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Our main story tonight
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is government surveillance.
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And I realize most people
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would rather have a conversation
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about literally any other topic.
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Including: 'Is my smartphone
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giving me cancer?'
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To which the answer is: Probably.
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Or: 'Do goldfish suffer from depression?'
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To which the answer is:
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Yes, but very briefly.
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But the fact is:
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It is vital
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that we have a discussion about this now.
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Because an important date
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is just around the corner.
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One big day to circle on the calendar
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when it comes to
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a very controversial subject.
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The re-authorization of the Patriot Act
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and all of the
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controversial provisions therein.
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June 1 they've got to come to an agreement
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to re-authorize
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or curtail those programs.
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Yes. Some controversial provisions
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within the Patriot Act
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are set to expire on June 1.
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So circle that date
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on your calendars, everyone.
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And while you're at it:
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Circle June 2 as well.
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Because that's Justin Long's birthday.
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You all forgot last year...
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...and he f*cking noticed.
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Now, over the last couple of years
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you've probably heard a lot about
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strange-sounding programs. Such as:
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X-Keyscore, Muscular, Prism, and Mystic.
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Which are -coincidentally- also the names
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of some of Florida's
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least popular stripclubs.
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"Welcome to X-Keyscore!"
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"Our dancers are fully un-redacted
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and Tuesday is wing-night!"
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But if you don't mind, I would like
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to refresh your memory over some of this.
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And let's start our focussing on the most
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controversial portion of the Patriot Act
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that is up for renewal:
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Section 215.
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Which, I'm aware, sounds like the name
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of an Eastern European boy-band.
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"We are Section 215."
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"Prepare to have your hearts...
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throbbed."
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There's the cute one, the bad-boy,
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the one who strangled a potato-farmer,
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and the one without an iron-deficiency.
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They're incredible.
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But the content of the real Section 215
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is actually even more sinister.
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It's called Section 215.
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Nicknamed: the library records provision.
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Which allows the government to require
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businesses to hand over records of any
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quote, 'any tangible things'
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including: books, records, papers,
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documents, and other items.
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If that sounds broad, it's because
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it was very much written that way.
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Section 215 says the government can ask
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for 'any tangible things' so long as it's
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'for an investigation to protect
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against international terrorism'.
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Which is basically a blank cheque.
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It's letting a teenager borrow the car
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under the strict condition that they
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only use it for 'car-related activities'.
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"Okay, mom and dad, I'm gonna use this
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for a hand-job in a Wendy's parking lot
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but that is car-related,
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so I think I'm covered."
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Section 215 is overseen
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by a secret intelligence-court
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known as the FISA-court.
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And they've interpreted it to mean
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the government could basically collect and
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store phone-records for every American.
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The vast majority of whom, of course
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have no connection to terrorism.
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Unless, Aunt Cheryl has been gravely
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mis-characterizing the activities
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of her needle-point club.
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"It's a sleeper-cell,
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isn't is, Aunt Cheryl?"
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"You will hang for this, Aunt Cheryl."
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"You're a traitor and a terrible aunt."
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"Not in that order."
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Now, the government will point out
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that under 215, they hold phone-records
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and not the calls themselves.
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What the intelligence-community is doing
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is looking at phone-numbers
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and durations of calls
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they are not looking at people's names
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and they are not looking at content.
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Yes, but that's not entirely reassuring.
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Because you can extrapolate a lot
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from that information.
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If they knew that you'd called your ex
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12 times last night, between 1 and 4 AM
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for a duration of 15 minutes each time
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they can be fairly sure that you left
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some pretty pathetic voice-mails.
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"I don't care whose monitoring
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this call, Vicky."
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"We should be together!"
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Pick up the phone, dammit!
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I'm a human being, not an animal!"
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Now, the Patriot-act was written
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just after 9-11.
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And for years it was extended
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and re-authorized
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with barely a passing thought.
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In fact, it became so routine
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that when it was extended in 2011
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one newscast just tacked it
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onto the end of a report
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about a Presidential trip abroad.
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Chip Reid. CBS-news.
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Travelling with the President
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in Deauville, France.
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Also in France, by the way
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President Obama signed in a law
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4-year extension
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of the terrorism fighting Patriot-Act.
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Also in France, by the way?
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By the way?
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He threw that in
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like a mother telling her grown daughter
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that her childhood pet just died.
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"Oh, nice talking to you, sweety.
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Also, by the way, Mr. Peppers is dead.
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See you at Christmas." BANG
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But all of that was before the public
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was made aware of what the government's
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capabilities actually were.
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'Cause that all ended in June of 2013.
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Edward Snowden has just taken
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responsibility for one of the
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biggest government leaks in US history.
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We learned that the government has
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the capacity to track
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virtually every American phone-call
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and to scoop up impossibly vast
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quantities of data across the internet.
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Revelations that the NSA eavesdropped
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on world leaders.
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If you've ever been to the Bahamas
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the NSA could've recorded your phone-calls
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and stored them for up to a month.
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All that information was exposed
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by Edward Snowden.
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And it is still kind of incredible
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that a 29-year-old contractor
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was able to steal top-secret documents
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from an organization
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that LITERALLY has the word 'security'
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in it's name.
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Clearly, that was not great for them.
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The only place where it should be THAT
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easy for employees in their 20ies to steal
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is a Lid store.
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"Dude, you sure I should take this?"
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"Relax, dude, it's a Miami Marlins-cap,
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we're not exactly selling
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Fabergé eggs here."
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It is still unclear
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exactly how many documents
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Edward Snowden stole.
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Although he's consistently tried
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to re-assure people
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that he put them in good hands.
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Honestly, I don't want to be the person
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making the decisions on what should
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be public and what shouldn't.
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Which is why
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rather than publishing these on my own
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or putting them out openly
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I'm running them through journalists.
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Well, that sounds great.
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But of course it's not a fail-safe plan.
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As was proven when the New York Times
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published this slide
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but did such a sloppy job
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of blocking out redacted information
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that some people were able to read
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the information behind that black bar
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which concerned how the US was monitoring
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Al Qaida in Mosul.
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A group now known as ISIS.
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So essentially a national security secret
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was leaked because no-one at the Times
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knows how to use Microsoft Paint.
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And look, you can think
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that Snowden did the wrong thing.
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Or did it in the wrong way.
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But the fact is:
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we have this information now
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and we no longer get the luxury
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of pleading ignorance.
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It's like you can't go to Sea World
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and pretend that Shamu's happy, anymore.
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When we now know
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at least half the water in her tank
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is whale-tears.
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We know that now.
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You can't un-know that information.
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So you have to bear that in mind.
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But here's the thing:
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It's now 2 years later
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and it seems like we've kind of forgotten
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to have a debate
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over the content of what Snowden leaked.
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A recent Pew-report found that nearly
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half of Americans say that they're
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'not very concerned'
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or 'not at all concerned'
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about government surveillance.
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Which is fine.
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If that's an informed opinion.
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But I'm not sure that it is.
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Because we actually sent a camera-crew to
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Times Square to ask some random passers by
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who Edward Snowden was and what he did.
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And there are the responses that we got.
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I have no idea who Edward Snowden is.
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Have no idea who Edward Snowden is.
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I've heard the name, I just can't picture
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think... right now exactly what it is.
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Edward Snowden...
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No. I do not.
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Just for the record:
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that wasn't cherry picking.
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That was entirely reflective
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of everyone we spoke to.
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Although, to be fair:
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some people did remember his name
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they just couldn't remember why.
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He sold some information to people.
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He revealed some information
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that shouldn't have been revealed.
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I think from what I remember is
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the information that he shared was
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detrimental to our military secrets?
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And keeping our soldiers and our country
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safe?
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He leaked documents what the US Army's
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operations in Iraq.
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Edward Snowden revealed a bunch of
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of secrets, I guess, or information
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into Wiki... Wikileaks?
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Edward Snowden leaked...
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Ah, he's in charge of Wikileaks?
