1
00:00:00,099 --> 00:00:15,282
<i>34C3 preroll music</i>

2
00:00:15,282 --> 00:00:26,850
Herald: So. The last are the best or
something like that. Our next speaker is

3
00:00:26,850 --> 00:00:33,010
here waiting for this massive crowd that
will support him to go through his

4
00:00:33,010 --> 00:00:42,739
experience with the FBI. He's gonna share
with us the way he informs the FBI about

5
00:00:42,739 --> 00:00:49,089
his behaviors. So it's not just like in
cycling or other sports but ... I don't

6
00:00:49,089 --> 00:00:55,690
know what sport you do, Hasan. But these
easy sports men in communication with FBI.

7
00:00:55,690 --> 00:01:08,159
Please give a welcome applause ... Yes!
Last are the best. Oh sorry ...

8
00:01:08,159 --> 00:01:11,920
Hasan: That's pointing to me. The arrow
will start making sense. Really I mean

9
00:01:11,920 --> 00:01:15,710
... How amazing has it been the last few
days here, right? It's been this ...

10
00:01:15,710 --> 00:01:19,250
amazingly intense last few days and it's
kind of ... You know it's, it's an honor

11
00:01:19,250 --> 00:01:23,530
to kind of wrap this up and I really
appreciate you guys hanging out here till

12
00:01:23,530 --> 00:01:28,479
the very very very last time slot. Thank
you, thank you for coming. This is ... it

13
00:01:28,479 --> 00:01:32,149
means a lot. I've been hearing a lot
about this Congress for many years and

14
00:01:32,149 --> 00:01:36,400
this is my first time here and it's just
... you know, I was just telling some

15
00:01:36,400 --> 00:01:42,101
friends that I consider myself relatively
tech literate and then I come here and I

16
00:01:42,101 --> 00:01:45,102
feel like everyone speaking a completely
different foreign language that I have no

17
00:01:45,102 --> 00:01:48,590
idea what's happening. And it's not
because some of the talks are in German.

18
00:01:48,590 --> 00:01:53,539
It's like literally like some of the
subject matter is so specific that it's

19
00:01:53,539 --> 00:01:58,729
so easy to be completely like: What is
being discussed? So I'm gonna tell you,

20
00:01:58,729 --> 00:02:03,859
it's something a little bit more ... you
know, a little more of a story and kind of

21
00:02:03,859 --> 00:02:09,199
tell you about what I've been doing. So
I'm an artist and I get called all sorts

22
00:02:09,199 --> 00:02:11,920
of different things I get ... You know,
sometimes I get lumped in with the media

23
00:02:11,920 --> 00:02:16,380
artists, sometimes with sculptor,
sometimes with photographers, sometimes I

24
00:02:16,380 --> 00:02:24,080
get called a con artist. But so ... so
it's kind of odd being in this, being in

25
00:02:24,080 --> 00:02:28,300
this gatherings. Particularly after some
of the other talks that I've been sitting

26
00:02:28,300 --> 00:02:32,421
in on. But let me tell you a little bit
about how this thing came about, this

27
00:02:32,421 --> 00:02:38,420
thing with the arrow. By the way I'm at
elahi.org or elahi.umd.edu. I'll show you

28
00:02:38,420 --> 00:02:42,180
some of my works but mainly I'll be
focusing on this one project which is

29
00:02:42,180 --> 00:02:47,710
called Tracking Transience which I
started shortly after 9/11. So let me just

30
00:02:47,710 --> 00:02:51,070
give you a live feed of what it looks
like. So this is, this is it. So you can

31
00:02:51,070 --> 00:02:55,980
go on the web and you could follow me at
any given moment. And there's this pixel,

32
00:02:55,980 --> 00:02:58,960
this arrow that comes here, which is actually...
These days we're so used to seeing

33
00:02:58,960 --> 00:03:05,050
ourselves as pixels on a map. But this
project was started 2002 and back then to

34
00:03:05,050 --> 00:03:09,360
see yourself as a pixel was just such an
unusual thing. I mean, these days we ...

35
00:03:09,360 --> 00:03:13,010
You know, these days you're driving down
the road and there's that little icon on

36
00:03:13,010 --> 00:03:17,810
the GPS, that tells you exactly where you
are. Or you know the ... I mean like, you

37
00:03:17,810 --> 00:03:20,760
know, like when was the last time you
bought one of those maps at the gas

38
00:03:20,760 --> 00:03:24,990
station? You opened it up ... Do you
remember that? I mean, we don't ... it's

39
00:03:24,990 --> 00:03:28,050
just like we just completely lost that. We
can't even know how to fold a map back up

40
00:03:28,050 --> 00:03:31,430
anymore. You know, cuz back in the old
days you'd have to take out that map and

41
00:03:31,430 --> 00:03:37,180
you'd go: "We're here!" So you'd have to
locate yourself to the geography within

42
00:03:37,180 --> 00:03:41,800
that map. These days, you take out that
magic phone, you press that little button,

43
00:03:41,800 --> 00:03:45,650
and you become the center of your own
map. And your ... the map resizes to you.

44
00:03:45,650 --> 00:03:49,440
So the space of the ... So looking at
yourself as a digital space versus a

45
00:03:49,440 --> 00:03:53,000
physical space. You know it's, it's a
totally different concept that we're

46
00:03:53,000 --> 00:03:57,870
running into now and for some reason this
looks like this got caught up over here.

47
00:03:57,870 --> 00:04:02,496
So let's give it another kick. And
hopefully it'll kick in again.

48
00:04:02,496 --> 00:04:09,061
Okay. So, that's, that's, so this is, this is where
I started. So the project starts here.

49
00:04:09,061 --> 00:04:12,510
And you know, then this goes through the
cycles of everything that I eat and ...

50
00:04:12,510 --> 00:04:15,760
You know, let's see what comes up after
this. You know, you can probably see where

51
00:04:15,760 --> 00:04:18,790
this place is. You probably recognize
that. So these are all the meals that

52
00:04:18,790 --> 00:04:22,480
I've been cooking at home. And I photograph 
all of them. It's just kind of interesting.

53
00:04:22,480 --> 00:04:24,820
As now it's like it's so common
on Instagram, it's like, you know, if

54
00:04:24,820 --> 00:04:28,460
people think that you know, well, why else
would you be using Instagram other than

55
00:04:28,460 --> 00:04:33,840
posting photos of your food? But I help
out the FBI with this. So I sent this ...

56
00:04:33,840 --> 00:04:37,660
So this was on Friday December 4th. This
was at the corner of Santa Clara and 11th

57
00:04:37,660 --> 00:04:43,380
in San Jose. I got, I bought gas there.
This is at the Gimhae Airport in Busan.

58
00:04:43,380 --> 00:04:47,363
This is some tripe, that I've cooked at
home. Because I really like tripe.

59
00:04:47,363 --> 00:04:52,710
This is, this is actually the Barack Hussein
Obama School in Jakarta, Indonesia,

60
00:04:52,710 --> 00:04:59,590
1st March. This is, this is, ... Sorry, this is
going so fast. So every few moments, what

61
00:04:59,590 --> 00:05:02,790
I do is: I take a photograph and I
timestamp my life and I send it to the

62
00:05:02,790 --> 00:05:08,260
FBI. And, well you know, it's ... And
it's also kind of interesting. Because

63
00:05:08,260 --> 00:05:11,870
these days, the project means something
so different. When I first started this

64
00:05:11,870 --> 00:05:15,710
project, people would be like: "Oh no no,
don't show up at my house!" And now it's

65
00:05:15,710 --> 00:05:19,139
like - You know, it's not like if you're
don't, if you're not on social media, if

66
00:05:19,139 --> 00:05:23,560
you're not connected, like people think of
you are some, some weirdo or something.

67
00:05:23,560 --> 00:05:30,280
So what happens here is that this thing of
like continuously, continuously

68
00:05:30,280 --> 00:05:34,300
monitoring myself and continuously
checking in ... You know, now a lot of

69
00:05:34,300 --> 00:05:37,131
people are like: "I don't get this. This
looks like my Instagram feed. What's the

70
00:05:37,131 --> 00:05:42,850
big deal?" But then this concept of self-
surveillance or this, this watching

71
00:05:42,850 --> 00:05:48,980
ourselves or monitoring ourselves for the
sake of someone else, whether it be your

72
00:05:48,980 --> 00:05:52,810
Twitter followers or in my case the FBI
... I mean, this is something that's

73
00:05:52,810 --> 00:05:58,125
become so commonplace. And each of us are
creating our own archives. So a lot of

74
00:05:58,125 --> 00:06:01,220
the shifts that's taking place culturally
- I think it's really important to think

75
00:06:01,220 --> 00:06:04,580
about this, because, you know, it's like,
like this bed. I mean, you're not really

76
00:06:04,580 --> 00:06:08,440
sure what happened in that bed. You're
not really sure who I was there with. Or

77
00:06:08,440 --> 00:06:11,790
you see these like random train stations.
There are always these empty spaces.

78
00:06:11,790 --> 00:06:14,800
There's like ... no one's ever there, and
every now and then you might see some

79
00:06:14,800 --> 00:06:18,099
people. But they just, they just tend to
be incidental to the image.

80
00:06:18,099 --> 00:06:21,260
Which is kind of interesting when you look at 
like the "no photography" or the

81
00:06:21,260 --> 00:06:22,260
"ask permission

82
00:06:22,260 --> 00:06:25,692
of people that are in there" Which is
really amazing to think about. That like

83
00:06:25,692 --> 00:06:30,790
how many cameras are there in every given
moment? Actually in this room, right now,

84
00:06:30,790 --> 00:06:37,090
they're at least twice as many cameras as
there are people. Because there's one

85
00:06:37,090 --> 00:06:40,777
camera in the front of your phone and
another one in the back of your phone. And

86
00:06:40,777 --> 00:06:45,250
who knows how many other cameras in, in
all the other devices and everything else

87
00:06:45,250 --> 00:06:49,480
that we are putting in. So we can't
really escape these cameras, regardless of

88
00:06:49,480 --> 00:06:55,093
what we do. And so all of these things,
all these bits and pieces that I'm

89
00:06:55,093 --> 00:06:59,669
archiving of my life. So every few moments
another photo gets put up and it gets

90
00:06:59,669 --> 00:07:03,480
tagged with the geo tag of where it was.
Again this is something that's so common

91
00:07:03,480 --> 00:07:08,340
today but 12, 13, 14 years ago this was
completely just like: "What are you doing

92
00:07:08,340 --> 00:07:11,560
and why are you doing this?"

