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Hazrat Ali (ra) aur Ameer Muawiya (ra) Ka Ikhtilaf - Part 15 - Javed Ahmad Ghamidi

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    [Hasan Ilyas] In the name of Allah, the
    most Gracious, the most Merciful!
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    Assalamu Alaikum. We are coming to you
    directly from Ghamidi Center, Dallas
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    with this weekly question-answer session
    with Ghamidi Sahab.
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    Let us begin…
    Ghamidi Sahab, thanks a lot for your time.
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    The chain of our conversation continues
    about your viewpoint of the conflict
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    between Syedna Ali (ra) and
    Ameer Muawiya (ra).
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    Today, this is the fifteenth episode
    of the series.
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    I am presenting to you, one by one, the
    questions regarding certain doubts and
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    objections that people have raised
    about your discourse.
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    In our last conversation, we comprehended
    certain important points.
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    And I will start by linking up our today’s
    conversation to the last conversation.
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    While being a governor of a province,
    Syedna Muawiya (ra) demanded retaliation
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    from Syedna Ali (ra) against the murderers
    of Uthman (ra).
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    Does this not imply that he considered Ali
    (ra) to be the ruler of the Muslim nation
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    and that he considered his government to
    be an established political fact since
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    he is making the demand of Ali (ra)
    to punish the murderers?
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    Had Muawiya (ra) not made the demand,
    it could have been said that Ali’s (ra)
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    government had not been fully established
    and that
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    it was a chaotic situation all around.
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    However, the moment Muawiya (ra) put
    forth his demand it becomes obvious that
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    he accepts Ali (ra) as the ruler and is
    demanding of him to ‘retaliate’ (qisas)
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    against Uthman’s (ra) murderers which only
    the ruler of the Muslims could do?
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    [Javed Ahmad Ghamidi] Muawiya (ra) is
    making this demand on the basis
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    of Ali’s (ra) claim that his government
    has become established.
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    And if it is claimed that the government
    has been (firmly) established,
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    one of its self-evident proofs would be to
    mete out the
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    just punishment to the criminals.’
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    ‘Otherwise, we have no personal animosity
    against you.’
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    ‘We shall accept your government.’
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    It is the approach that if a government is
    established and
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    you are hesitant about its establishment
    or you have some objections regarding it.
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    In that case, how are you manifesting
    your objection?
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    In other words, do you object to the
    person of the ruler?
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    If you object to the person of the ruler.
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    For instance, a number of people object to
    many of later rulers as
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    individual persons as well: it is believed
    that a certain person was not fit to rule
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    because of his personality, or character,
    or his lack of political acumen, etc.
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    In those cases, it is the opposition to
    the person of the ruler.
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    I have stated this earlier as well that
    whether it was Muawiya (ra), or
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    Syeda Aisha (ra) or Syedna Talha (ra), or
    Zubair (ra), none of them argued that
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    Syedna Ali (ra) was not fit to be
    the Caliph of the Muslims.
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    Instead, they argue that you are of course
    eligible to be the caliph and
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    we have no objections to your person.
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    However, from among necessary conditions
    for the establishment of a government,
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    we are demanding of you that you
    fulfill one important condition.
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    Why are governments established at all?
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    They are established to curb the abuse
    of power.
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    It is the fundamental objective of the
    establishment of government to be
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    in a position to punish the criminals.
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    However, if a government is not in a
    position to punish the criminals
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    although, you can claim that it is in the
    process of establishing itself,
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    but you cannot say it has been fully
    established as a fiat accompli.
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    Thus, they put forward their case with
    the same reasoning.
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    Even today, if a situation of emergency
    erupts and someone takes over
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    the government, then we too shall demand
    of them to prove their fitness
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    for legislation, application of the law,
    and for the re-establishment of order.
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    And only then would the government would
    be accepted – if only in de facto terms.
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    So, they are basically making this case.
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    How does it imply that they accepted
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    Ali’s (ra) government as an established
    political fact?
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    If indeed Muawiya (ra) had accepted
    Ali’s (ra) government,
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    then his first task would have
    been to give up his position
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    as the governor of Syria, as Ali (ra)
    had instructed him to do.
