0:00:01.329,0:00:03.527 The shocking police[br]crackdown 0:00:03.527,0:00:05.702 on protestors in [br]Ferguson, Missouri, 0:00:05.702,0:00:08.729 in the wake of the police [br]shooting of Michael Brown, 0:00:08.729,0:00:12.952 underscored the extent to which advanced[br]military weapons and equipment, 0:00:12.952,0:00:14.684 designed for the battlefield, 0:00:14.684,0:00:15.993 are making their way 0:00:15.993,0:00:19.874 to small-town police departments[br]across the United States. 0:00:20.704,0:00:22.500 Although much tougher to observe, 0:00:22.500,0:00:26.047 this same thing is happening [br]with surveillance equipment. 0:00:26.047,0:00:28.707 NSA-style mass [br]surveillance is enabling 0:00:28.707,0:00:31.665 local police departments [br]to gather vast quantities 0:00:31.665,0:00:35.232 of sensitive information[br]about each and every one of us 0:00:35.232,0:00:39.284 in a way that was[br]never previously possible. 0:00:39.284,0:00:42.760 Location information can [br]be very sensitive. 0:00:42.760,0:00:45.391 If you drive your car around[br]the United States, 0:00:45.391,0:00:47.314 it can reveal if you go [br]to a therapist, 0:00:47.314,0:00:49.782 attend an Alcoholics Anonymous meeting, 0:00:49.782,0:00:52.603 if you go to church [br]or if you don't go to church. 0:00:52.603,0:00:54.329 And when that [br]information about you 0:00:54.329,0:00:56.354 is combined with the same[br]information 0:00:56.354,0:00:57.807 about everyone else, 0:00:57.807,0:01:00.398 the government can gain a[br]detailed portrait 0:01:00.398,0:01:03.114 of how private citizens interact. 0:01:03.114,0:01:05.589 This information used to be private. 0:01:05.589,0:01:07.282 Thanks to modern technology, 0:01:07.282,0:01:09.010 the government knows [br]far too much 0:01:09.010,0:01:11.580 about what happens[br]behind closed doors. 0:01:11.580,0:01:15.998 And local police departments make decisions[br]about who they think you are 0:01:15.998,0:01:19.169 based on this information. 0:01:19.169,0:01:23.816 One of the key technologies [br]driving mass-location tracking 0:01:23.816,0:01:26.774 is the innocuous-sounding[br]Automatic License Plate Reader. 0:01:26.774,0:01:28.469 If you haven't seen one, 0:01:28.469,0:01:31.657 it's probably because you didn't[br]know what to look for 0:01:31.657,0:01:33.032 --they're everywhere. 0:01:33.032,0:01:36.104 Mounted on roads or [br]on police cars, 0:01:36.104,0:01:40.533 Automatic License Plate Readers[br]capture images of every passing car 0:01:40.533,0:01:42.048 and convert the license plate 0:01:42.048,0:01:44.158 into machine-readable text 0:01:44.158,0:01:47.560 so that they can be checked[br]against hot lists 0:01:47.560,0:01:50.845 of cars potentially wanted[br]for wrongdoing. 0:01:50.845,0:01:53.082 But more than that, increasingly, 0:01:53.082,0:01:56.012 local police departments are [br]keeping records not just 0:01:56.012,0:01:58.282 of people wanted [br]for wrongdoing, 0:01:58.282,0:02:01.084 but of every plate that [br]passes them by, 0:02:01.084,0:02:05.053 resulting in the collection[br]of mass quantities of data 0:02:05.053,0:02:07.294 about where Americans [br]have gone. 0:02:07.294,0:02:10.092 Did you know this[br]was happening? 0:02:10.092,0:02:13.228 When Mike Katz-Lacabe asked[br]his local police department 0:02:13.228,0:02:16.657 for information about the Plate[br]Reader data they had on him, 0:02:16.657,0:02:18.335 this is what they got: 0:02:18.335,0:02:21.477 in addition to the date, [br]time and location, 0:02:21.477,0:02:24.508 the police department had [br]photographs that captured 0:02:24.508,0:02:27.898 where he was going and [br]often, who he was with. 0:02:27.898,0:02:29.490 The second photo [br]from the top 0:02:29.490,0:02:31.923 is a picture of Mike and[br]his two daughters 0:02:31.923,0:02:35.552 getting out of their car[br]in their own driveway. 0:02:35.552,0:02:38.690 The government has [br]hundreds of photos like this 0:02:38.690,0:02:41.111 about Mike going about [br]his daily life. 0:02:41.111,0:02:43.295 And if you drive a car [br]in the United States, 0:02:43.295,0:02:46.028 I would bet money [br]that they have photographs 0:02:46.028,0:02:49.386 like this of you going[br]about your daily life. 0:02:49.386,0:02:51.087 Mike hasn't done[br]anything wrong. 