93
00:07:11,560 --> 00:07:16,400
And ...
sorry ... So yeah, and then of course

94
00:07:16,400 --> 00:07:20,714
there's all these toilets because, uh, my
FBI agent really needs to know. I figure

95
00:07:20,714 --> 00:07:24,550
the FBI, that ... You know, they want to
know my business and I'm very open and I'm

96
00:07:24,550 --> 00:07:27,380
very sharing. So I figure, I'm gonna tell
them every little bit of detail,

97
00:07:27,380 --> 00:07:32,680
including the toilets that I use and how
frequently and where I go. You know, they

98
00:07:32,680 --> 00:07:36,730
need to know, so! Really, what's
happening, you know and, and what I'm

99
00:07:36,730 --> 00:07:40,699
really, what I'm really doing is: I'm,
it's, it's a matter of telling you

100
00:07:40,699 --> 00:07:44,790
everything and telling you absolutely
nothing simultaneously. It's a barrage of

101
00:07:44,790 --> 00:07:50,030
noise. Look, I know that eventually, you
know, machine and AI machine readers and

102
00:07:50,030 --> 00:07:55,630
AI is going to get so, so sophisticated,
that at a certain point this idea of

103
00:07:55,630 --> 00:08:00,550
overwhelming the system, it's not going
to be possible. This is a temporary fix.

104
00:08:00,550 --> 00:08:07,639
And the reason I chose this fix is, you
know, obviously the FBI has a file on me.

105
00:08:07,639 --> 00:08:12,630
By the way, the background story of this
is: I got reported as a terrorist.

106
00:08:12,630 --> 00:08:18,560
I guess, I should probably explain on that
a little bit. So shortly after 9/11, my

107
00:08:18,560 --> 00:08:24,030
landlords, that I rented this storage
space from, called the police and said,

108
00:08:24,030 --> 00:08:27,678
that an Arab man had fled on September
12th, who is hoarding explosives.

109
00:08:27,678 --> 00:08:30,611
Never mind. There were no explosives.
Never mind,

110
00:08:30,611 --> 00:08:33,230
it wasn't an Arab man. 
But you know, that Arab man

111
00:08:33,230 --> 00:08:36,369
would be me. Even though
I'm Bengali and we're actually not Arabs.

112
00:08:36,369 --> 00:08:39,948
But it doesn't matter because as far as
many people ... You know, they're all the

113
00:08:39,948 --> 00:08:43,699
same over there. They're all kind of fun.
You know, that's, it's, it's that mentality

114
00:08:43,699 --> 00:08:47,079
So I spent six months of my
life with the FBI, convincing them that

115
00:08:47,079 --> 00:08:51,899
I'm not a terrorist. And after all that
they said: "Okay, everything's great,

116
00:08:51,899 --> 00:08:53,930
you're fine", and I said: "Okay,
wonderful, can I get a letter saying :

117
00:08:53,930 --> 00:08:58,759
I'm fine?" There's a little problem with
that, because have you ever tried to get

118
00:08:58,759 --> 00:09:03,779
something that says: "You're not guilty
of something you never did"? So you know,

119
00:09:03,779 --> 00:09:07,970
so ever since then I've been with my FBI
agent. I said: "Hey, what can I do? I

120
00:09:07,970 --> 00:09:10,689
mean, I travel a lot. All we need is the
next guy not to get the next memo and

121
00:09:10,689 --> 00:09:14,490
here we go all over again. How do I avoid
this?" So at that moment he gave me a

122
00:09:14,490 --> 00:09:17,490
phone. He says: "Here's some phone
numbers. If you get into trouble, give us

123
00:09:17,490 --> 00:09:20,670
a call. We'll take care of it." So ever
since then I would call my FBI agent,

124
00:09:20,670 --> 00:09:24,170
tell him where I was going, send him
photos to all of these things, and thus

125
00:09:24,170 --> 00:09:27,540
that's what this whole project started. In
a ... I mean back then when I started this

126
00:09:27,540 --> 00:09:30,939
project, shortly after 9/11, I mean, my
phone was like those old ... Remember

127
00:09:30,939 --> 00:09:34,839
those old Nokia 6600? Those like super
chunky ones and you had to hit the buttons

128
00:09:34,839 --> 00:09:38,158
like a whole bunch of times to send like
one text message across? And we should

129
00:09:38,158 --> 00:09:41,869
call them smart phones back then. I mean,
they're really not that smart, but

130
00:09:41,869 --> 00:09:46,170
they're kind of smart phones. Anyway. So
this process of like sending all this

131
00:09:46,170 --> 00:09:50,230
information to the FBI. I started telling
them everything. And also at the same

132
00:09:50,230 --> 00:09:53,570
time by telling them everything I'm also
telling them absoutely nothing because

133
00:09:53,570 --> 00:09:58,499
it's just a wall of noise. And in that
noise there is some signal and the ratio,

134
00:09:58,499 --> 00:10:03,749
the signal-to-noise ratio, is actually
pretty skewed. It's pretty, it's pretty

135
00:10:03,749 --> 00:10:07,990
out of sync in that sense. Because it's,
it's difficult for the, for the viewer to

136
00:10:07,990 --> 00:10:12,019
know what they're looking at. So if you
don't s–. That website, it's a, it's, it

137
00:10:12,019 --> 00:10:16,360
is an archaic website. I mean, it is
completely obsolete technologically, but

138
00:10:16,360 --> 00:10:20,899
more importantly, it's also one of these
things, it's, it's intentionally user-

139
00:10:20,899 --> 00:10:24,649
unfriendly. It's not, you know,
information is not categorized in a way

140
00:10:24,649 --> 00:10:27,830
where, you know, "oh, I want to see this
data this time". It's like, it's just, it

141
00:10:27,830 --> 00:10:31,730
just comes in it, whichever way it, the,
the algorithm these days feels like

142
00:10:31,730 --> 00:10:34,680
generating the, the info. So sometimes
you might see a taco, then you might see

143
00:10:34,680 --> 00:10:38,639
the next one from Mexico City, then
Mexico City might go to like this place

144
00:10:38,639 --> 00:10:41,640
because I took a flight from there to
Houston. So you might get some images

145
00:10:41,640 --> 00:10:44,649
from Houston next. And then from Houston
you might get some things from another

146
00:10:44,649 --> 00:10:49,660
city in the back and forth. So it actually
takes all these pathways various through

147
00:10:49,660 --> 00:10:54,069
it. So in this process I'm really, you
know, it's, it's, I'm telling you

148
00:10:54,069 --> 00:10:57,889
everything and nothing in this
camouflage. In this, you know, thing of,

149
00:10:57,889 --> 00:11:02,720
like, you know, historic camouflage. Now
the concept of camouflage particularly in

150
00:11:02,720 --> 00:11:08,149
digital identity is really important.
Because historically, when you hear

151
00:11:08,149 --> 00:11:13,431
camouflage, it's usually meant for, you
know, warfare, battle, soldiers. And the

152
00:11:13,431 --> 00:11:18,499
reason we have, the reason, camouflage
looks at certain ways, because it was

153
00:11:18,499 --> 00:11:23,079
designed to break the silhouette of the
body of the soldier in the battlefield,

154
00:11:23,079 --> 00:11:29,699
in the landscape of warfare. So this is
why, you know, certain trees look certain

155
00:11:29,699 --> 00:11:33,410
colors and when you look, you know, it's
every place you go, there's a different

156
00:11:33,410 --> 00:11:40,220
war. Each, with each war, there's a
different pattern, that, that's used. Now

157
00:11:40,220 --> 00:11:43,100
if you look at the new camouflage, that
most troops are wearing, particularly in

158
00:11:43,100 --> 00:11:49,240
the US, where I live, it's all pixeled,
it's all pixelized, you know, it's all,

159
00:11:49,240 --> 00:11:54,249
and it's all this, like, weirdly grayish,
greenish color. I don't know if you've

160
00:11:54,249 --> 00:12:00,220
noticed that color. But there's no trees
that color anywhere. It's because it's

161
00:12:00,220 --> 00:12:05,610
not meant for blending into the landscape
anymore. It's no longer meant so the

162
00:12:05,610 --> 00:12:11,759
soldier has to blend into the
battlefield. The reason it's pixelized and

163
00:12:11,759 --> 00:12:17,639
it's that grayish, greenish color is
because we no longer have a need for the

164
00:12:17,639 --> 00:12:22,800
soldier to blend in to the battlefield,
the physical battlefield. But what we want

165
00:12:22,800 --> 00:12:30,019
is the soldier to be, so the enemy cannot
distinguish the physical body of the

166
00:12:30,019 --> 00:12:35,480
soldier in the noise and the night-vision
goggles. That's why it's that color.

167
00:12:35,480 --> 00:12:41,100
That's why it's that grayish green. So this
is a huge step. So we no longer, it's no

168
00:12:41,100 --> 00:12:45,939
longer about the physical presence of the
body in the, in the war field, in the, in

169
00:12:45,939 --> 00:12:51,949
warfare. But it's now about the, it's now
where the, the digital body, that the

170
00:12:51,949 --> 00:12:58,029
physical body is intentionally
camouflaged and mistaken for a digital

171
00:12:58,029 --> 00:13:04,029
artifact. It's that pixelization, that we've forced basically in

172
00:13:04,029 --> 00:13:07,120
warfare. And a lot of work, that I do,
with a lot of, a lot of the art, that I

173
00:13:07,120 --> 00:13:11,160
come up with, comes out of warfare and
such. And I'll show you a little. But this

174
00:13:11,160 --> 00:13:14,370
is a really important piece, that I
wanted to talk to you about. Because this

175
00:13:14,370 --> 00:13:20,170
was taken from one of the earliest samples
of what the US Army uses. And it was done

176
00:13:20,170 --> 00:13:24,639
at the, at the base, at Natick, which is
the, outside of Boston. This is where a

177
00:13:24,639 --> 00:13:27,980
lot of the camouflage in the US is
designed. It's the US Army's fashion

178
00:13:27,980 --> 00:13:32,637
design department. Though they would never
call it the fashion design department. But

179
00:13:32,637 --> 00:13:36,434
this is where they design all the
camouflage and the, and the outfits. And

180
00:13:36,434 --> 00:13:40,589
so this sample was taken ... At first, it
just looks like a modernist grid. Various

181
00:13:40,589 --> 00:13:43,019
photographs and such. But what they
really are, is ... I took the old sample

182
00:13:43,019 --> 00:13:49,519
and I blew it out and took out each pixel
and replaced each pixel with a photograph

183
00:13:49,519 --> 00:13:53,480
of a historic or current point of
conflict. So there's these two images

184
00:13:53,480 --> 00:13:58,300
right in the middle. If you look. The two
blue images over there, kind of in the

185
00:13:58,300 --> 00:14:05,910
middle to the bottom, those are in North
Korea. Those are north the 38th parallel.

186
00:14:05,910 --> 00:14:09,069
That could technically, north the
parallel. So you're actually in North

187
00:14:09,069 --> 00:14:13,149
Korean territory, but at Panmunjom.
There's actually six buildings and three

188
00:14:13,149 --> 00:14:18,389
... And all six are built directly across
the border. And, you know, it's kind of

189
00:14:18,389 --> 00:14:22,480
unpractical to share half the building
with another country. So three of the

190
00:14:22,480 --> 00:14:25,953
buildings belong to South Korea, three of
them belong to North Korea. So these were

191
00:14:25,953 --> 00:14:29,585
the South Korean buildings. But physically
in North Korean territory. Similar like

192
00:14:29,585 --> 00:14:33,110
that plate of ham that you see right
below it, you know, it's a Spanish ham.

