • 170:59 - 171:03
    the point is that markets are mirrors
    of the human psyche.
  • 171:06 - 171:10
    they had no idea what was
    really behind their investment.
  • 171:07 - 171:11
    and that, of course,
    was going bankrupt in ChiIe.
  • 171:12 - 171:17
    The big question is whether such a crisis
    couId repIay itseIf today, ten years on,
  • 171:15 - 171:17
    with the accumulation of power.
  • 171:15 - 171:19
    Like homo sapiens,
    they are prone to mood swings,
  • 171:26 - 171:29
    Within 20 years of his father's death,
  • 171:30 - 171:31
    from greed to fear.
  • 171:39 - 171:41
    They can suffer from depression.
  • 171:40 - 171:43
    Cosimo de' Medici
    was the Florentine State.
  • 171:40 - 171:42
    FinanciaI aIchemy?
  • 171:41 - 171:42
    Between 1979 and 1981 ,
  • 171:41 - 171:44
    onIy this time invoIving
    so many hedge funds,
  • 171:44 - 171:48
    And that's why the fall of New Orleans
    on April 28, 1 862,
  • 171:49 - 171:53
    WeII, it was a business modeI
    that worked beautifuIIy
  • 171:50 - 171:54
    And sometimes they can experience
    compIete breakdowns.
  • 171:55 - 172:00
    Pinera and his coIIeagues erected
    a radicaIIy new pension system for ChiIe,
  • 171:55 - 172:00
    and on such a Iarge scaIe,
    that it simpIy couIdn't be baiIed out?
  • 172:07 - 172:11
    as Iong as interest rates stayed Iow,
    peopIe kept their jobs,
  • 172:07 - 172:09
    That happens rather more often
  • 172:11 - 172:17
    As the Pope himself put it - ''Political
    questions are settled at his house.
  • 172:15 - 172:17
    WeII, the answer to that question
  • 172:15 - 172:19
    was the real turning point
    in the American Civil War.
  • 172:16 - 172:20
    than some financiaI theories
    wouId Iead you to expect,
  • 172:18 - 172:23
    giving every worker the chance to opt out
    of the oId pay-as-you-go state system.
  • 172:24 - 172:29
    Iies not on another pIanet,
    but on the other side of this one.
  • 172:26 - 172:29
    and reaI-estate prices continued to rise.
  • 172:32 - 172:37
    but not so often that we're ever
    quite ready for the next breakdown.
  • 172:35 - 172:39
    Now that the South's main port
    was in Union hands,
  • 172:38 - 172:40
    ''The man he chooses holds office.
  • 172:44 - 172:46
    Instead of a payroII tax,
  • 172:51 - 172:55
    ''He it is who decides peace and war
    and controls the laws.
  • 172:53 - 172:57
    any investor who wanted to lay his hands
    on Southern cotton
  • 172:53 - 172:56
    each worker now couId put
    10% of his wages aside
  • 173:05 - 173:08
    Unfortunately, none of these things
    happened in Detroit.
  • 173:09 - 173:13
    had to run the Union's
    formidable naval blockade.
  • 173:13 - 173:16
    into an individuaI
    personaI retirement account,
  • 173:13 - 173:16
    ''He is King in everything but name. ''
  • 173:17 - 173:19
    lf movements in financial markets
  • 173:26 - 173:30
    to be managed by private
    competing companies.
  • 173:29 - 173:30
    ln 2006 alone,
  • 173:30 - 173:33
    were statistically distributed
    like human heights,
  • 173:41 - 173:45
    sub-prime lenders
    injected more than a billion dollars
  • 173:43 - 173:48
    This BotticeIIi is mainIy famous
    for the beauty of its young subject.
  • 173:45 - 173:49
    There was aIso a smaII premium
    for disabiIity and Iife insurance.
  • 173:47 - 173:49
    there would hardly be any crashes.
  • 173:59 - 174:02
    Most months would be clustered
    around the average,
  • 174:00 - 174:03
    The idea was to give each worker a sense
  • 174:03 - 174:09
    But it's actuaIIy intended as a tribute
    to a dead banker, Cosimo de' Medici.
  • 174:04 - 174:08
    into those areas of the city
    where home values were already falling
  • 174:10 - 174:15
    To some, financial history is just
    so much water under the bridge -
  • 174:15 - 174:19
    that the money being put aside
    was his own property,
  • 174:17 - 174:21
    with only a tiny number
    witnessing extreme ups or downs.
  • 174:27 - 174:31
    and unemployment and mortgage rates
    were already rising.
  • 174:30 - 174:32
    That's him there on the medaIIion,
  • 174:31 - 174:35
    ancient history,
    like the history of lmperial China.
  • 174:32 - 174:33
    his own capitaI.
  • 174:39 - 174:43
    and you can just make out the inscription
    Pater Patriae -
  • 174:39 - 174:41
    GUITAR PLAYING, MAN SINGING
  • 174:41 - 174:47
    Let's face it, not many of us are below
    four feet in height or above eight feet.
  • 174:47 - 174:52
    Some young traders don't even
    remember the 1997 / 98 Asian crisis.
  • 174:48 - 174:51
    The Confederates
    had overplayed their hand.
  • 174:55 - 174:57
    the father of his country.
  • 175:02 - 175:08
    They had turned off the cotton tap, but
    then lost the ability to turn it back on.
  • 175:02 - 175:06
    Where Detroit led,
    other cities soon followed.
  • 175:16 - 175:20
    In fact, if they came into
    the markets after 2000,
  • 175:28 - 175:31
    Pinera gambled. He gave workers a choice -
  • 175:30 - 175:35
    By 1 863, the mills of Lancashire
    had found new sources of cotton
  • 175:31 - 175:33
    they had seven bumper years.
  • 175:37 - 175:40
    This is the cIassic beII-shaped curve,
  • 175:37 - 175:43
    ln 1 50 years, the Medici had transformed
    themselves from backstreet moneylenders
  • 175:42 - 175:44
    Stock markets worIdwide boomed.
  • 175:47 - 175:51
    stick with the old system
    of pay as you go,
  • 175:50 - 175:54
    where things are distributed
    according to their frequency -
  • 175:54 - 175:58
    So too did bond markets.
    So did commodity markets.
  • 175:56 - 175:57
    in China, Egypt, and lndia
  • 176:01 - 176:04
    or opt for the new
    personal retirement accounts.
  • 176:06 - 176:12
    and investors were rapidly losing faith
    in the South's cotton-backed bonds.
  • 176:06 - 176:11
    the most commonIy occurring
    cIustered here around the middIe
  • 176:10 - 176:13
    to the most powerful financial force
    in Europe.
  • 176:10 - 176:15
    So did derivatives markets. In fact,
    every kind of asset market boomed.
  • 176:24 - 176:29
    and the reIativeIy rare dwarves
    and giants out here at the extremes.
  • 176:25 - 176:26
    lt paid off.
  • 176:32 - 176:33
    MEN READ OUT ADDRESSES
  • 176:35 - 176:39
    And so too did the markets
    for those products that are in demand
  • 176:35 - 176:39
    The consequences for the Confederate
    economy were disastrous.
  • 176:36 - 176:38
    Convinced by Pinera's argument,
  • 176:46 - 176:48
    That's why it's quite a steep curve,
  • 176:46 - 176:49
    80% made the switch
    to a private pension plan.
  • 176:49 - 176:53
    But it's this painting,
    BotticeIIi's Adorazione dei Magi,
  • 176:53 - 176:57
    when the bonuses are big, Iike
    vintage Bordeaux and Iuxury yachts.
  • 176:55 - 176:59
    because most human heights
    are quite cIose to the average.
  • 177:00 - 177:05
    It's Thursday at noon
    and I'm witnessing a twice-daiIy rituaI
  • 177:01 - 177:06
    With its domestic bond market exhausted
    and onIy two paItry foreign Ioans,
  • 177:11 - 177:15
    But if you do the same thing
    for financiaI markets,
  • 177:19 - 177:23
    which more than any other captures
    the transfiguration of finance
  • 177:25 - 177:27
    for daiIy moves in the stock market,
  • 177:27 - 177:30
    here on the steps
    of the Memphis Courthouse.
  • 177:28 - 177:33
    the Confederacy reaIIy had no aIternative
    but to print paper doIIars,
  • 177:29 - 177:33
    But was it worth it? Was it worth
    the huge moraI compromise
  • 177:35 - 177:39
    you end up with something
    that Iooks more Iike this,
  • 177:41 - 177:43
    the Medici had achieved.
  • 177:42 - 177:47
    About 30 homes are about to be
    auctioned off here, and the reason is
  • 177:49 - 177:54
    like these ones here in the Louisiana
    State Museum, to pay for the war.
  • 177:51 - 177:54
    that the Chicago Boys
    and the Harvard man made
  • 177:52 - 177:56
    On cIose inspection, the three wise men
    are Cosimo de' Medici,
  • 177:55 - 177:57
    with reIativeIy fewer smaII movements
  • 178:02 - 178:06
    that the mortgage Ienders have forecIosed
    on the homeowners
  • 178:05 - 178:08
    But these boom years
    were also mystery years.
  • 178:06 - 178:10
    and reIativeIy more
    big movements down or up.
  • 178:08 - 178:13
    when they got into bed with
    a torturing, murderous dictatorship?
  • 178:14 - 178:16
    ln all, 1. 7 billion dollars' worth.
  • 178:14 - 178:19
    washing the feet of Christ,
    and his sons Piero and Giovanni.
  • 178:19 - 178:23
    for faiIing to keep up
    with their interest payments.
  • 178:24 - 178:29
    For markets soared at a time
    of rising short-term interest rates,
  • 178:27 - 178:33
    And these are what the statisticians mean
    when they taIk about Iong or fat taiIs.
  • 178:29 - 178:35
    The answer to that question very much
    depends on whether you think their reform
  • 178:33 - 178:35
    2926 South Radford Avenue...
  • 178:34 - 178:38
    Now, it's true that the North
    aIso printed paper money,
  • 178:40 - 178:43
    The young man on the Ieft is Lorenzo.
  • 178:45 - 178:48
    Memphis is reaIIy becoming
    ForecIosure City these days.
  • 178:49 - 178:53
    glaring trade imbalances
    and escalating political risk.
  • 178:50 - 178:56
    but by the end of the war its ''greenbacks''
    were stiII worth around 50 pre-war cents,
  • 178:54 - 178:59
    has heIped pave a peacefuI way back
    to a sustainabIe democracy in ChiIe.
  • 178:55 - 178:59
    The painting had been commissioned
    by the head of the Bankers' GuiId
  • 179:06 - 179:11
    In the past five years,
    something Iike one in four househoIds
  • 179:10 - 179:14
    lf stock market movements
    were distributed like human heights,
  • 179:11 - 179:14
    The key to this seeming paradox
    lay here in China.
  • 179:11 - 179:13
    as a tribute to the famiIy.
  • 179:17 - 179:21
    whereas a Southern ''greyback''
    was down to just one cent.
  • 179:18 - 179:20
    And I think they did.
  • 179:23 - 179:28
    Perhaps it shouId reaIIy have been caIIed
    The Adoration of the Medici.
  • 179:23 - 179:27
    has received a notice
    threatening them with forecIosure.
  • 179:27 - 179:31
    a drop of 1 0% would happen
    only once every 500 years.
  • 179:34 - 179:40
    What's more, with more and more of
    this cash chasing fewer and fewer goods,
  • 179:43 - 179:47
    Having once been damned,
    bankers were now cIose to divinity.
  • 179:50 - 179:54
    Since the sub-prime mortgage market
    began to turn sour
  • 179:52 - 179:57
    And stock market crashes of 20%
    in a year would be unheard of,
  • 179:58 - 180:00
    infIation in the South simpIy expIoded.
  • 180:06 - 180:09
    ln 1 980, Pinochet
    conceded a new constitution
  • 180:11 - 180:15
    in the early summer of 2007,
    shockwaves have been spreading
  • 180:12 - 180:17
    By January 1865, the price of some goods
    was up by a factor of 90.
  • 180:17 - 180:20
    rather like people just six inches tall.
  • 180:22 - 180:26
    Chongqing, on the banks
    of the mighty River Yangtze,
  • 180:23 - 180:27
    Nothing could better illustrate
    the extraordinary ascent of money.
  • 180:27 - 180:31
    that prescribed a ten-year transition
    back to democracy.
  • 180:30 - 180:35
    Whereas in fact, there have been
    seven such crashes in the past century.
  • 180:31 - 180:34
    through all the world's financial markets,
  • 180:41 - 180:45
    wiping out hedge funds,
    obliterating venerable investment banks
  • 180:41 - 180:44
    is deep in the heart
    of the Middle Kingdom,
  • 180:44 - 180:46
    For what the Medici had achieved
  • 180:48 - 180:51
    Ten years later,
    he stepped down as president.
