WEBVTT 00:00:00.750 --> 00:00:03.026 So, security is two different things: 00:00:03.050 --> 00:00:05.576 it's a feeling, and it's a reality. 00:00:05.600 --> 00:00:07.025 And they're different. 00:00:07.049 --> 00:00:10.476 You could feel secure even if you're not. 00:00:10.500 --> 00:00:12.476 And you can be secure 00:00:12.500 --> 00:00:14.350 even if you don't feel it. 00:00:14.374 --> 00:00:16.491 Really, we have two separate concepts 00:00:16.515 --> 00:00:18.167 mapped onto the same word. 00:00:18.700 --> 00:00:22.326 And what I want to do in this talk is to split them apart -- 00:00:22.350 --> 00:00:25.960 figuring out when they diverge and how they converge. 00:00:26.451 --> 00:00:28.726 And language is actually a problem here. 00:00:28.750 --> 00:00:30.826 There aren't a lot of good words 00:00:30.850 --> 00:00:32.911 for the concepts we're going to talk about. 00:00:34.035 --> 00:00:38.155 So if you look at security from economic terms, 00:00:38.179 --> 00:00:39.826 it's a trade-off. 00:00:39.850 --> 00:00:43.982 Every time you get some security, you're always trading off something. 00:00:44.006 --> 00:00:45.851 Whether this is a personal decision -- 00:00:45.875 --> 00:00:48.887 whether you're going to install a burglar alarm in your home -- 00:00:48.911 --> 00:00:50.068 or a national decision, 00:00:50.092 --> 00:00:52.402 where you're going to invade a foreign country -- 00:00:52.426 --> 00:00:56.208 you're going to trade off something: money or time, convenience, capabilities, 00:00:56.232 --> 00:00:58.234 maybe fundamental liberties. 00:00:58.258 --> 00:01:01.532 And the question to ask when you look at a security anything 00:01:01.556 --> 00:01:04.938 is not whether this makes us safer, 00:01:04.962 --> 00:01:07.177 but whether it's worth the trade-off. 00:01:07.201 --> 00:01:10.430 You've heard in the past several years, the world is safer 00:01:10.454 --> 00:01:12.344 because Saddam Hussein is not in power. 00:01:12.368 --> 00:01:14.971 That might be true, but it's not terribly relevant. 00:01:14.995 --> 00:01:17.826 The question is: Was it worth it? 00:01:17.850 --> 00:01:20.309 And you can make your own decision, 00:01:20.333 --> 00:01:23.066 and then you'll decide whether the invasion was worth it. 00:01:23.090 --> 00:01:26.651 That's how you think about security: in terms of the trade-off. 00:01:26.675 --> 00:01:29.285 Now, there's often no right or wrong here. 00:01:29.948 --> 00:01:33.256 Some of us have a burglar alarm system at home and some of us don't. 00:01:33.280 --> 00:01:36.011 And it'll depend on where we live, 00:01:36.035 --> 00:01:37.961 whether we live alone or have a family, 00:01:37.985 --> 00:01:39.653 how much cool stuff we have, 00:01:39.677 --> 00:01:42.842 how much we're willing to accept the risk of theft. 00:01:43.683 --> 00:01:46.631 In politics also, there are different opinions. 00:01:47.199 --> 00:01:51.634 A lot of times, these trade-offs are about more than just security, 00:01:51.658 --> 00:01:53.523 and I think that's really important. 00:01:53.547 --> 00:01:56.855 Now, people have a natural intuition about these trade-offs. 00:01:57.328 --> 00:01:58.884 We make them every day. 00:01:59.547 --> 00:02:03.080 Last night in my hotel room, when I decided to double-lock the door, 00:02:03.104 --> 00:02:05.104 or you in your car when you drove here; 00:02:05.931 --> 00:02:07.409 when we go eat lunch 00:02:07.433 --> 00:02:10.041 and decide the food's not poison and we'll eat it. 00:02:10.065 --> 00:02:13.226 We make these trade-offs again and again, 00:02:13.250 --> 00:02:14.826 multiple times a day. 00:02:14.850 --> 00:02:16.439 We often won't even notice them. 00:02:16.463 --> 00:02:19.089 They're just part of being alive; we all do it. 00:02:19.113 --> 00:02:20.668 Every species does it. 00:02:21.214 --> 00:02:24.076 Imagine a rabbit in a field, eating grass. 