WEBVTT

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... wanted to be able to use

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Thunderbird and GnuPG together with Tor,

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and so we thought:

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oh, it would be really easy, I bet,

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to configure Thunderbird to work with Tor

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- hah - so a new Free software project
was born.

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It's a really simple thing, but basically

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it's just a package
that hooks it all together.

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So a lot of people were using Thunderbird

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and TorBirdy, and GnuPG, and Tor,

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and Debian, together for email,

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combined with Riseup as an email service.

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So it's a literally a real peer to peer,
Free software driven set of things,

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actually, that made it possible.

NOTE Paragraph

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[question]:
So one thing I never understood about this

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process was exactly how the documents were
handled, and maybe that's because nobody

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wants to say, but, you know, did you leave
them on a server somewhere and download

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them, hand them over to people, and who
took what where, and how do you...

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in case I need to do something really
dangerous with a load of documents,

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what's the best way of doing it?

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[laughter]

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[Jacob]: Hmm!

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[audience member]: It's a good thing
this isn't being streamed.

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I'm sorry, what?

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There was a voice from god,
what did she say?

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[audience]:
I said good we aren't streaming tonight.

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Oh yeah, so hello to all of our friends


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in domestic and international
surveillance services.

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Well, so I won't answer your question,

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but since you asked the question,
it's my turn to talk.

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So what I would say is that...

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if you want to do clandestine activities

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that you fear for your life for,

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you need to really think about
the situation that you're in

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very carefully.

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And so a big part of this is
operational security

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and a big part of that is
compartmentalization.

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So certain people had access
to certain things,

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but maybe they couldn't decrypt them,

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and certain things were moved around,

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and that's on a need to know basis,

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and those people who knew,

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which is not me - I don't know anything,
I don't know what you're talking about.

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Those people knew, and then you know,

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it'll go with them to their grave.

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So if you're interested in being the next
Edward Snowden,

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you need to do your homework

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in finding people that will be able to do
the other part of it, let's say.

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But just in general, I mean

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compartmentalization is key, right.

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So it's not just for AppArmor profiles.

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So you need to think about
what you want to do.

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And I mean a big part of this
is to consider that the network itself

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is the enemy, even though it is useful
for communicating.

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So all the metadata that exists
on the network

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could have tipped people off,
could have caused

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this whole thing to fall apart.

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It really is amazing, I feel like you know

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two and half, three years ago,

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when you talk about Free software,

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and you talk about the idea of
Free software,

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and you talk about issues relating to
autonomy and privacy, and security

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you have a really different reception now
than you did then,

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and that's really what it took

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to turn the world half a degree,
or something,

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or a quarter of a degree or something.

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So I'm not going to tell you about
detailed plans for conspiracy,

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but I highly encourage you to read about
South African history,

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in particular the history of
Umkhonto we Sizwe.

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They are the clandestine communications
group for MK,

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or rather the operation who lay inside of MK,

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which is Umkhonto we Sizwe,

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and they are sort of with
the African National Congress,

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and those people have published so many
books about the revolutionary activities

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to overthrow the apartheid state.

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If you read these books, especially
the book "Operation Vula"

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and "Armed and Dangerous"
by Ronnie Kasrils

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they give you some idea about
what you need to do

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which is to compartmentalize,

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how to find people to do various tasks,
specific tasks,

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how to work on building trust
with each other, what that looks like,

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how to identify political targets,

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how you might use things
like communications technology

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to change the political topic on,

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and the discussion in general.

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And I think the best way to learn about
these things is to study previous people

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who have tried to do that kind of stuff.

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And the NSA is not the apartheid regime of
South Africa,

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but there are still lessons
to be learned there,

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so if you really want to know the answer
to that, also Che Guevara's manual

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on guerilla warfare is very interesting,

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and there's a lot of other books like that.

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I'd be happy to talk about it
with you later.

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And I have nothing to do with anything
that we may or may not have done.

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[laughter]

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[question]: Do you think there is a chance
that things may get better

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for example I know that publicly,
some programs were not extended

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but I don't know what is happening
in the background

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so maybe it's the same thing
but they are pretending that it's not

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How do you see this?

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[Jacob]: Well I think a couple of things.

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In general I think what happened, not just
with this movie but with all of these things

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is that in inspired hope,

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and the hope is very important,

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but hope is not a strategy for survival,
or for building alternatives,

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so what it has also done, is that it has
allowed us to raise the profile

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of the things which actually do
make it better.

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For example ridding ourselves of the
chains of proprietary software

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is something that's a serious discussion
with people that wouldn't have previously

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talked about Free software
because they don't care about liberty,

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they care about security.

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And even though I think those are
really simliar things,

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previously they just thought we were just
Free software hippies,

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in tie-dye shirts

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and while that may be true on the weekends
and evenings

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or with Bdale every day
[laughter]

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I think that actually does make it better

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And it also changes the dialogue, in
the sense that it's no longer reasonable

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to pretend that mass surveillance and
surveillance issues don't matter,

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because if you really go down the
rabbit-hole

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of thinking about what some of the
security services are trying to do

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it becomes obvious that we want to encrypt
everything all the time

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to beat selector-based surveillance
and dragnet-based surveillance.

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It doesn't matter if something is authenticated

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You could still trigger some action
to take place

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with these kinds of surveillance machines

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that could for example drone
strike someone,

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and so it raises that.

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And that gives me a lot of hope too,

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because people understand the root
of the problem,

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or the root of many problems

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and the root of some violence
in the world, actually.

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And so it helps us to reduce that
violence

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by getting people to acknowledge
that it's real

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and also that they care about it

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and that we care about each other.

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So that really gives me a lot of hope,
and part of that is Snowden

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and part of that is the documents

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but the other part of it is that..

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I don't want to blow it up and make it
sound like we did something

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like a big deal,

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but in a sense, Laura, Glen, myself
and a number of other people

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were really not sure we would ever be able
to travel home to our country

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that we wouldn't be arrested.

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I actually haven't been home
in over two and half years,

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well, two years and three months
or something

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I went out on a small business trip
that was supposed to last two weeks

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and then this happened

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and I've been hear ever since.

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It's a really long, crazy trip.

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But the point is that that's what was
necessary to make some of these changes

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and eventually it will turn around

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and I will be able to go home,

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and Laura and Glen will be able to travel
to the US again.

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Obviously, Julian is still stuck in the
Ecuadorian embassy

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Sarah lives in exile in Berlin,

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I live in exile in Berlin,

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And Ed is in Moscow

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So we're not finished with some of
these things

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and it's also possible that we are,
the set of people I mentioned,

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the state we're in, will stay that way
forever.

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But what matters is that the rest
of the world

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can actually move on and fix some of
these problems,

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and I have a lot of hope about that.

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And I see a lot of change, that's the
really big part.

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Like I see the reproducible build stuff
that Holger and Lunar are working on.

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People really understand the root reason
for needing to do that

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and actually seems quite reasonable
to people

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who would previously have expended energy
against it,

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in support of it, so I think that's
really good.

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And there's a lot of other hopeful things.

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So I would try and be as uplifting
as possible.

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It's not just the rum!

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[question]: Near the end of the film
we saw something about another source.

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I may have been missing some news
or something

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but I don't remember anything about that
being public.

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Do you know what happened to them?

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[Jacob]: As far as I know any other
source that was mentioned in the film

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is still anonymous, and they're still free.

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I'm not exactly sure because I was not
involved in that part

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but I also saw the end of the film

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and I've seen a bunch of other reporting
which wasn't attributed to anyone in particular

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So the good news... there's an old slogan
from the Dutch hacker community, right?

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"Someone you trust is one of us,

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and the leak is higher up in the chain of
command than you"

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And I feel like that might be true again,
hopefully.

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I think that guy has a question as well.

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[question]: Part of the problem initially
was that encryption software

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was not so easy to use, right?

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And I think part of the challenge
for everyone

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was to improve on that situation
to make it better

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so I'm asking you if you've observed
any change and to the rest of the room

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have we done anything to improve on that?

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[Jacob]: I definitely think that there is
a lot of free software

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that makes encryption easier to use,

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though not always on free platforms,
which really is heart-breaking.

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For example Moxie Marlinspike has done
a really good job

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with Signal, Textsecure and Redphone

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and making end-to-end, encrypted
calling, texting, sexting,

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and whatever apps,

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sext-secure is what I think it's nicknamed

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and I'm very impressed by that,
and it works really well

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and it's something which, especially
in the last two years,

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if you have a cell-phone,
which I don't recommend

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but if you have a cell-phone,
and you put in everyone's phone number,

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a lot of people that I would classify as
non-technical people,

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that don't care about Free software
as a hobby or as a passion

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or as a profession.

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You see their names in those systems

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often more than some of the
Free software people,

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and that's really impressive to me,

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and I think there's been a huge shift
just generally about those sorts of things

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also about social responsibility,

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or people understand they have a
responsibility to other people

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to encrypt communications,
and not to put people in harm's way

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by sending unsafe stuff over
unsafe communication lines.

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So I think in my personal view it's better.

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But the original problem wasn't actually
that the encryption was hard to use.

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I think the main problem is people didn't
understand the reason

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that it needed to be done

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and they believed the lie that is
targetted versus mass surveillance.

00:10:16.859 --> 00:10:20.027
And there's a big lie, and the lie is
that there is such a thing

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as targeted surveillance.

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In the modern era, most so-called
targetted surveillance actually happens

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through mass surveillance.

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They gather everything up, and then they
look through the thing

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they've already seized.

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And of course there are targetted,
focussed attacks.

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But the main thing is that the abuse of
surveillance often happens

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on an individual basis.

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It also has a societal cost.

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I think a lot of people really
understand that.

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It's probably because I also live in
Germany now for the last two years

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but I feel that German society in
particular is extremely aware

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of these abuses in the modern world

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and they have a historical context
that allows them to talk about it

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with the rest of the world, where the
world doesn't downplay it.

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So this is how other people relate to
Germany

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not just about Germans relate to
each other.

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And that has also been really good
for just meeting regular people

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who really care about it,

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and who really want to do things.

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So people's parents email me,
and are like

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"I want to protect my children,

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what's the best way to use crypto
with them?"

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You know, things like that.

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And I didn't every receive emails like
that in the past

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and that's to me is uplifting
and very positive.

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[question]: A quick organisational question.

00:11:27.770 --> 00:11:30.497
Right now we're live-streaming the Q&A.
Are you comfortable with that?

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[Jacob]: I don't think in the last three
years I've ever had a moment

00:11:33.242 --> 00:11:36.092
that wasn't being recorded.

00:11:36.538 --> 00:11:39.324
[laughter, applause]

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[question]: If you're fine with it, moving on...

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[Jacob]: That's fine, just don't do it
when I'm trying to sleep.

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[question]: I was wondering why Laura
and you ended up in Germany

00:11:51.460 --> 00:11:54.861
because what you said about people in
Germany might be true

00:11:54.861 --> 00:12:00.612
but I'm really ashamed about my Government
and how they dealt with ????

00:12:00.612 --> 00:12:04.153
and they are doing nothing for this.

00:12:04.451 --> 00:12:07.692
[Jacob]: The reason that we ended up in
Germany

00:12:07.697 --> 00:12:10.850
is that I'd been attending
Chaos Computer Club events

00:12:10.868 --> 00:12:12.728
for many years

00:12:12.730 --> 00:12:15.241
and there are bunch of people that are
part of the Chaos Computer Club

00:12:15.251 --> 00:12:17.122
who are really supportive,
and good people,

00:12:17.137 --> 00:12:19.299
who have a stable base,
and an infrastructure.

00:12:19.427 --> 00:12:24.638
The German hacker scene has this
phenomenon which is that

00:12:24.659 --> 00:12:27.071
it's a part of society.

00:12:27.390 --> 00:12:30.479
So there are people in the CCC who will
talk with the constitutional court

00:12:30.479 --> 00:12:31.892
for example,

00:12:31.901 --> 00:12:34.480
and that creates a much more stable
civil society

00:12:34.480 --> 00:12:36.196
and those people were willing to help us.

00:12:36.205 --> 00:12:38.627
They were willing to hold footage,
to hold encrypted data.

