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Imagine you and a friend are [br]strolling through an art exhibit

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and a striking painting catches your eye.

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The vibrant red appears to you [br]as a symbol of love,

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but your friend is convinced [br]it's a symbol of war.

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And where you see stars in a romantic sky,

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your friend interprets global [br]warming-inducing pollutants.

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To settle the debate, you turn to the[br]internet, where you read [br]

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that the painting is a replica of [br]the artist's first-grade art project:

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Red was her favorite color [br]and the silver dots are fairies.

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You now know the exact intentions [br]that led to the creation of this work.

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Are you wrong to have enjoyed it [br]as something the artist didn’t intend?

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Do you enjoy it less now [br]that you know the truth?

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Just how much should [br]the artist's intention

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affect your interpretation [br]of the painting?

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It's a question that's been tossed around

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by philosophers and art critics for [br]decades, with no consensus in sight.

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In the mid-20th century,

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literary critic W.K. Wimsatt and [br]philosopher Monroe Beardsley

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argued that artistic [br]intention was irrelevant.

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They called this the Intentional Fallacy:

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the belief that valuing an artist's [br]intentions was misguided.

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Their argument was twofold:

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First, the artists we study are [br]often no longer living,

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never recorded their intentions,

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or are simply unavailable to answer [br]questions about their work.

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Second, even if there were a bounty [br]of relevant information,

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Wimsatt and Beardsley believed

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it would distract us from the [br]qualities of the work itself.

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They compared art to a dessert:

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When you taste a pudding,

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the chef's intentions don't affect whether[br]you enjoy its flavor or texture.

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All that matters, they said, [br]is that the pudding "works."

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Of course, what "works" for one person [br]might not "work" for another.

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And since different interpretations [br]appeal to different people,

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the silver dots in our painting could be [br]reasonably interpreted as fairies,

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stars, or pollutants.

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By Wimsatt and Beardsley's logic, the[br]artist's interpretation of her own work

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would be just one among many equally[br]acceptable possibilities.

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If you find this problematic,

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you might be more in line with Steven [br]Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels,

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two literary theorists who rejected the[br]Intentional Fallacy.

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They argued that an artist's [br]intended meaning

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was not just one possible interpretation,

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but the only possible interpretation.

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For example, suppose you're [br]walking along a beach

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and come across a series of marks in the [br]sand that spell out a verse of poetry.

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Knapp and Michaels believed the [br]poem would lose all meaning

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if you discovered these marks were not [br]the work of a human being,

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but an odd coincidence [br]produced by the waves.

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They believed an intentional creator

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is what makes the poem subject to [br]understanding at all.

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Other thinkers advocate for [br]a middle ground,

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suggesting that intention is just one [br]piece in a larger puzzle.

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Contemporary philosopher Noel Carroll [br]took this stance,

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arguing that an artist's intentions are [br]relevant to their audience

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the same way a speaker's intentions

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are relevant to the person they’re [br]engaging in conversation.

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To understand how intentions function [br]in conversation,

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Carroll said to imagine someone holding[br]a cigarette and asking for a match.

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You respond by handing them a lighter,

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gathering that their motivation is to [br]light their cigarette.

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The words they used to ask the question [br]are important,

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but the intentions behind the question [br]dictate your understanding and ultimately,

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your response.

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So which end of this spectrum [br]do you lean towards?

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Do you, like Wimsatt and Beardsley, [br]believe that when it comes to art,

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the proof should be in the pudding?

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Or do you think an artist's plans and [br]motivations for their work

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affect its meaning?

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Artistic interpretation is a complex web

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that will probably never offer [br]a definitive answer.