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    He did no such thing!
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    Instead, positioning himself as the
    governor of Levant, he asked Ali (ra),
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    who had assumed the caliphal office, the
    proof that
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    his power was actually established.
    [Ilyas] Alright…
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    Let us move the conversation forward,
    Ghamidi Sahab.
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    It is clear that Muawiya’s (ra) demand did
    not begin after
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    accepting Ali’s (ra) government;
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    In fact, the demand is the condition for
    the acceptance of government:
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    'Only after the fulfillment of this
    condition would
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    the other matters be settled.’
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    However, the matter was not settled and
    the dispute reached into the battlefield.
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    As the dispute reached the battlefield,
    and this is also a generally accepted
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    historical fact, that those demanding
    retaliation against the
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    murderers of Uthman (ra) and the removal
    from office of people who had surrounded
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    Syedna Ali, (ra),
    they lost in the battlefield.
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    You had described the principle in detail
    that whenever something like this happens.
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    And it proves that Ali’s (ra) government
    had become established.
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    In other words, it existed as a de facto
    reality and that is how he won the war.
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    After all this, the matter should have
    moved toward settlement…
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    The results of the battlefield went in
    favor of Ali (ra).
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    Thus, once the battlefield decided the
    matter in Ali’s (ra) favor,
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    what excuse was left for Muawiya (ra) to
    still not accept the government
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    as a de facto reality?
    [Ghamidi] What was the verdict exactly?
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    The verdict was this: Ali (ra) himself
    accepted to appoint arbiters to decide
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    the legality or illegality of his
    government.
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    It was after the Battle of Siffin that
    the arbiters were appointed.
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    What exactly do you accept when you
    accept arbitration?
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    Have you ever reflected on this point?
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    It means that you have accepted that
    you no longer insist on taking
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    your government as a de facto reality.
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    Instead, the verdict of whether or not to
    accept the government
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    shall be entrusted to certain arbiters.
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    Therefore, two people were nominated to
    be the arbiters in the dispute.
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    The clauses of arbitration were drawn up.
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    Abu Musa Ashari (ra) was nominated from
    Ali’s (ra) side
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    and Amr bin al ‘As (ra)
    was nominated from Muawiya’s (ra) side.
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    Both were allowed a fixed time period
    which spanned across many months.
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    And, then, it was specified that they
    would proclaim their verdict in front
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    of four hundred people and in that
    assembly they would give their verdict
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    about the rights and wrongs of the dispute
    and how it should be resolved!
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    Therefore, the moment you accept
    arbitration,
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    the legitimacy of your government becomes
    debatable as a result of your admission.
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    If, however, a different scenario would
    have emerged:
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    Muawiya’s (ra) side lost on the
    battlefield, his men ran away,
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    Ali’s (ra) forces captured his territory,
    and he was able to establish
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    the writ of his government throughout
    the empire.
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    In that case, the matter would have
    been decisively settled.
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    So, what was the upshot of the
    Battle of Siffin?
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    And it should also be kept in mind, in the
    Battle of Siffin,
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    the opposing side was not fighting to
    overtake Ali’s (ra) government.
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    Instead, it was Ali’s (ra) position – and
    he was absolutely sincere in his position
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    that his government had been legitimately
    established and he wanted to enforce
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    the writ of his government.
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    For this reason, he changed the governors
    of the provinces too and when Muawiya (ra)
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    refused to comply with his order, it was
    Ali (ra)
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    who initiated the hostilities in Siffin.
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    And because of this attack, at one point,
    the opposing side proposed this:
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    people, including the Companions, are
    being martyred in large numbers
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    and it would only perpetuate the civil
    war; instead, is it not better to settle
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    this dispute by making the Quran the
    final arbiter?
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    When this proposal was put forward from
    the opposing side,
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    Ali (ra), himself, accepted it.
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    People neglect this point that when a
    ruler accepts arbitration upon whether
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    or not his government is a de facto
    political fact and whether the steps
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    he took were legitimate or not, and now
    arbitrators will make a ruling on it,
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    you can imagine the situation.
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    So, the matter is not as simple
    as it seems.
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    [Ilyas] Alright.