193
00:14:33,110 --> 00:14:37,821
And being a good Muslim, I really do
enjoy my Spanish ham. But this was, this

194
00:14:37,821 --> 00:14:43,049
was photographed in Guernica, the site of
a brutal massacre. Shortly ... you know,

195
00:14:43,049 --> 00:14:45,790
so similarly, so each of the, every
single one of these images, they might

196
00:14:45,790 --> 00:14:50,879
seem like these generic or bland images,
but they're all historic conflicts or

197
00:14:50,879 --> 00:14:54,380
current conflicts. There's, there's an
image in the, in the upper right hand, in

198
00:14:54,380 --> 00:14:58,860
the upper left hand corner, right there,
and it's, it's of an office building with

199
00:14:58,860 --> 00:15:05,360
just a flag with three stripes going
across. And this is like a quick world

200
00:15:05,360 --> 00:15:10,389
affairs quiz. Which country has, has a
flag that goes three horizontal stripes

201
00:15:10,389 --> 00:15:16,936
across, the top and bottom are red, and
the middle one is green? Any guesses on

202
00:15:16,936 --> 00:15:30,859
this country? Three stripes, red, green,
red. Lots of confused looks,. Huh? ...

203
00:15:30,859 --> 00:15:34,949
It's, it's a trick question. The country
doesn't exist. It's a, it's Transnistria

204
00:15:34,949 --> 00:15:39,670
or at least the Russians call it
Pridnestrovia. And it's a breakaway

205
00:15:39,670 --> 00:15:43,499
republic of Moldova, it's a tiny little
sliver of land between Moldova and

206
00:15:43,499 --> 00:15:49,930
Ukraine. Maybe about 20, 30 kilometers
wide and maybe about 200 kilometers long.

207
00:15:49,930 --> 00:15:54,470
This tiny, tiny, tiny sliver ... no one
... They have it, well, by the way, they

208
00:15:54,470 --> 00:15:58,029
have their own military, they have their
own passports, they have their own

209
00:15:58,029 --> 00:16:01,820
currency, they have their own judicial
system, they've their own everything. Like

210
00:16:01,820 --> 00:16:08,920
a country, except no one recognizes them
as a country. But if you need to go buy 20

211
00:16:08,920 --> 00:16:13,829
cases of AK-47s, this is the place to go.
So this is, this tiny piece of land, this

212
00:16:13,829 --> 00:16:19,850
tiny piece of land, that no one
recognizes, is really where a lot of the

213
00:16:19,850 --> 00:16:24,199
destabilization of the world comes from.
So I went over there and then of course I

214
00:16:24,199 --> 00:16:27,139
would tell my FBI agent: "This is where I
was going, just loitering." He was like:

215
00:16:27,139 --> 00:16:29,800
"What are you doing over there?" So I
said: "I'm just hanging out, just seeing

216
00:16:29,800 --> 00:16:34,309
what's going on." Anyway. So again, all
of the, every single one of these images,

217
00:16:34,309 --> 00:16:37,560
there's bits and pieces of these types of
source ... But I want to go back at the

218
00:16:37,560 --> 00:16:44,109
state of warfare and talk to you a little
bit about that. So, I live in the US. And

219
00:16:44,109 --> 00:16:47,534
you know, it's we're, you know, currently
at the war on terror. Actually the, the

220
00:16:47,534 --> 00:16:54,109
real name is the Global War on Terror. And
this was a drawing that I did for a

221
00:16:54,109 --> 00:17:00,409
project a few years ago. And there's a,
there's a congressional document. So

222
00:17:00,409 --> 00:17:04,939
there's this document, that the US
Congress keeps, and it's called the

223
00:17:04,939 --> 00:17:10,572
"Instances of Use of United States Armed
Forces Abroad", this time was 1798 to

224
00:17:10,572 --> 00:17:15,900
2006. This gets updated every year. And
interestingly enough, when you look at

225
00:17:15,900 --> 00:17:20,040
this document, it's ... everything is just
the facts, everything is, you know, in

226
00:17:20,040 --> 00:17:26,530
1838, you know, Marines chased pirates
onto a Caribbean island. Well, when the

227
00:17:26,530 --> 00:17:30,363
Marines landed on that Caribbean island,
we invaded that country. Any time you send

228
00:17:30,363 --> 00:17:34,679
your troops on to another country soil
without that country's permission, you

229
00:17:34,679 --> 00:17:38,649
have invaded that country. So everything
from like, you know, Marines chasing

230
00:17:38,649 --> 00:17:43,750
pirates to a Caribbean island all the way
to World War One, it's all just one,

231
00:17:43,750 --> 00:17:47,100
everything's just listed as one instance,
just straight down like ... And this, and

232
00:17:47,100 --> 00:17:51,641
it's just, goes on for pages and pages and
pages and pages and pages and, you know,

233
00:17:51,641 --> 00:17:56,380
so and then you look at it like: "Wait.
When, when did, when did the US invade

234
00:17:56,380 --> 00:18:01,899
Florida?" Well, that was when it was Spanish
territory, this is a, you know, before

235
00:18:01,899 --> 00:18:04,920
that became part of United States
similarly, you know ... So when you look

236
00:18:04,920 --> 00:18:10,049
at it, all the white X's are all the
invasions, that the US has undertaken

237
00:18:10,049 --> 00:18:16,099
between 1776, which was the year of the
independence, to World War One. All the

238
00:18:16,099 --> 00:18:22,660
gray X's are World War One to Vietnam. And
all the black X's are Vietnam to today.

239
00:18:22,660 --> 00:18:29,860
The number of invasions, that the US
troops have undertaken between 1776 and

240
00:18:29,860 --> 00:18:35,755
World War One, roughly equate the same
amount as World War One to Vietnam. And

241
00:18:35,755 --> 00:18:42,706
the number of invasions from 1776
to Vietnam roughly equate Vietnam to

242
00:18:42,706 --> 00:18:51,210
today. In the last 100 years, in the last
117 years, since 1900, there's only

243
00:18:51,210 --> 00:18:55,630
been five years, where the US has not
been at war. Interestingly enough, we've

244
00:18:55,630 --> 00:19:01,029
only declared war 11 times in history.
Since independence of the country, the US

245
00:19:01,029 --> 00:19:08,080
has only formally declared war 11 times.
Yet of the all the years, that we've ever

246
00:19:08,080 --> 00:19:13,100
been an independent country, like there's
only like 20 or 30 years, that we haven't

247
00:19:13,100 --> 00:19:18,389
been at war. And most of those are pre
1800. And then... So since

248
00:19:18,389 --> 00:19:23,639
1900, there's only been five years. And
you can see all of these dots. So one of

249
00:19:23,639 --> 00:19:27,610
the reasons that I wanted to create this
document, is that I had this proposal,

250
00:19:27,610 --> 00:19:32,200
that I wanted to do for this, uh, this
museum in Spain. And I was talking to

251
00:19:32,200 --> 00:19:36,289
curator and I said: "Hey. You know, it
would be really great, what if we set up

252
00:19:36,289 --> 00:19:40,900
a wall of like bulletproof glass in the
gallery. So we'll just, it's like, as

253
00:19:40,900 --> 00:19:43,830
people are going around the museum, we
just set up a huge bulletproof, huge

254
00:19:43,830 --> 00:19:49,093
sheet of bulletproof glass with a really
faint drawing of the world. And we'll

255
00:19:49,093 --> 00:19:52,650
have got, we'll have a guy with a rifle
in the back and he'll shoot bullets at the

256
00:19:52,650 --> 00:19:58,797
audience. But the, but because there's
bulletproof glass, it'll stop. And I mean,

257
00:19:58,797 --> 00:20:02,370
I knew that there was just no way they
would go for it. But to my surprise, they

258
00:20:02,370 --> 00:20:09,406
said: "Let us talk to some security people
and we'll get back to you about this."

259
00:20:09,406 --> 00:20:12,850
And I was really surprised. So in the
meantime, we did some ballistics tests.

260
00:20:12,850 --> 00:20:16,080
So check this out. Look at, look at, I
mean, like, that's what it looks

261
00:20:16,080 --> 00:20:20,450
like. I mean, it's just beautiful when ...
I mean, just the way, like, when

262
00:20:20,450 --> 00:20:25,039
basically, when bullets hit bulletproof
glass. It's not really glass, it's just

263
00:20:25,039 --> 00:20:31,769
very dense plastic. And the heat of the
bullet comes in at such velocity,

264
00:20:31,769 --> 00:20:36,559
that the plastic melts just ever so
slightly and then just swallows the bullet

265
00:20:36,559 --> 00:20:42,840
back up and it freezes back up, so
slightly liquefies and then solidifies.

266
00:20:42,840 --> 00:20:47,620
This is what happens inside your body,
when you get shot. Except your body

267
00:20:47,620 --> 00:20:51,467
doesn't just, you know, absorb the bullet
and just refreeze together. It's just

268
00:20:51,467 --> 00:20:55,639
like this really scary looking thing of
just looking at that, that blunt trauma,

269
00:20:55,639 --> 00:21:02,169
that immediate point of when that
bullet hits. This is what happens. So we

270
00:21:02,169 --> 00:21:05,929
did some ballistics tests and we went
through some ideas and then, and then of

271
00:21:05,929 --> 00:21:09,019
course, as I expected, they said: "No,
you're crazy, there's no way we're doing

272
00:21:09,019 --> 00:21:16,470
this." But they were willing to send this
out to, to off-site. And we built this in

273
00:21:16,470 --> 00:21:21,490
these fabricators built this off-site.
And of course then there was these other

274
00:21:21,490 --> 00:21:27,139
problems of, you know, if we build this in
the US and send it to the museum, I mean,

275
00:21:27,139 --> 00:21:31,169
you know, when it comes into Europe, does
it get imported as artwork or does it get

276
00:21:31,169 --> 00:21:35,472
imported as, well, possibly firearms
because there's actual real gunpowder in

277
00:21:35,472 --> 00:21:41,860
it? There's a lot of problems. So in
order to deal with the customs issues

278
00:21:41,860 --> 00:21:45,850
of it, we figured, you
know, what, let's just ship it,

279
00:21:45,850 --> 00:21:50,630
let's just have it built in Spain. And
then, as we were about to build this, we

280
00:21:50,630 --> 00:21:57,009
realized: There was a little pesky Spanish
law, that requires you to be at least 25

281
00:21:57,009 --> 00:22:02,330
meters away from the intended target. You
can't discharge a weapon in less than 25

282
00:22:02,330 --> 00:22:06,669
meters of its intended target. Now of
course I wanted this piece to be gigantic.

283
00:22:06,669 --> 00:22:09,320
And then you could only imagine, that
this, the price of the bulletproof glass,

284
00:22:09,320 --> 00:22:14,420
as it gets larger and larger and larger.
So we eventually agreed that it'll be 4

285
00:22:14,420 --> 00:22:20,019
meters by 2 meters. Except at that scale,
each of these dots, each of these bull–,

286
00:22:20,019 --> 00:22:26,370
each of these targets then become like 3
millimeters or 4 millimeters in diameter.