00:02:24.100 --> 00:02:26.043 And the rabbit sees a fox. 00:02:26.596 --> 00:02:28.645 That rabbit will make a security trade-off: 00:02:28.669 --> 00:02:30.573 "Should I stay, or should I flee?" 00:02:31.120 --> 00:02:32.739 And if you think about it, 00:02:32.763 --> 00:02:35.318 the rabbits that are good at making that trade-off 00:02:35.342 --> 00:02:37.320 will tend to live and reproduce, 00:02:37.344 --> 00:02:39.651 and the rabbits that are bad at it 00:02:39.675 --> 00:02:41.149 will get eaten or starve. 00:02:41.698 --> 00:02:43.306 So you'd think 00:02:44.313 --> 00:02:48.622 that us, as a successful species on the planet -- you, me, everybody -- 00:02:48.646 --> 00:02:51.219 would be really good at making these trade-offs. 00:02:51.866 --> 00:02:54.970 Yet it seems, again and again, that we're hopelessly bad at it. 00:02:56.508 --> 00:02:59.310 And I think that's a fundamentally interesting question. 00:02:59.334 --> 00:03:01.207 I'll give you the short answer. 00:03:01.231 --> 00:03:03.882 The answer is, we respond to the feeling of security 00:03:03.906 --> 00:03:05.424 and not the reality. 00:03:06.604 --> 00:03:09.300 Now, most of the time, that works. 00:03:10.278 --> 00:03:11.781 Most of the time, 00:03:11.805 --> 00:03:13.938 feeling and reality are the same. 00:03:15.516 --> 00:03:19.032 Certainly that's true for most of human prehistory. 00:03:20.373 --> 00:03:23.081 We've developed this ability 00:03:23.105 --> 00:03:25.689 because it makes evolutionary sense. 00:03:26.725 --> 00:03:29.999 One way to think of it is that we're highly optimized 00:03:30.023 --> 00:03:31.826 for risk decisions 00:03:31.850 --> 00:03:34.393 that are endemic to living in small family groups 00:03:34.417 --> 00:03:36.953 in the East African Highlands in 100,000 BC. 00:03:37.532 --> 00:03:40.191 2010 New York, not so much. 00:03:41.619 --> 00:03:44.825 Now, there are several biases in risk perception. 00:03:44.849 --> 00:03:46.590 A lot of good experiments in this. 00:03:46.614 --> 00:03:50.217 And you can see certain biases that come up again and again. 00:03:50.241 --> 00:03:51.594 I'll give you four. 00:03:51.618 --> 00:03:54.826 We tend to exaggerate spectacular and rare risks 00:03:54.850 --> 00:03:56.826 and downplay common risks -- 00:03:56.850 --> 00:03:58.368 so, flying versus driving. 00:03:59.191 --> 00:04:02.985 The unknown is perceived to be riskier than the familiar. 00:04:06.210 --> 00:04:07.649 One example would be: 00:04:07.673 --> 00:04:10.286 people fear kidnapping by strangers, 00:04:10.310 --> 00:04:13.946 when the data supports that kidnapping by relatives is much more common. 00:04:13.970 --> 00:04:15.544 This is for children. 00:04:15.568 --> 00:04:19.608 Third, personified risks are perceived to be greater 00:04:19.632 --> 00:04:21.135 than anonymous risks. 00:04:21.159 --> 00:04:23.946 So, Bin Laden is scarier because he has a name. 00:04:24.922 --> 00:04:26.285 And the fourth is: 00:04:26.309 --> 00:04:31.064 people underestimate risks in situations they do control 00:04:31.088 --> 00:04:34.051 and overestimate them in situations they don't control. 00:04:34.075 --> 00:04:37.459 So once you take up skydiving or smoking, 00:04:37.483 --> 00:04:39.107 you downplay the risks. 00:04:39.777 --> 00:04:42.830 If a risk is thrust upon you -- terrorism is a good example -- 00:04:42.854 --> 00:04:44.011 you'll overplay it, 00:04:44.035 --> 00:04:46.374 because you don't feel like it's in your control. 00:04:46.897 --> 00:04:50.390 There are a bunch of other of these cognitive biases, 00:04:50.414 --> 00:04:52.753 that affect our risk decisions. 