0:02:51.087,0:02:52.704 Why is it okay that [br]the government 0:02:52.704,0:02:55.032 is keeping all of[br]this information? 0:02:55.032,0:02:56.721 The reason it's happening[br]is because 0:02:56.721,0:03:00.072 as the cost of storing[br]this data has plummeted, 0:03:00.072,0:03:02.824 the police departments[br]simply hang on to it, 0:03:02.824,0:03:06.676 just in case it could be [br]useful someday. 0:03:06.676,0:03:09.546 The issue is not just that[br]one police department 0:03:09.546,0:03:11.487 is gathering this information[br]in isolation, 0:03:11.487,0:03:14.246 or even that multiple police [br]departments are doing it. 0:03:14.246,0:03:16.743 At the same time, [br]the Federal Government 0:03:16.743,0:03:20.361 is collecting all of these[br]individual pots of data, 0:03:20.361,0:03:23.882 and pooling them together [br]into one vast database 0:03:23.882,0:03:25.598 with hundreds of [br]millions of hits 0:03:25.598,0:03:28.006 showing where Americans[br]have traveled. 0:03:28.006,0:03:30.964 This document from the [br]Federal Drug Enforcement Administration, 0:03:30.964,0:03:33.729 which is one of the agencies[br]primarily interested in this, 0:03:33.729,0:03:38.386 is one of several that reveal [br]the existence of this database. 0:03:38.386,0:03:40.735 Meanwhile, in New York City, 0:03:40.735,0:03:42.977 the NYPD has driven police cars 0:03:42.977,0:03:44.674 equipped with License Plate Readers 0:03:44.674,0:03:48.851 past mosques in order to[br]figure out who is attending. 0:03:48.851,0:03:50.845 The uses and abuses [br]of this technology 0:03:50.845,0:03:53.249 aren't limited to the United States. 0:03:53.249,0:03:55.974 In the UK, the police department 0:03:55.974,0:04:00.258 put 80-year-old John Kat[br]on a Plate Reader watch list 0:04:00.258,0:04:04.395 after he had attended dozens of[br]lawful political demonstrations 0:04:04.395,0:04:08.771 where he liked to sit on a bench[br]and sketch the attendees. 0:04:08.771,0:04:12.293 License Plate Readers aren't the[br]only mass-location tracking technology 0:04:12.293,0:04:15.099 available to law enforcement[br]agents today. 0:04:15.099,0:04:17.461 Through a technique known as[br]a Cell Tower Dump, 0:04:17.461,0:04:20.923 law enforcement agents can[br]uncover who was using 0:04:20.923,0:04:23.258 one or more cell towers[br]at a particular time, 0:04:23.258,0:04:25.050 a technique which [br]has known to reveal 0:04:25.050,0:04:26.911 the location of [br]tens of thousands 0:04:26.911,0:04:29.809 and even hundreds [br]of thousands of people. 0:04:29.809,0:04:32.549 Also, using a device [br]known as a Sting Ray, 0:04:32.549,0:04:35.185 law enforcement agents[br]can send tracking signals 0:04:35.185,0:04:37.112 inside people's houses 0:04:37.112,0:04:39.860 to identify the cell phones [br]located there. 0:04:39.860,0:04:41.992 And if they don't know[br]which house to target, 0:04:41.992,0:04:43.149 they've been known to drive 0:04:43.149,0:04:47.324 this technology around through[br]whole neighborhoods. 0:04:47.324,0:04:52.060 Just as the police in Ferguson possess[br]high-tech military weapons and equipment, 0:04:52.060,0:04:55.042 so too do police departments across[br]the United States 0:04:55.042,0:04:57.687 possess high-tech surveillance gear. 0:04:57.687,0:04:59.408 Just because you don't see it, 0:04:59.408,0:05:02.043 doesn't mean it's not there. 0:05:02.043,0:05:04.564 The question is, what should[br]we do about this? 0:05:04.564,0:05:07.654 I think this poses a serious[br]civil liberties threat. 0:05:07.654,0:05:09.406 History has shown that once 0:05:09.406,0:05:12.087 the police have massive [br]quantities of data, 0:05:12.087,0:05:14.515 tracking the movements [br]of innocent people, 0:05:14.515,0:05:17.097 it gets abused, maybe [br]for blackmail, 0:05:17.097,0:05:18.821 maybe for political advantage, 0:05:18.821,0:05:21.030 or maybe for [br]simple voyeurism. 0:05:21.030,0:05:23.492 Fortunately, there are[br]steps we can take. 0:05:23.492,0:05:27.072 Local police departments can [br]be governed by the city councils, 0:05:27.072,0:05:29.687 which can pass laws[br]requiring the police 0:05:29.687,0:05:32.468 to dispose of the data [br]about innocent people 0:05:32.468,0:05:34.958 while allowing the legitimate[br]uses of the technology 0:05:34.958,0:05:36.079 to go forward. 0:05:36.079,0:05:36.993 Thank you. 0:05:36.993,0:05:41.424 (Applause).