287
00:22:26,370 --> 00:22:30,330
Now I don't know how many of you do
shooting or target practice or any of

288
00:22:30,330 --> 00:22:35,929
that. But try to hit 330 dots that are
about 3 to 4 millimeters in

289
00:22:35,929 --> 00:22:40,812
diameter from 25 meters away, one after
another, without missing them. That's

290
00:22:40,812 --> 00:22:45,809
actually practically impossible. So I was
like: How do we do this? And then the

291
00:22:45,809 --> 00:22:50,347
museum fortunately hired three former
Olympians to do this. It was just

292
00:22:50,347 --> 00:22:56,549
unbelievable, watching these guys. And of
the 330 bullets, that are there, 326 of

293
00:22:56,549 --> 00:23:01,520
them were exactly on center. The four that
were off, were no more than five, five

294
00:23:01,520 --> 00:23:06,600
millimeters, and I'm convinced I just
drew them wrong. Those four, I mean, it's

295
00:23:06,600 --> 00:23:09,523
just, it's just unbelievable. But you,
but you can see what happens. So in the

296
00:23:09,523 --> 00:23:14,429
middle over here, this is Central
America, we have hit, we have invaded

297
00:23:14,429 --> 00:23:18,541
Central America so many times. That as
you keep hitting these bullets, these

298
00:23:18,541 --> 00:23:23,010
physical, these bullets, just eventually
the bulletproof glass just shatters and

299
00:23:23,010 --> 00:23:27,712
gives away, I mean, it so, it causes a
literal wreck. So it's kind of

300
00:23:27,712 --> 00:23:32,820
interesting, looking at this, this very
abstract concept of, of these invasions,

301
00:23:32,820 --> 00:23:38,200
these political, these types of political
policies, that we have, and what the

302
00:23:38,200 --> 00:23:43,230
physical manifestation of that, what that
does in a map. But what does that do to

303
00:23:43,230 --> 00:23:46,940
the physical geography? So I'm really
interested in this idea of geography body,

304
00:23:46,940 --> 00:23:50,529
data body, this physicality and the
virtuality and how these two come

305
00:23:50,529 --> 00:23:54,740
together. And this. So similarly, uh,
I've been, I've been doing a lot of these

306
00:23:54,740 --> 00:23:58,659
things about warfare and such. And I want
to show you this project. This is a

307
00:23:58,659 --> 00:24:02,583
project that I've been working on in, in
Hawaii recently. And you know, Hawaii, I

308
00:24:02,583 --> 00:24:07,820
mean, who's gonna turn down a job in
Hawaii? It was pretty unbelievable,

309
00:24:07,820 --> 00:24:15,920
getting a chance to do this
project. And so, when you go to, when you

310
00:24:15,920 --> 00:24:20,149
in... Hawaii is a really
interesting, at least in American policy

311
00:24:20,149 --> 00:24:25,759
and American political and cultural
perspectives, Hawaii is a very unique

312
00:24:25,759 --> 00:24:32,190
place. Because Hawaii is the ultimate
manifestation or the ultimate, like,...

313
00:24:32,190 --> 00:24:37,320
embodiment of what we in, in the, in the
US we have this term called "manifest

314
00:24:37,320 --> 00:24:43,070
destiny", which was a term from the early
1700, actually the late 1700s, in the

315
00:24:43,070 --> 00:24:47,580
early history of America, where we
decided to start in the East and the

316
00:24:47,580 --> 00:24:52,149
Atlantic and expand all the way across
the ... That we will manifest the

317
00:24:52,149 --> 00:24:57,593
country and the whole land will become
ours. This is the birth of the US. This

318
00:24:57,593 --> 00:25:02,830
is the idea of how the country was, was
given birth to. Now, Hawaii is a really

319
00:25:02,830 --> 00:25:09,090
interesting situation in this perspective
because now, you know, we've started on

320
00:25:09,090 --> 00:25:11,769
the Atlantic coast, we've
conquered, conquered, conquered,

321
00:25:11,769 --> 00:25:16,549
conquered, conquered, got, went all there
over to the end. We've gone to the Pacific

322
00:25:16,549 --> 00:25:21,030
Ocean. And now we've crossed the Pacific
Ocean. And now we've gone to this middle

323
00:25:21,030 --> 00:25:25,740
of this, this rock in the middle of the,
of the ocean. And now we're at the top of

324
00:25:25,740 --> 00:25:29,160
the mountain. So we've actually, like, you
know, then all that, then ... The

325
00:25:29,160 --> 00:25:31,780
interesting thing is: Hawaiian culture,
when you go to the peaks of each of the

326
00:25:31,780 --> 00:25:37,049
mountains, every, every of the mountain
peaks are sacred. Interestingly enough,

327
00:25:37,049 --> 00:25:41,880
when you go to each of these mountaintops,
they're all, well, there are almost always

328
00:25:41,880 --> 00:25:46,389
US military or some sort of government or
some sort of science. But, of course, for

329
00:25:46,389 --> 00:25:50,360
many ... And now, granted, I know, there
is some amazing stuff being done. But

330
00:25:50,360 --> 00:25:54,919
there's a lot of also very shady, you
know, like it's military stuff being

331
00:25:54,919 --> 00:25:58,370
done. And it's also this thing of like
going up and then now with these

332
00:25:58,370 --> 00:26:04,379
surveillance devices, these telescopes at
the top of each of these monitoring and

333
00:26:04,379 --> 00:26:10,899
surveying and measuring everything out in
the West and out in the sky. And you

334
00:26:10,899 --> 00:26:13,320
know, so we've gone through the West,
which is also a really interesting thing

335
00:26:13,320 --> 00:26:17,241
about the history of landscape in
America. Let me show you, let me show you

336
00:26:17,241 --> 00:26:21,590
a couple of these images of the top of
this place, which is just, it's just

337
00:26:21,590 --> 00:26:25,399
beautiful going up there. I mean, it
looks like Mars. And a lot of the Mars

338
00:26:25,399 --> 00:26:29,950
tests were actually done up there because
... I mean, it's just amazing.

339
00:26:29,950 --> 00:26:33,899
Like you're looking down at the sky and
there's these like satellites everywhere.

340
00:26:33,899 --> 00:26:38,769
I mean, it really does look like a Martian
landscape. I'm really interested in this.

341
00:26:38,769 --> 00:26:41,320
Okay, so let me show you these projects.
I've been really interested in watching

342
00:26:41,320 --> 00:26:47,389
the watchers of this thing of ... like
... And what happens when you aestheticize

343
00:26:47,389 --> 00:26:51,394
surveillance. I mean, obviously, this is
a major issue for a lot of us. And a lot

344
00:26:51,394 --> 00:26:55,360
of the conference topics here, talks
about privacy and what to do and how to

345
00:26:55,360 --> 00:27:01,330
stop mass surveillance and things of
that type. But when you hear the word

346
00:27:01,330 --> 00:27:07,179
"surveillance imagery", what do you think
of? What are you thinking? Just imagine:

347
00:27:07,179 --> 00:27:11,179
a picture, "surveillance imagery". What
does it look like to you? And for most of

348
00:27:11,179 --> 00:27:14,370
us, we generally probably think of like,
you know, like, what CCTV or surveillance

349
00:27:14,370 --> 00:27:20,558
camera images look like. Usually grainy,
pixely, no, gritty, sometimes black and

350
00:27:20,558 --> 00:27:25,740
white. You know, with this audience, we already know data
storage is cheap. I mean, this data

351
00:27:25,740 --> 00:27:30,779
storage, I mean, you could buy a terabyte
drive for like 30 bucks. So data, you

352
00:27:30,779 --> 00:27:33,519
know, it's, and it gets cheaper and
cheaper every day. And the capacity gets

353
00:27:33,519 --> 00:27:37,790
larger and larger. So it's not necessarily
an economic issue. But it's actually more

354
00:27:37,790 --> 00:27:42,350
of a cultural issue. And, and I'm
proposing the fact that when you hyper-

355
00:27:42,350 --> 00:27:51,220
aestheticize a surveillance image, your
brain no longer reads it as surveillance.

356
00:27:51,220 --> 00:27:57,056
Your brain rejects the image when it's
too aesthetically pleasing. You read it as

357
00:27:57,056 --> 00:28:01,883
landscape or you read it as, read it as
landscape photography. And, and many of

358
00:28:01,883 --> 00:28:04,919
the, in the case of landscape photography
and many of it is, the history of it is

359
00:28:04,919 --> 00:28:10,580
based on landscape painting. So it's
really that, that gritty graininess that

360
00:28:10,580 --> 00:28:15,860
actually gives us the, the emotional
attachment that this is a surveillance

361
00:28:15,860 --> 00:28:21,080
image. Because when it becomes, when it
doesn't have those characteristics, when

362
00:28:21,080 --> 00:28:27,248
it doesn't have those qualities, it
becomes a photo or a video. So in this

363
00:28:27,248 --> 00:28:30,139
case, I just, I was really interested in
what happens when, when you hyper-

364
00:28:30,139 --> 00:28:34,150
aestheticize that. And imagine if you had
x-ray vision. Imagine you had x-ray

365
00:28:34,150 --> 00:28:37,150
vision. You could see right through this
wall. What would you see on the other of

366
00:28:37,150 --> 00:28:41,959
this wall? Well, this image, which
actually looks like a window pane. They're

367
00:28:41,959 --> 00:28:47,320
actually six very large monitors and this
is, this functions as a see-

368
00:28:47,320 --> 00:28:51,175
through wall. So you could actually see
through this wall. And just so, it just

369
00:28:51,175 --> 00:28:55,970
so happened that on the other side of the,
of the wall from this exhibition space

370
00:28:55,970 --> 00:29:00,259
was the Baltimore Police Department. So I
loved the idea of being able to watch the

371
00:29:00,259 --> 00:29:04,649
police watching me watching them. And
when you notice that there's that, next in

372
00:29:04,649 --> 00:29:06,600
the blue light there's a little
surveillance camera on top of their

373
00:29:06,600 --> 00:29:10,710
dumpster which really doesn't make any
sense to me why they would need a

374
00:29:10,710 --> 00:29:13,980
surveillance camera over their dumpster.
But I just love this image of just this

375
00:29:13,980 --> 00:29:17,299
constant reflecting back and forth and
watching and watching and watching back.

376
00:29:17,299 --> 00:29:20,350
And in the image you couldn't tell, you
know, whether it was, whether you're

377
00:29:20,350 --> 00:29:23,940
looking at a photograph or whether you're
looking at a video or whether you're, you

378
00:29:23,940 --> 00:29:27,570
know, it's just every now that you see
some blurry lights move by or some of

379
00:29:27,570 --> 00:29:31,899
these figures. But really, you know, if
you look at a lot of what machine vision,

380
00:29:31,899 --> 00:29:34,289
a lot of the software, I mean, you know,
like, you know, you see those things on

381
00:29:34,289 --> 00:29:38,600
the TV with all those people looking at
those monitors. And that's, no, that's,

382
00:29:38,600 --> 00:29:42,899
that's like the movies or that's like they
used for like fundraising. The real stuff

383
00:29:42,899 --> 00:29:47,390
is all machines looking at this stuff. And
it doesn't actually look that sexy at all.