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Edward Snowden revealed a lot of
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documents through Wikileaks...?
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Okay, so here's the thing:
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Edward Snowden is NOT the Wikileaks guy.
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The Wikileaks guy is Julian Assange.
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And you do not want
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to be confused with him.
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Partly because he was far less careful
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than Snowden in what he released and how.
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And partly because he resembles
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a sandwich-bag full of biscuit-dough
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wearing a Stevie Nicks-wig.
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And that is, that is ciritical.
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Julian Assange is not a like-able man.
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00:08:58,965 --> 00:09:01,556
Even Benedict Cumberbatch could not
281
00:09:01,556 --> 00:09:03,312
make him like-able.
282
00:09:03,312 --> 00:09:05,422
He's un-Cumberbatch-able.
283
00:09:06,114 --> 00:09:07,271
That was supposed to be
284
00:09:07,271 --> 00:09:08,881
physically impossible.
285
00:09:09,442 --> 00:09:10,640
But I don't blame people
286
00:09:10,640 --> 00:09:11,848
for being confused.
287
00:09:11,848 --> 00:09:13,122
We've been looking at this story
288
00:09:13,122 --> 00:09:14,556
for the last 2 weeks
289
00:09:14,556 --> 00:09:17,192
and it is hard to get your head around.
290
00:09:17,192 --> 00:09:18,807
Not just because there are so many
291
00:09:18,807 --> 00:09:20,769
complicated programs to keep track of
292
00:09:20,769 --> 00:09:21,963
but also because
293
00:09:21,963 --> 00:09:23,787
there are no easy answers here.
294
00:09:23,787 --> 00:09:26,316
We all naturally want perfect privacy
295
00:09:26,316 --> 00:09:28,536
and perfect safety.
296
00:09:28,536 --> 00:09:31,170
But those 2 things cannot coexist.
297
00:09:31,170 --> 00:09:32,565
It's like how you can't have
298
00:09:32,565 --> 00:09:34,545
a badass pet falcon...
299
00:09:34,545 --> 00:09:37,485
and an adorable pet vole named Herbert.
300
00:09:39,140 --> 00:09:41,327
Either you have to lose one of them
301
00:09:41,327 --> 00:09:43,170
-which obviously you don't want to do-
302
00:09:43,170 --> 00:09:44,469
or you have to accept some
303
00:09:44,469 --> 00:09:46,899
reasonable restrictions on both of them.
304
00:09:47,432 --> 00:09:49,925
Now to be fair, the NSA will argue
305
00:09:49,925 --> 00:09:52,092
that just because they CAN do something
306
00:09:52,092 --> 00:09:53,612
doesn't mean they DO do it.
307
00:09:53,612 --> 00:09:55,424
And, that there are restrictions
308
00:09:55,424 --> 00:09:57,039
on their operations
309
00:09:57,039 --> 00:09:58,088
such as the FISA-court
310
00:09:58,088 --> 00:10:00,087
which must approve requests
311
00:10:00,087 --> 00:10:01,332
for foreign surveillance.
312
00:10:01,332 --> 00:10:02,118
But.
313
00:10:02,118 --> 00:10:04,775
In 34 years, that court has approved
314
00:10:04,775 --> 00:10:07,116
over 35000 applications
315
00:10:07,116 --> 00:10:09,146
and only rejected 12.
316
00:10:09,981 --> 00:10:12,677
Yes. Much like Robert Durst's second wife.
317
00:10:12,677 --> 00:10:16,156
The FISA-court is alarmingly accepting.
318
00:10:16,156 --> 00:10:18,263
"Listen, Robert, I'm not
319
00:10:18,263 --> 00:10:20,049
gonna ask you too many questions."
320
00:10:20,049 --> 00:10:22,306
I'm just gonna give you the benefit of
321
00:10:22,306 --> 00:10:24,302
a doubt that you clearly don't deserve."
322
00:10:24,302 --> 00:10:27,522
At least tell him to blink and burp less.
323
00:10:29,366 --> 00:10:31,980
The burping might be the most troubling
324
00:10:31,980 --> 00:10:33,740
thing about that show.
325
00:10:35,403 --> 00:10:38,052
So maybe it's time for us to talk.
326
00:10:38,052 --> 00:10:39,961
About where the limits should be.
327
00:10:39,961 --> 00:10:41,971
And the best place to start would be
328
00:10:41,984 --> 00:10:43,590
Section 215.
329
00:10:43,590 --> 00:10:45,171
Not just because it's the easiest
330
00:10:45,171 --> 00:10:45,874
to understand
331
00:10:45,874 --> 00:10:47,968
but there is wide-spread agreement
332
00:10:47,968 --> 00:10:49,634
it needs to be reformed.
333
00:10:49,634 --> 00:10:51,595
From the President, to Ted Cruz,
334
00:10:51,595 --> 00:10:54,469
to both the ACLU and the NRA,
335
00:10:54,469 --> 00:10:55,400
to even the guy
336
00:10:55,400 --> 00:10:57,420
who wrote the thing in the first place.
337
00:10:57,420 --> 00:10:58,634
I was the principal author
338
00:10:58,634 --> 00:10:59,832
of the Patriot Act.
339
00:10:59,832 --> 00:11:03,461
I can say, that without qualification
340
00:11:03,461 --> 00:11:05,967
Congress never did intend to allow
341
00:11:05,967 --> 00:11:07,161
bulk-collections
342
00:11:07,161 --> 00:11:09,273
when it passed Section 215.
343
00:11:09,273 --> 00:11:11,650
And no fair reading of the text
344
00:11:11,650 --> 00:11:13,887
would allow for this program.
345
00:11:13,887 --> 00:11:15,148
Think about that.
346
00:11:15,148 --> 00:11:16,515
He was the author.
347
00:11:16,515 --> 00:11:18,213
That's the legislative equivalent
348
00:11:18,213 --> 00:11:19,121
of Lewis Carroll
349
00:11:19,121 --> 00:11:20,983
seeing the tea-cups ride at Disney Land
350
00:11:20,983 --> 00:11:21,785
and saying:
351
00:11:21,785 --> 00:11:23,607
"This has got to be reined in."
352
00:11:23,607 --> 00:11:25,177
"No fair reading of my text
353
00:11:25,177 --> 00:11:26,877
would allow for this ride."
354
00:11:27,085 --> 00:11:28,850
"You've turned my perfectly nice tale
355
00:11:28,850 --> 00:11:30,238
of psychedelic paedofilia
356
00:11:30,238 --> 00:11:32,368
into a garish vomitorium."
357
00:11:34,112 --> 00:11:35,792
"This is not what I wanted!"
358
00:11:37,280 --> 00:11:39,057
And even the NSA has said
359
00:11:39,057 --> 00:11:41,384
that the number of terror-plots in the US
360
00:11:41,384 --> 00:11:42,437
that the Section 215
361
00:11:42,437 --> 00:11:44,669
telephone-records program has disrupted...
362
00:11:44,669 --> 00:11:46,051
...is 1.
363
00:11:46,051 --> 00:11:47,384
And it's worth noting:
364
00:11:47,384 --> 00:11:49,046
that one particular plot
365
00:11:49,046 --> 00:11:51,420
involved a cabdriver in San Diego
366
00:11:51,420 --> 00:11:54,170
who gave $8500 to a terror-group.
367
00:11:54,170 --> 00:11:56,858
And that is the shittiest terrorist-plot
368
00:11:56,858 --> 00:11:57,917
I've ever seen.
369
00:11:57,917 --> 00:11:59,223
Other than the plot of
370
00:11:59,223 --> 00:12:01,433
A Good Day To Die Hard.
371
00:12:02,183 --> 00:12:04,378
But here's the big problem here:
372
00:12:04,378 --> 00:12:06,626
If we let Section 215 get renewed
373
00:12:06,626 --> 00:12:07,949
in it's current form
374
00:12:07,949 --> 00:12:09,421
without serious public debate
375
00:12:09,421 --> 00:12:10,581
we're in trouble.