    Let us move ahead, Ghamidi Sahab!
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    A new point of view has emerged in
    the last few days…
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    It has been stated that the way you
    portray the matter that it pertains
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    to real historical events, wherein the
    partisans had their principled positions
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    and both were sincerely taking certain
    practical measures based
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    on those principled positions.
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    Instead, why can’t we say that the large
    group of the companions
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    who supported Muawiya, along with the
    suggestions he might have gotten
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    from the earlier caliphs, combined to
    deliberately keep the Hashemites,
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    i.e., the family of the Prophet (pbuh),
    away from power?
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    It is because once they had gained
    political power, then,
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    because of their status in the eyes of
    the people due to their descent
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    from the Prophet (pbuh), it would have
    been difficult to wrest it back.
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    Therefore, these factors were at work
    in Muawiya’s (ra) actions and
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    in the struggle to seek tribal supremacy
    among the Umayyads.
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    How do you see this line of thinking?
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    [Ghamidi] First, you have to tell me
    when did this “conspiracy”
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    to keep the Hashemites out of power begin?
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    Did it begin with Abu Bakr’s (ra)
    election as the Caliph?
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    Abu Bakr (ra) was the most exalted
    companion in the whole umma.
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    No person could have the temerity to
    claim that in Abu Bakr (ra)
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    such a man was elected as the Caliph
    who was not eligible for it.
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    Not only did all the companions assent
    to the election,
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    a person like Omar (ra) stated that he
    proposed the same of such a personality
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    that tukta’ul aana qi’lay (people’s necks
    would bow in front of him).
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    In fact, people, subsequently, accepted
    him in the same station.
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    And the way Abu Bakr (ra) ruled also
    proved his illustriousness.
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    Therefore, nobody can be bold enough to
    claim any of this about Abu Bakr (ra).
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    I have already described the election of
    Omar (ra) that how Abu Bakr (ra)
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    invited the entire leadership of the
    Quraish, put forth his proposal to them,
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    listened to the opinions and suggestions
    of every single one of them,
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    and replied to the objections that were
    raised.
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    Only then the final decision was made.
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    In this case as well, no such thing was
    under discussion from which
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    one could conclude a deliberate attempt
    to exclude the Hashemites from power.
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    At the most, you could say, at the time
    of Uthman’s (ra) election,
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    when Abdul Rahman bin Awf (ra) was
    given the authority to choose,
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    he might have kept these things in view.
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    However, it does not make any difference
    because whenever you form an opinion
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    about anyone at all, you take dozens
    of factors into consideration.
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    So, all these hypotheses can be discussed
    only with reference to the election
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    of the first three caliphs.
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    And they would be assessed in accordance
    with the evidence pertaining
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    to the three occasions.
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    In Muawiya’s (ra) case, what right do
    we have to speculate about
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    a different opinion than his stated
    position that is in front of us?
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    Did he ever claim that they have decided
    to keep the Hashemites out of power?
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    A power struggle was going on.
    There is no doubt about it.
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    In this backdrop, the establishment of
    Ali’s (ra) government was announced.
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    And a lot of people accepted the new
    government.
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    On the back of a large force, Ali (ra)
    managed to consolidate his power
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    over a large territorial span.
    Muawiya (ra) put forward a demand.
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    And the Mother of the Believers, Syeda
    Aisha (ra) too pressed the same demand.
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    She is not an ordinary woman.
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    It was an extraordinary decision on part
    of Aisha (ra),
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    keeping in view her juristic mind, her
    judgments,
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    and her insight in politics and strategy.
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    And two of the most prominent people
    from the council that elected Ali (ra),
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    i.e., Talha (ra) and Zubair (ra), also
    joined her in her opposition to Ali (ra).
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    So, did all these people come together to
    conspire
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    to keep the Hashemites out of power?
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    However, whenever it comes to the
    point of election and
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    when we vote in somebody’s favor, we
    take dozens of factors into consideration.
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    Let me give you a fresh example of this
    phenomenon.
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    Say, elections are going on in our
    country.
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    A number of political parties operate
    in the country.
