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L'Encerclement - La démocratie dans les rets du néolibéralisme

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    Encirclement
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    Neo-Liberalism Ensnares Democracy
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    Producer, director, editor
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    Photography
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    Sound
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    Music
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    In order of appearance
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    In the ’30s,
    the term “totalitarian regime”
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    was applied to single-party regimes
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    where the party’s mandate
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    was to rule over the totality
    of a society’s activities -
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    political, economic, social, cultural.
    The state looked after everything.
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    Unfortunately, we had examples
    particularly in Fascism, Nazism …
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    and Stalinism: totalitarian societies
    run by an omnicompetent party.
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    Today, we live in a democracy,
    of course, but we notice that …
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    single parties have given way
    to a single mindset,
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    and the proponents
    of such unilateral thinking
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    reckon that there is
    but one solution -
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    the one imposed by the market -
    to cover all society’s activities.
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    Whatever the activity -
    economic, social, cultural, athletic -
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    the market is mandated
    to regulate it.
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    We see how the market penetrates
    all society’s interstices,
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    like a liquid, that leaves nothing
    and spares nothing.
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    This is why we can now talk
    about “globalitarian” regimes:
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    because there’s a will to impose
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    a kind of unique solution
    to the plurality of our problems.
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    I wrote “La Pensée Unique” …
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    in 1995,
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    when most of our citizens …
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    hadn’t yet become totally aware
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    that we had fallen into an ideology
    in which we were now immersed.
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    Today, we’d call this ideology
    “neo-liberal”.
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    Neo-liberalism
    is an economic technique,
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    a certain set
    of economic principles,
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    but in reality, imperceptibly, it’s
    also a veritable ideological yoke.
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    This is what I was trying
    to point out, primarily,
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    by saying what it
    ultimately consists in:
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    Neo-Liberalism consists in
    a certain number of principles,
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    notably that
    the market’s invisible hand
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    is there to settle problems. People
    and States need not get involved,
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    let the market work.
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    Establishing principles
    like deregulation.
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    Everything’s over-regulated,
    the State’s been too involved.
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    We need less government.
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    Capital must prevail over labour.
    We must always favour capital.
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    And we must privatize.
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    The State’s perimeter must be small,
    the private sector’s expansive.
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    Free trade must be promoted
    because commerce is development.
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    We made this kind of equivalency.
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    I was trying to show how
    these principles weren’t recent,
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    but had been developed since ’44,
    since the Bretton-Woods conference,
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    which initiated the IMF
    and the World Bank.
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    It arose from all the work the IMF
    had done since the ’60s and ’70s
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    geared towards southern countries,
    called “structural adjustment”,
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    or, in some countries,
    “the Washington Consensus”,
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    namely that State budgets
    must necessarily be reduced,
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    no public deficit, no inflation,
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    bureaucracies must be reduced,
    all public services like health …
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    and education
    must be reduced to a minimum.
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    The State isn’t to make
    that kind of expenditure, etc.
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    Many southern countries
    suffered greatly, of course.
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    These were basically my points,
    and when we add up these elements,
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    we’re faced with an ideology.
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    And at the time, France was on
    the eve of a presidential election,
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    which took place
    a few months later in May.
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    So, I was saying that
    ultimately, in reality,
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    we were being proposed this almost
    single-party kind of pensée unique.
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    Leftist Privatization
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    Shortly after the Iron Curtain fell,
    we witnessed in the West
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    a reframing rightwards by the
    vast majority of left-wing parties.
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    From the British Labour Party to
    Germany’s SPD via the Parti Québécois,
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    they all got into a State “reform”,
    “reengineering” or “modernization”
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    that invariably meant
    adopting neo-liberal politics.
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    From 1997 to 2002 in France,
    Lionel Jospin’s socialist government
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    proceeded to privatize about
    10 major national corporations -
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    the same number as the right-wing
    governments before and afterwards.
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    How has neo-liberalism found its way
    into so-called “socialist” parties?
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    And where is it coming from?
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    origins
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    Winnipeg General Strike, 1919
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    Neo-liberalism appeared …
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    under particular intellectual
    and institutional configurations.
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    Generally speaking,
    from 1914 to 1945,
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    capitalism went through
    an unprecedented crisis.
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    The crisis was a material one.
    In the ’20s,
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    capitalism had boomed
    after Reconstruction,
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    but the Depression in the ’30s
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    led to unemployment,
    bankruptcy, political disorder.
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    And intellectually,
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    the liberal credo yielded
    to the claims of economic planning,
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    interventionism, and
    general wariness of laissez-faire.
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    There was widespread demand
    for reinforced State intervention,
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    state-controlled economies.
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    This turned into concrete projects,
    both in “dictatorships”
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    and in democracies.
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    We think of the Soviet 5-year plan
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    and also the New Deal in the U.S.,
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    under the National Recovery
    Administration (NRA)
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    and other such structures.
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    In Nazi Germany, it was
    the Reich economics ministry.
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    In Fascist Italy, it was
    the corporations ministry.
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    Even in France, a national
    economy ministry was established -
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    a totally new thing,
    under the rising Front Populaire.
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    Communist Demonstration
    Berlin, 1929
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    Important to establishing
    a neo-liberal network in France
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    was building a publishing house.
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    It was called Les Éditions
    de la Librairie de Médicis,
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    founded in 1937.
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    It was created by a woman,
    Marie-Thérése Génin,
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    which was rare
    in this fairly masculine field.
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    She was connected to a leader
    in French business associations,
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    Marcel Bourgeois,
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    who encouraged her to establish
    a vehicle for intellectual texts
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    for a public of intellectuals.
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    Éditions de Médicis published
    Walter Lippmann’s La Cité Libre,
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    the precursor of
    the Walter Lippmann colloquium,
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    as well as texts by Hayek,
    Rueff, Ludwig von Mises.
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    About 40 works
    between 1937 and 1940.
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    They published the proceedings
    of the Lippmann colloquium
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    at the Institut International
    de Coopération Intellectuel,
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    now defunct,
    but the forerunner of UNESCO.
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    This happened
    in a fairly official context.
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    There were 26 participants, whose
    significance is now acknowledged:
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    Friedrich Hayek, future
    Nobel Prize winner for economics,
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    Robert Marjolin, a pillar
    of European construction,
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    the founders of Germany’s
    “social market economy”,
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    Alexander Rüstow and Wilhelm Röpke,
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    de Gaulle’s financial advisor,
    Jacques Rueff,
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    the mastermind of Ronald Reagan’s
    Star Wars, Stefan Possony.
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    That’s all hindsight. At the time,
    they were less famous.
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    The colloquium lasted 4 days,
    during which were discussed
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    the eventual responsibilities
    of liberalism in the Depression,
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    as well as the means
    of renewing liberalism
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    and building worldwide opposition
    to interventionism and socialism.
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    The Walter Lippmann Colloquium
    hosted the avant-garde
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    of the neo-liberal battle
    in preparation.
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    Among the most ferocious opponents
    of collectivism,
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    Friedrich von Hayek and
    Ludwig von Mises stood out.
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    Hayek and Mises represented
    a particular trend in neo-liberalism,
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    the Austrian School.
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    They advocated a radical liberalism
    that grants the State minimal power.
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    The minimal State is an expression
    used by their disciples.
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    These two had slightly different
    economic ideas.
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    Liberals often gloss over
    their divergent views.
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    But they also had
    certain points in common.
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    The first is that economic science
    was just a fraction of their work.
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    Mises considered it a branch of the
    more general science of human action.
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    Hayek soon left pure economics
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    to pursue psychology.
    He studied the brain,
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    political orders, law, etc.
    For them, economics …
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    was their original field, but it
    didn’t cover all of the humanities.
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    Secondly, their conception
    of economics was fairly particular.
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    Austrian School economics
    were far from concrete:
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    no statistics,
    no mathematical data, etc.
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    Everything stemmed from axiomatics.
    There were “typical” ideal situations
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    where one observes
    how a rational person acts
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    in negotiating choices
    between work and leisure,
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    sleeping and getting rich, etc.,
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    supported by metaphors like
    Robinson Crusoe on his desert island.
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    The third thing they had in common,
    significant to neo-liberal history,
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    is a concept of intellectual work
    and its role in socialism.
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    The thinking of Hayek and Mises
    was very elitist and aristocratic:
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    basically, that the mass
    of humanity doesn’t think.
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    Mises book, Socialism, says,
    “The masses do not think.”
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    Only a few intellectuals think,
    and do so on society’s behalf.
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    So they thought,
    intellectuals must think,
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    and progressively oppose socialism,
    which other intellectuals invented
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    and spread to the masses.
    Socialism wasn’t spontaneous.
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    It was propagated by intellectuals.
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    Hayek and Mises put the intellectual
    at the centre of social change,
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    and political and economic change.
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    This led to them founding groups
    like the Mont Pelerin Society.
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    War imposed a hiatus on the
    neo-liberals’ militant activities.
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    The CIRL, a French research centre
    for the renewal of liberalism
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    arising from the Lippmann Colloquium,
    disappeared after only a year.
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    As soon as the war ended,
    Hayek took up the torch again.
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    He invited proponents
    of liberal reestablishment
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    to a meeting that would be decisive
    to the future of neo-liberalism.
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    The Mont Pelerin meeting
    took place …
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    from April 1 to 10, 1947,
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    in the Hôtel du Parc,
    near Vevey, Switzerland.
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    It was explicitly meant
    to bring together
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    liberal European and
    American intellectuals,
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    and to found an international
    organization for liberal ideas.
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    Hayek had started making contacts
    2 years earlier
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    with Colloquium participants
    and the British and Americans.
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    He invited this circle
    to Mont Pelerin,
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    whence the society’s name.
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    There were 39 participants
    at the first meeting.
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    Again, there were some major figures:
    3 future Nobel winners,
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    Milton Friedman, George Stigler,
    Maurice Allais.
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    People known for their political
    or philosophical essays,
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    Karl Popper, Bertrand de Jouvenel.
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    And those with direct political
    influence in their country -
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    the Germans, Wilhelm Röpke
    and Walter Eucken,
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    associated with Germany’s
    “social market economy”.
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    Discussions revolved around
    relatively general subjects
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    like Christianity and liberalism,
    the competitive order,
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    the possibilities of founding
    a European economic federation.
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    It lasted several days.
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    Hayek thought they needed
    a flexible structure
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    with invited members only,
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    no offices,
    statutes deposited in Illinois,
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    that would meet biannually
    in different countries -
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    a fairly nebulous structure for
    confirmed intellectuals who thought
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    liberalism was a doctrine primarily
    for intellectuals themselves.
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    at the core
    of the neo-liberal network
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    The Mont Pelerin Society
    is not a think tank.
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    It’s a kind of liberal academy.
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    Nevertheless, a kind of
    division of labour came about
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    between the Society, which recruited
    only the most renowned liberals,
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    and its members’ national activities,
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    which could include setting up
    associations or think tanks.
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    This took diverse forms.
    In France, they created
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    the association for economic freedom
    and social progress in the ’60s,
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    the French section of Mont Pelerin,
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    the members of which were recruited
    from business or politics.
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    This broadened recruitment
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    into milieux other than
    intellectual circles.
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    The other, think-tank model has been
    perennial in Mont Pelerin’s history.
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    The most famous are Britain’s 1955
    Institute of Economic Affairs,
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    or the Heritage Foundation from 1973,
    linked to the U.S. Republican party.
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    These think tanks
    have appointed employees,
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    people paid to write notes,
    produce legislative proposals
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    that are all laid out
    and distributed to politicians
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    and to journalists with the aim
    of creating liberal public opinion.
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    There are now hundreds of think tanks
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    that form a veritable cluster
    which is fairly disorienting,
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    to the point where think tanks
    like the Atlas Foundation
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    now have the role
    of promoting think tanks
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    by distributing kits and instructions
    on how to form one’s own.
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    They take very different forms.
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    Groups focused on an author -
    the Hayek Center,
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    the Mises Institute -
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    that revolve around
    a particular person’s work.
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    Groups can have a subject
    of particular concern -
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    the environment,
    foreign politics, etc.
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    The quality and power of these
    think tanks are very different.
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    A think tank’s strength comes from
    whether it can connect intellectuals,
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    some businessmen, and a general
    trend within conservative parties.
  • 19:27 - 19:31
    There are think tanks
    like the Center for Policy Studies
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    of Keith Joseph,
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    which promoted Thatcher
    and let her garner …
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    support to revolutionize
    the Conservative Party in the ’70s.
  • 19:41 - 19:46
    That’s an organization
    at the junction of 3 milieux.
  • 19:46 - 19:52
    A purely intellectual think tank
    with general thoughts on liberalism
  • 19:52 - 19:55
    would have little influence
    on political debate.
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    A whole part of the career
    of Mises, Hayek, etc.
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    can be explained by the affinities
    they had with business lobby leaders.
  • 20:11 - 20:16
    Mises was associated with the U.S.
    Foundation for Economic Education,
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    and thus with business associations.
    Hayek got to Chicago
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    financed by tycoons who wanted him
    to write another “Road to Serfdom”,
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    but on America, not just England.
  • 20:30 - 20:33
    These intellectuals got more power
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    by teaming up with
    or befriending powerful people.
  • 20:38 - 20:42
    Hayek’s work may reveal
    a utopian quality,
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    but it’s the Utopia of the strongest,
    not the most underprivileged.
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    Financed by corporations
    and vast private fortunes,
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    neo-liberal think tanks often enjoy
    charitable organization status.
  • 21:01 - 21:07
    Their generous donors thereby
    have the right to tax exemptions.
  • 21:07 - 21:11
    However, the law says
    charitable organizations
  • 21:11 - 21:15
    cannot engage in political acts.
  • 21:15 - 21:21
    In 1989, Greenpeace was stripped
    of its charitable status
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    by the Canadian government.
  • 21:24 - 21:27
    The Canada Revenue Agency
    concluded that this NGO
  • 21:27 - 21:31
    did not always act
    in the public’s interest.
  • 21:31 - 21:36
    It contributed, for example,
    “to propelling people into poverty
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    by demanding the closure
    of polluting industries.”
  • 21:41 - 21:47
    On the other hand, no neo-liberal
    think tank with charitable status
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    has ever been interfered with.
  • 21:49 - 21:55
    During their annual declaration
    to the Canadian government,
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    these “non-partisan” research
    institutes solemnly state
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    that they “do not try
    to influence public opinion
  • 22:04 - 22:08
    or obtain the modification
    of a law or policy”.
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    How can the market promote
    individual choice and freedom?
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    Student seminar,
    The Fraser Institute on public policy,
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    organized jointly with
    l’Institut Économique de Montréal …
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    Saturday, February 10, 2001 ,
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    sponsored by Fraser Institute
    supporters throughout Québec”
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    When one grants coercive power,
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    the monopoly on coercive power,
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    to an agency,
    one we call the government,
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    there will always be a tendency …
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    to use it, either ignorantly,
    or to abuse this power.
  • 25:55 - 25:59
    And power has a tendency to grow.
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    What the Fraser Institute tries
    to research and emphasize is,
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    what the proper limits
    of government are,
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    and what are the limits
    of private enterprise,
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    or of voluntary exchanges
    between individuals?
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    Therein lies the nexus, the division,
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    between coercion and free will
    that will inform my discussion …
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    my lecture today. And you’ll be
    seeing lectures by others who came
  • 26:34 - 26:36
    to participate today.
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    SPECIAL LUNCHEON PRESENTATION
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    … from the Foundation for
    Economic Education in New York.
  • 26:41 - 26:44
    In his presentation,
    ’Cleaned by Capitalism’,
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    this expert on liberty will discuss
    how our rising standard of living
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    has allowed us the ‘luxury’
    of worrying about such things
  • 26:53 - 26:55
    as global environmental issues.”
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    This seminar’s not government funded.
    It’s financed by private sponsorship.
  • 28:59 - 29:04
    It’s encouraging to see people put
    their money where their beliefs are.
  • 29:05 - 29:09
    I think there are
    far too many services
  • 29:09 - 29:13
    like unemployment insurance,
    health, education,
  • 29:14 - 29:16
    that fall under a monopoly,
  • 29:16 - 29:21
    that of the government, which is
    the sole producer of these services.
  • 29:21 - 29:24
    Why not open it up
    and have competition?