00:12:38.646 --> 00:12:41.616
They were willing to help modify hardware.

00:12:41.622 --> 00:12:44.855
There was a huge base of support where
people, even if they had fear,

00:12:44.855 --> 00:12:47.070
they did stuff anyway.

00:12:47.121 --> 00:12:49.894
And that support went back a long time.

00:12:49.907 --> 00:12:52.965
And so we knew that it would be safe
to store footage for the film here.

00:12:52.971 --> 00:12:56.234
In Berlin, not in Heidelberg, but here
in Germany.

00:12:56.234 --> 00:13:00.520
And we knew that, of course,
there were people that would be helpful.

00:13:00.598 --> 00:13:03.334
In the US there's a much bigger culture
of fear.

00:13:03.421 --> 00:13:06.033
People are afraid of having their houses
raided by the police,

00:13:06.038 --> 00:13:08.118
where there's lots of detainments at the
borders,

00:13:08.126 --> 00:13:10.079
where there's lots of speculative arrests,

00:13:10.079 --> 00:13:11.853
journalists that are jailed,

00:13:11.853 --> 00:13:15.196
so the situation was not to say that
Germany was perfect.

00:13:15.327 --> 00:13:18.994
I revealed in Der Speigel with three other
journalists that Merkel was spied on

00:13:19.019 --> 00:13:20.363
by the NSA.

00:13:20.369 --> 00:13:22.191
And it's clear that the Germany government
was complicit

00:13:22.191 --> 00:13:23.848
with some of this surveillance.

00:13:23.848 --> 00:13:27.011
But in a sort of pyramid of surveillance
there's a sort of colonialism

00:13:27.022 --> 00:13:28.409
that takes place.

00:13:28.426 --> 00:13:30.944
And that the NSA and GCHQ are at the top.

00:13:30.951 --> 00:13:33.374
And the Germans are little bit below that.

00:13:33.378 --> 00:13:37.225
The thing is that there's not a lot you
can do about that.

00:13:37.225 --> 00:13:38.955
And so even though we revealed this
about Merkel,

00:13:38.972 --> 00:13:40.680
it's not clear what she should do.

00:13:40.683 --> 00:13:42.258
It's not clear what anyone should do.

00:13:42.258 --> 00:13:45.406
But one thing that was clear was that
if they wanted to break into our houses

00:13:45.406 --> 00:13:49.504
they would do it in a way that would
cost them a lot politically.

00:13:49.504 --> 00:13:50.919
It would be very public.

00:13:51.048 --> 00:13:53.138
The last time someone raided someone
working with Der Speigel

00:13:53.154 --> 00:13:55.780
was in 1962 during the Speigel affair,

00:13:55.780 --> 00:13:57.786
and some ministers were kicked out.

00:13:57.876 --> 00:14:00.346
You may have seen recently the
Landersverrat thing

00:14:00.346 --> 00:14:01.718
with Netzpolitik.

00:14:01.718 --> 00:14:04.319
The charges against them now
have been dropped.

00:14:04.444 --> 00:14:06.537
That would never happen in the
United States.

00:14:06.619 --> 00:14:07.944
We would not be safe.

00:14:08.025 --> 00:14:09.815
And I still, for my investigative
journalism,

00:14:09.861 --> 00:14:11.436
and my work with Wikileaks,

00:14:11.486 --> 00:14:12.718
and my work with the Tor project,

00:14:12.730 --> 00:14:14.510
I wouldn't even go back to the US,

00:14:14.537 --> 00:14:16.687
because there's no chance that if they
wanted to do something to me

00:14:16.717 --> 00:14:20.828
that I would have any constitutional
liberties, I think,

00:14:20.846 --> 00:14:22.621
and the same is true of Snowden.

00:14:22.643 --> 00:14:24.457
You just won't get that fair trial.

00:14:24.472 --> 00:14:27.998
And we thought at least here we would
have ground to stand and fight on.

00:14:28.016 --> 00:14:30.427
And it's exactly what happened,
and we won.

00:14:33.651 --> 00:14:35.885
[question]: This is also about the fear
stuff that you talk about

00:14:35.885 --> 00:14:41.947
which is in the very old days we used to
put red words in the end of every message

00:14:41.974 --> 00:14:45.913
to make sure that it would be hard to find
the actual subversive message

00:14:45.913 --> 00:14:47.912
among all the noise.

00:14:47.912 --> 00:14:49.544
And you can think about the same thing
here.

00:14:49.716 --> 00:14:55.384
Should we build our systems so that
everything gets encrypted all the time?

00:14:56.430 --> 00:14:59.029
[Jacob]: So I have a lot of radical
suggestions for what to do,

00:14:59.029 --> 00:15:01.165
but I'm going to talk about them tomorrow
in the keynote mostly.

00:15:01.172 --> 00:15:03.928
But to give you an example,
when you install Debian,

00:15:03.953 --> 00:15:06.325
you can give someone the ability to log
into the machine

00:15:06.337 --> 00:15:07.899
over a Tor hidden service for free.

00:15:07.917 --> 00:15:12.250
You get a free .onion when you add two
lines to a Tor configuration file.

00:15:12.284 --> 00:15:15.532
We should make encryption not only easy
to use but out of the box

00:15:15.532 --> 00:15:19.504
we should have it possible to have
end-to-end reachability and connectivity,

00:15:19.527 --> 00:15:23.899
and we should reduce the total amount
of metadata, to make it harder for people

00:15:23.916 --> 00:15:26.374
who want to break the law, that want to
break into computers.

00:15:26.375 --> 00:15:30.724
We should solve the problem of adversarial
versus non-adversarial forensics

00:15:30.731 --> 00:15:36.315
so we can verify our systems with open
hardware and Free software together.

00:15:36.396 --> 00:15:39.302
And there's a lot to be done,
but the main thing to do is to recognise

00:15:39.307 --> 00:15:43.049
that if you have the ability to upload
to Debian,

00:15:43.393 --> 00:15:46.167
there are literally intelligence agencies
that would like those keys.

00:15:46.186 --> 00:15:49.362
And we have a great responsiblity to
humanity as Debian developers

00:15:49.362 --> 00:15:51.572
to do the right thing: to build open
systems,

00:15:51.572 --> 00:15:55.258
to build them in a way where users don't
need to understand this stuff.

00:15:55.427 --> 00:15:58.071
There are a lot of people in the world
that will never see this film.

00:15:58.204 --> 00:16:02.977
And we can solve the problems that this
film describes largely with Free software.

00:16:03.036 --> 00:16:04.728
And we can do that without them knowing,

00:16:04.728 --> 00:16:06.778
and they will be safe for us having
done that.

00:16:06.779 --> 00:16:10.021
And if we can do that, the world will be
a better place, I think.

00:16:10.021 --> 00:16:12.368
And I think the world is a better place
because of the efforts that were

00:16:12.452 --> 00:16:15.485
already done in that area, that made this
possible.

00:16:15.485 --> 00:16:17.647
The Tails project made it so that a bunch
of people

00:16:17.647 --> 00:16:19.573
who were good at investigative journalism,

00:16:19.588 --> 00:16:23.759
but absolutely terrible with computers,
were able to pull this off.

00:16:23.933 --> 00:16:27.252
And that is entirely the product, in my
opinion, of Free software.

00:16:27.252 --> 00:16:32.677
And a little bit of Laura and Glen, but
I'd say a lot of Free software.

00:16:34.302 --> 00:16:36.205
[question]: How many people do you think
NSA has

00:16:36.205 --> 00:16:38.995
working within the Debian community?

00:16:39.889 --> 00:16:43.601
[laughter, applause]

00:16:45.309 --> 00:16:49.302
[Jacob]: Well, I looked in the Snowden
archive about that actually.

00:16:52.813 --> 00:16:55.527
[laughter, applause]

00:16:56.640 --> 00:17:03.341
Yeah. And as far as I can tell Debian is
not a high priority target for them.

00:17:03.685 --> 00:17:05.927
I mean they write exploits for all sort
of stuff

00:17:05.927 --> 00:17:10.683
but I never found any systematic attempt
to compromise or harm the Debian project.

00:17:10.696 --> 00:17:14.561
But obviously there are people who are
paid by the NSA to infiltrate communities,

00:17:14.561 --> 00:17:16.993
and that's why we have to open transparent
processes

00:17:16.993 --> 00:17:21.044
so that if those people behave badly,
we have an audit trail.

00:17:21.044 --> 00:17:23.211
We won't ever stop that kind of stuff,

00:17:23.211 --> 00:17:25.178
but what matters
is that people do good things.

00:17:25.178 --> 00:17:28.587
It doesn't matter who they do bad things
for as long as we can correct those things

00:17:28.587 --> 00:17:31.019
and/or catch them and stop them before
it happens.

00:17:31.019 --> 00:17:33.111
But as far as I know there are only a
couple of people that have ever

00:17:33.111 --> 00:17:36.176
been associated with the NSA in the
Debian community.

00:17:36.176 --> 00:17:39.933
But I think we shouldn't get paranoid
about it,

00:17:39.933 --> 00:17:41.600
but we should just be prudent about our
processes,

00:17:41.600 --> 00:17:43.947
because there are lots of intelligence
services around the world

00:17:43.947 --> 00:17:47.147
that do not like the values of a
universal operating system,

00:17:47.147 --> 00:17:50.902
so I don't think it's super-important to
look, but I did actually look,

00:17:50.902 --> 00:17:54.695
very specifically for a whole bunch of
people in the Debian community

00:17:54.695 --> 00:17:58.027
to see if any of them also were being
paid by the NSA

00:17:58.027 --> 00:18:01.613
and I didn't find any serious thing that
raised concern,

00:18:01.613 --> 00:18:03.783
and if I did, I would have...

00:18:03.783 --> 00:18:07.541
I mean, there were lots of things I found
in the archive that I immediately

00:18:07.541 --> 00:18:09.333
notified security teams about.

00:18:09.333 --> 00:18:14.112
Where I worked along with many other
people to actually fix those things.

00:18:14.112 --> 00:18:18.546
And one of those things, if we had found
them, like infiltrators in Debian,

00:18:18.546 --> 00:18:20.769
I absolutely would have just told people
about.

00:18:20.769 --> 00:18:23.408
The problem is that a lot of the
journalists don't want to do that

00:18:23.408 --> 00:18:26.263
because there's a ten year felony
where you go to prison -

00:18:26.263 --> 00:18:28.185
a federal American prison, for
ten years -

00:18:28.322 --> 00:18:30.202
if you reveal the name of an agent.

00:18:30.599 --> 00:18:31.923
So there's a tension there,

00:18:31.923 --> 00:18:34.440
but I think that there's something
to be said,

00:18:34.652 --> 00:18:36.655
if they're actually actively harming the
community

00:18:36.655 --> 00:18:37.851
and they're committing a crime,

00:18:37.851 --> 00:18:39.470
I think there's something to be said
about that.

00:18:39.470 --> 00:18:40.921
So if I found that I think it would be
worthwhile,

00:18:40.921 --> 00:18:43.144
but just so you know, there's this
high cost.

00:18:43.144 --> 00:18:45.362
So if there were people in the agency
now,

00:18:45.362 --> 00:18:48.647
because they say that we used Tails, and
Debian, and they wanted to subvert it,

00:18:48.647 --> 00:18:52.015
there's a really really high bar for
punishment.

00:18:52.015 --> 00:18:55.132
Which suggests that maybe people
won't tell you.

00:18:55.132 --> 00:18:59.055
So we need to sort of bank on the fact
that we'll never know,

00:18:59.055 --> 00:19:02.766
but we don't need to know, as long as we
have good processes

00:19:02.766 --> 00:19:04.390
that would catch bad behaviour.

00:19:04.390 --> 00:19:06.181
And that's one of the strengths of Debian.

00:19:06.181 --> 00:19:08.739
There are very few operating systems,
I think,

00:19:08.739 --> 00:19:10.830
and just in general Free software
communities,

00:19:10.830 --> 00:19:14.759
that are as diverse, and committed to the
openness and the Free software nature

00:19:14.759 --> 00:19:17.742
of this kind of a project,

00:19:17.742 --> 00:19:20.985
and so it's very important to state that.