  • 180:54 - 180:59
    The South had bet everything
    on manipulating the bond market
  • 180:56 - 181:02
    over a thousand miles from the coastal
    enterprise zones most Westerners visit.
  • 180:58 - 181:02
    was nothing less than
    the birth of modern banking.
  • 181:00 - 181:04
    and costing the survivors
    hundreds of billions of dollars.
  • 181:11 - 181:13
    Democracy was restored,
  • 181:13 - 181:14
    and had lost.
  • 181:18 - 181:23
    As it turned out, those who feared
    that the brief panic of October 1 987
  • 181:22 - 181:24
    Others had tried before,
  • 181:22 - 181:27
    lt would not be the last time in history
    that an attempt to do so
  • 181:23 - 181:27
    and by that time,
    the economic miracle was under way
  • 181:30 - 181:35
    but the Medici were the first bankers
    to hit the poIiticaI big time.
  • 181:38 - 181:41
    that helped to ensure its survival.
  • 181:39 - 181:43
    Remember that pillar of the 1 930s
    New Deal mortgage market,
  • 181:39 - 181:41
    would end in ruinous inflation.
  • 181:42 - 181:46
    Yet this is the fastest-growing city
    on the planet.
  • 181:45 - 181:49
    would turn into the next great crash
    were proved wrong.
  • 181:54 - 181:58
    And they did it
    by Iearning one cruciaI Iesson -
  • 182:01 - 182:02
    Fannie Mae?
  • 182:05 - 182:09
    The market had one
    really bad month, then rallied.
  • 182:09 - 182:14
    With its younger brother, Freddie Mac,
    it grew to own or guarantee
  • 182:09 - 182:12
    in finance, smaII is seIdom beautifuI.
  • 182:14 - 182:19
    For the pension reform not only created
    a new class of property owners,
  • 182:23 - 182:27
    Today the global market
    for bonds is still bigger
  • 182:27 - 182:31
    By making their bank bigger
    and more diversified,
  • 182:28 - 182:33
    But that bubble provided a golden
    opportunity for corporate crookery.
  • 182:31 - 182:33
    around half of all American home loans.
  • 182:36 - 182:39
    each with his own retirement nest egg,
  • 182:43 - 182:46
    I've traveIIed aII over the worId
    making this series,
  • 182:45 - 182:48
    ln September 2008, Fannie and Freddie
  • 182:45 - 182:49
    than the all the world's
    stock markets put together.
  • 182:48 - 182:52
    the Medici had found a way
    of spreading their risks.
  • 182:50 - 182:54
    it also gave the Chilean economy
    a massive shot in the arm.
  • 182:59 - 183:02
    and I must say, I have never
    seen anything Iike this.
  • 183:03 - 183:07
    What John Law's Mississippi Company
    had been to the bubbIe
  • 183:04 - 183:06
    were effectively nationalised
  • 183:05 - 183:09
    lt's still a market
    that can make or break governments.
  • 183:06 - 183:10
    And by focusing on currency trading
    rather than just Iending,
  • 183:14 - 183:18
    WeIcome to Chongqing,
    the fastest growing city in the worId.
  • 183:14 - 183:18
    to avoid a complete collapse
    of the mortgage market.
  • 183:20 - 183:23
    that Iaunched the 18th century,
  • 183:24 - 183:27
    they'd reduced their exposure
    to defauIts by borrowers.
  • 183:31 - 183:35
    so another company wouId be
    to the bubbIe that ended the 20th.
  • 183:32 - 183:37
    Established Wall Street names
    like Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers
  • 183:33 - 183:37
    It's construction heaven.
    If you Iook over through the fog,
  • 183:36 - 183:38
    These brokers at the Banco de ChiIe
  • 183:43 - 183:48
    For Cosimo and his famiIy,
    it was a truIy beautifuI business modeI.
  • 183:46 - 183:51
    are investing ChiIean workers' pension
    contributions into the stock market.
  • 183:48 - 183:50
    Does it surprise you that its key player
  • 183:50 - 183:53
    It was a company
    that promised its investors
  • 183:50 - 183:56
    you can just about make out one of
    the 30 bridges they're currentIy buiIding,
  • 183:59 - 184:02
    and Merrill Lynch have vanished.
  • 184:00 - 184:04
    began his money-making career
    in the casinos of Las Vegas?
  • 184:04 - 184:06
    weaIth beyond the dreams of avarice.
  • 184:09 - 184:12
    And they've been doing
    a pretty good job of it.
  • 184:12 - 184:17
    Unlike savings and loans, this crisis
    extends right around the world.
  • 184:14 - 184:17
    and down there,
    one of the ten Iight raiIways.
  • 184:15 - 184:20
    It was a company that cIaimed to have
    reinvented the entire financiaI system.
  • 184:24 - 184:28
    Average returns on the personaI retirement
    accounts has been over 10%,
  • 184:26 - 184:29
    Yet not even the Medici
    were invulnerable.
  • 184:33 - 184:35
    I was a bIackjack pIayer.
  • 184:38 - 184:42
    And it was a company that used
    its impeccabIe poIiticaI connections
  • 184:39 - 184:44
    The four Norwegian municipalities of Rana,
    Hemnes, Hattfjelldal and Narvik,
  • 184:42 - 184:47
    One of the first professionaI
    bIackjack pIayers, not to brag,
  • 184:43 - 184:45
    The bank suffered heavy losses
  • 184:47 - 184:51
    refIecting the fact that
    in the 20 years after 1987,
  • 184:48 - 184:53
    AII around me, there used to be
    prime farmIand, untiI six months ago,
  • 184:57 - 185:00
    to ride aII the way to the top
    of the buII market.
  • 184:58 - 185:02
    as a result of over-generous loans
    to blue-blooded debtors
  • 185:05 - 185:07
    but in the Iate '60s, I went to Vegas
  • 185:06 - 185:10
    the ChiIean stock market
    has gone up by a factor of 18.
  • 185:10 - 185:15
    which had invested their citizens' taxes
    in sub-prime backed securities,
  • 185:11 - 185:16
    Named by Fortune Magazine
    as ''America's Most lnnovative Company''
  • 185:12 - 185:17
    when they started constructing
    IiteraIIy miIIions of square metres
  • 185:17 - 185:21
    who felt no compunction
    about defaulting on their obligations
  • 185:18 - 185:22
    and appIied a card-counting system
    to try and beat Vegas.
  • 185:34 - 185:39
    are now sitting on an investment worth
    roughly 1 5% of what they paid for it -
  • 185:34 - 185:35
    of new office space.
  • 185:37 - 185:40
    and telling the bankers to get lost.
  • 185:41 - 185:44
    for six consecutive years,
    that company was...
  • 185:42 - 185:47
    The aim is to turn Chongqing into
    the financiaI capitaI of western China.
  • 185:58 - 186:00
    a loss of $1 00 million.
  • 185:59 - 185:59
    Enron.
  • 186:03 - 186:07
    There is a downside
    to the system, to be sure.
  • 186:04 - 186:09
    Now this master of understatement
    is the King of the Bond Market,
  • 186:05 - 186:11
    WeII, if they keep this up, it'II soon be
    the financiaI capitaI of the worId.
  • 186:12 - 186:15
    Bad debts - money owed by borrowers
    who go bust -
  • 186:18 - 186:20
    Seven years after its collapse,
  • 186:26 - 186:31
    Thanks to growth like this, there are now
    345,000 dollar millionaires in China
  • 186:27 - 186:32
    most of us have consigned Enron
    to the dustbin of financial history.
  • 186:28 - 186:32
    controller of the biggest bond fund
    in the world.
  • 186:31 - 186:34
    In the EngIish-speaking worId,
  • 186:33 - 186:36
    are the perennial problem
    that any bank confronts.
  • 186:41 - 186:45
    we tend to think of property
    as a one-way bet.
  • 186:41 - 186:46
    Since not everyone in the economy
    has a regular full-time job,
  • 186:42 - 186:45
    So what has this got to do
    with you and me?
  • 186:51 - 186:55
    Yet it pioneered many
    of the dubious business practices
  • 186:56 - 187:01
    The simpIest way of getting rich
    is to pIay the property market.
  • 186:58 - 187:04
    Yet for a time, it seemed as if modern
    bankers had solved this age-old problem.
  • 186:58 - 187:02
    not everyone ends up
    participating in the system.
  • 187:02 - 187:04
    Well, when Gross buys or sells bonds,
  • 187:07 - 187:09
    and over 1 00 billionaires.
  • 187:13 - 187:18
    it doesn't just affect financial markets
    and government policy,
  • 187:14 - 187:19
    In fact, you'd be a mug
    to invest your money in anything eIse.
  • 187:15 - 187:17
    that continue to plague us today.
  • 187:27 - 187:31
    Not only has China
    left the colonial era far behind,
  • 187:28 - 187:32
    Which leaves a substantial chunk
    of the population
  • 187:29 - 187:33
    They really thought
    they were smarter than the Medici.
  • 187:36 - 187:39
    it affects the value of our pension funds
  • 187:43 - 187:45
    with no pension coverage at all.
  • 187:44 - 187:48
    But the remarkable thing
    about this supposed ''truth''
  • 187:47 - 187:51
    the fastest-growing economy
    in the world has also managed
  • 187:50 - 187:53
    and the interest rates
    we pay on our mortgages.
  • 188:01 - 188:04
    is how often reality gives it the lie.
  • 188:02 - 188:04
    to avoid the kind of crisis
  • 188:10 - 188:14
    There's only one thing
    that Mr Bond is afraid of
  • 188:10 - 188:13
    ln the three years up to August 2000,
  • 188:13 - 188:17
    that has periodically blown up
    in the other emerging markets.
  • 188:16 - 188:20
    I'm standing in front of
    the Communist Party headquarters
  • 188:24 - 188:27
    For like stock markets,
    property can soar in value
  • 188:24 - 188:29
    shares of the Houston energy company
    had gone through the roof.
  • 188:30 - 188:32
    and it's not Goldfinger.
  • 188:35 - 188:38
    Memphis, Tennessee
    is a long way from Florence.
  • 188:35 - 188:38
    here in La Victoria, a suburb of Santiago,
  • 188:40 - 188:45
    One reason for China's
    crisis-free ascent has been the fact
  • 188:42 - 188:45
    Once a small-time
    gas company in Nebraska,
  • 188:44 - 188:47
    only to crash
    in the most spectacular way.
  • 188:46 - 188:48
    Rather, it's inflation.
  • 188:49 - 188:54
    which was once one of the hotbeds
    of opposition to the Pinochet regime.
  • 188:54 - 188:58
    And the world economy has come a long way
    since the Renaissance.
  • 189:01 - 189:05
    that most Chinese investment
    hasn't been financed by foreigners,
  • 189:02 - 189:06
    Enron was now the fifth largest company
    in the United States,
  • 189:04 - 189:07
    The lethal danger that inflation poses
  • 189:08 - 189:11
    Because most peopIe here
    are either unempIoyed
  • 189:18 - 189:24
    is that it undermines the value of being
    paid a fixed rate of interest on a bond.
  • 189:19 - 189:22
    ln Britain, between 1 989 and 1 995,
  • 189:20 - 189:22
    but out of China's own savings.
  • 189:22 - 189:26
    with stated revenues
    of 1 1 1 billion dollars.
  • 189:23 - 189:26
    A crucial part in that transformation
  • 189:25 - 189:27
    or work in the informaI sector,
  • 189:29 - 189:31
    There has been foreign investment,
  • 189:35 - 189:39
    they don't, or can't,
    pay into the pension system
  • 189:38 - 189:43
    has been played by the spread of
    modern banking from its ltalian birthplace
  • 189:39 - 189:42
    but most of it has been
    direct investment
  • 189:40 - 189:43
    the average house price fell by 1 8%.
  • 189:45 - 189:47
    If infIation goes up to 10%
  • 189:46 - 189:49
    Enron was the darling of Wall Street.
  • 189:50 - 189:54
    which means they don't get
    anything out of it.
  • 189:52 - 189:54
    in the form of things Iike factories
  • 190:02 - 190:07
    to a country where money has increasingly
    taken the form of easy credit.
  • 190:02 - 190:06
    which you can't easiIy Iiquidate
    and send home in a crisis.
  • 190:03 - 190:08
    This is the kind of neighbourhood
    where Che Guevara is stiII the IocaI hero,
  • 190:06 - 190:10
    and the vaIue of a fixed-rate interest
    is onIy five,
  • 190:15 - 190:20
    But that was nothing compared
    with what happened here in Japan.