  • 29:26 - 29:31
    We could have competition
    in the production of services,
  • 29:32 - 29:35
    and perhaps address
    our concern for the poor
  • 29:35 - 29:39
    by giving them grants
    so they can buy these services.
  • 29:39 - 29:40
    So, divide …
  • 29:41 - 29:45
    Separate production, which I’d like
    to see private and competitive,
  • 29:45 - 29:50
    from funding, which could be
    partly governmental.
  • 29:56 - 30:02
    I don’t like talking about markets.
    They don’t exist without governments.
  • 30:02 - 30:04
    Every market needs rules.
  • 30:05 - 30:08
    Every market needs
    a certain level of coercion.
  • 30:10 - 30:15
    And I don’t like talking about
    freedom as a value in itself.
  • 30:15 - 30:17
    Many people don’t want freedom.
  • 30:20 - 30:23
    l’d like the freedom
    to choose my masters.
  • 30:25 - 30:26
    What I try to …
  • 30:28 - 30:30
    discuss in my lectures is,
  • 30:31 - 30:32
    how can we …
  • 30:34 - 30:39
    have a system of government
    that permits us the choice
  • 30:40 - 30:43
    of what kind of representatives
    and restrictions we’ll choose.
  • 30:43 - 30:48
    We must all live under restrictions,
    even the fiercest libertarians.
  • 30:50 - 30:58
    brief liberal anthology
  • 30:58 - 31:06
    libertarianism
    and the theory of public choice
  • 31:08 - 31:10
    Le Québécois Libre
    Editorial
  • 31:10 - 31:13
    What must libertarians do?”
  • 31:13 - 31:15
    Libertarianism is the descendent
  • 31:15 - 31:18
    of classic liberal philosophy.
  • 31:18 - 31:21
    It puts the accent
    on individual freedom
  • 31:22 - 31:26
    and its repercussions. Economically,
    it’s the free market. Politically,
  • 31:26 - 31:30
    it’s the minimal State
    and the least coercion possible.
  • 31:30 - 31:32
    The least regulation …
  • 31:34 - 31:38
    It gives individuals as much
    leeway as possible to act
  • 31:38 - 31:41
    and have willing relationships
    with others.
  • 31:41 - 31:44
    Socially speaking as well, it’s …
  • 31:44 - 31:50
    the polar opposite of philosophies
    that impose some social, religious …
  • 31:51 - 31:54
    or cultural order. The idea is,
  • 31:54 - 32:00
    if we are free in a context where
    person and property are protected,
  • 32:01 - 32:06
    everyone will be able to have
    voluntary relationships,
  • 32:06 - 32:10
    which will lead to harmony.
    Libertarianism isn’t anarchy,
  • 32:10 - 32:15
    with individuals fighting,
    “wild capitalism”, “wild competition”.
  • 32:15 - 32:16
    It’s not that at all.
  • 32:16 - 32:22
    It’s giving people enough space for
    peaceful, voluntary relationships.
  • 32:23 - 32:30
    Neo-liberal, anarchist
    or libertarian?
  • 32:31 - 32:34
    Libertarianism is the descendent
    of classic liberalism,
  • 32:34 - 32:39
    a philosophy that was developed
    in the 17th and 18th century
  • 32:41 - 32:46
    in reaction to the authoritarian
    monarchies of the period.
  • 32:46 - 32:49
    Liberalism said,
  • 32:49 - 32:53
    to match sovereign power,
    individuals must have more freedom.
  • 32:53 - 32:57
    This developed in subsequent
    centuries to give us …
  • 32:58 - 33:02
    our current philosophy,
    which embraces the free market …
  • 33:03 - 33:06
    But 20th-century libertarians
  • 33:06 - 33:11
    stand apart from liberals. The
    definition of “liberal” has changed.
  • 33:11 - 33:15
    In the U.S. a liberal
    is ultimately the reverse:
  • 33:16 - 33:18
    a social democrat or a leftist.
  • 33:20 - 33:24
    Europe keeps the French tradition,
    where liberal means liberal.
  • 33:25 - 33:29
    But there’s a lot of confusion.
    The Americans, the classic liberals,
  • 33:29 - 33:33
    started calling themselves
    “libertarians” in the ’20s and ’30s
  • 33:34 - 33:36
    to stand apart from leftist liberals.
  • 33:36 - 33:40
    And libertarian philosophy
    is more coherent and radical
  • 33:40 - 33:42
    than classic liberalism,
  • 33:43 - 33:47
    calling for State reduction,
    either to its simplest form,
  • 33:47 - 33:52
    or certain libertarians even favour
    eliminating the State altogether,
  • 33:52 - 33:56
    privatizing even defence,
    security and justice.
  • 33:57 - 34:04
    Redistributing wealth is immoral
  • 34:06 - 34:10
    Today, in a society
    where the State spends …
  • 34:11 - 34:16
    State expenditures represent
    about 45% to 50% of the GDP.
  • 34:16 - 34:20
    The State controls such sectors
    as education, health.
  • 34:20 - 34:23
    It controls a lot
    and regulates other things.
  • 34:23 - 34:26
    It subsidizes almost everyone.
    Much of the population …
  • 34:28 - 34:32
    lives only off
    the redistribution of money.
  • 34:32 - 34:37
    They don’t produce goods demanded
    by others on the free market.
  • 34:37 - 34:42
    They just receive State money
    confiscated from other taxpayers.
  • 34:43 - 34:45
    This means there are many people …
  • 34:47 - 34:51
    who live at the expense of others.
    From a libertarian standpoint,
  • 34:52 - 34:57
    society can be divided in two,
    those who produce and those who live
  • 34:57 - 35:01
    as the producers’ dependents
    and are a kind of parasite.
  • 35:01 - 35:04
    It’s a strong word,
    but it’s appropriate.
  • 35:05 - 35:09
    You can’t favour individual
    responsibility and defend that stance.
  • 35:10 - 35:15
    All who live dependently on others
    are really irresponsible.
  • 35:16 - 35:19
    They don’t do anything required
    and they live …
  • 35:20 - 35:26
    on State coercion, which transfers
    wealth from one group to the other.
  • 35:27 - 35:31
    If we want to promote
    freedom and responsibility,
  • 35:32 - 35:37
    we cannot accept the dependency
    of much of the population.
  • 35:39 - 35:45
    The theory of public choice says
    the adoption of government policies
  • 35:45 - 35:49
    is not motivated
    by collective interests
  • 35:49 - 35:54
    but by the particular interests
    of various social groups.
  • 35:54 - 36:00
    In 1986, James M. Buchanan,
    originator of this theory,
  • 36:00 - 36:05
    who denounces State inefficiency and
    advocates limited public spending,
  • 36:05 - 36:09
    won the “Nobel prize” for economics.
  • 36:19 - 36:23
    Contrary to the perception
    being peddled here,
  • 36:24 - 36:28
    we in Québec live in a State culture.
    People don’t realize
  • 36:28 - 36:31
    because we’re so inured
    to this viewpoint,
  • 36:31 - 36:35
    that we naturally accept it,
    but it’s actually a State culture
  • 36:35 - 36:37
    that naively perceives …
  • 36:39 - 36:43
    the State as the instrument
    to maximize the common good.
  • 36:44 - 36:46
    As though the inspiration …
  • 36:46 - 36:51
    But that view or vision
    of the State is perfectly …
  • 36:54 - 36:58
    angelic. It has nothing
    to do with real governments.
  • 36:59 - 37:03
    Why do we believe our governments,
    democratic as they are -
  • 37:03 - 37:05
    which is an advantage -
  • 37:06 - 37:09
    will maximize the common good?
    They won’t.
  • 37:09 - 37:12
    Governments obey
    the game rules that rule them.
  • 37:13 - 37:17
    What game rules?
    The electoral process.
  • 37:17 - 37:19
    That’s the virtue of it.
  • 37:19 - 37:22
    What does this herald?
  • 37:23 - 37:25
    Primarily that …
  • 37:26 - 37:28
    we will often witness …
  • 37:30 - 37:32
    majority dictatorship.
  • 37:33 - 37:39
    Since the primary, if not sole,
    rule in politics is the majority,
  • 37:39 - 37:44
    a government that can win elections
    will first privilege the majority.
  • 37:44 - 37:49
    The majority’s incomes are weak
    relative to the average.
  • 37:51 - 37:54
    So the sole object
    of policies will be …
  • 37:54 - 37:57
    to redistribute wealth in its favour,
  • 37:57 - 38:01
    not to maximize wealth
    or enhance growth.
  • 38:01 - 38:05
    Efficiency isn’t a major issue
    for a government.
  • 38:06 - 38:12
    Its priority is redistributing wealth
    to the majority that elects it.
  • 38:12 - 38:15
    That explains
    universal social programs.
  • 38:15 - 38:17
    That explains …
  • 38:19 - 38:23
    the majority’s predilections
    with regard to …
  • 38:24 - 38:29
    the public health
    and education monopolies.
  • 38:30 - 38:32
    It’s not compassion,
    nor a concern …
  • 38:34 - 38:38
    for sharing wealth
    that inspires this position.
  • 38:38 - 38:44
    The majority wants services paid
    by a slightly more affluent minority.
  • 38:44 - 38:45
    That’s the sense of it.
  • 38:46 - 38:49
    So, it’s a gigantic lie to say
  • 38:51 - 38:54
    that compassion inspires …
  • 38:55 - 39:00
    public health and education
    monopolies. That’s not the reality.
  • 39:00 - 39:04
    The second dimension is that people,
    i.e., the majority,
  • 39:06 - 39:08
    is rather apolitical.
  • 39:09 - 39:12
    In economics, it’s what we call
    “rational ignorance”.
  • 39:14 - 39:17
    It would be stupid for each of us
  • 39:17 - 39:21
    to acquire lots of information
    on politics,
  • 39:21 - 39:26
    to get informed on the impact on us
    of more than just a few policies.
  • 39:26 - 39:31
    Because we can’t do anything.
    We’re one voter out of X million.
  • 39:31 - 39:35
    So, informed or not,
    whether we vote wisely or badly,
  • 39:36 - 39:38
    the result’s the same.
  • 39:38 - 39:44
    So, everyone must aim to minimize
    the effort of understanding politics
  • 39:44 - 39:47
    and political information,
    which they do.
  • 39:47 - 39:50
    People often can’t name their MP.
  • 39:51 - 39:53
    And they’d be incapable …
  • 39:55 - 39:57
    of explaining a policy.
  • 39:57 - 40:00
    To them, this is normal
    because, again,
  • 40:01 - 40:03
    it would cost a lot to get informed,
  • 40:04 - 40:08
    whereas their potential
    influence is nil.
  • 40:08 - 40:13
    So, people are apathetic, apolitical.
    They don’t participate in politics
  • 40:13 - 40:16
    because it’s not worth it.
  • 40:16 - 40:22
    This opens the way for intervention
    by strategically placed groups.
  • 40:22 - 40:25
    Interest groups.
    That explains their dominance.
  • 40:28 - 40:33
    Organizations like the CSN or the
    Canadian Manufacturers’ Association
  • 40:33 - 40:38
    are already prepared to do politics,
    propaganda and lobbying,
  • 40:39 - 40:43
    at minimal cost because
    they’re already organized.
  • 40:43 - 40:48
    So that means political decisions
    will be dominated
  • 40:48 - 40:52
    by strategically placed people,
    organized groups.
  • 40:53 - 40:58
    All the world’s great governments -
    today’s and yesterday’s -
  • 40:58 - 41:06
    have merely been gangs of thieves,
    come together to pillage, conquer
  • 41:06 - 41:09
    and enslave their fellow men.
  • 41:09 - 41:15
    And their laws, as they call them,
    represent only those agreements
  • 41:15 - 41:21
    they deemed it necessary to enter
    in order to keep their organization
  • 41:21 - 41:26
    and act together in plundering
    and enslaving others,
  • 41:26 - 41:31
    and securing to each
    his agreed share of the spoils.
  • 41:31 - 41:37
    These laws impose no more real
    obligation than do the deals
  • 41:37 - 41:43
    that brigands, bandits and pirates
    find it necessary to enter into
  • 41:43 - 41:45
    with each other.”
  • 41:45 - 41:51
    - Natural Law, or the Science
    of Justice, 1882 (paraphrased)
  • 41:53 - 41:59
    lf we look objectively at the facts,
    the State is a coercive institution.
  • 41:59 - 42:03
    The State can only operate
    by forcibly imposing things.
  • 42:03 - 42:04
    For example,
  • 42:05 - 42:09
    when the State has
    a monopoly like Hydro-Québec,
  • 42:09 - 42:13
    if I decide to produce
    and sell electricity
  • 42:14 - 42:17
    and I’m outside the monopoly,
    ultimately,
  • 42:18 - 42:23
    they won’t just slap my wrists for
    breaking the rules. I’ll go to jail
  • 42:23 - 42:28
    if I persist in doing something
    the State prohibits by regulation.
  • 42:28 - 42:32
    The State will physically assault me
    if I offer a service
  • 42:33 - 42:38
    that the statesmen
    have decided to monopolize.
  • 42:39 - 42:42
    All the State does
    when it steals half our salary -
  • 42:42 - 42:45
    sorry, but no one asked
    my opinion about it,
  • 42:45 - 42:48
    so half my salary’s stolen …
    It could be said that,
  • 42:49 - 42:54
    democratically, we elected people
    who decided that for us,
  • 42:55 - 43:00
    but democracy is
    the “peaceful” organization
  • 43:00 - 43:02
    of the State’s thievery.
  • 43:03 - 43:08
    I didn’t vote to have half my salary
    lifted, but many are interested -
  • 43:08 - 43:11
    because they live
    at the expense of the State -
  • 43:12 - 43:15
    in having the State take half
    and giving it to them.
  • 43:15 - 43:19
    So, democracy isn’t true freedom.
  • 43:19 - 43:24
    I’m not anti-democratic in the sense
    of being for an authoritarian State,
  • 43:24 - 43:28
    When you speak against democracy,
    you’re always seen as favouring
  • 43:28 - 43:32
    an authoritarian State.
    On the contrary, I’m for a State
  • 43:33 - 43:36
    that’s absolutely non-authoritarian,
    to the point where
  • 43:36 - 43:40
    it doesn’t even justify its actions
    on the basis of democracy.
  • 43:41 - 43:44
    Individual freedom does not equal
    democratic freedom.
  • 43:44 - 43:50
    Democratically giving people
    the power to take and impose things,
  • 43:51 - 43:53
    contradicts individual freedom.
  • 43:54 - 43:59
    A true defence of individual freedom
    doesn’t favour more democracy,
  • 43:59 - 44:02
    more ways of divvying up
  • 44:03 - 44:05
    resources that have been
    stolen from others.
  • 44:05 - 44:11
    We’re for reducing the State’s role
    so individuals are altogether free,
  • 44:12 - 44:17
    not to decide
    which fox they’ll vote in
  • 44:18 - 44:21
    to raid the hen house, but to decide
    what to do with their property.
  • 44:25 - 44:29
    The incentives incorporated
    into social policies are harmful,
  • 44:29 - 44:32
    both to the poor,
    and to the general population.
  • 44:32 - 44:38
    What I mean by that is,
    we have a public social economy
  • 44:39 - 44:42
    in parallel with
    the capitalist market economy.
  • 44:42 - 44:47
    One is productive. The other is
    based on the former-USSR model
  • 44:48 - 44:53
    and comprises incentives that
    hurt everyone. We reward people …
  • 44:53 - 44:57
    for not working.
    We compensate them
  • 44:57 - 44:59
    for not having stable families.
  • 45:01 - 45:04
    Welfare for single mothers …
  • 45:04 - 45:08
    is a way of multiplying births
    outside the family.
  • 45:08 - 45:12
    And we reward poverty.
    It’s as radical as that.
  • 45:12 - 45:19
    Poverty obeys the standard rules:
    subsidies make it more prevalent,
  • 45:19 - 45:22
    because people start liking it.
  • 45:23 - 45:28
    This has been clear in Ontario
    and the U.S. over the past 5 years,
  • 45:28 - 45:30
    where they really imposed
  • 45:30 - 45:33
    limits to people’s access
  • 45:34 - 45:36
    to welfare payments,
  • 45:36 - 45:41
    and the population of poor people
    fell by half in a few years!
