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Why nations fail | James Robinson | TEDxAcademy

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    Thank you very much.
    I am James Robinson.
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    I am going to talk about why nations fail
    and why nations succeed as well,
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    which is really about
    why some countries are poor
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    and some countries are prosperous.
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    It turns out you can tell a lot
    about the answers to that question
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    by looking at the Korean
    peninsula at night.
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    If you look at Korean peninsula at night,
    you see some obvious things.
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    That South Korea
    has a lot of light, electricity.
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    North Korea, on the other hand,
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    is rather dark.
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    There you can see a spot of light.
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    That's probably the presidential
    palace in Pyongyang.
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    (Laughter)
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    Now, there could be different reasons
    why North Korea is very dark at night.
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    It could be that North Koreans
    have electricity and light bulbs,
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    but they just think candles
    are more romantic.
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    (Laughter)
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    It could be, on the other hand,
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    that North Koreans
    have electricity and light bulbs,
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    but they are just trying
    to reduce their carbon footprint.
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    I think, however,
    the more plausible explanation
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    is that actually North Koreans don't
    have access to the types of technologies
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    like electricity and power
    and light bulbs that South Koreans do.
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    And that enormously restricts
    their economic potential.
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    So one thing we know about the difference
    between poor countries and rich countries
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    is that poor countries, like North Korea,
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    tend to have much worse technology
    than rich countries.
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    Let me tell you about
    some other things we know
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    about the differences between
    poor countries and rich countries.
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    Poor countries have
    much less educated people.
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    They tend to have
    much less healthy people.
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    They live shorter lives.
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    They have much worse government
    services, like infrastructure.
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    So, here is an idyllic Congolese
    driving scene in a part of the world
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    where I do a lot of research,
    the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
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    This is what they call, somewhat
    ironically in the Congo, Interstate No 1.
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    And you can see that driving
    on Interstate No. 1,
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    you spend a lot of time digging
    your car out of sand and mud.
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    This is the dry season.
    If it was the rainy season, forget it.
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    You are not going anywhere.
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    So poor countries have much worse
    infrastructure public services.
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    So why is it that poor and rich countries
    differ in terms of their public services,
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    their technologies,
    their levels of education?
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    Well, some people think
    that it's just that poor countries
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    are too poor to afford to build roads,
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    or too poor to use modern technologies
    like electricity and light bulbs -
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    not that modern, really,
    if you think about it.
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    But anyway, they're too poor to use it.
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    But I didn't think that's right.
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    Most of poor counties where I do research,
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    lots of resources that could
    be used for these things are wasted.
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    Now, here is an example of that.
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    You may know this gentleman.
    He is called Robert Mugabe.
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    He is the president of Zimbabwe.
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    He has been president for 34 years.
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    You think, you probably known him
    as a good politician.
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    What you didn't know
    is he's also a remarkably lucky man.
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    In fact, he won the lottery.
    So how about that?
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    Someone who is a great politician
    and he also wins the lottery.
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    I mean, come on. Does Greece
    have politicians like that?
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    I mean, Britain doesn't.
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    So, he is a lucky guy, and I am thinking,
    I am sort of trying to suggest
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    that this may not be
    completely coincidental
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    that he happens to have been
    president for 34 years
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    and he also in his spare time
    wins the lottery.
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    (Laughter)
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    That road, by the way,
    I showed you in 2010 in the Congo,
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    in 1960 that was a nice
    tarmaced surfaced road
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    that has since deteriorated into the bush.
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    So I don't think the real reason
    that poor countries are poor
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    and prosperous countries are prosperous
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    is that poor countries just cannot afford
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    to do the sorts of things
    necessary to become rich.
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    I think the explanation is,
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    and that is what I am going to argue
    in the rest of my presentation,
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    that poor countries and rich countries
    are organized in very different ways.
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    And that organization in rich countries
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    creates incentives
    and opportunities for people,
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    and in poor countries, it doesn't.