384
00:29:47,390 --> 00:29:51,937
So I love this idea of actually taking
this image and, you know, seeing

385
00:29:51,937 --> 00:29:56,299
what can happen when it's
aestheticized. Now similarly, you know,

386
00:29:56,299 --> 00:29:59,720
what happens when the form is
aestheticized? This is the very

387
00:29:59,720 --> 00:30:03,230
similar project at another location. But
this is what you would see through the

388
00:30:03,230 --> 00:30:11,049
wall. And when you see this, I mean, your
brain completely rejects this as a

389
00:30:11,049 --> 00:30:17,370
surveillance image. But this is exactly
what happens right on the other side over

390
00:30:17,370 --> 00:30:22,309
there. So thinking about the idea of
aesthetics and what surveillance looks

391
00:30:22,309 --> 00:30:28,919
like and at least, you know, growing up
in an American context, you know, so

392
00:30:28,919 --> 00:30:33,809
a lot of the history of American
photography comes from American painting

393
00:30:33,809 --> 00:30:38,530
or landscape painting. And the history of
a lot of our landscape painting comes from

394
00:30:38,530 --> 00:30:42,450
the Hudson River School, which is the
Northeast and, you know, up north of New

395
00:30:42,450 --> 00:30:47,970
York City and up the Hudson River. These
gorgeous grand vistas, often of these

396
00:30:47,970 --> 00:30:54,210
really large, you know, wide viewpoints,
of these very like subliminal, very like

397
00:30:54,210 --> 00:30:59,190
spiritual type of imagery. This very
godlike imagery. Which is kind of

398
00:30:59,190 --> 00:31:04,358
interesting because in the way it is like
trying to replicate this eye of God. Or if

399
00:31:04,358 --> 00:31:06,700
you want to look at it from the
perspective of surveillance, in which we

400
00:31:06,700 --> 00:31:12,659
generally tend to think of surveillance
as a very post 9/11 or a very 21st century

401
00:31:12,659 --> 00:31:17,889
concept. I mean, most of us did not use
the word surveillance, say, you know, 20

402
00:31:17,889 --> 00:31:22,330
years ago, 30 years ago. That word was
not as common. It certainly has become

403
00:31:22,330 --> 00:31:27,330
incredibly common in our vocabulary very
recently. But even though we tend to

404
00:31:27,330 --> 00:31:32,429
think of surveillance as a very post–, a
very 21st century concept, this is

405
00:31:32,429 --> 00:31:36,510
something that's been embedded in our
history, in our brains for thousands of

406
00:31:36,510 --> 00:31:41,570
years. Particularly when you look at those
early paintings. And then God as the

407
00:31:41,570 --> 00:31:49,179
original surveillance camera. You behaved
because God was watching. So it was very

408
00:31:49,179 --> 00:31:55,220
easy to replace this being above with a
camera above. And that becomes so

409
00:31:55,220 --> 00:31:59,620
normalized in our daily lives. I mean,
think about it. How does Santa Claus know

410
00:31:59,620 --> 00:32:04,519
everything about you? I mean, we were
taught this since we were at such an

411
00:32:04,519 --> 00:32:09,780
early point in life. We've ... So this
normalization of surveillance, this

412
00:32:09,780 --> 00:32:13,640
normalization. And also this, you know,
and ... You know, we don't think, we

413
00:32:13,640 --> 00:32:18,610
never use the word surveillance when we're
talking about God. Again you know, this

414
00:32:18,610 --> 00:32:21,940
aesthetics, the hyper-
aestheticization or maybe, if you want to

415
00:32:21,940 --> 00:32:26,269
call, I mean, this is not exactly a
statusization. But, you know, in

416
00:32:26,269 --> 00:32:31,500
the idea of thinking about it. So, again,
this relationship between the watched and

417
00:32:31,500 --> 00:32:35,580
watcher. And, you know, another similar
project and one that looks like when

418
00:32:35,580 --> 00:32:40,360
you break that frame of looking at ... of
the format of surveillance and when you

419
00:32:40,360 --> 00:32:43,809
aestheticize the format, not only the
imagery of surveillance, but also the

420
00:32:43,809 --> 00:32:48,169
format and how the surveillance is
presented. I mean, we rarely, we would

421
00:32:48,169 --> 00:32:52,181
never, we wouldn't even think of this as a
surveillance camera image. But that is

422
00:32:52,181 --> 00:32:56,389
exactly what this is. That's another
similar piece. I just want to show you

423
00:32:56,389 --> 00:32:59,200
the context of this one. Because I want
to show you, but talk a little bit about

424
00:32:59,200 --> 00:33:04,350
the project that's going on on the right.
And this image is ... So they look like

425
00:33:04,350 --> 00:33:08,090
these landmines. But they also look like
satellites. I'm really interested in this

426
00:33:08,090 --> 00:33:12,015
idea of like circumnavigation. I'm really
interested in these things of, you know,

427
00:33:12,015 --> 00:33:16,320
conceptually this project is telling you
earlier about. This is about telling you

428
00:33:16,320 --> 00:33:21,119
everything and nothing simultaneously. But
in a similar way, I'm also really

429
00:33:21,119 --> 00:33:25,330
interested in this concept of Magellan and
circumnavigation, where you go far enough

430
00:33:25,330 --> 00:33:29,710
to this side, you end up in the other.
You circle around the whole thing. Does

431
00:33:29,710 --> 00:33:32,389
that make sense, a little bit? So in the,
you know, sometimes some people are so far

432
00:33:32,389 --> 00:33:36,908
to the left, that they're actually very
much to the right and vice versa. So

433
00:33:36,908 --> 00:33:40,388
there's this, the circular reasoning
that keeps coming back and forth. And I'm

434
00:33:40,388 --> 00:33:43,390
really interested in this thing and ...
This could be a landmine, but

435
00:33:43,390 --> 00:33:47,320
this could also be a satellite. It's,
there's these types. And then also at the

436
00:33:47,320 --> 00:33:50,940
same time, like, this was, this is an
earlier project. But they also look like

437
00:33:50,940 --> 00:33:54,779
selfie sticks. But then there's these,
like, all these things coming out with

438
00:33:54,779 --> 00:33:58,120
these, like, these monitors sticking out
of each of ... This is pretty iPad. Well,

439
00:33:58,120 --> 00:34:01,889
actually this installation was done
later. But I mean, now it's like these

440
00:34:01,889 --> 00:34:05,620
tablets are like so common. And they're so
everywhere. But what ... These are 72

441
00:34:05,620 --> 00:34:09,139
monitors and all the images that I've
shared with the FBI and said to my FBI

442
00:34:09,139 --> 00:34:13,480
agent, these are all being shown on all
these monitors simultaneously. And you

443
00:34:13,480 --> 00:34:19,350
could get an idea of what you're looking
at. So in the same sense this project was

444
00:34:19,350 --> 00:34:23,530
... This is only a part of ... This
one's... This one's about,

445
00:34:23,530 --> 00:34:32,090
it's about 28 feet. So that's just about
8 meters, 8 and a half meters tall, this

446
00:34:32,090 --> 00:34:37,350
piece. And it's basically every photo
that I photographed and shared.

447
00:34:37,350 --> 00:34:41,669
But they're all printed in these huge
pieces, in these huge, vinyl banners. And

448
00:34:41,669 --> 00:34:45,870
the actual photos, each photo is about
this little. But, you know, there's like

449
00:34:45,870 --> 00:34:48,962
thousands and thousands and thousands and
thousands of them. So when you look from

450
00:34:48,962 --> 00:34:53,897
the back, all you see is these vertical
color stripes. Interestly enough, well,

451
00:34:53,897 --> 00:34:57,080
what they, the other thing that ... I
don't necessarily disclose this in public

452
00:34:57,080 --> 00:35:00,140
and I put the <i>[unclear]</i> but you're really looking
at all the images shot on Sunday, all the

453
00:35:00,140 --> 00:35:05,570
ones on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday,
Thursday, and so on with the seven days.

454
00:35:05,570 --> 00:35:09,850
But what's also happening is, you know,
the color bars, the test bars for

455
00:35:09,850 --> 00:35:13,937
color calibration of monitors, you know,
it's like ... So, one of the things that

456
00:35:13,937 --> 00:35:17,762
happend, I'm sure you must have had,
I'm sure, you must have had this in

457
00:35:17,762 --> 00:35:21,100
Germany. But in the US we used to
have a thing called the Emergency

458
00:35:21,100 --> 00:35:27,090
Broadcast System. And the television show
would stop and would go <i>peeep</i> This tone

459
00:35:27,090 --> 00:35:30,360
would come out and these color bars would
come on the screen and it would say "This

460
00:35:30,360 --> 00:35:33,780
is a test of the Emergency Broadcast
System. Had this been a real emergency,

461
00:35:33,780 --> 00:35:37,380
you would have been instructed on what to
do." So this thing of impending doom,

462
00:35:37,380 --> 00:35:42,010
this thing, if something is, something bad
is about to happen or something bad could

463
00:35:42,010 --> 00:35:45,420
happen. And because something like that
could happen, we need to be ready and we

464
00:35:45,420 --> 00:35:49,545
need to be prepared. This thing of like,
you know, being ready for these things. So

465
00:35:49,545 --> 00:35:53,300
I'm really interested in that, in this
idea of, like, what happens when

466
00:35:53,300 --> 00:35:57,073
you use that tone or when you use that
color and you borrow that thing? But at

467
00:35:57,073 --> 00:36:01,670
the same time, it's the very same system
that broadcasters use to calibrate

468
00:36:01,670 --> 00:36:06,620
signal. So this thing of signal, you
know, and if you think about it. On a

469
00:36:06,620 --> 00:36:10,740
daily basis, we generate so much digital
information. How much of it can be, how do

470
00:36:10,740 --> 00:36:14,530
we calibrate that? So in a way of
giving a nod to that, that's where this

471
00:36:14,530 --> 00:36:20,520
piece comes out of. So and then this one
led to the next one, which ... This has

472
00:36:20,520 --> 00:36:25,151
been making the rounds throughout the
place. So this was at ZKM a couple of

473
00:36:25,151 --> 00:36:29,401
years ago here. And then, now this has
been floating around Eastern Europe. And

474
00:36:29,401 --> 00:36:32,270
these are, you know, they look really
small on the, in the photograph. But this

475
00:36:32,270 --> 00:36:36,060
is the same piece, but lit up from the
back. I'll show you another photo of it

476
00:36:36,060 --> 00:36:39,650
so you can get a better idea of this
piece. So you're seeing every little bits

477
00:36:39,650 --> 00:36:43,730
and pieces and all of these things coming
together. So they're about three meters