  • 45:42 - 45:45
    Because there was no more money,
    conditions changed,
  • 45:45 - 45:49
    work was imposed on them,
    whatever the methods were.
  • 45:56 - 46:00
    So, there are ways
    to foster people’s reinsertion
  • 46:01 - 46:03
    into the productive economy.
  • 46:04 - 46:08
    Instead of piling them
    into social housing, ghettos,
  • 46:09 - 46:10
    where everyone’s poor,
  • 46:10 - 46:15
    if they were given vouchers or stamps
    that gave them access to property,
  • 46:16 - 46:20
    instead of subsidizing unemployment,
  • 46:21 - 46:25
    as with unemployment insurance.
    People are subsidized
  • 46:25 - 46:29
    to be unemployed.
    Otherwise, no subsidy.
  • 46:31 - 46:34
    We could create
    unemployment savings funds,
  • 46:34 - 46:37
    so people could accumulate a hedge,
  • 46:38 - 46:41
    sheltered from tax,
    even subsidized,
  • 46:41 - 46:45
    in case they lose their job.
    Everyone would then be careful
  • 46:46 - 46:52
    not to lose their job because
    they’d be eating into their own fund,
  • 46:52 - 46:55
    the beneficiary of their own savings.
  • 46:55 - 47:00
    Lots of ideas. But our social
    policies are really built
  • 47:00 - 47:06
    to create an industry of poverty,
    an industry of dependence,
  • 47:06 - 47:09
    that benefits all the bureaucrats
    who gravitate around it
  • 47:09 - 47:13
    and encourage dependence
    in the population,
  • 47:14 - 47:15
    as well as political support,
  • 47:18 - 47:21
    with no long-term effect
    across the country.
  • 47:22 - 47:24
    Social policies
    haven’t diminished poverty.
  • 47:25 - 47:29
    That’s the final diagnosis
    of the matter.
  • 47:43 - 47:44
    We observe …
  • 47:45 - 47:46
    that growth …
  • 47:49 - 47:53
    Historically and from
    country to country,
  • 47:53 - 47:57
    the growth of economies’ revenues
    is the only means
  • 47:58 - 48:00
    to help the poor.
  • 48:02 - 48:05
    We have rigorous data about this.
  • 48:05 - 48:08
    The only variable that affects …
  • 48:10 - 48:12
    that reduces poverty
  • 48:12 - 48:15
    in various countries
  • 48:15 - 48:17
    is the growth of wealth.
  • 48:18 - 48:20
    Social policies count for nothing!
  • 48:22 - 48:24
    So, whoever is concerned
  • 48:26 - 48:29
    about helping the poor
    or underprivileged
  • 48:30 - 48:32
    must also privilege growth.
  • 48:34 - 48:37
    Consequently, all those
    who oppose free trade
  • 48:38 - 48:42
    on behalf of poor countries,
    or of the poor within countries,
  • 48:42 - 48:46
    are wrong.
    Their observations are mistaken.
  • 48:47 - 48:50
    The facts contradict their options.
  • 48:50 - 48:55
    The best help is to open trade
    so everyone’s income goes up.
  • 48:55 - 48:59
    Statistically, the income of the poor
    increases as fast as anyone’s
  • 48:59 - 49:04
    when revenues go up. To achieve this,
    the economy must be opened up.
  • 49:04 - 49:06
    Beyond that,
  • 49:07 - 49:11
    beyond helping the poor
    with measures that might help,
  • 49:12 - 49:15
    I don’t see any …
  • 49:15 - 49:18
    basis for redistributing wealth.
  • 49:20 - 49:24
    The government
    redistributes a lot of wealth
  • 49:25 - 49:29
    in favour of the middle class,
    because it’s the decisive majority.
  • 49:30 - 49:35
    But not on any moral basis.
    The only social justice, if I may,
  • 49:35 - 49:37
    is the respect for property rights.
  • 49:39 - 49:41
    Libertarians believe
    public goods don’t exist.
  • 49:42 - 49:47
    The notion’s a fallacy
    to justify State intervention.
  • 49:47 - 49:52
    The logic is, there are always
    external factors, like pollution.
  • 49:52 - 49:56
    We cannot produce without making
    smoke, which falls on our neighbour,
  • 49:58 - 50:00
    or residues that will have to …
  • 50:00 - 50:05
    go into the river.
    But the reason this happens is
  • 50:06 - 50:10
    there’s no property right
    over water, for example.
  • 50:10 - 50:12
    Rivers are public.
  • 50:15 - 50:18
    Hence,
    during the entire 19th century,
  • 50:19 - 50:22
    companies were allowed
    to pollute rivers,
  • 50:22 - 50:27
    and until very recently
    this was done because the State
  • 50:27 - 50:32
    controlled the river. It was
    a public State-controlled resource
  • 50:32 - 50:36
    and the State let private companies
    pollute the river.
  • 50:37 - 50:42
    But if the river had been privatized
    and each of its owners
  • 50:43 - 50:47
    had had to be consulted
    for permission for the company
  • 50:48 - 50:51
    to put effluents into the river,
    we can be quite sure
  • 50:51 - 50:55
    things would’ve been different.
    Or it might’ve happened,
  • 50:55 - 50:59
    if the company had paid
    the true price for polluting,
  • 51:01 - 51:04
    i.e., paid the owners
    for polluting their resource.
  • 51:04 - 51:08
    Resource allocation
    would’ve been very different.
  • 51:08 - 51:10
    There would’ve been emphasis
  • 51:12 - 51:14
    on alternative solutions.
  • 51:15 - 51:19
    Companies would’ve invested more
    in technological solutions,
  • 51:19 - 51:23
    or arranged to pollute
    in very targeted places
  • 51:23 - 51:28
    owned by someone who would accept
    pollution in exchange for payment.
  • 51:28 - 51:32
    Production priorities would’ve been
    reorganized differently.
  • 51:34 - 51:38
    So, “public goods” exist
    only because the State
  • 51:40 - 51:42
    distorts production
  • 51:43 - 51:46
    by nationalizing certain assets,
    or the environment itself.
  • 52:02 - 52:05
    Historically, liberalism
    represented a progression.
  • 52:05 - 52:09
    But classic liberalism
    as championed by Adam Smith,
  • 52:09 - 52:13
    founder of political economics,
    has very little to do
  • 52:14 - 52:19
    with what’s presently circulating as
    the “liberalism” in neo-liberalism.
  • 52:19 - 52:21
    It has almost nothing to do
    with classic liberalism.
  • 52:22 - 52:26
    So, historically liberalism was
    a progression, in that it was …
  • 52:26 - 52:29
    a way of contesting
    absolute monarchies,
  • 52:29 - 52:32
    and giving individuals rights.
  • 52:32 - 52:36
    Among these rights,
    in the liberalism of Locke and Smith,
  • 52:37 - 52:41
    were private property rights.
    That’s a progression.
  • 52:42 - 52:45
    But it’s not absurd
    to think that even anarchism …
  • 52:45 - 52:51
    is a child of liberalism. Early
    liberalism was somewhat radical,
  • 52:51 - 52:57
    and today’s “liberal” thinkers would
    make Adam Smith roll in his grave,
  • 52:57 - 53:02
    because he wouldn’t recognize much
    in what’s now passing for liberalism.
  • 53:02 - 53:05
    Take the case of private property.
  • 53:05 - 53:12
    lf it stems from interactions driven
    by transnational corporations,
  • 53:12 - 53:16
    at the core and in the framework
    of classic liberalism,
  • 53:16 - 53:19
    this is unthinkable.
    It’s a fallacy to think
  • 53:20 - 53:25
    that private tyrannies like GM
    or Bombardier can have rights,
  • 53:26 - 53:30
    either property rights or rights
    that transcend human beings.
  • 53:30 - 53:35
    On the other hand, the question
    of property rights is a hard one.
  • 53:36 - 53:39
    It’s important to ask.
    There’s no simple answer.
  • 53:39 - 53:42
    Nevertheless, I’m sure that,
    even in the context of liberalism,
  • 53:43 - 53:48
    one cannot place current practices,
    agents such as transnationals,
  • 53:48 - 53:52
    and their accepted rights,
    within a classically liberal model.
  • 53:52 - 53:54
    Property rights must be reconsidered.
  • 53:55 - 53:59
    My opinions about it
    are those of classic anarchism:
  • 53:59 - 54:03
    private ownership of means
    of production seems aberrant.
  • 54:03 - 54:06
    But what Proudhon calls “possession”
    has a place.
  • 54:06 - 54:08
    Ownership rights are healthy.
  • 54:08 - 54:14
    But the current, ersatz “liberal”
    or “neo-liberal” doctrine is absurd.
  • 54:14 - 54:17
    Let’s suppose that, in our world,
  • 54:17 - 54:20
    someone can appropriate,
  • 54:20 - 54:25
    by the means one normally acquires
    property rights over anything …
  • 54:26 - 54:30
    Suppose someone like me
    appropriates by accepted legal means
  • 54:31 - 54:36
    elements that are essential
    to everyone’s life.
  • 54:36 - 54:39
    People like you could die
    or sell out to me.
  • 54:39 - 54:43
    Current neo-liberalism would
    recognize such a society as just.
  • 54:43 - 54:48
    It’s clearly aberrant. Such questions
    can’t be answered as simplistically
  • 54:48 - 54:53
    as our world would have it. But it’s
    a tough question. I choose to think
  • 54:53 - 54:58
    production means can’t be private but
    ownership of things we use is good.
  • 58:21 - 58:26
    Free trade
    is a very beautiful concept,
  • 58:27 - 58:31
    and, as it was imagined
    in the 18th century,
  • 58:31 - 58:36
    it certainly had merits,
    because it’s very logical to say
  • 58:36 - 58:39
    you must produce better
    and more cheaply,
  • 58:39 - 58:42
    and trade with others
    who’ll do the same.
  • 58:42 - 58:46
    Instead of making wine in England,
    buy it from Portugal.
  • 58:46 - 58:50
    The Portuguese
    will buy your woollens.
  • 58:50 - 58:53
    That’s Riccardo’s original example.
  • 58:55 - 58:59
    But the great 18th-century
    theoreticians never imagined
  • 58:59 - 59:03
    that capital itself would be free
    to go where it wanted,
  • 59:04 - 59:09
    and an American or British company
    could go invest in China,
  • 59:10 - 59:14
    take advantage
    of repression in China,
  • 59:16 - 59:20
    which rejects unions
    and so has extremely low wages,
  • 59:21 - 59:25
    could “externalize”
    all the environmental costs,
  • 59:25 - 59:30
    make society and the whole planet pay
    because it pollutes but it’s cheaper.
  • 59:31 - 59:34
    So, instead of having
    a “comparative” advantage -
  • 59:35 - 59:39
    I make wine cheaper than you,
    you make woollens cheaper than me -
  • 59:39 - 59:43
    it becomes an absolute advantage
    because …
  • 59:43 - 59:47
    my capital is free
    to roam wherever it finds
  • 59:47 - 59:51
    the best conditions for profit.
  • 59:51 - 59:55
    This is what warps trade practices,
  • 59:55 - 59:59
    and makes the transnationals
    naturally want
  • 59:59 - 60:04
    the greatest possible freedom
    for themselves.
  • 60:04 - 60:07
    But there’s no question
    of labour circulating,
  • 60:07 - 60:10
    except for our “contemporary nomads”-
  • 60:11 - 60:14
    highly qualified personnel,
  • 60:14 - 60:18
    covered under service agreements,
    since they have the right
  • 60:19 - 60:22
    to circulate freely
    and set up where they want,
  • 60:22 - 60:25
    whereas the common mortal does not.
  • 60:26 - 60:31
    December 17, 1992.
    U.S. president, George H. W. Bush,
  • 60:31 - 60:36
    signed the North American
    Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
  • 60:36 - 60:38
    with Canada and Mexico.
  • 60:44 - 60:47
    Fourteen years later,
    on October 26, 2006,
  • 60:47 - 60:52
    his son, George W. Bush
    promulgated the Secure Fence Act.
  • 60:52 - 60:56
    This law authorizes
    the construction of a double wall,
  • 60:56 - 61:01
    4.5 meters high and 1,200 km long,
    along the Mexican border.
  • 61:01 - 61:08
    It is also outfitted with
    the latest surveillance technology:
  • 61:08 - 61:13
    watchtowers, cameras,
    ground sensors, drones, etc.
  • 61:25 - 61:31
    The theory of comparative advantage
    posits international specialization.
  • 61:32 - 61:37
    It says nations must specialize
    according to comparative advantages.
  • 61:38 - 61:40
    It’s a purely static theory.
  • 61:40 - 61:44
    Pawns are shifted around a box
    without questioning the box’s form,
  • 61:44 - 61:48
    or whether the box evolves
    with the pawn configuration.
  • 61:49 - 61:54
    The theory’s purely immediate.
    So, why doesn’t it work?
  • 61:54 - 61:59
    Because international trade
    isn’t just neutral exchange,
  • 61:59 - 62:05
    where the nice Natives trade
    with the charming conquistadors.
  • 62:05 - 62:07
    It doesn’t work like that
    and it never did.
  • 62:08 - 62:12
    The conquistadors kill everyone.
    Then trade comes in
  • 62:12 - 62:16
    as Phase Two of pacification.
    But in international trade,
  • 62:16 - 62:20
    which is the matrix of business …
    That’s another preconceived notion.
  • 62:21 - 62:27
    Trade’s not intra-village, then city,
    region, nation. Then international.
  • 62:27 - 62:30
    It never worked that way.
    Quite the contrary.
  • 62:30 - 62:34
    International business
    follows the military,
  • 62:34 - 62:40
    it follows predation. Then comes
    an inward pacification process.
  • 62:46 - 62:49
    The “invisible hand” theory
    is quite extraordinary.
  • 62:49 - 62:53
    First, it wagers that men are bad.
  • 62:53 - 62:57
    It’s quite lucid. It says,
    we’ll work with that.
  • 62:58 - 63:00
    People are self-centred, greedy,
  • 63:00 - 63:04
    mean and self-interested.
    They dislike collectives.
  • 63:04 - 63:07
    They’re unsupportive,
    anti-social, narcissistic.
  • 63:08 - 63:12
    Let’s say this kind of flaw
    turns into …
  • 63:13 - 63:16
    an advantage
    for the collective and society.
  • 63:17 - 63:22
    Let them go. Public happiness will
    arise from their egoistic antagonism.
  • 63:22 - 63:25
    That’s the invisible hand.
    The idea is that
  • 63:26 - 63:32
    every time one intervenes,
    tries to order this ego antagonism,
  • 63:33 - 63:38
    the system gets disrupted and worse.
    One great reactionary thesis
  • 63:38 - 63:43
    is the argument of perverse effect.
    Hirschmann said it. It’s great.
  • 63:43 - 63:46
    The reactionary rightists
  • 63:47 - 63:50
    have always accused leftists
    of causing evil by doing good.
  • 63:50 - 63:54
    You want to do good, help the poor,
    you’ll create a lot of poverty.
  • 63:55 - 63:59
    The Economist published an amazing
    picture after the Seattle summit.
  • 64:01 - 64:06
    It showed starving Third-World people,
    African children, labelled,
  • 64:07 - 64:09
    Victims of the Seattle failure.
  • 64:10 - 64:14
    That is vile!
    Worse than the Benetton ads.
  • 64:14 - 64:18
    The message was, you played
    around at hindering the WTO.
  • 64:18 - 64:23
    To what end? You created
    poor, unhappy, starving people.
  • 64:23 - 64:27
    Whereas this system creates
    the poor, starving, unhappy.
  • 64:29 - 64:31
    The invisible hand says, let it be.
  • 64:31 - 64:34
    You can’t fix it. Man is unkind, bad.
  • 64:35 - 64:38
    Only wickedness can stop wickedness.
  • 64:39 - 64:43
    Put two bad guys together,
    it balances out. Laissez-faire.
  • 64:43 - 64:46
    Economists have been studying
    the invisible hand since 1776.
  • 64:47 - 64:51
    So they’ve been studying
    this problem for quite a while.
  • 64:53 - 64:57
    For it to work, men have
    to be separate. Autonomous.
  • 64:58 - 65:02
    No relationships, no collectives.
    Only their own rationality,
  • 65:03 - 65:08
    separate from others’, individual.
    Absolute individualism.
  • 65:08 - 65:11
    The second condition
    is perfect information.
