0:00:00.000,0:00:01.488
... wanted to be able to use

0:00:01.488,0:00:03.284
Thunderbird and GnuPG together with Tor,

0:00:03.284,0:00:04.744
and so we thought:

0:00:04.744,0:00:07.103
oh, it would be really easy, I bet,

0:00:07.104,0:00:09.694
to configure Thunderbird to work with Tor

0:00:09.703,0:00:11.989
- hah - so a new Free software project[br]was born.

0:00:12.358,0:00:15.533
It's a really simple thing, but basically

0:00:15.533,0:00:17.655
it's just a package[br]that hooks it all together.

0:00:17.655,0:00:20.577
So a lot of people were using Thunderbird

0:00:20.581,0:00:23.796
and TorBirdy, and GnuPG, and Tor,

0:00:23.796,0:00:26.031
and Debian, together for email,

0:00:26.050,0:00:29.808
combined with Riseup as an email service.

0:00:30.699,0:00:36.954
So it's a literally a real peer to peer,[br]Free software driven set of things,

0:00:37.179,0:00:41.221
actually, that made it possible.

0:00:48.559,0:00:50.438
[question]:[br]So one thing I never understood about this

0:00:50.440,0:00:53.464
process was exactly how the documents were[br]handled, and maybe that's because nobody

0:00:53.474,0:00:57.561
wants to say, but, you know, did you leave[br]them on a server somewhere and download

0:00:57.580,0:01:00.807
them, hand them over to people, and who[br]took what where, and how do you...

0:01:01.263,0:01:04.848
in case I need to do something really[br]dangerous with a load of documents,

0:01:04.848,0:01:07.764
what's the best way of doing it?

0:01:07.891,0:01:10.879
[laughter]

0:01:12.758,0:01:14.763
[Jacob]: Hmm!

0:01:16.555,0:01:18.859
[audience member]: It's a good thing[br]this isn't being streamed.

0:01:19.498,0:01:21.593
I'm sorry, what?

0:01:21.845,0:01:24.789
There was a voice from god,[br]what did she say?

0:01:25.169,0:01:27.261
[audience]:[br]I said good we aren't streaming tonight.

0:01:27.478,0:01:30.156
Oh yeah, so hello to all of our friends[br]

0:01:30.156,0:01:34.133
in domestic and international[br]surveillance services.

0:01:34.819,0:01:37.457
Well, so I won't answer your question,

0:01:37.457,0:01:40.146
but since you asked the question,[br]it's my turn to talk.

0:01:40.157,0:01:41.600
So what I would say is that...

0:01:41.616,0:01:44.075
if you want to do clandestine activities

0:01:44.078,0:01:46.161
that you fear for your life for,

0:01:46.171,0:01:48.198
you need to really think about[br]the situation that you're in

0:01:48.198,0:01:49.347
very carefully.

0:01:49.347,0:01:51.873
And so a big part of this is[br]operational security

0:01:51.892,0:01:54.102
and a big part of that is[br]compartmentalization.

0:01:54.109,0:01:56.310
So certain people had access[br]to certain things,

0:01:56.319,0:01:58.195
but maybe they couldn't decrypt them,

0:01:58.204,0:02:00.968
and certain things were moved around,

0:02:00.972,0:02:03.486
and that's on a need to know basis,

0:02:03.486,0:02:05.067
and those people who knew,

0:02:05.081,0:02:09.305
which is not me - I don't know anything,[br]I don't know what you're talking about.

0:02:09.845,0:02:11.888
Those people knew, and then you know,

0:02:11.896,0:02:13.427
it'll go with them to their grave.

0:02:13.445,0:02:15.729
So if you're interested in being the next[br]Edward Snowden,

0:02:15.760,0:02:17.225
you need to do your homework

0:02:17.247,0:02:20.341
in finding people that will be able to do[br]the other part of it, let's say.

0:02:20.341,0:02:22.771
But just in general, I mean

0:02:22.778,0:02:24.826
compartmentalization is key, right.

0:02:24.839,0:02:27.163
So it's not just for AppArmor profiles.

0:02:27.174,0:02:30.285
So you need to think about[br]what you want to do.

0:02:30.294,0:02:33.551
And I mean a big part of this[br]is to consider that the network itself

0:02:33.551,0:02:36.765
is the enemy, even though it is useful[br]for communicating.

0:02:37.063,0:02:40.730
So all the metadata that exists[br]on the network

0:02:40.733,0:02:42.867
could have tipped people off,[br]could have caused

0:02:42.867,0:02:44.363
this whole thing to fall apart.

0:02:44.489,0:02:46.789
It really is amazing, I feel like you know

0:02:46.823,0:02:48.150
two and half, three years ago,

0:02:48.150,0:02:49.769
when you talk about Free software,

0:02:49.769,0:02:51.617
and you talk about the idea of[br]Free software,

0:02:51.623,0:02:55.024
and you talk about issues relating to[br]autonomy and privacy, and security

0:02:55.024,0:02:57.718
you have a really different reception now[br]than you did then,

0:02:57.718,0:02:58.983
and that's really what it took

0:02:58.983,0:03:01.596
to turn the world half a degree,[br]or something,

0:03:01.618,0:03:03.899
or a quarter of a degree or something.

0:03:04.881,0:03:08.165
So I'm not going to tell you about[br]detailed plans for conspiracy,

0:03:08.178,0:03:10.943
but I highly encourage you to read about[br]South African history,

0:03:10.948,0:03:13.588
in particular the history of[br]Umkhonto we Sizwe.

0:03:13.598,0:03:17.979
They are the clandestine communications[br]group for MK,

0:03:18.023,0:03:20.881
or rather the operation who lay inside of MK,

0:03:20.881,0:03:22.675
which is Umkhonto we Sizwe,

0:03:22.690,0:03:25.000
and they are sort of with[br]the African National Congress,

0:03:25.000,0:03:28.760
and those people have published so many[br]books about the revolutionary activities

0:03:28.762,0:03:31.206
to overthrow the apartheid state.

0:03:31.206,0:03:33.756
If you read these books, especially[br]the book "Operation Vula"

0:03:33.760,0:03:36.182
and "Armed and Dangerous"[br]by Ronnie Kasrils

0:03:36.182,0:03:38.705
they give you some idea about[br]what you need to do

0:03:38.715,0:03:40.220
which is to compartmentalize,

0:03:40.220,0:03:42.542
how to find people to do various tasks,[br]specific tasks,

0:03:42.549,0:03:45.182
how to work on building trust[br]with each other, what that looks like,

0:03:45.182,0:03:47.196
how to identify political targets,

0:03:47.198,0:03:50.307
how you might use things[br]like communications technology

0:03:50.307,0:03:53.037
to change the political topic on,

0:03:53.059,0:03:55.286
and the discussion in general.

0:03:55.556,0:03:59.519
And I think the best way to learn about[br]these things is to study previous people

0:03:59.519,0:04:01.660
who have tried to do that kind of stuff.

0:04:01.732,0:04:05.241
And the NSA is not the apartheid regime of[br]South Africa,

0:04:05.241,0:04:06.890
but there are still lessons[br]to be learned there,

0:04:06.896,0:04:10.060
so if you really want to know the answer[br]to that, also Che Guevara's manual

0:04:10.084,0:04:12.104
on guerilla warfare is very interesting,

0:04:12.117,0:04:13.774
and there's a lot of other books like that.

0:04:13.784,0:04:15.582
I'd be happy to talk about it[br]with you later.

0:04:15.582,0:04:18.236
And I have nothing to do with anything[br]that we may or may not have done.

0:04:18.547,0:04:20.213
[laughter]

0:04:24.900,0:04:28.530
[question]: Do you think there is a chance[br]that things may get better

0:04:28.545,0:04:33.940
for example I know that publicly,[br]some programs were not extended

0:04:33.950,0:04:37.100
but I don't know what is happening[br]in the background

0:04:37.100,0:04:42.966
so maybe it's the same thing[br]but they are pretending that it's not

0:04:42.966,0:04:45.193
How do you see this?

0:04:45.409,0:04:47.713
[Jacob]: Well I think a couple of things.

0:04:47.724,0:04:53.926
In general I think what happened, not just[br]with this movie but with all of these things

0:04:53.926,0:04:56.073
is that in inspired hope,

0:04:56.073,0:04:57.353
and the hope is very important,

0:04:57.361,0:05:01.149
but hope is not a strategy for survival,[br]or for building alternatives,

0:05:01.149,0:05:03.495
so what it has also done, is that it has[br]allowed us to raise the profile

0:05:03.510,0:05:05.500
of the things which actually do[br]make it better.

0:05:05.587,0:05:08.821
For example ridding ourselves of the[br]chains of proprietary software

0:05:08.821,0:05:12.071
is something that's a serious discussion[br]with people that wouldn't have previously

0:05:12.078,0:05:14.849
talked about Free software[br]because they don't care about liberty,

0:05:14.872,0:05:16.510
they care about security.

0:05:16.519,0:05:18.689
And even though I think those are[br]really simliar things,

0:05:18.704,0:05:21.101
previously they just thought we were just[br]Free software hippies,

0:05:21.101,0:05:22.402
in tie-dye shirts

0:05:22.416,0:05:25.086
and while that may be true on the weekends[br]and evenings

0:05:25.086,0:05:27.581
or with Bdale every day[br][laughter]

0:05:27.581,0:05:29.541
I think that actually does make it better

0:05:29.671,0:05:32.768
And it also changes the dialogue, in[br]the sense that it's no longer reasonable

0:05:32.768,0:05:36.947
to pretend that mass surveillance and[br]surveillance issues don't matter,

0:05:37.309,0:05:39.111
because if you really go down the[br]rabbit-hole

0:05:39.111,0:05:42.257
of thinking about what some of the[br]security services are trying to do

0:05:42.257,0:05:45.289
it becomes obvious that we want to encrypt[br]everything all the time

0:05:45.289,0:05:48.101
to beat selector-based surveillance[br]and dragnet-based surveillance.

0:05:48.187,0:05:50.276
It doesn't matter if something is authenticated

0:05:50.276,0:05:52.683
You could still trigger some action[br]to take place

0:05:52.692,0:05:54.387
with these kinds of surveillance machines

0:05:54.393,0:05:56.774
that could for example drone[br]strike someone,

0:05:56.795,0:05:58.440
and so it raises that.

0:05:58.454,0:05:59.818
And that gives me a lot of hope too,

0:05:59.818,0:06:03.376
because people understand the root[br]of the problem,

0:06:03.376,0:06:05.002
or the root of many problems

0:06:05.007,0:06:07.090
and the root of some violence[br]in the world, actually.

0:06:07.217,0:06:09.098
And so it helps us to reduce that[br]violence

0:06:09.102,0:06:10.761
by getting people to acknowledge[br]that it's real

0:06:10.778,0:06:12.204
and also that they care about it

0:06:12.204,0:06:14.138
and that we care about each other.

0:06:14.138,0:06:16.860
So that really gives me a lot of hope,[br]and part of that is Snowden

0:06:16.860,0:06:18.483
and part of that is the documents

0:06:18.499,0:06:20.276
but the other part of it is that..

0:06:20.401,0:06:25.013
I don't want to blow it up and make it[br]sound like we did something

0:06:25.024,0:06:26.630
like a big deal,

0:06:26.638,0:06:29.911
but in a sense, Laura, Glen, myself[br]and a number of other people

0:06:29.911,0:06:32.526
were really not sure we would ever be able[br]to travel home to our country

0:06:32.543,0:06:34.137
that we wouldn't be arrested.

0:06:34.137,0:06:36.487
I actually haven't been home[br]in over two and half years,

0:06:36.498,0:06:38.723
well, two years and three months[br]or something

0:06:38.723,0:06:41.975
I went out on a small business trip[br]that was supposed to last two weeks

0:06:41.975,0:06:43.484
and then this happened

0:06:43.499,0:06:44.893
and I've been hear ever since.

0:06:44.893,0:06:46.516
It's a really long, crazy trip.

0:06:46.644,0:06:50.868
But the point is that that's what was[br]necessary to make some of these changes

0:06:51.035,0:06:53.474
and eventually it will turn around

0:06:53.599,0:06:54.667
and I will be able to go home,

0:06:54.667,0:06:57.096
and Laura and Glen will be able to travel[br]to the US again.

0:06:57.098,0:07:00.062
Obviously, Julian is still stuck in the[br]Ecuadorian embassy

0:07:00.062,0:07:01.807
Sarah lives in exile in Berlin,

0:07:01.807,0:07:03.048
I live in exile in Berlin,

0:07:03.048,0:07:04.539
And Ed is in Moscow

0:07:04.547,0:07:07.528
So we're not finished with some of[br]these things

0:07:07.533,0:07:11.708
and it's also possible that we are,[br]the set of people I mentioned,

0:07:11.726,0:07:15.163
the state we're in, will stay that way[br]forever.

