WEBVTT 00:00:00.000 --> 00:00:01.388 ... wanted to be able to use 00:00:01.484 --> 00:00:03.114 Thunderbird and GnuPG together with Tor, 00:00:03.279 --> 00:00:04.744 and so we thought: 00:00:04.884 --> 00:00:07.103 oh, it would be really easy, I bet, 00:00:07.164 --> 00:00:09.694 to configure Thunderbird to work with Tor 00:00:09.753 --> 00:00:11.989 - hah - so a new Free software project was born. 00:00:12.758 --> 00:00:15.403 It's a really simple thing, but basically 00:00:15.530 --> 00:00:18.162 it's just a package that hooks it all together. 00:00:18.285 --> 00:00:21.277 So a lot of people were using Thunderbird 00:00:21.361 --> 00:00:23.797 and TorBirdy, and GnuPG, and Tor, 00:00:23.966 --> 00:00:26.031 and Debian, together for email, 00:00:26.100 --> 00:00:30.748 combined with Riseup as an email service. 00:00:30.829 --> 00:00:36.954 So it's a literally a real peer to peer, Free software driven set of things, 00:00:37.679 --> 00:00:41.221 actually, that made it possible. NOTE Paragraph 00:00:48.559 --> 00:00:50.438 [question]: So one thing I never understood about this 00:00:50.610 --> 00:00:53.464 process was exactly how the documents were handled, and maybe that's because nobody 00:00:53.634 --> 00:00:57.561 wants to say, but, you know, did you leave them on a server somewhere and download 00:00:57.690 --> 00:01:00.807 them, hand them over to people, and who took what where, and how do you... 00:01:01.263 --> 00:01:05.069 in case I need to do something really dangerous with a load of documents, 00:01:05.198 --> 00:01:07.764 what's the best way of doing it? 00:01:07.891 --> 00:01:10.879 [laughter] 00:01:12.758 --> 00:01:14.763 [Jacob]: Hmm! 00:01:16.555 --> 00:01:18.859 [audience member]: It's a good thing this isn't being streamed. 00:01:19.498 --> 00:01:21.593 I'm sorry, what? 00:01:21.845 --> 00:01:24.789 There was a voice from god, what did she say? 00:01:25.169 --> 00:01:27.261 [audience]: I said good we aren't streaming tonight. 00:01:27.478 --> 00:01:30.162 Oh yeah, so hello to all of our friends 00:01:30.246 --> 00:01:34.133 in domestic and international surveillance services. 00:01:34.819 --> 00:01:37.458 Well, so I won't answer your question, 00:01:37.587 --> 00:01:40.146 but since you asked the question, it's my turn to talk. 00:01:40.407 --> 00:01:41.600 So what I would say is that... 00:01:41.686 --> 00:01:44.075 if you want to do clandestine activities 00:01:44.198 --> 00:01:46.161 that you fear for your life for, 00:01:46.291 --> 00:01:48.211 you need to really think about the situation that you're in 00:01:48.298 --> 00:01:49.361 very carefully. 00:01:49.447 --> 00:01:52.093 And so a big part of this is operational security 00:01:52.182 --> 00:01:54.272 and a big part of that is compartmentalization. 00:01:54.359 --> 00:01:56.530 So certain people had access to certain things, 00:01:56.699 --> 00:01:58.195 but maybe they couldn't decrypt them, 00:01:58.364 --> 00:02:00.968 and certain things were moved around, 00:02:01.052 --> 00:02:03.487 and that's on a need to know basis, 00:02:03.616 --> 00:02:05.067 and those people who knew, 00:02:05.191 --> 00:02:09.845 which is not me - I don't know anything, I don't know what you're talking about. 00:02:09.845 --> 00:02:11.888 Those people knew, and then you know, 00:02:12.016 --> 00:02:13.427 it'll go with them to their grave. 00:02:13.515 --> 00:02:15.729 So if you're interested in being the next Edward Snowden, 00:02:15.860 --> 00:02:17.225 you need to do your homework 00:02:17.397 --> 00:02:20.341 in finding people that will be able to do the other part of it, let's say. 00:02:20.341 --> 00:02:22.771 But just in general, I mean 00:02:22.858 --> 00:02:24.826 compartmentalization is key, right. 00:02:24.949 --> 00:02:27.163 So it's not just for AppArmor profiles. 