478
00:36:43,730 --> 00:36:49,280
tall, each of these slabs. And
and they're lit up from the back. So

479
00:36:49,280 --> 00:36:52,450
and then this is a body of work that
I'm dealing with. So this thing of, like,

480
00:36:52,450 --> 00:36:56,300
you know, libraries or archives. And we
all have them. We all create personal

481
00:36:56,300 --> 00:36:59,250
archives. I mean, if you look at every
single photo you've ever shot, I mean,

482
00:36:59,250 --> 00:37:03,170
which you probably have a record of. You
know, so when you have all of these, so

483
00:37:03,170 --> 00:37:06,530
what, you know, so we're all keeping our
own private archives, you know, I have my

484
00:37:06,530 --> 00:37:11,130
own private archive that I'm doing as a
parallel archive to the FBI. But, you

485
00:37:11,130 --> 00:37:14,950
know, it doesn't have to be for the FBI.
I mean, we all ... maybe in this room, I'm

486
00:37:14,950 --> 00:37:18,030
sure everybody here has been watched
by the government. And there's

487
00:37:18,030 --> 00:37:21,620
probably a few people from the shady
organizations in this room right here

488
00:37:21,620 --> 00:37:26,000
anyway or certainly at the conference. But
what you're looking at here is every,

489
00:37:26,000 --> 00:37:30,380
maybe one of those images. And then
there's this pretty grainy black-and-white

490
00:37:30,380 --> 00:37:34,590
image on top. And it looks like every
other industrial rooftop. It looks like

491
00:37:34,590 --> 00:37:38,560
it's a roof top of a building. And you
can see the, the fans and the exhaust and

492
00:37:38,560 --> 00:37:42,200
the vents. And then at the lower right
there's these like golf ball looking

493
00:37:42,200 --> 00:37:48,800
things. And most buildings don't have
those. This happens to be the rooftop of

494
00:37:48,800 --> 00:37:53,910
the NSA. This is... So really
you know, and I kind of look at

495
00:37:53,910 --> 00:37:58,200
it like the NSA and you know - us,
we're kind of in the same business. We're

496
00:37:58,200 --> 00:38:00,580
kind of on the information business.
Except, you know, they like to keep

497
00:38:00,580 --> 00:38:04,976
theirs to themselves and I like to
give it out to everybody. So, you know,

498
00:38:04,976 --> 00:38:08,200
we operate a little differently in our
business. But we're kind of in the same

499
00:38:08,200 --> 00:38:12,510
business. So I decided to put this piece
out. And really, this thing of like, you

500
00:38:12,510 --> 00:38:15,586
know, so, you know, in a lot of ways
they're kind of like selfies. But they're

501
00:38:15,586 --> 00:38:19,230
not really selfies, because when I
photographed these things ... So let's go

502
00:38:19,230 --> 00:38:23,150
back to this for now. So, you know, when
I'm photographing this, I mean, I could

503
00:38:23,150 --> 00:38:26,680
have taken the camera and I could
have photographed you right now. But

504
00:38:26,680 --> 00:38:29,680
instead there's this very anonymous
looking thing. I mean, like, you know, if

505
00:38:29,680 --> 00:38:32,730
you've been in this room, 
you know, that this could, we

506
00:38:32,730 --> 00:38:36,790
know where that is. But in the same way,
there's these like really like, you know,

507
00:38:36,790 --> 00:38:41,010
so the camera is not pointing towards me.
But the camera is pointing outward. And

508
00:38:41,010 --> 00:38:43,010
that's what's really important here. And
there's thousands and thousands and

509
00:38:43,010 --> 00:38:47,687
thousands of these. I know. So the
selfies, it's become a common thing. And

510
00:38:47,687 --> 00:38:53,220
it's no shame in, you know, saying
you like the selfies. I mean, here's

511
00:38:53,220 --> 00:38:57,150
President Obama trying to make the look
at selfie stick and selfies look pretty

512
00:38:57,150 --> 00:39:02,425
respectable. I can't use the new guy.
I can't just bear to see him. So I

513
00:39:02,425 --> 00:39:05,716
have to go with this guy. I have to go
with Obama. Because, you know, it's

514
00:39:05,716 --> 00:39:09,850
important. But, you know, he's making
that, so when he's taken that image, what

515
00:39:09,850 --> 00:39:13,721
happens? Now when you look at the 
image, this is what, this is the image

516
00:39:13,721 --> 00:39:16,950
that we're seeing. That's, that's up on my
website right now. And as soon as I leave

517
00:39:16,950 --> 00:39:20,020
this room, there'll be a new image that'll
pop up and then when I get to my hotel,

518
00:39:20,020 --> 00:39:23,860
you'll see another image. And then when I
get to, you know, wherever I go eat

519
00:39:23,860 --> 00:39:27,540
tonight, you'll see another image. But
anyway, so, you know, every few moments I

520
00:39:27,540 --> 00:39:31,600
timestamp to change it. So when we're
seeing this image, but really this is what

521
00:39:31,600 --> 00:39:34,740
the, this is what the computer is seeing.
And this ... Some of you, and I'm sure

522
00:39:34,740 --> 00:39:38,480
you know about this, but for those that
are not aware of it, I mean, you know,

523
00:39:38,480 --> 00:39:42,930
when you look at the Exif data – I use <i>[unclear]</i>
which is an Exif reader to extract what

524
00:39:42,930 --> 00:39:46,780
my images are or what the data that's
behind it – so you can see what the image

525
00:39:46,780 --> 00:39:51,220
is. That was shot right there, in that
location. I mean, we know that because

526
00:39:51,220 --> 00:39:55,880
that's how our apps know. Would you like
to check in from here? That's how it knows

527
00:39:55,880 --> 00:39:59,240
the location. So location services,
that's pretty simple. And that's all the,

528
00:39:59,240 --> 00:40:01,620
the metadata that's going ... But the
here it's where it gets really

529
00:40:01,620 --> 00:40:06,620
interesting. The fact that when you 
look at the altitude of this image,

530
00:40:06,620 --> 00:40:14,010
the altitude is 186.061643, sounds about
right for Leipzig? For this area, 186

531
00:40:14,010 --> 00:40:19,530
meters of altitude? Yes? No? I mean, I'm
assuming it's correct because that's what

532
00:40:19,530 --> 00:40:22,431
the phone is telling me. But similarly,
what's really interesting is, when you

533
00:40:22,431 --> 00:40:27,500
look at the image direction. So, I mean,
we know the latitude, longitude, that's a

534
00:40:27,500 --> 00:40:31,270
given. The altitude, that's a new one.
Because an image taken on the ground, sea

535
00:40:31,270 --> 00:40:36,000
level, on the ground level will look very
different than an image shot on the 20th

536
00:40:36,000 --> 00:40:40,760
or 30th floor of a building. Because the
barometric sensor inside the phone will

537
00:40:40,760 --> 00:40:44,580
put a different altitude number in there.
So we know, that this image can also,

538
00:40:44,580 --> 00:40:49,620
if I were to shoot this image from the
roof looking down, that image probably

539
00:40:49,620 --> 00:40:57,760
will be about a 188, 189, 190 meters.
Because of the distance of this. The other

540
00:40:57,760 --> 00:41:03,000
part, that's really interesting, is the
image direction. The camera was tilted at

541
00:41:03,000 --> 00:41:12,390
a 163 degrees from North. 0 being North,
90 East, 180 South, 270 West. So slightly

542
00:41:12,390 --> 00:41:16,680
south. The camera was pointed slightly
south-ish. Which is exactly what that

543
00:41:16,680 --> 00:41:23,120
camera's pointed. Now, why does this
matter? It was only a few years ago that

544
00:41:23,120 --> 00:41:27,470
we were thinking: "You mean, Google is
going to drive up and down every single

545
00:41:27,470 --> 00:41:34,780
road and record every single street?"
Yes, basically the only thing, that's

546
00:41:34,780 --> 00:41:39,000
holding them back in certain places, is
the country's laws or the local things.

547
00:41:39,000 --> 00:41:43,470
Aside from that, not only they drive up
and down every single road in every single

548
00:41:43,470 --> 00:41:47,620
city in every single country that they
can. They do this repeatedly, year after

549
00:41:47,620 --> 00:41:51,540
year, after year, after year, after year.
Some places they'll put, you know, like

550
00:41:51,540 --> 00:41:55,101
in Venice, they'll have like someone on a
boat that goes through. On certain

551
00:41:55,101 --> 00:41:58,450
pedestrian-only islands, there'll be
someone carrying a backpack of those

552
00:41:58,450 --> 00:42:03,040
Google cameras around. So it wasn't that
long ago that this concept, that Google

553
00:42:03,040 --> 00:42:11,120
would catalog every possible outdoor
space was seemed so far-fetched. It's only

554
00:42:11,120 --> 00:42:18,090
a matter of time before we collectively
photograph every indoor space and we

555
00:42:18,090 --> 00:42:23,350
catalog every single indoor space and we
photograph all of it. And sooner or

556
00:42:23,350 --> 00:42:28,190
later, this database, we, through this
database of every indoor image with all

557
00:42:28,190 --> 00:42:32,800
the metadata, we can restitch every
interior space. We could recreate every

558
00:42:32,800 --> 00:42:35,850
interior space. Similarly, you know, then,
you know, when you look at your frequent

559
00:42:35,850 --> 00:42:38,390
locations. I mean, you know, do you look
at me that's like, you know, exactly what

560
00:42:38,390 --> 00:42:42,360
moment you've come on, what minute you
walked into a place, what minute you've

561
00:42:42,360 --> 00:42:47,860
walked out of a place. I mean, you know,
how does your phone know that you've

562
00:42:47,860 --> 00:42:53,650
taken, you know, 8934 steps today? I
mean, it's counting every single one of

563
00:42:53,650 --> 00:42:57,050
them. It knows, you went three, you 
know it, you've done five flights

564
00:42:57,050 --> 00:43:01,039
today, because it knows that your altitude
changed from here to here to here. And it

565
00:43:01,039 --> 00:43:06,050
knows every second you've done all 
this. I mean, this is kind of crazy. So,

566
00:43:06,050 --> 00:43:09,390
you cross-reference all of this
data. I mean, and short of basically

567
00:43:09,390 --> 00:43:13,878
giving up our phones. I mean, this data
is being collected and it's gonna happen.

568
00:43:13,878 --> 00:43:19,570
It's going to get archived. I mean, you
know, there's plenty of, you

569
00:43:19,570 --> 00:43:24,350
know, but at these... that these phones
are just like, it's inevitable. And we're

570
00:43:24,350 --> 00:43:27,970
not going to give up our lives without
them. So you cross-reference all of

571
00:43:27,970 --> 00:43:33,390
these. And very quickly it creates
a complete picture of the owner of that

572
00:43:33,390 --> 00:43:38,470
device. Now back in the old days, you
know, you'd have to, you know, the

573
00:43:38,470 --> 00:43:41,955
intelligence agencies would waste all of
this energy or follow people around. I

574
00:43:41,955 --> 00:43:46,140
mean, you know, it wasn't that long ago.
It happened right here. I mean, you'd have

575
00:43:46,140 --> 00:43:49,092
people following other people around.
You'd have databases. And you have

576
00:43:49,092 --> 00:43:54,310
archives on other archives. This record-
keeping, this massive amount of analog

577
00:43:54,310 --> 00:43:58,930
record-keeping, was not, this is
not far-fetched. This happened very

578
00:43:58,930 --> 00:44:04,180
recently. Now, why should they
go around, do that today, when they can

579
00:44:04,180 --> 00:44:07,030
just go to one of the companies and say:
"Hey. You don't want you give it to us?"