0:07:15.248,0:07:16.918
But what matters is that the rest[br]of the world

0:07:16.933,0:07:19.044
can actually move on and fix some of[br]these problems,

0:07:19.044,0:07:20.920
and I have a lot of hope about that.

0:07:21.007,0:07:24.038
And I see a lot of change, that's the[br]really big part.

0:07:24.038,0:07:29.795
Like I see the reproducible build stuff[br]that Holger and Lunar are working on.

0:07:29.969,0:07:32.872
People really understand the root reason[br]for needing to do that

0:07:32.881,0:07:34.918
and actually seems quite reasonable[br]to people

0:07:34.919,0:07:37.521
who would previously have expended energy[br]against it,

0:07:37.537,0:07:40.722
in support of it, so I think that's[br]really good.

0:07:40.722,0:07:43.026
And there's a lot of other hopeful things.

0:07:43.109,0:07:45.456
So I would try and be as uplifting[br]as possible.

0:07:45.485,0:07:47.588
It's not just the rum!

0:07:50.281,0:07:53.651
[question]: Near the end of the film[br]we saw something about another source.

0:07:54.066,0:07:57.147
I may have been missing some news[br]or something

0:07:57.164,0:08:01.038
but I don't remember anything about that[br]being public.

0:08:01.296,0:08:02.943
Do you know what happened to them?

0:08:03.031,0:08:05.633
[Jacob]: As far as I know any other[br]source that was mentioned in the film

0:08:05.639,0:08:08.364
is still anonymous, and they're still free.

0:08:08.492,0:08:11.221
I'm not exactly sure because I was not[br]involved in that part

0:08:11.230,0:08:13.188
but I also saw the end of the film

0:08:13.199,0:08:16.424
and I've seen a bunch of other reporting[br]which wasn't attributed to anyone in particular

0:08:16.552,0:08:21.375
So the good news... there's an old slogan[br]from the Dutch hacker community, right?

0:08:21.547,0:08:22.928
"Someone you trust is one of us,

0:08:22.928,0:08:25.983
and the leak is higher up in the chain of[br]command than you"

0:08:26.067,0:08:30.718
And I feel like that might be true again,[br]hopefully.

0:08:32.765,0:08:34.856
I think that guy has a question as well.

0:08:34.945,0:08:39.303
[question]: Part of the problem initially[br]was that encryption software

0:08:39.428,0:08:42.285
was not so easy to use, right?

0:08:42.285,0:08:44.211
And I think part of the challenge[br]for everyone

0:08:44.211,0:08:47.744
was to improve on that situation[br]to make it better

0:08:47.917,0:08:52.524
so I'm asking you if you've observed[br]any change and to the rest of the room

0:08:52.524,0:08:56.148
have we done anything to improve on that?

0:08:57.049,0:09:00.713
[Jacob]: I definitely think that there is[br]a lot of free software

0:09:00.713,0:09:02.723
that makes encryption easier to use,

0:09:02.724,0:09:05.620
though not always on free platforms,[br]which really is heart-breaking.

0:09:05.711,0:09:09.078
For example Moxie Marlinspike has done[br]a really good job

0:09:09.165,0:09:10.914
with Signal, Textsecure and Redphone

0:09:10.914,0:09:14.030
and making end-to-end, encrypted[br]calling, texting, sexting,

0:09:14.111,0:09:16.717
and whatever apps,

0:09:16.743,0:09:19.707
sext-secure is what I think it's nicknamed

0:09:19.707,0:09:22.417
and I'm very impressed by that,[br]and it works really well

0:09:22.417,0:09:24.572
and it's something which, especially[br]in the last two years,

0:09:24.573,0:09:27.517
if you have a cell-phone,[br]which I don't recommend

0:09:27.560,0:09:31.044
but if you have a cell-phone,[br]and you put in everyone's phone number,

0:09:31.044,0:09:34.449
a lot of people that I would classify as[br]non-technical people,

0:09:34.449,0:09:37.285
that don't care about Free software[br]as a hobby or as a passion

0:09:37.285,0:09:38.999
or as a profession.

0:09:38.999,0:09:40.506
You see their names in those systems

0:09:40.532,0:09:42.537
often more than some of the[br]Free software people,

0:09:42.539,0:09:44.460
and that's really impressive to me,

0:09:44.482,0:09:48.290
and I think there's been a huge shift[br]just generally about those sorts of things

0:09:48.290,0:09:51.154
also about social responsibility,

0:09:51.154,0:09:53.840
or people understand they have a[br]responsibility to other people

0:09:53.841,0:09:57.555
to encrypt communications,[br]and not to put people in harm's way

0:09:57.555,0:10:01.420
by sending unsafe stuff over[br]unsafe communication lines.

0:10:01.420,0:10:04.937
So I think in my personal view it's better.

0:10:04.958,0:10:07.903
But the original problem wasn't actually[br]that the encryption was hard to use.

0:10:07.903,0:10:10.656
I think the main problem is people didn't[br]understand the reason

0:10:10.662,0:10:12.572
that it needed to be done

0:10:12.700,0:10:16.727
and they believed the lie that is[br]targetted versus mass surveillance.

0:10:16.859,0:10:20.027
And there's a big lie, and the lie is[br]that there is such a thing

0:10:20.027,0:10:22.236
as targeted surveillance.

0:10:22.363,0:10:24.924
In the modern era, most so-called[br]targetted surveillance actually happens

0:10:24.924,0:10:26.455
through mass surveillance.

0:10:26.455,0:10:28.418
They gather everything up, and then they[br]look through the thing

0:10:28.431,0:10:30.211
they've already seized.

0:10:30.211,0:10:32.945
And of course there are targetted,[br]focussed attacks.

0:10:33.073,0:10:36.358
But the main thing is that the abuse of[br]surveillance often happens

0:10:36.363,0:10:37.805
on an individual basis.

0:10:37.814,0:10:39.681
It also has a societal cost.

0:10:39.681,0:10:41.816
I think a lot of people really[br]understand that.

0:10:41.904,0:10:45.950
It's probably because I also live in[br]Germany now for the last two years

0:10:45.950,0:10:49.511
but I feel that German society in[br]particular is extremely aware

0:10:49.511,0:10:52.012
of these abuses in the modern world

0:10:52.019,0:10:55.299
and they have a historical context[br]that allows them to talk about it

0:10:55.318,0:10:58.279
with the rest of the world, where the[br]world doesn't downplay it.

0:10:58.279,0:10:59.948
So this is how other people relate to[br]Germany

0:10:59.961,0:11:02.681
not just about Germans relate to[br]each other.

0:11:02.853,0:11:06.390
And that has also been really good[br]for just meeting regular people

0:11:06.390,0:11:07.885
who really care about it,

0:11:07.898,0:11:09.122
and who really want to do things.

0:11:09.139,0:11:10.875
So people's parents email me,[br]and are like

0:11:10.880,0:11:12.477
"I want to protect my children,

0:11:12.477,0:11:14.939
what's the best way to use crypto[br]with them?"

0:11:14.939,0:11:16.505
You know, things like that.

0:11:16.505,0:11:19.450
And I didn't every receive emails like[br]that in the past

0:11:19.468,0:11:23.504
and that's to me is uplifting[br]and very positive.

0:11:25.041,0:11:27.748
[question]: A quick organisational question.

0:11:27.770,0:11:30.497
Right now we're live-streaming the Q&A.[br]Are you comfortable with that?

0:11:30.668,0:11:33.242
[Jacob]: I don't think in the last three[br]years I've ever had a moment

0:11:33.242,0:11:36.092
that wasn't being recorded.

0:11:36.538,0:11:39.324
[laughter, applause]

0:11:41.095,0:11:43.056
[question]: If you're fine with it, moving on...

0:11:43.726,0:11:47.512
[Jacob]: That's fine, just don't do it[br]when I'm trying to sleep.

0:11:48.148,0:11:51.460
[question]: I was wondering why Laura[br]and you ended up in Germany

0:11:51.460,0:11:54.861
because what you said about people in[br]Germany might be true

0:11:54.861,0:12:00.612
but I'm really ashamed about my Government[br]and how they dealt with ????

0:12:00.612,0:12:04.153
and they are doing nothing for this.

0:12:04.451,0:12:07.692
[Jacob]: The reason that we ended up in[br]Germany

0:12:07.697,0:12:10.850
is that I'd been attending[br]Chaos Computer Club events

0:12:10.868,0:12:12.728
for many years

0:12:12.730,0:12:15.241
and there are bunch of people that are[br]part of the Chaos Computer Club

0:12:15.251,0:12:17.122
who are really supportive,[br]and good people,

0:12:17.137,0:12:19.299
who have a stable base,[br]and an infrastructure.

0:12:19.427,0:12:24.638
The German hacker scene has this[br]phenomenon which is that

0:12:24.659,0:12:27.071
it's a part of society.

0:12:27.390,0:12:30.479
So there are people in the CCC who will[br]talk with the constitutional court

0:12:30.479,0:12:31.892
for example,

0:12:31.901,0:12:34.480
and that creates a much more stable[br]civil society

0:12:34.480,0:12:36.196
and those people were willing to help us.

0:12:36.205,0:12:38.627
They were willing to hold footage,[br]to hold encrypted data.

0:12:38.646,0:12:41.616
They were willing to help modify hardware.

0:12:41.622,0:12:44.855
There was a huge base of support where[br]people, even if they had fear,

0:12:44.855,0:12:47.070
they did stuff anyway.

0:12:47.121,0:12:49.894
And that support went back a long time.

0:12:49.907,0:12:52.965
And so we knew that it would be safe[br]to store footage for the film here.

0:12:52.971,0:12:56.234
In Berlin, not in Heidelberg, but here[br]in Germany.

0:12:56.234,0:13:00.520
And we knew that, of course,[br]there were people that would be helpful.

0:13:00.598,0:13:03.334
In the US there's a much bigger culture[br]of fear.

0:13:03.421,0:13:06.033
People are afraid of having their houses[br]raided by the police,

0:13:06.038,0:13:08.118
where there's lots of detainments at the[br]borders,

0:13:08.126,0:13:10.079
where there's lots of speculative arrests,

0:13:10.079,0:13:11.853
journalists that are jailed,

0:13:11.853,0:13:15.196
so the situation was not to say that[br]Germany was perfect.

0:13:15.327,0:13:18.994
I revealed in Der Speigel with three other[br]journalists that Merkel was spied on

0:13:19.019,0:13:20.363
by the NSA.

0:13:20.369,0:13:22.191
And it's clear that the Germany government[br]was complicit

0:13:22.191,0:13:23.848
with some of this surveillance.

0:13:23.848,0:13:27.011
But in a sort of pyramid of surveillance[br]there's a sort of colonialism

0:13:27.022,0:13:28.409
that takes place.

0:13:28.426,0:13:30.944
And that the NSA and GCHQ are at the top.

0:13:30.951,0:13:33.374
And the Germans are little bit below that.

0:13:33.378,0:13:37.225
The thing is that there's not a lot you[br]can do about that.

0:13:37.225,0:13:38.955
And so even though we revealed this[br]about Merkel,

0:13:38.972,0:13:40.680
it's not clear what she should do.

0:13:40.683,0:13:42.258
It's not clear what anyone should do.

0:13:42.258,0:13:45.406
But one thing that was clear was that[br]if they wanted to break into our houses

0:13:45.406,0:13:49.504
they would do it in a way that would[br]cost them a lot politically.

0:13:49.504,0:13:50.919
It would be very public.

0:13:51.048,0:13:53.138
The last time someone raided someone[br]working with Der Speigel

0:13:53.154,0:13:55.780
was in 1962 during the Speigel affair,

0:13:55.780,0:13:57.786
and some ministers were kicked out.

0:13:57.876,0:14:00.346
You may have seen recently the[br]Landersverrat thing

0:14:00.346,0:14:01.718
with Netzpolitik.

0:14:01.718,0:14:04.319
The charges against them now[br]have been dropped.

0:14:04.444,0:14:06.537
That would never happen in the[br]United States.

0:14:06.619,0:14:07.944
We would not be safe.

0:14:08.025,0:14:09.815
And I still, for my investigative[br]journalism,

0:14:09.861,0:14:11.436
and my work with Wikileaks,

0:14:11.486,0:14:12.718
and my work with the Tor project,

0:14:12.730,0:14:14.510
I wouldn't even go back to the US,

0:14:14.537,0:14:16.687
because there's no chance that if they[br]wanted to do something to me

0:14:16.717,0:14:20.828
that I would have any constitutional[br]liberties, I think,

0:14:20.846,0:14:22.621
and the same is true of Snowden.

0:14:22.643,0:14:24.457
You just won't get that fair trial.

0:14:24.472,0:14:27.998
And we thought at least here we would[br]have ground to stand and fight on.

0:14:28.016,0:14:30.427
And it's exactly what happened,[br]and we won.