  • 190:19 - 190:23
    Indeed, so enormous have China's
    savings become in recent years
  • 190:23 - 190:24
    not Jose Pinera.
  • 190:23 - 190:29
    Yet a little historical knowledge might
    have made Enron's investors think twice.
  • 190:30 - 190:35
    then that means that the bond hoIder
    is faIIing behind infIation by 5%.
  • 190:33 - 190:36
    The United States
    has been built on borrowed money.
  • 190:37 - 190:42
    that they have enabIed gIobaIisation
    to do the most aImighty U-turn.
  • 190:54 - 190:58
    The poor of Chile may not have
    a private pension plan,
  • 190:59 - 191:03
    PreviousIy, it was the rich
    EngIish-speakers who Ient money
  • 191:06 - 191:11
    lndeed, the story of Enron was like
    a re-run of the Mississippi Bubble
  • 191:06 - 191:11
    But whereas the Medici tended to lend
    only to the relatively well off,
  • 191:07 - 191:12
    That's why, at the first whiff
    of higher inflation, bond prices fall,
  • 191:10 - 191:15
    and may have to make do with a meagre
    government handout in their old age...
  • 191:16 - 191:18
    to the poor Asian periphery.
  • 191:23 - 191:24
    The view's good.
  • 191:27 - 191:33
    until the present credit crunch at least,
    American banks seemed willing to give
  • 191:27 - 191:32
    But now it's the Chinese who are
    Iending money to rich Americans.
  • 191:30 - 191:32
    and in some cases, keep falling.
  • 191:30 - 191:31
    280 years before.
  • 191:34 - 191:37
    Very Austin Powers decor.
    I'm Ioving that.
  • 191:43 - 191:48
    ..but even they've benefited from
    Chile's rapidly growing economy.
  • 191:46 - 191:50
    WeIcome to the strange new hybrid
    country of China and America.
  • 191:50 - 191:52
    just about anyone a loan.
  • 191:55 - 192:00
    John Law's plan had been to revolutionise
    French government finance.
  • 192:05 - 192:06
    Oh, that's the boiIer.
  • 192:09 - 192:14
    Memphis is famous for blue suede shoes,
    barbecued ribs and bankruptcies.
  • 192:11 - 192:13
    I caII it ''Chimerica''.
  • 192:14 - 192:19
    To see just how bad things can get
    when the inflationary genie escapes
  • 192:20 - 192:24
    (Jose Pinera) Growth makes
    a difference in the Iife of every citizen.
  • 192:22 - 192:24
    OK, weII, Iet's cut to the chase.
  • 192:24 - 192:26
    Ken Lay, the chairman of Enron,
  • 192:32 - 192:37
    How much is this pIace going to cost
    if I put the money down now?
  • 192:34 - 192:38
    from the bottle you just have to look
    at the example of Argentina.
  • 192:36 - 192:40
    planned to revolutionise
    the global energy business.
  • 192:42 - 192:46
    The poverty rate in ChiIe
    has gone down from about 50%
  • 192:51 - 192:57
    You can tell people here are a little...
    How shall l say it? ..a little sub-prime.
  • 192:56 - 192:57
    SPEAKS JAPANESE
  • 192:59 - 192:59
    to 13%.
  • 193:03 - 193:06
    So that wouId be cIose to $2 miIIion.
  • 193:09 - 193:12
    So this has been reaIIy a huge success
  • 193:17 - 193:19
    OK, that's Iike a miIIion...
  • 193:20 - 193:25
    You onIy need to Iook at the shopping maII
    for the seriousIy poor.
  • 193:21 - 193:26
    and the pension reform
    has been a criticaI eIement in this.
  • 193:22 - 193:27
    This extraordinary place
    is the South Western Stock Exchange.
  • 193:26 - 193:30
    a miIIion pounds buys me
    this bijou apartment in Tokyo.
  • 193:27 - 193:32
    For years, the industry had been
    dominated by huge utility companies,
  • 193:29 - 193:34
    Many Argentines date the steady
    decline of their economic fortunes
  • 193:45 - 193:50
    lt's where hundreds of Chongqing's
    residents come to have lunch,
  • 193:45 - 193:48
    And the ubiquitous no-friIIs eatery.
  • 193:46 - 193:49
    The improvement in ChiIe's
    economic performance
  • 193:51 - 193:53
    to a day in February, 1 946,
  • 193:53 - 193:59
    which both produced the energy, pumped
    the gas and generated the electricity,
  • 193:54 - 193:57
    But this is a smart neighbourhood, right?
  • 194:00 - 194:05
    since the Chicago Boys' reforms
    is reaIIy very hard to argue with.
  • 194:03 - 194:09
    Then there's a tax advisor who can teII
    you how to cIaim your Iow-income credits.
  • 194:03 - 194:05
    play ping pong and invest -
  • 194:03 - 194:07
    when the newly elected President,
    General Juan Domingo Peron
  • 194:15 - 194:21
    That may sound like a lot, but in recent
    Japanese history, it's a real bargain.
  • 194:16 - 194:18
    and sold it on to consumers.
  • 194:17 - 194:21
    In the 15 years before
    MiIton Friedman's visit,
  • 194:19 - 194:23
    or is it gamble? -
    their savings on the stock market.
  • 194:23 - 194:26
    came here to the Central Bank
    in Buenos Aires.
  • 194:34 - 194:38
    the growth rate here
    was a measIy 0. 1 7% a year.
  • 194:35 - 194:38
    This is what defines
    the Chinese economy today.
  • 194:36 - 194:39
    Lay's big idea was to create
    a kind of energy bank,
  • 194:49 - 194:54
    A shop where you can borrow money
    on the equity you own in your car.
  • 194:52 - 194:55
    lncreasingly, it's what defines
    the world economy.
  • 194:55 - 194:57
    In the subsequent 15 years,
  • 194:58 - 195:03
    which would act as the intermediary
    between suppliers and consumers.
  • 195:01 - 195:04
    He was astonished at what he saw.
  • 195:04 - 195:06
    Between 1 985 and 1 990,
  • 195:05 - 195:07
    it increased by a factor of nearIy 20.
  • 195:06 - 195:11
    Chinese investors trying to work out
    what to do with their abundant savings.
  • 195:14 - 195:19
    And a pIace where they'II give you
    an advance on next week's pay cheque...
  • 195:15 - 195:18
    The poverty rate here's down to 15%,
  • 195:16 - 195:19
    ''There is so much gold, '' he marvelled,
  • 195:18 - 195:23
    property prices in Japan rose
    by a factor of roughly three.
  • 195:24 - 195:29
    His dream was to make Enron
    the greatest energy company in the world.
  • 195:29 - 195:32
    compared to 40%
    in the rest of Latin America.
  • 195:30 - 195:33
    ''you can hardly walk
    through the corridors. ''
  • 195:30 - 195:32
    After years of instability,
  • 195:36 - 195:40
    Banks fell over themselves
    to ride this wave.
  • 195:44 - 195:49
    And when you Iook down at Santiago's
    shiny new financiaI district,
  • 195:45 - 195:49
    Chinese households save
    an unusually high proportion
  • 195:52 - 195:56
    ..not to mention a pawn shop
    the size of a department store.
  • 195:52 - 195:55
    Caught up in the heady spirit of the times
  • 195:54 - 195:57
    The very name Argentina
    suggests wealth and plenty -
  • 196:04 - 196:07
    you can see why the ChiIean pension reform
  • 196:04 - 196:06
    of their rapidly rising incomes,
  • 196:06 - 196:09
    was senior Enron executive,
    Sherron Watkins.
  • 196:13 - 196:18
    in marked contrast to Americans,
    who these days save none at all.
  • 196:14 - 196:17
    it means ''The Land Of Silver''.
  • 196:17 - 196:22
    has been imitated right across the region
    and, indeed, around the worId.
  • 196:23 - 196:29
    The river flowing past the capital is
    the Rio de la Plata, ''The Silver River''.
  • 196:24 - 196:25
    It was very eIectric.
  • 196:27 - 196:30
    But it wasn't a wave.
    lt was a bubble.
  • 196:27 - 196:32
    And finaIIy, when you've no possessions
    Ieft to pawn or to seII,
  • 196:36 - 196:40
    You feIt Iike you couId...
    If you came up with a good idea,
  • 196:47 - 196:49
    there's just one option Ieft.
  • 196:51 - 196:57
    Enron wouId give you the money and
    you couId go for it at a very young age.
  • 196:52 - 196:56
    For Britain's Margaret Thatcher,
    the general from Chile
  • 196:55 - 196:56
    And in 1 990 it burst.
  • 196:59 - 197:02
    And that's to head on down to ZLB PIasma
  • 196:59 - 197:04
    So plentiful are Chinese savings
    that for the first time in centuries,
  • 197:09 - 197:12
    and the professor
    from Chicago were heroes,
  • 197:11 - 197:14
    Like John Law,
    Ken Lay had friends in high places.
  • 197:14 - 197:18
    where you can seII your own bIood
    for $25 doIIars a pop.
  • 197:15 - 197:20
    Once upon a time, there used to be
    two Harrods in the world.
  • 197:20 - 197:22
    Prices here in Tokyo fell...
  • 197:24 - 197:28
    who demonstrated that only
    by rolling back the welfare state
  • 197:27 - 197:31
    the direction of capital flow
    is not from West to East,
  • 197:30 - 197:35
    He contributed generously to
    George HWBush's presidential campaign.
  • 197:35 - 197:39
    TaIk about being ''bIed dry''.
    It's amazing reaIIy -
  • 197:36 - 197:41
    One in London, in Knightsbridge, and
    the other here, in the Avenida Florida,
  • 197:42 - 197:45
    ..by 7 5%,
    wiping out all the previous gains.
  • 197:45 - 197:47
    could governments revive economic growth.
  • 197:48 - 197:50
    but from East to West.
  • 197:50 - 197:54
    an entire economic sector
    based on peopIe who are broke.
  • 197:57 - 197:59
    in the heart of Buenos Aires.
  • 197:59 - 198:03
    As President,
    Bush duly pushed through legislation
  • 198:04 - 198:06
    And it is a mighty flow.
  • 198:06 - 198:07
    Founded in 1912,
  • 198:14 - 198:17
    Yet one country where
    this recipe has not been tried
  • 198:17 - 198:22
    this other Harrods is a reminder
    that Argentina used to be a rich country.
  • 198:18 - 198:19
    This costs Ł1 miIIion now.
  • 198:18 - 198:20
    that deregulated the energy industry.
  • 198:28 - 198:33
    How much did it cost back in 1990,
    at the peak of the property bubbIe?
  • 198:32 - 198:35
    is the country
    that's come to need it most.
  • 198:37 - 198:40
    Riding a global wave
    of energy privatisation,
  • 198:41 - 198:47
    At one time, its per capita income was
    18% Iess than that of the United States.
  • 198:47 - 198:52
    ln 2007, the United States
    needed to borrow around $800 billion
  • 198:48 - 198:53
    ln some ways, it rather reminds me
    of the East End of Glasgow.
  • 198:53 - 198:56
    Enron snapped up assets
    all over the world.
  • 198:55 - 198:58
    - So roughIy three times the vaIue.
    - Three times?
  • 199:01 - 199:02
    Japan.
  • 199:07 - 199:10
    Yet there's a world of difference
    between this world
  • 199:11 - 199:14
    Investors who fIocked
    to buy Argentine bonds
  • 199:14 - 199:19
    ln Latin America alone, the company
    had interests in Colombia, Ecuador,
  • 199:15 - 199:17
    So cIose to...possibIy $6 miIIion.
  • 199:16 - 199:18
    from the rest of the world.
  • 199:23 - 199:26
    That's more than $4 billion
    every working day.
  • 199:26 - 199:31
    and the world where loan sharks extract
    their pounds of flesh
  • 199:27 - 199:32
    hoped that Argentina wouId become
    the United States of South America.
  • 199:30 - 199:33
    So successful was the Japanese
    welfare superpower
  • 199:31 - 199:33
    Ł3 miIIion. Wow!
  • 199:37 - 199:43
    Peru and Bolivia, where they laid a huge
    pipeline across the continent to Brazil.
  • 199:41 - 199:47
    We think we've had a property crash in the
    West, but this is a reaI property crash.
  • 199:45 - 199:48
    China, by contrast,
    ran a current account surplus
  • 199:46 - 199:48
    from petty defaulters.
  • 199:48 - 199:53
    that by the 1 97 0s, life expectancy
    was the longest in the world.
  • 199:58 - 200:01
    Well, Argentina's history since then
  • 200:04 - 200:08
    equivalent to more than
    a quarter of the US deficit.
  • 200:05 - 200:09
    Here in sub-prime America,
    defaulting on your debts is easy.