00:19:21.922 --> 00:19:24.824
But I do think one of the things that will
happen in the future at some point

00:19:24.824 --> 00:19:28.067
is that you'll start to find people in the
Debian community that are pressured

00:19:28.067 --> 00:19:29.645
by other people to do bad things

00:19:29.645 --> 00:19:31.866
so we need to set up processes that will
stop that,

00:19:31.866 --> 00:19:34.296
to create an incentive for that
not happening.

00:19:35.022 --> 00:19:37.240
But it's really tough,

00:19:37.926 --> 00:19:40.274
so I think that openness, transparency
and accountability are the ways that

00:19:40.274 --> 00:19:43.772
we can combat that, because otherwise
we won't really be able to solve it.

00:19:44.881 --> 00:19:47.182
But don't be paranoid, is the other thing.

00:19:47.309 --> 00:19:49.699
They really are out to get you,
so be prepared.

00:19:50.430 --> 00:19:56.487
[laughter, applause]

00:20:00.796 --> 00:20:05.999
[question]: I'm just wondering how trust
was established

00:20:05.999 --> 00:20:09.628
because I'm just realizing that
this community,

00:20:09.628 --> 00:20:14.532
for you to verify your public key and even
fingerprint is like,

00:20:14.532 --> 00:20:16.113
you have you produce your passport,

00:20:16.113 --> 00:20:19.613
so I'm wondering how Laura managed to
exchange her keys with Snowden

00:20:19.613 --> 00:20:23.071
and make sure that they were really
talking to the right person.

00:20:23.843 --> 00:20:28.019
[Julian]: Well, they had a whole sort of
dance for doing key exchange.

00:20:28.019 --> 00:20:32.749
I think it was a little bit luck, and a
little bit transitive trust,

00:20:32.749 --> 00:20:35.101
there's a little bit of the web of trust,

00:20:35.101 --> 00:20:36.457
and it worked pretty well.

00:20:36.719 --> 00:20:41.332
I mean, I don't think that the key-signing
stuff that Debian does is anything close

00:20:41.332 --> 00:20:42.907
to what they were doing.

00:20:42.907 --> 00:20:45.939
They just wanted to make sure that the
keys they had were the right keys,

00:20:45.939 --> 00:20:47.687
and that they weren't compromised,

00:20:47.687 --> 00:20:50.075
and that then they would change things.

00:20:50.075 --> 00:20:51.355
There was a point in the movie where they
said:

00:20:51.355 --> 00:20:55.875
"let's disassociate our meta-data
one more time"

00:20:55.875 --> 00:20:58.951
And what that means is they changed all
of the identifiers that are visible

00:20:58.951 --> 00:21:04.158
to the network, new keys, new email
addresses, new Tor circuit, etc

00:21:04.158 --> 00:21:07.611
and this is like a key consistency thing,

00:21:07.611 --> 00:21:11.358
where they had the right key to begin with
and the continued to rotate over new keys.

00:21:11.358 --> 00:21:13.411
This is also sometimes called TOFU.

00:21:13.411 --> 00:21:15.848
This is, I think, weaker than the
web of trust,

00:21:15.848 --> 00:21:19.345
but a lot easier for people to do, and
very easy to explain,

00:21:19.345 --> 00:21:20.841
and it worked out pretty well.

00:21:20.841 --> 00:21:25.190
It doesn't scale really well, but it has a
separate good side

00:21:25.190 --> 00:21:28.985
which is the web of trust explicitly names
a web of co-conspirators.

00:21:28.985 --> 00:21:31.377
And so you don't want that feature.

00:21:31.377 --> 00:21:33.386
It's useful for something like Debian;

00:21:33.386 --> 00:21:36.067
it's not useful for clandestine
conspiracies to commit

00:21:36.067 --> 00:21:37.949
investigative journalism.

00:21:37.949 --> 00:21:39.997
[laughter]

00:21:41.746 --> 00:21:44.137
Lots of questions, this is great.

00:21:44.771 --> 00:21:51.857
[question]: Somebody working on Tails told
me that the NSA has a file on every DD.

00:21:52.323 --> 00:21:54.246
Is that true, do you know?

00:21:54.673 --> 00:21:57.101
[Julian]: Okay, so when you balance your
check-book,

00:21:57.101 --> 00:21:58.941
just to answer your question in a really
strange way,

00:21:58.941 --> 00:22:00.945
when you balance your check-book,
or you balance your bank account,

00:22:00.945 --> 00:22:03.630
and you think this is how much my rent is,
this is how much food is,

00:22:03.630 --> 00:22:06.401
this is how much I have to spend on some
new hardware,

00:22:06.401 --> 00:22:09.688
you think about money in an
individual way.

00:22:10.502 --> 00:22:13.187
But if you think about is as a state, the
way a state thinks about money.

00:22:13.187 --> 00:22:16.302
They don't balance budgets the same
way that you do.

00:22:16.302 --> 00:22:18.225
They think about long-term investments
very differently.

00:22:18.225 --> 00:22:19.759
They have other people's money.

00:22:19.759 --> 00:22:21.719
It's a whole different way of managing it.

00:22:21.719 --> 00:22:27.291
And the NSA is not the Stasi. So it's not
that you have to worry about

00:22:27.420 --> 00:22:29.784
them having a file on you, or every Debian
developer,

00:22:30.197 --> 00:22:32.626
but rather there exist some laws in the
United States that say

00:22:32.626 --> 00:22:35.781
for cyber-security purposes, you don't
have constitutional rights

00:22:35.781 --> 00:22:37.707
and based on your accent, you weren't
an American anyway,

00:22:37.707 --> 00:22:39.753
and you aren't in America,

00:22:39.753 --> 00:22:41.970
so you don't have any rights at all,
anyway, according to them.

00:22:41.970 --> 00:22:44.186
They're just allowed to do whatever they
want to you,

00:22:44.186 --> 00:22:46.280
up to and including murdering you, with
the CIA.

00:22:46.280 --> 00:22:49.180
That's what they do with drones; that was
at the very end of the movie.

00:22:49.735 --> 00:22:52.165
So it's not that they have a file on you.

00:22:52.339 --> 00:22:56.179
It's that they have giant databases full
of information on all of us,

00:22:56.179 --> 00:22:59.550
and then when they're interested in you,
pull up all your data,

00:22:59.550 --> 00:23:01.299
and associative data,

00:23:01.299 --> 00:23:03.348
and then they use that, and sometimes
they use it to target you,

00:23:03.348 --> 00:23:06.246
to break into your machines,
or to find people to exert pressure on,

00:23:06.246 --> 00:23:08.378
or to do psychological manipulation on.

00:23:08.378 --> 00:23:10.892
All that stuff, they do all of those
things.

00:23:10.892 --> 00:23:12.774
And so it's not that they have one file
on you.

00:23:12.774 --> 00:23:16.101
Though maybe, it depends, if you work on
a critical package like the Linux kernel


00:23:16.101 --> 00:23:20.756
they might be more interested in you
than if you work on something else.

00:23:20.756 --> 00:23:25.402
I don't want to denigrate anyone's work,
but they have very specific focuses,

00:23:25.402 --> 00:23:29.065
and so they definitely are interested in
being able to compromise systems, right?

00:23:29.920 --> 00:23:36.316
And so you may also have a file, but it's
really the meta list that's the new way

00:23:36.316 --> 00:23:37.470
of thinking about it.

00:23:37.470 --> 00:23:40.755
And in some senses I think that's actually
scarier, because they just hoover up

00:23:40.755 --> 00:23:43.019
everything, all across the whole Internet,

00:23:43.019 --> 00:23:46.134
and things that are interesting, then
they have them.

00:23:46.134 --> 00:23:49.202
And depending on what interesting
things are there, they maybe

00:23:49.202 --> 00:23:51.504
put those in a database that lasts
for ever,

00:23:51.504 --> 00:23:53.469
or maybe it's just around for 30 days,

00:23:53.469 --> 00:23:56.889
or maybe its full content for 9 days,
or something like that.

00:23:57.608 --> 00:23:59.830
And then of course if you are a person of
interest

00:23:59.830 --> 00:24:02.686
they do do the same stuff that the Stasi
does,

00:24:02.686 --> 00:24:06.014
they do that Zersetzung stuff, if you're
familiar with this German term,

00:24:06.014 --> 00:24:11.050
disintegration, they do that kind of
stuff, along with JTRIG, from GHCQ,

00:24:11.050 --> 00:24:16.042
so they harass people, blackmail them,
do all sorts of really nasty stuff.

00:24:16.509 --> 00:24:20.005
And they do that also, so both of those
things.

00:24:20.651 --> 00:24:23.210
So again, I don't think you should be
paranoid, you should encrypt your stuff,

00:24:23.210 --> 00:24:24.747
and help people do the same,

00:24:24.747 --> 00:24:28.966
and know that in a democratic society with
a secret political police,

00:24:28.966 --> 00:24:31.953
the right place to be is in their
database, right?

00:24:31.953 --> 00:24:34.045
You should be proud of being surveilled
by them,

00:24:34.045 --> 00:24:35.665
it means you're doing the right thing.

00:24:36.650 --> 00:24:41.727
[laughter, applause]

00:24:43.174 --> 00:24:44.883
Nonetheless, we should stop them.

00:24:48.895 --> 00:24:53.843
[question]: I'm curious about your views
about Snowden actually coming out

00:24:53.843 --> 00:24:55.634
and saying he was the whistleblower,

00:24:55.634 --> 00:24:59.004
because I know, when he came out,
I had some fierce discussion

00:24:59.004 --> 00:25:01.613
with friends about it, so I wanted to know
what you thought about it.

00:25:01.613 --> 00:25:03.102
[Jacob]: What do you mean came out?

00:25:03.102 --> 00:25:06.516
[question]: He said I'm Edward Snowden,
I'm the whistle-blower, here I am,

00:25:06.516 --> 00:25:10.139
instead of just being anonymous the
whole way, just sending files to people.

00:25:11.248 --> 00:25:13.680
[Jacob]: Well, I think the main thing is
that it's about control of

00:25:13.680 --> 00:25:15.429
your own narrative, right?

00:25:15.429 --> 00:25:19.654
I mean if we could have done everything
here anonymous, and gotten away with it,

00:25:19.654 --> 00:25:20.980
would that have made the same impact

00:25:20.980 --> 00:25:24.948
in getting other people to come forward
even if they maintain their anonymity?

00:25:24.948 --> 00:25:27.802
So I think that what Snowden did, what's
beautiful about it,

00:25:27.832 --> 00:25:30.506
is that he basically did enough,

00:25:31.243 --> 00:25:32.951
where he could then survive.

00:25:33.118 --> 00:25:36.236
Our job now for the most part, a very
good friend told me,

00:25:36.236 --> 00:25:39.221
he's a little bit of a fatalist, he said:

00:25:39.221 --> 00:25:43.232
your job, Laura's job, Glen's job,
Snowden's job, your job now is

00:25:43.232 --> 00:25:44.897
just to survive.

00:25:44.897 --> 00:25:47.371
That's all that you need to do now.
You don't need to do anything else.

00:25:47.371 --> 00:25:51.804
You should go do other things, like
drink a glass of wine, relax, be happy,

00:25:51.804 --> 00:25:54.751
have a nice life, but just survive,

00:25:54.929 --> 00:25:58.732
so other people can see that you do the
right thing, and even though you could have

00:25:59.156 --> 00:26:02.230
done more, you did enough,
and you lived through it.

00:26:02.230 --> 00:26:06.198
And so Snowden coming out and telling us
all of these things, I mean,

00:26:06.198 --> 00:26:09.862
there are really powerful people saying
he should be assassinated, right,

00:26:09.862 --> 00:26:13.921
hung by the neck until dead, was what one
of the CIA people said.

00:26:13.921 --> 00:26:17.244
So he probably could have continued to be
anonymous for a while,

00:26:17.244 --> 00:26:20.449
but imagine if the NSA had got to reveal
his identity.

00:26:20.449 --> 00:26:23.884
How would that have been framed, what
would the first impression have been?

00:26:23.884 --> 00:26:27.719
I think they called him a narcissist, and
they called him all these terrible names.