0:14:33.651,0:14:35.885
[question]: This is also about the fear[br]stuff that you talk about

0:14:35.885,0:14:41.947
which is in the very old days we used to[br]put red words in the end of every message

0:14:41.974,0:14:45.913
to make sure that it would be hard to find[br]the actual subversive message

0:14:45.913,0:14:47.912
among all the noise.

0:14:47.912,0:14:49.544
And you can think about the same thing[br]here.

0:14:49.716,0:14:55.384
Should we build our systems so that[br]everything gets encrypted all the time?

0:14:56.430,0:14:59.029
[Jacob]: So I have a lot of radical[br]suggestions for what to do,

0:14:59.029,0:15:01.165
but I'm going to talk about them tomorrow[br]in the keynote mostly.

0:15:01.172,0:15:03.928
But to give you an example,[br]when you install Debian,

0:15:03.953,0:15:06.325
you can give someone the ability to log[br]into the machine

0:15:06.337,0:15:07.899
over a Tor hidden service for free.

0:15:07.917,0:15:12.250
You get a free .onion when you add two[br]lines to a Tor configuration file.

0:15:12.284,0:15:15.532
We should make encryption not only easy[br]to use but out of the box

0:15:15.532,0:15:19.504
we should have it possible to have[br]end-to-end reachability and connectivity,

0:15:19.527,0:15:23.899
and we should reduce the total amount[br]of metadata, to make it harder for people

0:15:23.916,0:15:26.374
who want to break the law, that want to[br]break into computers.

0:15:26.375,0:15:30.724
We should solve the problem of adversarial[br]versus non-adversarial forensics

0:15:30.731,0:15:36.315
so we can verify our systems with open[br]hardware and Free software together.

0:15:36.396,0:15:39.302
And there's a lot to be done,[br]but the main thing to do is to recognise

0:15:39.307,0:15:43.049
that if you have the ability to upload[br]to Debian,

0:15:43.393,0:15:46.167
there are literally intelligence agencies[br]that would like those keys.

0:15:46.186,0:15:49.362
And we have a great responsiblity to[br]humanity as Debian developers

0:15:49.362,0:15:51.572
to do the right thing: to build open[br]systems,

0:15:51.572,0:15:55.258
to build them in a way where users don't[br]need to understand this stuff.

0:15:55.427,0:15:58.071
There are a lot of people in the world[br]that will never see this film.

0:15:58.204,0:16:02.977
And we can solve the problems that this[br]film describes largely with Free software.

0:16:03.036,0:16:04.728
And we can do that without them knowing,

0:16:04.728,0:16:06.778
and they will be safe for us having[br]done that.

0:16:06.779,0:16:10.021
And if we can do that, the world will be[br]a better place, I think.

0:16:10.021,0:16:12.368
And I think the world is a better place[br]because of the efforts that were

0:16:12.452,0:16:15.485
already done in that area, that made this[br]possible.

0:16:15.485,0:16:17.647
The Tails project made it so that a bunch[br]of people

0:16:17.647,0:16:19.573
who were good at investigative journalism,

0:16:19.588,0:16:23.759
but absolutely terrible with computers,[br]were able to pull this off.

0:16:23.933,0:16:27.252
And that is entirely the product, in my[br]opinion, of Free software.

0:16:27.252,0:16:32.677
And a little bit of Laura and Glen, but[br]I'd say a lot of Free software.

0:16:34.302,0:16:36.205
[question]: How many people do you think[br]NSA has

0:16:36.205,0:16:38.995
working within the Debian community?

0:16:39.889,0:16:43.601
[laughter, applause]

0:16:45.309,0:16:49.302
[Jacob]: Well, I looked in the Snowden[br]archive about that actually.

0:16:52.813,0:16:55.527
[laughter, applause]

0:16:56.640,0:17:03.341
Yeah. And as far as I can tell Debian is[br]not a high priority target for them.

0:17:03.685,0:17:05.927
I mean they write exploits for all sort[br]of stuff

0:17:05.927,0:17:10.683
but I never found any systematic attempt[br]to compromise or harm the Debian project.

0:17:10.696,0:17:14.561
But obviously there are people who are[br]paid by the NSA to infiltrate communities,

0:17:14.561,0:17:16.993
and that's why we have to open transparent[br]processes

0:17:16.993,0:17:21.044
so that if those people behave badly,[br]we have an audit trail.

0:17:21.044,0:17:23.211
We won't ever stop that kind of stuff,

0:17:23.211,0:17:25.178
but what matters[br]is that people do good things.

0:17:25.178,0:17:28.587
It doesn't matter who they do bad things[br]for as long as we can correct those things

0:17:28.587,0:17:31.019
and/or catch them and stop them before[br]it happens.

0:17:31.019,0:17:33.111
But as far as I know there are only a[br]couple of people that have ever

0:17:33.111,0:17:36.176
been associated with the NSA in the[br]Debian community.

0:17:36.176,0:17:39.933
But I think we shouldn't get paranoid[br]about it,

0:17:39.933,0:17:41.600
but we should just be prudent about our[br]processes,

0:17:41.600,0:17:43.947
because there are lots of intelligence[br]services around the world

0:17:43.947,0:17:47.147
that do not like the values of a[br]universal operating system,

0:17:47.147,0:17:50.902
so I don't think it's super-important to[br]look, but I did actually look,

0:17:50.902,0:17:54.695
very specifically for a whole bunch of[br]people in the Debian community

0:17:54.695,0:17:58.027
to see if any of them also were being[br]paid by the NSA

0:17:58.027,0:18:01.613
and I didn't find any serious thing that[br]raised concern,

0:18:01.613,0:18:03.783
and if I did, I would have...

0:18:03.783,0:18:07.541
I mean, there were lots of things I found[br]in the archive that I immediately

0:18:07.541,0:18:09.333
notified security teams about.

0:18:09.333,0:18:14.112
Where I worked along with many other[br]people to actually fix those things.

0:18:14.112,0:18:18.546
And one of those things, if we had found[br]them, like infiltrators in Debian,

0:18:18.546,0:18:20.769
I absolutely would have just told people[br]about.

0:18:20.769,0:18:23.408
The problem is that a lot of the[br]journalists don't want to do that

0:18:23.408,0:18:26.263
because there's a ten year felony[br]where you go to prison -

0:18:26.263,0:18:28.185
a federal American prison, for[br]ten years -

0:18:28.322,0:18:30.202
if you reveal the name of an agent.

0:18:30.599,0:18:31.923
So there's a tension there,

0:18:31.923,0:18:34.440
but I think that there's something[br]to be said,

0:18:34.652,0:18:36.655
if they're actually actively harming the[br]community

0:18:36.655,0:18:37.851
and they're committing a crime,

0:18:37.851,0:18:39.470
I think there's something to be said[br]about that.

0:18:39.470,0:18:40.921
So if I found that I think it would be[br]worthwhile,

0:18:40.921,0:18:43.144
but just so you know, there's this[br]high cost.

0:18:43.144,0:18:45.362
So if there were people in the agency[br]now,

0:18:45.362,0:18:48.647
because they say that we used Tails, and[br]Debian, and they wanted to subvert it,

0:18:48.647,0:18:52.015
there's a really really high bar for[br]punishment.

0:18:52.015,0:18:55.132
Which suggests that maybe people[br]won't tell you.

0:18:55.132,0:18:59.055
So we need to sort of bank on the fact[br]that we'll never know,

0:18:59.055,0:19:02.766
but we don't need to know, as long as we[br]have good processes

0:19:02.766,0:19:04.390
that would catch bad behaviour.

0:19:04.390,0:19:06.181
And that's one of the strengths of Debian.

0:19:06.181,0:19:08.739
There are very few operating systems,[br]I think,

0:19:08.739,0:19:10.830
and just in general Free software[br]communities,

0:19:10.830,0:19:14.759
that are as diverse, and committed to the[br]openness and the Free software nature

0:19:14.759,0:19:17.742
of this kind of a project,

0:19:17.742,0:19:20.985
and so it's very important to state that.

0:19:21.922,0:19:24.824
But I do think one of the things that will[br]happen in the future at some point

0:19:24.824,0:19:28.067
is that you'll start to find people in the[br]Debian community that are pressured

0:19:28.067,0:19:29.645
by other people to do bad things

0:19:29.645,0:19:31.866
so we need to set up processes that will[br]stop that,

0:19:31.866,0:19:34.296
to create an incentive for that[br]not happening.

0:19:35.022,0:19:37.240
But it's really tough,

0:19:37.926,0:19:40.274
so I think that openness, transparency[br]and accountability are the ways that

0:19:40.274,0:19:43.772
we can combat that, because otherwise[br]we won't really be able to solve it.

0:19:44.881,0:19:47.182
But don't be paranoid, is the other thing.

0:19:47.309,0:19:49.699
They really are out to get you,[br]so be prepared.

0:19:50.430,0:19:56.487
[laughter, applause]

0:20:00.796,0:20:05.999
[question]: I'm just wondering how trust[br]was established

0:20:05.999,0:20:09.628
because I'm just realizing that[br]this community,

0:20:09.628,0:20:14.532
for you to verify your public key and even[br]fingerprint is like,

0:20:14.532,0:20:16.113
you have you produce your passport,

0:20:16.113,0:20:19.613
so I'm wondering how Laura managed to[br]exchange her keys with Snowden

0:20:19.613,0:20:23.071
and make sure that they were really[br]talking to the right person.

0:20:23.843,0:20:28.019
[Julian]: Well, they had a whole sort of[br]dance for doing key exchange.

0:20:28.019,0:20:32.749
I think it was a little bit luck, and a[br]little bit transitive trust,

0:20:32.749,0:20:35.101
there's a little bit of the web of trust,

0:20:35.101,0:20:36.457
and it worked pretty well.

0:20:36.719,0:20:41.332
I mean, I don't think that the key-signing[br]stuff that Debian does is anything close

0:20:41.332,0:20:42.907
to what they were doing.

0:20:42.907,0:20:45.939
They just wanted to make sure that the[br]keys they had were the right keys,

0:20:45.939,0:20:47.687
and that they weren't compromised,

0:20:47.687,0:20:50.075
and that then they would change things.

0:20:50.075,0:20:51.355
There was a point in the movie where they[br]said:

0:20:51.355,0:20:55.875
"let's disassociate our meta-data[br]one more time"

0:20:55.875,0:20:58.951
And what that means is they changed all[br]of the identifiers that are visible

0:20:58.951,0:21:04.158
to the network, new keys, new email[br]addresses, new Tor circuit, etc

0:21:04.158,0:21:07.611
and this is like a key consistency thing,

0:21:07.611,0:21:11.358
where they had the right key to begin with[br]and the continued to rotate over new keys.

0:21:11.358,0:21:13.411
This is also sometimes called TOFU.

0:21:13.411,0:21:15.848
This is, I think, weaker than the[br]web of trust,

0:21:15.848,0:21:19.345
but a lot easier for people to do, and[br]very easy to explain,

0:21:19.345,0:21:20.841
and it worked out pretty well.

0:21:20.841,0:21:25.190
It doesn't scale really well, but it has a[br]separate good side

0:21:25.190,0:21:28.985
which is the web of trust explicitly names[br]a web of co-conspirators.

0:21:28.985,0:21:31.377
And so you don't want that feature.

0:21:31.377,0:21:33.386
It's useful for something like Debian;

0:21:33.386,0:21:36.067
it's not useful for clandestine[br]conspiracies to commit

0:21:36.067,0:21:37.949
investigative journalism.

0:21:37.949,0:21:39.997
[laughter]

0:21:41.746,0:21:44.137
Lots of questions, this is great.

0:21:44.771,0:21:51.857
[question]: Somebody working on Tails told[br]me that the NSA has a file on every DD.

0:21:52.323,0:21:54.246
Is that true, do you know?

0:21:54.673,0:21:57.101
[Julian]: Okay, so when you balance your[br]check-book,

0:21:57.101,0:21:58.941
just to answer your question in a really[br]strange way,

0:21:58.941,0:22:00.945
when you balance your check-book,[br]or you balance your bank account,

0:22:00.945,0:22:03.630
and you think this is how much my rent is,[br]this is how much food is,

0:22:03.630,0:22:06.401
this is how much I have to spend on some[br]new hardware,

0:22:06.401,0:22:09.688
you think about money in an[br]individual way.

0:22:10.502,0:22:13.187
But if you think about is as a state, the[br]way a state thinks about money.

0:22:13.187,0:22:16.302
They don't balance budgets the same[br]way that you do.

0:22:16.302,0:22:18.225
They think about long-term investments[br]very differently.

0:22:18.225,0:22:19.759
They have other people's money.

0:22:19.759,0:22:21.719
It's a whole different way of managing it.

0:22:21.719,0:22:27.291
And the NSA is not the Stasi. So it's not[br]that you have to worry about

0:22:27.420,0:22:29.784
them having a file on you, or every Debian[br]developer,

0:22:30.197,0:22:32.626
but rather there exist some laws in the[br]United States that say

0:22:32.626,0:22:35.781
for cyber-security purposes, you don't[br]have constitutional rights

0:22:35.781,0:22:37.707
and based on your accent, you weren't[br]an American anyway,

0:22:37.707,0:22:39.753
and you aren't in America,

0:22:39.753,0:22:41.970
so you don't have any rights at all,[br]anyway, according to them.