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    In fact, most poor countries
    are organized in ways
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    which block people's incentives
    and block people's opportunities.
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    And that's what creates poverty.
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    So let me give you
    a very specific example of that
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    which I've realized
    it is sort of the theme, you know,
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    it's almost the motif of the whole event,
    which is the light bulb.
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    I was only expecting to connect this
    to North and South Korea,
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    but there we had all these light bulbs
    and Shakespeare that started the day.
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    So what is this?
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    This is a patent.
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    It was taken out by Thomas Edison in 1880,
    who invented the light bulb.
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    So Edison had an invention.
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    And what did he do?
    He took out a patent.
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    The patent protected
    his intellectual property rights.
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    It stopped people from copying his idea.
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    And that created incentives
    for people to innovate.
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    So, that was a very important stimulus
    for innovation in 19th century U.S.
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    Let me tell you a few other things
    about the patent system.
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    The patent system was actually set up
    by the US constitution.
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    The first patent law's in 1790,
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    and Thomas Jefferson, not Thomas Edison,
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    one of the founding
    fathers of the United States,
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    was actually on the first patent board
    handing out patents.
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    The system was open to everybody.
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    So, it didn't matter who you were,
    you could pay the same fee,
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    you got a patent,
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    and the government protected
    your intellectual property rights, OK?
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    Now, that's absolutely crucial
    because we know as economists
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    that one of the huge differences
    between poor and rich countries
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    is exactly innovation,
    exactly technological change.
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    It's that new technologies
    that don't spread
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    from South Korea to North Korea.
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    So, here's an example of would call
    an economic institution,
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    a kind of rule that creates incentives
    and opportunities in society,
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    and this institution
    has a particular property
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    which I'm going to call inclusive.
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    It's inclusive in a particular
    and important way
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    because if you look at who are
    these people who are filing patents?
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    You know, Thomas Edison. Who?
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    What were their social backgrounds?
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    Well, it turns out,
    they came from all over society.
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    Poor people, rich people,
    elite, non-elite,
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    farmers, artists, professional people,
    educated people, non-educated people.
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    Talent, ideas, skill,
    creativity, entrepreneurship
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    are spread very broadly in society.
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    And if you want to have
    a prosperous society,
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    you need to have a set of institutions
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    that can harness all that
    latent talent in society.
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    That's what inclusive
    institutions are about,
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    and that's exactly how
    the patent system worked.
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    Countries like Zimbabwe,
    or Democratic Republic of Kongo,
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    or North Korea, which are poor,
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    have economic institutions
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    that create very different
    incentives and opportunities
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    than inclusive economic institutions
    like the patent system.
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    To illustrate that in a richer way,
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    let me bring time
    from 1880 right up today,
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    and talk about why the United States
    is richer than Mexico,
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    just across the border.
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    I'm going to do that
    in a very particular context.
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    I'm going get you think about
    the two richest men in the world,
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    Bill Gates and Carlos Slim.
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    Bill Gates from United States of America,
    Carlos Slim from Mexico.
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    What's really interesting
    about the comparison
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    is the way those people made their money.
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    Bill Gates was an entrepreneur.
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    He set up a company when he was
    a Harvard undergraduate.
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    He made a fortune through innovation
    in the computer software industry.
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    Carlos Slim, on the other hand,
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    made a fortune
    through creating monopolies,
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    and through owning a monopoly,
    a telecommunications monopoly.
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    According to the Organization
    of Economic Cooperation and Development,
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    Carlos Slim's monopoly created
    an enormous amount of wealth for him,
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    reduces national income in Mexico
    by about 2% a year,
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    for the period of 2005 to 2009
    it actually reduced income in Mexico
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    by 130 billion dollars.
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    So, in the United States,
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    Bill Gates responded
    to the inclusive nature of institutions,
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    creating incentives,
    creating opportunities.
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    What happened?
