Return to Video

vimeo.com/.../236121345

  • 0:03 - 0:05
    Greetings troublemakers... welcome to Trouble.
  • 0:05 - 0:06
    My name is not important.
  • 0:06 - 0:10
    Insurgencies are, by their very nature, chaotic events.
  • 0:10 - 0:12
    They are attacks on the dominant order,
  • 0:12 - 0:14
    waged by determined and mobilized groups of people
  • 0:14 - 0:17
    intent on uprooting and destroying the established power structure
  • 0:17 - 0:19
    by any means necessary.
  • 0:19 - 0:21
    From the perspective of the political and economic elites
  • 0:21 - 0:24
    who draw substantial benefit from the status quo,
  • 0:24 - 0:26
    the unpredictable and tumultuous nature of insurgencies
  • 0:26 - 0:30
    make them terrifying worst-case scenarios.
  • 0:30 - 0:33
    To those in power, they constitute existential threats
  • 0:33 - 0:34
    that must be carefully managed
  • 0:34 - 0:36
    and avoided at all costs.
  • 0:36 - 0:38
    Despite the sophisticated means of coercion
  • 0:38 - 0:41
    and incredible capacity for violence that they wield,
  • 0:41 - 0:43
    modern states are more precarious than they let on.
  • 0:43 - 0:45
    Like fortresses built on sand,
  • 0:45 - 0:47
    they are vulnerable to the seismic shifts
  • 0:47 - 0:50
    of their internal contradictions and political fault lines.
  • 0:50 - 0:52
    While anarchists have historically been
  • 0:52 - 0:53
    at the forefront of critiques of the state,
  • 0:53 - 0:55
    we are by no means alone in rejecting
  • 0:55 - 0:57
    the illegitimate authority that they represent.
  • 0:57 - 1:00
    Whether it's colonized nations fighting against foreign occupation,
  • 1:00 - 1:03
    crowds of people rising up to topple dictators,
  • 1:03 - 1:06
    or radicals struggling against the exploitation, oppression
  • 1:06 - 1:09
    and ecological destruction of capitalist democracies
  • 1:09 - 1:11
    ... the desire for freedom is universal.
  • 1:11 - 1:14
    Well aware of this, states seek to prop up their legitimacy
  • 1:14 - 1:17
    by assuming the mantle of the protectors of freedom itself,
  • 1:17 - 1:20
    and the guarantors of another universally-shared human trait,
  • 1:20 - 1:21
    the desire for security.
  • 1:21 - 1:24
    But on their own, these promises are not always enough,
  • 1:24 - 1:27
    and so states have developed intricate systems of social control,
  • 1:27 - 1:29
    aimed at proactively seeking out and destroying
  • 1:29 - 1:32
    any potential challenge to their continued rule.
  • 1:32 - 1:34
    This constant shaping of internal political dynamics
  • 1:34 - 1:37
    forms the basis of counterinsurgency doctrine
  • 1:37 - 1:40
    – a science that cuts to the very essence of state power itself.
  • 1:40 - 1:44
    Over the next thirty minutes, we'll share the voices of several individuals
  • 1:44 - 1:46
    as they explain the principles of counterinsurgency,
  • 1:46 - 1:48
    how they’ve manifested in historical
  • 1:48 - 1:50
    and contemporary strategies of state repression,
  • 1:50 - 1:53
    and some of the ways that our movements can thwart these dynamics
  • 1:53 - 1:54
    in order to challenge state legitimacy,
  • 1:54 - 1:55
    spread treasonous thoughts,
  • 1:55 - 1:58
    and all around just make a whole lot of trouble.
  • 2:26 - 2:28
    Counterinsurgency is a specialized form of warfare
  • 2:28 - 2:31
    waged by a state against its population.
  • 2:31 - 2:34
    An insurgency is an organized revolt
  • 2:34 - 2:36
    by people against an established authority.
  • 2:36 - 2:39
    Most commonly throughout history it's an anti-colonial
  • 2:39 - 2:42
    or anti-imperialist resistance movement.
  • 2:42 - 2:47
    Counterinsurgency is the technical art of counterrevolution.
  • 2:47 - 2:52
    At it's broadest, counterinsurgency refers to the whole range of activities
  • 2:52 - 2:55
    that a state engages in to repress an uprising.
  • 2:55 - 2:58
    Counterinsurgency is basically the constant war
  • 2:58 - 3:02
    that states carry out in order to manage conflict
  • 3:02 - 3:07
    and ensure the stability and continuity of governance.
  • 3:07 - 3:10
    Counterinsurgency is designed to keep a movement
  • 3:10 - 3:13
    which is at a formative stage, which is weak and vulnerable
  • 3:13 - 3:16
    – they're designed to keep them at that stage and to be able to crush them.
  • 3:16 - 3:18
    To make them lose legitimacy
  • 3:18 - 3:21
    or keep them from getting any real legitimacy
  • 3:21 - 3:23
    for their demands or their grievances.
  • 3:23 - 3:27
    Under the counterinsurgency philosophy, conflict is permanent.
  • 3:27 - 3:31
    Therefore state institutions need to always be the arbiters
  • 3:31 - 3:33
    and the mediators of conflict.
  • 3:33 - 3:37
    They therefore need the legitimacy to be seen as neutral arbiters.
  • 3:37 - 3:40
    To be seen as the only ones with the resources
  • 3:40 - 3:42
    or the capability to offer a solution to a problem.
  • 3:42 - 3:44
    There's always a thing within counterinsurgency
  • 3:44 - 3:47
    that it's always supposed to be operating within the rule of law
  • 3:47 - 3:48
    and within a democratic context.
  • 3:48 - 3:50
    At least that's sort of the modern counterinsurgency,
  • 3:50 - 3:53
    is the ideal that the soldiers won't be out on the street.
  • 3:53 - 3:55
    It won't be evidently a war.
  • 3:55 - 3:59
    The objective is to maintain the level of conflict at the lowest levels.