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    In this backdrop, there is a person who
    maintains,
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    irrespective of his other preferences,
    he won’t vote for certain parties because,
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    according to him, they have become
    hereditary parties.
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    Thus, it can be one important factor
    determining one’s political preference.
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    So, it is possible that some people would
    have considered
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    this factor back then as well.
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    However, to consider that it was the
    only determining factor and
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    the sole basis of everything that
    happened; that everyone came together
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    and decided to keep the Hashemites
    out; and that it was a planned conspiracy
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    from the very beginning; etc.
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    In my opinion, to make such a far-reaching
    claim,
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    one needs a rather staggering amount
    of evidence than is generally cited.
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    [Ilyas] Alright.
    Moving forward, Ghamidi Sahab.
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    The most important point of our entire
    conversation,
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    the point around which all our explanation
    and
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    all the positions of the partisans revolve
    and the point that affords
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    all sides some benefit of doubt and that is
    the storm that manifested itself
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    in the shape of Uthman’s (ra) murder.
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    The question arises in everyone’s mind,
    whoever has heard your position
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    in these fifteen episodes, is this:
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    One party is demanding retaliation against
    the murderers of Uthman (ra).
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    However, when the party making the
    demand comes to power…
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    Muawiya (ra) ruled for nineteen years
    and the reason for his coming to power
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    was the dispute around Uthman’s (ra)
    murder.
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    So, if it was not the desire for power and
    become the ruler of the empire,
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    then what became of the real reason
    for coming to power?
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    In other words, what became of Uthman’s
    (ra) murderers in Muawiya’s (ra) reign?
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    Muawiya (ra) reigned for 19 years
    without sharing power with anyone.
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    What did he do about the event that led
    to everything:
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    the Battle of the Camel, the Battle of
    Siffin, and the endless bloodshed
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    within the Muslim community?
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    [Ghamidi] There were two types of
    people among Uthman’s (ra) murderers.
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    You are familiar, of course, that the
    incident took the shape of a riot.
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    A mob fell upon the city.
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    And it was not a couple of men who broke
    into Uthman’s (ra) house; it was a mob.
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    There are two salient names when
    it comes to who, from the mob,
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    laid their hands upon and murdered
    Uthman (ra).
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    One is Muhammad bin Abi Bakr.
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    He was the Abu Bakr’s (ra) son and
    was brought up by Syedna Ali (ra) himself.
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    After Abu Bakr’s (ra) death, Ali (ra)
    had married his widow.
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    So, Muhammad bin Abi Bakr was brought
    up in Syedna Ali’s (ra) household.
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    Second was Malik al-Ashtar.
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    Both these men could be pointed out
    as Uthman’s murderers!
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    There would, of course, have been a
    trial first and only then action
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    could be taken against them.
    These were the two people.
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    How conspicuous were these two
    people as Uthman’s murderers?
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    You can get a sense of this from that fact
    that our venerated scholar,
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    Maulana Syed Abul Alaa Maududi, who,
    as compared to mine,
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    was making a different case altogether.
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    He too was forced to remark: ‘I can
    explain and justify every action
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    taken by Ali (ra), except the position
    he bestowed upon the two.’
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    Muhammad bin Abi Bakr was appointed as
    the governor of Egypt later on.
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    [Ilyas] It happened after Uthman’s (ra)
    murder?
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    [Ghamidi] Of course. After Uthman’s (ra)
    murder, when Ali (ra) formed his government.
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    He would appoint governors after he has
    formed the government, right?
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    They were so conspicuous.
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    And both of them were dead when
    Muawiya (ra) became the sole ruler.
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    Now, we are left with others.
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    The problem was that there was no
    certainty who among the other people
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    was involved in the murder.
    It was an open question.
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    In fact, if you read the history, you would
    come to know whenever
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    it was found out that someone was involved
    in the murder, he was brought to justice.
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    You will find all the details of these
    events in a number of historical tracts.
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    However, two conspicuous perpetrators
    who should have been apprehended
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    and who were closest to Ali (ra) at the
    time, both those men were dead
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    by the time Muawiya came to power.
  • 16:07 - 16:13
    [Ilyas] Ghamidi Sahab, you give a rational
    explanation of every partisan’s position
  • 16:13 - 16:16
    based on the available evidence.