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    He generated innovation,
    he generated new ideas,
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    and that created wealth for him,
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    it created a vast amount
    of wealth for society.
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    What happened in Mexico
    was something very different.
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    The way to create wealth
    was not through innovation,
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    but through creating monopolies.
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    Monopolies block
    other people's opportunities,
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    and they block other people's incentives.
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    Extractive institutions is what I'm
    going to call the opposite of inclusive.
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    I gave the patent system as an example
    of an inclusive economic institution.
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    Let me say that there is something else,
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    and that's what's going on in Mexico,
    in North Korea, and Zimbabwe.
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    I'm going to call that
    extractive economic institutions.
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    Rules in society that impede
    incentives and opportunities.
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    So, that's the difference between
    poor and rich countries, in a nutshell.
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    But now, let's go
    one layer back in the onion
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    and ask, "OK, fine. So how come
    the United States ended up like that?"
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    or "How come Mexico is like that?"
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    and "Why is Zimbabwe like that?"
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    The example of president
    Mugabe winning the lottary
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    is perhaps meant to plant
    a seed in your mind.
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    And so now, I'd like the seed
    to sort of grow a little.
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    But I'm not going to grow it in Zimbabwe.
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    Let me go back to the United States and
    back to the patent system, back in 1790,
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    when Thomas Jefferson
    was on the patent board,
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    and get you to think,
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    "OK, so how come they ended up
    with this patent system like this?
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    What was the secret?"
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    And I think there were two secrets,
    and they are very political.
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    So, ultimately, I think what matters
    for economic prosperity,
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    for success and failure, is inclusive
    and extractive economic institutions.
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    But lying behind that is politics.
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    And I want to emphasize
    two dimensions of politics.
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    One is, how did you end up
    in the United States
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    with this patent law
    that treated everybody equally,
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    that gave everybody equal access
    to patenting on the same terms.
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    That was because in the United States
    in the late 18th century,
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    political power was sufficiently
    broadly distributed in society,
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    but you couldn't have some
    oligarchive patent system.
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    You couldn't have a patent system
    where Thomas Jefferson could decide,
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    "Mmm, maybe you get a patent,
    and maybe you don't.
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    Maybe I'll give you a patent,
    but I don't like your face.
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    You're not getting a patent."
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    That wasn't possible, given how
    democratic US society was at that time.
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    So, one thing which is important about
    creating these inclusive institutions
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    was the distribution
    of political power in society.
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    The broad distribution of political power.
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    The other thing was important,
    was at that time,
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    the United States had a strong state
    that could enforce the patent.
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    It wasn't just a matter
    of passing the law,
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    it was enforcing the law.
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    The state would come, and they would
    protect your intellectual property rights.
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    So, these two things are very important.
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    So let me bring that to the present
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    and show you a photograph
    of Bill Gates in Washington DC.
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    Now, what is he doing here?
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    He's giving testimony
    to the US anti-trust authority.
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    Here's the strong US state in action.
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    Both of these elements
    that I talked about,
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    the distribution of power
    and the strength of the state
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    are crucial for understanding
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    the difference between
    Bill Gates and Carlos Slim.
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    How did Carlos Slim
    get his monopolies?
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    It was a one-party state,
    the PRI, the one-party state,
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    which had been in power
    since the late 1920s,
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    in the 1990s, privatized
    a monopoly to Carlos Slim.
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    Mexico has very nice anti-trust laws.
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    But it's inconceivable that Carlos Slim
    would have to do what Bill Gates did,
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    which was to come and, you know,
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    "I swear to tell the truth, the whole
    truth and nothing but the truth,"
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    in front of anti-trust authorities
    in Washington DC.
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    So, this is the power of the state.
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    And if you think about
    both of these examples,
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    both of these elements come in.
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    The fact that Carlos Slim
    could create his monopolies
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    because political power was not
    broadly distributed in Mexico,
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    and the anti-trust laws that exist
    in Mexico cannot be enforced,
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    because the state is too weak
    to enforce them.