580
00:44:07,030 --> 00:44:11,020
Now we know, you know, of course here's,
you know, Tim Cook saying: "No, no, we

581
00:44:11,020 --> 00:44:15,257
don't, we don't give our information to
the NSA, we don't do that." We know a

582
00:44:15,257 --> 00:44:18,800
little differently, you know, I mean,
remember these? These are from Snowden. I

583
00:44:18,800 --> 00:44:23,520
mean, this is obvious. Look, it doesn't
say, when we ... well, it does not say,

584
00:44:23,520 --> 00:44:28,060
when the NSA intercepted each of these
dates, when prism collection began for

585
00:44:28,060 --> 00:44:32,660
each provider. They're being called
providers here. The reason they're being

586
00:44:32,660 --> 00:44:36,450
called providers is, because these are the
companies, that are providing the

587
00:44:36,450 --> 00:44:42,760
information to the NSA. So while Tim Cook
can say that he doesn't, you know, well,

588
00:44:42,760 --> 00:44:47,680
while he can say, well, he can say all he
wants about he doesn't, you know, that

589
00:44:47,680 --> 00:44:52,330
they don't involve themselves, we 
know otherwise. This is proof. So, you

590
00:44:52,330 --> 00:44:57,270
know, so my whole thing is like, hey, you
know, if the tech companies, if these

591
00:44:57,270 --> 00:45:01,020
organisa..., if these large multinational
tech companies can provide this

592
00:45:01,020 --> 00:45:03,820
information, why can't we do this for
ourselves? Why can't we just put this out

593
00:45:03,820 --> 00:45:07,510
there? And what and why not just put
everything out there, whether it's

594
00:45:07,510 --> 00:45:13,080
relevant or not? And why not just mud up
the whole system? So, you know, I'm

595
00:45:13,080 --> 00:45:16,520
really interested in this idea of like
creating our own archives. Do you know

596
00:45:16,520 --> 00:45:20,110
this building? This is the AT&T data
center in San Francisco at the corner of

597
00:45:20,110 --> 00:45:23,481
2nd and Folsom. This is a project that
they call Hawkeye, which is actually

598
00:45:23,481 --> 00:45:30,310
AT&T's internal code name for this data
center. And shortly before 2007, about a

599
00:45:30,310 --> 00:45:35,200
little over 10 years ago, there were,
there was a whistleblower though, that

600
00:45:35,200 --> 00:45:41,970
came forward. It was in room 641a of this
building, which... Basically, what

601
00:45:41,970 --> 00:45:46,050
happened is: The NSA approached 16 telecom
companies in the US and said: "We'd like

602
00:45:46,050 --> 00:45:51,820
to copy your data stream." And 15 of the
16 said: "Sure, help yourself, you know,

603
00:45:51,820 --> 00:45:55,265
make yourself at home." There's only one
company, that said: "You know. We're not

604
00:45:55,265 --> 00:45:59,220
really sure the legalities of this. Can
you come back with a warrant and tell us

605
00:45:59,220 --> 00:46:03,070
what you're looking for? And we
will provide it to you, if you can tell

606
00:46:03,070 --> 00:46:08,810
us what you want." But you know, you
had, you had 15 of the 16 just say:

607
00:46:08,810 --> 00:46:14,221
"Yeah, go ahead." So what basically, what
happened in, in 2007, not like, who

608
00:46:14,221 --> 00:46:21,710
knows, what it is now. But in 2007 it was
estimated, that there was 213 terabytes

609
00:46:21,710 --> 00:46:29,830
of phone records in this building. Every
phone record of every domestic call in the

610
00:46:29,830 --> 00:46:35,070
US was archived. And then of course
there's multiple data centers. This is

611
00:46:35,070 --> 00:46:39,330
just one of many. Now who does that phone
call belong to? You know, when you're

612
00:46:39,330 --> 00:46:42,740
calling grandma. Does that phone call,
does that information and that phone

613
00:46:42,740 --> 00:46:47,090
call, does that belong to you? Does that
belong to Grandma? Or does that belong to

614
00:46:47,090 --> 00:46:51,839
the phone company and they're licensing
you a one-time use of it? We don't, I

615
00:46:51,839 --> 00:46:55,650
mean again with this... Who
actually owns this data? So I was really

616
00:46:55,650 --> 00:46:59,260
interested in this and keeping it record.
So, I know, you know, while AT&T's

617
00:46:59,260 --> 00:47:03,450
keeping records, which is my
mobile phone provider in the US.

618
00:47:03,450 --> 00:47:07,330
Similarly, I'm keeping my own records.
And this is all my, this is my log files

619
00:47:07,330 --> 00:47:11,490
of all the people that come by on my
website. And you can see all of the folks.

620
00:47:11,490 --> 00:47:15,480
Let me show you a little bit cleaner
version. And you can see all the

621
00:47:15,480 --> 00:47:19,490
lovely happy people, that come by, like,
the terrorist screening center of the

622
00:47:19,490 --> 00:47:24,510
Central Intelligence Agency or the, you
know, the National Geospatial-

623
00:47:24,510 --> 00:47:29,300
Intelligence Agency. I don't know why they
come by. I mean, I, I'm glad that they

624
00:47:29,300 --> 00:47:35,720
like art. I'm glad we have patrons of the
arts in, in these organizations. Because,

625
00:47:35,720 --> 00:47:38,570
you know, I mean, like, they come by
frequently enough. I'm not really sure

626
00:47:38,570 --> 00:47:42,370
what they're doing. But I'm glad, I'm
glad they like what I do. But, so, I

627
00:47:42,370 --> 00:47:47,180
really have to thank one particular
person for making my art career possible.

628
00:47:47,180 --> 00:47:51,390
And that would be Dick Cheney. Because if
it was not for Dick Cheney, I would not

629
00:47:51,390 --> 00:47:54,620
be here talking to you. None of this would
be possible without Dick Cheney. I mean,

630
00:47:54,620 --> 00:47:57,660
really, I mean, you know, he's really
responsible for a lot of things that have

631
00:47:57,660 --> 00:48:01,710
happened recently. So thank you, Dick
Cheney. If you're, if you're listening,

632
00:48:01,710 --> 00:48:05,210
which you probably are, because you know
everything and you are, you know, you have

633
00:48:05,210 --> 00:48:12,020
your people. Anyway. So a few years ago,
I said, well, about 2010 I moved to the, I

634
00:48:12,020 --> 00:48:15,490
start–, I took a job at the University of
Maryland, which is in College Park. When I

635
00:48:15,490 --> 00:48:18,140
say Maryland, most people assume we're in
Baltimore. Because that's the main city

636
00:48:18,140 --> 00:48:22,610
in Maryland. But we're actually closer to
Washington DC. So you can see, so there's

637
00:48:22,610 --> 00:48:28,025
College Park, that's, that's where I work.
This is the FBI headquarters. This is the

638
00:48:28,025 --> 00:48:34,740
CIA. This is the NSA. You triangulate the
three, it ends up on my campus. So it's

639
00:48:34,740 --> 00:48:37,170
only appropriate, you know, it's, and
plus, you know, we have this budget

640
00:48:37,170 --> 00:48:40,585
problem in the US right now. So I'm,
like, helping them out. It's like, you

641
00:48:40,585 --> 00:48:43,340
know: "Guys, can I help you, guys? Can I
help you out by moving in like right next

642
00:48:43,340 --> 00:48:47,360
to you, so you don't have to waste your
resources?" By the way, vice.com ranked

643
00:48:47,360 --> 00:48:51,376
us "The Most Militarized University In
America". We're number one. And then

644
00:48:51,376 --> 00:48:53,745
we're not number one at football or
anything. It takes a while for that sort

645
00:48:53,745 --> 00:48:57,483
of stuff. But most militarized, that's
pretty easy. We can do that. Let me show

646
00:48:57,483 --> 00:49:00,490
you a little bit about ... So it's an
amazing place. DC is, Washington DC is a

647
00:49:00,490 --> 00:49:05,669
great place to be. Problem is, real estate
is really, really, really expensive. Like

648
00:49:05,669 --> 00:49:08,830
housing is really, you know, it's a
company town. I mean, like, why else would

649
00:49:08,830 --> 00:49:12,537
you need to live there unless, you know,
you're working in government? So while,

650
00:49:12,537 --> 00:49:15,550
you know, real estate prices in other
parts of the country go up and down,

651
00:49:15,550 --> 00:49:19,080
Washington just keeps going up and up and
up and up and up. So, you know, it's been

652
00:49:19,080 --> 00:49:23,360
good. But then I found this piece of land
in St. Michael's. Now if you look over

653
00:49:23,360 --> 00:49:27,620
here, it says, the average listing price
in the zip code, which is the, the postal

654
00:49:27,620 --> 00:49:33,970
code in that area, is 797303 dollars. This
was back in 2010. You know, 800000

655
00:49:33,970 --> 00:49:38,840
dollars at that time average. And then I
found this piece of land for only 74000

656
00:49:38,840 --> 00:49:43,040
bucks. I was like: "I want this. I want
this. I want this. I'm gonna ..." I know,

657
00:49:43,040 --> 00:49:45,920
it's like I need to do something. And
it's about an hour and a half away from

658
00:49:45,920 --> 00:49:49,320
work, which is a bit ... But, you know,
it's possible. Anyway, so this is where

659
00:49:49,320 --> 00:49:53,200
the house is over there. It goes 
further up. So it's a piece of land, it's a

660
00:49:53,200 --> 00:49:56,210
beautiful place. I mean, you see the
nature and all that. It's that weird

661
00:49:56,210 --> 00:50:00,280
oblong shape over there. You see that
little driveway with the nice trees and

662
00:50:00,280 --> 00:50:03,410
that house in the water? That belongs to
this guy.