  • 16:17 - 16:21
    I am sure the question would be bothering
    people and I want you to discuss it:
  • 16:21 - 16:26
    If Uthman (ra), the Caliph of the Muslims,
    was subjected to the gravest injustice,
  • 16:26 - 16:29
    and his murderers were known …
  • 16:29 - 16:32
    Obviously, Syedna Ali (ra) would have
    been aware of these things.
  • 16:32 - 16:34
    All of us deeply revere Ali (ra).
  • 16:34 - 16:37
    You, yourself, gave the examples of his
    intellect and knowledge.
  • 16:37 - 16:39
    So, how this this happen?
  • 16:39 - 16:43
    What, according to you, is the explanation
    for the fact that not only did Ali (ra)
  • 16:43 - 16:47
    not bring the two to justice after the
    notorious murder of the caliph,
  • 16:47 - 16:54
    but he appointed them to important
    positions in his government?
  • 16:54 - 17:00
    Do you think there is a justification and
    explanation for Syedna Ali’s (ra) actions?
  • 17:01 - 17:05
    [Ghamidi] As I already remarked that
    Maulana Syedna Abul Alaa Maududi
  • 17:05 - 17:10
    described his entire case.
    He has defended Ali (ra) in every sense.
  • 17:10 - 17:12
    However, he too could not defend
    him on this point.
  • 17:12 - 17:14
    Here, he couldn’t defend Ali’s (ra)
    position at all.
  • 17:14 - 17:18
    Nonetheless, I would argue that Ali’s (ra)
    action, according to me,
  • 17:18 - 17:20
    could have a reason of its own.
  • 17:20 - 17:24
    In other words, I am claiming that despite
    all this, Ali’s (ra) position has a rationale.
  • 17:24 - 17:25
    Syedna Ali (ra) made a decision.
  • 17:25 - 17:28
    It was the decision of assuming the
    responsibility
  • 17:28 - 17:30
    of the government of the Muslim empire.
  • 17:30 - 17:32
    There could have been two responses
    to the situation.
  • 17:32 - 17:36
    One response would have been this: when
    he was requested to assume
  • 17:36 - 17:39
    the responsibility of government, he
    could have refused.
  • 17:39 - 17:43
    Instead, he could have said that they must
    first wait for the leadership of Quraish
  • 17:43 - 17:46
    and the Muslims to arrive from different
    corners of the empire.
  • 17:46 - 17:50
    Or, that all the leaders, representatives
    of the people should first assemble,
  • 17:50 - 17:54
    and then, they could freely elect either
    Ali (ra) or
  • 17:54 - 17:57
    anyone else to be the next caliph.
  • 17:57 - 18:01
    It could have been the case that on the
    occasion he would not have taken
  • 18:01 - 18:03
    control of the reins of the government.
  • 18:03 - 18:05
    This could have been one possible response
    or decision to the situation.
  • 18:05 - 18:07
    However, Ali (ra) did not make this
    decision.
  • 18:07 - 18:11
    Although, the events that followed have
    made it clear that the first scenario
  • 18:11 - 18:13
    would possibly have been better
    for everyone.
  • 18:13 - 18:17
    But, Ali (ra) made a different decision.
    And the decision was this:
  • 18:17 - 18:21
    the manner in which the rioters had
    occupied Medina and the way
  • 18:21 - 18:25
    the situation has descended into a
    bloodbath in order to rescue
  • 18:25 - 18:27
    the Muslim community from the
    catastrophe,
  • 18:27 - 18:32
    Ali (ra), with utmost sincerity – and all
    signs point toward his utmost sincerity –
  • 18:32 - 18:36
    resolved to assume the responsibility
    of government.
  • 18:36 - 18:39
    I have pointed this out earlier as well:
    at the time, Ali (ra) was the most
  • 18:39 - 18:42
    exalted personality in the
    Muslim community.
  • 18:42 - 18:45
    In other words, it can also become a
    reason for impelling you to action
  • 18:45 - 18:49
    when you believe that you are the best
    person upon whom the people could unite.
  • 18:49 - 18:53
    On such occasions, you form an opinion.