  • 3:59 - 4:03
    At levels of simple dissidence or non-violence.
  • 4:03 - 4:08
    And not allow those conflicts to evolve to more insurrectional
  • 4:08 - 4:10
    or revolutionary levels.
  • 4:10 - 4:14
    As it has developed as a term of art in the military literature,
  • 4:14 - 4:17
    it has come to refer to a specific approach
  • 4:17 - 4:21
    - a specific philosophy as to how that is best done.
  • 4:21 - 4:23
    And that approach is characterized
  • 4:23 - 4:27
    less by a reliance on sheer coercive force,
  • 4:27 - 4:29
    and more by the use of soft power
  • 4:29 - 4:31
    – the shaping of social conditions,
  • 4:31 - 4:36
    the co-optation of movement leaders into the state apparatus,
  • 4:36 - 4:39
    and the offering of concessions and reforms
  • 4:39 - 4:42
    to undercut popular support for the uprising.
  • 4:42 - 4:44
    Former British military officer Frank Kitson,
  • 4:44 - 4:46
    in a book called Low Intensity Operations,
  • 4:46 - 4:49
    talks about the need to find and neutralize
  • 4:49 - 4:51
    subversive elements in the population
  • 4:51 - 4:56
    and to remove the masses from leadership of the subversive movement.
  • 4:56 - 5:00
    And one of the key components of that is attaching
  • 5:00 - 5:03
    parts of the resistance movement that engage in
  • 5:03 - 5:06
    non-violent, civil disobedience-type of campaigns
  • 5:06 - 5:09
    – attaching those types of elements to the state
  • 5:09 - 5:12
    as a means of dividing the resistance movement
  • 5:12 - 5:16
    and undermining the more radical or militant components.
  • 5:16 - 5:22
    Big non-profit groups are responsible for subverting radical political change,
  • 5:22 - 5:26
    and they play a big role in the counterinsurgency.
  • 5:26 - 5:30
    Their goal is to channel people in directions
  • 5:30 - 5:35
    that will not put them in the position of directly confronting the state.
  • 5:35 - 5:39
    Basically counterinsurgency as a state philosophy arose
  • 5:39 - 5:41
    as specialists working for the state,
  • 5:41 - 5:44
    as state institutions analyzed their failures and weaknesses
  • 5:44 - 5:49
    in the anti-colonial struggles of the 50's and 60's,
  • 5:49 - 5:53
    and the particularly urban, and other domestic struggles
  • 5:53 - 5:56
    within powerful colonizing states of the 60's and 70's.
  • 5:56 - 6:02
    Back in the 60's and 70's, you had more of a revolutionary consciousness
  • 6:02 - 6:05
    among many people in the United States.
  • 6:05 - 6:08
    A lot of it was influenced by the revolutions that were actually
  • 6:08 - 6:09
    – the armed revolutions –
  • 6:09 - 6:13
    that were going on in Africa and South-East Asia at the time.
  • 6:13 - 6:16
    They did not want these kinds of groups to ever exist again.
  • 6:16 - 6:19
    They did not want groups like the Black Panther Party
  • 6:19 - 6:23
    to ever be able to come into existence again.
  • 6:23 - 6:25
    Counterinsurgency, because its a type of warfare,
  • 6:25 - 6:27
    involves all the means of war
  • 6:27 - 6:31
    – including political, economic, military, cultural and ideological
  • 6:31 - 6:33
    as well as psychological measures.
  • 6:33 - 6:37
    A huge part of counterinsurgency, it's about hearts and minds.
  • 6:37 - 6:38
    That's what they say,
  • 6:38 - 6:41
    but really it's not about actually offering people services
  • 6:41 - 6:43
    or actually providing them with a better life.
  • 6:43 - 6:46
    It's about saying that that's what you're doing,
  • 6:46 - 6:50
    and repressing people to the point that their silence becomes consent
  • 6:50 - 6:54
    for whatever kind of rule you decide is appropriate in that moment,
  • 6:54 - 6:58
    as the sort of state or as the elite ruler.
  • 6:58 - 6:59
    It's all about fear.
  • 6:59 - 7:01
    It's about managing people through fear.
  • 7:01 - 7:05
    And when you see these thugs being thrown into the back of a paddy-waggon,
  • 7:05 - 7:07
    you just see them thrown in. Rough.
  • 7:07 - 7:10
    I said please don't be too nice.
  • 7:21 - 7:23
    Whether it's handing out speeding tickets,
  • 7:23 - 7:25
    kicking in doors to execute search warrants,
  • 7:25 - 7:27
    or putting down riots with batons, tear gas
  • 7:27 - 7:30
    and other so-called “less-lethal” weaponry,
  • 7:30 - 7:33
    police are the front-line shock troops of the state and capitalist class.
  • 7:33 - 7:35
    They’re tasked with enforcing laws
  • 7:35 - 7:36
    and meting out repression
  • 7:36 - 7:39
    in order to keep domestic populations in line.
  • 7:39 - 7:40
    Armed with a badge and a gun,
  • 7:40 - 7:42
    and basked in the legitimacy of the state,
  • 7:42 - 7:45
    police are granted a blank cheque to beat and even kill
  • 7:45 - 7:47
    whoever they deem a threat to their authority
  • 7:47 - 7:49
    … as long as the person on the receiving end is
  • 7:49 - 7:52
    Black, Brown, queer, trans, and/or poor.
  • 7:52 - 7:55
    Because they form the most visible face of state repression,
  • 7:55 - 7:58
    cops are often seen as being synonymous with state power itself.
  • 7:58 - 8:01
    And while they actually comprise only one small component
  • 8:01 - 8:03
    of the broader state security apparatus,
  • 8:03 - 8:05
    which itself makes up only one facet of
  • 8:05 - 8:07
    the state’s sprawling bureaucracy
  • 8:07 - 8:09
    ... it’s fair to say that their historical development
  • 8:09 - 8:12
    was of pivotal importance to the rise of modern states.