663
00:50:03,410 --> 00:50:06,550
<i>slight laughter in the audience</i>
So, and let me take you around the

664
00:50:06,550 --> 00:50:11,768
neighborhood for a little bit. So 
this is, this is his gate. This is his

665
00:50:11,768 --> 00:50:17,450
driveway. He drives up this way. He
has a five car garage. Two of those

666
00:50:17,450 --> 00:50:21,700
garages go back pretty deep. This is
swimming pool. We're gonna hang out here

667
00:50:21,700 --> 00:50:25,925
over the summers, hang out, you know,
we'd gonna throw some parties. This is his

668
00:50:25,925 --> 00:50:33,882
front room. This is his kitchen. This is
where he sleeps. And this is where we're

669
00:50:33,882 --> 00:50:39,610
gonna plot world domination. We're gonna
hang out and eat yellowcake up there. So

670
00:50:39,610 --> 00:50:43,330
this is the place. I'm hoping to
build this. This is what I was trying to

671
00:50:43,330 --> 00:50:46,541
build. But the listing just kind of
disappeared. It literally just

672
00:50:46,541 --> 00:50:50,351
disappeared. And I'm convinced it's, so,
you know, it's like he kind of does that

673
00:50:50,351 --> 00:50:54,140
to people, too. I'm glad he just did it to
the listening and not to me. But, you

674
00:50:54,140 --> 00:50:57,640
know, it wasn't withdrawn, it wasn't
sold, it just like disappeared. So these

675
00:50:57,640 --> 00:51:00,230
days, it has become like this really
conceptual project, where I'm actually

676
00:51:00,230 --> 00:51:03,672
painting them. And then I'm photographing
the paintings. So this is what I'm

677
00:51:03,672 --> 00:51:07,436
actually showing. So, you know,
it's... So, okay. Here's my thing. So,

678
00:51:07,436 --> 00:51:11,204
look, here's a man, Dick Cheney, with not
only are you dealing with the former vice

679
00:51:11,204 --> 00:51:15,650
president. You're dealing with the former,
you deal with the former CEO of

680
00:51:15,650 --> 00:51:22,130
Halliburton. Like every ... This man has
every motivation to be secret. This man,

681
00:51:22,130 --> 00:51:29,760
money is no object. And yet, if I can show
you, where he sleeps and where he eats

682
00:51:29,760 --> 00:51:33,980
and where he swims, I mean, what can he
know about us? I mean, I'm completely

683
00:51:33,980 --> 00:51:37,930
self-trained in this. I'm not even, I'm
not even like, you know, I'm not even like

684
00:51:37,930 --> 00:51:42,020
that, that tech-savvy in this. I mean, I
just kind of, just like duct-tape things

685
00:51:42,020 --> 00:51:47,610
together to find things, whatever I
needed. But what do entire companies and

686
00:51:47,610 --> 00:51:53,110
corporations and countries, that really
have the motivation to dig through our

687
00:51:53,110 --> 00:51:57,690
information, what can they get about us?
So I'd like to leave you with this, that,

688
00:51:57,690 --> 00:52:01,220
you know, we really need to come up with
a different idea and a different

689
00:52:01,220 --> 00:52:06,450
interpretation and a different meaning of
what privacy in the 21st century means.

690
00:52:06,450 --> 00:52:11,540
This is no longer, we can no longer 
afford to use the same definitions

691
00:52:11,540 --> 00:52:16,592
of privacy that we used 50 years ago. Or
a hundred years ago. Or 200 years ago. Or

692
00:52:16,592 --> 00:52:20,620
even just five years ago or even just last
week. We need to have a much more

693
00:52:20,620 --> 00:52:24,760
adaptive and open idea what this means to
us. And for each of us, this will mean,

694
00:52:24,760 --> 00:52:28,392
mean something differently. So I want to
leave you with that. And thank you very

695
00:52:28,392 --> 00:52:32,170
much and I'm happy to take some
questions.

696
00:52:32,170 --> 00:52:38,260
<i>applause</i>
Herald: Thank you, Hasan.

697
00:52:38,260 --> 00:52:43,400
Hasan: Thank you! Welcome!
Herald: It's a fantastic adventure to be

698
00:52:43,400 --> 00:52:51,450
always on the run and at the same time,
actually, yeah, they're running for you

699
00:52:51,450 --> 00:52:54,010
now.
Hasan: A little bit. They come by. You

700
00:52:54,010 --> 00:52:56,177
know, I try to be friends with them.
Herald: Yeah, that's good.

701
00:52:56,177 --> 00:52:58,740
Hasan: You know, they're not, they're
actually not that, they're not very, they

702
00:52:58,740 --> 00:53:02,230
don't like, they don't want to be friends.
They just like, they just like to watch

703
00:53:02,230 --> 00:53:06,150
from a distance.
Herald: You think that Dick Cheney will

704
00:53:06,150 --> 00:53:10,040
allow parties at your house?
Hasan: I'm trying. Yeah. We're gonna have

705
00:53:10,040 --> 00:53:11,726
a shooting range in the back
Herald: Like it's good.

706
00:53:11,726 --> 00:53:13,940
Hasan: Yeah, it'll be a lot of fun.

707
00:53:13,940 --> 00:53:16,320
Herald: I'm looking forward.
Hasan: Do you have a question?

708
00:53:16,320 --> 00:53:23,090
Q: Yeah, thanks for the talk. You
mentioned ways that you are ... kind of

709
00:53:23,090 --> 00:53:27,660
anticipated things that now we kind of
take very common. Is there any way in

710
00:53:27,660 --> 00:53:34,160
which your art practice has evolved or
responded to having a newer, younger

711
00:53:34,160 --> 00:53:38,890
generation of students year over year in
your classes, for whom Instagram or selfie

712
00:53:38,890 --> 00:53:41,520
sticks might be just second nature to
them?

713
00:53:41,520 --> 00:53:45,950
Hasan: Yeah. You know, I think it's
really interesting watching how people of

714
00:53:45,950 --> 00:53:49,710
different generations react to this.
Because, you know, I think a lot of it

715
00:53:49,710 --> 00:53:53,010
also has to do with the way we
communicate. I mean, there was a very

716
00:53:53,010 --> 00:53:56,580
specific generation that would write a
letter. And then you had a generation

717
00:53:56,580 --> 00:54:00,960
that would write, you know, that would
call. And then you have text. And then

718
00:54:00,960 --> 00:54:04,010
you have people that write you over email.
And you have people that will only text

719
00:54:04,010 --> 00:54:06,820
you. I mean, we were seeing that and
we're, and, and we're actually living in

720
00:54:06,820 --> 00:54:09,800
that right now. Because we actually deal
with certain different types of people

721
00:54:09,800 --> 00:54:13,780
that only deal with different modes of
communication. So I really think in, that

722
00:54:13,780 --> 00:54:17,300
it's ... The interesting thing is though
that time is compressed. Because we've

723
00:54:17,300 --> 00:54:21,310
only had people that communicate over
writing for hundreds of years. Then we

724
00:54:21,310 --> 00:54:26,381
would have people that only communicated
and phoned for maybe 30 to 50, maybe a

725
00:54:26,381 --> 00:54:30,120
little longer. And then, now we only have
that like in the last 5 years we've had

726
00:54:30,120 --> 00:54:33,590
this. And then now, down to like one year.
So who knows what the next method will

727
00:54:33,590 --> 00:54:38,890
be? But I really think a lot of it has to
do with this adaptation. I think a lot of

728
00:54:38,890 --> 00:54:43,180
the things really interesting is this
idea of like, like migration and, you

729
00:54:43,180 --> 00:54:47,570
know, the whole immigration topics are
some real hot topic politically right now.

730
00:54:47,570 --> 00:54:50,820
But I think we also need to think 
about this from a digital perspective.

731
00:54:50,820 --> 00:54:55,240
Because, you know, we turn, we tend to use
the word digital native a lot. But we

732
00:54:55,240 --> 00:54:59,430
never actually use the word digital
immigrant. But yet that's all of us in

733
00:54:59,430 --> 00:55:03,000
some way. I mean, very few of us...
I mean there, yes, there are

734
00:55:03,000 --> 00:55:06,950
certain, there is a certain generation
that is 100% digital from day one. But

735
00:55:06,950 --> 00:55:11,360
for most of us, at least of a certain
age, we are all digital immigrants. And I

736
00:55:11,360 --> 00:55:15,520
think that, that type of shift, I think
that type of understanding of it, I think

737
00:55:15,520 --> 00:55:21,140
it has an impact and particularly
in terms of dealing with

738
00:55:21,140 --> 00:55:25,730
learning and dealing with education, you
know. At what point is it a natively

739
00:55:25,730 --> 00:55:37,580
learned skill versus a naturalised, a
migratory type of an action. So. Hopefully

740
00:55:37,580 --> 00:55:41,490
that answers that you're talking about,
yeah. Do you have another question? ...

741
00:55:41,490 --> 00:55:48,810
Yeah?
Q: Just ... have they ever asked

742
00:55:48,810 --> 00:55:51,070
you to stop?
Hasan: No, no there's no law against

743
00:55:51,070 --> 00:55:54,330
talking too much. Because if there was a
law against talking too much, we'd all be

744
00:55:54,330 --> 00:55:57,710
in trouble. But you know, but this is
interesting. Because they're very much

745
00:55:57,710 --> 00:56:04,780
about, there ... It's very much a 
one-way direction. They're not about,

746
00:56:04,780 --> 00:56:08,730
they don't editorialize, they don't
provide opinion. They only take

747
00:56:08,730 --> 00:56:14,700
information. They ask you questions and
they take information. So you could answer

748
00:56:14,700 --> 00:56:20,280
them with one word or you could answer
them with millions. And I've just decided

749
00:56:20,280 --> 00:56:24,690
that I'm gonna keep talking, keep
talking to them. I'm a relatively, you

750
00:56:24,690 --> 00:56:30,190
know, I think cooperative person. I'd like
to be helpful, you know. But really, what

751
00:56:30,190 --> 00:56:34,710
it is, it's really, it's, defiance 
through compliance. It's

752
00:56:34,710 --> 00:56:38,557
this level of aggressive compliance. And
at a certain point, I try to be so

753
00:56:38,557 --> 00:56:41,300
helpful, that I'm completely not 
helpful at all.

754
00:56:41,300 --> 00:56:45,330
<i>slight laughter in the audience</i>
So thank you, thank you for the question.

755
00:56:45,330 --> 00:56:51,490
<i>applause</i>
Herald: Thank you very much. Is there, is

756
00:56:51,490 --> 00:56:53,450
there ... Oh, there's a question from the
internet!

757
00:56:53,450 --> 00:56:55,940
Hasan: No, oh, okay. Nobody else? Okay,
great.

758
00:56:55,940 --> 00:56:58,380
Herald: Is there an FBI agent in there to
have a drink, maybe?

759
00:56:58,380 --> 00:57:04,240
Hasan: Yeah that'd be great. Yeah yeah.
Herald: Why not? Yeah.

760
00:57:04,240 --> 00:57:07,500
Hasan: I'm sure, I'm sure there's people
from some government organization at this

761
00:57:07,500 --> 00:57:09,680
place. So, you know, let's get a drink
later together.

762
00:57:09,680 --> 00:57:12,030
Herald: Okay, let's have one. Thank you
very much!

763
00:57:12,030 --> 00:57:14,590
Hasan: See you guys. Thank you so much,
thanks.

764
00:57:14,590 --> 00:57:17,682
Herald: Don't forget to help us all to
clean this all up.

765
00:57:17,682 --> 00:57:29,960
<i>34C3 Music</i>

766
00:57:29,960 --> 00:57:40,292
subtitles created by c3subtitles.de
in the year 2020. Join, and help us!