00:04:53.572 --> 00:04:55.826 There's the availability heuristic, 00:04:55.850 --> 00:05:00.030 which basically means we estimate the probability of something 00:05:00.054 --> 00:05:03.393 by how easy it is to bring instances of it to mind. 00:05:04.571 --> 00:05:06.348 So you can imagine how that works. 00:05:06.372 --> 00:05:10.000 If you hear a lot about tiger attacks, there must be a lot of tigers around. 00:05:10.024 --> 00:05:13.368 You don't hear about lion attacks, there aren't a lot of lions around. 00:05:13.392 --> 00:05:15.689 This works, until you invent newspapers, 00:05:15.713 --> 00:05:20.119 because what newspapers do is repeat again and again 00:05:20.143 --> 00:05:21.549 rare risks. 00:05:21.573 --> 00:05:24.438 I tell people: if it's in the news, don't worry about it, 00:05:24.462 --> 00:05:28.737 because by definition, news is something that almost never happens. 00:05:28.761 --> 00:05:30.530 (Laughter) 00:05:30.554 --> 00:05:33.477 When something is so common, it's no longer news. 00:05:33.501 --> 00:05:35.699 Car crashes, domestic violence -- 00:05:35.723 --> 00:05:37.713 those are the risks you worry about. 00:05:38.453 --> 00:05:40.601 We're also a species of storytellers. 00:05:40.625 --> 00:05:42.740 We respond to stories more than data. 00:05:43.254 --> 00:05:45.660 And there's some basic innumeracy going on. 00:05:45.684 --> 00:05:48.826 I mean, the joke "One, two, three, many" is kind of right. 00:05:48.850 --> 00:05:51.172 We're really good at small numbers. 00:05:51.196 --> 00:05:53.532 One mango, two mangoes, three mangoes, 00:05:53.556 --> 00:05:55.533 10,000 mangoes, 100,000 mangoes -- 00:05:55.557 --> 00:05:58.534 it's still more mangoes you can eat before they rot. 00:05:58.558 --> 00:06:01.826 So one half, one quarter, one fifth -- we're good at that. 00:06:01.850 --> 00:06:03.826 One in a million, one in a billion -- 00:06:03.850 --> 00:06:05.425 they're both almost never. 00:06:06.286 --> 00:06:09.700 So we have trouble with the risks that aren't very common. 00:06:10.500 --> 00:06:12.477 And what these cognitive biases do 00:06:12.501 --> 00:06:15.477 is they act as filters between us and reality. 00:06:16.024 --> 00:06:19.897 And the result is that feeling and reality get out of whack, 00:06:19.921 --> 00:06:21.305 they get different. 00:06:22.110 --> 00:06:26.041 Now, you either have a feeling -- you feel more secure than you are, 00:06:26.065 --> 00:06:27.750 there's a false sense of security. 00:06:27.774 --> 00:06:31.148 Or the other way, and that's a false sense of insecurity. 00:06:31.755 --> 00:06:34.635 I write a lot about "security theater," 00:06:34.659 --> 00:06:37.339 which are products that make people feel secure, 00:06:37.363 --> 00:06:39.340 but don't actually do anything. 00:06:39.364 --> 00:06:41.921 There's no real word for stuff that makes us secure, 00:06:41.945 --> 00:06:43.826 but doesn't make us feel secure. 00:06:43.850 --> 00:06:46.570 Maybe it's what the CIA is supposed to do for us. 00:06:48.279 --> 00:06:50.447 So back to economics. 00:06:50.471 --> 00:06:54.127 If economics, if the market, drives security, 00:06:54.151 --> 00:06:58.998 and if people make trade-offs based on the feeling of security, 00:06:59.022 --> 00:07:03.702 then the smart thing for companies to do for the economic incentives 00:07:03.726 --> 00:07:05.783 is to make people feel secure. 00:07:06.682 --> 00:07:09.012 And there are two ways to do this. 00:07:09.036 --> 00:07:11.826 One, you can make people actually secure 00:07:11.850 --> 00:07:13.313 and hope they notice. 00:07:13.337 --> 00:07:16.181 Or two, you can make people just feel secure 00:07:16.205 --> 00:07:18.077 and hope they don't notice. 00:07:19.141 --> 00:07:20.516 Right? 00:07:20.540 --> 00:07:23.681 So what makes people notice? 