  • 8:12 - 8:15
    Processes of state formation and consolidation
  • 8:15 - 8:17
    have taken different paths in countries around the world,
  • 8:17 - 8:20
    as they’ve had to account for different historical,
  • 8:20 - 8:22
    geographical and socio-political factors.
  • 8:22 - 8:25
    And while cops generally play the same repressive role everywhere,
  • 8:25 - 8:27
    and are, without a doubt, all bastards
  • 8:27 - 8:30
    … these national and regional distinctions have left imprints
  • 8:30 - 8:32
    in the character of local police forces themselves.
  • 8:32 - 8:34
    In the United States, for instance
  • 8:34 - 8:37
    ... given contemporary police officers' role as the enforcers
  • 8:37 - 8:39
    of white supremacist terror in Black communities,
  • 8:39 - 8:41
    it should not be surprising that they trace their origins
  • 8:41 - 8:43
    to an earlier institution of racist social control
  • 8:43 - 8:45
    – namely, slave patrols.
  • 8:46 - 8:49
    [♫] WOOP WOOP! That's the sound of the police.
  • 8:49 - 8:51
    WOOP WOOP! That's the sound of the beast! [♫]
  • 8:53 - 8:55
    To understand slave patrols,
  • 8:55 - 9:01
    it's important to understand the slow development of the state intervention
  • 9:01 - 9:04
    in maintaining slave society,
  • 9:04 - 9:06
    beginning with simply passing laws
  • 9:06 - 9:10
    that would restrict the activities of the slaves.
  • 9:10 - 9:13
    And then, laws on their own being insufficient,
  • 9:13 - 9:16
    authorizing any adult white man to enforce those laws.
  • 9:16 - 9:20
    But then the reliance on individual action proving insufficient,
  • 9:20 - 9:23
    forming into this body called the slave patrols
  • 9:23 - 9:25
    that were an off-shoot of the militia
  • 9:25 - 9:29
    and worked as kind of a voluntary-compulsory organization,
  • 9:29 - 9:31
    meaning that participation was mandatory,
  • 9:31 - 9:34
    but it wasn't a professional outfit.
  • 9:34 - 9:38
    That provided a way of making the entire white male population
  • 9:38 - 9:41
    directly involved in maintaining slave society.
  • 9:41 - 9:44
    As industrialization came to the south,
  • 9:44 - 9:47
    and there were larger slave populations in southern cities,
  • 9:47 - 9:50
    the slave patrols moved similarly into the city.
  • 9:50 - 9:52
    And there they became professionalized
  • 9:52 - 9:55
    and very quickly their duties expanded
  • 9:55 - 9:57
    and they became a body that we would
  • 9:57 - 9:59
    immediately recognize as a modern police force.
  • 9:59 - 10:04
    [♫] Overseer! Overseer! Overseer – officer!
  • 10:04 - 10:07
    Yeah officer from overseer!
  • 10:07 - 10:08
    You need a little clarity?
  • 10:08 - 10:09
    Check the similarity! [♫]
  • 10:12 - 10:13
    And now 200 years later,
  • 10:13 - 10:17
    the basic function of the police is largely the same.
  • 10:17 - 10:20
    It's maintaining the stratified nature of the society,
  • 10:20 - 10:22
    both in terms of race and class.
  • 10:22 - 10:27
    White lives matter! White lives matter! White lives matter!
  • 10:27 - 10:31
    If you look at the whole concept of white supremacy
  • 10:31 - 10:36
    and how that fits into the counterinsurgency
  • 10:36 - 10:37
    on a historical basis,
  • 10:37 - 10:40
    of course the oldest terrorist organization in the United States,
  • 10:40 - 10:42
    which is the Ku Klux Klan
  • 10:42 - 10:45
    – that was a group that was founded right after the Civil War
  • 10:45 - 10:49
    to inflict terror against the African people in the United States,
  • 10:49 - 10:51
    who had been newly freed from slavery
  • 10:51 - 10:54
    and who were beginning to try to organize.
  • 10:54 - 10:57
    And as you move on into the 20th century
  • 10:57 - 11:00
    and the Civil Rights Movement began to develop,
  • 11:00 - 11:04
    the Klan and other groups would work alongside the police,
  • 11:04 - 11:08
    whether it was local police or whether it was sheriffs departments.
  • 11:08 - 11:11
    And they would work together to inflict terror
  • 11:11 - 11:18
    to restrain the movement - the organizing against white supremacy.
  • 11:24 - 11:25
    I think one of the big differences
  • 11:25 - 11:28
    between police in Canada and police in the US
  • 11:28 - 11:30
    is that the North-West Mounted Police
  • 11:30 - 11:33
    were modeled after the Royal Irish Constabulary,
  • 11:33 - 11:37
    which the British had set up in Ireland as a colonial police force.
  • 11:37 - 11:40
    And they replicated this type of thing not only in Canada,
  • 11:40 - 11:43
    but also in their colonies in India and Africa.
  • 11:43 - 11:48
    Y'know, one of their main functions was to impose colonial law and order,
  • 11:48 - 11:51
    and to extend the control of the state into these frontier regions.
  • 11:51 - 11:56
    And that remains pretty much the role of the RCMP today across Canada.
  • 11:56 - 12:00
    A lot of the critical infrastructure and transportation corridors,
  • 12:00 - 12:01
    such as railways and highways,
  • 12:01 - 12:06
    they pass through or very nearby Indigenous populations and reservations.
  • 12:06 - 12:09
    Especially as you go further north in the country.
  • 12:10 - 12:15
    So this type of situation creates a lot of vulnerabilities for Canada,
  • 12:15 - 12:18
    and I think the state is very aware of this.
  • 12:18 - 12:22
    And that's why it's so cautious in its repression of Indigenous social movements.
  • 12:22 - 12:25
    A big wake up call was during the Oka Crisis of 1990,
  • 12:25 - 12:28
    when you had widespread solidarity actions across the country,
  • 12:28 - 12:31
    and you had sabotage actions being carried out
  • 12:31 - 12:33
    against this type of infrastructure.