  • 200:07 - 200:12
    And thanks to the intervention of
    Ken Lay's personaI friend, George W Bush,
  • 200:10 - 200:15
    is a classic illustration that all the
    resources and talent in the world
  • 200:20 - 200:24
    And a remarkably large
    proportion of that surplus
  • 200:28 - 200:29
    Well, pretty easy.
  • 200:34 - 200:38
    can be set at nought
    by chronic financial mismanagement.
  • 200:36 - 200:39
    has ended up being lent
    to the United States.
  • 200:37 - 200:40
    Enron was abIe to acquire
    a controIIing stake
  • 200:38 - 200:40
    The problem was
  • 200:44 - 200:48
    So no, property isn't
    a uniqueIy safe investment.
  • 200:46 - 200:49
    that Japan's welfare state
    was too successful.
  • 200:50 - 200:54
    in the Iargest naturaI gas
    pipeIine network in the worId,
  • 201:07 - 201:10
    ln effect, the People's Republic of China
  • 201:08 - 201:11
    House prices can go down
    as weII as up.
  • 201:12 - 201:13
    here in Argentina.
  • 201:18 - 201:19
    MUTED CONVERSATION
  • 201:20 - 201:23
    This is Richie.
    He's in the repo business -
  • 201:24 - 201:28
    And as assets go,
    houses are pretty iIIiquid,
  • 201:25 - 201:29
    has become banker
    to the United States of America.
  • 201:39 - 201:43
    Today, the programmes run here
    at Japan's Ministry of WeIfare
  • 201:40 - 201:44
    There have been many financial crises
    in Argentine history.
  • 201:40 - 201:46
    which means you can't unIoad them in
    a hurry if you get into a financiaI jam.
  • 201:42 - 201:45
    snatching cars
    from under their owners' noses
  • 201:45 - 201:47
    Above all, however, Enron traded.
  • 201:57 - 202:01
    reIy on an ever-smaIIer number
    of active workers
  • 201:58 - 202:01
    when they haven't made their payments.
  • 201:59 - 202:03
    Not only in energy,
    but in virtually all the ancient elements
  • 202:03 - 202:06
    But the crisis
    that hit the country in 1 989
  • 202:04 - 202:07
    And that, pretty much, is the downside
  • 202:08 - 202:10
    lt may seem a little bizarre.
  • 202:09 - 202:14
    He grabbed that boIt action, he went
    ''chh'' and I watched the rifIe sheII
  • 202:14 - 202:18
    to support an ever-rising
    popuIation of retirees.
  • 202:16 - 202:19
    of the idea
    of a property-owning democracy.
  • 202:20 - 202:22
    of earth, water, fire and air.
  • 202:22 - 202:23
    was unparalleled.
  • 202:22 - 202:27
    The average American has an income
    of around $44,000 a year,
  • 202:32 - 202:35
    The question now
    is whether we EngIish-speakers
  • 202:32 - 202:35
    lt even traded in internet bandwidth.
  • 202:33 - 202:37
    Back in 1960, there were
    something Iike 1 1 active workers
  • 202:43 - 202:48
    go in the barreI and he Iunged it
    towards me and hit me right here
  • 202:46 - 202:51
    whereas the average Chinese, despite
    this country's 100-pIus biIIionaires
  • 202:49 - 202:54
    have any business trying to export
    our modeI to the rest of the worId.
  • 202:53 - 202:55
    for every one retired person.
  • 203:00 - 203:05
    Enron led a Wall Street surge unnervingly
    reminiscent of the Mississippi Bubble.
  • 203:05 - 203:06
    But by 2025,
  • 203:07 - 203:12
    and aII the ostentatious signs of
    new money here in centraI Chongqing,
  • 203:13 - 203:16
    that number couId sink as Iow as two.
  • 203:20 - 203:22
    and aImost knocked me down.
  • 203:26 - 203:30
    In other words,
    there'II be one oId-age pensioner
  • 203:28 - 203:29
    is on around $2,000.
  • 203:32 - 203:37
    He said, ''Either you drop the truck
    or I'm dropping you.''
  • 203:33 - 203:37
    Despite his half-hearted warnings
    against ''irrational exuberance'',
  • 203:38 - 203:42
    So why wouId the Iatter
    want to Iend money to the former
  • 203:41 - 203:45
    for every two bureaucrats
    working here at the Ministry.
  • 203:48 - 203:53
    The real flaw in the property-owning
    democracy, as recent events have proved,
  • 203:48 - 203:51
    At the beginning of February,
  • 203:51 - 203:55
    And I said, ''Yes, sir,''
    and I dropped the truck.
  • 203:55 - 203:59
    the country was suffering
    one of the hottest summers on record.
  • 203:58 - 204:02
    In just 30 years, the cost
    of sociaI security benefits
  • 203:59 - 204:01
    this bull market was propelled upward
  • 203:59 - 204:01
    who's roughIy 22 times richer?
  • 204:07 - 204:12
    You know, you make it sound so attractive,
    maybe I... I shouId switch jobs!
  • 204:11 - 204:13
    WeII, here's how it works.
  • 204:12 - 204:16
    by the chairman of the US Federal Reserve,
    Alan Greenspan.
  • 204:15 - 204:20
    is that the housing market, like any asset
    market, is prone to booms and busts.
  • 204:16 - 204:20
    ln Buenos Aires, the electricity system
    just couldn't cope.
  • 204:19 - 204:23
    has risen in reIation
    to Japan's nationaI income
  • 204:35 - 204:37
    Five-hour power cuts were commonplace.
  • 204:35 - 204:37
    I teII you what, it's interesting.
  • 204:36 - 204:38
    by a factor of four.
  • 204:42 - 204:46
    But maybe there's another
    way of looking at property -
  • 204:46 - 204:51
    As in John Law's time,
    a stock market bubble could only happen
  • 204:59 - 205:02
    Until recently,
    from China's point of view,
  • 205:00 - 205:04
    Today, virtually all Japan's
    health insurance societies
  • 205:04 - 205:08
    But these, as it turned out,
    were the least of Argentina's problems.
  • 205:07 - 205:09
    as a means of unlocking new wealth
  • 205:07 - 205:09
    if money was abundant.
  • 205:11 - 205:17
    ln the bankruptcy capital of America,
    repossessing cars is a routine matter.
  • 205:13 - 205:16
    the best way of employing
    its vast population
  • 205:17 - 205:18
    are in deficit.
  • 205:17 - 205:21
    by providing collateral
    for aspiring entrepreneurs.
  • 205:24 - 205:28
    And the pension funds
    are nearly out of money too.
  • 205:29 - 205:34
    And by raising interest rates only once
    between February 1 995 and June 1 990,
  • 205:29 - 205:34
    was through exporting manufactures
    to the insatiably spendthrift US consumer.
  • 205:32 - 205:34
    As is almost always the case,
  • 205:47 - 205:49
    Japan's once so-super welfare state
  • 205:47 - 205:51
    Could property ownership be
    the answer to the problems
  • 205:50 - 205:54
    there were several well-trodden steps
    to monetary hell.
  • 205:58 - 206:01
    Greenspan made sure that it was.
  • 206:01 - 206:04
    To ensure that those exports
    were irresistibly cheap,
  • 206:01 - 206:04
    is threatening to bankrupt the nation.
  • 206:04 - 206:06
    of the world's poorest countries?
  • 206:06 - 206:07
    BUZZ OF AUCTION ROOM
  • 206:13 - 206:16
    In step one, the government
    spends more, much more,
  • 206:16 - 206:18
    The rewards for investors were immense,
  • 206:17 - 206:21
    China had to stop its currency
    strengthening against the dollar
  • 206:29 - 206:34
    and aIso for the managers here
    at the company's Houston headquarters,
  • 206:29 - 206:34
    You've heard of sub-prime borrowers.
    Well, welcome to a sub-prime country...
  • 206:33 - 206:35
    than it can raise in taxation.
  • 206:37 - 206:41
    by buying literally billions
    of dollars on world markets.
  • 206:40 - 206:44
    UsuaIIy, but not aIways,
    it's because of a war.
  • 206:48 - 206:52
    who were generousIy incentivised
    with share options.
  • 206:53 - 206:56
    lnsurance. lt seemed such a brilliant idea
  • 206:59 - 207:02
    In Argentina's case, there were two.
  • 207:02 - 207:05
    ..Argentina,
    where economic underachievement
  • 207:04 - 207:07
    In the space of just three years
    after 1997,
  • 207:08 - 207:09
    $16,000...
  • 207:08 - 207:12
    One, a civiI war between GeneraIs
    and the Left in the 1970s,
  • 207:09 - 207:12
    in the calculations
    of those Scottish ministers,
  • 207:14 - 207:19
    And, until recently, this seemed
    to be to America's benefit too.
  • 207:22 - 207:27
    the Enron stock price rose
    by a factor of very nearIy five,
  • 207:25 - 207:29
    and even more brilliant in Japan's
    all-encompassing welfare state.
  • 207:25 - 207:27
    It's got the Ieather, the top...
  • 207:27 - 207:30
    has been a way of life for a century.
  • 207:29 - 207:34
    the other a foreign war against Britain
    over the FaIkIand IsIands in 1982.
  • 207:38 - 207:42
    Each week, United Auto Recoveries
    sells 500 repossessed cars.
  • 207:45 - 207:48
    from beIow 20 doIIars a share
    to above 90.
  • 207:45 - 207:50
    But as we've seen, the best-laid schemes
    can be thrown into disarray
  • 207:54 - 207:58
    Here in America, the best way
    to keep the good times roIIing
  • 207:54 - 207:58
    By 1989, the financiaI system
    was about ready to bIow.
  • 208:03 - 208:06
    It was the Mississippi Company
    aII over again.
  • 208:05 - 208:10
    These slums on the outskirts
    of Buenos Aires seem a million miles
  • 208:05 - 208:11
    The cars are auctioned off to the trade,
    ending up in the same car lots,
  • 208:09 - 208:14
    in recent years has been to import cheap
    Chinese goods by the container-Ioad
  • 208:11 - 208:14
    by an unexpected turn of events.
  • 208:26 - 208:30
    So is there any better way of
    managing risk in an uncertain world?
  • 208:27 - 208:31
    from the elegant boulevards
    of the Argentine capital's centre.
  • 208:30 - 208:32
    to be sold to much the same people
  • 208:30 - 208:34
    By February, inflation had already
    reached 1 0% - per month.
  • 208:38 - 208:42
    and seII them in out-of-town
    superstores, Iike this one.
  • 208:41 - 208:45
    and, when they can't keep up
    with their monthly payments,
  • 208:53 - 208:58
    Even a city used to extravagant
    oil-fired living had seen nothing like it.
  • 208:54 - 208:57
    But are people here
    really as poor as they look?
  • 208:54 - 208:57
    repo'd and recycled once again.
  • 208:55 - 208:58
    For companies Iike WaI-Mart,
    outsourcing to China
  • 208:56 - 208:59
    Disasters Iike 9/1 1 and Katrina
  • 209:08 - 209:14
    Banks were ordered to close as the
    government tried to lower interest rates
  • 209:10 - 209:15
    has been a way of reaping vast profits
    from cheap Chinese Iabour.
  • 209:11 - 209:14
    expose the Iimits of both
    traditionaI insurance
  • 209:18 - 209:23
    TechnicaIIy the Memphis repo men
    are simpIy doing what debt coIIectors do
  • 209:20 - 209:22
    One man didn't believe so.
  • 209:24 - 209:26
    and the weIfare state.
  • 209:30 - 209:34
    and stop the currency's
    exchange rate from collapsing.
  • 209:31 - 209:32
    In 2006 aIone,
  • 209:33 - 209:36
    But insurance and weIfare
    aren't the onIy ways
  • 209:34 - 209:38
    This is where Ken Lay
    and his Enron executives used to live,
  • 209:35 - 209:40
    Peruvian economist Hernando de Soto
    saw the shabby residences like these
  • 209:40 - 209:46
    WaI-Mart out-sourced no Iess than
    $9 biIIion-worth of goods from China.
  • 209:43 - 209:44
    the worId over.
  • 209:46 - 209:50
    to buy yourseIf protection
    against future shocks.
  • 209:49 - 209:54
    The difference, apart from the sheer
    mind-boggIing scaIe of the thing,
  • 209:51 - 209:52
    lt didn't work.
  • 209:56 - 210:00
    in River Oaks, Houston's
    most exclusive neighbourhood.
  • 210:01 - 210:05
    These days, the smart way
    of doing it is by being hedged.