  • 18:53 - 18:56
    He formed an opinion and took over
    the government.
  • 18:56 - 18:59
    One of the possible consequences, as he
    assumed the responsibility of government,
  • 18:59 - 19:03
    would have been the unanimous
    acceptance of this act by the people.
  • 19:03 - 19:07
    In such a scenario, all the people would
    abide by his edicts and
  • 19:07 - 19:11
    all the provincial governors would accept
    his command in the same spirit
  • 19:11 - 19:16
    as had been the norm during the reign
    of earlier Rightly Guided Caliphs.
  • 19:17 - 19:21
    Similarly, people would not have rallied
    against Ali (ra) under Aisha’s (ra) banner
  • 19:21 - 19:25
    And Talha (ra) and Zubair (ra) too would
    not have adopted the position they did.
  • 19:25 - 19:27
    This could have been one scenario!
  • 19:27 - 19:31
    It would have been exactly the same
    scenario that Syedna Omar (ra) described
  • 19:31 - 19:34
    with reference to Syedna Abu Bakr’s (ra)
    appointment as the caliph:
  • 19:34 - 19:39
    ‘I had made an emergency decision
    and Allah saved us from its harm.’
  • 19:40 - 19:45
    In Ali’s (ra) case, however, the decision
    he took led, in practical terms, to harm.
  • 19:45 - 19:49
    In other words, a lot of people did
    not accept the decision.
  • 19:49 - 19:51
    Gradually, the opposition kept growing.
  • 19:51 - 19:55
    Obviously, in this backdrop, there was
    just one option left for him:
  • 19:55 - 19:59
    to run the administration with the help
    of the people who supported him.
  • 20:00 - 20:04
    In other words, as his opponents did
    not accept it and
  • 20:04 - 20:08
    he also refused to rescind his decision,
    then he would,
  • 20:08 - 20:13
    of course, run the government and
    commandeer his army
  • 20:13 - 20:18
    with the same people because they
    accepted his authority in the first stage.
  • 20:18 - 20:25
    So for me, such decisions are not barren:
    they have their consequences.
  • 20:25 - 20:30
    And even the greatest of men just
    have to accept the consequences.
  • 20:30 - 20:33
    So Ali (ra) seems to have accepted the
    ramifications of his decision.
  • 20:33 - 20:36
    [Ilyas] Ghamidi Sahab, the explanation
    you just gave illustrates the principle
  • 20:36 - 20:38
    you have been trying to get across to
    the people
  • 20:38 - 20:40
    from the beginning of the series:
  • 20:40 - 20:44
    that is, instead of looking at an
    individual’s political decisions
  • 20:44 - 20:47
    and practical affairs from the viewpoint
    of the notion of truth or falsehood,
  • 20:47 - 20:51
    if we approach them
    considering the practical realities,
  • 20:51 - 20:56
    expediencies, and constraints within
    a political context,
  • 20:56 - 20:59
    then we can explain all actions.
  • 20:59 - 21:02
    However, if you try to frame it within
    a strictly religious discourse and
  • 21:02 - 21:04
    start condemning people for their
    perceived moral failures,
  • 21:04 - 21:07
    then every single individual becomes
    susceptible to the greatest condemnation.
  • 21:07 - 21:11
    [Ghamidi] If we adopt this approach,
    then we might even have to discuss
  • 21:11 - 21:15
    certain measures taken by Omar (ra)
    and Abu Bakr (ra) as well.
  • 21:15 - 21:19
    And political expediencies are kept in
    consideration in political actions.
  • 21:19 - 21:22
    At times, many things have to be
    kept in consideration…
  • 21:22 - 21:27
    Look, even the Prophet (pbuh) had to
    take care of certain things:
  • 21:27 - 21:29
    We know that Abdullah bin Ubay
    adopted a malicious approach
  • 21:29 - 21:30
    toward the Prophet (pbuh).
  • 21:30 - 21:34
    During the Expedition of Banu Mustaliq,
    he instigated people
  • 21:34 - 21:36
    against the Prophet (pbuh).