  • 12:33 - 12:38
    So I think it's very clear to the state that this is the possible consequence
  • 12:38 - 12:44
    if their repression leads to the widening of Indigenous resistance,
  • 12:44 - 12:47
    and even to the beginning of actual insurgency.
  • 12:52 - 12:54
    We try to use training dummies as much as we can for,
  • 12:54 - 12:56
    like, the strikes and everything.
  • 12:56 - 12:59
    But a lot of the pressure points you really gotta feel it on the human body.
  • 12:59 - 13:03
    Repression is basically the attempts by the state to punish,
  • 13:03 - 13:07
    and to enclose and to isolate – and therefore neutralize –
  • 13:07 - 13:09
    threats to its authority.
  • 13:09 - 13:14
    Recuperation are the attempts to integrate threats to authority.
  • 13:14 - 13:19
    To redirect them towards non-threatening modes,
  • 13:19 - 13:22
    or modes that even regenerate or modify state power
  • 13:22 - 13:28
    in a way that makes states more able to respond to similar threats.
  • 13:28 - 13:30
    And if you look at the 1950s and 1960s
  • 13:30 - 13:32
    civil rights struggle in the United States,
  • 13:32 - 13:36
    there's some really good examples because the government,
  • 13:36 - 13:38
    especially the Kennedy administration,
  • 13:38 - 13:41
    y'know they're having high-level meetings with Martin Luther King
  • 13:41 - 13:45
    and all these other leaders of non-violent civil disobedience organizations.
  • 13:45 - 13:46
    And then at the same time,
  • 13:46 - 13:51
    they're carrying out repression against the more radical elements
  • 13:51 - 13:55
    of the Black Civil Rights – which came the Black Liberation Movement,
  • 13:55 - 13:58
    and which led into the FBI's counter-intelligence program, COINTELPRO.
  • 13:58 - 14:00
    In addition to COINTELPRO,
  • 14:00 - 14:03
    the FBI ran a program called the ghetto informant program.
  • 14:03 - 14:07
    And the ghetto informant program is where they would get preachers,
  • 14:07 - 14:10
    pastors of churches, teachers or whomever
  • 14:10 - 14:13
    – they would try to get those people to be informants.
  • 14:13 - 14:16
    Militarization and community policing are talked about
  • 14:16 - 14:19
    as though they're these two separate alternatives.
  • 14:19 - 14:22
    Two different ways that policing can develop.
  • 14:22 - 14:25
    But what the history shows
  • 14:25 - 14:29
    is that they developed at exactly the same time,
  • 14:29 - 14:31
    both in response to the crisis of the 60's.
  • 14:31 - 14:35
    And generally developed alongside each other in the same cities
  • 14:35 - 14:37
    - often with the same commanders in charge.
  • 14:37 - 14:42
    Rather than seeing these as two separate and competing developments,
  • 14:42 - 14:45
    it makes more sense to see them as complementary developments,
  • 14:45 - 14:49
    each operating as one half of a domestic counterinsurgency strategy.
  • 14:49 - 14:53
    The counter-intelligence program was designed to be hard-hitting.
  • 14:53 - 14:55
    And designed to assassinate,
  • 14:55 - 14:59
    designed to subvert and actually destroy organizations,
  • 14:59 - 15:03
    whereas the ghetto informant program was designed
  • 15:03 - 15:06
    to spy on the Black population at large,
  • 15:06 - 15:09
    and to find out who it was, as they saw it,
  • 15:09 - 15:12
    would be agitating for riots.
  • 15:12 - 15:16
    All of that is pretty textbook counterinsurgency stuff.
  • 15:16 - 15:18
    As we see it play out domestically,
  • 15:18 - 15:23
    it has the political benefit of building legitimacy for the police,
  • 15:23 - 15:28
    while at the same time the militarization preserves their capacity
  • 15:28 - 15:31
    to come in hard when they do face actual resistance.
  • 15:36 - 15:38
    The FBI's illicit program of surveillance,
  • 15:38 - 15:41
    sabotage and assassination known as COINTELPRO
  • 15:41 - 15:43
    was formally ended in April of 1971,
  • 15:43 - 15:46
    after their covert activities were exposed by activists
  • 15:46 - 15:49
    who broke into a Pennsylvania FBI field office
  • 15:49 - 15:52
    and released troves of top-secret documents to the press.
  • 15:52 - 15:55
    Just two months later, the Nixon administration launched the War on Drugs.
  • 15:55 - 15:59
    America's public enemy number one is drug abuse.
  • 15:59 - 16:00
    Pretty convenient, right?
  • 16:00 - 16:03
    Any suggestion that the timing of these two events
  • 16:03 - 16:05
    could be chalked up to simple coincidence was quashed
  • 16:05 - 16:08
    by Richard Nixon's chief policy advisor, John Ehrlichman,
  • 16:08 - 16:10
    who in a candid interview in 1994,
  • 16:10 - 16:13
    admitted that the War on Drugs was a lie
  • 16:13 - 16:15
    concocted to target anti-war leftists
  • 16:15 - 16:17
    and Black communities for political repression.
  • 16:17 - 16:19
    After Tricky Dick was dishonorably deposed...
  • 16:19 - 16:20
    I'm not a crook!
  • 16:25 - 16:29
    ... subsequent Presidential administrations took the idea of the War on Drugs,
  • 16:29 - 16:30
    greatly expanded its scope,
  • 16:30 - 16:33
    and refined it into a potent tool for both domestic social control
  • 16:33 - 16:35
    and imperialist foreign policy aims.
  • 16:39 - 16:43
    It's hard to overstate the effect of the War on Drugs
  • 16:43 - 16:47
    and its role in accelerating the development
  • 16:47 - 16:49
    of counterinsurgency in American policing.
  • 16:49 - 16:51
    Nixon launched the War on Drugs.
  • 16:51 - 16:55
    And the War on Drugs was chemical warfare.