0:22:41.970,0:22:44.186
They're just allowed to do whatever they[br]want to you,

0:22:44.186,0:22:46.280
up to and including murdering you, with[br]the CIA.

0:22:46.280,0:22:49.180
That's what they do with drones; that was[br]at the very end of the movie.

0:22:49.735,0:22:52.165
So it's not that they have a file on you.

0:22:52.339,0:22:56.179
It's that they have giant databases full[br]of information on all of us,

0:22:56.179,0:22:59.550
and then when they're interested in you,[br]pull up all your data,

0:22:59.550,0:23:01.299
and associative data,

0:23:01.299,0:23:03.348
and then they use that, and sometimes[br]they use it to target you,

0:23:03.348,0:23:06.246
to break into your machines,[br]or to find people to exert pressure on,

0:23:06.246,0:23:08.378
or to do psychological manipulation on.

0:23:08.378,0:23:10.892
All that stuff, they do all of those[br]things.

0:23:10.892,0:23:12.774
And so it's not that they have one file[br]on you.

0:23:12.774,0:23:16.101
Though maybe, it depends, if you work on[br]a critical package like the Linux kernel[br]

0:23:16.101,0:23:20.756
they might be more interested in you[br]than if you work on something else.

0:23:20.756,0:23:25.402
I don't want to denigrate anyone's work,[br]but they have very specific focuses,

0:23:25.402,0:23:29.065
and so they definitely are interested in[br]being able to compromise systems, right?

0:23:29.920,0:23:36.316
And so you may also have a file, but it's[br]really the meta list that's the new way

0:23:36.316,0:23:37.470
of thinking about it.

0:23:37.470,0:23:40.755
And in some senses I think that's actually[br]scarier, because they just hoover up

0:23:40.755,0:23:43.019
everything, all across the whole Internet,

0:23:43.019,0:23:46.134
and things that are interesting, then[br]they have them.

0:23:46.134,0:23:49.202
And depending on what interesting[br]things are there, they maybe

0:23:49.202,0:23:51.504
put those in a database that lasts[br]for ever,

0:23:51.504,0:23:53.469
or maybe it's just around for 30 days,

0:23:53.469,0:23:56.889
or maybe its full content for 9 days,[br]or something like that.

0:23:57.608,0:23:59.830
And then of course if you are a person of[br]interest

0:23:59.830,0:24:02.686
they do do the same stuff that the Stasi[br]does,

0:24:02.686,0:24:06.014
they do that Zersetzung stuff, if you're[br]familiar with this German term,

0:24:06.014,0:24:11.050
disintegration, they do that kind of[br]stuff, along with JTRIG, from GHCQ,

0:24:11.050,0:24:16.042
so they harass people, blackmail them,[br]do all sorts of really nasty stuff.

0:24:16.509,0:24:20.005
And they do that also, so both of those[br]things.

0:24:20.651,0:24:23.210
So again, I don't think you should be[br]paranoid, you should encrypt your stuff,

0:24:23.210,0:24:24.747
and help people do the same,

0:24:24.747,0:24:28.966
and know that in a democratic society with[br]a secret political police,

0:24:28.966,0:24:31.953
the right place to be is in their[br]database, right?

0:24:31.953,0:24:34.045
You should be proud of being surveilled[br]by them,

0:24:34.045,0:24:35.665
it means you're doing the right thing.

0:24:36.650,0:24:41.727
[laughter, applause]

0:24:43.174,0:24:44.883
Nonetheless, we should stop them.

0:24:48.895,0:24:53.843
[question]: I'm curious about your views[br]about Snowden actually coming out

0:24:53.843,0:24:55.634
and saying he was the whistleblower,

0:24:55.634,0:24:59.004
because I know, when he came out,[br]I had some fierce discussion

0:24:59.004,0:25:01.613
with friends about it, so I wanted to know[br]what you thought about it.

0:25:01.613,0:25:03.102
[Jacob]: What do you mean came out?

0:25:03.102,0:25:06.516
[question]: He said I'm Edward Snowden,[br]I'm the whistle-blower, here I am,

0:25:06.516,0:25:10.139
instead of just being anonymous the[br]whole way, just sending files to people.

0:25:11.248,0:25:13.680
[Jacob]: Well, I think the main thing is[br]that it's about control of

0:25:13.680,0:25:15.429
your own narrative, right?

0:25:15.429,0:25:19.654
I mean if we could have done everything[br]here anonymous, and gotten away with it,

0:25:19.654,0:25:20.980
would that have made the same impact

0:25:20.980,0:25:24.948
in getting other people to come forward[br]even if they maintain their anonymity?

0:25:24.948,0:25:27.802
So I think that what Snowden did, what's[br]beautiful about it,

0:25:27.832,0:25:30.506
is that he basically did enough,

0:25:31.243,0:25:32.951
where he could then survive.

0:25:33.118,0:25:36.236
Our job now for the most part, a very[br]good friend told me,

0:25:36.236,0:25:39.221
he's a little bit of a fatalist, he said:

0:25:39.221,0:25:43.232
your job, Laura's job, Glen's job,[br]Snowden's job, your job now is

0:25:43.232,0:25:44.897
just to survive.

0:25:44.897,0:25:47.371
That's all that you need to do now.[br]You don't need to do anything else.

0:25:47.371,0:25:51.804
You should go do other things, like[br]drink a glass of wine, relax, be happy,

0:25:51.804,0:25:54.751
have a nice life, but just survive,

0:25:54.929,0:25:58.732
so other people can see that you do the[br]right thing, and even though you could have

0:25:59.156,0:26:02.230
done more, you did enough,[br]and you lived through it.

0:26:02.230,0:26:06.198
And so Snowden coming out and telling us[br]all of these things, I mean,

0:26:06.198,0:26:09.862
there are really powerful people saying[br]he should be assassinated, right,

0:26:09.862,0:26:13.921
hung by the neck until dead, was what one[br]of the CIA people said.

0:26:13.921,0:26:17.244
So he probably could have continued to be[br]anonymous for a while,

0:26:17.244,0:26:20.449
but imagine if the NSA had got to reveal[br]his identity.

0:26:20.449,0:26:23.884
How would that have been framed, what[br]would the first impression have been?

0:26:23.884,0:26:27.719
I think they called him a narcissist, and[br]they called him all these terrible names.

0:26:27.719,0:26:32.974
And it didn't really stick, because he[br]basically said "come at me bro',

0:26:33.396,0:26:37.746
I'm ready, and you can do your worst,[br]but you can't get rid of the facts,

0:26:37.746,0:26:39.155
so let's talk about the facts."

0:26:39.155,0:26:42.403
And I think the timing of how he did that[br]is good, because people really cared

0:26:42.612,0:26:45.853
about the issues, but he also recognized[br]that it was a matter of time,

0:26:45.853,0:26:50.891
the NSA police went to his house, they[br]really bothered his family,

0:26:50.891,0:26:54.777
they've done that with my family as well,[br]other people's families have had trouble.

0:26:55.283,0:26:59.553
So I think think it's tough, because I[br]think he probably would have liked to have

0:26:59.553,0:27:03.198
been able to not have that happen, but [br]there comes a point at which

0:27:03.198,0:27:05.287
you're the person who has access to all [br]that information

0:27:05.287,0:27:06.865
and they're going to figure it out.

0:27:06.865,0:27:11.517
No amount of anonymity, I think, will[br]last forever, but it can buy you time.

0:27:11.517,0:27:14.508
He got exactly the amount of time[br]he needed.

0:27:15.062,0:27:17.663
The really sad part about him coming out[br]in public when he did, though, was that

0:27:17.663,0:27:21.247
he got stuck in Russia, because my[br]government cancelled his passport.

0:27:21.247,0:27:23.681
I think mostly for propaganda reasons.

0:27:23.681,0:27:28.329
Because in the United States, we denigrate[br]all things relating to Russia.

0:27:28.329,0:27:29.781
And there are lots of problems with[br]Russia,

0:27:29.781,0:27:32.256
and especially with Vladimir Putin,

0:27:32.256,0:27:36.695
but at the same time that seems to be the[br]only country that was willing to uphold

0:27:36.695,0:27:38.441
his fundamental liberties.

0:27:38.441,0:27:41.171
I went to the Council of Europe, and to[br]the European Parliament,

0:27:41.171,0:27:44.670
to the German Parliament, to the French,[br]sort of to the French Parliament,

0:27:44.670,0:27:48.297
they didn't really want to meet with me,[br]but also to the Austrian Parliament,

0:27:48.297,0:27:49.963
and to a number of other places,

0:27:49.963,0:27:53.380
and everyone said, oh, we would really[br]live to help anybody who needs help,

0:27:53.380,0:27:55.253
oh it's Edward Snowden, never mind.

0:27:55.975,0:27:57.813
[laughter]

0:27:57.941,0:28:02.527
And so though I have a lot of critiques[br]on Russia, the propaganda aspect of it

0:28:02.527,0:28:04.657
was very damaging for him to be stuck[br]in Russia,

0:28:04.657,0:28:08.242
but on the other hand, he's still alive,[br]and he's still mostly free.

0:28:08.242,0:28:12.300
And they recognized his right to[br]seek and to receive asylum.

0:28:12.857,0:28:15.331
So there's a lot of trade-offs to think[br]identifying one's self,

0:28:15.331,0:28:17.807
and if you were thinking about being[br]the next Snowden,

0:28:18.300,0:28:19.460
or helping Snowden,[br]or something like that,

0:28:20.384,0:28:22.647
you really have to think that, you really[br]have to think this out many steps ahead,

0:28:22.647,0:28:25.808
and it's easy to stay, oh he should have[br]just stayed anonymous and

0:28:25.808,0:28:27.556
nobody would have figured it out,

0:28:27.556,0:28:31.476
but that's very clearly not planning for[br]the case that they do figure it out,

0:28:31.476,0:28:33.272
and then they're going to be in control[br]of the narrative,

0:28:33.272,0:28:37.750
and in that case, I think you are better[br]off to do what he did,

0:28:37.853,0:28:40.156
and he did so quite reluctantly.

0:28:40.411,0:28:43.481
He's not an egoist, or an narcissist,[br]he's actually a really shy guy

0:28:43.481,0:28:44.762
from what I can tell.

0:28:44.762,0:28:48.644
I don't know exactly what conversation[br]you and your friend had,

0:28:48.644,0:28:52.826
but I would suspect that the notion is[br]that people are more powerful

0:28:52.826,0:28:53.875
when anonymous.

0:28:53.875,0:28:55.966
And that is true sometimes,[br]but not always,

0:28:55.966,0:28:58.484
and it's important to remember that[br]the anonymity technology is there

0:28:58.484,0:29:01.004
so you have a choice, not a requirement.

0:29:01.004,0:29:03.647
And that choice is sometimes[br]counter-intuitive,

0:29:03.647,0:29:06.380
but I think he did the right thing in[br]this way, and I wish that my government

0:29:06.380,0:29:09.022
had done the right thing by him as well,[br]but they did not.

0:29:09.022,0:29:12.123
[question]: So there are lot of questions,[br]do you want to keep going on,

0:29:12.132,0:29:13.489
shall we get in a little Mate?

0:29:14.556,0:29:17.747
[Jacob]: I would love some of that rum.

0:29:17.747,0:29:22.724
I think I have to GRsec, right?[br]GRsec kernel.

0:29:22.724,0:29:24.127
And then rum appears. Rum as a service.

0:29:26.385,0:29:29.909
[applause]

0:29:32.902,0:29:36.906
I'm really happy to keep taking questions,[br]because to me, what I want is

0:29:36.906,0:29:41.571
for every person in this room to feel[br]a part of this, because you really are.

0:29:41.571,0:29:44.845
A lot of the people I've met in this[br]community really inspire me to action,

0:29:44.845,0:29:48.850
and it's important to understand that[br]really, it would not have been possible

0:29:48.850,0:29:50.094
without Debian.

0:29:50.094,0:29:54.246
For example debootstrap - really important[br]tool, right?

0:29:54.246,0:29:58.570
With weasel's packaging of Tor, it allowed[br]us to have bootstraps of things,

0:29:58.570,0:29:59.937
it allowed us to build things,

0:29:59.937,0:30:02.494
and using Free software really was[br]helpful,

0:30:02.494,0:30:04.890
so if you guys have any questions at all,

0:30:04.890,0:30:08.392
really each and every person that helps[br]with Debian should just know

0:30:08.392,0:30:09.863
that you are a part of that,

0:30:09.863,0:30:12.362
and I'm just happy to talk for as long as[br]you want, basically,

0:30:12.362,0:30:14.163
to answer all of your questions,[br]

0:30:14.163,0:30:16.458
except the ones that put me in prison.[br]Thanks.