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    In the United States it's inconceivable
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    that you could have such
    a monopolization of industry,
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    and the state is capable
    of enforcing the law.
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    And in fact, anti-trust laws
    are a fascinating example.
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    If you go back to a hundred
    years before this.
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    This is the octopus
    of the Standard Oil Company.
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    The Standard Oil Company
    was run by John Rockefeller.
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    It was an enormous attempt to build
    a monopoly in the United States.
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    You can see here, it's got its tentacles
    around the White House,
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    it's got its tentacles
    around the politicians, around Congress,
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    it's enveloping the political system
    with its wealth and connections.
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    It was broken up
    by federal anti-trust authority.
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    So, there's a long battle
    against monopolies,
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    against extractive institutions
    in an inclusive society.
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    So, what about Greece?
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    (Laughter)
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    Let me say something about Greece.
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    How does Greece fit into this?
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    Well, of course, compared to Zimbabwe,
    or the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
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    or Haiti, or North Korea,
    Greece is an enormous success.
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    Greece has been enormously successful,
    economically, in the past 100 years.
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    It's diversified its economy,
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    it's raised people's
    living standards enormously,
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    it's broadened education, health, etc.
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    But I think, the problems
    of Greece in the last decade
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    stem from the problems of reconciling
    these two dimensions of politics
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    that you need to create
    an inclusive society.
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    Reconciling, building
    an effective strong modern state
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    with having a democracy
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    where political power
    is broadly distributed.
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    Now, when I talked about the United States
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    you might have been thinking, "Gosh,
    these things smoothly come into place,
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    you have one thing, you have the other.
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    You want to have a broad
    distribution of power
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    that makes the state accountable.
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    You want to have a strong state
    because that makes democracy effective.
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    You can enforce the rules,
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    but I think the more you look,
    and the more you think,
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    you see that actually in many contexts
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    these two dimensions
    are difficult to reconcile.
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    They sometimes have
    an enormous contradictory feature.
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    And I think that's part
    of the problem in Greece,
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    particularly since
    the redemocratization in 1974,
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    is that Greek society
    has found it difficult to reconcile
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    building an effective central
    state based on rules.
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    Remember my example of the patent system,
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    how crucial it was that this was a rule,
    the patent system applied to everyone,
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    the same rules applied to everyone.
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    That's what generated
    these incentives and opportunities.
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    If Thomas Jefferson had been handing out
    patents to people on the basis,
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    "Hey, I want to be president,
    so if you support me,
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    let's start building a coalition,
    then you get your patent."
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    "I don't like your face. You don't
    look like you're going to be on my team.
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    You're not going to get a patent."
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    If that had been how
    the US patent system worked,
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    then it would not have
    the incentive effects,
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    the effects on innovation and economic
    development, that it did have.
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    And I think that once you think about it,
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    you can see that when you
    increase political power,
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    when you create political power
    broadly in society,
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    that can create pressures to undermine
    the functionality of the state.
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    To undermine the strong state.
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    To make the state become a tool
    of the political struggle
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    rather than a neutral arbiter
    of new rules and universal principles.
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    And I would say, that's the root cause
    of a lot of the problems,
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    from my perspective, in Greece.
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    Trying to make the state
    work properly, to enforce rules,
  • 16:09 - 16:13
    to not be clientalistic,
    to enforce universal principles.
  • 16:13 - 16:16
    And a lot of the economics
    stems from that.
  • 16:16 - 16:19
    The way I'm talking now
    is sort of politics.
  • 16:19 - 16:22
    Politics, it's about politics.
    Economics is crucial.
  • 16:22 - 16:26
    But economic institutions
    and economic incentives and opportunities
  • 16:26 - 16:29
    are embedded in a political society.
  • 16:29 - 16:31
    And they stem from a political process.