  • 16:55 - 16:58
    A spreading of – at that time it was heroin –
  • 16:58 - 17:00
    into the communities of colour.
  • 17:00 - 17:03
    Black and Latino, poor communities of colour.
  • 17:03 - 17:05
    They called it a War on Drugs,
  • 17:05 - 17:07
    but they unleashed the drugs into the community,
  • 17:07 - 17:09
    then they went into the communities
  • 17:09 - 17:13
    and started arresting people for using the drugs.
  • 17:13 - 17:16
    This chemical warfare, it has a historical parallel.
  • 17:16 - 17:19
    After they killed the Indians here in this country,
  • 17:19 - 17:20
    after the Indian Wars,
  • 17:20 - 17:23
    then they turned around and gave them whiskey.
  • 17:23 - 17:27
    And whiskey was an addictive drug that even to this very day
  • 17:27 - 17:30
    is still destroying the lives of people in Native communities.
  • 17:30 - 17:32
    So they gave them whiskey.
  • 17:32 - 17:35
    Well they gave Black people,
  • 17:35 - 17:40
    to put down the insurgency that erupted in the 1960's and 1970's,
  • 17:40 - 17:43
    they gave them crack cocaine.
  • 17:43 - 17:46
    This was deliberately done as the government's response
  • 17:46 - 17:49
    to the Black Power movement,
  • 17:49 - 17:51
    and all the other radical progressive movements.
  • 17:51 - 17:55
    They wanted to make sure that none of this stuff ever happened again.
  • 17:55 - 17:58
    And crack cocaine was distributed by people
  • 17:58 - 18:00
    who were given the drugs by federal agents,
  • 18:00 - 18:03
    and distributed to the urban market.
  • 18:03 - 18:07
    And the effect of crack cocaine just destroyed
  • 18:07 - 18:10
    numerous vibrant communities at the time.
  • 18:10 - 18:12
    Communities where people had jobs
  • 18:12 - 18:15
    ... communities where people had social cohesion
  • 18:15 - 18:18
    - well crack cocaine destroyed that.
  • 18:18 - 18:21
    And the federal government used the fact of the drug trade,
  • 18:21 - 18:22
    that they created
  • 18:22 - 18:27
    – they used that to then turn around and build a paramilitary policing force.
  • 18:27 - 18:29
    It provided a handy pretext,
  • 18:29 - 18:33
    with the stories of police being out-gunned by gangs
  • 18:33 - 18:34
    and all that sort of thing.
  • 18:34 - 18:38
    Beyond that, there's just the sheer demographic effect
  • 18:38 - 18:43
    of the War on Drugs providing a mechanism for
  • 18:43 - 18:48
    removing a large portion of the Black population,
  • 18:48 - 18:50
    just from cities altogether
  • 18:50 - 18:52
    and putting them in prisons for long periods of time.
  • 18:52 - 18:56
    And then later normalizing the monitoring of those communities
  • 18:56 - 18:58
    through probation and parole,
  • 18:58 - 19:02
    and other sorts of community-based corrections.
  • 19:02 - 19:05
    I think it's probably impossible to accurately estimate
  • 19:05 - 19:07
    the damage that has done to those communities
  • 19:07 - 19:09
    in terms of just sheerly fracturing them.
  • 19:09 - 19:13
    We've gotta understand that there's a continual path
  • 19:13 - 19:18
    leading from COINTELPRO to the War on Drugs.
  • 19:18 - 19:21
    And then the War on Drugs, now we're at a new counterinsurgency.
  • 19:25 - 19:28
    The War on Drugs everywhere is a US war.
  • 19:28 - 19:32
    The US is the largest consumer of illegal narcotics in the world as a market.
  • 19:32 - 19:35
    Almost half of the whole drug market is in the United States.
  • 19:35 - 19:38
    The US has always been pushing the most radical,
  • 19:38 - 19:42
    militaristic “solution” to the drug problem.
  • 19:42 - 19:46
    The basis of the US drug war in the United States is the prison system.
  • 19:46 - 19:50
    And in places like Mexico, in places like Central America, Columbia
  • 19:50 - 19:53
    – it's massacre and it's enforced disappearance.
  • 19:53 - 19:56
    And it's often based on social class.
  • 19:56 - 19:59
    It's based on living in certain areas that are resource rich.
  • 19:59 - 20:03
    It's based on the potential that those communities could be a threat.
  • 20:03 - 20:05
    That's where again, that same pretext gets used.
  • 20:05 - 20:09
    They're called narco traffickers, they're called drug dealers,
  • 20:09 - 20:12
    and instead of being brought to jail
  • 20:12 - 20:14
    ... they're murdered in the street.
  • 20:14 - 20:15
    I think what's happening in Mexico
  • 20:15 - 20:18
    is a counterinsurgent war against the people,
  • 20:18 - 20:21
    and I think in Mexico they've sort of
  • 20:21 - 20:23
    expanded the idea of who the insurgent is
  • 20:23 - 20:26
    to include basically the entire population.
  • 20:26 - 20:29
    Even just the idea that people are living in different ways,
  • 20:29 - 20:32
    that they have assemblies, that they're living on collective land,
  • 20:32 - 20:35
    that they're organizing in some way... even just with their neighbours
  • 20:35 - 20:39
    – all of those things are seen as threats to the dominant order.
  • 20:39 - 20:41
    And in Mexico they're being dealt with through a kind of
  • 20:41 - 20:44
    counterinsurgency that is extremely violent.
  • 20:44 - 20:46
    The Merida Initiative started in 2008,
  • 20:46 - 20:50
    and it's a multi-billion dollar plan funded by the United States
  • 20:50 - 20:54
    to finance the militarization, essentially,
  • 20:54 - 20:56
    of the War on Drugs in Mexico.
  • 20:56 - 21:00
    So when the drug war started in 2006, there were 4,000 federal police.
  • 21:00 - 21:04
    Now there's 40,000, and they're deployed together with the army
  • 21:04 - 21:07
    to different cities to "fight the War on Drugs."
