0:00:00.393,0:00:03.574 ♪ [music] ♪ 0:00:09.178,0:00:10.438 - In this short lecture, 0:00:10.438,0:00:13.601 I want to elaborate [br]on a surprising claim 0:00:13.601,0:00:15.875 made at the end of the last video. 0:00:15.875,0:00:20.321 Namely that firms have[br]an incentive to increase job safety 0:00:20.321,0:00:23.525 because then it can lower wages. 0:00:26.869,0:00:30.278 Recall that the main idea [br]of compensating variations 0:00:30.278,0:00:35.459 is that wages adjust until jobs[br]requiring a similar level of skill 0:00:35.459,0:00:38.689 have similar compensation packages. 0:00:38.689,0:00:42.087 What this means is that jobs [br]which aren't very fun 0:00:42.087,0:00:46.047 they have to have higher wages [br]compared to similar jobs, 0:00:46.047,0:00:48.137 which are more fun [br]and which therefore, 0:00:48.137,0:00:51.293 have to have lower wages. 0:00:51.293,0:00:53.016 The same thing goes for safety. 0:00:53.016,0:00:56.237 So if we were to replace fun [br]with safety jobs 0:00:56.237,0:00:59.326 with low levels of safety [br]have to have higher wages 0:00:59.326,0:01:01.884 compared to jobs [br]with high levels of safety 0:01:01.884,0:01:04.609 which are going[br]to have lower wages. 0:01:04.609,0:01:07.484 Let's see this in another diagram. 0:01:07.484,0:01:09.278 Let's consider two fishing jobs. 0:01:09.278,0:01:11.637 One in the Gulf of Mexico[br]is low risk. 0:01:11.637,0:01:14.263 The other in the frigid[br]choppy waters of the Arctic 0:01:14.263,0:01:15.810 has high risk. 0:01:15.810,0:01:18.278 If the jobs require[br]equal skill levels, 0:01:18.278,0:01:20.757 then the supply of workers [br]to the high-risk job 0:01:20.757,0:01:22.766 is going to be lower 0:01:22.766,0:01:26.529 and therefore the wage [br]is going to be higher. 0:01:26.529,0:01:30.866 In fact, the wage will adjust [br]till difference in wages 0:01:30.866,0:01:33.698 compensates for the risk. 0:01:33.698,0:01:34.977 Putting it the other way. 0:01:34.977,0:01:37.732 If firms were able [br]to make the Alaska job 0:01:37.732,0:01:40.058 as safe as the Mexico job, 0:01:40.058,0:01:42.001 they could pay lower wages 0:01:42.001,0:01:45.418 and what this means [br]is that the firm has an incentive 0:01:45.418,0:01:47.508 to invest in safety. 0:01:47.508,0:01:51.520 Whenever the cost of the investment[br]is less than the extra wages 0:01:51.520,0:01:56.069 the firm has to pay to compensate[br]the workers for risk. 0:01:56.069,0:01:58.678 Moreover, the more wages 0:01:58.678,0:02:01.677 that workers require[br]to take on risk. 0:02:01.677,0:02:06.418 the greater the firm's incentive [br]to invest in safety. 0:02:06.418,0:02:08.389 Now keeping this principle in mind 0:02:08.389,0:02:12.659 let's consider this along with [br]the history of developed countries. 0:02:12.659,0:02:15.319 Job safety is much higher today [br]in rich countries 0:02:15.319,0:02:16.980 than in poor countries 0:02:16.980,0:02:19.070 and it's much higher today [br]than in the past 0:02:19.070,0:02:21.449 when rich countries were poorer. 0:02:21.449,0:02:23.950 Many people think [br]that this increase in job safety 0:02:23.950,0:02:26.599 is due to government regulations [br]and to unions 0:02:26.599,0:02:31.029 but in fact those factors [br]have played only a small role. 0:02:31.029,0:02:34.040 The major cause [br]of increased job safety 0:02:34.040,0:02:38.130 is increasing wealth [br]and the profit motive. 0:02:38.130,0:02:40.418 As workers have become wealthier, 0:02:40.418,0:02:44.230 they have demanded[br]higher wages to take on risk 0:02:44.230,0:02:47.700 and that in turn has increased [br]the incentive of firms 0:02:47.700,0:02:49.880 to make workplaces safer 0:02:49.880,0:02:54.161 because firms are able to pay [br]lower wages for safer jobs. 0:02:54.161,0:02:59.350 In other words, rich workers [br]buy more Plasma TVs 0:02:59.350,0:03:03.731 and they also buy [br]more workplace safety. 0:03:03.731,0:03:08.200 The profit motive is a reason [br]to supply workers with Plasma TVs 0:03:08.200,0:03:13.090 and it's also a reason [br]to supply workers with safer jobs. 0:03:13.090,0:03:15.200 There are, however, [br]two qualifications. 0:03:15.200,0:03:18.130 Let's take a look at those. 0:03:18.130,0:03:20.380 So the profit motive [br]give firms an incentive 0:03:20.380,0:03:23.630 to supply workers with goods [br]like Plasma TVs 0:03:23.630,0:03:27.288 and also to supply[br]workplace safety. 0:03:27.288,0:03:29.690 This process works however 0:03:29.690,0:03:33.419 only when workers[br]know about the risks. 0:03:33.419,0:03:36.530 Workers won't accept [br]lower wages to reduce risks 0:03:36.530,0:03:38.483 that they don't know about. 0:03:38.483,0:03:40.990 Fortunately, workers' compensation, 0:03:40.990,0:03:43.928 the government required[br]insurance system, 0:03:43.928,0:03:45.910 is experience rated. 0:03:45.910,0:03:48.525 Firms which have [br]more accidents pay more. 0:03:48.525,0:03:52.879 So firms do have an incentive [br]to take into account hidden risks 0:03:52.879,0:03:58.701 so long as they occur [br]when the worker is on the job. 0:03:58.701,0:04:02.239 Risks that are hidden [br]and that don't occur on the job. 0:04:02.239,0:04:04.471 Things like risk[br]from asbestos, cancer, 0:04:04.471,0:04:06.351 radiation risks, and so forth. 0:04:06.351,0:04:09.660 They will not be handled very well [br]by the market process 0:04:09.660,0:04:12.319 or by workers' compensation. 0:04:12.319,0:04:14.779 Unfortunately,[br]no system works all that well 0:04:14.779,0:04:17.171 for hidden long-run risks 0:04:17.171,0:04:19.471 but the tort system [br]and government regulation 0:04:19.471,0:04:25.230 do have a role to play in handling [br]these hidden long-run risks. 0:04:25.230,0:04:28.511 Okay, that's it for job safety [br]and compensating variations. 0:04:28.511,0:04:30.726 See you next time. 0:04:31.290,0:04:33.950 - If you want to test yourself, [br]click practice questions 0:04:33.950,0:04:38.111 or if you're ready to move on [br]just click "Next video."