376
00:12:10,581 --> 00:12:11,672
Because Section 215
377
00:12:11,672 --> 00:12:13,183
is the canary in the coal-mine.
378
00:12:13,183 --> 00:12:14,342
If we cannot fix that
379
00:12:14,342 --> 00:12:16,354
we're not gonna fix any of them.
380
00:12:16,354 --> 00:12:18,563
And the public debate so far
381
00:12:18,563 --> 00:12:20,886
has been absolutely pathetic.
382
00:12:20,886 --> 00:12:21,668
A year ago
383
00:12:21,668 --> 00:12:22,910
a former congresswoman was
384
00:12:22,910 --> 00:12:25,823
discussing the 215 program on the news.
385
00:12:25,823 --> 00:12:27,405
Watch wat happened.
386
00:12:27,405 --> 00:12:29,147
This vast collection of data
387
00:12:29,147 --> 00:12:31,533
is not that useful
388
00:12:31,533 --> 00:12:34,414
and infringes substantially
389
00:12:34,414 --> 00:12:35,496
on personal privacy.
390
00:12:35,496 --> 00:12:37,601
I think at this point we should
391
00:12:37,601 --> 00:12:41,916
seriously consider not continuing...
392
00:12:41,916 --> 00:12:44,721
Congress woman Harman, let me interrupt..
393
00:12:44,721 --> 00:12:46,601
Let me interrupt you just for a moment.
394
00:12:46,601 --> 00:12:48,611
We've got some breaking news out of Miami.
395
00:12:48,611 --> 00:12:50,411
Stand by if you will.
396
00:12:50,411 --> 00:12:51,301
Right now in Miami
397
00:12:51,301 --> 00:12:52,487
Justin Bieber
398
00:12:52,487 --> 00:12:54,596
has been arrested on a number of charges.
399
00:12:54,596 --> 00:12:57,097
The judge is reading the charges
400
00:12:57,097 --> 00:12:58,764
including resisting arrest
401
00:12:58,764 --> 00:13:00,303
and driving under the influence.
402
00:13:00,303 --> 00:13:02,195
He's appearing now before the judge for
403
00:13:02,195 --> 00:13:04,177
his bond-hearing. Let's watch.
404
00:13:07,683 --> 00:13:09,017
Actually, you know what?
405
00:13:09,017 --> 00:13:11,014
Bad news, we're gonna have to interrupt
406
00:13:11,014 --> 00:13:12,719
your interruption of the Bieber news
407
00:13:12,719 --> 00:13:14,109
for a new interruption.
408
00:13:14,109 --> 00:13:16,184
This time featuring a YouTube video of
409
00:13:16,184 --> 00:13:17,986
a tortoise having sex with a plastic clog.
410
00:13:17,986 --> 00:13:19,353
Let's watch.
411
00:13:19,353 --> 00:13:20,308
HEEH
412
00:13:21,938 --> 00:13:23,213
HEEH
413
00:13:26,963 --> 00:13:27,968
HEH
414
00:13:30,098 --> 00:13:33,075
That. Is essentially the current tone
415
00:13:33,075 --> 00:13:35,156
of this vitally important debate.
416
00:13:35,456 --> 00:13:37,007
HEEEH
417
00:13:38,377 --> 00:13:39,319
And again:
418
00:13:39,319 --> 00:13:40,507
I'm not saying
419
00:13:40,507 --> 00:13:42,305
this is an easy conversation.
420
00:13:42,305 --> 00:13:43,913
But we have to have it.
421
00:13:43,913 --> 00:13:45,185
I know this is confusing.
422
00:13:45,185 --> 00:13:46,463
And unfortunately the most
423
00:13:46,463 --> 00:13:47,893
obvious person to talk to
424
00:13:47,893 --> 00:13:49,838
about this is Edward Snowden.
425
00:13:49,838 --> 00:13:51,887
But he currently lives in Russia. Meaning:
426
00:13:51,887 --> 00:13:53,519
If you wanted to ask him about any
427
00:13:53,519 --> 00:13:55,184
of these issues, you'd have to fly
428
00:13:55,184 --> 00:13:56,650
all the way there to do it.
429
00:13:56,650 --> 00:13:58,624
And it is not a pleasant flight.
430
00:13:59,624 --> 00:14:01,440
And the reason I know that...
431
00:14:01,920 --> 00:14:03,955
...is that last week, I went to Russia
432
00:14:03,955 --> 00:14:05,645
to speak to Edward Snowden.
433
00:14:06,190 --> 00:14:07,810
And this is what happened.
434
00:14:09,928 --> 00:14:13,161
Yes, last week I spent 48 paranoid hours
435
00:14:13,161 --> 00:14:14,370
in Moscow.
436
00:14:14,370 --> 00:14:15,913
Arguably the last place on earth
437
00:14:15,913 --> 00:14:16,816
where you can find
438
00:14:16,816 --> 00:14:19,211
an overweight Josef Stalin impersonator
439
00:14:19,211 --> 00:14:21,941
arguing with an unconvincing fake Lenin.
440
00:14:22,396 --> 00:14:23,481
And after experiencing
441
00:14:23,481 --> 00:14:25,945
Russia's famously warm hospitality
442
00:14:25,945 --> 00:14:27,924
I went to meet Edward Snowden.
443
00:14:27,924 --> 00:14:30,024
Who is supposed to show up in this room
444
00:14:30,024 --> 00:14:31,097
at noon.
445
00:14:31,097 --> 00:14:32,658
However, after 5 minutes after
446
00:14:32,658 --> 00:14:34,556
the interview was scheduled to begin
447
00:14:34,556 --> 00:14:36,697
I had a troubling thought.
448
00:14:37,237 --> 00:14:38,127
I don't know.
449
00:14:39,026 --> 00:14:40,426
Do you think he's coming?
450
00:14:42,444 --> 00:14:44,139
'Cause my argument is:
451
00:14:40,426 --> 00:14:41,734
Yeah, he's coming.
452
00:14:44,139 --> 00:14:45,769
Why would he?
453
00:14:45,769 --> 00:14:47,729
When you think about it.
454
00:14:49,040 --> 00:14:50,922
I got 2000 roebels
455
00:14:50,922 --> 00:14:53,159
that says he doesn't make it.
456
00:14:53,159 --> 00:14:55,469
Without understanding how much that is.
457
00:15:00,365 --> 00:15:01,817
All I'm saying is...
458
00:15:01,817 --> 00:15:04,650
...a 10-hour flight for an empty chair?
459
00:15:04,650 --> 00:15:06,800
I'm gonna lose my shit.
460
00:15:10,338 --> 00:15:12,392
It turns out it may be a bit of a problem
461
00:15:12,392 --> 00:15:14,647
because our Russian producer
462
00:15:14,647 --> 00:15:18,582
booked us in a room directly overlooking
463
00:15:18,582 --> 00:15:21,302
the old KGB-building.
464
00:15:21,302 --> 00:15:22,146
And the home
465
00:15:22,146 --> 00:15:25,170
of the current Federal Security Bureau.
466
00:15:25,170 --> 00:15:26,716
And we've just been told...
467
00:15:26,716 --> 00:15:28,345
...they know we're here.
468
00:15:28,345 --> 00:15:30,035
So uhm...
469
00:15:30,035 --> 00:15:32,212
So that happened.
470
00:15:37,543 --> 00:15:40,645
Uhm, just if the Russian...
471
00:15:40,645 --> 00:15:42,019
...Russian KGB is listening:
472
00:15:42,019 --> 00:15:43,224
We'll ring the fire-alarm
473
00:15:43,224 --> 00:15:44,654
if he's not coming.
474
00:15:47,570 --> 00:15:48,910
Oh shit.
475
00:15:49,695 --> 00:15:51,405
Oh God.
476
00:15:57,732 --> 00:15:58,902
So sorry for the delay.
477
00:15:58,902 --> 00:16:00,455
It's fine, don't worry about it.