0:30:16.458,0:30:18.384
[laughter]

0:30:19.434,0:30:23.805
[question]: I just wanted to make a quick[br]note about the question

0:30:23.805,0:30:26.075
"do they have a file on me?"

0:30:26.075,0:30:30.168
From all I've read so far, it's just that[br]they're doing the thing

0:30:30.168,0:30:33.235
that is in the commercial world called[br]"big data".

0:30:34.011,0:30:36.338
[Jacob]: Yep. Absolutely.

0:30:36.338,0:30:38.813
Oh boy. GRsec again?

0:30:40.787,0:30:44.953
[orga]: it's not rum, but it's Bavarian[br]whisky.

0:30:45.580,0:30:50.052
[Jacob]: Oh boy. It's going to be a[br]heavy morning tomorrow.

0:30:50.929,0:30:54.078
I saw another couple of hands.

0:30:56.475,0:30:59.976
[question]: I was just wondering if[br]that you noticed throughout this

0:30:59.976,0:31:04.893
that you think we could improve in Debian[br]to make the next people's lives easier.

0:31:04.893,0:31:08.691
[Jacob]: Oh my god, I'm so glad you asked[br]that question, that's so fantastic.

0:31:08.691,0:31:10.391
I'm going to talk about that tomorrow[br]in my keynote,

0:31:10.391,0:31:12.342
but let me tell you about one that I have.

0:31:12.342,0:31:16.666
I revealed a specific document about a[br]wifi injection attack system.

0:31:16.666,0:31:19.466
It's a classified document, it's a[br]top secret document,

0:31:19.466,0:31:22.163
for a thing called nightstand, and what[br]nightstand is,

0:31:22.163,0:31:25.930
it's basically like car metasploit,[br]it's a wifi injector...

0:31:25.930,0:31:29.089
cheers!

0:31:35.352,0:31:37.405
Danke schön.

0:31:38.375,0:31:40.554
It's a wifi injector device...

0:31:41.158,0:31:42.847
Whew, jesus!

0:31:43.953,0:31:48.095
[laughter, applause]

0:31:52.749,0:31:56.570
[orga]: Tonight's whisky sponsored by[br]drunc-tank dot org.

0:31:59.914,0:32:03.815
[Jacob]: So this wifi injector device,[br]what it does is it basically is able to

0:32:03.815,0:32:09.039
exploit the kernel of a device by sending[br]malformed data over wifi.

0:32:09.039,0:32:14.983
Now I have a series of photographs, so[br]all of us.. not all of us, but most of us

0:32:14.983,0:32:19.580
used these speciallly modified X60s where[br]we removed the microphones, soldered??

0:32:19.580,0:32:22.080
down things on the PCI bus,

0:32:22.080,0:32:24.030
we removed, like, firewire, really[br]modified it, flashed coreboot onto it,

0:32:24.030,0:32:26.871
flipped the read pin so it was only[br]read-only,

0:32:26.871,0:32:30.155
so you couldn't easily make a BIOS[br]root kit and make it persistent,

0:32:30.155,0:32:32.449
we booted TAILS, did all this stuff,

0:32:32.449,0:32:35.974
often we could boot to RAM so that[br]once the machine was powered off

0:32:35.974,0:32:39.325
basically it would be done, so if someone[br]kicks down your door,

0:32:39.325,0:32:41.015
you just pull the power out,

0:32:41.015,0:32:43.148
and you don't have a battery, and[br]when the power fails you have an

0:32:43.148,0:32:45.248
instant kill switch.

0:32:45.248,0:32:48.373
So things that are in TAILS that are [br]really useful include this

0:32:48.373,0:32:52.812
wiping the kernel memory package[br]which I hear is being packaged for Debian

0:32:52.812,0:32:54.660
soon, which is very exciting.

0:32:54.660,0:32:57.043
Because everyone should have access[br]to that so we can tie it into something

0:32:57.043,0:33:01.209
like GNU panicd or these other things.

0:33:01.209,0:33:08.031
But one thing I kept having problems with[br]is this wifi injection device,

0:33:08.031,0:33:09.981
I'm pretty sure, was very close to my[br]house.

0:33:09.981,0:33:13.107
There was a white van outside, it was[br]vibrating a bit like there was a guy

0:33:13.107,0:33:14.831
walking around in it,

0:33:14.831,0:33:17.727
and then all of sudden, an X60 here,[br]an X60 here, and an X60 here,

0:33:17.727,0:33:22.097
just booted into TAILS, not doing[br]anything at all, but on the wifi network,

0:33:22.097,0:33:24.445
kernel panic, kernel panic, kernel panic.

0:33:24.445,0:33:27.674
All the same kernel panic, all the[br]same memory offsets,

0:33:27.674,0:33:32.420
in the Appletalk driver of the stock[br]kernel for TAILS.

0:33:32.420,0:33:36.577
I think I filed a bug upstream with TAILS[br]at the time,

0:33:36.577,0:33:40.018
but this is just incredible because[br]it's clear that all the crap

0:33:40.018,0:33:46.065
in the default Debian kernel that you[br]really want for your 1992 Apple network

0:33:46.065,0:33:48.413
makes operational security really hard,

0:33:48.413,0:33:51.632
and one thing that would be really great[br]would be a GRsec enabled kernel...

0:33:53.206,0:33:55.281
[applause]

0:33:55.281,0:33:57.506
Yes, have to drink.

0:34:01.351,0:34:06.702
But as an example, we built different[br]custom machines, and one of the things

0:34:06.702,0:34:09.953
that we did for some people and in some[br]circumstances was

0:34:09.953,0:34:12.371
to build GRsec enabled kernels.

0:34:12.371,0:34:14.755
And I'm not going to drink again.

0:34:19.044,0:34:20.892
So we built those kernels

0:34:21.222,0:34:23.448
[audience]: Which ones?

0:34:24.315,0:34:27.166
[Jacbob]: Yes, exactly, those ones.

0:34:27.166,0:34:30.886
And that was work which creates a problem[br]for a bunch of reasons.

0:34:30.886,0:34:33.544
When you build custom kernels, and[br]you only have a few people

0:34:33.544,0:34:35.244
that can build those kernels,

0:34:35.244,0:34:37.890
you actually build a chain of evidence of[br]who helped who.

0:34:37.890,0:34:39.891
And if that was stable, normal package,

0:34:39.891,0:34:42.590
that people could install in a Debian[br]pure blend,

0:34:42.590,0:34:44.713
then it would have been easier to do that.

0:34:44.713,0:34:48.660
We built a lot more sandbox profiles for[br]various different things,

0:34:48.660,0:34:51.284
we built some transparent TOR-ification[br]stuff,

0:34:51.284,0:34:53.953
and that required a lot of bespoke[br]knowledge,

0:34:53.953,0:34:57.305
and it required a lot of effort that a lot[br]of people did not have,

0:34:57.305,0:34:59.201
because they had a different set of[br]skills,

0:34:59.201,0:35:00.882
and it's good to have a division of[br]labour,

0:35:00.882,0:35:04.155
but having that kind of stuff built into[br]Debian by default, making a

0:35:04.155,0:35:06.130
Debian installer that could do that,

0:35:06.130,0:35:08.749
and also verification, would be great,[br]right?

0:35:08.749,0:35:12.147
So I wrote some custom scripts [br]where I could look at a TAILS disk,

0:35:12.147,0:35:14.041
or a Debian install,

0:35:14.041,0:35:15.993
and know if it had been tampered with.

0:35:15.993,0:35:19.939
And it would be nice if there was just[br]a disk you could boot that did

0:35:19.939,0:35:21.993
verification of an installed system

0:35:21.993,0:35:25.039
very very easily, so easily that[br]Glen Greenwald could use it.

0:35:25.039,0:35:29.784
I love Glen, I say that very politely,

0:35:30.047,0:35:33.002
but what I means is it needs to be[br]easier than that,

0:35:33.002,0:35:36.425
because Glen at least knows that he[br]he a reason to need it.

0:35:36.425,0:35:39.526
And so that was something that we really[br]needed help with.

0:35:39.526,0:35:41.615
And we spent a lot of time on that.

0:35:41.615,0:35:43.794
And there are lots of other little things[br]like that,

0:35:43.794,0:35:45.390
and I'll talk about some of those things[br]tomorrow,

0:35:45.390,0:35:47.398
but one of the really big problems is[br]hardware,

0:35:47.398,0:35:50.592
which is that you cannot buy a modern[br]Intel CPU which doesn't come

0:35:50.592,0:35:52.444
with a backdoor any more.

0:35:52.444,0:35:57.016
And that is a huge problem, and I'm not[br]sure that the answer is to use ARM.

0:35:57.016,0:35:59.035
It seems like the answer is to use ARM.

0:35:59.035,0:36:02.915
But that's only if assume that ARM didn't[br]just add a backdoor that's obvious.

0:36:02.915,0:36:07.580
So we really need to think about how to,[br]in moving forward,

0:36:07.580,0:36:12.485
how to have easy to use, easy to buy[br]on the shelf, Debian hardware,

0:36:12.485,0:36:14.976
available everywhere, all the time,

0:36:14.976,0:36:18.101
so you can just go and buy this thing and[br]verify it in some way

0:36:18.101,0:36:19.881
with some other machine,

0:36:19.881,0:36:21.705
to know that you would have the right[br]thing.

0:36:21.705,0:36:24.649
And to that extent we didn't have X-rays[br]for a lot of the circuit boards,

0:36:24.649,0:36:27.506
so that made it very difficult to know[br]if when you buy something,

0:36:27.506,0:36:29.725
it's been tampered with.

0:36:29.725,0:36:32.349
I'll talk about some of that stuff[br]tomorrow,

0:36:32.349,0:36:35.748
but basically, Debian does a lot of stuff[br]right,

0:36:35.748,0:36:39.114
and that is also worth mentioning.

0:36:39.114,0:36:44.112
There's so many things that just work[br]out of the box, that just work perfectly.

0:36:44.112,0:36:47.659
So the main thing is to keep the[br]quality assurance at the level,

0:36:47.659,0:36:49.644
or to exceed where it is right now.

0:36:49.644,0:36:51.960
Because it actually works super super[br]well.

0:36:51.960,0:36:55.735
The exception being for very specific[br]targetted attacks,

0:36:55.735,0:36:59.488
the kernel attack surface is pretty big,[br]and pretty bad, I think.

0:36:59.488,0:37:03.059
And also, we rebuilt some binaries in[br]order to..

0:37:03.059,0:37:04.452
sorry, I'll get to you in a second.

0:37:04.452,0:37:08.880
We rebuilt some binaries to make sure[br]that we had address space randomisation

0:37:08.880,0:37:11.581
and linker hardening, and stack[br]canary stuff,

0:37:11.581,0:37:15.597
and for some stuff lately we've been using[br]address sanitizer,

0:37:15.597,0:37:19.601
so it would be really great if all the[br]hardening stuff was turned in,

0:37:19.601,0:37:22.977
if there was PAX plus GRsec as a kernel.

0:37:23.801,0:37:26.520
[audience]: so the specific problem with[br]GR security is that they don't really

0:37:26.520,0:37:29.580
want to work with distros.

0:37:29.580,0:37:35.280
So we could have a Linux kernel package[br]with GR security applied,

0:37:35.280,0:37:38.401
but it wouldn't have any of the other[br]Debian patches.

0:37:39.121,0:37:41.400
[Jacob]: So I talked with Brad Spender[br]about this,

0:37:41.400,0:37:42.942
and I'm so glad that you said that,

0:37:42.942,0:37:47.180
because what he said was that, as far[br]as I can tell, he's totally interested in

0:37:47.180,0:37:49.700
helping Debian with this but thinks that[br]Debian is not interested.

0:37:49.700,0:37:53.060
He actually runs a kernel building[br]service where they do

0:37:53.060,0:37:55.280
individual kernel builds, and I think[br]you'd be interested,

0:37:55.292,0:37:57.080
and when I told him we'd love to have[br]this in TAILS, he said

0:37:57.340,0:38:01.420
what patches do I need to include in GRsec[br]to make sure that it'll work?

0:38:01.420,0:38:04.500
And he offered to do the integration[br]into the GRsec patch if there are not

0:38:04.500,0:38:05.760
too many things.

0:38:05.760,0:38:07.903
So I think what we should try and do[br]is build a line of communication,

0:38:07.903,0:38:10.000
and if it costs money we should find a way[br]to raise that money,

0:38:10.000,0:38:11.800
I'll put in some of my own personal money[br]for this,

0:38:11.800,0:38:13.720
and I know other people would too.

0:38:13.720,0:38:14.421
[distant audience]: I will.

0:38:14.421,0:38:16.160
[Jacob]: Great.