00:26:27.719 --> 00:26:32.974
And it didn't really stick, because he
basically said "come at me bro',

00:26:33.396 --> 00:26:37.746
I'm ready, and you can do your worst,
but you can't get rid of the facts,

00:26:37.746 --> 00:26:39.155
so let's talk about the facts."

00:26:39.155 --> 00:26:42.403
And I think the timing of how he did that
is good, because people really cared

00:26:42.612 --> 00:26:45.853
about the issues, but he also recognized
that it was a matter of time,

00:26:45.853 --> 00:26:50.891
the NSA police went to his house, they
really bothered his family,

00:26:50.891 --> 00:26:54.777
they've done that with my family as well,
other people's families have had trouble.

00:26:55.283 --> 00:26:59.553
So I think think it's tough, because I
think he probably would have liked to have

00:26:59.553 --> 00:27:03.198
been able to not have that happen, but 
there comes a point at which

00:27:03.198 --> 00:27:05.287
you're the person who has access to all 
that information

00:27:05.287 --> 00:27:06.865
and they're going to figure it out.

00:27:06.865 --> 00:27:11.517
No amount of anonymity, I think, will
last forever, but it can buy you time.

00:27:11.517 --> 00:27:14.508
He got exactly the amount of time
he needed.

00:27:15.062 --> 00:27:17.663
The really sad part about him coming out
in public when he did, though, was that

00:27:17.663 --> 00:27:21.247
he got stuck in Russia, because my
government cancelled his passport.

00:27:21.247 --> 00:27:23.681
I think mostly for propaganda reasons.

00:27:23.681 --> 00:27:28.329
Because in the United States, we denigrate
all things relating to Russia.

00:27:28.329 --> 00:27:29.781
And there are lots of problems with
Russia,

00:27:29.781 --> 00:27:32.256
and especially with Vladimir Putin,

00:27:32.256 --> 00:27:36.695
but at the same time that seems to be the
only country that was willing to uphold

00:27:36.695 --> 00:27:38.441
his fundamental liberties.

00:27:38.441 --> 00:27:41.171
I went to the Council of Europe, and to
the European Parliament,

00:27:41.171 --> 00:27:44.670
to the German Parliament, to the French,
sort of to the French Parliament,

00:27:44.670 --> 00:27:48.297
they didn't really want to meet with me,
but also to the Austrian Parliament,

00:27:48.297 --> 00:27:49.963
and to a number of other places,

00:27:49.963 --> 00:27:53.380
and everyone said, oh, we would really
live to help anybody who needs help,

00:27:53.380 --> 00:27:55.253
oh it's Edward Snowden, never mind.

00:27:55.975 --> 00:27:57.813
[laughter]

00:27:57.941 --> 00:28:02.527
And so though I have a lot of critiques
on Russia, the propaganda aspect of it

00:28:02.527 --> 00:28:04.657
was very damaging for him to be stuck
in Russia,

00:28:04.657 --> 00:28:08.242
but on the other hand, he's still alive,
and he's still mostly free.

00:28:08.242 --> 00:28:12.300
And they recognized his right to
seek and to receive asylum.

00:28:12.857 --> 00:28:15.331
So there's a lot of trade-offs to think
identifying one's self,

00:28:15.331 --> 00:28:17.807
and if you were thinking about being
the next Snowden,

00:28:18.300 --> 00:28:19.460
or helping Snowden,
or something like that,

00:28:20.384 --> 00:28:22.647
you really have to think that, you really
have to think this out many steps ahead,

00:28:22.647 --> 00:28:25.808
and it's easy to stay, oh he should have
just stayed anonymous and

00:28:25.808 --> 00:28:27.556
nobody would have figured it out,

00:28:27.556 --> 00:28:31.476
but that's very clearly not planning for
the case that they do figure it out,

00:28:31.476 --> 00:28:33.272
and then they're going to be in control
of the narrative,

00:28:33.272 --> 00:28:37.750
and in that case, I think you are better
off to do what he did,

00:28:37.853 --> 00:28:40.156
and he did so quite reluctantly.

00:28:40.411 --> 00:28:43.481
He's not an egoist, or an narcissist,
he's actually a really shy guy

00:28:43.481 --> 00:28:44.762
from what I can tell.

00:28:44.762 --> 00:28:48.644
I don't know exactly what conversation
you and your friend had,

00:28:48.644 --> 00:28:52.826
but I would suspect that the notion is
that people are more powerful

00:28:52.826 --> 00:28:53.875
when anonymous.

00:28:53.875 --> 00:28:55.966
And that is true sometimes,
but not always,

00:28:55.966 --> 00:28:58.484
and it's important to remember that
the anonymity technology is there

00:28:58.484 --> 00:29:01.004
so you have a choice, not a requirement.

00:29:01.004 --> 00:29:03.647
And that choice is sometimes
counter-intuitive,

00:29:03.647 --> 00:29:06.380
but I think he did the right thing in
this way, and I wish that my government

00:29:06.380 --> 00:29:09.022
had done the right thing by him as well,
but they did not.

00:29:09.022 --> 00:29:12.123
[question]: So there are lot of questions,
do you want to keep going on,

00:29:12.132 --> 00:29:13.489
shall we get in a little Mate?

00:29:14.556 --> 00:29:17.747
[Jacob]: I would love some of that rum.

00:29:17.747 --> 00:29:22.724
I think I have to GRsec, right?
GRsec kernel.

00:29:22.724 --> 00:29:24.127
And then rum appears. Rum as a service.

00:29:26.385 --> 00:29:29.909
[applause]

00:29:32.902 --> 00:29:36.906
I'm really happy to keep taking questions,
because to me, what I want is

00:29:36.906 --> 00:29:41.571
for every person in this room to feel
a part of this, because you really are.

00:29:41.571 --> 00:29:44.845
A lot of the people I've met in this
community really inspire me to action,

00:29:44.845 --> 00:29:48.850
and it's important to understand that
really, it would not have been possible

00:29:48.850 --> 00:29:50.094
without Debian.

00:29:50.094 --> 00:29:54.246
For example debootstrap - really important
tool, right?

00:29:54.246 --> 00:29:58.570
With weasel's packaging of Tor, it allowed
us to have bootstraps of things,

00:29:58.570 --> 00:29:59.937
it allowed us to build things,

00:29:59.937 --> 00:30:02.494
and using Free software really was
helpful,

00:30:02.494 --> 00:30:04.890
so if you guys have any questions at all,

00:30:04.890 --> 00:30:08.392
really each and every person that helps
with Debian should just know

00:30:08.392 --> 00:30:09.863
that you are a part of that,

00:30:09.863 --> 00:30:12.362
and I'm just happy to talk for as long as
you want, basically,

00:30:12.362 --> 00:30:14.163
to answer all of your questions,


00:30:14.163 --> 00:30:16.458
except the ones that put me in prison.
Thanks.

00:30:16.458 --> 00:30:18.384
[laughter]

00:30:19.434 --> 00:30:23.805
[question]: I just wanted to make a quick
note about the question

00:30:23.805 --> 00:30:26.075
"do they have a file on me?"

00:30:26.075 --> 00:30:30.168
From all I've read so far, it's just that
they're doing the thing

00:30:30.168 --> 00:30:33.235
that is in the commercial world called
"big data".

00:30:34.011 --> 00:30:36.338
[Jacob]: Yep. Absolutely.

00:30:36.338 --> 00:30:38.813
Oh boy. GRsec again?

00:30:40.787 --> 00:30:44.953
[orga]: it's not rum, but it's Bavarian
whisky.

00:30:45.580 --> 00:30:50.052
[Jacob]: Oh boy. It's going to be a
heavy morning tomorrow.

00:30:50.929 --> 00:30:54.078
I saw another couple of hands.

00:30:56.475 --> 00:30:59.976
[question]: I was just wondering if
that you noticed throughout this

00:30:59.976 --> 00:31:04.893
that you think we could improve in Debian
to make the next people's lives easier.

00:31:04.893 --> 00:31:08.691
[Jacob]: Oh my god, I'm so glad you asked
that question, that's so fantastic.

00:31:08.691 --> 00:31:10.391
I'm going to talk about that tomorrow
in my keynote,

00:31:10.391 --> 00:31:12.342
but let me tell you about one that I have.

00:31:12.342 --> 00:31:16.666
I revealed a specific document about a
wifi injection attack system.

00:31:16.666 --> 00:31:19.466
It's a classified document, it's a
top secret document,

00:31:19.466 --> 00:31:22.163
for a thing called nightstand, and what
nightstand is,

00:31:22.163 --> 00:31:25.930
it's basically like car metasploit,
it's a wifi injector...

00:31:25.930 --> 00:31:29.089
cheers!

00:31:35.352 --> 00:31:37.405
Danke schön.

00:31:38.375 --> 00:31:40.554
It's a wifi injector device...

00:31:41.158 --> 00:31:42.847
Whew, jesus!

00:31:43.953 --> 00:31:48.095
[laughter, applause]

00:31:52.749 --> 00:31:56.570
[orga]: Tonight's whisky sponsored by
drunc-tank dot org.

00:31:59.914 --> 00:32:03.815
[Jacob]: So this wifi injector device,
what it does is it basically is able to

00:32:03.815 --> 00:32:09.039
exploit the kernel of a device by sending
malformed data over wifi.

00:32:09.039 --> 00:32:14.983
Now I have a series of photographs, so
all of us.. not all of us, but most of us

00:32:14.983 --> 00:32:19.580
used these speciallly modified X60s where
we removed the microphones, soldered??

00:32:19.580 --> 00:32:22.080
down things on the PCI bus,

00:32:22.080 --> 00:32:24.030
we removed, like, firewire, really
modified it, flashed coreboot onto it,

00:32:24.030 --> 00:32:26.871
flipped the read pin so it was only
read-only,

00:32:26.871 --> 00:32:30.155
so you couldn't easily make a BIOS
root kit and make it persistent,

00:32:30.155 --> 00:32:32.449
we booted TAILS, did all this stuff,

00:32:32.449 --> 00:32:35.974
often we could boot to RAM so that
once the machine was powered off

00:32:35.974 --> 00:32:39.325
basically it would be done, so if someone
kicks down your door,

00:32:39.325 --> 00:32:41.015
you just pull the power out,

00:32:41.015 --> 00:32:43.148
and you don't have a battery, and
when the power fails you have an

00:32:43.148 --> 00:32:45.248
instant kill switch.

00:32:45.248 --> 00:32:48.373
So things that are in TAILS that are 
really useful include this

00:32:48.373 --> 00:32:52.812
wiping the kernel memory package
which I hear is being packaged for Debian

00:32:52.812 --> 00:32:54.660
soon, which is very exciting.

00:32:54.660 --> 00:32:57.043
Because everyone should have access
to that so we can tie it into something

00:32:57.043 --> 00:33:01.209
like GNU panicd or these other things.

00:33:01.209 --> 00:33:08.031
But one thing I kept having problems with
is this wifi injection device,

00:33:08.031 --> 00:33:09.981
I'm pretty sure, was very close to my
house.

00:33:09.981 --> 00:33:13.107
There was a white van outside, it was
vibrating a bit like there was a guy

00:33:13.107 --> 00:33:14.831
walking around in it,

00:33:14.831 --> 00:33:17.727
and then all of sudden, an X60 here,
an X60 here, and an X60 here,

00:33:17.727 --> 00:33:22.097
just booted into TAILS, not doing
anything at all, but on the wifi network,

00:33:22.097 --> 00:33:24.445
kernel panic, kernel panic, kernel panic.

00:33:24.445 --> 00:33:27.674
All the same kernel panic, all the
same memory offsets,

00:33:27.674 --> 00:33:32.420
in the Appletalk driver of the stock
kernel for TAILS.

00:33:32.420 --> 00:33:36.577
I think I filed a bug upstream with TAILS
at the time,

00:33:36.577 --> 00:33:40.018
but this is just incredible because
it's clear that all the crap

00:33:40.018 --> 00:33:46.065
in the default Debian kernel that you
really want for your 1992 Apple network

00:33:46.065 --> 00:33:48.413
makes operational security really hard,

00:33:48.413 --> 00:33:51.632
and one thing that would be really great
would be a GRsec enabled kernel...