478
00:16:00,455 --> 00:16:02,378
HOLY SHIT.
479
00:16:02,378 --> 00:16:04,454
He actually came.
480
00:16:04,454 --> 00:16:06,685
Edward f*cking Snowden.
481
00:16:06,685 --> 00:16:09,660
The most famous hero and/or traitor
482
00:16:09,660 --> 00:16:11,719
in recent American history!
483
00:16:11,719 --> 00:16:13,321
And I've started with a question
484
00:16:13,321 --> 00:16:15,423
designed to test his loyalties.
485
00:16:16,093 --> 00:16:18,193
How much do you miss America?
486
00:16:18,193 --> 00:16:21,656
You know, my country is something
487
00:16:21,656 --> 00:16:24,815
that travels with me, you know.
488
00:16:24,815 --> 00:16:26,498
It's not just a geogra...
489
00:16:26,498 --> 00:16:28,312
That's a way too complicated answer.
490
00:16:28,312 --> 00:16:29,822
The answer is: I miss it a lot.
491
00:16:29,822 --> 00:16:31,702
it's the greatest country in the world.
492
00:16:31,702 --> 00:16:32,701
I do miss my country.
493
00:16:32,701 --> 00:16:33,570
I do miss my home.
494
00:16:33,570 --> 00:16:34,551
I do miss my family.
495
00:16:34,551 --> 00:16:37,222
Do you miss hot pockets?
496
00:16:37,222 --> 00:16:39,125
Yes.
497
00:16:39,125 --> 00:16:41,093
I miss hot pockets. Very much.
498
00:16:41,093 --> 00:16:43,633
Okay. The entire state of Florida?
499
00:16:51,945 --> 00:16:53,249
Let's just let that silence
500
00:16:53,249 --> 00:16:54,719
hang in the air.
501
00:16:55,398 --> 00:16:57,245
Truck Nuts?
502
00:16:57,245 --> 00:16:58,391
Do you miss Truck Nuts?
503
00:16:58,391 --> 00:16:59,681
I don't know what they are.
504
00:16:59,681 --> 00:17:01,411
Lucky for you, Edward...
505
00:17:05,121 --> 00:17:07,018
Not just Truck Nuts.
506
00:17:07,018 --> 00:17:09,494
Stars and stripes Truck Nuts.
507
00:17:09,494 --> 00:17:11,714
That is 2 balls of liberty
508
00:17:11,715 --> 00:17:13,141
in a freedom sack.
509
00:17:13,141 --> 00:17:14,606
You really thought ahead.
510
00:17:14,606 --> 00:17:17,083
Well, at least one of us did.
511
00:17:17,083 --> 00:17:20,084
You know, 'cause of the... uhm...
512
00:17:20,084 --> 00:17:22,226
the quandary... the...
513
00:17:22,226 --> 00:17:25,417
...Kafka-esque nightmare that you're in.
514
00:17:25,417 --> 00:17:28,037
Okay. Let's dive in.
515
00:17:28,037 --> 00:17:30,157
Why did you do this?
516
00:17:30,157 --> 00:17:31,580
The NSA has
517
00:17:31,580 --> 00:17:33,901
the greatest surveillance capabilities
518
00:17:33,901 --> 00:17:36,469
that we've ever seen in history.
519
00:17:36,469 --> 00:17:38,643
Now, what they will argue
520
00:17:38,643 --> 00:17:40,746
is that they don't use this
521
00:17:40,746 --> 00:17:43,225
for nefarious purposes
522
00:17:43,225 --> 00:17:45,376
against American citizens.
523
00:17:45,376 --> 00:17:47,757
In some ways that's true.
524
00:17:47,757 --> 00:17:50,428
But the real problem is that
525
00:17:50,428 --> 00:17:52,691
they're using these capabilities
526
00:17:52,691 --> 00:17:54,619
to make us vulnerable to them
527
00:17:54,619 --> 00:17:56,605
and then saying:
528
00:17:56,605 --> 00:17:58,667
"While I have a gun pointed at your head
529
00:17:58,667 --> 00:18:00,279
I'm not gonna pull the trigger."
530
00:18:00,279 --> 00:18:01,522
"Trust me."
531
00:18:01,522 --> 00:18:04,467
So, what does the NSA you want look like?
532
00:18:04,467 --> 00:18:07,844
Because you applied for a job at the NSA.
533
00:18:07,844 --> 00:18:09,864
So you clearly see an inherent value
534
00:18:09,864 --> 00:18:11,972
in that shadowy organization.
535
00:18:11,972 --> 00:18:15,000
I worked with mass-surveillance systems
536
00:18:15,000 --> 00:18:17,754
against Chinese hackers.
537
00:18:17,754 --> 00:18:19,045
I saw that, you know
538
00:18:19,045 --> 00:18:20,338
these things do have some purpose.
539
00:18:20,338 --> 00:18:21,502
And you want your spies
540
00:18:21,502 --> 00:18:22,984
to be good at spying.
541
00:18:22,984 --> 00:18:23,806
To be fair.
542
00:18:23,806 --> 00:18:24,529
Right.
543
00:18:24,529 --> 00:18:26,173
What you don't want is
544
00:18:26,173 --> 00:18:28,086
you don't want them spying inside
545
00:18:28,086 --> 00:18:29,253
their own country.
546
00:18:29,253 --> 00:18:32,684
Spies are great when they're on our side.
547
00:18:32,684 --> 00:18:33,784
But we can never forget
548
00:18:33,784 --> 00:18:35,312
that they're incredibly powerful
549
00:18:35,312 --> 00:18:36,517
and incredibly dangerous.
550
00:18:36,517 --> 00:18:37,993
And if they're off the leash...
551
00:18:37,993 --> 00:18:39,658
...they can end up coming after us.
552
00:18:39,658 --> 00:18:40,698
Well just to be clear we're talking about
553
00:18:40,698 --> 00:18:41,739
2 different things here
554
00:18:41,739 --> 00:18:42,780
Domestic surveillance
555
00:18:42,780 --> 00:18:44,139
and foreign surveillance.
556
00:18:44,139 --> 00:18:45,529
'Cause domestic surveillance
557
00:18:45,529 --> 00:18:48,475
Americans give some of a shit about.
558
00:18:48,475 --> 00:18:50,093
Foreign surveillance...
559
00:18:50,093 --> 00:18:52,418
...they don't give any remote shit about.
560
00:18:52,418 --> 00:18:53,752
Well the second question is:
561
00:18:53,752 --> 00:18:56,080
When we talk about foreign surveillance
562
00:18:56,080 --> 00:18:57,899
are we applying it in ways that are
563
00:18:57,899 --> 00:18:59,134
beneficial...
564
00:18:59,134 --> 00:19:00,184
No-one cares.
565
00:19:00,184 --> 00:19:00,922
In terms...
566
00:19:00,922 --> 00:19:02,113
They don't give a shit.
567
00:19:02,113 --> 00:19:04,805
We spied on UNICEF, the children's fund.
568
00:19:04,805 --> 00:19:06,094
Sure.
569
00:19:06,094 --> 00:19:09,564
We spied on lawyers negotiating...
570
00:19:09,569 --> 00:19:12,758
What was UNICEF doing?
571
00:19:12,758 --> 00:19:13,488
I mean:
572
00:19:13,488 --> 00:19:15,503
That's the question there, isn't it?
573
00:19:15,503 --> 00:19:16,283
The question is:
574
00:19:16,283 --> 00:19:17,950
Are these projects valuable?
575
00:19:17,950 --> 00:19:21,044
Are we going to be safer when we're spying
576
00:19:21,044 --> 00:19:23,355
on UNICEF and lawyers who are talking about
577
00:19:23,355 --> 00:19:25,641
the price of shrimp and clove cigarettes.
578
00:19:25,641 --> 00:19:27,412
I don't think people say that's good.
579
00:19:27,412 --> 00:19:28,379
I think they'll say:
580
00:19:28,379 --> 00:19:30,530
I definitely don't care.