  • 65:12 - 65:16
    Omniscience about future events
    for centuries to come …
  • 65:18 - 65:21
    Second condition.
    Now, what’s the third …
  • 65:23 - 65:27
    Perfect information …
    and thirdly,
  • 65:27 - 65:33
    no uncertainty, like a storm,
    chance, Ariane breaking down
  • 65:33 - 65:36
    on the 25th flight and not the 3rd.
  • 65:38 - 65:41
    The world must be hazard-free,
    which is corollary to saying
  • 65:41 - 65:45
    perfect foresight is necessary.
    Under these conditions,
  • 65:47 - 65:52
    the invisible hand might work,
    but it’s not even sure,
  • 65:53 - 65:56
    for it’s important to know
    that liberal economists -
  • 65:56 - 66:01
    the greatest, most mathematical,
    most prestigious, Nobel winners -
  • 66:02 - 66:06
    have shown for about 25 years,
  • 66:07 - 66:13
    that the invisible hand theorem
    doesn’t work. It’s bullshit.
  • 66:14 - 66:17
    They’ve shown it.
    Many suspected as much.
  • 66:17 - 66:21
    Keynes suspected it for a long time
    because he thought
  • 66:21 - 66:24
    the idea of equilibrium
    was inapplicable to economy,
  • 66:24 - 66:29
    It was more disequilibrium -
    economy was fundamentally chaotic.
  • 66:29 - 66:35
    But the pure, hard, mean, liberal,
    most prestigious economists,
  • 66:35 - 66:39
    draped in the prestige
    of the most hard-nose science,
  • 66:39 - 66:43
    starting with Nobel winner,
    Gérard Debreu, 25 years ago,
  • 66:45 - 66:50
    have said it doesn’t work. Markets
    don’t mean equilibrium or efficiency.
  • 66:50 - 66:56
    Markets don’t mean equilibrium, so
    supply-and-demand means nothing.
  • 66:56 - 67:00
    And they’re not efficient, so
    laissez-faire is the worst solution.
  • 67:03 - 67:08
    Thank you, liberal gentlemen. Kind of
    you to say so. We thought as much.
  • 67:08 - 67:13
    So anyone who says “invisible hand”,
    “supply and demand”, “equilibrium” …
  • 67:13 - 67:17
    is either a crook (not uncommon),
  • 67:17 - 67:21
    or hides his eyes (also happens),
    someone who’s wilfully blind,
  • 67:21 - 67:24
    or Sartre’s “bastard” -
    who knows but stays silent,
  • 67:24 - 67:27
    or an incompetent. They exist too.
  • 69:55 - 70:01
    Adam Smith, David Riccardo,
    Karl Marx, John Stuart Mill,
  • 70:01 - 70:02
    Malthus, more or less -
  • 70:03 - 70:07
    all the classic figures
    in the creation of economics
  • 70:07 - 70:10
    incorporated social thought.
    They were social philosophers
  • 70:11 - 70:13
    more than “pure” economists.
  • 70:13 - 70:18
    But the neo-classics - Auguste
    and Léon Walras, father and son,
  • 70:19 - 70:20
    mid- to late-19th century,
  • 70:21 - 70:25
    inaugurated a kind of economics
    that calls itself scientific.
  • 70:26 - 70:30
    In doing so, it dispenses with
    all moral or philosophical thought.
  • 70:31 - 70:35
    So it evacuates all the concerns
    the classics had until Karl Marx,
  • 70:35 - 70:38
    which were the following:
  • 70:38 - 70:43
    Who makes money and why?
    Has he the right to make so much?
  • 70:44 - 70:46
    Is this fair? Unfair?
  • 70:46 - 70:51
    Is it good for the community or bad?
    Economics had an ethical dimension.
  • 70:51 - 70:55
    And this was evacuated
    with neo-classical thought.
  • 70:55 - 70:59
    This neo-classicism opened the way
    for neo-liberal thought.
  • 71:00 - 71:05
    Neo-liberalism then added
    to neo-classicism’s kind of …
  • 71:06 - 71:10
    scientific decree (We are a science,
    so we imitate physics.):
  • 71:11 - 71:14
    We notice money goes
    from here to there.
  • 71:14 - 71:16
    We count, observe, classify.
  • 71:17 - 71:19
    But we refrain from casting judgment,
  • 71:19 - 71:23
    because physics, the mother
    of all sciences, does not judge.”
  • 71:24 - 71:28
    Economics’ strength is that it
    comes as obvious, neutral truth -
  • 71:28 - 71:31
    a neutral discourse
    that speaks neither good nor evil,
  • 71:31 - 71:35
    that is scientific,
    with all the neutrality of science,
  • 71:35 - 71:37
    that comes across as normal.
  • 71:38 - 71:42
    Putting pressure on wages
    to cut inflation is obviously normal.
  • 71:43 - 71:45
    Obviously we can’t have inflation.
  • 71:45 - 71:49
    No matter if this generated
    phenomenal inequality,
  • 71:50 - 71:52
    led certain peoples into destitution,
  • 71:52 - 71:55
    created disparities
    between north and south,
  • 71:55 - 71:58
    created a caste of rich people
    taking up the foreground,
  • 71:59 - 72:02
    eradicating State power,
    breaking social security.
  • 72:02 - 72:05
    Despite all this,
    there is but one obvious truth:
  • 72:06 - 72:08
    You can’t be pro-inflation!?
  • 72:09 - 72:14
    But if we look at truth and history,
    we see that those rare times
  • 72:14 - 72:17
    when capital was muzzled,
    as in the glorious ’30s,
  • 72:17 - 72:21
    were inflationary periods
    when wages could increase,
  • 72:21 - 72:26
    because people who borrowed
    for houses, etc., due to inflation,
  • 72:26 - 72:29
    managed to pay off debt quickly.
  • 72:30 - 72:32
    Now, it’s an economy of the rich.
  • 72:32 - 72:36
    One could ask,
    “You want the rich to run the world?”
  • 72:37 - 72:40
    instead of,
    “Surely, you’re against inflation?”
  • 72:42 - 72:47
    To impose their ideology,
    neo-liberals have, over the years,
  • 72:47 - 72:52
    developed a relentless strategy,
    thought encirclement.
  • 72:52 - 72:59
    This strategy rests in large part
    on the actions of a global network
  • 72:59 - 73:02
    of propaganda, intoxication
    and indoctrination
  • 73:02 - 73:08
    that can make its polymorphous voice
    heard in all forums.
  • 73:08 - 73:11
    Largely conceived in think tanks,
  • 73:11 - 73:17
    neo-liberal propaganda subsequently
    branched out in many ways.
  • 73:17 - 73:23
    Education became
    one of the most important branches.
  • 73:24 - 73:24
    propaganda and indoctrination
  • 73:24 - 73:31
    propaganda and indoctrination
  • 73:31 - 73:37
    education
  • 73:39 - 73:43
    The idea of national education
    arose in the 18th century.
  • 73:43 - 73:47
    In the wake of the French Revolution
    and European nation-states,
  • 73:47 - 73:48
    there arose the idea …
  • 73:49 - 73:54
    that a public democratic space
    implied people who were informed,
  • 73:55 - 73:59
    and who were skilled
    at thinking, discussing,
  • 73:59 - 74:03
    participating in political discourse.
    There were 2 institutions for this
  • 74:04 - 74:09
    to ensure that people could become
    “citizens”, as they said at the time:
  • 74:10 - 74:16
    Education, one important function
    of which was to train citizens,
  • 74:16 - 74:19
    prepare citizens.
    And then, the media.
  • 74:19 - 74:22
    We’ll discuss that later.
    As for education,
  • 74:22 - 74:28
    one of its mandates - not that it was
    implemented or realized very well -
  • 74:28 - 74:31
    but a mandate of education
    was to train citizens,
  • 74:31 - 74:34
    empower people to take part
    in political debate
  • 74:35 - 74:39
    and reflect on political questions
    beyond their own interests.
  • 74:39 - 74:42
    That was the main thing.
    Not to think about politics,
  • 74:43 - 74:47
    or economic and social debates,
    from a self-serving standpoint,
  • 74:47 - 74:51
    but from the standpoint of the
    public good and collective interests.
  • 74:52 - 74:53
    Education cultivated this.
  • 74:54 - 74:58
    But in the so-called “neo-liberal”
    changes of the past 30 years,
  • 74:59 - 75:04
    the dominant institutions realized
    education was an important issue,
  • 75:04 - 75:08
    and important to appropriate.
    Is what I’m saying right?
  • 75:09 - 75:13
    Are they penetrating education?
    Anyone who looks knows it is.
  • 75:13 - 75:16
    From primary school to university,
    it varies according to country.
  • 75:16 - 75:19
    It’s different in the U.S.,
    Canada, Québec, France.
  • 75:19 - 75:23
    It depends on the history
    of how each system developed.
  • 75:23 - 75:29
    But we see massive penetration
    on the part of private industry
  • 75:29 - 75:32
    into the education system. Why?
  • 75:32 - 75:34
    The answers are quite simple.
  • 75:34 - 75:37
    Education’s a very profitable market.
  • 75:37 - 75:42
    It’s interesting to appropriate this
    piece of social and economic activity
  • 75:42 - 75:46
    because it’s profitable. And it lets
    children’s minds be appropriated.
  • 75:46 - 75:49
    It’s as blunt as that.
    Educating is seizing minds.
  • 75:52 - 75:57
    Being able to take hold of children’s
    minds is extremely crucial, serious.
  • 75:57 - 76:03
    It requires a strong justification
    and I’m not sure we can give it one.
  • 76:03 - 76:07
    When companies infiltrate education,
    they’re aiming for children’s minds,
  • 76:07 - 76:10
    and to transform the subjects taught.
  • 76:11 - 76:16
    That’s when training deviates from
    citizenship and sense of common good
  • 76:16 - 76:22
    towards the interests of the
    businesses appropriating education.
  • 76:22 - 76:27
    Seeing the world through culture,
    knowledge, outside of oneself,
  • 76:28 - 76:31
    is different than from the viewpoint
    of what a company gives us.
  • 76:31 - 76:34
    The latter element’s always there.
  • 76:34 - 76:37
    Appropriation of a market,
    of children’s minds,
  • 76:37 - 76:41
    and preparation for labour.
    From this perspective,
  • 76:41 - 76:45
    education will increasingly
    lose its other functions -
  • 76:45 - 76:50
    preparation for civic life,
    openness to the world,
  • 76:50 - 76:54
    the pure pleasure of understanding
    and knowledge for its own sake -
  • 76:55 - 76:57
    to orient towards
    market enslavement,
  • 76:58 - 77:02
    the preparation of subjects
    taught for economic functions.
  • 77:03 - 77:05
    Education will become
  • 77:05 - 77:09
    a prelude to mercantile life,
    and to employment.
  • 77:09 - 77:10
    That’s also very troubling.
  • 77:11 - 77:15
    We’ve seen transformations like this
    for about 20 years.
  • 77:15 - 77:18
    With some resistance.
    As this phenomenon arises,
  • 77:19 - 77:21
    so does resistance to it, luckily.
  • 77:25 - 77:28
    Channel One is an American company,
  • 77:29 - 77:32
    now listed on the stock market.
    It launched a project
  • 77:32 - 77:36
    where they go into
    underfunded schools and say,
  • 77:36 - 77:40
    Since you have no supplies,
    we’ll furnish you with TV’s, VCR’s
  • 77:40 - 77:45
    in exchange for which,
    you’ll screen for 20 minutes a day
  • 77:45 - 77:51
    our educational videos.” -
    current issues shows for children.
  • 77:51 - 77:55
    Their interest in this
    is the captive clientele.
  • 77:55 - 78:00
    Throughout the X minutes of
    proposed programming, there are ads.
  • 78:01 - 78:03
    They add a few minutes of publicity
  • 78:03 - 78:09
    that allows advertisers to address,
    in an extremely privileged context,
  • 78:09 - 78:11
    this captive clientele.
  • 78:11 - 78:15
    This is strong in the U.S.
    Here, it has been tried.
  • 78:15 - 78:18
    The company in Canada
    was called Athena.
  • 78:18 - 78:21
    It made sustained efforts
    for a few years.
  • 78:21 - 78:24
    By and large,
    the school boards refused.
  • 78:25 - 78:28
    Our public-service funding is not
    in the same state as the U.S.’s,
  • 78:28 - 78:32
    but it’s another assault
    being conducted against education.
  • 78:32 - 78:36
    It takes many forms,
    according to country and region.
  • 78:37 - 78:42
    Mobil has shows on energy. Learn
    environmental protection from them.
  • 78:42 - 78:48
    And nutrition from NutraSweet,
    which has a kid’s show on nutrition.
  • 78:49 - 78:53
    You’ll learn the virtues
    of NAFTA with GM,
  • 78:53 - 78:55
    and about protecting
    forests and the environment
  • 78:55 - 78:59
    from the companies
    responsible for deforestation.
  • 79:01 - 79:06
    This model has repercussions
    from primary school to university,
  • 79:06 - 79:10
    which means, ultimately,
    we could have - I’m half joking -
  • 79:10 - 79:15
    university ecology departments
    where pollution will be justified.
  • 79:15 - 79:17
    That’s the troubling thing.
  • 79:17 - 79:21
    The loss of meaning in certain
    intellectual and human activities …
  • 79:21 - 79:23
    that this implies.
  • 79:23 - 79:26
    The more efficient we think
    we are economically …
  • 79:27 - 79:31
    Financially is more precise,
    since finance is multiplying money.
  • 79:31 - 79:36
    The more efficiently we make money,
    the less sense it makes.
  • 79:37 - 79:42
    Does it makes sense to say
    that GM, for example, is efficient
  • 79:43 - 79:49
    because it made $23- or 24-billion
    net profit in the last decade,
  • 79:50 - 79:53
    when it created 300,000 unemployed!
  • 79:54 - 79:56
    Does that make sense?
  • 79:56 - 79:59
    We say GM is efficient,
    but what is this efficiency?
  • 80:00 - 80:02
    We say the American economy
    is more efficient.
  • 80:03 - 80:08
    It is, in financial indicators,
    yield over capital investment, etc.
  • 80:09 - 80:14
    But the U.S. has never had so many
    people living under the poverty line,
  • 80:14 - 80:16
    the American poverty line,
  • 80:16 - 80:20
    or so many people
    without access to health care -
  • 80:20 - 80:25
    40% of the American population has
    practically no access to health care.
  • 80:26 - 80:30
    The U.S. has never had
    such a low level of education.
  • 80:32 - 80:37
    50% of Americans
    can’t locate England on a map.
  • 80:38 - 80:40
    Today, this is aberrant,
  • 80:40 - 80:44
    when there are at least
    50 TV channels per household.
  • 80:44 - 80:47
    There’s a picture of what
    I’m calling lack of meaning.
  • 80:48 - 80:50
    Materially, economically,
    financially, we’re more efficient.
  • 80:51 - 80:55
    But ecologically, socially,
    politically, humanly,
  • 80:55 - 81:00
    we are steadily losing
    our values and quality of life.
  • 81:00 - 81:02
    Senselessness.
  • 81:02 - 81:06
    To discuss this, we must eschew
    the dominant economic discourse.
  • 81:07 - 81:11
    To start to make sense of this,
    the problem must be reformulated …
  • 81:12 - 81:16
    from scratch. To do this,
    we must go back to Aristotle.
  • 81:17 - 81:20
    He said, “Do not confuse
    the economic -
  • 81:21 - 81:26
    oikos nomia, the norms
    of running home and community,
  • 81:26 - 81:29
    with chrematistic, krema atos,
    the accumulation of money.”
  • 81:30 - 81:32
    That brings us to education.
  • 81:33 - 81:37
    In education today,
    to what degree is Aristotle taught?
  • 81:37 - 81:39
    Who knows Aristotle? Who reads him?
  • 81:40 - 81:44
    I could say the same
    of Victor Hugo, Jean-Paul Sartre,
  • 81:45 - 81:47
    Archimedes, etc.
  • 81:48 - 81:50
    So, today,
  • 81:51 - 81:54
    we say we’re in
    a knowledge-based economy,
  • 81:54 - 81:57
    but we’ve never educated
    or taught so little.
  • 81:57 - 82:01
    Yet we’ve never put so much emphasis
  • 82:01 - 82:04
    on so-called training
    and educational institutions.