00:33:53.206 --> 00:33:55.281
[applause]

00:33:55.281 --> 00:33:57.506
Yes, have to drink.

00:34:01.351 --> 00:34:06.702
But as an example, we built different
custom machines, and one of the things

00:34:06.702 --> 00:34:09.953
that we did for some people and in some
circumstances was

00:34:09.953 --> 00:34:12.371
to build GRsec enabled kernels.

00:34:12.371 --> 00:34:14.755
And I'm not going to drink again.

00:34:19.044 --> 00:34:20.892
So we built those kernels

00:34:21.222 --> 00:34:23.448
[audience]: Which ones?

00:34:24.315 --> 00:34:27.166
[Jacbob]: Yes, exactly, those ones.

00:34:27.166 --> 00:34:30.886
And that was work which creates a problem
for a bunch of reasons.

00:34:30.886 --> 00:34:33.544
When you build custom kernels, and
you only have a few people

00:34:33.544 --> 00:34:35.244
that can build those kernels,

00:34:35.244 --> 00:34:37.890
you actually build a chain of evidence of
who helped who.

00:34:37.890 --> 00:34:39.891
And if that was stable, normal package,

00:34:39.891 --> 00:34:42.590
that people could install in a Debian
pure blend,

00:34:42.590 --> 00:34:44.713
then it would have been easier to do that.

00:34:44.713 --> 00:34:48.660
We built a lot more sandbox profiles for
various different things,

00:34:48.660 --> 00:34:51.284
we built some transparent TOR-ification
stuff,

00:34:51.284 --> 00:34:53.953
and that required a lot of bespoke
knowledge,

00:34:53.953 --> 00:34:57.305
and it required a lot of effort that a lot
of people did not have,

00:34:57.305 --> 00:34:59.201
because they had a different set of
skills,

00:34:59.201 --> 00:35:00.882
and it's good to have a division of
labour,

00:35:00.882 --> 00:35:04.155
but having that kind of stuff built into
Debian by default, making a

00:35:04.155 --> 00:35:06.130
Debian installer that could do that,

00:35:06.130 --> 00:35:08.749
and also verification, would be great,
right?

00:35:08.749 --> 00:35:12.147
So I wrote some custom scripts 
where I could look at a TAILS disk,

00:35:12.147 --> 00:35:14.041
or a Debian install,

00:35:14.041 --> 00:35:15.993
and know if it had been tampered with.

00:35:15.993 --> 00:35:19.939
And it would be nice if there was just
a disk you could boot that did

00:35:19.939 --> 00:35:21.993
verification of an installed system

00:35:21.993 --> 00:35:25.039
very very easily, so easily that
Glen Greenwald could use it.

00:35:25.039 --> 00:35:29.784
I love Glen, I say that very politely,

00:35:30.047 --> 00:35:33.002
but what I means is it needs to be
easier than that,

00:35:33.002 --> 00:35:36.425
because Glen at least knows that he
he a reason to need it.

00:35:36.425 --> 00:35:39.526
And so that was something that we really
needed help with.

00:35:39.526 --> 00:35:41.615
And we spent a lot of time on that.

00:35:41.615 --> 00:35:43.794
And there are lots of other little things
like that,

00:35:43.794 --> 00:35:45.390
and I'll talk about some of those things
tomorrow,

00:35:45.390 --> 00:35:47.398
but one of the really big problems is
hardware,

00:35:47.398 --> 00:35:50.592
which is that you cannot buy a modern
Intel CPU which doesn't come

00:35:50.592 --> 00:35:52.444
with a backdoor any more.

00:35:52.444 --> 00:35:57.016
And that is a huge problem, and I'm not
sure that the answer is to use ARM.

00:35:57.016 --> 00:35:59.035
It seems like the answer is to use ARM.

00:35:59.035 --> 00:36:02.915
But that's only if assume that ARM didn't
just add a backdoor that's obvious.

00:36:02.915 --> 00:36:07.580
So we really need to think about how to,
in moving forward,

00:36:07.580 --> 00:36:12.485
how to have easy to use, easy to buy
on the shelf, Debian hardware,

00:36:12.485 --> 00:36:14.976
available everywhere, all the time,

00:36:14.976 --> 00:36:18.101
so you can just go and buy this thing and
verify it in some way

00:36:18.101 --> 00:36:19.881
with some other machine,

00:36:19.881 --> 00:36:21.705
to know that you would have the right
thing.

00:36:21.705 --> 00:36:24.649
And to that extent we didn't have X-rays
for a lot of the circuit boards,

00:36:24.649 --> 00:36:27.506
so that made it very difficult to know
if when you buy something,

00:36:27.506 --> 00:36:29.725
it's been tampered with.

00:36:29.725 --> 00:36:32.349
I'll talk about some of that stuff
tomorrow,

00:36:32.349 --> 00:36:35.748
but basically, Debian does a lot of stuff
right,

00:36:35.748 --> 00:36:39.114
and that is also worth mentioning.

00:36:39.114 --> 00:36:44.112
There's so many things that just work
out of the box, that just work perfectly.

00:36:44.112 --> 00:36:47.659
So the main thing is to keep the
quality assurance at the level,

00:36:47.659 --> 00:36:49.644
or to exceed where it is right now.

00:36:49.644 --> 00:36:51.960
Because it actually works super super
well.

00:36:51.960 --> 00:36:55.735
The exception being for very specific
targetted attacks,

00:36:55.735 --> 00:36:59.488
the kernel attack surface is pretty big,
and pretty bad, I think.

00:36:59.488 --> 00:37:03.059
And also, we rebuilt some binaries in
order to..

00:37:03.059 --> 00:37:04.452
sorry, I'll get to you in a second.

00:37:04.452 --> 00:37:08.880
We rebuilt some binaries to make sure
that we had address space randomisation

00:37:08.880 --> 00:37:11.581
and linker hardening, and stack
canary stuff,

00:37:11.581 --> 00:37:15.597
and for some stuff lately we've been using
address sanitizer,

00:37:15.597 --> 00:37:19.601
so it would be really great if all the
hardening stuff was turned in,

00:37:19.601 --> 00:37:22.977
if there was PAX plus GRsec as a kernel.

00:37:23.801 --> 00:37:26.520
[audience]: so the specific problem with
GR security is that they don't really

00:37:26.520 --> 00:37:29.580
want to work with distros.

00:37:29.580 --> 00:37:35.280
So we could have a Linux kernel package
with GR security applied,

00:37:35.280 --> 00:37:38.401
but it wouldn't have any of the other
Debian patches.

00:37:39.121 --> 00:37:41.400
[Jacob]: So I talked with Brad Spender
about this,

00:37:41.400 --> 00:37:42.942
and I'm so glad that you said that,

00:37:42.942 --> 00:37:47.180
because what he said was that, as far
as I can tell, he's totally interested in

00:37:47.180 --> 00:37:49.700
helping Debian with this but thinks that
Debian is not interested.

00:37:49.700 --> 00:37:53.060
He actually runs a kernel building
service where they do

00:37:53.060 --> 00:37:55.280
individual kernel builds, and I think
you'd be interested,

00:37:55.292 --> 00:37:57.080
and when I told him we'd love to have
this in TAILS, he said

00:37:57.340 --> 00:38:01.420
what patches do I need to include in GRsec
to make sure that it'll work?

00:38:01.420 --> 00:38:04.500
And he offered to do the integration
into the GRsec patch if there are not

00:38:04.500 --> 00:38:05.760
too many things.

00:38:05.760 --> 00:38:07.903
So I think what we should try and do
is build a line of communication,

00:38:07.903 --> 00:38:10.000
and if it costs money we should find a way
to raise that money,

00:38:10.000 --> 00:38:11.800
I'll put in some of my own personal money
for this,

00:38:11.800 --> 00:38:13.720
and I know other people would too.

00:38:13.720 --> 00:38:14.421
[distant audience]: I will.

00:38:14.421 --> 00:38:16.160
[Jacob]: Great.

00:38:16.160 --> 00:38:18.920
So securedrop, for example, part of what
they do for their leaking platform,

00:38:18.920 --> 00:38:22.300
if you go to the intercepts website,
you wan to leak them a document,

00:38:22.300 --> 00:38:26.201
they actually use free software
everywhere, but there are a few things


00:38:26.201 --> 00:38:29.341
they build specially, and one of those
things is a GRsec kernel.

00:38:29.341 --> 00:38:31.760
So the people at first look, that helped
make this movie,

00:38:31.760 --> 00:38:33.520
and that work on securedrop,

00:38:33.520 --> 00:38:34.903
they would probably also,

00:38:34.903 --> 00:38:37.242
I'm not committing them, I don't
know that they would actually do this,

00:38:37.242 --> 00:38:39.280
but I think they would really like it if
that was in there,

00:38:39.280 --> 00:38:41.901
and I think it we could find the community
will to do that,

00:38:41.901 --> 00:38:44.081
I know I would volunteer and other people
would,

00:38:44.081 --> 00:38:47.160
I know that dkg in the back would love to
help with this, I would that ???

00:38:47.160 --> 00:38:50.480
who is just totally behind funding this
work, right?

00:38:53.700 --> 00:38:56.401
I thought that you were there to protect
my civil liberties, buddy.

00:39:00.080 --> 00:39:03.460
But I really think that it's possible
that we could do this,

00:39:03.460 --> 00:39:07.380
and I definitely think Brad, the author of
GRsec,

00:39:07.380 --> 00:39:09.920
I think he would really love it if Debian
shipped GRsec.

00:39:09.920 --> 00:39:11.920
And it doesn't need to come by default,

00:39:11.920 --> 00:39:16.781
but if it was possible to just have
it all, that would be great.

00:39:17.220 --> 00:39:20.400
Maybe we could have an affinity group
where everyone who is interested can

00:39:20.400 --> 00:39:23.100
meet sometime tomorrow and we could
talk about doing this.

00:39:23.100 --> 00:39:25.421
I would love to have that conversation.

00:39:25.421 --> 00:39:27.080
Who are you?

00:39:28.030 --> 00:39:29.110
[audience]: Ben Hutchings.

00:39:29.720 --> 00:39:34.270
[Jacob]: Oh, nice to meet you!

00:39:35.041 --> 00:39:38.580
[laughter, applause]

00:39:42.880 --> 00:39:44.740
That's awkward.

00:39:46.820 --> 00:39:50.840
[question]: Hi. Sorry to interrupt the
awkwardness,

00:39:50.840 --> 00:39:52.562
and replace it with more awkwardness.

00:39:52.562 --> 00:39:54.060
Nice to see you, Jake.

00:39:54.060 --> 00:39:58.282
So, I remember reading the documents
in 2013

00:39:58.282 --> 00:40:04.220
and seeing the NSA's internal training
guide for how to query their

00:40:04.220 --> 00:40:07.501
Hadoop data store, aka xkeyscore,

00:40:07.501 --> 00:40:14.961
and so I thought I would just ask you
if you think Free software net helps us

00:40:14.961 --> 00:40:16.641
or helps them.

00:40:17.361 --> 00:40:19.161
[Jacob]: I'm really glad you asked that
question.

00:40:19.161 --> 00:40:23.001
I think that Free software helps everyone
on the planet, and I think that

00:40:23.001 --> 00:40:26.983
purpose-based limitations.. I understand
why people want them.

00:40:27.640 --> 00:40:30.682
I think we should try to build a world
where we are free,

00:40:30.682 --> 00:40:34.360
and so putting in purpose-based
limitations is really problematic,

00:40:34.641 --> 00:40:37.681
and I think what we should do is try to
mitigate the harm that they can do

00:40:37.681 --> 00:40:39.340
with those systems,

00:40:39.340 --> 00:40:41.820
as opposed to pretending that they care
about Free software licensing.

00:40:42.280 --> 00:40:45.100
These guys kill people with flying robots,

00:40:45.100 --> 00:40:48.664
it's illegal to murder people, and they
do it.

00:40:49.421 --> 00:40:52.700
Limiting their use with licenses, first
of all, that just means they'll spend

00:40:52.700 --> 00:40:55.361
your tax money to rewrite it if they care
about the license,

00:40:56.241 --> 00:40:59.680
and you won't get their bug-fixes or their
improvements,

00:40:59.680 --> 00:41:02.160
and then additionally they're still not
going to obey your license anyway,

00:41:02.160 --> 00:41:05.140
because literally some of these people
work on assassinating people.