0:38:16.160,0:38:18.920
So securedrop, for example, part of what[br]they do for their leaking platform,

0:38:18.920,0:38:22.300
if you go to the intercepts website,[br]you wan to leak them a document,

0:38:22.300,0:38:26.201
they actually use free software[br]everywhere, but there are a few things[br]

0:38:26.201,0:38:29.341
they build specially, and one of those[br]things is a GRsec kernel.

0:38:29.341,0:38:31.760
So the people at first look, that helped[br]make this movie,

0:38:31.760,0:38:33.520
and that work on securedrop,

0:38:33.520,0:38:34.903
they would probably also,

0:38:34.903,0:38:37.242
I'm not committing them, I don't[br]know that they would actually do this,

0:38:37.242,0:38:39.280
but I think they would really like it if[br]that was in there,

0:38:39.280,0:38:41.901
and I think it we could find the community[br]will to do that,

0:38:41.901,0:38:44.081
I know I would volunteer and other people[br]would,

0:38:44.081,0:38:47.160
I know that dkg in the back would love to[br]help with this, I would that ???

0:38:47.160,0:38:50.480
who is just totally behind funding this[br]work, right?

0:38:53.700,0:38:56.401
I thought that you were there to protect[br]my civil liberties, buddy.

0:39:00.080,0:39:03.460
But I really think that it's possible[br]that we could do this,

0:39:03.460,0:39:07.380
and I definitely think Brad, the author of[br]GRsec,

0:39:07.380,0:39:09.920
I think he would really love it if Debian[br]shipped GRsec.

0:39:09.920,0:39:11.920
And it doesn't need to come by default,

0:39:11.920,0:39:16.781
but if it was possible to just have[br]it all, that would be great.

0:39:17.220,0:39:20.400
Maybe we could have an affinity group[br]where everyone who is interested can

0:39:20.400,0:39:23.100
meet sometime tomorrow and we could[br]talk about doing this.

0:39:23.100,0:39:25.421
I would love to have that conversation.

0:39:25.421,0:39:27.080
Who are you?

0:39:28.030,0:39:29.110
[audience]: Ben Hutchings.

0:39:29.720,0:39:34.270
[Jacob]: Oh, nice to meet you!

0:39:35.041,0:39:38.580
[laughter, applause]

0:39:42.880,0:39:44.740
That's awkward.

0:39:46.820,0:39:50.840
[question]: Hi. Sorry to interrupt the[br]awkwardness,

0:39:50.840,0:39:52.562
and replace it with more awkwardness.

0:39:52.562,0:39:54.060
Nice to see you, Jake.

0:39:54.060,0:39:58.282
So, I remember reading the documents[br]in 2013

0:39:58.282,0:40:04.220
and seeing the NSA's internal training[br]guide for how to query their

0:40:04.220,0:40:07.501
Hadoop data store, aka xkeyscore,

0:40:07.501,0:40:14.961
and so I thought I would just ask you[br]if you think Free software net helps us

0:40:14.961,0:40:16.641
or helps them.

0:40:17.361,0:40:19.161
[Jacob]: I'm really glad you asked that[br]question.

0:40:19.161,0:40:23.001
I think that Free software helps everyone[br]on the planet, and I think that

0:40:23.001,0:40:26.983
purpose-based limitations.. I understand[br]why people want them.

0:40:27.640,0:40:30.682
I think we should try to build a world[br]where we are free,

0:40:30.682,0:40:34.360
and so putting in purpose-based[br]limitations is really problematic,

0:40:34.641,0:40:37.681
and I think what we should do is try to[br]mitigate the harm that they can do

0:40:37.681,0:40:39.340
with those systems,

0:40:39.340,0:40:41.820
as opposed to pretending that they care[br]about Free software licensing.

0:40:42.280,0:40:45.100
These guys kill people with flying robots,

0:40:45.100,0:40:48.664
it's illegal to murder people, and they[br]do it.

0:40:49.421,0:40:52.700
Limiting their use with licenses, first[br]of all, that just means they'll spend

0:40:52.700,0:40:55.361
your tax money to rewrite it if they care[br]about the license,

0:40:56.241,0:40:59.680
and you won't get their bug-fixes or their[br]improvements,

0:40:59.680,0:41:02.160
and then additionally they're still not[br]going to obey your license anyway,

0:41:02.160,0:41:05.140
because literally some of these people[br]work on assassinating people.

0:41:05.140,0:41:08.481
So it is better that we keep our integrity[br]and take the high road,

0:41:08.481,0:41:11.980
and write Free software, and we give it to[br]every single person on the planet

0:41:11.980,0:41:13.620
without exception,

0:41:14.600,0:41:16.460
It's just better. It's better for all of[br]us, right?

0:41:16.460,0:41:22.080
So the fact that they have Hadoop, the[br]fact that they, for example, use OpenSSL,

0:41:22.080,0:41:24.860
or maybe they use Tor, or whatever, right?

0:41:24.860,0:41:26.920
Or they use gdb to debug their exploits.

0:41:30.220,0:41:32.260
I kind of wish that on them.

0:41:33.721,0:41:36.622
[laughter, applause]

0:41:37.643,0:41:39.100
I think it's great, right?

0:41:39.100,0:41:42.341
So one of the things Che Guevara said[br]in his manual about guerilla warfare,

0:41:42.341,0:41:44.820
in chapter two, is that (oh, it was[br]chapter three)

0:41:44.820,0:41:48.000
He talks about when you have to arm[br]a guerrilla army,

0:41:48.000,0:41:52.141
this is not exactly related, but it's an[br]analog.

0:41:52.141,0:41:54.780
He says that the most important thing[br]is for the guerrilla army to

0:41:54.780,0:41:58.340
use the weapons of the people that[br]they're fighting - the oppressor.

0:41:58.340,0:42:01.740
And the reason is that it allows you to[br]resupply, essentially.

0:42:01.740,0:42:04.580
When you win a battle, you resupply.

0:42:05.141,0:42:07.860
When we all use the same Free software,[br]and we're working on these things,

0:42:07.860,0:42:10.883
the fact that they have to contribute[br]to the same projects and they often do

0:42:10.883,0:42:13.121
means there's a net win for us.

0:42:13.121,0:42:16.420
They do have some private things that they[br]don't share, obviously,

0:42:16.420,0:42:19.380
with the exception of nice people like[br]Edward Snowden,

0:42:19.380,0:42:22.062
and I think that it is a net positive[br]thing,

0:42:22.062,0:42:24.200
and if we think of it as a struggle,

0:42:24.200,0:42:26.280
we are better off to take the high road,

0:42:26.280,0:42:29.420
and so I really think we should not[br]pretend that we can stop them,

0:42:29.420,0:42:32.000
and instead we should work together[br]to build solutions.

0:42:32.000,0:42:33.641
And I think that Debian is doing that,[br]right?

0:42:33.641,0:42:35.960
I think Debian is much harder to[br]compromise than

0:42:35.960,0:42:37.680
a lot of other operating systems,

0:42:37.680,0:42:39.882
and it's much much harder to coerce[br]people,

0:42:39.882,0:42:42.720
and there's a strong ethos that comes[br]with it that it's not just the technical

0:42:42.720,0:42:45.300
project, there's a social aspect to it.

0:42:45.300,0:42:48.506
I think I was in the New Maintainer[br]queue for 11 years,

0:42:48.506,0:42:50.301
maybe that's a little too long,

0:42:50.301,0:42:52.400
but there's a huge hazing process,

0:42:52.400,0:42:55.640
so anyone who wants to help, really really[br]wants to help,

0:42:55.640,0:42:58.660
and if they want to do something wrong[br]there are processes to catch

0:42:58.660,0:43:00.602
people doing things wrong.

0:43:00.602,0:43:03.000
So we should really stay true to the[br]Free software ethos,

0:43:03.000,0:43:05.060
and it really is a net benefit.

0:43:08.362,0:43:12.120
[question]: Hi Jake. Thanks a lot for[br]saying so much "GRsec".

0:43:17.020,0:43:19.740
Just wanted to give a shout out.

0:43:19.740,0:43:24.681
You mentioned possible backdoors in[br]CPUs and so on,

0:43:24.681,0:43:30.340
that ARM might not be the next best thing[br]because it's not so open either.

0:43:30.340,0:43:32.961
You might want to have a look at Power 8.

0:43:32.961,0:43:38.541
It's basically PowerPC 64, so Debian has[br]support for it as far as I know,

0:43:38.541,0:43:41.300
and most of the stuff is actually open.

0:43:41.300,0:43:45.300
Not that actual designs that IBM is[br]using,

0:43:45.300,0:43:49.101
but you can have, actually, an FPGA[br]implementation of it,

0:43:49.101,0:43:55.240
and if you have the money make your own[br]ASICs for it, without even knowing

0:43:55.240,0:43:59.080
how to do it, which is pretty good,[br]I think.

0:43:59.861,0:44:02.860
[Jacob]: I think there are lots of things[br]we can hack right?

0:44:02.860,0:44:06.100
I mean I had one of those weird RMS[br]laptops, the Limote,

0:44:06.100,0:44:07.940
or whatever it's called, for a while.

0:44:07.940,0:44:10.540
And I was definitely able to get some[br]Free software running on it,

0:44:10.540,0:44:12.621
in theory it was a Free software laptop.

0:44:12.621,0:44:16.160
But getting other people to use this is[br]the problem,

0:44:16.160,0:44:18.382
you need to get everybody to use it,[br]right?

0:44:18.382,0:44:20.680
There's a sort of old anarchist cliché,

0:44:20.680,0:44:22.721
"None of us are free until all of us are[br]free"

0:44:22.721,0:44:25.201
And that really applies here.

0:44:25.201,0:44:28.024
We really need to have Free software[br]that's usable by everyone,

0:44:28.024,0:44:31.320
otherwise we're sort of bound by the[br]lowest common denominator

0:44:31.320,0:44:36.440
of Free, or proprietary tools, depending[br]on what people have to use.

0:44:36.440,0:44:38.380
So it'll be great when we have that,

0:44:38.380,0:44:40.142
and there's a thing called the Nokimist???

0:44:40.142,0:44:44.201
which is a video mixing board that has an[br]FPGA implementing a Free software CPU

0:44:44.201,0:44:46.321
that you can boot Debian on, or OpenWRT,

0:44:46.321,0:44:48.401
and it does work, and I have used it,

0:44:48.401,0:44:50.580
and in fact I used to use it as a shell,

0:44:50.580,0:44:54.120
and for a long time I used a Debian[br]trick,

0:44:54.120,0:44:56.301
actually I've never talked about that in[br]public,

0:44:56.301,0:44:57.720
let me think about that for a second.

0:44:58.880,0:45:02.280
So I used to use an IRC client that was[br]really buggy,

0:45:02.280,0:45:05.460
and I couldn't figure out where all the[br]bugs were,

0:45:05.460,0:45:08.280
but I knew that if I hung out in certain[br]networks that someone else

0:45:08.280,0:45:11.820
would help me find those bugs by trying[br]to exploit my client.

0:45:11.820,0:45:13.740
And I wanted to make it as hard as[br]possible.

0:45:13.740,0:45:18.960
So I ran my IRC client inside of a Debian[br]machine that was running an S390 emulator.

0:45:18.960,0:45:24.981
Who here uses Hercules? Thank you to[br]whoever packaged it.

0:45:24.981,0:45:28.042
And so I would use Hercules, it was a[br]very long install process.

0:45:28.042,0:45:30.022
Very slow.

0:45:30.022,0:45:34.382
And I would do this, and what I'd always[br]dreamed of doing at some point

0:45:34.382,0:45:37.200
was using the Nokimist??? and the[br]Hercules together

0:45:37.200,0:45:40.580
for maximum ridiculously difficult[br]to exploit,

0:45:40.580,0:45:42.220
plus GRsec kernel.

0:45:45.140,0:45:47.663
But that's not a usable thing.

0:45:47.663,0:45:49.901
So what we need to do is take these kinds[br]of prototypes

0:45:49.901,0:45:52.601
which actually do represent many steps[br]forward,

0:45:52.601,0:45:55.900
and we need to make sure that they're[br]produced on a scale where

0:45:55.900,0:45:59.980
you can go into a store and puchase them[br]anonymously, with cash,

0:45:59.980,0:46:02.261
in a way that you can then verify.

0:46:02.261,0:46:06.260
And we're actually really close to that[br]with software defined radios

0:46:06.260,0:46:07.720
and open hardware,

0:46:07.720,0:46:10.240
but we're not quite there yet.

0:46:11.820,0:46:15.900
[question]: What I meant is that Power 8[br]is basically getting big, currently,

0:46:15.900,0:46:17.880
on the server market,

0:46:17.880,0:46:20.943
and it might get big for other stuff also.

0:46:21.780,0:46:23.401
[Jacob]: Hopefully.

0:46:26.160,0:46:29.240
[question]: I want to come back to the[br]story about the panic

0:46:29.240,0:46:31.841
in the Appletalk driver.