00:07:24.240 --> 00:07:25.622 Well, a couple of things: 00:07:25.646 --> 00:07:27.912 understanding of the security, 00:07:27.936 --> 00:07:29.826 of the risks, the threats, 00:07:29.850 --> 00:07:31.724 the countermeasures, how they work. 00:07:31.748 --> 00:07:34.038 But if you know stuff, you're more likely 00:07:34.895 --> 00:07:37.121 to have your feelings match reality. 00:07:37.850 --> 00:07:40.995 Enough real-world examples helps. 00:07:41.019 --> 00:07:43.578 We all know the crime rate in our neighborhood, 00:07:43.602 --> 00:07:46.403 because we live there, and we get a feeling about it 00:07:46.427 --> 00:07:48.296 that basically matches reality. 00:07:49.778 --> 00:07:51.985 Security theater is exposed 00:07:52.009 --> 00:07:54.795 when it's obvious that it's not working properly. 00:07:55.949 --> 00:07:58.619 OK. So what makes people not notice? 00:07:59.183 --> 00:08:00.675 Well, a poor understanding. 00:08:01.382 --> 00:08:04.526 If you don't understand the risks, you don't understand the costs, 00:08:04.550 --> 00:08:06.707 you're likely to get the trade-off wrong, 00:08:06.731 --> 00:08:09.219 and your feeling doesn't match reality. 00:08:09.243 --> 00:08:10.980 Not enough examples. 00:08:11.619 --> 00:08:15.125 There's an inherent problem with low-probability events. 00:08:15.659 --> 00:08:19.472 If, for example, terrorism almost never happens, 00:08:19.496 --> 00:08:24.100 it's really hard to judge the efficacy of counter-terrorist measures. 00:08:25.263 --> 00:08:28.826 This is why you keep sacrificing virgins, 00:08:28.850 --> 00:08:31.525 and why your unicorn defenses are working just great. 00:08:31.549 --> 00:08:34.106 There aren't enough examples of failures. 00:08:35.849 --> 00:08:38.636 Also, feelings that cloud the issues -- 00:08:38.660 --> 00:08:42.688 the cognitive biases I talked about earlier: fears, folk beliefs -- 00:08:43.467 --> 00:08:46.212 basically, an inadequate model of reality. 00:08:48.143 --> 00:08:50.314 So let me complicate things. 00:08:50.338 --> 00:08:52.315 I have feeling and reality. 00:08:52.339 --> 00:08:55.135 I want to add a third element. I want to add "model." 00:08:55.579 --> 00:08:57.929 Feeling and model are in our head, 00:08:57.953 --> 00:09:01.405 reality is the outside world; it doesn't change, it's real. 00:09:02.540 --> 00:09:04.754 Feeling is based on our intuition, 00:09:04.778 --> 00:09:06.404 model is based on reason. 00:09:07.123 --> 00:09:09.162 That's basically the difference. 00:09:09.186 --> 00:09:11.163 In a primitive and simple world, 00:09:11.187 --> 00:09:13.324 there's really no reason for a model, 00:09:14.993 --> 00:09:17.288 because feeling is close to reality. 00:09:17.312 --> 00:09:18.685 You don't need a model. 00:09:19.336 --> 00:09:21.486 But in a modern and complex world, 00:09:22.296 --> 00:09:25.946 you need models to understand a lot of the risks we face. 00:09:27.102 --> 00:09:29.386 There's no feeling about germs. 00:09:29.850 --> 00:09:31.966 You need a model to understand them. 00:09:32.897 --> 00:09:36.575 This model is an intelligent representation of reality. 00:09:37.151 --> 00:09:41.902 It's, of course, limited by science, by technology. 00:09:42.989 --> 00:09:45.315 We couldn't have a germ theory of disease 00:09:45.339 --> 00:09:47.873 before we invented the microscope to see them. 00:09:49.056 --> 00:09:51.699 It's limited by our cognitive biases. 00:09:52.850 --> 00:09:55.841 But it has the ability to override our feelings. 00:09:56.247 --> 00:09:59.351 Where do we get these models? We get them from others. 00:09:59.375 --> 00:10:04.594 We get them from religion, from culture, teachers, elders. 00:10:05.038 --> 00:10:08.464 A couple years ago, I was in South Africa on safari. 00:10:08.488 --> 00:10:11.250 The tracker I was with grew up in Kruger National Park. 00:10:11.274 --> 00:10:14.027 He had some very complex models of how to survive. 