00:41:05.140 --> 00:41:08.481
So it is better that we keep our integrity
and take the high road,

00:41:08.481 --> 00:41:11.980
and write Free software, and we give it to
every single person on the planet

00:41:11.980 --> 00:41:13.620
without exception,

00:41:14.600 --> 00:41:16.460
It's just better. It's better for all of
us, right?

00:41:16.460 --> 00:41:22.080
So the fact that they have Hadoop, the
fact that they, for example, use OpenSSL,

00:41:22.080 --> 00:41:24.860
or maybe they use Tor, or whatever, right?

00:41:24.860 --> 00:41:26.920
Or they use gdb to debug their exploits.

00:41:30.220 --> 00:41:32.260
I kind of wish that on them.

00:41:33.721 --> 00:41:36.622
[laughter, applause]

00:41:37.643 --> 00:41:39.100
I think it's great, right?

00:41:39.100 --> 00:41:42.341
So one of the things Che Guevara said
in his manual about guerilla warfare,

00:41:42.341 --> 00:41:44.820
in chapter two, is that (oh, it was
chapter three)

00:41:44.820 --> 00:41:48.000
He talks about when you have to arm
a guerrilla army,

00:41:48.000 --> 00:41:52.141
this is not exactly related, but it's an
analog.

00:41:52.141 --> 00:41:54.780
He says that the most important thing
is for the guerrilla army to

00:41:54.780 --> 00:41:58.340
use the weapons of the people that
they're fighting - the oppressor.

00:41:58.340 --> 00:42:01.740
And the reason is that it allows you to
resupply, essentially.

00:42:01.740 --> 00:42:04.580
When you win a battle, you resupply.

00:42:05.141 --> 00:42:07.860
When we all use the same Free software,
and we're working on these things,

00:42:07.860 --> 00:42:10.883
the fact that they have to contribute
to the same projects and they often do

00:42:10.883 --> 00:42:13.121
means there's a net win for us.

00:42:13.121 --> 00:42:16.420
They do have some private things that they
don't share, obviously,

00:42:16.420 --> 00:42:19.380
with the exception of nice people like
Edward Snowden,

00:42:19.380 --> 00:42:22.062
and I think that it is a net positive
thing,

00:42:22.062 --> 00:42:24.200
and if we think of it as a struggle,

00:42:24.200 --> 00:42:26.280
we are better off to take the high road,

00:42:26.280 --> 00:42:29.420
and so I really think we should not
pretend that we can stop them,

00:42:29.420 --> 00:42:32.000
and instead we should work together
to build solutions.

00:42:32.000 --> 00:42:33.641
And I think that Debian is doing that,
right?

00:42:33.641 --> 00:42:35.960
I think Debian is much harder to
compromise than

00:42:35.960 --> 00:42:37.680
a lot of other operating systems,

00:42:37.680 --> 00:42:39.882
and it's much much harder to coerce
people,

00:42:39.882 --> 00:42:42.720
and there's a strong ethos that comes
with it that it's not just the technical

00:42:42.720 --> 00:42:45.300
project, there's a social aspect to it.

00:42:45.300 --> 00:42:48.506
I think I was in the New Maintainer
queue for 11 years,

00:42:48.506 --> 00:42:50.301
maybe that's a little too long,

00:42:50.301 --> 00:42:52.400
but there's a huge hazing process,

00:42:52.400 --> 00:42:55.640
so anyone who wants to help, really really
wants to help,

00:42:55.640 --> 00:42:58.660
and if they want to do something wrong
there are processes to catch

00:42:58.660 --> 00:43:00.602
people doing things wrong.

00:43:00.602 --> 00:43:03.000
So we should really stay true to the
Free software ethos,

00:43:03.000 --> 00:43:05.060
and it really is a net benefit.

00:43:08.362 --> 00:43:12.120
[question]: Hi Jake. Thanks a lot for
saying so much "GRsec".

00:43:17.020 --> 00:43:19.740
Just wanted to give a shout out.

00:43:19.740 --> 00:43:24.681
You mentioned possible backdoors in
CPUs and so on,

00:43:24.681 --> 00:43:30.340
that ARM might not be the next best thing
because it's not so open either.

00:43:30.340 --> 00:43:32.961
You might want to have a look at Power 8.

00:43:32.961 --> 00:43:38.541
It's basically PowerPC 64, so Debian has
support for it as far as I know,

00:43:38.541 --> 00:43:41.300
and most of the stuff is actually open.

00:43:41.300 --> 00:43:45.300
Not that actual designs that IBM is
using,

00:43:45.300 --> 00:43:49.101
but you can have, actually, an FPGA
implementation of it,

00:43:49.101 --> 00:43:55.240
and if you have the money make your own
ASICs for it, without even knowing

00:43:55.240 --> 00:43:59.080
how to do it, which is pretty good,
I think.

00:43:59.861 --> 00:44:02.860
[Jacob]: I think there are lots of things
we can hack right?

00:44:02.860 --> 00:44:06.100
I mean I had one of those weird RMS
laptops, the Limote,

00:44:06.100 --> 00:44:07.940
or whatever it's called, for a while.

00:44:07.940 --> 00:44:10.540
And I was definitely able to get some
Free software running on it,

00:44:10.540 --> 00:44:12.621
in theory it was a Free software laptop.

00:44:12.621 --> 00:44:16.160
But getting other people to use this is
the problem,

00:44:16.160 --> 00:44:18.382
you need to get everybody to use it,
right?

00:44:18.382 --> 00:44:20.680
There's a sort of old anarchist cliché,

00:44:20.680 --> 00:44:22.721
"None of us are free until all of us are
free"

00:44:22.721 --> 00:44:25.201
And that really applies here.

00:44:25.201 --> 00:44:28.024
We really need to have Free software
that's usable by everyone,

00:44:28.024 --> 00:44:31.320
otherwise we're sort of bound by the
lowest common denominator

00:44:31.320 --> 00:44:36.440
of Free, or proprietary tools, depending
on what people have to use.

00:44:36.440 --> 00:44:38.380
So it'll be great when we have that,

00:44:38.380 --> 00:44:40.142
and there's a thing called the Nokimist???

00:44:40.142 --> 00:44:44.201
which is a video mixing board that has an
FPGA implementing a Free software CPU

00:44:44.201 --> 00:44:46.321
that you can boot Debian on, or OpenWRT,

00:44:46.321 --> 00:44:48.401
and it does work, and I have used it,

00:44:48.401 --> 00:44:50.580
and in fact I used to use it as a shell,

00:44:50.580 --> 00:44:54.120
and for a long time I used a Debian
trick,

00:44:54.120 --> 00:44:56.301
actually I've never talked about that in
public,

00:44:56.301 --> 00:44:57.720
let me think about that for a second.

00:44:58.880 --> 00:45:02.280
So I used to use an IRC client that was
really buggy,

00:45:02.280 --> 00:45:05.460
and I couldn't figure out where all the
bugs were,

00:45:05.460 --> 00:45:08.280
but I knew that if I hung out in certain
networks that someone else

00:45:08.280 --> 00:45:11.820
would help me find those bugs by trying
to exploit my client.

00:45:11.820 --> 00:45:13.740
And I wanted to make it as hard as
possible.

00:45:13.740 --> 00:45:18.960
So I ran my IRC client inside of a Debian
machine that was running an S390 emulator.

00:45:18.960 --> 00:45:24.981
Who here uses Hercules? Thank you to
whoever packaged it.

00:45:24.981 --> 00:45:28.042
And so I would use Hercules, it was a
very long install process.

00:45:28.042 --> 00:45:30.022
Very slow.

00:45:30.022 --> 00:45:34.382
And I would do this, and what I'd always
dreamed of doing at some point

00:45:34.382 --> 00:45:37.200
was using the Nokimist??? and the
Hercules together

00:45:37.200 --> 00:45:40.580
for maximum ridiculously difficult
to exploit,

00:45:40.580 --> 00:45:42.220
plus GRsec kernel.

00:45:45.140 --> 00:45:47.663
But that's not a usable thing.

00:45:47.663 --> 00:45:49.901
So what we need to do is take these kinds
of prototypes

00:45:49.901 --> 00:45:52.601
which actually do represent many steps
forward,

00:45:52.601 --> 00:45:55.900
and we need to make sure that they're
produced on a scale where

00:45:55.900 --> 00:45:59.980
you can go into a store and puchase them
anonymously, with cash,

00:45:59.980 --> 00:46:02.261
in a way that you can then verify.

00:46:02.261 --> 00:46:06.260
And we're actually really close to that
with software defined radios

00:46:06.260 --> 00:46:07.720
and open hardware,

00:46:07.720 --> 00:46:10.240
but we're not quite there yet.

00:46:11.820 --> 00:46:15.900
[question]: What I meant is that Power 8
is basically getting big, currently,

00:46:15.900 --> 00:46:17.880
on the server market,

00:46:17.880 --> 00:46:20.943
and it might get big for other stuff also.

00:46:21.780 --> 00:46:23.401
[Jacob]: Hopefully.

00:46:26.160 --> 00:46:29.240
[question]: I want to come back to the
story about the panic

00:46:29.240 --> 00:46:31.841
in the Appletalk driver.

00:46:31.841 --> 00:46:36.940
The common approach against this is
to compile your own kernel with

00:46:36.940 --> 00:46:39.720
all this stuff not compiled in,

00:46:39.720 --> 00:46:44.500
but on two of my systems I have a
modprobe wrapper which has

00:46:44.500 --> 00:46:47.320
a whitelist of modules which may be
loaded,

00:46:47.320 --> 00:46:52.111
and I install that wrapper as the thing
that the kernel uses for loading modules.

00:46:52.361 --> 00:46:58.041
Do you know if such a thing exists
elsewhere, or if not,

00:46:58.041 --> 00:47:03.141
I would be interested in developing it
into something which is actually useable

00:47:03.141 --> 00:47:04.781
for people.

00:47:05.680 --> 00:47:07.740
[Jacob]: That would be great.

00:47:07.740 --> 00:47:11.600
In this case we were using Tails.

00:47:11.600 --> 00:47:19.150
And so, Tails is very finicky about what
it will accept, and very reasonably so,

00:47:19.150 --> 00:47:23.360
and so having that in Debian will make it
a lot easier to get it into something

00:47:23.360 --> 00:47:25.335
like Tails, I think.

00:47:25.335 --> 00:47:28.520
But the main thing is really that we have
to think about the attack surface

00:47:28.520 --> 00:47:30.301
of the kernel very differently.

00:47:30.301 --> 00:47:33.300
The problem is not Appletalk; the problem
is the Linux kernel is filled with

00:47:33.300 --> 00:47:34.921
a lot of code,

00:47:34.921 --> 00:47:38.520
and you can autoload, in certain cases,
certain things come in,

00:47:38.520 --> 00:47:40.500
and certain things get autoloaded,

00:47:40.500 --> 00:47:43.381
and I know Bdale loves his
ham radio stuff,

00:47:43.381 --> 00:47:45.722
but I never use ham radio on my machine

00:47:45.722 --> 00:47:49.000
I used for clandestine conspiracies,
you know?

00:47:49.000 --> 00:47:50.640
That's a separate machine.

00:47:50.640 --> 00:47:52.120
It's over here.

00:47:52.120 --> 00:47:53.860
So we just need to find a way to think
about that.

00:47:53.860 --> 00:47:56.840
And part of that could be kernel stuff,
but also part of it could be thinking

00:47:56.840 --> 00:47:59.741
about solutions like that, where we
don't need to change the kernel.

00:47:59.741 --> 00:48:02.100
So if you could package that and develop
that, it would be really fantastic.

00:48:04.022 --> 00:48:09.481
[Ben]: Actually, some time ago, after
I think it was the econet exploits,

00:48:09.481 --> 00:48:13.280
no-one uses econet, it was broken anyway,
but you could exploit it,

00:48:13.280 --> 00:48:15.240
because it was autoloaded.