  • 16:31 - 16:34
    And I think that's being
    the problem in Greece.
  • 16:34 - 16:36
    Think about the deficit
    or the fiscal problem.
  • 16:36 - 16:39
    Why has that happened?
  • 16:39 - 16:41
    That didn't happen
    for some technical reason.
  • 16:41 - 16:45
    It didn't happen because Greek governments
    had the wrong economic advisors.
  • 16:45 - 16:49
    It happened because of this problem
    of reconciling democracy
  • 16:49 - 16:51
    with creating a strong state.
  • 16:51 - 16:55
    If the state becomes a tool
    for serving private interests
  • 16:55 - 16:57
    and not public interests,
  • 16:57 - 17:03
    serving individuals and not following
    the collective welfare in society,
  • 17:03 - 17:06
    then of course you're going
    to have terrible fiscal policy
  • 17:06 - 17:07
    and unsustainable debt problems.
  • 17:07 - 17:10
    Stable macroeconomic
    policies are public good,
  • 17:10 - 17:14
    but if the state become clientalized,
    it's not about providing public good.
  • 17:14 - 17:16
    It's about providing private goods.
  • 17:16 - 17:20
    So who's internalizing the debt
    or the deficit? Nobody.
  • 17:20 - 17:24
    So, that's a natural context
    to get unsustainable fiscal policy.
  • 17:24 - 17:26
    So what's the solution to this?
  • 17:26 - 17:27
    Not fiscal austerity.
  • 17:27 - 17:31
    Fiscal austerity might be necessary
    to keep the Germans happy,
  • 17:31 - 17:35
    but you're treating the
    symptoms, not the cause.
  • 17:35 - 17:36
    The cause is political.
  • 17:36 - 17:39
    The solution to the problem
    is to find a way of reconciling
  • 17:39 - 17:43
    these two elements to build
    inclusive political institutions.
  • 17:43 - 17:45
    And where does that come from?
  • 17:45 - 17:47
    That's a political project.
  • 17:47 - 17:50
    That'a about organizing
    people collectively.
  • 17:50 - 17:53
    Clientelism is always
    individually rational,
  • 17:53 - 17:55
    it's just not collectively
    rational for society.
  • 17:55 - 17:58
    So, you have to build a project.
  • 17:58 - 18:01
    Politicians have to build
    a project to build the state,
  • 18:01 - 18:03
    to build a non-clientelistic state,
  • 18:03 - 18:07
    to reform the interface
    between state and society in Greece.
  • 18:07 - 18:10
    And if you ask me, am I optimistic
    or pessimistic about Greece,
  • 18:10 - 18:14
    then I'd start looking at the politics,
    and I'd start looking at civil society
  • 18:14 - 18:17
    and ask, "Who has
    that project? Where is it?"
  • 18:18 - 18:22
    (Applause)
  • 18:22 - 18:23
    Thank you.
  • 18:23 - 18:25
    (Applause)
Title:
Why nations fail | James Robinson | TEDxAcademy
Description:

This talk was given at a local TEDx event, produced independently of the TED Conferences. Why do some states enjoy wealth, security, health and nutrition while others face poverty, unemployment, lack of health care and safety?

James Robinson is a political scientist and economist. Professor Robinson teaches Economics, History and Government at Harvard University. His main research interests lie in the study of the economies of developing countries. He travels a lot in Latin America and Africa and spends his summers teaching at the University of Bogota. In 2012, he was elected Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. In 2007, James Robinson and Daron Acemoglu coauthored the book “Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy”. The book was considered the best book released on U.S. policy and international relations. Their latest book, "Why Nations Fail", was included in the ten best releases of the 2012 list in Washington Post.

This talk was given at a TEDx event using the TED conference format but independently organized by a local community. Learn more at http://ted.com/tedx

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Video Language:
English
Team:
closed TED
Project:
TEDxTalks
Duration:
18:34

English subtitles

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