00:10:14.540 --> 00:10:18.453 And it depended on if you were attacked by a lion, leopard, rhino, or elephant -- 00:10:18.477 --> 00:10:21.211 and when you had to run away, when you couldn't run away, 00:10:21.235 --> 00:10:24.318 when you had to climb a tree, when you could never climb a tree. 00:10:24.342 --> 00:10:25.691 I would have died in a day. 00:10:26.900 --> 00:10:30.682 But he was born there, and he understood how to survive. 00:10:31.230 --> 00:10:32.826 I was born in New York City. 00:10:32.850 --> 00:10:36.101 I could have taken him to New York, and he would have died in a day. 00:10:36.125 --> 00:10:37.126 (Laughter) 00:10:37.150 --> 00:10:41.294 Because we had different models based on our different experiences. 00:10:43.031 --> 00:10:45.500 Models can come from the media, 00:10:45.524 --> 00:10:47.287 from our elected officials ... 00:10:47.974 --> 00:10:51.055 Think of models of terrorism, 00:10:51.079 --> 00:10:53.276 child kidnapping, 00:10:53.300 --> 00:10:55.625 airline safety, car safety. 00:10:56.279 --> 00:10:58.272 Models can come from industry. 00:10:59.088 --> 00:11:02.306 The two I'm following are surveillance cameras, 00:11:02.330 --> 00:11:03.826 ID cards, 00:11:03.850 --> 00:11:06.980 quite a lot of our computer security models come from there. 00:11:07.004 --> 00:11:09.231 A lot of models come from science. 00:11:09.255 --> 00:11:11.092 Health models are a great example. 00:11:11.116 --> 00:11:14.142 Think of cancer, bird flu, swine flu, SARS. 00:11:14.682 --> 00:11:19.552 All of our feelings of security about those diseases 00:11:19.576 --> 00:11:24.231 come from models given to us, really, by science filtered through the media. 00:11:25.778 --> 00:11:27.498 So models can change. 00:11:28.222 --> 00:11:30.325 Models are not static. 00:11:30.349 --> 00:11:33.589 As we become more comfortable in our environments, 00:11:33.613 --> 00:11:37.215 our model can move closer to our feelings. 00:11:38.705 --> 00:11:41.045 So an example might be, 00:11:41.069 --> 00:11:42.665 if you go back 100 years ago, 00:11:42.689 --> 00:11:46.117 when electricity was first becoming common, 00:11:46.141 --> 00:11:47.844 there were a lot of fears about it. 00:11:47.868 --> 00:11:50.346 There were people who were afraid to push doorbells, 00:11:50.370 --> 00:11:53.375 because there was electricity in there, and that was dangerous. 00:11:53.399 --> 00:11:56.268 For us, we're very facile around electricity. 00:11:56.292 --> 00:11:59.110 We change light bulbs without even thinking about it. 00:11:59.688 --> 00:12:05.851 Our model of security around electricity is something we were born into. 00:12:06.475 --> 00:12:08.989 It hasn't changed as we were growing up. 00:12:09.013 --> 00:12:10.578 And we're good at it. 00:12:12.120 --> 00:12:16.619 Or think of the risks on the Internet across generations -- 00:12:16.643 --> 00:12:18.740 how your parents approach Internet security, 00:12:18.764 --> 00:12:20.380 versus how you do, 00:12:20.404 --> 00:12:21.946 versus how our kids will. 00:12:23.040 --> 00:12:25.590 Models eventually fade into the background. 00:12:27.167 --> 00:12:29.660 "Intuitive" is just another word for familiar. 00:12:30.627 --> 00:12:34.477 So as your model is close to reality and it converges with feelings, 00:12:34.501 --> 00:12:36.419 you often don't even know it's there. 00:12:37.979 --> 00:12:41.796 A nice example of this came from last year and swine flu. 00:12:43.021 --> 00:12:45.021 When swine flu first appeared, 00:12:45.045 --> 00:12:47.663 the initial news caused a lot of overreaction. 00:12:48.302 --> 00:12:50.280 Now, it had a name, 00:12:50.304 --> 00:12:52.354 which made it scarier than the regular flu, 00:12:52.378 --> 00:12:53.945 even though it was more deadly. 