  • 21:07 - 21:10
    And what we see time after time in these different regions
  • 21:10 - 21:12
    where federal police and soldiers are deployed together,
  • 21:12 - 21:15
    is a spike in homicide rates,
  • 21:15 - 21:18
    a spike in violence, a spike in disappearances
  • 21:18 - 21:21
    – and again, enacted against the population at large.
  • 21:21 - 21:23
    We're told that it's one drug cartel
  • 21:23 - 21:25
    sending a message to another drug cartel.
  • 21:25 - 21:27
    But when, y'know, in your town
  • 21:27 - 21:30
    there's a bunch of beheaded bodies in the central square
  • 21:30 - 21:32
    – that's a message to the whole town.
  • 21:32 - 21:35
    What the militarization of prohibition has really done
  • 21:35 - 21:38
    - because it's a militarized strategy to enforce prohibition -
  • 21:38 - 21:40
    is it has meant that the folks who are
  • 21:40 - 21:44
    moving these products also militarize.
  • 21:44 - 21:46
    And that's kind of a paramilitary process.
  • 21:46 - 21:49
    In Mexico these groups aren't explicitly political groups,
  • 21:49 - 21:53
    but it's clear that they often work closely with other parts
  • 21:53 - 21:57
    of the same state apparatus that's fighting them.
  • 21:57 - 21:58
    So like, say the federal police come in
  • 21:58 - 22:00
    and they crack down on the Sinaloa cartel
  • 22:00 - 22:02
    ... okay, the Sinaloa cartel goes and they start working with
  • 22:02 - 22:05
    state-level police officers, whatever it is.
  • 22:05 - 22:07
    So people in these strategic areas,
  • 22:07 - 22:10
    just regular folks trying to get on with their lives,
  • 22:10 - 22:13
    they're the ones who are being picked up and disappeared.
  • 22:13 - 22:14
    They're the ones who are being massacred.
  • 22:14 - 22:18
    They're the ones who are paying, actually, with their lives for this war.
  • 22:18 - 22:20
    And so when you take that kind of step back
  • 22:20 - 22:22
    and you see it on a bit more of a macro level,
  • 22:22 - 22:25
    it's very clear that what's happening is a war against the people.
  • 22:25 - 22:28
    And the whole idea of the state fighting drug cartels
  • 22:28 - 22:33
    is a big charade, basically to justify militarization, paramilitarization
  • 22:33 - 22:35
    and a war against the population.
  • 22:40 - 22:43
    States go to incredible lengths to study our movements.
  • 22:43 - 22:46
    Dozens of federal security and intelligence agencies,
  • 22:46 - 22:48
    and an untold number of private contractors
  • 22:48 - 22:51
    are constantly combing over our social media posts,
  • 22:51 - 22:54
    mapping out our networks and probing them for vulnerabilities.
  • 22:54 - 22:56
    Analysts churn over a never-ending stream
  • 22:56 - 22:58
    of risk assessments and policy suggestions,
  • 22:58 - 23:02
    covering a vast array of possible contingency plans.
  • 23:02 - 23:05
    Each year, billions of dollars are spent keeping tabs on dissent,
  • 23:05 - 23:08
    infiltrating our organizations and training local police forces
  • 23:08 - 23:09
    in riot suppression
  • 23:09 - 23:12
    and community engagement tactics.
  • 23:12 - 23:14
    No matter how powerful states are,
  • 23:14 - 23:16
    and no matter how vast the scale of resources they're able to marshal
  • 23:16 - 23:19
    towards maintaining and expanding their power
  • 23:19 - 23:20
    ... they still view us as threats.
  • 23:20 - 23:22
    And why shouldn't they?
  • 23:22 - 23:24
    States are collective illusions.
  • 23:24 - 23:26
    The social, economic and political hierarchies
  • 23:26 - 23:28
    that keep the many ruled by the few are
  • 23:28 - 23:30
    built on a foundation of fear,
  • 23:30 - 23:31
    loyalty
  • 23:31 - 23:32
    and internal division.
  • 23:32 - 23:34
    If these supporting pillars were ever to be removed,
  • 23:34 - 23:37
    the whole house of cards would come crashing down.
  • 23:39 - 23:43
    States have invested a lot of resources
  • 23:43 - 23:46
    into understanding how insurgencies arise,
  • 23:46 - 23:48
    understanding how uprisings succeed,
  • 23:48 - 23:50
    understanding how states fail,
  • 23:50 - 23:52
    and then working to counteract that.
  • 23:52 - 23:54
    And I think we can learn from some of their insights,
  • 23:54 - 23:58
    even as we are counteracting their operations.
  • 23:58 - 24:01
    I think it's very important to understand,
  • 24:01 - 24:02
    and to have some knowledge of
  • 24:02 - 24:05
    how counterinsurgency operations are carried out,
  • 24:05 - 24:08
    because that's how you can better defend yourselves against them.
  • 24:08 - 24:10
    The more that we can spread awareness
  • 24:10 - 24:13
    of counterinsurgency beyond anarchist circles,
  • 24:13 - 24:16
    the more people will understand the methods we use,
  • 24:16 - 24:20
    why we choose antagonistic and combative methods vis-a-vis the state.
  • 24:20 - 24:23
    Because once you understand that states organize
  • 24:23 - 24:25
    according to a philosophy of counterinsurgency,
  • 24:25 - 24:28
    people understand that the state views them as their enemy,
  • 24:28 - 24:29
    or as their potential enemy.
  • 24:29 - 24:33
    And so people understand that when we talk about social war,
  • 24:33 - 24:35
    it's not because we like war or we like violence,
  • 24:35 - 24:37
    but because the state started the social war.
  • 24:37 - 24:39
    The existence of the state is a social war,
  • 24:39 - 24:41
    it's constant warfare against all of us.
  • 24:41 - 24:44
    In order to defeat the enemy's plans,
  • 24:44 - 24:46
    we have to understand them.
  • 24:46 - 24:49
    And we have to do political education
  • 24:49 - 24:52
    on a large scale about government repression.