00:48:15.240 --> 00:48:22.920
So I actually went through and turned off
autoloading on a few of the more obscure

00:48:22.920 --> 00:48:24.740
network protocols.

00:48:24.740 --> 00:48:29.021
We could probably go further with that,
even in the defaults.

00:48:29.021 --> 00:48:31.860
[Jacob]: I think it would be great to
change some of the kernel stuff so that

00:48:31.860 --> 00:48:36.040
at least, I mean, Tails is a special use
case, where, I think, it's very important,

00:48:36.040 --> 00:48:37.941
and it doesn't work for everyone,

00:48:37.941 --> 00:48:41.320
but we should just consider that there are
certainly things which are really great,

00:48:41.320 --> 00:48:44.400
and I want to use Debian for it, because
Debian is a universal operating system.

00:48:44.400 --> 00:48:48.160
But for a modern desktop system where
you're using GNOME,

00:48:48.160 --> 00:48:53.700
and you haven't set anything up,
Appletalk for example,

00:48:53.700 --> 00:48:57.781
maybe we would ask those people
to load that module themselves.

00:48:59.541 --> 00:49:04.900
[Ben]: Yeah, for example you could
have, a lot of those things are going to

00:49:04.900 --> 00:49:06.981
have supporting utilities,

00:49:06.981 --> 00:49:10.021
so you could put something in the
supporting utilities that loads it

00:49:10.021 --> 00:49:11.380
at boot time.

00:49:12.100 --> 00:49:14.160
And if you don't have those installed,
you don't need it.

00:49:15.060 --> 00:49:17.421
[Jacob]: Yep, totally. And I think there's
lots of ways to do it where

00:49:17.421 --> 00:49:20.060
the network can't trigger it,
and that's important.

00:49:20.800 --> 00:49:23.802
[Ben]: Yeah, that puzzled me,
I can't understand,

00:49:23.802 --> 00:49:29.360
the protocol module should get loaded
when userland tries to open a socket

00:49:29.360 --> 00:49:32.220
of that type,

00:49:32.220 --> 00:49:35.481
it shouldn't happen in response to
network traffic.

00:49:36.960 --> 00:49:44.981
There are things like, I think if you
run ifconfig that can autoload

00:49:44.981 --> 00:49:47.000
a bunch of things, for example.

00:49:47.720 --> 00:49:49.801
[Jacob]: Yeah, I think on either side
it should be more explicit,

00:49:49.801 --> 00:49:52.940
and in this case with Tails,

00:49:52.940 --> 00:49:55.220
there was a time when you looked at
the kernel module list

00:49:55.220 --> 00:49:57.080
and it was pretty amazing,

00:49:57.080 --> 00:50:00.801
like I think there was an X25 thing,
an Appletalk thing,

00:50:00.801 --> 00:50:03.781
wait, this is all about going over Tor,
we don't support any of these

00:50:03.781 --> 00:50:05.340
things at all.

00:50:05.340 --> 00:50:09.540
So it's just the way that things are 
interdependent, right?

00:50:09.540 --> 00:50:11.440
It's not a dig at the kernel itself.

00:50:11.440 --> 00:50:13.981
I think the Linux kernel as it works
in Debian today works really well

00:50:13.981 --> 00:50:15.440
for a lot of people,

00:50:15.440 --> 00:50:17.960
but there is definitely a high security
use case,

00:50:17.960 --> 00:50:20.780
and I, for example, if I were a Debian
developer, and I had a development

00:50:20.780 --> 00:50:22.780
machine where I didn't run a web
browser,

00:50:22.780 --> 00:50:24.940
and I took a lot of effort.

00:50:24.940 --> 00:50:29.401
It would be really nice if there were
a kernel that put in the same

00:50:29.401 --> 00:50:32.420
threshold of security.

00:50:32.420 --> 00:50:35.840
And I think that the GRsec kernel with
some stuff changed about it,

00:50:35.840 --> 00:50:37.840
like getting rid of Appletalk and a few
other things,

00:50:37.840 --> 00:50:39.500
would be closer to that,

00:50:39.500 --> 00:50:41.581
and combined with that guy's tool that
he's talking about,

00:50:41.581 --> 00:50:46.760
you could make autoloadable module,
that at least even if the system was

00:50:46.760 --> 00:50:49.500
going to autoload it, you could stop it,
in a failing closed sort of way.

00:50:49.500 --> 00:50:53.200
And I think there's a lot of stuff,
practically, to do on that front,

00:50:53.200 --> 00:50:56.160
and there's another project called
Subgraph OS,

00:50:56.160 --> 00:51:02.161
which is basically working on becoming
in some ways a Debian derivative,

00:51:02.161 --> 00:51:04.540
and they're going to do stuff like GRsec
kernel,

00:51:04.540 --> 00:51:08.142
and they have a whole sandboxing framework
which uses apparmor, seccomp

00:51:08.142 --> 00:51:10.540
and xpra, and a few other things,

00:51:10.540 --> 00:51:13.903
and I think that they'll make a lot of
interesting security decisions,

00:51:13.903 --> 00:51:16.961
which might make sense to adopt in 
Debian later.

00:51:17.860 --> 00:51:20.441
[Ben]: I think Matthew Garrett has an
interesting criticism about that and

00:51:20.441 --> 00:51:24.020
how it wouldn't really work, and Wayland
was a better way to go than xpra.

00:51:25.240 --> 00:51:26.741
[Jacob]: Yeah, I've heard those
criticisms,

00:51:26.741 --> 00:51:28.622
but Matthew Garrett is wrong.

00:51:29.600 --> 00:51:32.540
Not usually, but in this particular case.

00:51:32.540 --> 00:51:37.200
For example, the sandboxing stuff,
if you have a GNOME appstore,

00:51:37.200 --> 00:51:41.761
essentially, that's for one set of users,
but for a Debian developer

00:51:41.761 --> 00:51:44.282
writing your own policies,
it might be useful,

00:51:44.282 --> 00:51:46.960
and if you need Wayland, you might
not have a full solution,

00:51:46.960 --> 00:51:49.220
we might want to have both for a while.

00:51:49.220 --> 00:51:51.060
And think it'd be great.

00:51:51.060 --> 00:51:54.140
And the main thing is we just need to
find people who will think about those

00:51:54.140 --> 00:51:55.823
issues and try to integrate them,

00:51:55.823 --> 00:52:00.481
because most people who write exploits,
or who understand how to do offensive

00:52:00.481 --> 00:52:03.360
security stuff, they don't want to help
Free software projects,

00:52:04.200 --> 00:52:05.761
they just want to exploit them.

00:52:05.761 --> 00:52:08.460
And so some of the Subgraph guys,
what I really like about them

00:52:08.460 --> 00:52:11.461
is that they're trying to improve the
Free software products we all use.

00:52:11.461 --> 00:52:13.480
Even though they may make different
design decisions,

00:52:13.480 --> 00:52:15.200
they're making Free software all the same.

00:52:18.680 --> 00:52:24.400
[question]: Maybe also, some other thing
to keep in mind is actually

00:52:24.400 --> 00:52:39.040
that there is also a social aspect of this
pressure if NSA wants to put anything

00:52:39.040 --> 00:52:41.440
inside Debian.

00:52:41.440 --> 00:52:48.021
So if we actually also need to make sure
that if they put pressure on somebody

00:52:48.021 --> 00:52:56.601
we have any way to help these people
not land in prison.

00:52:56.601 --> 00:53:04.080
So is there also a social aspect of 
supporting people which get pressure

00:53:04.080 --> 00:53:05.980
from anyone.

00:53:06.840 --> 00:53:09.722
[Jacob]: Yep. I mean, if anyone is ever
in that situation one thing I would say

00:53:09.722 --> 00:53:12.641
is that it's your right to remain silent,

00:53:12.641 --> 00:53:15.721
you have the right to remain silent
I think is the phrase the police would say

00:53:15.721 --> 00:53:19.300
but there are definitely communities
of people who will help you.

00:53:19.300 --> 00:53:21.700
There's a group called the Courage
foundation, for example,

00:53:21.700 --> 00:53:23.563
which was started by Sarah Harrison,

00:53:23.563 --> 00:53:26.280
and the job that the Courage foundation
has taken on

00:53:26.280 --> 00:53:30.060
is essentially to help people who would be
sources or who are in harm's way like this

00:53:30.060 --> 00:53:32.642
and if you found yourself in that kind of
a position there are people

00:53:32.642 --> 00:53:34.520
who will try to help you.

00:53:34.520 --> 00:53:36.800
I really don't think that is the next step
in this,

00:53:36.800 --> 00:53:38.383
I think that could happen.

00:53:38.383 --> 00:53:42.000
But I thin it's much more likely someone
is going to write an exploit for Firefox.

00:53:42.000 --> 00:53:44.581
That's the way they're going to own
Debian people in the future,

00:53:44.581 --> 00:53:47.041
for the most part, that's how they own
us today.

00:53:47.041 --> 00:53:51.700
Firefox, number one enemy to security
on your Debian machine, probably.

00:53:51.700 --> 00:53:54.680
And that's not a dig at Firefox, it's just
super-complicated software,

00:53:54.680 --> 00:53:56.520
and these guys are really good at
writing exploits,

00:53:56.520 --> 00:53:58.582
and that's an easy target.

00:53:58.582 --> 00:54:00.960
So we, I think, have to do with the social
thing,

00:54:00.960 --> 00:54:03.580
but we also should look at some of the
technical problems,

00:54:03.580 --> 00:54:06.820
and then when and if people have that,
you can contact me.

00:54:06.820 --> 00:54:10.022
I'm super happy to put you in touch with
people who will help.

00:54:10.022 --> 00:54:13.860
And obviously, get a lawyer, get several
lawyers if you can.

00:54:13.860 --> 00:54:17.440
Contact the EFF, or the ACLU, depending
on where you are.

00:54:17.440 --> 00:54:22.561
At least in Germany, and in the United
States, it isn't so bad yet

00:54:22.561 --> 00:54:25.903
that they can put that kind of pressure 
on you openly,

00:54:25.903 --> 00:54:27.760
in a Free software project.

00:54:27.760 --> 00:54:31.120
If you write proprietary software you're
in a very different situations,

00:54:31.120 --> 00:54:34.180
and there are definitely people who are in
that situation right now,

00:54:34.180 --> 00:54:38.223
and I don't envy them. Their position is
actually much harder.

00:54:38.223 --> 00:54:42.200
So actually writing Free software already
makes you not at the very beginning

00:54:42.200 --> 00:54:43.761
of the target list, I think.

00:54:46.860 --> 00:54:53.140
Any other questions? Wow. Where's the rum?

00:55:01.323 --> 00:55:06.080
[question]: How do you deliver the
encrypted message without exposing

00:55:06.080 --> 00:55:07.780
the connection to a third party?

00:55:14.321 --> 00:55:15.960
[Jacob]: Which encrypted message do you
mean?

00:55:16.960 --> 00:55:19.102
Do you mean, like jabber?

00:55:19.800 --> 00:55:21.262
[question]: Email, or jabber, yes.

00:55:22.040 --> 00:55:25.640
[Jacob]: For the most part we use systems
where Tor hidden services are available

00:55:25.640 --> 00:55:29.060
to connect to them, so we never even left
the Tor anonymity network,

00:55:29.060 --> 00:55:31.521
so they're end-to-end encrypted and
anonymized, you connect to a

00:55:31.521 --> 00:55:33.541
.onion address,

00:55:33.541 --> 00:55:37.560
and then using crypto on top of that, so
TLS to a Jabber server,

00:55:37.560 --> 00:55:39.880
and then OTR on top of that,

00:55:39.880 --> 00:55:44.944
so you have, you could call it a
composition of cryptographic systems,

00:55:44.944 --> 00:55:50.060
and the core of that is Tor, along with
using throwaway machines,

00:55:50.060 --> 00:55:52.620
going to locations where you never go
twice,

00:55:52.620 --> 00:55:57.160
using open wifi plus Tor plus TLS plus
OTR,

00:55:57.160 --> 00:56:01.821
and for email, Riseup offers Tor hidden
services, which allows you to do the same

00:56:01.821 --> 00:56:05.040
thing, essentially, and then using PGP as
well.