00:12:54.524 --> 00:12:57.732 And people thought doctors should be able to deal with it. 00:12:58.199 --> 00:13:00.723 So there was that feeling of lack of control. 00:13:00.747 --> 00:13:03.856 And those two things made the risk more than it was. 00:13:03.880 --> 00:13:07.437 As the novelty wore off and the months went by, 00:13:07.461 --> 00:13:10.304 there was some amount of tolerance; people got used to it. 00:13:11.095 --> 00:13:13.765 There was no new data, but there was less fear. 00:13:14.421 --> 00:13:16.595 By autumn, 00:13:16.619 --> 00:13:20.001 people thought the doctors should have solved this already. 00:13:20.462 --> 00:13:22.422 And there's kind of a bifurcation: 00:13:22.446 --> 00:13:28.197 people had to choose between fear and acceptance -- 00:13:29.252 --> 00:13:30.896 actually, fear and indifference -- 00:13:30.920 --> 00:13:32.715 and they kind of chose suspicion. 00:13:33.850 --> 00:13:36.961 And when the vaccine appeared last winter, 00:13:36.985 --> 00:13:39.496 there were a lot of people -- a surprising number -- 00:13:39.520 --> 00:13:41.317 who refused to get it. 00:13:43.517 --> 00:13:47.173 And it's a nice example of how people's feelings of security change, 00:13:47.197 --> 00:13:48.800 how their model changes, 00:13:48.824 --> 00:13:50.492 sort of wildly, 00:13:50.516 --> 00:13:53.286 with no new information, with no new input. 00:13:55.067 --> 00:13:56.875 This kind of thing happens a lot. 00:13:57.939 --> 00:13:59.910 I'm going to give one more complication. 00:13:59.934 --> 00:14:02.630 We have feeling, model, reality. 00:14:03.380 --> 00:14:05.890 I have a very relativistic view of security. 00:14:05.914 --> 00:14:07.728 I think it depends on the observer. 00:14:08.435 --> 00:14:13.601 And most security decisions have a variety of people involved. 00:14:14.532 --> 00:14:21.071 And stakeholders with specific trade-offs will try to influence the decision. 00:14:21.095 --> 00:14:22.776 And I call that their agenda. 00:14:24.252 --> 00:14:27.743 And you see agenda -- this is marketing, this is politics -- 00:14:28.221 --> 00:14:31.260 trying to convince you to have one model versus another, 00:14:31.284 --> 00:14:33.268 trying to convince you to ignore a model 00:14:33.292 --> 00:14:35.964 and trust your feelings, 00:14:35.988 --> 00:14:38.492 marginalizing people with models you don't like. 00:14:39.484 --> 00:14:41.000 This is not uncommon. 00:14:42.350 --> 00:14:45.579 An example, a great example, is the risk of smoking. 00:14:46.936 --> 00:14:48.719 In the history of the past 50 years, 00:14:48.743 --> 00:14:51.356 the smoking risk shows how a model changes, 00:14:51.380 --> 00:14:55.738 and it also shows how an industry fights against a model it doesn't like. 00:14:56.723 --> 00:14:59.826 Compare that to the secondhand smoke debate -- 00:14:59.850 --> 00:15:01.803 probably about 20 years behind. 00:15:02.722 --> 00:15:04.337 Think about seat belts. 00:15:04.361 --> 00:15:06.385 When I was a kid, no one wore a seat belt. 00:15:06.409 --> 00:15:09.950 Nowadays, no kid will let you drive if you're not wearing a seat belt. 00:15:11.373 --> 00:15:13.826 Compare that to the airbag debate, 00:15:13.850 --> 00:15:15.517 probably about 30 years behind. 00:15:16.746 --> 00:15:18.834 All examples of models changing. 00:15:21.595 --> 00:15:24.391 What we learn is that changing models is hard. 00:15:25.074 --> 00:15:27.127 Models are hard to dislodge. 00:15:27.151 --> 00:15:28.826 If they equal your feelings, 00:15:28.850 --> 00:15:30.749 you don't even know you have a model. 00:15:31.850 --> 00:15:33.736 And there's another cognitive bias 00:15:33.760 --> 00:15:35.826 I'll call confirmation bias, 00:15:35.850 --> 00:15:40.211 where we tend to accept data that confirms our beliefs 00:15:40.235 --> 00:15:42.672 and reject data that contradicts our beliefs. 