  • 210:02 - 210:04
    ln just a month,
  • 210:05 - 210:09
    in developing countries all over the world
    as representing
  • 210:05 - 210:07
    But at the same time,
  • 210:09 - 210:13
    is the reIative ease
    with which the bad debts are wound up
  • 210:11 - 210:14
    the austral fell 1 40%
    against the dollar.
  • 210:13 - 210:18
    by seIIing biIIions of doIIars of bonds
    to the PeopIe's Bank of China,
  • 210:16 - 210:21
    ln the final year of its existence,
    Enron paid its top 1 40 executives
  • 210:21 - 210:25
    literally trillions of dollars
    of unrealised wealth.
  • 210:22 - 210:25
    Now, everybody's heard of hedge funds,
  • 210:25 - 210:29
    and the coIIateraI is soId off.
    For the debtors,
  • 210:32 - 210:36
    the United States has been abIe
    to enjoy much Iower interest rates
  • 210:33 - 210:38
    but what exactIy does ''hedging'' mean
    and where did it come from?
  • 210:40 - 210:45
    there's virtuaIIy no sociaI stigma
    and nobody seems to be getting hurt.
  • 210:43 - 210:47
    At the same time, the World Bank
    froze lending to Argentina,
  • 210:47 - 210:50
    an average of 5.3 million dollars each.
  • 210:51 - 210:54
    than wouId otherwise
    have been the case.
  • 211:01 - 211:04
    Luxury car sales went through the roof.
  • 211:03 - 211:08
    saying that the government had failed
    to tackle the root cause of inflation -
  • 211:03 - 211:08
    The big mystery is why the worId's
    most successfuI capitaIist economy
  • 211:03 - 211:07
    It's what they caII at business schooI
    a win-win situation.
  • 211:04 - 211:07
    The probIem is
    that the peopIe who Iive here,
  • 211:18 - 211:21
    and in countIess shanty towns
    around the worId,
  • 211:19 - 211:22
    To most of us, hedge funds are a mystery.
  • 211:23 - 211:26
    a bloated public-sector deficit.
  • 211:26 - 211:31
    is based on a foundation of more or Iess
    painIess economic faiIure.
  • 211:32 - 211:36
    don't have secure IegaI titIe
    to their homes.
  • 211:33 - 211:37
    (Sherron Watkins) You got muItipIes
    of your annuaI base pay.
  • 211:36 - 211:40
    With no cheap Ioans forthcoming
    from the WorId Bank,
  • 211:37 - 211:39
    But the one thing we do know
  • 211:40 - 211:44
    This is the wonderful
    dual country of ''Chimerica'',
  • 211:49 - 211:52
    is that they can make you
    stupendously rich.
  • 211:50 - 211:53
    That's bad, because without
    a IegaI titIe to property,
  • 211:56 - 212:01
    the government tried to finance its
    deficit by seIIing bonds to the pubIic.
  • 211:57 - 212:01
    You were reaIIy Iess thought of
    if you got a percentage,
  • 211:59 - 212:03
    accounting for 33%
    of the world's economic output
  • 212:07 - 212:13
    One hugely successful hedge fund manager
    paid $60 million for this Cezanne.
  • 212:08 - 212:11
    you can't use it as coIIateraI
    to borrow money.
  • 212:10 - 212:13
    even if it was 75%
    of your annuaI base pay.
  • 212:17 - 212:22
    But investors were hardIy IikeIy
    to buy bonds with the prospect
  • 212:18 - 212:23
    and more than half of all global
    growth in the past eight years.
  • 212:21 - 212:25
    Oh, you were getting a percentage.
    You wanted muItipIes.
  • 212:23 - 212:26
    And if you can't borrow money,
  • 212:24 - 212:28
    Here in Tennessee,
    when the house has been stripped bare
  • 212:33 - 212:38
    then you can't possibIy raise the capitaI
    you need to start a business.
  • 212:34 - 212:37
    You wanted two times
    your annuaI base pay,
  • 212:35 - 212:41
    that their reaI vaIue wouId be wiped out
    by infIation in just a matter of days.
  • 212:39 - 212:41
    And he owns this Degas too.
  • 212:45 - 212:47
    and the repo man has taken your car,
  • 212:47 - 212:51
    three times, four times
    your annuaI base pay, as a bonus.
  • 212:53 - 212:57
    Not to mention a Jasper Johns
    he paid $80 million for.
  • 212:56 - 213:00
    you end up in the hands of one
    of Memphis's bankruptcy lawyers,
  • 213:00 - 213:01
    Nobody was buying.
  • 213:06 - 213:10
    Chimerica seemed like
    a marriage made in heaven.
  • 213:07 - 213:10
    The government was running out of options.
  • 213:10 - 213:16
    Part of the trouble is that in poor
    countries, it's a bureaucratic nightmare
  • 213:15 - 213:19
    He's also given hundreds of millions
    of dollars to charity.
  • 213:16 - 213:19
    along with around 1 3,000 other people
  • 213:17 - 213:19
    And Lay, the pillar of society,
  • 213:28 - 213:31
    who filed for bankruptcy here
    in the past year.
  • 213:30 - 213:35
    The East Chimericans did the saving.
    The West Chimericans did the spending.
  • 213:31 - 213:35
    espoused the highest moral
    standards for his company.
  • 213:33 - 213:36
    ln April, furious customers
    overturned shopping trolleys
  • 213:38 - 213:41
    to establish secure legal title
    to property.
  • 213:43 - 213:48
    Of course that's one thing that's making
    you... Bumping your payments up so high.
  • 213:49 - 213:55
    (Ken Lay) Enron is a company that deaIs
    with everyone with absoIute integrity.
  • 213:50 - 213:54
    after one supermarket announced
    over the loudspeaker
  • 213:55 - 214:01
    lt can take months - sometimes years -
    longer than in the English-speaking world.
  • 213:56 - 213:57
    But there was a catch.
  • 214:11 - 214:15
    that prices were being raised by 30%
    immediately.
  • 214:12 - 214:15
    Every week, bankrupts gather
    here with their lawyers
  • 214:18 - 214:21
    We pIay by aII of the ruIes,
    we stand by our word,
  • 214:19 - 214:21
    For Hernando de Soto,
  • 214:24 - 214:28
    Ken Griffin is the founder
    of the Citadel lnvestment Group,
  • 214:25 - 214:29
    The more China was willing
    to lend to the United States,
  • 214:29 - 214:33
    breathing financiaI Iife
    into aII this dead capitaI
  • 214:33 - 214:38
    to hammer out deals with their creditors.
    There's even a fast track lane.
  • 214:34 - 214:37
    we mean what we say,
    we say what we mean.
  • 214:40 - 214:46
    Shops emptied of goods as owners weren't
    making enough money to buy new stock.
  • 214:43 - 214:46
    the more Americans
    were willing to borrow.
  • 214:44 - 214:46
    one of the world's biggest hedge funds.
  • 214:46 - 214:51
    is the key to providing the poor
    with a more prosperous future.
  • 214:53 - 214:57
    The only problem was that,
    like John Law's system,
  • 214:59 - 215:01
    Chimerica, in other words,
  • 215:00 - 215:05
    Last year, he navigated his way through
    the credit crunch so successfully
  • 215:07 - 215:11
    was the underlying cause
    of the flood of new bank loans,
  • 215:14 - 215:16
    the Enron system was an elaborate fraud.
  • 215:21 - 215:25
    he was able to pay himself
    more than a billion dollars.
  • 215:24 - 215:29
    In this case it's a mortgage
    and it's a car, or two cars.
  • 215:32 - 215:37
    bond issues and derivative contracts
    that swept Planet Finance after 2000.
  • 215:35 - 215:35
    PHONE RINGS
  • 215:42 - 215:47
    The shanty town of Quilmes,
    on the southern outskirts of Buenos Aires,
  • 215:49 - 215:51
    To most of us, risk is scary,
  • 216:03 - 216:09
    I can't see anything eIse in there
    that they're...they're having to pay off.
  • 216:06 - 216:10
    provides a natural experiment
    to test De Soto's theory.
  • 216:08 - 216:14
    but all of Griffin's vast wealth has come
    because he's found a way of managing risk,
  • 216:19 - 216:24
    That, in turn, was the underlying
    reason why the US mortgage market
  • 216:25 - 216:29
    - ActuaIIy there are three cars.
    - Three cars?
  • 216:33 - 216:35
    ln this tape, an Enron trader
  • 216:34 - 216:39
    with a mixture of mathematical
    precision and brilliant intuition.
  • 216:37 - 216:43
    On one side of the town, there are some
    of the most squalid slums l've ever seen.
  • 216:41 - 216:45
    is discussing with
    the El Paso Electric Company
  • 216:44 - 216:46
    was so awash with cash in 2006
  • 216:46 - 216:49
    The third car is...
    the neighbourhood titIe Ioans,
  • 216:56 - 217:01
    that sub-prime mortgages were
    being sold to people with no income,
  • 216:57 - 217:00
    how to hold California's
    consumers to ransom
  • 217:06 - 217:10
    has a... has a Iien on the car,
    they are hoIding the titIe.
  • 217:08 - 217:13
    (Ken Griffin) Nothing is constant.
    Nothing is the way it's aIways been.
  • 217:11 - 217:15
    But just a few miles away,
    it's a very different story.
  • 217:14 - 217:19
    by closing power stations
    to restrict the supply of electricity.
  • 217:17 - 217:20
    no job and no assets - Ninjas.
  • 217:26 - 217:29
    Government bond prices plunged
  • 217:29 - 217:32
    (NiaII) So putting this reaIIy simpIy,
  • 217:34 - 217:38
    So what I find is that peopIe
    who are reaIIy good at this
  • 217:39 - 217:43
    as fears rose that the Central Bank's
    reserves were running out.
  • 217:43 - 217:48
    what were they supposed to be paying
    and what are they now paying?
  • 217:46 - 217:50
    It was in the earIy 1980s
    that a group of squatters here
  • 217:54 - 217:57
    have great intuition, great instinct.
  • 218:01 - 218:05
    With no foreign Ioans
    and no-one wiIIing to buy bonds,
  • 218:03 - 218:08
    It wasn't as if the sub-prime mortgage
    crisis of 2007 was hard to predict.
  • 218:04 - 218:09
    Iobbied the government
    for secure IegaI titIe to their homes.
  • 218:05 - 218:08
    WeII, that payment was reduced
    from 241 . 1 1 ...
  • 218:09 - 218:12
    Their gut actuaIIy teIIs them something.
  • 218:18 - 218:23
    there was onIy one thing Ieft for an
    increasingIy desperate government to do -
  • 218:19 - 218:21
    The mathematics are important
  • 218:25 - 218:25
    OK.
  • 218:28 - 218:31
    because they demonstrate
    you understand the probIem.
  • 218:29 - 218:35
    They were successfuI, and those wiIIing
    to pay a nominaI rent were granted Ieases
  • 218:30 - 218:31
    - down to 107.
    - OK.
  • 218:31 - 218:35
    Months before it bIew up,
    I was in Tennessee and in Michigan,
  • 218:40 - 218:44
    get the CentraI Bank IiteraIIy
    to print more money.
  • 218:42 - 218:44
    Quite an improvement.
  • 218:43 - 218:48
    But uItimateIy, the decision about
    whether or not to take a given risk
  • 218:49 - 218:52
    Cutting their monthIy obIigations
    by more than haIf.
  • 218:50 - 218:54
    which, after 20 years,
    converted into fuII ownership.
  • 218:51 - 218:54
    seeing for myseIf
    how many poorer househoIds
  • 218:55 - 218:58
    But they couIdn't even get that right.
  • 218:59 - 219:03
    The results were not only
    the higher prices Enron wanted,
  • 219:05 - 219:09
    I think is reaIIy a human judgement caII
    in every sense of the word.
  • 219:07 - 219:10
    were heading for mortgage defauIt
    and forecIosure.
  • 219:08 - 219:13
    You can teII they're owner-occupied
    by the fact that there's a fence,
  • 219:19 - 219:23
    but also, despite there being
    plenty of power available,
  • 219:22 - 219:25
    What was much harder to predict
  • 219:27 - 219:31
    the waIIs are painted,
    there's even a rather excitabIe guard dog.
  • 219:33 - 219:38
    was how a smaII tremor in America's
    very own home-grown emerging market
  • 219:33 - 219:37
    On Friday April 28th,
    Argentina literally ran out of money.
  • 219:42 - 219:44
    repeated blackouts for consumers.
  • 219:44 - 219:49
    From 1 996 to 2006 there were between one
    and two million bankruptcy cases a year
  • 219:49 - 219:54
    After aII, owners tend to Iook after
    properties better than tenants.
  • 220:00 - 220:04
    wouId cause a financiaI earthquake
    aII around the worId.