  • 21:36 - 21:42
    And we also know that he uttered
    a poisonous sentence –
  • 21:42 - 21:45
    and the Quran has reproduced the
    sentence –
  • 21:45 - 21:48
    that could be considered insolence
    and insult of the last degree.
  • 21:48 - 21:51
    Quran has reproduced the sentence
    he uttered in Surah al-Munafiqun.
  • 21:51 - 21:56
    However, despite the fact that
    Abdullah bin Ubay’s son offered
  • 21:56 - 22:00
    to behead his father, the Prophet
    (pbuh) refused.
  • 22:00 - 22:02
    He declined his offer and replied:
  • 22:02 - 22:05
    ‘People would say that Muhammad
    kills his companions!’
  • 22:05 - 22:09
    Thus, in political matters, certain things
    have to be similarly overlooked.
  • 22:09 - 22:13
    However, Uthman’s murder pertained to the
    questions of retributive justice (qisas).
  • 22:13 - 22:16
    The former case pertains to Abdullah
    bin Ubay’s insolence.
  • 22:16 - 22:20
    It was such a matter in which you
    could not identify a specific crime.
  • 22:20 - 22:22
    Thus, it was overlooked.
  • 22:22 - 22:26
    However, qisas has an irreducible
    moral dimension.
  • 22:26 - 22:31
    So, the matters that pertain to moral
    questions may be delayed…
  • 22:31 - 22:35
    And in my view, Ali’s (ra) decision was
  • 22:35 - 22:39
    not to let Uthman’s (ra) murderers
    off the hook.
  • 22:39 - 22:41
    However, he delayed the delivery
    of justice.
  • 22:41 - 22:44
    And he repeatedly underscored the
    reasons for the delay:
  • 22:44 - 22:52
    I can only execute this task if you accept
    my decision and come to my assistance!
  • 22:52 - 22:54
    So, this is the plea Ali (ra) is making…
  • 22:54 - 22:57
    He did not evade the issue of delivering
    justice to Uthman (ra).
  • 22:57 - 23:02
    The point I am trying to clarify is this:
    the attitude has developed
  • 23:02 - 23:06
    in our society to judge and condemn
    one or the other party.
  • 23:06 - 23:10
    However, in such sensitive matters
    the positions of and the constraints
  • 23:10 - 23:13
    upon every group must be kept in
    consideration.
  • 23:13 - 23:16
    And in today’s world, when we form
    opinions and make decisions
  • 23:16 - 23:19
    about political matters, we take all
    these factors into consideration.
  • 23:19 - 23:23
    [Ilyas] Ghamidi Sahab, you provided the
    explanation and
  • 23:23 - 23:27
    justification of Ali’s (ra) steps, which
    according to you, Maulana Maududi,
  • 23:27 - 23:30
    who stands opposite to you in
    the entire matter, couldn’t offer.
  • 23:30 - 23:34
    But you have highlighted a new and
    unique dimension for the people
  • 23:34 - 23:37
    whom you are trying to teach the art
    of assessing the positions
  • 23:37 - 23:39
    of the opposing sides in an
    unbiased manner.
  • 23:39 - 23:41
    We shall take the conversation forward.
  • 23:41 - 23:45
    Inshallah, in the next episode, we shall
    ask you about Muawiya (ra),
  • 23:45 - 23:48
    whom we give a lot of leeway that there
    was no house of representatives
  • 23:48 - 23:52
    in that age. However, the empire had
    already expanded when Uthman (ra)
  • 23:52 - 23:54
    was elected as the caliph, but still a
    scientific approach was adopted
  • 23:54 - 23:55
    to choose the new ruler.
  • 23:55 - 23:57
    Why did Muawiya (ra) not adopt the
    same approach and
  • 23:57 - 23:59
    why did he insist on transferring
    the government to Yazid?
  • 23:59 - 24:00
    All these topics shall be brought
    under discussion.
  • 24:00 - 24:04
    We are running out of time.
    We shall take your leave. Allah Hafiz!
Title:
Hazrat Ali (ra) aur Ameer Muawiya (ra) Ka Ikhtilaf - Part 15 - Javed Ahmad Ghamidi
Description:

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Video Language:
Urdu
Duration:
24:13

English subtitles

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