581
00:19:30,530 --> 00:19:31,962
Americans do not give a shit.
582
00:19:31,962 --> 00:19:32,993
I think you're right.
583
00:19:32,993 --> 00:19:35,220
About foreign surveillance.
584
00:19:35,220 --> 00:19:37,036
What some people do care about
585
00:19:37,036 --> 00:19:38,476
is whether Snowden considered
586
00:19:38,482 --> 00:19:40,485
the adverse consequences of leaking
587
00:19:40,485 --> 00:19:42,760
so much information at once.
588
00:19:42,760 --> 00:19:44,691
How many of those documents
589
00:19:44,691 --> 00:19:46,815
have you actually read?
590
00:19:46,815 --> 00:19:48,894
I've evaluated all the documents
591
00:19:48,894 --> 00:19:50,060
that are in the archive.
592
00:19:50,060 --> 00:19:51,491
You've read every single one?
593
00:19:51,491 --> 00:19:54,188
I do understand what I've turned over.
594
00:19:54,188 --> 00:19:55,748
But there's a difference between
595
00:19:55,748 --> 00:19:58,522
understanding what's in the documents
596
00:19:58,522 --> 00:20:00,342
and reading what's in the documents.
597
00:20:00,342 --> 00:20:02,456
I recognized the concern.
598
00:20:02,456 --> 00:20:04,329
'Cause when you're handing over
599
00:20:04,329 --> 00:20:06,360
thousands of NSA documents the last
600
00:20:06,360 --> 00:20:09,514
thing you want to do is read them.
601
00:20:09,514 --> 00:20:11,949
I think it's fair to be concerned about
602
00:20:11,949 --> 00:20:13,344
'did this person do enough?'
603
00:20:13,344 --> 00:20:14,497
'were they careful enough?'
604
00:20:14,497 --> 00:20:16,616
Especially when you're handling material
605
00:20:16,616 --> 00:20:18,819
like we know you are handling.
606
00:20:18,819 --> 00:20:19,910
Well, in my defense:
607
00:20:19,910 --> 00:20:21,538
I'm not handling anything anymore.
608
00:20:21,548 --> 00:20:23,317
That's been passed to the journalists
609
00:20:23,317 --> 00:20:24,813
and they're using extraordinary
610
00:20:24,813 --> 00:20:26,749
security measures to make sure that this
611
00:20:26,749 --> 00:20:28,880
is reported in the most responsible way.
612
00:20:28,880 --> 00:20:30,739
But, those are journalists
613
00:20:30,739 --> 00:20:33,240
with a lower technical skill-set than you.
614
00:20:33,240 --> 00:20:35,089
That's true. But they DO understand
615
00:20:35,089 --> 00:20:36,288
-just like you and I do-
616
00:20:36,288 --> 00:20:37,571
just HOW important it is
617
00:20:37,571 --> 00:20:38,775
to get this right.
618
00:20:38,775 --> 00:20:41,015
So the New York Times took a slide
619
00:20:41,015 --> 00:20:42,931
didn't redact it properly...
620
00:20:42,931 --> 00:20:44,474
...and
621
00:20:44,474 --> 00:20:45,767
In the end it was possible
622
00:20:45,767 --> 00:20:47,683
for people to see that something
623
00:20:47,683 --> 00:20:49,828
was being used in Mosul.
624
00:20:49,828 --> 00:20:51,128
On Al Qaida.
625
00:20:51,128 --> 00:20:52,762
That is a problem.
626
00:20:52,762 --> 00:20:53,937
Well, that's a f*ck-up.
627
00:20:53,937 --> 00:20:55,324
It is a f*ck-up.
628
00:20:55,324 --> 00:20:57,339
And these things do happen in reporting.
629
00:20:57,339 --> 00:20:58,956
In journalism we have to accept
630
00:20:58,956 --> 00:21:00,698
that some mistakes will be made.
631
00:21:00,698 --> 00:21:03,711
This is a fundamental concept of liberty.
632
00:21:03,711 --> 00:21:04,486
Right.
633
00:21:04,486 --> 00:21:06,749
But you have to own that then.
634
00:21:08,059 --> 00:21:09,909
You're giving documents with information
635
00:21:09,909 --> 00:21:11,746
you know could be harmful
636
00:21:11,746 --> 00:21:13,714
which could get out there.
637
00:21:13,714 --> 00:21:15,641
Yes.
638
00:21:15,641 --> 00:21:19,179
If people act in bad faith.
639
00:21:19,179 --> 00:21:21,646
Not even bad faith, but incompetence.
640
00:21:21,646 --> 00:21:22,569
We are.
641
00:21:22,569 --> 00:21:24,558
But you will never be
642
00:21:24,558 --> 00:21:28,275
completely free from risk, if you're free.
643
00:21:28,275 --> 00:21:29,479
The only time you can be
644
00:21:29,479 --> 00:21:31,952
free from risk is when you're in prison.
645
00:21:31,952 --> 00:21:34,025
While the risks were significant
646
00:21:34,025 --> 00:21:36,189
Snowden himself has made it clear
647
00:21:36,189 --> 00:21:38,243
he feels the rewards have been worth it.
648
00:21:38,243 --> 00:21:39,940
You've said in you letters to Brasil:
649
00:21:39,940 --> 00:21:41,573
"I was motivated by a believe that
650
00:21:41,573 --> 00:21:43,196
citizens deserve to understand
651
00:21:43,196 --> 00:21:44,720
the system in which they live."
652
00:21:44,720 --> 00:21:45,963
"My greatest fear was that
653
00:21:45,963 --> 00:21:47,741
no-one would listen to my warning."
654
00:21:47,741 --> 00:21:49,901
"Never have I been so glad
655
00:21:49,901 --> 00:21:51,694
to have been so wrong."
656
00:21:51,694 --> 00:21:53,176
How did that feel?
657
00:21:53,176 --> 00:21:55,568
I was initially terrified that this
658
00:21:55,568 --> 00:21:57,003
was going to be a 3-day story.
659
00:21:57,003 --> 00:21:59,316
Everybody was going to forget about it.
660
00:21:59,316 --> 00:22:01,163
But when I saw that
661
00:22:01,163 --> 00:22:03,235
everybody around the world said:
662
00:22:03,235 --> 00:22:05,609
"Wow, this is a problem."
663
00:22:05,609 --> 00:22:09,044
"We have to do something about this."
664
00:22:09,044 --> 00:22:10,558
It felt like vindication.
665
00:22:10,558 --> 00:22:11,856
Even in America?
666
00:22:11,856 --> 00:22:12,912
Even in America.
667
00:22:12,912 --> 00:22:15,033
And I think we're seeing something amazing
668
00:22:15,033 --> 00:22:19,039
which is if you ask... the American people
669
00:22:19,039 --> 00:22:20,996
to make tough decisions
670
00:22:20,996 --> 00:22:23,409
to confront tough issues
671
00:22:23,409 --> 00:22:25,428
to think about hard problems...
672
00:22:25,428 --> 00:22:28,971
...they'll actually surprise you.
673
00:22:28,971 --> 00:22:29,767
Okay.
674
00:22:29,767 --> 00:22:30,782
Here's the problem:
675
00:22:30,782 --> 00:22:32,451
I did ask some Americans.
676
00:22:32,451 --> 00:22:35,221
And, boy did it surprise me.
677
00:22:37,783 --> 00:22:39,869
I have no idea who Edward Snowden is.
678
00:22:39,869 --> 00:22:41,626
You've never heard of Edward Snowden?
679
00:22:41,626 --> 00:22:42,544
No.
680
00:22:42,544 --> 00:22:45,069
I have no idea who Edward Snowden is.
681
00:22:45,069 --> 00:22:46,500
I've heard the name
682
00:22:46,500 --> 00:22:48,541
I just can't picture... think right now
683
00:22:48,541 --> 00:22:49,872
exactly what it is.
684
00:22:49,872 --> 00:22:51,695
Well, he's... uhm...