  • 220:09 - 220:11
    ''lt's a physical problem, ''
  • 220:12 - 220:16
    The origins of hedging,
    appropriateIy enough, are agricuIturaI.
  • 220:12 - 220:14
    And some of the owners here
  • 220:18 - 220:22
    the Central Bank Vice-President
    told a news conference.
  • 220:22 - 220:27
    are even reaIising the vaIue of their
    properties by putting them up for saIe.
  • 220:24 - 220:27
    Enron's money was stolen
    in more ways than one.
  • 220:24 - 220:28
    in the United States,
    nearly all of them involving individuals
  • 220:30 - 220:35
    For a farmer, nothing is more important
    than the future price of his crop
  • 220:38 - 220:42
    Not many people foresaw that
    defaults on sub-prime mortgages
  • 220:40 - 220:44
    The company's stated assets
    were vastly inflated.
  • 220:42 - 220:46
    who elected to go bust
    rather than meet their obligations.
  • 220:50 - 220:55
    What he meant was that Argentina's mint
    had run out of paper to print new notes,
  • 220:52 - 220:55
    after it's been harvested
    and brought to market.
  • 220:58 - 221:03
    But its key financial innovation was to
    remove its debts from the balance sheet
  • 220:58 - 221:03
    Yet there seems to be a flaw in
    the theory, for owning their own homes
  • 220:59 - 221:02
    would send such a shockwave
    around the world
  • 221:05 - 221:09
    But that can be higher,
    or much Iower, than he expects.
  • 221:13 - 221:15
    and the printers had gone on strike.
  • 221:13 - 221:17
    that a British bank would suffer
    the first run since 1 866
  • 221:16 - 221:21
    ln medieval ltaly - or in the Glasgow
    of my youth, for that matter -
  • 221:26 - 221:31
    hasn't made it significantly easier
    for people here to borrow money.
  • 221:27 - 221:30
    A futures contract aIIows him
    to protect himseIf
  • 221:32 - 221:36
    and hide them in so-called
    ''special purpose entities'',
  • 221:36 - 221:38
    and end up being nationalised,
  • 221:39 - 221:42
    bankruptcy was seen as a disaster.
    But not here.
  • 221:41 - 221:46
    by committing a merchant to buy
    the crop when it's brought to market
  • 221:46 - 221:50
    or that one of the greatest names
    in American investment banking,
  • 221:53 - 221:57
    Just 4% of them
    have managed to secure a mortgage.
  • 221:58 - 222:01
    dubious names like Chewco and Raptor.
  • 221:59 - 222:03
    at a price agreed when the seeds
    are being pIanted.
  • 222:01 - 222:04
    Lehman Brothers, would go bust.
  • 222:07 - 222:11
    In fact, this abiIity to waIk away
    unscathed from unsustainabIe debt
  • 222:14 - 222:18
    The reaIity is that owning property
    doesn't give you security -
  • 222:15 - 222:20
    Each quarter, the company's executives
    had to use more smoke and more mirrors
  • 222:17 - 222:20
    ''l don't know how we'll do it,
  • 222:22 - 222:26
    The farmer gets a floor
    below which the price can't sink.
  • 222:24 - 222:25
    And not many people saw
  • 222:29 - 222:33
    ''but the money has got to be there
    on Monday, '' he declared.
  • 222:34 - 222:39
    and start again has been a defining
    characteristic of American capitaIism.
  • 222:35 - 222:38
    it just gives your creditors security.
  • 222:36 - 222:41
    that as other banks started to write down
    hundreds of billions of losses,
  • 222:40 - 222:44
    The merchant gets a ceiling
    above which it can't rise.
  • 222:40 - 222:44
    to make actual losses
    look like bumper profits.
  • 222:49 - 222:52
    ReaI security comes
    from having an income,
  • 222:57 - 223:00
    inter-bank lending
    would simply seize up,
  • 222:58 - 223:02
    There were no debtors' prisons here
    in the earIy 1800s,
  • 223:01 - 223:03
    By signing a futures contract,
  • 223:03 - 223:04
    lt couldn't last.
  • 223:05 - 223:08
    as the Duke of Buckingham
    discovered in the 1840s,
  • 223:11 - 223:16
    Yet the faster the printing presses
    rolled, the less the money was worth.
  • 223:11 - 223:15
    both the farmer and the merchant
    have hedged their bets.
  • 223:12 - 223:16
    When you cook the books
    and then you try to hide it,
  • 223:12 - 223:17
    driving the US Treasury
    to propose a $7 00 billion bail-out
  • 223:16 - 223:22
    at a time when EngIish debtors couId
    Ianguish in jaiI for years. Since 1898,
  • 223:21 - 223:24
    as Detroit homeowners
    are discovering today,
  • 223:31 - 223:34
    (Ken Griffin) Both parties are better off,
  • 223:32 - 223:32
    you're toast.
  • 223:33 - 223:38
    The government was forced to print higher
    and higher denominations of notes.
  • 223:35 - 223:39
    and as I suspect the peopIe of QuiImes
    wouId probabIy agree.
  • 223:39 - 223:41
    for the financial system as a whole.
  • 223:43 - 223:46
    When they sensed
    the game would soon be up,
  • 223:45 - 223:49
    and because of that, the worId
    as a whoIe is much better off.
  • 223:46 - 223:51
    every American has been entitIed
    to fiIe for Chapter 7 - Iiquidation,
  • 223:52 - 223:55
    For that reason,
    it probabIy isn't necessary
  • 223:55 - 223:58
    Lay and his cronies started to unload
  • 223:58 - 224:02
    ln May, the price of coffee went up
    by 50% in a week.
  • 224:05 - 224:07
    It encourages capitaI formation,
  • 224:06 - 224:12
    for every entrepreneur in the deveIoping
    worId to take out a mortgage on his home
  • 224:07 - 224:10
    hundreds of millions
    of dollars worth of shares,
  • 224:09 - 224:12
    or Chapter 13 -
    voIuntary personaI reorganisation.
  • 224:17 - 224:19
    it encourages investment,
  • 224:21 - 224:24
    while at the same time
    reassuring the public
  • 224:27 - 224:31
    it encourages peopIe to do
    what is needed to be done
  • 224:28 - 224:30
    CertainIy, by June 2008.
  • 224:29 - 224:30
    For rich and poor aIike,
  • 224:29 - 224:34
    Farmers stopped bringing cattle to market
    as the price for one cow
  • 224:30 - 224:32
    or, for that matter, on her home.
  • 224:34 - 224:37
    that the share price
    would continue to soar.
  • 224:37 - 224:41
    an American recession
    seemed more or Iess inevitabIe.
  • 224:38 - 224:42
    bankruptcy has become
    as much of an inaIienabIe right
  • 224:41 - 224:46
    In fact, property ownership may not be
    the key to weaIth-generation at aII.
  • 224:46 - 224:48
    to make the worId a better pIace.
  • 224:51 - 224:54
    was now the same as for
    three pairs of shoes.
  • 224:55 - 224:57
    But the end of the worId?
  • 224:56 - 224:59
    as ''Iife, Iiberty
    and the pursuit of happiness''.
  • 224:57 - 225:00
    Like John Law's desperate attempts
  • 225:05 - 225:07
    Looking around
    the streets of Hong Kong,
  • 225:07 - 225:11
    to stem the freefall
    of Mississippi Company shares,
  • 225:09 - 225:13
    With the development of
    a standardised futures contract,
  • 225:16 - 225:19
    I don't see much sign
    of a recession here.
  • 225:23 - 225:26
    all Ken Lay's reassurances were in vain.
  • 225:26 - 225:29
    agreed rules,
    and an effective clearing house,
  • 225:28 - 225:31
    Can it be that
    the Chinese haIf of Chimerica
  • 225:34 - 225:39
    The theory is that American law exists
    to encourage entrepreneurship -
  • 225:43 - 225:46
    the first true futures market was born.
  • 225:44 - 225:48
    has successfuIIy decoupIed itseIf
    from the American haIf?
  • 225:54 - 225:59
    On November 1 5th 2001, Alan Greenspan,
    head of the US Federal Reserve,
  • 225:55 - 225:59
    to facilitate
    the creation of new businesses.
  • 226:06 - 226:11
    By June 1989, infIation in Argentina
    had reached a monthIy rate of 100%,
  • 226:10 - 226:12
    This is Betty Flores.
  • 226:13 - 226:19
    And that means giving people a break
    when things don't work out the first time,
  • 226:16 - 226:19
    And its birthplace was here
    in the Windy City.
  • 226:17 - 226:22
    The idea that China can somehow walk
    away unscathed from the American crisis
  • 226:27 - 226:31
    received the Enron Prize
    for Distinguished Public Service,
  • 226:27 - 226:30
    She runs a small coffee shop in El Alto,
  • 226:34 - 226:35
    Chicago.
  • 226:40 - 226:42
    or even the second time.
  • 226:41 - 226:44
    an annuaI rate of roughIy 12,000%.
  • 226:44 - 226:47
    a poor suburb of the Bolivian capital,
    La Paz.
  • 226:46 - 226:48
    is certainly seductive.
  • 226:49 - 226:55
    The born risk-takers don't get wiped out
    as they learn through trial and error
  • 226:51 - 226:54
    adding his name to a roll of honour
  • 226:57 - 226:59
    To put that into concrete terms,
  • 226:57 - 227:02
    Betty is one of an increasingly large
    number of women around the world
  • 226:59 - 227:03
    After the city's futures exchange
    was established in 1 87 4,
  • 227:01 - 227:04
    that included Mikhail Gorbachev
    and Nelson Mandela.
  • 227:02 - 227:05
    Despite declining exports
    to the recession-hit West,
  • 227:09 - 227:14
    if you wanted to go out for dinner
    in Buenos Aires on a Saturday night,
  • 227:16 - 227:18
    how to make that first million,
  • 227:17 - 227:21
    and a stock market crash,
    booming domestic demand
  • 227:21 - 227:26
    Greenspan deserved it, because without
    his monetary policies in the late '90s,
  • 227:23 - 227:26
    hedging commodities
    became standard practice.
  • 227:24 - 227:28
    who have borrowed money
    with no security at all.
  • 227:27 - 227:31
    because today's bankrupt
    might be tomorrow's billionaire.
  • 227:29 - 227:32
    in May you'd pay 10,000 austraIes.
  • 227:35 - 227:40
    seems set to keep China's economy
    growing at at least 8% a year.
  • 227:42 - 227:46
    By June, you'd have to pay 20,000
    for the same meaI.
  • 227:44 - 227:46
    She's the personification
  • 227:47 - 227:51
    the Enron bubble, and the dotcom bubble
    that coincided with it,
  • 227:54 - 227:58
    The next step was for a conditional
    kind of future to evolve.
  • 227:57 - 228:01
    of an extraordinary new financial movement
    known as microfinance.
  • 228:02 - 228:04
    lt's a theory that seems to work.
  • 228:06 - 228:09
    And by the foIIowing month,
    it wouId take 60,000.
  • 228:06 - 228:09
    But remember, we've been here before.
  • 228:07 - 228:09
    would surely have been impossible.
  • 228:12 - 228:17
    Many of America's greatest successes
    failed in their early endeavours,
  • 228:20 - 228:21
    The option.
  • 228:22 - 228:23
    A hundred years ago,
  • 228:28 - 228:32
    Did you borrow the money
    to set up this coffee stand?
  • 228:30 - 228:33
    You've heard of a fistfuI of doIIars.
  • 228:32 - 228:35
    in the first age of globalisation,
  • 228:34 - 228:38
    Some of this really is the financial
    equivalent of rocket science,
  • 228:35 - 228:40
    Just two weeks after the award ceremony,
    Enron filed for bankruptcy.
  • 228:35 - 228:37
    including the author Mark Twain,
  • 228:41 - 228:46
    WeII, you needed a drawer fuII
    of austraIes just to buy a square meaI.
  • 228:46 - 228:50
    many investors thought there was
    similarly symbiotic relationship
  • 228:48 - 228:50
    COMPANION TRANSLATES
  • 228:56 - 228:58
    but the underlying principle is simple.
  • 229:02 - 229:04
    The company owed billions.
  • 229:04 - 229:06
    the comedian Buster Keaton,
  • 229:05 - 229:08
    between the world's
    financial centre, Britain,
  • 229:13 - 229:16
    Because they're derived
    from underIying assets,
  • 229:14 - 229:16
    SHE REPLIES IN SPANISH
  • 229:17 - 229:20
    and Europe's most dynamic
    industrial economy.
  • 229:19 - 229:21
    But just how many billions?
  • 229:27 - 229:32
    Yes, to make the...the stand.
    She borrowed money to make the stand.
  • 229:28 - 229:32
    aII futures contracts
    are known as ''derivatives''.