00:56:05.840 --> 00:56:11.600
[question]: I mean, how about metadata,
like the delivery address of the target?

00:56:12.900 --> 00:56:23.100
[Jacob]: In some cases we use a system
called Pond,

00:56:23.100 --> 00:56:26.420
and Pond is a system that is completely
Tor hidden service based,

00:56:26.420 --> 00:56:29.342
pond.imperialviolet.org.

00:56:29.342 --> 00:56:33.441
Adam Langley probably wouldn't want me to
say, but I'll say it anyway,

00:56:33.441 --> 00:56:35.880
it would be very useful to package this
for Debian,

00:56:35.880 --> 00:56:39.400
because it's a system where once you do
key exchange with someone,

00:56:39.400 --> 00:56:44.363
you have an end-to-end encrypted messaging
system that's like email,

00:56:44.363 --> 00:56:47.960
you can send files that are encrypted,
you can send messages that are encrypted,

00:56:47.960 --> 00:56:50.580
It's delay based. You don't have
usernames,

00:56:50.580 --> 00:56:53.500
you just have a public key,
and then you have group signatures,

00:56:53.500 --> 00:56:57.080
so that people can send things to your
mailbox by proving they are a member

00:56:57.080 --> 00:56:59.662
of the group but not which member of
the group they are.

00:56:59.662 --> 00:57:01.620
And there's a lot of stuff like that.

00:57:01.620 --> 00:57:03.862
So we use Jabber, we use email, and we use
Pond.

00:57:03.862 --> 00:57:08.002
And those three systems together also
allowed us to build a clandestine

00:57:08.002 --> 00:57:09.580
sneakernet.

00:57:09.580 --> 00:57:11.445
So we have the ability to carry USB disks,

00:57:11.445 --> 00:57:13.260
and a few of us carried them inside of
our bodies,

00:57:13.260 --> 00:57:16.120
and if you've never had that experience,
lucky you.

00:57:19.580 --> 00:57:24.401
You want to make sure you use post-quantum
computer crypto for that, by the way.

00:57:24.401 --> 00:57:25.641
It's more comfortable.

00:57:28.680 --> 00:57:30.620
[orga]: Shall we relieve this man from his
duties?

00:57:31.204 --> 00:57:33.080
[Jacob]: Any more questions?

00:57:33.660 --> 00:57:35.241
[orga]: One more question.

00:57:36.180 --> 00:57:39.061
[question]: Okay, so when the Snowden
leaks were first published it created

00:57:39.061 --> 00:57:42.180
a lot of awareness, and people were
talking about it,

00:57:42.180 --> 00:57:44.520
and there was a huge media echo,

00:57:44.520 --> 00:57:48.220
Now if some documents leaked, people
are saying yeah, all this surveillance,

00:57:48.220 --> 00:57:51.480
and we aren't dead yet, and we can still
live our lives.

00:57:51.480 --> 00:57:55.380
They basically care less. They still care
a bit, but they care much less than

00:57:55.380 --> 00:57:58.582
when the first documents were published,

00:57:58.582 --> 00:58:04.663
so how can we maintain awareness for
this issue in the world population,

00:58:04.663 --> 00:58:06.021
in your opinion?

00:58:07.100 --> 00:58:09.280
[Jacob]: There's a really scary thing
that's happening right now.

00:58:09.280 --> 00:58:13.584
There was this idea in the 90s, we had
the crypto wars.

00:58:13.584 --> 00:58:16.281
Did any of you remember this idea of the
crypto wars?

00:58:16.281 --> 00:58:18.520
Okay, a few of you do, maybe not all of
you do.

00:58:18.520 --> 00:58:21.741
But we had the so-called crypto wars in
the 90s, I encourage you to look this up

00:58:21.741 --> 00:58:25.020
on DuckDuckGo, or whatever your
favourite search engine is.

00:58:25.020 --> 00:58:28.763
In theory we're in the second crypto
wars now.

00:58:28.763 --> 00:58:32.120
In reality what happened is the first
crypto wars never ended.

00:58:32.120 --> 00:58:34.825
We didn't actually win, like we thought
we did.

00:58:34.825 --> 00:58:37.180
But there are a bunch of things that are
taking place.

00:58:37.180 --> 00:58:41.020
For example, making a stand against
backdoors.

00:58:41.020 --> 00:58:45.082
Using end-to-end encrypted
communications.

00:58:45.082 --> 00:58:47.622
Actually pushing for that, being quite
open about actually hosting

00:58:47.622 --> 00:58:50.821
those kinds of services, and doing it
from a principled perspective,

00:58:50.821 --> 00:58:52.880
from a legal perspective.

00:58:52.880 --> 00:58:57.541
I think you will find that the tension
will continue to rise for a while,

00:58:57.541 --> 00:59:02.140
and I think that it will continue to be
a conversation about public debate,

00:59:02.140 --> 00:59:06.561
and an important aspect of this is that
now regular journalists that don't

00:59:06.561 --> 00:59:10.200
understand technology at least understand
the importance of these things.

00:59:10.200 --> 00:59:13.260
And if they don't do that, they at least
perceive that they will be considered

00:59:13.260 --> 00:59:16.901
unprofessional if they don't care, and
think about those things,

00:59:16.901 --> 00:59:19.140
or they'll be somehow negligent.

00:59:19.140 --> 00:59:21.200
And I think that will keep some of the
discussion going,

00:59:21.200 --> 00:59:23.860
and it will allow us to build some
breathing room,

00:59:23.860 --> 00:59:26.781
and that breathing room will actually
allow us to build some alternatives.

00:59:26.781 --> 00:59:29.704
But there are some downsides, right?

00:59:29.704 --> 00:59:34.020
Some of the things that take place when
you reveal security service spying

00:59:34.020 --> 00:59:36.740
is that it tends to get normalized, to a
degree.

00:59:36.740 --> 00:59:39.280
But then in some cases it does get pushed
back.

00:59:39.280 --> 00:59:43.760
In the 70s in the United States, it became
illegal to do assassinations, for example.

00:59:43.760 --> 00:59:46.861
Because what the CIA were doing was so
atrocious that eventually there was

00:59:46.861 --> 00:59:48.620
political pushback.

00:59:48.620 --> 00:59:52.401
It turns out it only lasted 30 years, and
then they started doing it again.

00:59:52.401 --> 00:59:57.700
But there's a saying in my country which
is that effectively the price of liberty

00:59:57.700 --> 00:59:59.480
is eternal vigilance.

00:59:59.480 --> 01:00:01.080
And that's what we are engaged in now.

01:00:01.080 --> 01:00:04.801
And the liberty starts with software
liberty, I think,

01:00:04.801 --> 01:00:06.960
in the case of communications on networks.

01:00:06.960 --> 01:00:10.500
And so we have to have Free software,
and it has to be responsibly encoding

01:00:10.500 --> 01:00:12.160
packets and data,

01:00:12.160 --> 01:00:14.000
and if we think about it in this sense
we'll find a lot of pressure,

01:00:14.000 --> 01:00:16.908
and we'll have a lot of discussions
about it,

01:00:16.908 --> 01:00:19.720
and you'll start to see it be a part of
policy debates,

01:00:19.720 --> 01:00:22.600
like one of the presidential candidates
in the United States

01:00:22.600 --> 01:00:24.400
just came out against encryption.

01:00:24.400 --> 01:00:26.621
I hope that sinks his presidential
campaign.

01:00:26.621 --> 01:00:28.600
I mean it's weird to be against
encryption.

01:00:28.600 --> 01:00:31.160
It's like I'm against prime numbers.

01:00:31.160 --> 01:00:33.240
No modular arithmetic.

01:00:33.581 --> 01:00:37.161
[laughter, applause]

01:00:38.520 --> 01:00:41.721
I just want to say it's important to
understand, you are right,

01:00:41.721 --> 01:00:43.721
people will be normalized about it,

01:00:43.721 --> 01:00:45.880
but each and every one of us that
understands these issues

01:00:45.880 --> 01:00:47.700
can actually keep it alive.

01:00:47.700 --> 01:00:49.880
And the way we do that is when we
communicate with people...

01:00:49.880 --> 01:00:52.201
I'll give you an example which I
like to give.

01:00:52.201 --> 01:00:55.220
I grew up in San Fransisco and in the Bay
Area or San Fransisco, and California,

01:00:55.220 --> 01:00:57.740
and I did that in the 80s.

01:00:57.740 --> 01:01:01.783
And so a lot of people that I knew had
HIV and they died of AIDS.

01:01:01.783 --> 01:01:05.600
And there was a huge discussion about
this, and it was called GRID,

01:01:05.600 --> 01:01:08.701
the Gay Related Immune Deficiency
syndrome.

01:01:08.701 --> 01:01:10.662
Before it was called HIV and AIDS.

01:01:10.662 --> 01:01:12.644
And lots of people were sick, and lot of
people died,

01:01:12.644 --> 01:01:14.820
and there was a sort of normalization
process where people sort of

01:01:14.820 --> 01:01:18.141
accepted this as their fate, especially
if they were in the gay community.

01:01:18.141 --> 01:01:22.900
And still, over years and years and years,
people began to build a culture about

01:01:22.900 --> 01:01:26.300
safe sex, and they started to talk about
respecting their partners,

01:01:26.300 --> 01:01:28.560
and about talking about these issues,
and about getting tested,

01:01:28.560 --> 01:01:32.400
and it took a lot of effort, to really go
much further.

01:01:32.400 --> 01:01:34.500
A lot of people actually died in that
process.

01:01:34.500 --> 01:01:37.160
It was a very sad, serious situation.

01:01:37.160 --> 01:01:40.460
And I think we have similar discussions
that are taking place now,

01:01:40.460 --> 01:01:42.361
and some people don't take it seriously,

01:01:42.361 --> 01:01:45.483
and if they happen to be Muslims living 
in Pakistan,

01:01:45.483 --> 01:01:48.320
they might get a drone strike.

01:01:48.320 --> 01:01:51.300
And there's a sort of survival mechanism
that takes place there.

01:01:51.300 --> 01:01:54.384
And it's an unfortunate parallel, I think,

01:01:54.384 --> 01:01:57.261
but I would really consider that we can
change this dialogue

01:01:57.261 --> 01:01:59.580
by continuing to have it even though
it's exhausting,

01:01:59.580 --> 01:02:01.900
and by recognizing our responsibility,

01:02:01.900 --> 01:02:04.241
and how we can make it better by
continuing to do that,

01:02:04.241 --> 01:02:07.040
and by building healthy alternatives,
and by building new systems,

01:02:07.040 --> 01:02:10.380
and by refusing to backdoor any
system, ever,

01:02:10.380 --> 01:02:13.561
completely committing to
Free software,

01:02:13.561 --> 01:02:16.761
and transparency of that software,
and also of those processes.

01:02:16.761 --> 01:02:19.640
And really really really sharing the
knowledge about it,

01:02:19.640 --> 01:02:21.620
to make it impossible to surpress.

01:02:21.620 --> 01:02:25.020
And we should not accept the
normalization of that.

01:02:25.020 --> 01:02:28.122
We shouldn't make it fun to spy on people,
we shouldn't make jokes about it

01:02:28.122 --> 01:02:30.242
in a way that normalizes it,

01:02:30.242 --> 01:02:33.842
and we should respect those people
who are victims of surveillance,

01:02:33.842 --> 01:02:36.702
and we should recognize that basically
everyone here is a victim of surveillance

01:02:36.702 --> 01:02:38.300
to some degree,

01:02:38.300 --> 01:02:40.420
and we should care about that,
and we should continue to be upset,

01:02:40.420 --> 01:02:43.160
but not just upset; to channel that
anger into something useful

01:02:43.160 --> 01:02:45.321
like making Debian better.

01:02:46.820 --> 01:02:50.240
[applause]

01:02:56.101 --> 01:03:00.041
[orga]: Thanks Jake for such a long Q&A
session,

01:03:00.041 --> 01:03:01.860
I hope you enjoy the rum.

01:03:01.860 --> 01:03:04.802
And I'm sure Jake's going to ask any more
questions if he can still talk.

01:03:08.300 --> 01:03:10.140
[Jacob]: Thanks.