  • 82:04 - 82:09
    Now for the paradox and nonsensical.
    They’re in the fact that
  • 82:10 - 82:13
    just about everywhere,
    particularly in North America,
  • 82:13 - 82:19
    schools are being turned into
    the system’s servant factories.
  • 82:20 - 82:23
    In other words, thinking bipeds
  • 82:24 - 82:30
    must be concerned only about fuelling
    this free, self-regulating market
  • 82:31 - 82:34
    and the mechanics
    of production and finance.
  • 82:34 - 82:36
    We call this “employability”,
  • 82:36 - 82:39
    training the employable,
  • 82:39 - 82:44
    reforming education,
    from grade school to university -
  • 82:44 - 82:48
    training people to find their place
    in the labour market.
  • 82:48 - 82:50
    That’s horrible.
  • 82:50 - 82:53
    Would a Victor Hugo
    be employable today?
  • 82:54 - 82:56
    Would a Socrates be employable?
  • 82:57 - 83:00
    Would a Paul Verlaine
    or a Rimbaud be employable?
  • 83:01 - 83:03
    No! So, there would be none.
  • 83:03 - 83:07
    But what would humanity be
    without Socrates, Aristotle,
  • 83:07 - 83:10
    Rimbaud, Verlaine, Hugo?
  • 83:10 - 83:14
    What would we be without them?
    We’d be animals.
  • 83:14 - 83:18
    Now, on the pretence that they’re
    unemployable and unwanted,
  • 83:18 - 83:23
    we no longer train poets, literary
    people, pure mathematicians,
  • 83:24 - 83:26
    or theoretical physicists.
  • 83:27 - 83:31
    We only train what industry,
    financial enterprise, wants
  • 83:31 - 83:34
    to fuel the money-making machine.
  • 83:35 - 83:36
    Who is employable?
  • 83:37 - 83:40
    The people I see in universities
    where I teach, around the world.
  • 83:41 - 83:45
    In other words, at the highest level
    - Master’s, Ph.D. -
  • 83:46 - 83:49
    they’re what I call “technocrats”,
  • 83:50 - 83:54
    analytical technocrats,
    trained to analyze problems.
  • 83:54 - 83:58
    We tell them they’re smart
    because they do problem-solving.
  • 83:58 - 84:03
    Problem-solving is not intelligence.
    Problem-formulation is.
  • 84:03 - 84:06
    The person who formulates
    the problem is the smart one.
  • 84:06 - 84:11
    He articulates it, puts it in terms
    of links and combinations
  • 84:12 - 84:13
    that call for a question.
  • 84:14 - 84:18
    He’s the smart one. The one who
    relies on a pre-formulated problem
  • 84:18 - 84:22
    in order to find the right solution
    isn’t intelligent.
  • 84:22 - 84:26
    Despite what they say.
    Analytical technocrats
  • 84:26 - 84:29
    master techniques
    of analysis and calculation,
  • 84:29 - 84:33
    and confuse thinking
    with analyzing and calculating.
  • 84:33 - 84:38
    They make decisions with no qualms,
    like laying off 60,000 in a day,
  • 84:38 - 84:42
    doubling their salary by a million,
    and saying “I’m suffering.”
  • 84:42 - 84:45
    I make hard decisions.
    These are non-humans!
  • 84:46 - 84:49
    Someone who openly makes
    decisions without soul-searching
  • 84:50 - 84:53
    is saying, “I’m not a human being.”
  • 84:53 - 84:58
    By what right do we let him make
    decisions that affect human beings?
  • 84:58 - 85:03
    He says, “No soul-searching,
    no soul. I’m not human.”
  • 85:04 - 85:09
    These are highly trained technocrats.
    At the intermediate level …
  • 85:10 - 85:16
    are the producer technicians.
    These technicians serve machines,
  • 85:16 - 85:19
    from the computer
    to the digital machine
  • 85:20 - 85:23
    that cranks out parts
    in plastic, steel, aluminum.
  • 85:23 - 85:26
    These people are there
  • 85:26 - 85:30
    so the automated mechanics
    of production never break down.
  • 85:31 - 85:33
    The only knowledge required of them
  • 85:34 - 85:38
    is the logic of the machinery
    they’re overseeing. That’s all.
  • 85:40 - 85:45
    What’s more, they’re merely required
    to understand the machine’s demands.
  • 85:47 - 85:52
    They don’t even dominate the machine,
    or possess a kind of …
  • 85:52 - 85:58
    human superiority, additional soul,
    knowledge or sense of the machine.
  • 85:58 - 86:02
    Instead, the machine says,
    if you’re smart enough,
  • 86:02 - 86:08
    find the bad chip, change the card.
    And if he can’t, he’s no good.
  • 86:08 - 86:12
    And on the lower levels,
    what do we train? We don’t.
  • 86:12 - 86:17
    45% of the labour of multi-nationals,
    American in particular,
  • 86:17 - 86:19
    are completely illiterate.
  • 86:19 - 86:22
    The multi-nationals
    don’t want to change that.
  • 86:23 - 86:27
    They don’t want these illiterates
    to be the least bit trained,
  • 86:28 - 86:31
    because otherwise
    they’ll start asking questions.
  • 86:31 - 86:36
    lf they read papers and reports,
    they’ll start asking questions,
  • 86:36 - 86:39
    unionizing, thinking.
  • 86:39 - 86:41
    So, no way.
  • 86:41 - 86:46
    Today, particularly in North America
    and even more in the States,
  • 86:47 - 86:49
    there are primary
    and high school graduates …
  • 86:52 - 86:55
    in fairly staggering proportions -
  • 86:55 - 86:58
    up to 25% here in Québec,
  • 86:58 - 87:03
    and if we looked at U.S. figures,
    they’d be the same, if not more -
  • 87:04 - 87:09
    who graduated, yet are illiterate,
    who basically can’t read or write.
  • 87:09 - 87:12
    They graduated by seniority.
  • 87:13 - 87:17
    By attendance and age.
    This suits the system fine.
  • 87:17 - 87:21
    Because when your low-level workers
  • 87:22 - 87:24
    are lobotomized bipeds,
  • 87:24 - 87:29
    who haven’t even been taught to think
    because this would require reading …
  • 87:29 - 87:33
    lf I want to learn to think,
    I must read Victor Hugo, poems …
  • 87:33 - 87:35
    I must read philosophers.
  • 87:36 - 87:39
    Writers teach me to think.
  • 87:39 - 87:44
    I can’t think without putting words
    and their permutations into my head.
  • 87:44 - 87:46
    lf I don’t have this, I cannot think.
  • 87:47 - 87:51
    But I can become an excellent
    reproducer of the system,
  • 87:51 - 87:55
    who doesn’t think
    and who defends the system.
  • 87:55 - 87:58
    There are now workers who say -
    and this has happened to me
  • 87:59 - 88:04
    in serious situations where
    there are closures, layoffs, etc.
  • 88:04 - 88:07
    and I ask the workers,
    “What do you think?”
  • 88:07 - 88:11
    They often tell me,
    “It’s the law of the market.
  • 88:11 - 88:15
    Competition. We must be more
    competitive than the Japanese…”
  • 88:15 - 88:19
    They defend the very system
    that’s crushing them.
  • 88:21 - 88:25
    We began by examining the networks
    by which ideas circulate.
  • 88:25 - 88:28
    Education’s the same. We find …
  • 88:29 - 88:33
    ideological justifications, theorists,
    people who conceived education,
  • 88:34 - 88:37
    advocating its transformation
    in a way I’ll describe.
  • 88:37 - 88:41
    There are also
    powerful transnational institutions
  • 88:41 - 88:47
    that entertain the same discourse
    and compel agents, governments
  • 88:47 - 88:50
    and teachers to adopt practices
    that conform to these ideals.
  • 88:50 - 88:54
    Finally, lobby groups, think tanks,
    try to accomplish the same thing.
  • 88:55 - 88:58
    Education is striking.
    It has all three.
  • 88:59 - 89:03
    The most influential education
    theorist of the last 50 years
  • 89:03 - 89:06
    was an economist, not a pedagogue.
  • 89:07 - 89:12
    The top educational theorist
    was probably Gary Becker.
  • 89:12 - 89:14
    He teaches at
    the University of Chicago.
  • 89:15 - 89:18
    He developed
    the theory of human capital.
  • 89:18 - 89:19
    The idea is …
  • 89:20 - 89:23
    humans and knowledge
    are capital that requires investment
  • 89:23 - 89:27
    and evaluation from
    the standpoint of profitability.
  • 89:27 - 89:29
    This theory of human capital
  • 89:30 - 89:35
    allows mathematical economic tools
    to be applied to education,
  • 89:35 - 89:40
    henceforth viewed as a certain order
    of capital that can be quantified.
  • 89:40 - 89:44
    This has been the most influential
    theory of the last 50 years,
  • 89:44 - 89:49
    especially where it counts, in places
    where decision-makers are influenced.
  • 89:49 - 89:52
    Places where States,
    education ministers
  • 89:53 - 89:56
    and education policy-makers
    are influenced.
  • 89:56 - 90:01
    The second theorist who established
    the mechanisms that are in play now
  • 90:01 - 90:05
    is Milton Friedman, the father
    of monetary economics,
  • 90:05 - 90:09
    who proposed a system
    of education vouchers,
  • 90:09 - 90:13
    the idea again being
    to inject market mechanisms
  • 90:13 - 90:16
    into education,
    and to make schools compete.
  • 90:16 - 90:22
    These 2 education theories, never
    discussed in education faculties,
  • 90:23 - 90:26
    are the most influential
    recent educational thinking.
  • 90:26 - 90:32
    These theories circulate to the IMF,
    the OECD, the World Bank.
  • 90:32 - 90:36
    National education systems are
    analyzed from their point of view.
  • 90:36 - 90:39
    Recommendations
    are made accordingly.
  • 90:40 - 90:46
    Think tanks and major media groups
    often enjoy privileged connections.
  • 90:46 - 90:52
    Propaganda naturally circulates
    from one group to the other.
  • 90:52 - 90:58
    Also, it is largely due
    to this media transmission
  • 90:58 - 91:03
    that neo-liberal ideology
    attains the status of accepted fact.
  • 91:04 - 91:04
    propaganda and indoctrination
  • 91:04 - 91:12
    propaganda and indoctrination
  • 91:12 - 91:17
    the media
  • 91:20 - 91:25
    It has traditionally been said
    that Hitler invented propaganda.
  • 91:25 - 91:30
    Journals, etc., describe how Hitler
    understood its role in World War II.
  • 91:30 - 91:34
    It’s true, he understood
    it’s societal importance.
  • 91:35 - 91:37
    But he didn’t invent it.
    He learned from us,
  • 91:38 - 91:41
    the Western democracies,
    in particular the English,
  • 91:42 - 91:43
    and the Americans.
  • 91:44 - 91:47
    Overall, since the advent
    of modern societies,
  • 91:47 - 91:49
    two trends prevail.
  • 91:49 - 91:54
    The first calls for participative
    democracy with aware people,
  • 91:54 - 91:58
    who can talk, act
    and influence decisions.
  • 91:58 - 92:03
    The other vision of the world says
    some people must be pushed aside.
  • 92:03 - 92:07
    They must not get involved
    in the issues that concern them.
  • 92:07 - 92:11
    This vision of society,
    the world and the economy
  • 92:11 - 92:15
    also exists in our culture.
    It strongly manifested itself
  • 92:15 - 92:20
    during World War I in the U.S.,
    when the government was elected
  • 92:20 - 92:23
    on a promise
    of abstaining from war.
  • 92:24 - 92:28
    Shortly thereafter, for reasons
    pertaining to internal affairs
  • 92:28 - 92:30
    and the role of the industrialists,
  • 92:30 - 92:34
    the government decided
    to enter into the conflict.
  • 92:34 - 92:40
    The serious problem it then faced was
    confronting an opposed population.
  • 92:40 - 92:45
    They formed a commission named after
    the journalist who presided over it,
  • 92:45 - 92:47
    Mr Creel.
    It was the Creel Commission.
  • 92:48 - 92:53
    This commission largely invented
    modern propaganda techniques,
  • 92:53 - 92:57
    techniques for shaping
    and preparing public opinion.
  • 92:58 - 93:02
    The Creel Commission magnificently
    fulfilled its mandate,
  • 93:02 - 93:05
    reversing public opinion
    in a few months.
  • 93:05 - 93:09
    The commission engaged very famous
    people, renowned intellectuals
  • 93:10 - 93:14
    and Edward Burnays, founder of
    the modern public-relations industry.
  • 93:15 - 93:17
    These people later
    left the commission
  • 93:17 - 93:22
    and established communication tools
    within our societies
  • 93:22 - 93:26
    that are still present and are among
    the propaganda mechanisms.
  • 93:26 - 93:29
    One very important political aim
  • 93:29 - 93:32
    is to exclude part of the population,
    to shape public opinion
  • 93:33 - 93:36
    and build consensus within society.
  • 93:36 - 93:40
    The institutions they invented -
    public relations firms -
  • 93:40 - 93:45
    plus the modern concept of the role
    of companies and of P.R. within them,
  • 93:45 - 93:49
    social communication, media,
    the role of the intellectual,
  • 93:49 - 93:54
    the role of publicity and information
    in our society …
  • 93:54 - 93:58
    This was all set up, and was
    the lesson Hitler rightly remembered.
  • 93:58 - 94:02
    Whence the mechanisms that
    led to today’s one-track thinking?
  • 94:02 - 94:07
    They’re the descendents of what
    I’m describing - the Creel Commission
  • 94:08 - 94:12
    and, further back in time,
    of the conception of politics
  • 94:12 - 94:17
    that says society must exclude
    part of its population to function.
  • 94:17 - 94:19
    We find this too.
  • 94:19 - 94:24
    But if the agents I’m describing
    are very powerful, strong, numerous,
  • 94:24 - 94:29
    a counter-discourse arises, as do
    sites where other analyses blossom,
  • 94:29 - 94:34
    alternative media, intellectuals,
    social and community groups,
  • 94:34 - 94:38
    where new thought percolates.
    There’s a dual phenomenon.
  • 94:38 - 94:41
    Unfortunately,
    pensée unique predominates.
  • 94:41 - 94:44
    Propaganda is working.
  • 94:44 - 94:48
    Through such mechanisms
    and institutions,
  • 94:48 - 94:52
    a world vision, a vocabulary, a way
    of thinking and conceiving the world
  • 94:52 - 94:54
    ensure that certain questions
    may be asked,
  • 94:55 - 94:56
    certain answers given,
  • 94:57 - 95:00
    certain analyses made,
    while others are excluded.
  • 95:03 - 95:07
    Currently, dominant ideology,
    which I call ambient ideology,
  • 95:07 - 95:11
    has its official face,
    the pensée unique we spoke of,
  • 95:11 - 95:14
    and its unofficial face, which is …
  • 95:14 - 95:20
    this ensemble of behaviours
    prescribed by the media overall.
  • 95:20 - 95:24
    This ideology never appears
    as an ideology.
  • 95:24 - 95:29
    It’s presented as entirely natural,
    something we should obviously do.
  • 95:30 - 95:35
    Owning a TV must be obvious.
    “How can one not own a TV
  • 95:35 - 95:38
    in the late 20th century?”
  • 95:38 - 95:43
    Accepting the advertising system
    is obvious.
  • 95:43 - 95:46
    Surely, you won’t,
  • 95:46 - 95:51
    in early 2K, call the advertising
    system into question!”
  • 95:52 - 95:55
    All that is ideological,
    all that is choice,
  • 95:56 - 96:00
    which the system has organized
    without consulting us,
  • 96:00 - 96:06
    is presented to us as self-evident,
    given and above discussion.
  • 96:07 - 96:10
    Interesting. Indeed,
    concerning pensée unique,
  • 96:12 - 96:17
    which is a uniform,
    partial and sectarian way
  • 96:17 - 96:20
    of interpreting and
    conducting economy,
  • 96:21 - 96:24
    Alain Minc said, “Thought
    is not unique, reality is.”
  • 96:24 - 96:27
    From that point on,
    forget calling into question
  • 96:28 - 96:31
    what the liberal or ultra-liberal
    economy was doing.
  • 96:32 - 96:35
    It was given as reality.
    Reality had to be followed.