  • 229:31 - 229:35
    and none other than the great
    industrialist Henry Ford himself.
  • 229:34 - 229:36
    That economy was Germany's,
  • 229:36 - 229:38
    ln June, popular frustration erupted
  • 229:39 - 229:42
    When Enron decIared bankruptcy,
    December 2001 ,
  • 229:42 - 229:46
    But an even smarter kind
    of derivative is an ''option''.
  • 229:49 - 229:53
    and the breakdown of that
    relationship ended in war.
  • 229:53 - 229:58
    in two days of intense rioting and looting
    by hungry mobs.
  • 229:54 - 229:56
    they met with their creditors to say,
  • 229:55 - 229:57
    Has she paid it aII back?
  • 230:01 - 230:03
    The buyer of a caII option
  • 230:07 - 230:10
    All of these men eventually flourished
  • 230:13 - 230:16
    has the right, say,
    to buy a barreI of oiI for $120
  • 230:15 - 230:18
    ''Erm, guys, I know on our baIance sheet,
  • 230:15 - 230:19
    - She's paid it off a Iong time ago.
    - Oh, I see.
  • 230:16 - 230:18
    At least 1 4 people died.
  • 230:18 - 230:23
    not least because they were given a chance
    to try, fail and start over.
  • 230:33 - 230:36
    ''we have reported 13 biIIion doIIars
    of Iong-term debt.
  • 230:38 - 230:39
    As before 1 91 4,
  • 230:42 - 230:43
    in a year's time.
  • 230:44 - 230:47
    For their part, the banks simply assume
  • 230:46 - 230:49
    ln a country where a steak
    and a bottle of wine
  • 230:49 - 230:54
    there's a fine line that separates
    symbiosis from rivalry and conflict.
  • 230:50 - 230:54
    Now, if the price of oiI rises
    to $150 a barreI,
  • 230:50 - 230:55
    Stories Iike Betty's point
    to one of the great reveIations
  • 230:52 - 230:56
    ''Our true Iong-term debt picture
    is 38 biIIion doIIars.
  • 231:00 - 231:04
    that a proportion of the loans
    they make will go bad.
  • 231:01 - 231:04
    were on practically every table every day,
  • 231:10 - 231:13
    of the microfinance movement
    in a country Iike BoIivia.
  • 231:11 - 231:13
    then the option is in the money
  • 231:12 - 231:17
    After all, most people going bankrupt
    owe relatively trivial sums.
  • 231:14 - 231:18
    thousands were eating in soup kitchens
    or going hungry.
  • 231:16 - 231:20
    ''There's 25 biIIion doIIars
    in off-baIance-sheet debt''.
  • 231:21 - 231:25
    According to one estimate,
    China's gross domestic product
  • 231:21 - 231:24
    and the smart guy makes a profit of $30.
  • 231:25 - 231:29
    It turns out that women are actuaIIy
    a better credit risk than men,
  • 231:36 - 231:37
    CLOCK CHIMES
  • 231:37 - 231:42
    But if that doesn't happen,
    if the price of oiI stays the same,
  • 231:40 - 231:44
    could exceed that of
    the United States as early as 2027.
  • 231:40 - 231:45
    A Chapter 1 3 doesn't wipe their debts out,
    it just reschedules them.
  • 231:42 - 231:46
    (NiaII Ferguson) Did those numbers
    come as a shock to you?
  • 231:45 - 231:48
    with or without a home
    as security for the Ioan.
  • 231:47 - 231:51
    lt's obvious enough who loses
    from hyperinflation.
  • 231:52 - 231:56
    You knew there were probIems,
    but not on that scaIe.
  • 231:56 - 231:58
    or actuaIIy decIines,
  • 232:00 - 232:04
    By that time
    some critics of free trade argue
  • 232:02 - 232:06
    It aII rather fIies in the face
    of the conventionaI image
  • 232:03 - 232:06
    Yes, I mean, I think
    we were aII fIabbergasted.
  • 232:03 - 232:07
    he's under no obIigation
    to carry through the deaI.
  • 232:09 - 232:12
    Very rapidly rising prices are bound
    to wipe out
  • 232:17 - 232:22
    AII he does is to write off
    the cost of the option itseIf.
  • 232:18 - 232:20
    of the spendthrift femaIe.
  • 232:20 - 232:25
    that virtually nothing may remain
    of American manufacturing industry.
  • 232:23 - 232:28
    anybody who's dependent on an income
    that's fixed in cash terms.
  • 232:34 - 232:40
    The day before 4,500 employees at Enron's
    HQ were given their marching orders,
  • 232:37 - 232:42
    WeII, it's by buying and seIIing compIex
    smart derivatives Iike options
  • 232:41 - 232:46
    Groups Iike academics and civiI servants
    on infIexibIe monthIy saIaries,
  • 232:43 - 232:48
    These women are hardly what
    you would call good financial risks.
  • 232:44 - 232:48
    So it's a mistake to think,
    as Shakespeare's Antonio did,
  • 232:44 - 232:48
    And the worse things get
    in the United States,
  • 233:01 - 233:04
    that Ken Griffin has become a biIIionaire.
  • 233:03 - 233:06
    the louder such complaints will grow.
  • 233:04 - 233:06
    of moneylenders as mere leeches,
  • 233:06 - 233:10
    They probably have
    just a few dollars between them.
  • 233:07 - 233:11
    a final round of bonus cheques
    were issued to grateful executives.
  • 233:07 - 233:09
    oId-age pensioners and, particuIarIy,
  • 233:15 - 233:16
    TRADERS SHOUTING
  • 233:18 - 233:22
    sucking the life's blood
    out of unfortunate debtors.
  • 233:20 - 233:23
    bondhoIders Iiving off the interest
    on their investments.
  • 233:26 - 233:30
    Yet with no security, they are being
    lent money. Here in Bolivia,
  • 233:32 - 233:37
    ln theory, derivatives offer a new way
    to hedge against an uncertain future.
  • 233:36 - 233:41
    On a day Iike today, when the
    Hong Kong stock market is down sharpIy,
  • 233:40 - 233:44
    Buenos Aires is absoIuteIy fuII
    of antique shops Iike this one,
  • 233:41 - 233:47
    ln May 2006, Ken Lay was convicted on all
    six counts of securities and wire fraud.
  • 233:51 - 233:53
    lenders have come to realise
  • 233:56 - 234:00
    it's tempting to ask whether
    anything couId trigger
  • 233:58 - 234:01
    A much smarter way
    than boring old insurance.
  • 234:01 - 234:05
    Credit and debt are the building blocks
    of economic development.
  • 234:02 - 234:06
    Iaden down with jeweIIery and watches
    and cutIery,
  • 234:05 - 234:08
    that creditworthiness
    may in fact be a female trait.
  • 234:11 - 234:16
    a comparabIe breakdown in gIobaIisation
    Iike the one that happened in 191 4?
  • 234:15 - 234:17
    And much more profitable.
  • 234:17 - 234:22
    His sidekick, Jeffrey Skilling,
    was sentenced to 24 years in prison.
  • 234:21 - 234:25
    aII soId off by middIe-cIass famiIies
    who just ran out of cash.
  • 234:21 - 234:25
    But it takes banks to elevate
    that relationship
  • 234:35 - 234:38
    The obvious answer
    is some kind of confIict
  • 234:36 - 234:40
    beyond the tie between
    a loan shark and his hapless victim.
  • 234:36 - 234:38
    Carmen Velasco set up Pro Mujer
  • 234:42 - 234:48
    ln the past decade, derivatives have
    seemed to take over the world of finance.
  • 234:47 - 234:52
    between the United States and China,
    whether over trade, Taiwan, Tibet,
  • 234:48 - 234:52
    ln the 1 920s, the great economist
    John Maynard Keynes had predicted
  • 234:53 - 234:57
    to provide finance
    to poor but enterprising women.
  • 234:56 - 235:00
    Lay died before sentencing,
    while on holiday in Aspen, Colorado.
  • 235:11 - 235:13
    the euthanasia of the bondholder,
  • 235:13 - 235:18
    By the end of 2007, the notional value
    of all derivatives contracts
  • 235:13 - 235:16
    or some other unforeseeabIe
    bone of contention.
  • 235:16 - 235:19
    Because the loans
    are unsecured by property,
  • 235:22 - 235:26
    anticipating that inflation would eat up
    the paper wealth
  • 235:30 - 235:34
    Yet the fraudulent practices
    that propelled Enron's rise and fall
  • 235:30 - 235:35
    It's onIy when borrowers Iike the ones
    on this GIasgow housing estate
  • 235:30 - 235:33
    What starts with competition
    for Olympic medals
  • 235:34 - 235:39
    the challenge is to get the women
    to pay them back...but they do.
  • 235:36 - 235:39
    reached a staggering $596 trillion.
  • 235:43 - 235:46
    of financial families
    like the Rothschilds.
  • 235:49 - 235:52
    could end in a battle over dollars
  • 235:51 - 235:54
    have access to efficient credit markets
  • 235:51 - 235:53
    didn't die with Ken Lay.
  • 235:55 - 236:00
    From day one, they have to know
    that they have to repay on time,
  • 236:01 - 236:04
    That's 43 times the size
    of the American economy.
  • 236:03 - 236:09
    if the Chinese one day decide to cut off
    their credit line to the American empire.
  • 236:03 - 236:08
    that they can escape the cIutches
    of the ShyIocks and the Ioan sharks.
  • 236:08 - 236:12
    On the contrary, the habit
    of hiding debt off-balance-sheet
  • 236:08 - 236:12
    As inflation swept through the world
    in the 1 97 0s,
  • 236:20 - 236:23
    that they have interest rates
    and they have to save.
  • 236:24 - 236:28
    It's onIy when savers can put
    their money in dependabIe banks
  • 236:31 - 236:33
    Keynes seemed to be proved right.
  • 236:34 - 236:39
    that Enron pioneered subsequently spread
    throughout the Western financial system.
  • 236:35 - 236:37
    Maybe, as its name suggests,
  • 236:39 - 236:45
    So it's a process of Iearning,
    and at the beginning it's very difficuIt,
  • 236:42 - 236:46
    that it can be channeIIed
    from the idIe to the industrious.
  • 236:47 - 236:51
    There are tremendous economic
    benefits for peopIe that work here.
  • 236:48 - 236:50
    ln our time, however,
  • 236:53 - 236:56
    Chimerica is nothing more
    than a chimera -
  • 236:55 - 236:59
    we've seen a miraculous resurrection
    of the bondholder -
  • 237:02 - 237:05
    because they are not used to
    handIing a Ioan.
  • 237:05 - 237:08
    The unravelling of this dodgy accounting
  • 237:10 - 237:12
    $20 biIIion in the hands of 1 ,000 peopIe
  • 237:15 - 237:19
    But wait, l hear you ask,
    if banks are the answer,
  • 237:15 - 237:20
    the mythical beast of ancient legend
    that was part lion, part goat,
  • 237:15 - 237:21
    But IittIe by IittIe, they get used to it,
    and they feeI so proud when they repay.
  • 237:18 - 237:21
    a comeback by Mr Bond...
    even in Argentina.
  • 237:19 - 237:22
    has been a key component
    of the current crisis.
  • 237:23 - 237:26
    is reaIIy a 21st century phenomenon.
  • 237:34 - 237:34
    part dragon.
  • 237:36 - 237:41
    In many respects, I think
    the Enron probIem was in a Petri dish
  • 237:39 - 237:41
    This never happened 50 years ago.
  • 237:40 - 237:45
    how could so many have collapsed
    so spectacularly in the past year,
  • 237:47 - 237:48
    The bond market is back,
  • 237:59 - 238:04
    terrifying American officials as they
    try to fund a massive financial bailout
  • 238:00 - 238:04
    and the germ has spread
    throughout the financiaI markets.
  • 238:01 - 238:04
    throwing the financial world
    into turmoil?
  • 238:06 - 238:11
    I must say, I'm hugeIy impressed
    by what I'm seeing here at Pro Mujer.
  • 238:09 - 238:13
    A Chinese-American conflict
    may sound implausible,
  • 238:15 - 238:18
    Yet there are downsides to hedging too.
  • 238:19 - 238:23
    Some of which comes from
    Enron traders and finance foIks
  • 238:23 - 238:28
    by - you guessed it - selling billions
    of dollars of freshly minted bonds.
  • 238:26 - 238:29
    You can sense in this hive of activity
  • 238:28 - 238:31
    but one of the key points of this series
  • 238:28 - 238:32
    To understand why bad debts
    in places like Memphis
  • 238:31 - 238:33
    When biIIionaire investor Warren Buffet
  • 238:39 - 238:43
    that are gainfuIIy empIoyed at banks
    and energy trading houses.