0:46:31.841,0:46:36.940
The common approach against this is[br]to compile your own kernel with

0:46:36.940,0:46:39.720
all this stuff not compiled in,

0:46:39.720,0:46:44.500
but on two of my systems I have a[br]modprobe wrapper which has

0:46:44.500,0:46:47.320
a whitelist of modules which may be[br]loaded,

0:46:47.320,0:46:52.111
and I install that wrapper as the thing[br]that the kernel uses for loading modules.

0:46:52.361,0:46:58.041
Do you know if such a thing exists[br]elsewhere, or if not,

0:46:58.041,0:47:03.141
I would be interested in developing it[br]into something which is actually useable

0:47:03.141,0:47:04.781
for people.

0:47:05.680,0:47:07.740
[Jacob]: That would be great.

0:47:07.740,0:47:11.600
In this case we were using Tails.

0:47:11.600,0:47:19.150
And so, Tails is very finicky about what[br]it will accept, and very reasonably so,

0:47:19.150,0:47:23.360
and so having that in Debian will make it[br]a lot easier to get it into something

0:47:23.360,0:47:25.335
like Tails, I think.

0:47:25.335,0:47:28.520
But the main thing is really that we have[br]to think about the attack surface

0:47:28.520,0:47:30.301
of the kernel very differently.

0:47:30.301,0:47:33.300
The problem is not Appletalk; the problem[br]is the Linux kernel is filled with

0:47:33.300,0:47:34.921
a lot of code,

0:47:34.921,0:47:38.520
and you can autoload, in certain cases,[br]certain things come in,

0:47:38.520,0:47:40.500
and certain things get autoloaded,

0:47:40.500,0:47:43.381
and I know Bdale loves his[br]ham radio stuff,

0:47:43.381,0:47:45.722
but I never use ham radio on my machine

0:47:45.722,0:47:49.000
I used for clandestine conspiracies,[br]you know?

0:47:49.000,0:47:50.640
That's a separate machine.

0:47:50.640,0:47:52.120
It's over here.

0:47:52.120,0:47:53.860
So we just need to find a way to think[br]about that.

0:47:53.860,0:47:56.840
And part of that could be kernel stuff,[br]but also part of it could be thinking

0:47:56.840,0:47:59.741
about solutions like that, where we[br]don't need to change the kernel.

0:47:59.741,0:48:02.100
So if you could package that and develop[br]that, it would be really fantastic.

0:48:04.022,0:48:09.481
[Ben]: Actually, some time ago, after[br]I think it was the econet exploits,

0:48:09.481,0:48:13.280
no-one uses econet, it was broken anyway,[br]but you could exploit it,

0:48:13.280,0:48:15.240
because it was autoloaded.

0:48:15.240,0:48:22.920
So I actually went through and turned off[br]autoloading on a few of the more obscure

0:48:22.920,0:48:24.740
network protocols.

0:48:24.740,0:48:29.021
We could probably go further with that,[br]even in the defaults.

0:48:29.021,0:48:31.860
[Jacob]: I think it would be great to[br]change some of the kernel stuff so that

0:48:31.860,0:48:36.040
at least, I mean, Tails is a special use[br]case, where, I think, it's very important,

0:48:36.040,0:48:37.941
and it doesn't work for everyone,

0:48:37.941,0:48:41.320
but we should just consider that there are[br]certainly things which are really great,

0:48:41.320,0:48:44.400
and I want to use Debian for it, because[br]Debian is a universal operating system.

0:48:44.400,0:48:48.160
But for a modern desktop system where[br]you're using GNOME,

0:48:48.160,0:48:53.700
and you haven't set anything up,[br]Appletalk for example,

0:48:53.700,0:48:57.781
maybe we would ask those people[br]to load that module themselves.

0:48:59.541,0:49:04.900
[Ben]: Yeah, for example you could[br]have, a lot of those things are going to

0:49:04.900,0:49:06.981
have supporting utilities,

0:49:06.981,0:49:10.021
so you could put something in the[br]supporting utilities that loads it

0:49:10.021,0:49:11.380
at boot time.

0:49:12.100,0:49:14.160
And if you don't have those installed,[br]you don't need it.

0:49:15.060,0:49:17.421
[Jacob]: Yep, totally. And I think there's[br]lots of ways to do it where

0:49:17.421,0:49:20.060
the network can't trigger it,[br]and that's important.

0:49:20.800,0:49:23.802
[Ben]: Yeah, that puzzled me,[br]I can't understand,

0:49:23.802,0:49:29.360
the protocol module should get loaded[br]when userland tries to open a socket

0:49:29.360,0:49:32.220
of that type,

0:49:32.220,0:49:35.481
it shouldn't happen in response to[br]network traffic.

0:49:36.960,0:49:44.981
There are things like, I think if you[br]run ifconfig that can autoload

0:49:44.981,0:49:47.000
a bunch of things, for example.

0:49:47.720,0:49:49.801
[Jacob]: Yeah, I think on either side[br]it should be more explicit,

0:49:49.801,0:49:52.940
and in this case with Tails,

0:49:52.940,0:49:55.220
there was a time when you looked at[br]the kernel module list

0:49:55.220,0:49:57.080
and it was pretty amazing,

0:49:57.080,0:50:00.801
like I think there was an X25 thing,[br]an Appletalk thing,

0:50:00.801,0:50:03.781
wait, this is all about going over Tor,[br]we don't support any of these

0:50:03.781,0:50:05.340
things at all.

0:50:05.340,0:50:09.540
So it's just the way that things are [br]interdependent, right?

0:50:09.540,0:50:11.440
It's not a dig at the kernel itself.

0:50:11.440,0:50:13.981
I think the Linux kernel as it works[br]in Debian today works really well

0:50:13.981,0:50:15.440
for a lot of people,

0:50:15.440,0:50:17.960
but there is definitely a high security[br]use case,

0:50:17.960,0:50:20.780
and I, for example, if I were a Debian[br]developer, and I had a development

0:50:20.780,0:50:22.780
machine where I didn't run a web[br]browser,

0:50:22.780,0:50:24.940
and I took a lot of effort.

0:50:24.940,0:50:29.401
It would be really nice if there were[br]a kernel that put in the same

0:50:29.401,0:50:32.420
threshold of security.

0:50:32.420,0:50:35.840
And I think that the GRsec kernel with[br]some stuff changed about it,

0:50:35.840,0:50:37.840
like getting rid of Appletalk and a few[br]other things,

0:50:37.840,0:50:39.500
would be closer to that,

0:50:39.500,0:50:41.581
and combined with that guy's tool that[br]he's talking about,

0:50:41.581,0:50:46.760
you could make autoloadable module,[br]that at least even if the system was

0:50:46.760,0:50:49.500
going to autoload it, you could stop it,[br]in a failing closed sort of way.

0:50:49.500,0:50:53.200
And I think there's a lot of stuff,[br]practically, to do on that front,

0:50:53.200,0:50:56.160
and there's another project called[br]Subgraph OS,

0:50:56.160,0:51:02.161
which is basically working on becoming[br]in some ways a Debian derivative,

0:51:02.161,0:51:04.540
and they're going to do stuff like GRsec[br]kernel,

0:51:04.540,0:51:08.142
and they have a whole sandboxing framework[br]which uses apparmor, seccomp

0:51:08.142,0:51:10.540
and xpra, and a few other things,

0:51:10.540,0:51:13.903
and I think that they'll make a lot of[br]interesting security decisions,

0:51:13.903,0:51:16.961
which might make sense to adopt in [br]Debian later.

0:51:17.860,0:51:20.441
[Ben]: I think Matthew Garrett has an[br]interesting criticism about that and

0:51:20.441,0:51:24.020
how it wouldn't really work, and Wayland[br]was a better way to go than xpra.

0:51:25.240,0:51:26.741
[Jacob]: Yeah, I've heard those[br]criticisms,

0:51:26.741,0:51:28.622
but Matthew Garrett is wrong.

0:51:29.600,0:51:32.540
Not usually, but in this particular case.

0:51:32.540,0:51:37.200
For example, the sandboxing stuff,[br]if you have a GNOME appstore,

0:51:37.200,0:51:41.761
essentially, that's for one set of users,[br]but for a Debian developer

0:51:41.761,0:51:44.282
writing your own policies,[br]it might be useful,

0:51:44.282,0:51:46.960
and if you need Wayland, you might[br]not have a full solution,

0:51:46.960,0:51:49.220
we might want to have both for a while.

0:51:49.220,0:51:51.060
And think it'd be great.

0:51:51.060,0:51:54.140
And the main thing is we just need to[br]find people who will think about those

0:51:54.140,0:51:55.823
issues and try to integrate them,

0:51:55.823,0:52:00.481
because most people who write exploits,[br]or who understand how to do offensive

0:52:00.481,0:52:03.360
security stuff, they don't want to help[br]Free software projects,

0:52:04.200,0:52:05.761
they just want to exploit them.

0:52:05.761,0:52:08.460
And so some of the Subgraph guys,[br]what I really like about them

0:52:08.460,0:52:11.461
is that they're trying to improve the[br]Free software products we all use.

0:52:11.461,0:52:13.480
Even though they may make different[br]design decisions,

0:52:13.480,0:52:15.200
they're making Free software all the same.

0:52:18.680,0:52:24.400
[question]: Maybe also, some other thing[br]to keep in mind is actually

0:52:24.400,0:52:39.040
that there is also a social aspect of this[br]pressure if NSA wants to put anything

0:52:39.040,0:52:41.440
inside Debian.

0:52:41.440,0:52:48.021
So if we actually also need to make sure[br]that if they put pressure on somebody

0:52:48.021,0:52:56.601
we have any way to help these people[br]not land in prison.

0:52:56.601,0:53:04.080
So is there also a social aspect of [br]supporting people which get pressure

0:53:04.080,0:53:05.980
from anyone.

0:53:06.840,0:53:09.722
[Jacob]: Yep. I mean, if anyone is ever[br]in that situation one thing I would say

0:53:09.722,0:53:12.641
is that it's your right to remain silent,

0:53:12.641,0:53:15.721
you have the right to remain silent[br]I think is the phrase the police would say

0:53:15.721,0:53:19.300
but there are definitely communities[br]of people who will help you.

0:53:19.300,0:53:21.700
There's a group called the Courage[br]foundation, for example,

0:53:21.700,0:53:23.563
which was started by Sarah Harrison,

0:53:23.563,0:53:26.280
and the job that the Courage foundation[br]has taken on

0:53:26.280,0:53:30.060
is essentially to help people who would be[br]sources or who are in harm's way like this

0:53:30.060,0:53:32.642
and if you found yourself in that kind of[br]a position there are people

0:53:32.642,0:53:34.520
who will try to help you.

0:53:34.520,0:53:36.800
I really don't think that is the next step[br]in this,

0:53:36.800,0:53:38.383
I think that could happen.

0:53:38.383,0:53:42.000
But I thin it's much more likely someone[br]is going to write an exploit for Firefox.

0:53:42.000,0:53:44.581
That's the way they're going to own[br]Debian people in the future,

0:53:44.581,0:53:47.041
for the most part, that's how they own[br]us today.

0:53:47.041,0:53:51.700
Firefox, number one enemy to security[br]on your Debian machine, probably.

0:53:51.700,0:53:54.680
And that's not a dig at Firefox, it's just[br]super-complicated software,

0:53:54.680,0:53:56.520
and these guys are really good at[br]writing exploits,

0:53:56.520,0:53:58.582
and that's an easy target.

0:53:58.582,0:54:00.960
So we, I think, have to do with the social[br]thing,

0:54:00.960,0:54:03.580
but we also should look at some of the[br]technical problems,

0:54:03.580,0:54:06.820
and then when and if people have that,[br]you can contact me.

0:54:06.820,0:54:10.022
I'm super happy to put you in touch with[br]people who will help.

0:54:10.022,0:54:13.860
And obviously, get a lawyer, get several[br]lawyers if you can.

0:54:13.860,0:54:17.440
Contact the EFF, or the ACLU, depending[br]on where you are.

0:54:17.440,0:54:22.561
At least in Germany, and in the United[br]States, it isn't so bad yet

0:54:22.561,0:54:25.903
that they can put that kind of pressure [br]on you openly,

0:54:25.903,0:54:27.760
in a Free software project.

0:54:27.760,0:54:31.120
If you write proprietary software you're[br]in a very different situations,

0:54:31.120,0:54:34.180
and there are definitely people who are in[br]that situation right now,

0:54:34.180,0:54:38.223
and I don't envy them. Their position is[br]actually much harder.

0:54:38.223,0:54:42.200
So actually writing Free software already[br]makes you not at the very beginning

0:54:42.200,0:54:43.761
of the target list, I think.

0:54:46.860,0:54:53.140
Any other questions? Wow. Where's the rum?

0:55:01.323,0:55:06.080
[question]: How do you deliver the[br]encrypted message without exposing

0:55:06.080,0:55:07.780
the connection to a third party?

0:55:14.321,0:55:15.960
[Jacob]: Which encrypted message do you[br]mean?