685
00:22:51,695 --> 00:22:53,725
He sold some information to people.
686
00:22:53,725 --> 00:22:55,624
He revealed some information
687
00:22:55,624 --> 00:22:58,980
that shouldn't have been revealed.
688
00:22:58,980 --> 00:23:01,482
Edward Snowden revealed a lot of documents
689
00:23:01,482 --> 00:23:03,551
through Wikileaks.
690
00:23:03,551 --> 00:23:05,063
Edward Snowden revealed a bunch of
691
00:23:05,063 --> 00:23:07,015
secrets, I guess...
692
00:23:07,015 --> 00:23:08,969
or information into Wikileaks.
693
00:23:08,969 --> 00:23:10,916
Edward Snowden leaked... uhm...
694
00:23:10,916 --> 00:23:12,726
he's in charge of Wikileaks.
695
00:23:13,596 --> 00:23:16,128
I'm in charge of Wikileaks.
696
00:23:16,128 --> 00:23:17,582
Not ideal.
697
00:23:17,582 --> 00:23:18,829
I guess, on the plus side:
698
00:23:18,829 --> 00:23:20,232
You might be able to go home.
699
00:23:20,232 --> 00:23:21,811
'Cause it seems like no-one knows
700
00:23:21,811 --> 00:23:24,089
who the f*ck you are or what you did
701
00:23:24,089 --> 00:23:26,695
We can't expect everybody to be uniformly
702
00:23:26,695 --> 00:23:28,847
informed.
703
00:23:28,847 --> 00:23:31,339
So, did you do this to solve a problem?
704
00:23:31,339 --> 00:23:34,599
I did this to give the American people
705
00:23:34,599 --> 00:23:36,848
a chance to decide for themselves
706
00:23:36,848 --> 00:23:39,284
the kind of government they want to have.
707
00:23:39,284 --> 00:23:41,625
That is a conversation that I think that
708
00:23:41,625 --> 00:23:44,254
the American people deserve to decide.
709
00:23:44,254 --> 00:23:45,585
There is no doubt that it is
710
00:23:45,585 --> 00:23:47,319
a critical conversation.
711
00:23:47,319 --> 00:23:49,677
But is it a conversation that we have
712
00:23:49,677 --> 00:23:52,377
the capacity to have?
713
00:23:52,377 --> 00:23:54,505
Because it's so complicated.
714
00:23:54,505 --> 00:23:57,226
We don't fundamentally understand it.
715
00:23:57,226 --> 00:23:58,989
It is a challenging conversation.
716
00:23:58,989 --> 00:24:00,812
It's difficult for most people
717
00:24:00,812 --> 00:24:02,893
to even conceptualize.
718
00:24:02,893 --> 00:24:04,126
The problem is
719
00:24:04,126 --> 00:24:05,942
the internet is massively complex
720
00:24:05,942 --> 00:24:08,034
and so much of it is invisible.
721
00:24:08,034 --> 00:24:11,179
Service providers, technicians, engineers,
722
00:24:11,179 --> 00:24:12,153
the phonenumber....
723
00:24:12,153 --> 00:24:13,874
Let me stop you right there, Edward.
724
00:24:13,874 --> 00:24:15,571
'Cause this is the whole problem.
725
00:24:15,571 --> 00:24:16,277
Right.
726
00:24:16,277 --> 00:24:17,540
This is the whole problem.
727
00:24:17,540 --> 00:24:18,347
I glaze over.
728
00:24:18,347 --> 00:24:20,324
It's like the IT-guy comes to your office
729
00:24:20,324 --> 00:24:23,251
and you go: "Oooh shit".
730
00:24:23,251 --> 00:24:24,475
In fairness...
731
00:24:24,475 --> 00:24:26,923
"Ooh shit, don't teach me anything."
732
00:24:26,923 --> 00:24:28,597
"I don't want to learn."
733
00:24:28,597 --> 00:24:30,839
"You smell like canned soup."
734
00:24:30,839 --> 00:24:32,601
It's a real challenge to figure out
735
00:24:32,601 --> 00:24:35,113
how do we communicate
736
00:24:35,113 --> 00:24:37,917
things that require sort of years and years
737
00:24:37,917 --> 00:24:39,474
of technical understanding.
738
00:24:39,474 --> 00:24:42,677
And compress that into seconds of speech.
739
00:24:42,677 --> 00:24:45,954
So, I'm sympathetic to the problem there.
740
00:24:45,954 --> 00:24:47,327
But the thing is
741
00:24:47,327 --> 00:24:49,463
everything you did only matters
742
00:24:49,463 --> 00:24:52,757
if we have this conversation properly.
743
00:24:52,757 --> 00:24:54,430
So let me help you out there.
744
00:24:54,430 --> 00:24:56,186
You mentioned in an interview
745
00:24:56,186 --> 00:24:57,811
that the NSA was passing around
746
00:24:57,811 --> 00:24:59,267
naked photo's of people.
747
00:24:59,267 --> 00:25:02,277
Yeah. This is something where it's...
748
00:25:02,277 --> 00:25:05,529
it's not actually seen as a big deal.
749
00:25:05,529 --> 00:25:07,378
In the culture of NSA.
750
00:25:07,378 --> 00:25:09,227
Because you see naked pictures
751
00:25:09,227 --> 00:25:10,590
all of the time.
752
00:25:10,590 --> 00:25:11,694
That.
753
00:25:11,694 --> 00:25:13,234
Terrifies people.
754
00:25:13,234 --> 00:25:15,518
'Cause when we asked people about THAT...
755
00:25:15,518 --> 00:25:17,284
...this is the response you get.
756
00:25:17,284 --> 00:25:18,867
The government should not be able
757
00:25:18,867 --> 00:25:20,081
to look at dick-pictures.
758
00:25:20,081 --> 00:25:21,955
If the government was looking at
759
00:25:21,955 --> 00:25:23,765
a picture of Gordon's penis
760
00:25:23,765 --> 00:25:25,955
I definitely feel it would be an invasion
761
00:25:25,955 --> 00:25:27,277
of my privacy.
762
00:25:27,277 --> 00:25:29,312
Ah, yeah, if the government was looking at
763
00:25:29,312 --> 00:25:31,332
pictures of my penis, that would upset me.
764
00:25:31,332 --> 00:25:32,915
They should never, ever
765
00:25:32,915 --> 00:25:34,258
the US government have a picture
766
00:25:34,258 --> 00:25:35,607
of my dick.
767
00:25:35,607 --> 00:25:37,020
If my husband sent me
768
00:25:37,020 --> 00:25:38,474
a picture of his penis
769
00:25:38,474 --> 00:25:40,365
and the government could access it
770
00:25:40,365 --> 00:25:43,821
I would want that program to be shut down.
771
00:25:43,821 --> 00:25:47,024
I would want the Dick-pic Program changed.
772
00:25:47,974 --> 00:25:49,795
I would also want the Dick-pic program
773
00:25:49,795 --> 00:25:50,706
changed.
774
00:25:50,706 --> 00:25:52,418
It would be terrific if the program
775
00:25:52,418 --> 00:25:53,167
could change.
776
00:25:53,167 --> 00:25:54,832
I would want it to be tweeked
777
00:25:54,832 --> 00:25:56,981
I would want it to have clear and
778
00:25:56,981 --> 00:25:59,375
transparent laws that we knew about.
779
00:25:59,375 --> 00:26:01,390
And that were communicated to us.
780
00:26:01,390 --> 00:26:03,860
To understand what they're being used for.
781
00:26:03,860 --> 00:26:05,284
Or why the were being kept.
782
00:26:05,284 --> 00:26:06,881
Do you think that program exists?
783
00:26:06,881 --> 00:26:09,217
I don't think that program exists at all.
784
00:26:09,217 --> 00:26:13,242
No.
785
00:26:13,242 --> 00:26:16,863
If I had knowledge that the US government
786
00:26:16,863 --> 00:26:19,026
had a picture of my dick...