00:15:44.230 --> 00:15:48.165 So evidence against our model, we're likely to ignore, 00:15:48.189 --> 00:15:49.437 even if it's compelling. 00:15:49.461 --> 00:15:52.466 It has to get very compelling before we'll pay attention. 00:15:53.730 --> 00:15:56.327 New models that extend long periods of time are hard. 00:15:56.351 --> 00:15:58.105 Global warming is a great example. 00:15:58.129 --> 00:16:01.571 We're terrible at models that span 80 years. 00:16:01.595 --> 00:16:03.658 We can do "to the next harvest." 00:16:03.682 --> 00:16:05.988 We can often do "until our kids grow up." 00:16:06.500 --> 00:16:08.701 But "80 years," we're just not good at. 00:16:09.715 --> 00:16:12.017 So it's a very hard model to accept. 00:16:12.739 --> 00:16:15.685 We can have both models in our head simultaneously -- 00:16:16.652 --> 00:16:23.600 that kind of problem where we're holding both beliefs together, 00:16:23.624 --> 00:16:24.994 the cognitive dissonance. 00:16:25.018 --> 00:16:28.174 Eventually, the new model will replace the old model. 00:16:28.904 --> 00:16:31.094 Strong feelings can create a model. 00:16:32.151 --> 00:16:37.514 September 11 created a security model in a lot of people's heads. 00:16:37.538 --> 00:16:40.826 Also, personal experiences with crime can do it, 00:16:40.850 --> 00:16:42.229 personal health scare, 00:16:42.253 --> 00:16:43.719 a health scare in the news. 00:16:44.938 --> 00:16:48.283 You'll see these called "flashbulb events" by psychiatrists. 00:16:48.923 --> 00:16:51.384 They can create a model instantaneously, 00:16:51.408 --> 00:16:53.169 because they're very emotive. 00:16:54.648 --> 00:16:56.236 So in the technological world, 00:16:56.260 --> 00:16:59.497 we don't have experience to judge models. 00:16:59.864 --> 00:17:02.797 And we rely on others. We rely on proxies. 00:17:02.821 --> 00:17:05.440 And this works, as long as it's the correct others. 00:17:05.923 --> 00:17:08.605 We rely on government agencies 00:17:08.629 --> 00:17:13.033 to tell us what pharmaceuticals are safe. 00:17:13.057 --> 00:17:14.970 I flew here yesterday. 00:17:14.994 --> 00:17:16.756 I didn't check the airplane. 00:17:17.439 --> 00:17:20.034 I relied on some other group 00:17:20.058 --> 00:17:22.495 to determine whether my plane was safe to fly. 00:17:22.519 --> 00:17:25.817 We're here, none of us fear the roof is going to collapse on us, 00:17:25.841 --> 00:17:28.046 not because we checked, 00:17:28.070 --> 00:17:31.742 but because we're pretty sure the building codes here are good. 00:17:33.182 --> 00:17:36.171 It's a model we just accept 00:17:36.195 --> 00:17:37.555 pretty much by faith. 00:17:38.071 --> 00:17:39.429 And that's OK. 00:17:42.706 --> 00:17:48.579 Now, what we want is people to get familiar enough with better models, 00:17:48.603 --> 00:17:50.723 have it reflected in their feelings, 00:17:50.747 --> 00:17:53.749 to allow them to make security trade-offs. 00:17:54.850 --> 00:17:58.569 When these go out of whack, you have two options. 00:17:58.593 --> 00:18:02.826 One, you can fix people's feelings, directly appeal to feelings. 00:18:02.850 --> 00:18:05.256 It's manipulation, but it can work. 00:18:05.913 --> 00:18:08.104 The second, more honest way 00:18:08.128 --> 00:18:09.901 is to actually fix the model. 00:18:11.460 --> 00:18:13.561 Change happens slowly. 00:18:13.585 --> 00:18:17.963 The smoking debate took 40 years -- and that was an easy one. 00:18:19.935 --> 00:18:21.748 Some of this stuff is hard. 00:18:22.236 --> 00:18:25.992 Really, though, information seems like our best hope. 00:18:26.016 --> 00:18:27.288 And I lied. 00:18:27.312 --> 00:18:31.332 Remember I said feeling, model, reality; reality doesn't change? 