0:55:16.960,0:55:19.102
Do you mean, like jabber?

0:55:19.800,0:55:21.262
[question]: Email, or jabber, yes.

0:55:22.040,0:55:25.640
[Jacob]: For the most part we use systems[br]where Tor hidden services are available

0:55:25.640,0:55:29.060
to connect to them, so we never even left[br]the Tor anonymity network,

0:55:29.060,0:55:31.521
so they're end-to-end encrypted and[br]anonymized, you connect to a

0:55:31.521,0:55:33.541
.onion address,

0:55:33.541,0:55:37.560
and then using crypto on top of that, so[br]TLS to a Jabber server,

0:55:37.560,0:55:39.880
and then OTR on top of that,

0:55:39.880,0:55:44.944
so you have, you could call it a[br]composition of cryptographic systems,

0:55:44.944,0:55:50.060
and the core of that is Tor, along with[br]using throwaway machines,

0:55:50.060,0:55:52.620
going to locations where you never go[br]twice,

0:55:52.620,0:55:57.160
using open wifi plus Tor plus TLS plus[br]OTR,

0:55:57.160,0:56:01.821
and for email, Riseup offers Tor hidden[br]services, which allows you to do the same

0:56:01.821,0:56:05.040
thing, essentially, and then using PGP as[br]well.

0:56:05.840,0:56:11.600
[question]: I mean, how about metadata,[br]like the delivery address of the target?

0:56:12.900,0:56:23.100
[Jacob]: In some cases we use a system[br]called Pond,

0:56:23.100,0:56:26.420
and Pond is a system that is completely[br]Tor hidden service based,

0:56:26.420,0:56:29.342
pond.imperialviolet.org.

0:56:29.342,0:56:33.441
Adam Langley probably wouldn't want me to[br]say, but I'll say it anyway,

0:56:33.441,0:56:35.880
it would be very useful to package this[br]for Debian,

0:56:35.880,0:56:39.400
because it's a system where once you do[br]key exchange with someone,

0:56:39.400,0:56:44.363
you have an end-to-end encrypted messaging[br]system that's like email,

0:56:44.363,0:56:47.960
you can send files that are encrypted,[br]you can send messages that are encrypted,

0:56:47.960,0:56:50.580
It's delay based. You don't have[br]usernames,

0:56:50.580,0:56:53.500
you just have a public key,[br]and then you have group signatures,

0:56:53.500,0:56:57.080
so that people can send things to your[br]mailbox by proving they are a member

0:56:57.080,0:56:59.662
of the group but not which member of[br]the group they are.

0:56:59.662,0:57:01.620
And there's a lot of stuff like that.

0:57:01.620,0:57:03.862
So we use Jabber, we use email, and we use[br]Pond.

0:57:03.862,0:57:08.002
And those three systems together also[br]allowed us to build a clandestine

0:57:08.002,0:57:09.580
sneakernet.

0:57:09.580,0:57:11.445
So we have the ability to carry USB disks,

0:57:11.445,0:57:13.260
and a few of us carried them inside of[br]our bodies,

0:57:13.260,0:57:16.120
and if you've never had that experience,[br]lucky you.

0:57:19.580,0:57:24.401
You want to make sure you use post-quantum[br]computer crypto for that, by the way.

0:57:24.401,0:57:25.641
It's more comfortable.

0:57:28.680,0:57:30.620
[orga]: Shall we relieve this man from his[br]duties?

0:57:31.204,0:57:33.080
[Jacob]: Any more questions?

0:57:33.660,0:57:35.241
[orga]: One more question.

0:57:36.180,0:57:39.061
[question]: Okay, so when the Snowden[br]leaks were first published it created

0:57:39.061,0:57:42.180
a lot of awareness, and people were[br]talking about it,

0:57:42.180,0:57:44.520
and there was a huge media echo,

0:57:44.520,0:57:48.220
Now if some documents leaked, people[br]are saying yeah, all this surveillance,

0:57:48.220,0:57:51.480
and we aren't dead yet, and we can still[br]live our lives.

0:57:51.480,0:57:55.380
They basically care less. They still care[br]a bit, but they care much less than

0:57:55.380,0:57:58.582
when the first documents were published,

0:57:58.582,0:58:04.663
so how can we maintain awareness for[br]this issue in the world population,

0:58:04.663,0:58:06.021
in your opinion?

0:58:07.100,0:58:09.280
[Jacob]: There's a really scary thing[br]that's happening right now.

0:58:09.280,0:58:13.584
There was this idea in the 90s, we had[br]the crypto wars.

0:58:13.584,0:58:16.281
Did any of you remember this idea of the[br]crypto wars?

0:58:16.281,0:58:18.520
Okay, a few of you do, maybe not all of[br]you do.

0:58:18.520,0:58:21.741
But we had the so-called crypto wars in[br]the 90s, I encourage you to look this up

0:58:21.741,0:58:25.020
on DuckDuckGo, or whatever your[br]favourite search engine is.

0:58:25.020,0:58:28.763
In theory we're in the second crypto[br]wars now.

0:58:28.763,0:58:32.120
In reality what happened is the first[br]crypto wars never ended.

0:58:32.120,0:58:34.825
We didn't actually win, like we thought[br]we did.

0:58:34.825,0:58:37.180
But there are a bunch of things that are[br]taking place.

0:58:37.180,0:58:41.020
For example, making a stand against[br]backdoors.

0:58:41.020,0:58:45.082
Using end-to-end encrypted[br]communications.

0:58:45.082,0:58:47.622
Actually pushing for that, being quite[br]open about actually hosting

0:58:47.622,0:58:50.821
those kinds of services, and doing it[br]from a principled perspective,

0:58:50.821,0:58:52.880
from a legal perspective.

0:58:52.880,0:58:57.541
I think you will find that the tension[br]will continue to rise for a while,

0:58:57.541,0:59:02.140
and I think that it will continue to be[br]a conversation about public debate,

0:59:02.140,0:59:06.561
and an important aspect of this is that[br]now regular journalists that don't

0:59:06.561,0:59:10.200
understand technology at least understand[br]the importance of these things.

0:59:10.200,0:59:13.260
And if they don't do that, they at least[br]perceive that they will be considered

0:59:13.260,0:59:16.901
unprofessional if they don't care, and[br]think about those things,

0:59:16.901,0:59:19.140
or they'll be somehow negligent.

0:59:19.140,0:59:21.200
And I think that will keep some of the[br]discussion going,

0:59:21.200,0:59:23.860
and it will allow us to build some[br]breathing room,

0:59:23.860,0:59:26.781
and that breathing room will actually[br]allow us to build some alternatives.

0:59:26.781,0:59:29.704
But there are some downsides, right?

0:59:29.704,0:59:34.020
Some of the things that take place when[br]you reveal security service spying

0:59:34.020,0:59:36.740
is that it tends to get normalized, to a[br]degree.

0:59:36.740,0:59:39.280
But then in some cases it does get pushed[br]back.

0:59:39.280,0:59:43.760
In the 70s in the United States, it became[br]illegal to do assassinations, for example.

0:59:43.760,0:59:46.861
Because what the CIA were doing was so[br]atrocious that eventually there was

0:59:46.861,0:59:48.620
political pushback.

0:59:48.620,0:59:52.401
It turns out it only lasted 30 years, and[br]then they started doing it again.

0:59:52.401,0:59:57.700
But there's a saying in my country which[br]is that effectively the price of liberty

0:59:57.700,0:59:59.480
is eternal vigilance.

0:59:59.480,1:00:01.080
And that's what we are engaged in now.

1:00:01.080,1:00:04.801
And the liberty starts with software[br]liberty, I think,

1:00:04.801,1:00:06.960
in the case of communications on networks.

1:00:06.960,1:00:10.500
And so we have to have Free software,[br]and it has to be responsibly encoding

1:00:10.500,1:00:12.160
packets and data,

1:00:12.160,1:00:14.000
and if we think about it in this sense[br]we'll find a lot of pressure,

1:00:14.000,1:00:16.908
and we'll have a lot of discussions[br]about it,

1:00:16.908,1:00:19.720
and you'll start to see it be a part of[br]policy debates,

1:00:19.720,1:00:22.600
like one of the presidential candidates[br]in the United States

1:00:22.600,1:00:24.400
just came out against encryption.

1:00:24.400,1:00:26.621
I hope that sinks his presidential[br]campaign.

1:00:26.621,1:00:28.600
I mean it's weird to be against[br]encryption.

1:00:28.600,1:00:31.160
It's like I'm against prime numbers.

1:00:31.160,1:00:33.240
No modular arithmetic.

1:00:33.581,1:00:37.161
[laughter, applause]

1:00:38.520,1:00:41.721
I just want to say it's important to[br]understand, you are right,

1:00:41.721,1:00:43.721
people will be normalized about it,

1:00:43.721,1:00:45.880
but each and every one of us that[br]understands these issues

1:00:45.880,1:00:47.700
can actually keep it alive.

1:00:47.700,1:00:49.880
And the way we do that is when we[br]communicate with people...

1:00:49.880,1:00:52.201
I'll give you an example which I[br]like to give.

1:00:52.201,1:00:55.220
I grew up in San Fransisco and in the Bay[br]Area or San Fransisco, and California,

1:00:55.220,1:00:57.740
and I did that in the 80s.

1:00:57.740,1:01:01.783
And so a lot of people that I knew had[br]HIV and they died of AIDS.

1:01:01.783,1:01:05.600
And there was a huge discussion about[br]this, and it was called GRID,

1:01:05.600,1:01:08.701
the Gay Related Immune Deficiency[br]syndrome.

1:01:08.701,1:01:10.662
Before it was called HIV and AIDS.

1:01:10.662,1:01:12.644
And lots of people were sick, and lot of[br]people died,

1:01:12.644,1:01:14.820
and there was a sort of normalization[br]process where people sort of

1:01:14.820,1:01:18.141
accepted this as their fate, especially[br]if they were in the gay community.

1:01:18.141,1:01:22.900
And still, over years and years and years,[br]people began to build a culture about

1:01:22.900,1:01:26.300
safe sex, and they started to talk about[br]respecting their partners,

1:01:26.300,1:01:28.560
and about talking about these issues,[br]and about getting tested,

1:01:28.560,1:01:32.400
and it took a lot of effort, to really go[br]much further.

1:01:32.400,1:01:34.500
A lot of people actually died in that[br]process.

1:01:34.500,1:01:37.160
It was a very sad, serious situation.

1:01:37.160,1:01:40.460
And I think we have similar discussions[br]that are taking place now,

1:01:40.460,1:01:42.361
and some people don't take it seriously,

1:01:42.361,1:01:45.483
and if they happen to be Muslims living [br]in Pakistan,

1:01:45.483,1:01:48.320
they might get a drone strike.

1:01:48.320,1:01:51.300
And there's a sort of survival mechanism[br]that takes place there.

1:01:51.300,1:01:54.384
And it's an unfortunate parallel, I think,

1:01:54.384,1:01:57.261
but I would really consider that we can[br]change this dialogue

1:01:57.261,1:01:59.580
by continuing to have it even though[br]it's exhausting,

1:01:59.580,1:02:01.900
and by recognizing our responsibility,

1:02:01.900,1:02:04.241
and how we can make it better by[br]continuing to do that,

1:02:04.241,1:02:07.040
and by building healthy alternatives,[br]and by building new systems,

1:02:07.040,1:02:10.380
and by refusing to backdoor any[br]system, ever,

1:02:10.380,1:02:13.561
completely committing to[br]Free software,

1:02:13.561,1:02:16.761
and transparency of that software,[br]and also of those processes.

1:02:16.761,1:02:19.640
And really really really sharing the[br]knowledge about it,

1:02:19.640,1:02:21.620
to make it impossible to surpress.

1:02:21.620,1:02:25.020
And we should not accept the[br]normalization of that.

1:02:25.020,1:02:28.122
We shouldn't make it fun to spy on people,[br]we shouldn't make jokes about it

1:02:28.122,1:02:30.242
in a way that normalizes it,

1:02:30.242,1:02:33.842
and we should respect those people[br]who are victims of surveillance,

1:02:33.842,1:02:36.702
and we should recognize that basically[br]everyone here is a victim of surveillance

1:02:36.702,1:02:38.300
to some degree,

1:02:38.300,1:02:40.420
and we should care about that,[br]and we should continue to be upset,

1:02:40.420,1:02:43.160
but not just upset; to channel that[br]anger into something useful

1:02:43.160,1:02:45.321
like making Debian better.

1:02:46.820,1:02:50.240
[applause]

1:02:56.101,1:03:00.041
[orga]: Thanks Jake for such a long Q&A[br]session,

1:03:00.041,1:03:01.860
I hope you enjoy the rum.

1:03:01.860,1:03:04.802
And I'm sure Jake's going to ask any more[br]questions if he can still talk.

1:03:08.300,1:03:10.140
[Jacob]: Thanks.