787
00:26:19,026 --> 00:26:21,780
...I would be very pissed off.
788
00:26:24,010 --> 00:26:25,773
Well...
789
00:26:25,773 --> 00:26:27,495
The good news is that there's no
790
00:26:27,495 --> 00:26:30,335
program named 'the Dick-pic Program'.
791
00:26:30,335 --> 00:26:32,020
The bad news is that they are still
792
00:26:32,020 --> 00:26:33,746
collecting everybody's information.
793
00:26:33,746 --> 00:26:35,596
Including your dick-pics.
794
00:26:35,596 --> 00:26:36,986
What's the over/under on that last guy
795
00:26:36,990 --> 00:26:39,970
having sent a dick-pic recently?
796
00:26:39,970 --> 00:26:42,412
You don't need to guess, I'll show you.
797
00:26:42,412 --> 00:26:44,262
I did.
798
00:26:44,262 --> 00:26:47,518
I did take a picture of my... dick.
799
00:26:47,518 --> 00:26:49,698
And I sent it to a girl. Recently.
800
00:26:51,723 --> 00:26:53,252
This is the most visible
801
00:26:53,252 --> 00:26:55,352
line in the sand for people.
802
00:26:55,352 --> 00:26:59,151
"Can they see my dick?"
803
00:26:59,151 --> 00:27:01,309
So, with that in mind...
804
00:27:01,309 --> 00:27:03,399
look inside that folder.
805
00:27:07,285 --> 00:27:09,232
That.
806
00:27:09,232 --> 00:27:10,809
Is a picture of my dick.
807
00:27:10,809 --> 00:27:13,071
So let's go through each NSA program
808
00:27:13,071 --> 00:27:15,179
and explain to me it's capabilities
809
00:27:15,179 --> 00:27:18,212
in regards to that photograph...
810
00:27:18,212 --> 00:27:20,812
...of my penis.
811
00:27:20,812 --> 00:27:24,240
702 Surveillance: can they see my dick?
812
00:27:24,240 --> 00:27:25,692
Yes.
813
00:27:25,692 --> 00:27:28,306
The FISA-amendment act of 2008
814
00:27:28,306 --> 00:27:30,181
which Section 702 falls under
815
00:27:30,181 --> 00:27:33,228
allows the bulk-collection
816
00:27:33,228 --> 00:27:34,899
of internet communications that are
817
00:27:34,899 --> 00:27:35,746
one-end foreign.
818
00:27:35,746 --> 00:27:36,556
Bulk-collection:
819
00:27:36,556 --> 00:27:38,343
Now we're talking about my dick.
820
00:27:38,343 --> 00:27:39,060
You get it.
821
00:27:39,060 --> 00:27:39,877
It's not what...
822
00:27:39,877 --> 00:27:41,111
You get it though, right?
823
00:27:41,111 --> 00:27:41,977
I do.
824
00:27:41,977 --> 00:27:43,826
Because it's... it's... yeah, anyway.
825
00:27:43,826 --> 00:27:46,217
So, if you have you're email somewhere
826
00:27:46,217 --> 00:27:48,725
like G-mail, hosted on a server overseas
827
00:27:48,725 --> 00:27:50,280
or transferred over seas
828
00:27:50,280 --> 00:27:52,718
or it any time crosses outside the borders
829
00:27:52,718 --> 00:27:54,949
of the United States...
830
00:27:54,949 --> 00:27:57,419
...you're junk ends up in the database.
831
00:27:57,419 --> 00:27:58,811
So it doesn't have to be
832
00:27:58,811 --> 00:28:00,438
sending your dick to a German?
833
00:28:00,438 --> 00:28:01,146
No.
834
00:28:01,146 --> 00:28:02,680
Even if you sent it to somebody
835
00:28:02,680 --> 00:28:04,382
within the United States
836
00:28:04,382 --> 00:28:07,722
your wholly domestic communication
837
00:28:07,722 --> 00:28:09,348
between you and your wife
838
00:28:09,348 --> 00:28:10,510
can go from New York...
839
00:28:10,510 --> 00:28:11,792
to London and back.
840
00:28:11,792 --> 00:28:13,474
And get caught up in the database.
841
00:28:13,474 --> 00:28:16,637
Executive Order 12-333: Dick or no dick?
842
00:28:16,637 --> 00:28:17,617
Yes.
843
00:28:17,617 --> 00:28:21,402
EO 12-333 is what the NSA uses when the
844
00:28:21,402 --> 00:28:23,650
other authorities aren't aggressive enough
845
00:28:23,650 --> 00:28:26,076
or not catching as much as they'd like.
846
00:28:26,076 --> 00:28:27,481
For example:
847
00:28:27,481 --> 00:28:29,225
How are they gonna see my dick?
848
00:28:29,225 --> 00:28:32,029
I'm only concerned about my penis.
849
00:28:33,039 --> 00:28:35,885
When you send your junk
850
00:28:35,885 --> 00:28:37,764
through G-mail, for example.
851
00:28:37,764 --> 00:28:40,609
That's stored on Google's servers.
852
00:28:40,609 --> 00:28:43,369
Google moves data.
853
00:28:43,369 --> 00:28:45,073
from datacenter to datacenter.
854
00:28:45,073 --> 00:28:45,942
Invisibly to you.
855
00:28:45,942 --> 00:28:47,331
Without your knowledge...
856
00:28:47,331 --> 00:28:49,221
your data could be moved outside
857
00:28:49,221 --> 00:28:50,820
the borders of the United States.
858
00:28:50,820 --> 00:28:51,581
Oh no.
859
00:28:51,581 --> 00:28:52,764
Temporarily.
860
00:28:52,764 --> 00:28:56,799
When your junk was passed by G-mail
861
00:28:56,799 --> 00:28:58,560
the NSA caught a copy of that.
862
00:28:58,560 --> 00:28:59,918
Prism.
863
00:28:59,918 --> 00:29:02,602
Prism is how they pull your junk
864
00:29:02,602 --> 00:29:05,372
out of Google, with Google's involvement.
865
00:29:05,372 --> 00:29:07,568
All of the different Prism partners
866
00:29:07,568 --> 00:29:10,595
people like Yahoo, Facebook, Google.
867
00:29:10,595 --> 00:29:13,658
The government deputizes them, to be...
868
00:29:13,658 --> 00:29:16,895
sort of their little surveillance sheriff.
869
00:29:16,895 --> 00:29:18,167
They're a dick-sheriff.
870
00:29:18,167 --> 00:29:19,061
Correct.
871
00:29:19,061 --> 00:29:20,630
Uhm, Upstream?
872
00:29:20,630 --> 00:29:23,119
Upstream is how they snatch your junk
873
00:29:23,119 --> 00:29:25,451
as it transits the internet.
874
00:29:25,451 --> 00:29:26,389
Okay. Mystic.
875
00:29:26,389 --> 00:29:27,862
If you're describing your junk
876
00:29:27,862 --> 00:29:28,937
on the phone?
877
00:29:28,937 --> 00:29:29,735
Yes.
878
00:29:29,735 --> 00:29:31,079
But do they have the content
879
00:29:31,079 --> 00:29:32,081
of that junk-call
880
00:29:32,081 --> 00:29:33,740
or just the duration of it?
881
00:29:33,740 --> 00:29:35,551
They have the content as well
882
00:29:35,551 --> 00:29:37,136
but only for a few countries.
883
00:29:37,136 --> 00:29:38,852
If you are on vacation in the Bahamas?
884
00:29:38,852 --> 00:29:40,047
Yes.
885
00:29:40,047 --> 00:29:42,519
Finally. And you need to remind yourself...
886
00:29:42,519 --> 00:29:44,634
No, I'm just not sure...
887
00:29:44,634 --> 00:29:46,358
what to do with this.
888
00:29:46,358 --> 00:29:47,979
Just hold on to it.
889
00:29:47,979 --> 00:29:49,414
It's a lot of responsibility.
890
00:29:49,414 --> 00:29:51,281
Yeah. It is a lot of responsibility.