  • 24:52 - 24:55
    But even more than that, we have to design our movements
  • 24:55 - 24:58
    to be able to withstand government repression,
  • 24:58 - 25:02
    to be able to withstand all manner of secret police activity.
  • 25:02 - 25:04
    Specifically within anarchist circles,
  • 25:04 - 25:06
    if we encourage more nuanced understandings
  • 25:06 - 25:08
    of how counterinsurgency works,
  • 25:08 - 25:11
    it will certainly help identify recuperation
  • 25:11 - 25:13
    and how not to fall into that trap.
  • 25:13 - 25:17
    And it will also help us improve our anti-repressive strategies.
  • 25:17 - 25:20
    Especially at the point that we realize that repression
  • 25:20 - 25:23
    is primarily a mechanism for isolating people,
  • 25:23 - 25:25
    then we'll begin to put more importance
  • 25:25 - 25:28
    on creating broader social relationships,
  • 25:28 - 25:32
    avoiding isolation and certainly giving up on strategies
  • 25:32 - 25:34
    that basically amount to self-isolation.
  • 25:34 - 25:38
    Still some of the best resources for this are our adversaries'.
  • 25:38 - 25:42
    A lot of the RAND Corporation research on counterinsurgency
  • 25:42 - 25:44
    is available on their website.
  • 25:44 - 25:49
    The US Army Field Manual, FM-324, is widely available.
  • 25:49 - 25:51
    All of that is worth looking at directly as well.
  • 25:51 - 25:55
    A very important counterinsurgency campaign that people can learn from
  • 25:55 - 25:59
    is the FBI's COINTELPRO operations in the United States
  • 25:59 - 26:02
    during the 1950's to early 1970's,
  • 26:02 - 26:04
    because I think these are the types of tactics
  • 26:04 - 26:06
    that are being used against resistance movements today.
  • 26:06 - 26:09
    That was a radical period in the 1960's and 70's,
  • 26:09 - 26:13
    and so they used that heavy-handed repression.
  • 26:13 - 26:14
    That was an illegal program.
  • 26:14 - 26:18
    But the same kind of repression, if not even worse,
  • 26:18 - 26:21
    now is being used – and it's legal.
  • 26:21 - 26:23
    Under the so-called PATRIOT Act first,
  • 26:23 - 26:26
    and now under other forms of legislation
  • 26:26 - 26:29
    that allows the police and state agencies
  • 26:29 - 26:31
    to spy on the population at large.
  • 26:31 - 26:33
    Including spying on dissident organizations.
  • 26:33 - 26:37
    Intelligence-gathering is probably the single most important part
  • 26:37 - 26:39
    of a counterinsurgency campaign,
  • 26:39 - 26:40
    because without intelligence
  • 26:40 - 26:44
    the state doesn't know who the organizers of resistance are,
  • 26:44 - 26:48
    where they are, what their plans are, or how to combat them.
  • 26:48 - 26:50
    The tools around counter-surveillance,
  • 26:50 - 26:52
    the tools around anonymity,
  • 26:52 - 26:55
    and making sure that you're protecting yourself
  • 26:55 - 26:58
    and that you're protecting your comrades from state surveillance
  • 26:58 - 26:59
    ... that stuff's really important.
  • 26:59 - 27:04
    Obviously, y'know, not snitching and not talking to police officers,
  • 27:04 - 27:07
    all that basic stuff - I mean, those are our weapons.
  • 27:07 - 27:09
    We have to figure out how
  • 27:09 - 27:13
    to build a movement to fight fascism in this period.
  • 27:13 - 27:14
    In the United State particularly.
  • 27:14 - 27:17
    And we have to begin to develop movements
  • 27:17 - 27:20
    that are not just "left" movements.
  • 27:20 - 27:23
    We have, y'know, people who will go on the streets
  • 27:23 - 27:28
    and engage toe-to-toe, fist-to-fist combat with the alt-right,
  • 27:28 - 27:30
    the neo-nazis, and neo-fascists
  • 27:30 - 27:33
    on the streets and in various protests.
  • 27:33 - 27:35
    And this kind of resistance is still needed.
  • 27:35 - 27:37
    But this is a kind of resistance
  • 27:37 - 27:41
    that is not going to organize masses of people.
  • 27:41 - 27:42
    Everyday people in the communities,
  • 27:42 - 27:46
    they identify that as being more of a kind of leftist movement.
  • 27:46 - 27:49
    And most people in our communities, everyday communities,
  • 27:49 - 27:50
    are not leftists.
  • 27:50 - 27:54
    It's just amazing that no one was shot and killed in Charlottesville.
  • 27:54 - 27:56
    And we can't say that that's not gonna happen
  • 27:56 - 27:58
    in other demonstrations that they put together.
  • 27:58 - 28:00
    But they're not the primary threat.
  • 28:00 - 28:02
    We're getting past the time when you could just say
  • 28:02 - 28:04
    that the task to defeat fascism is just to get out
  • 28:04 - 28:05
    and punch nazis in the face.
  • 28:05 - 28:08
    They're in office now. They're running the state.
  • 28:08 - 28:10
    So we have to go to another level.
  • 28:10 - 28:12
    We need to build a broader-based movement.
  • 28:12 - 28:15
    We need to bring in peoples of colour and communities of colour.
  • 28:15 - 28:16
    We need to bring in the women's movement.
  • 28:16 - 28:18
    We need to bring in all the forces that are necessary
  • 28:18 - 28:20
    to overthrow the entire system.
  • 28:20 - 28:21
    Our task is still a revolutionary task.
  • 28:21 - 28:26
    We have to change the society that creates fascism in the first place.
  • 28:26 - 28:27
    We have to overthrow capitalism.
  • 28:27 - 28:29
    Looking at it from our adversary's perspective,
  • 28:29 - 28:33
    their authority is in some ways very fragile.
  • 28:33 - 28:34
    And from their perspective,
  • 28:34 - 28:36
    the crucial thing that they need to maintain
  • 28:36 - 28:38
    is the sense of legitimacy.