  • 238:39 - 238:44
    the transformation that microfinance
    has brought into these women's Iives.
  • 238:41 - 238:44
    is that the really big crises
    come just seldom enough
  • 238:42 - 238:47
    described derivatives as
    ''financiaI weapons of mass destruction'',
  • 238:46 - 238:50
    could cause such chaos,
    you need to understand
  • 238:57 - 239:00
    So that rot is everywhere
    in the financiaI markets.
  • 238:59 - 239:01
    The key to Mr Bond's revival
  • 239:00 - 239:04
    how the relationship between
    banks and borrowers broke down
  • 239:01 - 239:06
    he aII but prophesised the downfaII
    of American insurance giant AIG.
  • 239:04 - 239:06
    to be beyond the living memory
  • 239:05 - 239:08
    And behind me
    you can see the bottom Iine...
  • 239:12 - 239:16
    of the people who run today's
    companies, banks and funds.
  • 239:14 - 239:18
    has been a growth
    in the number of bondholders...
  • 239:20 - 239:24
    as loans came to be ''securitised''
    and sold on to unwary investors.
  • 239:21 - 239:24
    women Iining up
    to repay their Ioans punctuaIIy.
  • 239:29 - 239:32
    Their European headquarters
    are there behind me.
  • 239:41 - 239:47
    Maybe it's time to change that oId
    catch phrase from ''as safe as houses''
  • 239:43 - 239:46
    Brought Iow not by seIIing
    insurance poIicies,
  • 239:44 - 239:47
    Just because all the swans
    you've ever seen are white
  • 239:52 - 239:57
    The joint stock Iimited IiabiIity company
    truIy is a miracuIous institution.
  • 239:52 - 239:54
    ..which brings us back to ltaly,
  • 239:58 - 240:02
    but by seIIing derivatives
    that bIew up in its face.
  • 240:01 - 240:04
    doesn't mean there are no black swans.
  • 240:05 - 240:07
    to ''as safe as housewives''.
  • 240:09 - 240:12
    where the bond market was born
    600 years ago.
  • 240:19 - 240:23
    Once upon a time, being a banker
    was reaIIy rather boring.
  • 240:23 - 240:26
    And yet throughout financiaI history,
  • 240:26 - 240:30
    Of course, it would be a mistake
    to assume that microfinance
  • 240:34 - 240:38
    there have aIways been
    a few crooked companies,
  • 240:38 - 240:40
    You Iived by the 3-6-3 ruIe,
  • 240:46 - 240:48
    is some kind of economic magic bullet.
  • 240:50 - 240:53
    just as there have occasionaIIy
    been irrationaI markets.
  • 240:55 - 240:59
    which meant you paid 3% on deposits,
    coIIected 6% on Ioans
  • 240:58 - 241:04
    ltaly is now a country with one of the
    most rapidly ageing populations in Europe.
  • 240:59 - 241:04
    Just giving out loans won't necessarily
    consign poverty to the museums.
  • 241:06 - 241:08
    Indeed, the two go hand in hand,
  • 241:10 - 241:16
    Today's financial world is the result
    of four millennia of economic evolution.
  • 241:17 - 241:22
    because it's preciseIy when the buIIs
    are stampeding most enthusiasticaIIy
  • 241:19 - 241:22
    and were on the goIf course by 3 o'cIock.
  • 241:23 - 241:27
    Our basic human urge
    to protect ourselves against risk
  • 241:26 - 241:30
    But then, betting everything
    on the house won't do that, either.
  • 241:33 - 241:37
    But in our time, banking became
    reaIIy rather too interesting.
  • 241:34 - 241:35
    ln such a greying society,
  • 241:39 - 241:44
    that peopIe are most IikeIy
    to get taken for the proverbiaI ride.
  • 241:44 - 241:47
    has proved frustratingly
    difficult to satisfy.
  • 241:44 - 241:49
    there is a growing demand
    for fixed-income securities like bonds.
  • 241:55 - 241:57
    A whoIe series of financiaI innovations
  • 242:04 - 242:08
    But there's also a strong fear
    of inflation eating up
  • 242:08 - 242:11
    made it possibIe for
    common or garden Ioans
  • 242:08 - 242:10
    THUNDER RUMBLES
  • 242:10 - 242:14
    Yet despite the unprecedented
    complexity and diversity
  • 242:13 - 242:15
    lnsurance companies let us down.
  • 242:19 - 242:21
    Financial illiteracy may be rampant,
  • 242:23 - 242:26
    to poor foIks in pIaces Iike Memphis
  • 242:23 - 242:26
    the real value of pensions and savings.
  • 242:27 - 242:29
    of the modern financial system,
  • 242:27 - 242:29
    As we've seen in the past year,
  • 242:30 - 242:34
    but somehow we were all experts
    on one branch of economics -
  • 242:35 - 242:38
    to metamorphose
    into weird and wonderfuI things
  • 242:36 - 242:41
    the path of financial markets can
    never be as smooth as we would like.
  • 242:36 - 242:40
    Planet Finance remains
    as vulnerable as ever
  • 242:38 - 242:42
    Central bankers suspected of being
    soft on inflation
  • 242:39 - 242:41
    Welfare states sink into insolvency.
  • 242:50 - 242:52
    the property market.
  • 242:52 - 242:55
    with names Iike
    ''coIIateraIised debt obIigations''.
  • 242:56 - 243:00
    have to answer to the pensioner's friend -
    the bond market.
  • 242:58 - 243:01
    to the age-old problem
    of booms and busts,
  • 242:58 - 243:01
    Since the current credit crunch began,
  • 243:03 - 243:07
    And derivatives turn out to be
    a double-edged weapon too.
  • 243:04 - 243:08
    We all knew
    that property was a one-way bet.
  • 243:08 - 243:12
    WeII, this financiaI aIchemy -
    turning Iead into goId
  • 243:13 - 243:18
    some stock markets around the world
    have fallen by as much as 50%.
  • 243:17 - 243:20
    irrational exuberance
    and manic depression.
  • 243:22 - 243:28
    And treasuries planning to spend billions
    to bail out banks that have gone bust
  • 243:29 - 243:32
    or toxic waste
    into giIt-edged securities -
  • 243:33 - 243:34
    Except that it wasn't.
  • 243:40 - 243:45
    Maybe all this complexity has actually
    increased our vulnerability to crisis.
  • 243:41 - 243:41
    GUNSHOT
  • 243:44 - 243:47
    was onIy possibIe
    because the ascent of banks
  • 243:44 - 243:48
    in the current credit crunch
    have to tread warily, too,
  • 243:59 - 244:02
    So long as human expectations
    of the future veer
  • 244:00 - 244:02
    And so for many families,
  • 244:01 - 244:05
    was foIIowed by the ascent
    of the second great piIIar
  • 244:03 - 244:07
    All over the world, it seems,
    property prices are falling...
  • 244:03 - 244:07
    if they expect to raise the money
    by selling yet more bonds.
  • 244:11 - 244:15
    For 4,000 years, from ancient
    Mesopotamia to modern China,
  • 244:11 - 244:15
    providing for the future
    now takes one very simple form -
  • 244:12 - 244:17
    from the over-optimistic to
    the over-pessimistic, from greed to fear,
  • 244:18 - 244:21
    of the modern financiaI system -
    the bond market.
  • 244:29 - 244:34
    the ascent of money has been one of
    the key factors in human progress,
  • 244:32 - 244:34
    an investment in a house,
  • 244:35 - 244:36
    ..from Memphis to Santiago,
  • 244:35 - 244:38
    stock prices will tend to trace a line
  • 244:38 - 244:41
    In modern Europe,
    as in Renaissance ItaIy,
  • 244:47 - 244:50
    the value of which
    is supposed to keep going up
  • 244:51 - 244:55
    not unlike the jagged
    and irregular peaks of the Andes.
  • 244:52 - 244:58
    an equiIibrium has been struck between
    poIiticaI power and financiaI exposure.
  • 244:54 - 244:55
    from London to La Paz.
  • 244:55 - 245:00
    an extraordinary story of innovation,
    intermediation and integration
  • 245:02 - 245:05
    until the day the breadwinners
    need to retire.
  • 245:15 - 245:18
    Encouraging home ownership
    may weII create
  • 245:18 - 245:20
    that had done as much as anything
  • 245:20 - 245:21
    Today, as much as ever,
  • 245:20 - 245:23
    As an investor, you just have to hope
  • 245:28 - 245:32
    to heIp peopIe escape from the drudgery
    of subsistence agricuIture.
  • 245:31 - 245:35
    it seems it's the bond market,
    our oId friend Mr Bond,
  • 245:31 - 245:35
    that when you have to come down
    from the summit of euphoria,
  • 245:31 - 245:34
    a poIiticaI constituency for capitaIism.
  • 245:33 - 245:36
    lf the pension plan
    falls short, never mind.
  • 245:46 - 245:52
    But it aIso distorts the capitaI market by
    persuading peopIe to bet the house on...
  • 245:49 - 245:52
    And yet PIanet Finance
    can never quite escape
  • 245:49 - 245:54
    it'll be on a nice, smooth ski-slope,
    and not over a sheer cliff.
  • 245:50 - 245:52
    that reaIIy ruIes the worId.
  • 245:51 - 245:53
    There's always home, sweet home.
  • 246:04 - 246:07
    from the gravitationaI force
    of PIanet Earth,
  • 246:12 - 246:13
    weII, the house.
  • 246:15 - 246:18
    But what if,
    rather than lending to governments,
  • 246:17 - 246:22
    because the quants can never take
    fuII account of the human factor -
  • 246:19 - 246:22
    As a pension or an insurance poIicy,
  • 246:22 - 246:25
    But is there nothing
    we can do to protect ourselves
  • 246:22 - 246:25
    PeopIe need to borrow money, of course,
  • 246:29 - 246:33
    you prefer to use your money to buy
    a share in a company?
  • 246:32 - 246:35
    this strategy has one very obvious fIaw -
  • 246:34 - 246:37
    to start up businesses
    or to buy expensive assets.
  • 246:37 - 246:41
    our tendency to underestimate
    the probabiIity of bIack swans,
  • 246:43 - 246:46
    from real and metaphorical falls?
  • 246:47 - 246:50
    it represents a one-way,
    totaIIy unhedged bet
  • 246:49 - 246:51
    Would that be more or less risky?
  • 246:50 - 246:55
    But it seems dangerous to Iure them
    into staking everything
  • 246:57 - 247:00
    our propensity to veer from
    euphoria to despondency,
  • 247:01 - 247:05
    As we'll see in the next episode
    of The Ascent Of Money,
  • 247:03 - 247:05
    More or less profitable?
  • 247:05 - 247:08
    on a singIe market,
    the property market.
  • 247:08 - 247:11
    on the far from risk-free property market.
  • 247:15 - 247:18
    our chronic inabiIity
    to Iearn from history.
  • 247:20 - 247:23
    ln the next episode
    of the Ascent Of Money,
  • 247:20 - 247:24
    But as we'II see in the next episode
    of The Ascent Of Money,
  • 247:20 - 247:24
    finance is as much about risk
    as it is about return.
  • 247:22 - 247:26
    From Buckinghamshire to BoIivia
    to bonny ScotIand,
  • 247:31 - 247:36
    we'll discover why we find it
    so hard to learn from financial history,
  • 247:31 - 247:35
    And that's why the course
    of financiaI history -
  • 247:38 - 247:40
    a bet on bricks and mortar,
  • 247:42 - 247:46
    the key is to strike the right baIance
    between debt and income.
  • 247:43 - 247:45
    And the big question is,
  • 247:46 - 247:51
    Iike that most human of emotions,
    Iove - never runs smooth, and never wiII,
  • 247:49 - 247:51
    or good oId Japanese wood,
  • 247:52 - 247:53
    are you insured?
  • 248:02 - 248:07
    And next week I'II be suggesting
    that the entire worId economy
  • 248:10 - 248:16
    not even here, on the magicaI and quite
    possibIy mythicaI country of Chimerica.
Title:
The Ascent of Money by Niall Ferguson - full 4hr 48min (minus E06)
Description:

ALSO WATCH Episode 6 ! (the video response)

history of money

I DO NOT CLAIM THE OWNERSHIP OF ANY OF THE CONTENT NOR DO I CLAIM ANY PROFITS FROM IT.
UPLOADED FOR FREE PUBLIC INFORMATION!

The video may or may not contain images or audio under copyright. Use of these images and audio in this video are for the purpose of education or criticism, and fall under "Fair Use" US Copyright Act of 1976, 17 U.S.C. § 107

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Video Language:
English
Duration:
04:00:15

English subtitles

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