  • 96:36 - 96:39
    For example,
    “Internationalization is a reality.”
  • 96:39 - 96:43
    Of course it is,
    but not necessarily a good one.
  • 96:44 - 96:49
    The ideology says it’s a reality,
    it’s valid, we must go with it.
  • 96:50 - 96:51
    Globalization, same thing.
  • 96:53 - 96:56
    Privatization, same thing.
  • 96:56 - 97:01
    It’s being done, so it must be done.
    It had to be done, etc.
  • 97:01 - 97:04
    They present as faits accomplis,
  • 97:06 - 97:10
    things people must be made to accept,
    instead of asking whether they agree.
  • 97:11 - 97:15
    Naturally, this pertains to
    what I was saying in my book
  • 97:16 - 97:18
    on the sophism of the ineluctable:
  • 97:18 - 97:24
    most politicians cover up
    their actions, their choices,
  • 97:24 - 97:29
    because these choices and decisions
    are being billed as inevitable.
  • 97:30 - 97:32
    We couldn’t do otherwise.
  • 97:32 - 97:35
    It was decreed.
    The Americans are doing this.
  • 97:36 - 97:42
    Everyone knows what happens in France
    happened 10 years earlier in the U.S.
  • 97:42 - 97:44
    It had to be done in France.
  • 97:45 - 97:48
    Renault closed a factory in Belgium
  • 97:50 - 97:53
    in order to restructure …
  • 97:55 - 98:00
    and create factories elsewhere to do
    the same work, with cheaper labour.
  • 98:00 - 98:04
    That was the result
    of an economic calculation.
  • 98:05 - 98:11
    About this closure, the head of the
    French state declared the following:
  • 98:12 - 98:15
    Alas, factory closures are life.
  • 98:15 - 98:21
    Trees are born, live and die, as do
    plants, animals, men and companies.”
  • 98:21 - 98:24
    That is a good example
    of naturalizing
  • 98:25 - 98:28
    what’s happening,
    which is depoliticization.
  • 98:28 - 98:31
    People are obliged
    to accept as natural,
  • 98:32 - 98:35
    as independent
    of the will of politicians,
  • 98:35 - 98:42
    certain decisions
    that are in fact contingent.
  • 98:42 - 98:45
    That’s how they manipulate citizens
  • 98:45 - 98:50
    and dissuade them from believing
    in their own vote, ultimately.
  • 98:52 - 98:54
    Today, the functioning
    of the media
  • 98:55 - 98:57
    fosters the creation of truth.
  • 99:00 - 99:03
    The truth can only appear
    as the confrontation,
  • 99:04 - 99:08
    the verification of a given version
  • 99:08 - 99:13
    confirmed by a number of witnesses.
    We know truth is hard to establish.
  • 99:13 - 99:16
    We see it with investigating judges,
  • 99:17 - 99:21
    with analytical scientists
    trying to discover truth.
  • 99:21 - 99:24
    But today,
    the way the media functions,
  • 99:24 - 99:27
    it’s enough that,
    in coverage of an event,
  • 99:29 - 99:33
    all the media - press, radio, TV -
    say the same thing
  • 99:34 - 99:38
    for this to be established as truth,
    even if it’s false.
  • 99:38 - 99:44
    We saw it during the Gulf War,
    and recent mega-events.
  • 99:47 - 99:51
    Consequently, in establishing
    this kind of false equation,
  • 99:51 - 99:55
    repetition equals proof.
    I was recently rereading …
  • 99:55 - 99:59
    Brave New World by Aldous Huxley,
  • 100:00 - 100:03
    and I found a phrase
    about hypnopaedia,
  • 100:04 - 100:08
    the aural hypnosis they subject
    infants to when they’re born
  • 100:09 - 100:12
    to persuade them to be happy
    to be what they are,
  • 100:13 - 100:17
    and one of the directors of the
    Conditioning Centre, as it’s called,
  • 100:20 - 100:24
    says, “64,000 repetitions
    make one truth.”
  • 100:25 - 100:28
    We’re now in Huxley’s world.
  • 100:38 - 100:42
    Sustained by incessant
    propaganda and proselytizing
  • 100:42 - 100:46
    that pass repeatedly through
    the multiple relays
  • 100:46 - 100:50
    of a sprawling network
    of mind control,
  • 100:50 - 100:54
    neo-liberal reforms
    gradually impose themselves
  • 100:54 - 100:59
    in the anaesthetized consciences
    of Western democracies.
  • 100:59 - 101:04
    In these countries, in the name
    of a necessary “realism”,
  • 101:04 - 101:08
    all parties, both right and left,
    adopt measures
  • 101:08 - 101:14
    that sap the social State more
    every day, to market’s benefit.
  • 101:14 - 101:19
    But elsewhere, where propaganda
    doesn’t enjoy the same success,
  • 101:19 - 101:25
    especially in developing countries,
    other solutions are imperative.
  • 101:25 - 101:28
    Drastic solutions.
  • 101:28 - 101:32
    For behind the ideological
    smokescreen,
  • 101:32 - 101:36
    behind the beautiful concepts
    of spontaneous order
  • 101:36 - 101:40
    and harmonized interests
    in a free market,
  • 101:40 - 101:44
    beyond the panacea
    of the invisible hand,
  • 101:44 - 101:46
    what’s really hidden?
  • 101:46 - 101:52
    What were the true motivations
    of the bankers and industrialists
  • 101:52 - 101:56
    who financed the establishment
    of the neo-liberal network?
  • 101:57 - 102:05
    neo-liberalism or neo-colonialism?
  • 102:05 - 102:13
    strong-arm tactics
    of the financial markets
  • 104:23 - 104:25
    Before,
  • 104:26 - 104:31
    nearly all of banks’ operations
    until the ’70s were monitored.
  • 104:32 - 104:37
    All these operations passed
    via the French central bank
  • 104:37 - 104:39
    which kept track.
  • 104:39 - 104:43
    Now the problem is,
    banks transact over the counter.
  • 104:43 - 104:48
    They’ve taken out just over
    half of their business figures -
  • 104:49 - 104:52
    OTC transactions
    outside market control.
  • 104:52 - 104:55
    It’s as though there were
    the normal market,
  • 104:55 - 104:59
    and a black market.
    A grocery with posted prices
  • 104:59 - 105:03
    and a proper cash register.
    Then, a mysterious black market.
  • 105:04 - 105:07
    In its reports,
    the Bank of France says,
  • 105:07 - 105:09
    when it checks bank reports,
  • 105:10 - 105:13
    about half of bank transactions
    are unreported,
  • 105:13 - 105:17
    beyond the control
    of a superior authority,
  • 105:17 - 105:19
    like a public treasury
    or a central bank.
  • 105:21 - 105:27
    These unreported activities mean that
    governments count for nothing.
  • 105:29 - 105:30
    There must be …
  • 105:33 - 105:35
    $500 billion minimum
  • 105:35 - 105:39
    circulating every day
    in off-shore funds, etc.
  • 105:39 - 105:42
    If a government hassles a bank,
  • 105:42 - 105:47
    it doesn’t care. It just stocks up
    with one of its foreign counterparts,
  • 105:47 - 105:50
    another multi-national bank,
  • 105:50 - 105:55
    an off-shore fund or elsewhere.
    No problem. Money’s mobile now.
  • 105:55 - 105:58
    Beyond the control
    of any public authority.
  • 105:58 - 106:00
    OTC transactions
  • 106:05 - 106:08
    are a very serious problem.
  • 106:08 - 106:11
    To control the economy,
    you must control money.
  • 106:13 - 106:19
    Over-the-counter operations
    are generally effectuated
  • 106:19 - 106:24
    with relatively new financial
    instruments, derivative products:
  • 106:30 - 106:34
    It’s basically insurance contracts.
    In other words,
  • 106:35 - 106:38
    you get insured
    against future fluctuations
  • 106:39 - 106:42
    in interest rates and currency.
  • 106:42 - 106:44
    You sign a contract
  • 106:47 - 106:52
    with someone to pay in 6 months.
    The contract is in dollars.
  • 106:54 - 106:57
    If the dollar rises,
    you’re in trouble. In 6 months,
  • 106:58 - 107:03
    you’ll have to buy dollars at a 10%
    premium. So you take out insurance
  • 107:03 - 107:06
    on the value of the dollar.
  • 107:06 - 107:12
    A guy takes on the risk. You pay him
    3% or 4% extra at the onset.
  • 107:12 - 107:17
    Whatever the dollar’s rise or fall -
    the guy wins if it falls -
  • 107:17 - 107:21
    you don’t move. You have insurance.
    That’s derivative products.
  • 107:21 - 107:25
    The interesting thing is
    it creates a risk economy.
  • 107:26 - 107:29
    Currency’s no longer controlled,
    capital flux isn’t monitored, etc.
  • 107:30 - 107:32
    So, it’s an economy
    where risk is maintained
  • 107:33 - 107:36
    in order to create
    on top of this system,
  • 107:36 - 107:40
    an insurance system
    where risk is covered.
  • 107:40 - 107:45
    But the difference between this
    and risks like car accidents
  • 107:45 - 107:50
    is that accidents are predictable.
    It’s the law of probability.
  • 107:51 - 107:54
    Whereas the risks
    in the financial markets …
  • 107:56 - 108:01
    are rare epiphenomena that
    can’t be statistically quantified.
  • 108:01 - 108:04
    Absolute risks,
    absolutely unforeseeable.
  • 108:04 - 108:09
    So these insurance contracts
    that crown the normal economy
  • 108:09 - 108:12
    create a 2nd layer
    that’s even riskier.
  • 108:12 - 108:17
    So, sometimes people take out
    insurance on their insurance.
  • 108:17 - 108:20
    It’s Escheresque.
    You create a risk pyramid.
  • 108:20 - 108:23
    And people speculate on that.
  • 108:23 - 108:28
    You create a purely speculative
    economy by sustaining risk.
  • 108:28 - 108:33
    A trait of contemporary capitalism
    is this economy where financial risk
  • 108:34 - 108:38
    is systematically maintained,
    and systematically marketed.
  • 108:43 - 108:49
    In the 1980s, under the sway
    of Thatcher and Reagan,
  • 108:49 - 108:55
    a number of countries adopted reforms
    to deregulate financial markets.
  • 108:55 - 109:02
    By allowing capital to flow freely,
    governments considerably increased
  • 109:02 - 109:06
    the power
    of major institutional speculators:
  • 109:06 - 109:15
    hedge funds, commercial banks,
    pension funds, insurance companies …
  • 109:15 - 109:18
    Now in a position of strength,
  • 109:18 - 109:24
    these entities would act as a new
    purveyor of neo-liberal ideology,
  • 109:24 - 109:29
    going so far as to compel
    the most recalcitrant States
  • 109:29 - 109:33
    to accelerate the liberalization
    of their economy.
  • 109:33 - 109:40
    Among the methods used to do this,
    speculative attacks proved to be
  • 109:40 - 109:43
    particularly effective …
    and devastating.
  • 109:43 - 109:49
    Certainly, the emperor’s new clothes
    are woven of complex mechanisms
  • 109:49 - 109:53
    that readily deflect
    the most curious minds.
  • 109:53 - 109:59
    But if colonialism has changed
    its look, its goal remains the same:
  • 109:59 - 110:01
    the concentration of capital.
  • 110:06 - 110:07
    Speculation …
  • 110:08 - 110:10
    has several instruments.
  • 110:13 - 110:15
    Without going into technical details,
  • 110:16 - 110:22
    I’d like to show what happened
    in the Asian Financial Crisis of ’97,
  • 110:24 - 110:28
    which led to a currency collapse
    in several countries,
  • 110:29 - 110:34
    countries that had been categorized
    as “Asian tigers”,
  • 110:36 - 110:38
    with a successful economy, etc.
  • 110:40 - 110:43
    There were various factors
    in this crisis,
  • 110:43 - 110:47
    but I think one of
    the fundamental elements
  • 110:48 - 110:51
    was the prior deregulation
    of the exchange market.
  • 110:52 - 110:57
    In certain cases,
    this deregulation was imposed,
  • 110:57 - 111:03
    if not indeed recommended by
    the International Monetary Fund.
  • 111:04 - 111:06
    Now, speculators
  • 111:08 - 111:12
    got their hands on the reserves
    of the central banks
  • 111:12 - 111:15
    through the following mechanism:
  • 111:16 - 111:21
    they speculated against
    national currencies
  • 111:22 - 111:25
    by selling short.
  • 111:26 - 111:31
    Short selling is speculating on
    a transferable security’s decrease
  • 111:31 - 111:37
    rather than on its increase,
    as is traditionally the case.
  • 111:37 - 111:43
    If a security is the object
    of massive short selling,
  • 111:43 - 111:49
    it leads to a collapse in demand
    and thus of the security’s price.
  • 111:49 - 111:52
    This constitutes speculative attack
  • 111:52 - 111:59
    for, in wagering massively
    on a decrease in value,
  • 111:59 - 112:04
    the speculators themselves
    bring about the decrease.
  • 112:05 - 112:09
    Say I want to short sell
    the Korean won.
  • 112:10 - 112:14
    I start selling huge quantities
    of Korean won,
  • 112:14 - 112:20
    deliverable at some future date.
    The contracts are 3 or 6 months.
  • 112:21 - 112:25
    When the contract comes to term,
    I must deliver huge quantities
  • 112:25 - 112:28
    of Korean won or Thai baht.
  • 112:29 - 112:33
    But I don’t have them.
    I can sell as much as I want,
  • 112:33 - 112:38
    I can sell billions of dollars’ worth
    of Korean won.
  • 112:40 - 112:42
    Who buys up the Korean won?
  • 112:42 - 112:45
    The central bank of Korea,
  • 112:46 - 112:52
    which is obliged through accords
    with the International Monetary Fund
  • 112:52 - 112:54
    to stabilize its currency.
  • 112:56 - 112:58
    Technically, what happened was,
  • 113:00 - 113:03
    when the Korean currency fell,
  • 113:04 - 113:06
    a few months later,
  • 113:06 - 113:09
    the short-selling contracts
    came to term
  • 113:10 - 113:12
    and that’s when …
  • 113:13 - 113:18
    there was an appropriation
    of the central bank reserves,
  • 113:18 - 113:20
    because the won was worthless
  • 113:21 - 113:26
    and speculators had only to buy
    Korean won on the spot market,
  • 113:26 - 113:32
    and then fulfill the terms
    of their contracts.
  • 113:32 - 113:36
    So the central bank’s buying back
    its own money - not too profitable.
  • 113:37 - 113:39
    And in exchange,
    its reserves are confiscated
  • 113:39 - 113:45
    and go into the pockets
    of the major Western banks.
  • 113:45 - 113:48
    That’s the mechanism.
  • 113:48 - 113:51
    Now the reserves have been sacked,
  • 113:53 - 113:58
    and this means Korea must now
    go to the IMF and say,
  • 113:59 - 114:03
    Our reserves have been sacked.
    We can’t function without them.
  • 114:03 - 114:08
    We must reimburse…” (The money
    hasn’t even gone to creditors yet.)
  • 114:08 - 114:11
    We must reimburse our creditors
    (the speculators).
  • 114:11 - 114:12
    What’s going on?
  • 114:13 - 114:19
    When the IMF grants a loan
    in the order of $56 billion,
  • 114:19 - 114:23
    there’s participation
    by a number of countries.
  • 114:23 - 114:25
    There were 24 countries,
  • 114:28 - 114:33
    because astronomical sums are needed.
    The American and Canadian treasuries,
  • 114:33 - 114:36
    the main Western governments.
  • 114:37 - 114:40
    For the American
    or Canadian treasury
  • 114:40 - 114:45
    or another Western country
    to help give
  • 114:45 - 114:47
    a $56-billion loan,
  • 114:48 - 114:50
    they have to raise
    their own debt level,
  • 114:50 - 114:53
    which means they must start selling
  • 114:54 - 114:58
    and negotiating their debt
    on the stock markets.
  • 114:58 - 115:03
    So, it’s the debt market.
    And who controls the debt market
  • 115:04 - 115:08
    for sovereign Western debt?
    The same speculating banks.
  • 115:09 - 115:11
    There’s a vicious circle here.