  • 28:38 - 28:41
    The sense that the population trusts them.
  • 28:41 - 28:42
    The sense that the population supports them.
  • 28:42 - 28:46
    The sense that when they issue demands, that people will respond.
  • 28:46 - 28:49
    And we can reverse-engineer that
  • 28:49 - 28:52
    and see from what they feel like they need to protect,
  • 28:52 - 28:53
    where they're fragile.
  • 28:53 - 28:56
    And that sense of legitimacy seems to be something
  • 28:56 - 28:58
    that popular movements are very good at damaging,
  • 28:58 - 29:00
    even with far fewer resources.
  • 29:00 - 29:04
    And so the good news of all this is that
  • 29:04 - 29:07
    the place where they feel themselves most vulnerable
  • 29:07 - 29:11
    is actually the thing that we are best positioned to hurt
  • 29:11 - 29:13
    – which is their sense of public support.
  • 29:13 - 29:15
    They want our cooperation.
  • 29:15 - 29:17
    That's what this whole thing is about.
  • 29:17 - 29:19
    The key thing we can do against counterinsurgency
  • 29:19 - 29:21
    is not share information with them,
  • 29:21 - 29:24
    cooperate to the least extent possible with the state
  • 29:24 - 29:28
    – especially in terms of the criminalization of other people.
  • 29:28 - 29:31
    And keep our relationships with our friends, with our comrades,
  • 29:31 - 29:33
    but also with our neighbours, to the extent possible.
  • 29:33 - 29:37
    To other people in our community, folks we met at a Trouble screening.
  • 29:37 - 29:39
    Really keep those relationships strong and have each others' back.
  • 29:39 - 29:41
    That's our best weapon. That's all we've got.
  • 29:41 - 29:43
    People are deploying new strategies,
  • 29:43 - 29:46
    looking for new terrains of struggle and conflict,
  • 29:46 - 29:48
    and as always, the story hasn't come to its end.
  • 29:53 - 29:57
    As the world continues into a period of sustained and ever-deepening crisis,
  • 29:57 - 30:00
    new counterinsurgency strategies are being developed and deployed
  • 30:00 - 30:02
    in countries around the globe.
  • 30:02 - 30:04
    Overlapping catastrophes,
  • 30:04 - 30:06
    fueled by the destructive effects of neoliberal capitalism,
  • 30:06 - 30:07
    climate change,
  • 30:07 - 30:08
    devastating wars
  • 30:08 - 30:10
    and surging levels of global inequality
  • 30:10 - 30:14
    are culminating in historically-unprecedented levels of human migration.
  • 30:14 - 30:17
    This is feeding into a rise of xenophobic reaction,
  • 30:17 - 30:20
    whereby states and far-right media outlets
  • 30:20 - 30:21
    are redirecting popular discontent
  • 30:21 - 30:24
    towards targeted and already-oppressed groups.
  • 30:24 - 30:25
    These are dangerous times,
  • 30:25 - 30:27
    which require serious reflection
  • 30:27 - 30:30
    and committed action on the part of revolutionaries.
  • 30:30 - 30:31
    So at this point,
  • 30:31 - 30:34
    we’d like to remind you that Trouble is intended to be watched in groups,
  • 30:34 - 30:38
    and to be used as a resource to promote discussion and collective organizing.
  • 30:38 - 30:40
    Think that anarchists and other anti-capitalists in your town
  • 30:40 - 30:42
    need to start upping their game?
  • 30:42 - 30:43
    Consider getting together with some comrades,
  • 30:43 - 30:46
    screening this film and discussing what steps you can take
  • 30:46 - 30:49
    to collectively prepare yourselves to better anticipate
  • 30:49 - 30:52
    and resist state strategies of repression and recuperation.
  • 30:52 - 30:55
    Interested in running regular screenings of Trouble at your campus,
  • 30:55 - 30:59
    infoshop, community center, or even just at your home with friends?
  • 30:59 - 31:00
    Become a Trouble-Maker!
  • 31:00 - 31:03
    For 10 bucks a month, we’ll hook you up with an advanced copy of the show,
  • 31:03 - 31:06
    and a screening kit featuring additional resources
  • 31:06 - 31:09
    and some questions you can use to get a discussion going.
  • 31:09 - 31:12
    If you can’t afford to support us financially, no worries!
  • 31:12 - 31:15
    You can stream and/or download all of our content for free off our website:
  • 31:18 - 31:21
    If you’ve got any suggestions for show topics, or just want to get in touch,
  • 31:21 - 31:25
    drop us a line at trouble@sub.media.
  • 31:25 - 31:27
    This month we've kicked off a large-scale fundraiser
  • 31:27 - 31:31
    aimed at expanding subMedia, and increasing our monthly video output.
  • 31:31 - 31:32
    If we can reach our fundraising goals,
  • 31:32 - 31:35
    we plan on bringing the Stimulator back out of retirement,
  • 31:35 - 31:37
    in order to unleash him on the alt-right trolls
  • 31:37 - 31:39
    who got our paypal account shut down.
  • 31:39 - 31:43
    If you like Trouble, hate the alt-right, and want to see more subMedia content,
  • 31:43 - 31:48
    please consider going to sub.media/donate and becoming a monthly sustainer.
  • 31:48 - 31:51
    As always, we’re excited to see that people have been
  • 31:51 - 31:52
    supporting and screening our work,
  • 31:52 - 31:55
    and we wanna give a big shout out to new Troublemaker chapters
  • 31:55 - 31:59
    in London, Kitchener, Kingston, Halifax, and Tampa.
  • 31:59 - 32:03
    This episode would not have been possible without the generous support
  • 32:03 - 32:05
    of Brianna, Anonymous, Jodi, and Naber.
  • 32:05 - 32:08
    Now get out there, and make some trouble!
Title:
vimeo.com/.../236121345
Video Language:
English
Duration:
32:33

English subtitles

Revisions