891
00:29:51,281 --> 00:29:52,574
That's the whole point.
892
00:29:52,574 --> 00:29:53,427
Should I...?
893
00:29:53,427 --> 00:29:54,800
No, you should absolutely not.
894
00:29:54,800 --> 00:29:55,954
And it's unbelievable
895
00:29:55,954 --> 00:29:57,774
that you would do that.
896
00:29:57,774 --> 00:29:59,225
Actually, it's entirely believable.
897
00:29:59,225 --> 00:30:01,197
215 Meta-data?
898
00:30:01,197 --> 00:30:02,266
No.
899
00:30:02,266 --> 00:30:03,038
Good.
900
00:30:03,038 --> 00:30:04,126
But...
901
00:30:04,126 --> 00:30:05,623
Come on, Ed.
902
00:30:05,623 --> 00:30:07,110
They can probably tell who you're sharing
903
00:30:07,110 --> 00:30:08,820
your junk pictures with.
904
00:30:08,820 --> 00:30:09,763
Because they're seeing
905
00:30:09,763 --> 00:30:11,271
who you're texting with
906
00:30:11,271 --> 00:30:12,308
who you're calling.
907
00:30:12,308 --> 00:30:13,300
If you call
908
00:30:13,300 --> 00:30:15,246
the penis enlargement centre at 3 AM
909
00:30:15,246 --> 00:30:16,302
and that call lasted 90 minutes?
910
00:30:16,302 --> 00:30:17,336
They would have a record
911
00:30:17,336 --> 00:30:18,857
of YOUR phone-number
912
00:30:18,857 --> 00:30:21,176
calling THAT phone-number.
913
00:30:21,176 --> 00:30:23,601
(Which is a penis enlargement center).
914
00:30:23,601 --> 00:30:25,391
They would say they don't know
915
00:30:25,391 --> 00:30:26,307
it's penis enlargement center
916
00:30:26,307 --> 00:30:27,232
but of course they can look it up.
917
00:30:27,232 --> 00:30:29,498
Edward, if the American people
918
00:30:29,498 --> 00:30:32,506
understood this...
919
00:30:32,506 --> 00:30:34,541
...they would be absolutely horrified.
920
00:30:34,541 --> 00:30:36,474
I guess I never thought about putting it
921
00:30:36,474 --> 00:30:38,674
in the...
922
00:30:38,674 --> 00:30:40,611
...in the context of your junk.
923
00:30:40,611 --> 00:30:43,695
Would a good take-away from this be:
924
00:30:43,695 --> 00:30:45,717
'Until such time as we've sorted
925
00:30:45,717 --> 00:30:47,116
all of this out...
926
00:30:47,116 --> 00:30:50,025
...don't take pictures of your dick'.
927
00:30:50,025 --> 00:30:51,876
Just don't do it anymore.
928
00:30:51,876 --> 00:30:54,159
No. If we do that.
929
00:30:54,159 --> 00:30:56,714
Wait, hold on, you're saying 'no'?
930
00:30:56,714 --> 00:30:57,104
Yeah.
931
00:30:57,104 --> 00:30:58,096
You should keep
932
00:30:58,096 --> 00:30:59,093
taking pictures of your dick?
933
00:30:59,093 --> 00:31:01,213
Yes. You shouldn't change your behavior
934
00:31:01,213 --> 00:31:02,581
because of a government agency somehwere
935
00:31:02,581 --> 00:31:04,128
is doing the wrong thing.
936
00:31:04,128 --> 00:31:06,513
If we sacrifice our values
937
00:31:06,513 --> 00:31:08,393
because we're afraid, we don't care
938
00:31:08,393 --> 00:31:09,803
about those values very much.
939
00:31:09,803 --> 00:31:12,070
That is a pretty inspiring answer
940
00:31:12,070 --> 00:31:13,279
to the question:
941
00:31:13,279 --> 00:31:14,753
"Hey, why did you just send me
942
00:31:14,753 --> 00:31:16,260
a picture of your dick?"
943
00:31:17,670 --> 00:31:20,020
"Because I love America, that's why."
944
00:31:21,460 --> 00:31:23,290
So there you have it, America.
945
00:31:23,290 --> 00:31:24,810
All of us should now be equipped
946
00:31:24,810 --> 00:31:26,767
to have this vital debate.
947
00:31:26,767 --> 00:31:28,151
Because by June 1
948
00:31:28,151 --> 00:31:30,192
it is imperative we have a rational
949
00:31:30,192 --> 00:31:31,524
adult conversation
950
00:31:31,524 --> 00:31:33,391
about whether our safety is worth
951
00:31:33,391 --> 00:31:35,874
living in a country of barely regulated
952
00:31:35,874 --> 00:31:38,954
government-sanctioned dick-sheriffs.
953
00:31:40,985 --> 00:31:42,436
And with my work here done
954
00:31:42,436 --> 00:31:44,264
there was just time to take care of
955
00:31:44,264 --> 00:31:45,576
one more thing.
956
00:31:45,576 --> 00:31:47,419
Finally, congratulations on Citizenfour
957
00:31:47,419 --> 00:31:48,567
winning the Oscar.
958
00:31:48,567 --> 00:31:50,403
I know you couldn't be at the ceremony
959
00:31:50,403 --> 00:31:52,583
for obvious reasons, so...
960
00:31:53,844 --> 00:31:56,314
I thought we'd celebrate ourselves.
961
00:31:56,314 --> 00:31:57,314
Cheers.
962
00:31:57,314 --> 00:31:59,088
Wow, that's...
963
00:31:59,088 --> 00:32:00,794
...that's really, really something.
964
00:32:00,794 --> 00:32:01,531
Thank you.
965
00:32:01,531 --> 00:32:02,406
You're welcome.
966
00:32:02,406 --> 00:32:03,809
What's the over/under on me
967
00:32:03,809 --> 00:32:05,590
getting home safely?
968
00:32:05,590 --> 00:32:07,013
Well, if you weren't on the list before
969
00:32:07,013 --> 00:32:08,963
you are now.
970
00:32:11,501 --> 00:32:13,018
Is that like, uhm...
971
00:32:14,148 --> 00:32:16,086
Is that like a f... is that like a...
972
00:32:16,086 --> 00:32:17,910
...joke? Or is that actually possible?
973
00:32:17,910 --> 00:32:19,568
No, it's... it's a real thing.
974
00:32:19,568 --> 00:32:21,790
You're associated now.
975
00:32:22,830 --> 00:32:23,530
Okay.
976
00:32:23,530 --> 00:32:24,916
Just to be clear, NSA:
977
00:32:24,916 --> 00:32:26,397
I never met this guy
978
00:32:26,397 --> 00:32:28,812
so take me off you're f*cking list.
979
00:32:28,812 --> 00:32:31,554
I DO NOT want to get stuck in Russia.
980
00:32:31,554 --> 00:32:34,425
I want to go home I want to go home
981
00:32:37,654 --> 00:32:40,044
Now, just for the record.
982
00:32:40,044 --> 00:32:41,745
Just so you know.
983
00:32:41,745 --> 00:32:44,142
We got in touch with the NSA,
984
00:32:44,142 --> 00:32:45,623
the National Security Council,
985
00:32:45,623 --> 00:32:46,605
and the White House.
986
00:32:46,605 --> 00:32:47,974
And we asked them to comment
987
00:32:47,974 --> 00:32:50,080
on the dick-pick capabilities
988
00:32:50,080 --> 00:32:51,954
of each of the programs Edward Snowden
989
00:32:51,954 --> 00:32:52,755
just discussed.
990
00:32:52,755 --> 00:32:54,623
Which -incidentally- were some very fun
991
00:32:54,623 --> 00:32:57,304
emails to write to government agencies.
992
00:32:57,304 --> 00:32:59,870
They didn't wish to comment on the record.
993
00:32:59,870 --> 00:33:00,696
And I can see why
994
00:33:00,696 --> 00:33:02,786
for every possible reason.