  • 115:12 - 115:15
    Attack Korea, come to its rescue,
  • 115:15 - 115:19
    confiscate its reserves,
    lend it money …
  • 115:20 - 115:24
    from the public funds
    of various Western governments,
  • 115:26 - 115:29
    and increasing the debt
    of these Western countries
  • 115:30 - 115:35
    requires backing from
    these private-sector banks,
  • 115:37 - 115:41
    the underwriters of national debts.
  • 115:42 - 115:44
    In the end, everyone goes into debt
  • 115:45 - 115:48
    except the speculators,
  • 115:48 - 115:53
    who are creditors of both Korea
    and the Western governments
  • 115:53 - 115:56
    who came to Korea’s rescue
  • 115:56 - 115:59
    through the intermediary
    of the IMF program.
  • 116:00 - 116:01
    So, what happens?
  • 116:04 - 116:05
    The Korean economy
  • 116:06 - 116:08
    is doomed to bankruptcy.
  • 116:08 - 116:14
    Its bank shares and high-tech
    industry are sold at a discount.
  • 116:16 - 116:19
    What’s in the process of happening
  • 116:19 - 116:24
    is the transfer of
    all this country’s industrial wealth
  • 116:24 - 116:28
    to American foreign investors,
  • 116:29 - 116:31
    to the point where …
  • 116:32 - 116:37
    its shares are practically taken over
    for an absolute pittance.
  • 116:38 - 116:40
    I’ll give you an example
  • 116:41 - 116:45
    of one of the primary Korean banks
  • 116:45 - 116:49
    that was restructured
    on the recommendation of the IMF,
  • 116:49 - 116:52
    following this operation,
    because it had conditions.
  • 116:53 - 116:58
    This bank, Korea First Bank,
    was sold for $450 million.
  • 116:59 - 117:04
    It was sold to Californian and
    Texan investors for $450 million.
  • 117:04 - 117:08
    But a condition of sale was
  • 117:09 - 117:15
    that the Korean government
    finance the bad debts of this bank
  • 117:15 - 117:17
    with grants,
  • 117:17 - 117:22
    subsidies that were
    35 times the purchase price.
  • 117:23 - 117:25
    Something in the order
    of over $15 billion.
  • 117:26 - 117:28
    These American investors
    arrive in Korea,
  • 117:28 - 117:33
    and overnight they gain control over
    the whole local financial apparatus,
  • 117:34 - 117:35
    the commercial banks,
  • 117:35 - 117:39
    and they hold the debt
    of major Korean companies
  • 117:39 - 117:42
    like Hyundai, Daewoo, etc.
  • 117:42 - 117:47
    And they’re in a position to dictate
    the break-up of these companies!
  • 117:47 - 117:51
    Part of Daewoo
    has now been sold to GM.
  • 117:51 - 117:55
    Other Korean companies will be sold.
  • 117:56 - 117:59
    So, through a mechanism
    that was initially based on
  • 118:00 - 118:02
    manipulating financial markets,
  • 118:04 - 118:08
    they take possession
    of an entire economy.
  • 118:08 - 118:13
    Korean companies see
    credit dried up by bank crisis.
  • 118:13 - 118:15
    A million people
    affected by unemployment
  • 118:16 - 118:17
    The IMF’s ‘beggars’”
  • 118:17 - 118:20
    The most serious social crisis
    South Korea has faced
  • 118:20 - 118:22
    since the war began.
  • 118:22 - 118:25
    Early March, the number
    of unemployed surpasses a million”
  • 118:26 - 118:32
    The economic liberalization campaign
    led by the financial markets
  • 118:32 - 118:35
    wouldn’t have enjoyed
    the same success
  • 118:35 - 118:40
    without the precious collaboration
    of the Bretton Woods institutions,
  • 118:40 - 118:46
    which constitute another major
    vehicle of neo-liberal ideology:
  • 118:46 - 118:49
    the International Monetary Fund
    (IMF),
  • 118:49 - 118:53
    the World Bank
  • 118:53 - 118:58
    and the World Trade Organization
    (WTO, formerly GATT).
  • 118:58 - 119:03
    The IMF and World Bank
    were established in 1944
  • 119:03 - 119:08
    to ensure the stability of exchange
    rates and support the reconstruction
  • 119:08 - 119:11
    of countries devastated
    by World War II.
  • 119:11 - 119:17
    Over time, however, the U.S. and
    Europe have considerably altered
  • 119:17 - 119:22
    the mandate of the twin institutions,
    based in Washington.
  • 119:22 - 119:27
    Indeed, shortly after the U.S.’s
    unilateral decision in 1971
  • 119:27 - 119:32
    to put an end to
    the International Monetary System,
  • 119:32 - 119:39
    the IMF and World Bank were invested
    with an entirely new mandate:
  • 119:39 - 119:43
    to impose economic liberalization
    upon developing countries,
  • 119:43 - 119:48
    by fixing as a “conditionality”
    to granting any loan
  • 119:48 - 119:52
    the adoption of a series
    of neo-liberal measures.
  • 119:52 - 119:59
    Some have described this set of
    economic reforms as “shock therapy”,
  • 119:59 - 120:05
    while others ironically call it
    “the Washington Consensus”.
  • 120:06 - 120:06
    neo-liberalism or neo-colonialism?
  • 120:06 - 120:13
    neo-liberalism or neo-colonialism?
  • 120:13 - 120:23
    strong-arm tactics
    of the Bretton Woods institutions
  • 120:23 - 120:25
    or
  • 120:25 - 120:30
    the Washington Consensus
  • 120:33 - 120:37
    Washington, where the World Bank
    and IMF are headquartered,
  • 120:37 - 120:40
    started dictating
    to the rest of the world,
  • 120:40 - 120:44
    especially the poorest,
    almost-bankrupt countries,
  • 120:44 - 120:46
    how to apply sound economic science.
  • 120:47 - 120:50
    It was called
    “structural adjustment measures”.
  • 120:50 - 120:53
    or “the structural adjustment plan”,
    dictated by the IMF,
  • 120:53 - 120:59
    and bolstered with World Bank loans
    to the countries concerned.
  • 120:59 - 121:01
    Equatorial Guinea, 2006
  • 121:02 - 121:05
    Many dozens of countries
    were thrown into chaos
  • 121:07 - 121:11
    precisely because of the measures
    of the IMF and the World Bank,
  • 121:11 - 121:15
    of which there are many.
    It would take too long to outline
  • 121:15 - 121:20
    fundamental adjustment measures
    vs. short-term cyclical adjustments
  • 121:20 - 121:21
    but overall,
  • 121:22 - 121:27
    let’s say the 3 or 4 most important
    measures can be summed up.
  • 121:27 - 121:31
    first measure:
    reduce State expenditures
  • 121:32 - 121:36
    The first measure imposed
    on countries approaching default,
  • 121:37 - 121:38
    i.e., poverty-stricken,
  • 121:42 - 121:45
    was governmental non-deficit
    or deficit reduction:
  • 121:45 - 121:48
    the reduction of State expenditures.
  • 121:49 - 121:51
    Shrink the government,
    shrink its expenditures.
  • 121:52 - 121:56
    second measure:
    privatization
  • 121:57 - 122:00
    In privatization, who will buy?
  • 122:01 - 122:03
    There are no local operators.
  • 122:03 - 122:06
    If there were enough
    local money to buy
  • 122:06 - 122:12
    entire oil, phosphate
    or steel companies,
  • 122:13 - 122:15
    the country wouldn’t be so poor.
  • 122:17 - 122:22
    The extraversion of these Third-World
    impoverished economies gets so bad,
  • 122:23 - 122:28
    they sell off their last
    national economic interests
  • 122:28 - 122:30
    to foreign interests.
  • 122:31 - 122:37
    So, multi-nationals start buying
    and relocating to these countries,
  • 122:37 - 122:40
    due to low wages and dollarization.
  • 122:41 - 122:47
    It gets cheaper for multi-nationals
    to produce there than at home.
  • 122:47 - 122:51
    But these multi-nationals
    can also acquire, dirt cheap,
  • 122:52 - 122:54
    installations and
    production capacities,
  • 122:54 - 122:58
    like sugar production and refining,
  • 122:58 - 123:01
    oil or gas production
    and pre-refining,
  • 123:01 - 123:05
    gas liquefaction
    or mineral transport, etc.
  • 123:05 - 123:10
    at low prices, which cost these
    national economies years and years.
  • 123:11 - 123:15
    third measure:
    currency devaluation
  • 123:15 - 123:18
    Devaluing local currency
    means, all of a sudden,
  • 123:19 - 123:20
    for already-poor countries,
  • 123:21 - 123:25
    anything imported becomes
    proportionally more expensive
  • 123:26 - 123:28
    than the level of devaluation.
  • 123:29 - 123:32
    When the CFA franc
    was suddenly devalued by half
  • 123:32 - 123:34
    in the early ’90s,
  • 123:34 - 123:40
    well, suddenly about
    a third of Africa or more
  • 123:40 - 123:43
    that was using the CFA franc,
  • 123:43 - 123:47
    found itself with half its
    purchasing power overnight.
  • 123:48 - 123:53
    So, your wage, that lets you live
    at a certain level,
  • 123:53 - 123:55
    only gives you half of that.
  • 123:57 - 124:01
    That’s an immediate 100% inflation.
  • 124:02 - 124:06
    Add to that manufactured or
    semi-manufactured products,
  • 124:07 - 124:11
    refined products and
    everything you’d expect Africa,
  • 124:11 - 124:14
    West and Central French Africa,
    to import.
  • 124:14 - 124:19
    Suddenly with the franc cut in half,
    these things are twice as expensive.
  • 124:19 - 124:24
    Combine that with the effects
    of local devaluation,
  • 124:24 - 124:29
    and products and services
    suddenly cost you 4, 5, 6 times more,
  • 124:29 - 124:31
    from one day to the next!
  • 124:31 - 124:35
    Add time, and see what happens.
    Local products
  • 124:36 - 124:39
    made from imported
    semi-raw materials,
  • 124:40 - 124:45
    or that need imported binders,
    glues, solvents, paint, etc.,
  • 124:45 - 124:47
    over a longer wavelength,
  • 124:48 - 124:53
    1 , 2, 3, 6 months later, they become
    2, 3, 4 times more expensive.
  • 124:54 - 125:00
    fourth measure: reorient
    the national economy around export
  • 125:00 - 125:04
    If we measure the effects
    of making the poorest countries,
  • 125:05 - 125:08
    where the IMF and
    World Bank intervene,
  • 125:08 - 125:11
    boost the production
    of exportable products,
  • 125:13 - 125:16
    we make them compete
    with the same products.
  • 125:17 - 125:22
    Coffee-producing countries
    all start producing more coffee.
  • 125:22 - 125:25
    Cocoa, petroleum, same thing.
  • 125:26 - 125:27
    Bauxite …
  • 125:29 - 125:33
    Whatever it is … Sugar, wheat …
  • 125:34 - 125:36
    All the base products
  • 125:37 - 125:42
    suffer falling prices
    due to over-production.
  • 125:42 - 125:47
    Not only do their prices fall,
    and countries made to compete,
  • 125:47 - 125:51
    but added to this is the inflation
    effect from currency devaluation
  • 125:52 - 125:56
    and the automatic increase
    in anything the country imports.
  • 125:57 - 126:01
    We witness a kind of reversal
    of the countries’ interests -
  • 126:01 - 126:05
    even as we pretend to defend them -
    caused by this initial phenomenon.
  • 126:07 - 126:10
    All their imports
    are increasingly expensive,
  • 126:10 - 126:13
    while all their exports
    bring in less.
  • 126:14 - 126:19
    They enter a spiral of indebtedness
    that means that now, in 2002,
  • 126:20 - 126:24
    servicing the debt
    of most of the poorest countries -
  • 126:25 - 126:31
    I’m talking about countries like
    Bangladesh, Ruanda, Burundi, Togo -
  • 126:32 - 126:35
    countries like that,
    that are already minus 250th …
  • 126:36 - 126:42
    Their debt servicing alone can be
    up to 600 x their export revenues.
  • 126:42 - 126:46
    fifth measure:
    “getting the prices right”
  • 126:47 - 126:50
    Getting the prices right
    goes like this:
  • 126:50 - 126:55
    no subsidies for basic necessities,
    so no more subsidized housing,
  • 126:55 - 126:59
    no more subsidies
    for health, oil, rice …
  • 127:01 - 127:04
    transportation …
    No more subsidies,
  • 127:05 - 127:07
    in the name of the right price.
    What does this mean?
  • 127:07 - 127:12
    In terms of dollars, all prices
    become equivalent world wide.
  • 127:13 - 127:18
    If you travel with dollars,
    as I, a Canadian citizen, do,
  • 127:18 - 127:23
    wherever you go, products
    and services cost the same.
  • 127:23 - 127:26
    Whether in Cotonou, Benin,
    one of the poorest countries,
  • 127:27 - 127:29
    or Chicago, New York, Paris,
  • 127:30 - 127:35
    your Holiday Inn or Sheraton room,
    your Holiday Inn meal
  • 127:35 - 127:39
    cost about the same in dollars
    throughout the world. Fine.
  • 127:40 - 127:45
    But in Cotonou, capital of Benin,
    one of the world’s poorest countries,
  • 127:46 - 127:50
    one night at the Sheraton,
    where I sleep when I go there,
  • 127:50 - 127:55
    equals six months’ salary
    of a Benin public servant.
  • 127:56 - 128:00
    One meal in the restaurant
    of this Cotonou hotel
  • 128:00 - 128:05
    is a week’s work
    for a minor Benin official.
  • 128:06 - 128:12
    sixth measure: liberalization
    of investment and reverse wage parity
  • 128:13 - 128:17
    Next comes reverse wage parity.
    This consists in …
  • 128:17 - 128:20
    a succinct formula
    that slides all wages
  • 128:21 - 128:24
    down to the lowest, by sector,
  • 128:28 - 128:34
    and does so in concert with
    the “movement” to liberalize trade.
  • 128:35 - 128:36
    I’ll explain.
  • 128:36 - 128:41
    NAFTA is announced: the Mexico,
    U.S., Canada free trade zone.
  • 128:42 - 128:48
    Wages naturally slide from the
    American level to the Mexican level.
  • 128:49 - 128:54
    That’s what happens when Mexican,
    Canadian and American labour compete.
  • 128:54 - 129:00
    Relocation to Mexico means NAFTA
    has created employment in Mexico.
  • 129:01 - 129:06
    But in net terms,
    6 or 7 years after NAFTA,
  • 129:08 - 129:13
    wages in the whole region of Leone,
    northern Mexico,
  • 129:13 - 129:17
    where the American
    multi-nationals moved in -
  • 129:17 - 129:20
    while they shut down
    proportionately in the U.S. …
  • 129:21 - 129:24
    There has been
    an elimination of jobs
  • 129:24 - 129:27
    that were high-paying,
    compared to Mexico,
  • 129:28 - 129:32
    to “create” jobs in Mexico
  • 129:32 - 129:37
    that are infinitely lower-paid.
    So, for the past 5 years,
  • 129:38 - 129:43
    the average wage in the most
    active, richest region of Mexico,
  • 129:43 - 129:46
    where the American
    multi-nationals relocated …
  • 129:46 - 129:52
    Wages dropped in net terms
    of purchasing power by 23%.
  • 129:53 - 129:59
    Five years ago, a General Motors
    worker in northern Mexico
  • 129:59 - 130:05
    could survive and maintain
    a family of 1 or 2 kids.
  • 130:05 - 130:10
    Today, the same worker
    can support only his own needs.
  • 130:10 - 130:11
    Survive alone.
  • 130:13 - 130:17
    On the eve of the summit
    to be held in northern Mexico,
  • 130:18 - 130:23
    they’re building in Monterey
    a wall to hide the slums.
  • 130:24 - 130:27
    Three meters high
    and kilometers long,
  • 130:27 - 130:31
    so summit participants
    won’t see the poverty there.
  • 130:31 - 130:37
    That’s reverse parity: sliding wages
    from highest to lowest by sector.
  • 130:37 - 130:42
    And now that the most modern sectors
    - like information technology,
  • 130:43 - 130:48
    electronics, etc. - are increasingly
    saleable in the Third World,
  • 130:49 - 130:53
    you have entire companies -
    such as Swissair I think,
  • 130:53 - 130:56
    and other companies,
    the steel industry, whatever -
  • 130:57 - 131:01
    that do all their accounting,
    financial and IT work in Bombay.