00:18:31.356 --> 00:18:32.731 It actually does. 00:18:32.755 --> 00:18:34.469 We live in a technological world; 00:18:34.493 --> 00:18:36.831 reality changes all the time. 00:18:37.627 --> 00:18:40.604 So we might have, for the first time in our species: 00:18:40.628 --> 00:18:43.811 feeling chases model, model chases reality, reality's moving -- 00:18:43.835 --> 00:18:45.368 they might never catch up. 00:18:46.920 --> 00:18:48.248 We don't know. 00:18:50.354 --> 00:18:51.957 But in the long term, 00:18:51.981 --> 00:18:54.185 both feeling and reality are important. 00:18:54.209 --> 00:18:57.442 And I want to close with two quick stories to illustrate this. 00:18:57.466 --> 00:18:59.945 1982 -- I don't know if people will remember this -- 00:18:59.969 --> 00:19:03.339 there was a short epidemic of Tylenol poisonings 00:19:03.363 --> 00:19:04.559 in the United States. 00:19:04.583 --> 00:19:05.944 It's a horrific story. 00:19:05.968 --> 00:19:08.047 Someone took a bottle of Tylenol, 00:19:08.071 --> 00:19:11.073 put poison in it, closed it up, put it back on the shelf, 00:19:11.097 --> 00:19:12.655 someone else bought it and died. 00:19:12.679 --> 00:19:14.352 This terrified people. 00:19:14.376 --> 00:19:16.603 There were a couple of copycat attacks. 00:19:16.627 --> 00:19:19.472 There wasn't any real risk, but people were scared. 00:19:19.496 --> 00:19:23.372 And this is how the tamper-proof drug industry was invented. 00:19:23.396 --> 00:19:25.625 Those tamper-proof caps? That came from this. 00:19:25.649 --> 00:19:27.220 It's complete security theater. 00:19:27.244 --> 00:19:30.135 As a homework assignment, think of 10 ways to get around it. 00:19:30.159 --> 00:19:32.050 I'll give you one: a syringe. 00:19:32.074 --> 00:19:34.855 But it made people feel better. 00:19:35.484 --> 00:19:39.186 It made their feeling of security more match the reality. 00:19:40.130 --> 00:19:43.064 Last story: a few years ago, a friend of mine gave birth. 00:19:43.088 --> 00:19:44.485 I visit her in the hospital. 00:19:44.509 --> 00:19:46.432 It turns out, when a baby's born now, 00:19:46.456 --> 00:19:50.019 they put an RFID bracelet on the baby, a corresponding one on the mother, 00:19:50.043 --> 00:19:53.663 so if anyone other than the mother takes the baby out of the maternity ward, 00:19:53.687 --> 00:19:54.845 an alarm goes off. 00:19:54.869 --> 00:19:56.598 I said, "Well, that's kind of neat. 00:19:56.622 --> 00:20:00.592 I wonder how rampant baby snatching is out of hospitals." 00:20:00.616 --> 00:20:01.852 I go home, I look it up. 00:20:01.876 --> 00:20:03.401 It basically never happens. 00:20:03.425 --> 00:20:05.269 (Laughter) 00:20:05.293 --> 00:20:08.136 But if you think about it, if you are a hospital, 00:20:08.160 --> 00:20:10.540 and you need to take a baby away from its mother, 00:20:10.564 --> 00:20:12.345 out of the room to run some tests, 00:20:12.369 --> 00:20:14.419 you better have some good security theater, 00:20:14.443 --> 00:20:16.388 or she's going to rip your arm off. 00:20:16.412 --> 00:20:17.945 (Laughter) 00:20:18.901 --> 00:20:20.618 So it's important for us, 00:20:20.642 --> 00:20:22.777 those of us who design security, 00:20:22.801 --> 00:20:24.832 who look at security policy -- 00:20:25.686 --> 00:20:28.994 or even look at public policy in ways that affect security. 00:20:29.746 --> 00:20:33.162 It's not just reality; it's feeling and reality. 00:20:33.186 --> 00:20:35.051 What's important 00:20:35.075 --> 00:20:36.620 is that they be about the same. 00:20:36.644 --> 00:20:39.175 It's important that, if our feelings match reality, 00:20:39.199 --> 00:20:41.072 we make better security trade-offs. 00:20:41.451 --> 00:20:42.604 Thank you. 00:20:42.628 --> 00:20:44.761 (Applause)