  • 131:03 - 131:08
    A Bombay accountant who does the
    same work as a Swiss or Canadian one
  • 131:08 - 131:11
    costs 100 times less.
  • 131:11 - 131:15
    A programmer who writes an aviation
    program is 200 times cheaper.
  • 131:16 - 131:19
    And so on.
    That’s reverse wage parity.
  • 131:20 - 131:24
    What bothers me is that
    when we combine these measures -
  • 131:24 - 131:27
    devaluation, export, debt servicing,
  • 131:28 - 131:31
    privatization,
    shrinking public budgets,
  • 131:31 - 131:34
    forced public lay-offs
    making more unemployed …
  • 131:34 - 131:37
    Combine all these
    with the prices and wages,
  • 131:37 - 131:40
    and we come to the situation
    we’re in today:
  • 131:40 - 131:46
    rich countries are infinitely richer
    and poor countries infinitely poorer.
  • 131:47 - 131:51
    And I’m alarmed to see
    the World Bank and the IMF
  • 131:51 - 131:57
    trying to repeat in Argentina exactly
    what massacred the Argentine economy.
  • 131:58 - 132:03
    It’s like we never learn.
    Why not? There’s a reason.
  • 132:03 - 132:08
    It’s in their interest that this
    ideology that explains the world,
  • 132:09 - 132:12
    continue to survive,
    as long as the planet,
  • 132:12 - 132:15
    in its entirety,
    is exploitable this way.
  • 132:18 - 132:23
    At the International Monetary Fund,
    the right to vote is exercised
  • 132:23 - 132:25
    within the board of directors.
  • 132:26 - 132:30
    Now, it’s a right based on …
  • 132:30 - 132:32
    financial participation,
  • 132:32 - 132:35
    or the financial contribution
    of each State.
  • 132:36 - 132:39
    In fact, it’s the IMF shareholders.
  • 132:39 - 132:42
    Same for the World Bank.
    It’s not like the U.N.
  • 132:42 - 132:47
    The main shareholders
    of the IMF are, of course,
  • 132:47 - 132:51
    the U.S., Germany, Japan,
    Great Britain, France, etc.
  • 132:52 - 132:55
    But ultimately, that’s just
    one aspect, because …
  • 132:56 - 133:01
    under the political representation
    in an intergovernmental organization,
  • 133:02 - 133:05
    there are other issues.
    It’s the backroom.
  • 133:06 - 133:11
    It’s influence-peddling between
    Wall Street, on one hand,
  • 133:11 - 133:16
    and Washington. It’s the connections
    between the IMF and the think tanks:
  • 133:16 - 133:19
    the Heritage Foundation,
    the Brookings Institute.
  • 133:19 - 133:24
    The American treasury’s involved.
    The U.S. Federal Reserve.
  • 133:26 - 133:30
    This all forms what’s been called
    “the Washington Consensus”.
  • 133:31 - 133:32
    It’s a power game.
  • 133:33 - 133:36
    In 2005, Paul Wolfowitz,
  • 133:36 - 133:41
    one of the most radical ideologues
    of imperialist politics
  • 133:41 - 133:44
    and President Bush’s warmonger,
    passed directly
  • 133:44 - 133:51
    from the U.S. Defense Department
    to being head of the World Bank.
  • 133:51 - 133:53
    This appointment put an end
  • 133:53 - 133:58
    to any ambiguity about
    the World Bank’s real goals
  • 133:58 - 134:03
    and revealed the true face
    of the Bretton Woods institutions.
  • 134:12 - 134:15
    Bretton Woods conference,
    Mount Washington Hotel, 1944
  • 134:15 - 134:18
    After the war,
    naturally there was the creation
  • 134:19 - 134:23
    of the IMF and the World Bank.
  • 134:24 - 134:28
    In the mind of John Maynard Keynes,
    the architect of these institutions,
  • 134:29 - 134:32
    a third thing was needed.
  • 134:32 - 134:37
    A third organization,
    the International Trade Organization.
  • 134:38 - 134:40
    This didn’t work.
    The Americans didn’t want it.
  • 134:42 - 134:44
    So, as a fallback position,
  • 134:45 - 134:46
    GATT was created.
  • 134:50 - 134:54
    It was created in ’47
    and was supposed to take care of
  • 134:54 - 134:59
    lowering customs duties
    on industrial products.
  • 135:00 - 135:02
    GATT worked fairly well
  • 135:03 - 135:06
    because during
    its 50 years of existence,
  • 135:09 - 135:12
    there were major reductions
    in duties,
  • 135:12 - 135:18
    which went from
    an average of 40% to 50%
  • 135:18 - 135:20
    down to 4% or 5%.
  • 135:20 - 135:25
    But that covered only
    industrial goods. Products.
  • 135:26 - 135:29
    So, the need was felt,
  • 135:29 - 135:34
    primarily by transnational
    financial companies
  • 135:35 - 135:38
    to create an organization
  • 135:39 - 135:42
    that would cover many more domains
  • 135:43 - 135:46
    than just industrial products.
    That’s why,
  • 135:48 - 135:53
    at the end of the Uruguay Round,
    the final GATT negotiation cycle,
  • 135:54 - 135:59
    the decision was made to create
    the World Trade Organization,
  • 136:00 - 136:05
    which became a reality
    on January 1, 1995,
  • 136:05 - 136:10
    and covers a multitude of agreements.
    Not just the perennial GATT
  • 136:10 - 136:13
    but the agricultural accord,
  • 136:13 - 136:16
    the TRIPS accord
    on intellectual property,
  • 136:17 - 136:22
    the general accord on the service
    trade, a huge thing that covers
  • 136:22 - 136:25
    11 main areas and 160 sub-areas,
  • 136:25 - 136:29
    so that all human activities
    are found there,
  • 136:30 - 136:33
    covered by GATT regulations:
  • 136:33 - 136:36
    education, health, culture,
    environment.
  • 136:36 - 136:40
    There are other technical agreements
  • 136:40 - 136:45
    that may seem technical,
    but that are extremely political:
  • 136:45 - 136:48
    the accords on
    technical trade barriers,
  • 136:49 - 136:53
    on sanitary and
    phytosanitary measures.
  • 136:53 - 136:58
    These are accords on standards
    that various members, i.e., States,
  • 136:58 - 137:00
    can put in place
  • 137:01 - 137:06
    and which declare that certain norms
    are technical barriers to trade.
  • 137:06 - 137:11
    Perhaps lesser known,
    but the most important of all
  • 137:11 - 137:14
    is the Dispute Settlement
    Understanding,
  • 137:15 - 137:20
    which is the very powerful
    judicial branch
  • 137:20 - 137:22
    of the World Trade Organization,
  • 137:22 - 137:27
    which enables it to settle
    disputes among members
  • 137:27 - 137:29
    and exercise jurisprudence.
  • 137:30 - 137:32
    So, who judges?
  • 137:33 - 137:38
    We don’t really know.
    Experts are chosen from lists.
  • 137:40 - 137:44
    Countries may recommend someone
    for these lists.
  • 137:44 - 137:46
    They’re generally private citizens.
  • 137:47 - 137:52
    Business lawyers or sometimes
    former business executives.
  • 137:52 - 137:56
    But they’re unidentified.
    They meet in secret,
  • 137:56 - 137:58
    generally in three’s.
  • 137:59 - 138:01
    They decide fairly quickly.
  • 138:01 - 138:05
    There’s also an appeals process,
  • 138:05 - 138:09
    but appeals have the same conditions:
    a new panel,
  • 138:10 - 138:12
    and it’s done in secret.
  • 138:12 - 138:18
    What’s important to know about the
    DSB, the Dispute Settlement Body,
  • 138:18 - 138:20
    is that it’s at once
  • 138:21 - 138:26
    the legislator, the jurist
    and the executive,
  • 138:26 - 138:32
    because it renders verdicts
    and establishes jurisprudence.
  • 138:33 - 138:36
    It places itself above all the laws
  • 138:36 - 138:38
    that have been passed
  • 138:39 - 138:43
    by the countries’
    individual legislatures,
  • 138:43 - 138:48
    but also above international law,
    established laboriously over 50 years.
  • 138:48 - 138:50
    Human rights,
  • 138:52 - 138:55
    multi-lateral conventions
    on the environment,
  • 138:56 - 139:00
    the basic labour conventions of the
    International Labour Organization.
  • 139:00 - 139:05
    All this is forgotten and verdicts
    are rendered at the DSB
  • 139:05 - 139:08
    that say, “Business trumps all,
  • 139:09 - 139:14
    and we don’t want to hear about
    your environmental conventions.”
  • 139:14 - 139:19
    And it’s executive because
    it has the power to impose sanctions.
  • 139:20 - 139:24
    When a country disagrees
    with its verdict, it’s told, “Fine.
  • 139:25 - 139:30
    Don’t make your legislation conform
    to our verdict, but you’ll pay.
  • 139:30 - 139:31
    You’ll pay annually,
  • 139:33 - 139:39
    through customs duties that your
    adversary in this settlement process
  • 139:39 - 139:43
    will determine.”
    So when the U.S. decides
  • 139:43 - 139:47
    to impose duties on Europe,
    for France,
  • 139:47 - 139:51
    on foie gras, mustard
    and roquefort,
  • 139:51 - 139:54
    it’s perfectly within its rights.
  • 139:54 - 140:01
    And it’s expensive. And few countries
    can afford this annual leaching.
  • 140:02 - 140:08
    At the WTO, various negotiations
    go on at the same time.
  • 140:09 - 140:13
    A country with no ambassador
    in Geneva,
  • 140:13 - 140:16
    or that shares one
    with other countries,
  • 140:17 - 140:22
    as is the case with the Africans
    and with many small micro-States …
  • 140:27 - 140:31
    It’s impossible for them
    to follow negotiations.
  • 140:32 - 140:39
    So, the South doesn’t know
    what’s going on in all areas,
  • 140:39 - 140:42
    and they say so openly.
    One Southern ambassador
  • 140:42 - 140:45
    said, “The WTO
    is like a multiplex theatre.
  • 140:46 - 140:50
    You must pick a film,
    you can’t see them all.”
  • 140:51 - 140:55
    So they pick only what seems
    important to their country.
  • 140:56 - 140:58
    So who really makes the decisions?
  • 140:59 - 141:03
    They say it’s by consensus.
    There’s never been a vote.
  • 141:04 - 141:09
    And the American ambassador said
    a vote would be a very bad precedent.
  • 141:10 - 141:12
    So much for democracy.
  • 141:13 - 141:17
    In reality, it’s the Quad.
    The Quad is 4 countries -
  • 141:17 - 141:22
    Canada, the U.S.,
    the European Union and Japan -
  • 141:22 - 141:26
    that meet all the time
    and have numerous staff
  • 141:27 - 141:28
    at the WTO,
  • 141:28 - 141:31
    and that come to their own consensus
  • 141:32 - 141:35
    and come back
    before the plenary assembly
  • 141:35 - 141:38
    and say, “Well, you agree,
    don’t you?”
  • 141:40 - 141:46
    And it’s very hard for
    Southern countries to say no.
  • 141:46 - 141:49
    It takes courage
    and they must be certain,
  • 141:49 - 141:54
    because pressure tactics
    against them exist.
  • 141:54 - 141:56
    And don’t delude yourself.
  • 141:56 - 142:03
    If you’re dependent on the IMF
    or have problems with the U.S.,
  • 142:03 - 142:07
    you know you can’t step out of line.
  • 142:08 - 142:13
    Certainly, the financial markets
    and the Bretton Woods institutions
  • 142:13 - 142:19
    have become privileged instruments
    of the neo-liberal conquest.
  • 142:19 - 142:23
    But some countries
    still obstinately refuse
  • 142:23 - 142:27
    to join this forced march.
  • 142:27 - 142:31
    That’s when colonialism
    sheds its new suit
  • 142:31 - 142:35
    and comes forth
    in its old warrior gear.
  • 142:35 - 142:43
    From the break-up of Yugoslavia
    to the war in Afghanistan via Darfur,
  • 142:43 - 142:50
    post-Cold War conflicts
    hinge on very different issues
  • 142:50 - 142:58
    than the ones Western propaganda
    presents as new “military humanism”.
  • 142:58 - 143:04
    Control over resources,
    financial flux and geostrategic space -
  • 143:04 - 143:11
    like the dictates of the IMF,
    the World Bank and the WTO -
  • 143:11 - 143:17
    ensure the domination of mega-
    corporations and giant capitalists
  • 143:17 - 143:20
    over the entire planet.
  • 143:20 - 143:25
    Also, the colonial governments
    that the conquerors have installed
  • 143:25 - 143:30
    have soon moved to adopt
    the dogma of neo-liberal ideology.
  • 143:30 - 143:34
    And the encirclement is complete.
  • 143:35 - 143:35
    neo-liberalism or neo-colonialism?
  • 143:35 - 143:43
    neo-liberalism or neo-colonialism?
  • 143:43 - 143:51
    strong-arm tactics
    of military humanism
  • 143:51 - 143:53
    or
  • 143:53 - 143:58
    war is peace
  • 144:02 - 144:05
    The Dayton Accords were signed in ’95
  • 144:06 - 144:08
    on an American military base.
  • 144:08 - 144:13
    And if we consult
    the text of these accords,
  • 144:14 - 144:18
    we see the Constitution
    of Bosnia-Herzegovina appended
  • 144:18 - 144:20
    to the Dayton accords.
  • 144:20 - 144:25
    This constitution was written by
    American consultants and lawyers,
  • 144:26 - 144:31
    who got together and wrote
    a fundamental document
  • 144:31 - 144:35
    without so much
    as a constituent assembly
  • 144:35 - 144:37
    of Bosnia-Herzegovina citizens.
  • 144:38 - 144:41
    And we can read
    in this constitution
  • 144:43 - 144:46
    prepared by the United States,
  • 144:50 - 144:51
    Article X:
  • 144:52 - 144:55
    The central bank
    of Bosnia-Herzegovina
  • 144:56 - 145:02
    shall not function as a central bank.
    It must function as a currency board.
  • 145:04 - 145:07
    In other words, a colonial bank,
  • 145:08 - 145:12
    with no chance
    of creating money.
  • 145:12 - 145:17
    Meaning, it’s completely trapped
    by its external creditors.
  • 145:17 - 145:22
    Well, that’s the model that
    currently exists in Argentina.
  • 145:22 - 145:28
    Moreover, in the Bosnia-Herzegovina
    Constitution, written in Dayton,
  • 145:29 - 145:30
    we read that
  • 145:31 - 145:37
    the IMF will nominate the president
    of Bosnia-Herzegovina’s central bank,
  • 145:37 - 145:39
    and this person …
  • 145:40 - 145:42
    may not be a citizen
  • 145:43 - 145:46
    of either Bosnia-Herzegovina
    or a neighbouring country.
  • 145:46 - 145:50
    In other words,
    we see that this constitution,
  • 145:51 - 145:52
    which is totally fabricated
  • 145:53 - 145:58
    and has no citizen base
    within Bosnia-Herzegovina,
  • 145:59 - 146:01
    is installing a colonial government.
  • 146:02 - 146:07
    We don’t call it that. We say
    it’s the international community …
  • 146:07 - 146:13
    But ultimately we see that
    all the administrative structures
  • 146:14 - 146:16
    are dominated by foreigners.
  • 146:17 - 146:22
    Budgets are dominated by foreigners.
    Monetary policy is non-existent.
  • 146:26 - 146:29
    Nevertheless, the Dayton Accords
  • 146:29 - 146:35
    are now being presented by the
    so-called international community
  • 146:35 - 146:39
    as the answer to the problems
    of various countries.
  • 146:39 - 146:44
    They’d like to establish
    the same management model -
  • 146:47 - 146:49
    colonial administration -
  • 146:51 - 146:54
    in countries like
    Macedonia and Yugoslavia.
  • 146:56 - 146:59
    Indeed, they talk about a mosaic.
  • 146:59 - 147:01
    A mosaic of protectorates.
  • 153:09 - 153:13
    Adaptation: Kathleen Fleming
    Anrà Médiatextes, Montréal
  • 153:13 - 153:17
    srt & ripped by Tokadime
Title:
L'Encerclement - La démocratie dans les rets du néolibéralisme
Video Language:
French
Duration:
02:33:30

English subtitles

Revisions