00:02:27.294 --> 00:02:30.285 So you need to think about what you want to do. 00:02:30.364 --> 00:02:33.563 And I mean a big part of this is to consider that the network itself 00:02:33.651 --> 00:02:36.935 is the enemy, even though it is useful for communicating. 00:02:37.063 --> 00:02:40.730 So all the metadata that exists on the network 00:02:40.863 --> 00:02:42.871 could have tipped people off, could have caused 00:02:42.997 --> 00:02:44.363 this whole thing to fall apart. 00:02:44.489 --> 00:02:46.789 It really is amazing, I feel like you know 00:02:46.923 --> 00:02:48.157 two and half, three years ago, 00:02:48.240 --> 00:02:49.866 when you talk about Free software, 00:02:49.949 --> 00:02:51.617 and you talk about the idea of Free software, 00:02:51.743 --> 00:02:55.242 and you talk about issues relating to autonomy and privacy, and security 00:02:55.324 --> 00:02:57.803 you have a really different reception now than you did then, 00:02:57.928 --> 00:02:58.997 and that's really what it took 00:02:59.163 --> 00:03:01.596 to turn the world half a degree, or something, 00:03:01.728 --> 00:03:03.899 or a quarter of a degree or something. 00:03:04.881 --> 00:03:08.165 So I'm not going to tell you about detailed plans for conspiracy, 00:03:08.298 --> 00:03:10.943 but I highly encourage you to read about South African history, 00:03:11.028 --> 00:03:13.588 in particular the history of Umkhonto we Sizwe. 00:03:13.718 --> 00:03:17.979 They are the clandestine communications group for MK, 00:03:18.023 --> 00:03:20.881 or rather the operation who lay inside of MK, 00:03:20.881 --> 00:03:22.675 which is Umkhonto we Sizwe, 00:03:22.800 --> 00:03:25.151 and they are sort of with the African National Congress, 00:03:25.360 --> 00:03:28.760 and those people have published so many books about the revolutionary activities 00:03:28.852 --> 00:03:31.239 to overthrow the apartheid state. 00:03:31.366 --> 00:03:33.756 If you read these books, especially the book "Operation Vula" 00:03:33.880 --> 00:03:36.188 and "Armed and Dangerous" by Ronnie Kasrils 00:03:36.272 --> 00:03:38.705 they give you some idea about what you need to do 00:03:38.835 --> 00:03:40.279 which is to compartmentalize, 00:03:40.410 --> 00:03:42.542 how to find people to do various tasks, specific tasks, 00:03:42.719 --> 00:03:45.188 how to work on building trust with each other, what that looks like, 00:03:45.272 --> 00:03:47.196 how to identify political targets, 00:03:47.278 --> 00:03:50.313 how you might use things like communications technology 00:03:50.397 --> 00:03:53.037 to change the political topic on, 00:03:53.129 --> 00:03:55.426 and the discussion in general. 00:03:55.556 --> 00:03:59.523 And I think the best way to learn about these things is to study previous people 00:03:59.609 --> 00:04:01.660 who have tried to do that kind of stuff. 00:04:01.742 --> 00:04:05.241 And the NSA is not the apartheid regime of South Africa, 00:04:05.241 --> 00:04:06.890 but there are still lessons to be learned there, 00:04:06.986 --> 00:04:10.060 so if you really want to know the answer to that, also Che Guevara's manual 00:04:10.184 --> 00:04:12.104 on guerilla warfare is very interesting, 00:04:12.287 --> 00:04:13.774 and there's a lot of other books like that. 00:04:13.854 --> 00:04:15.691 I'd be happy to talk about it with you later. 00:04:15.852 --> 00:04:18.456 And I have nothing to do with anything that we may or may not have done. 00:04:18.547 --> 00:04:20.213 [laughter] 00:04:24.900 --> 00:04:28.280 [question]: Do you think there is a chance that things may get better 00:04:28.725 --> 00:04:33.050 for example I know that publicly, some programs were not extended 00:04:33.950 --> 00:04:37.212 but I don't know what is happening in the background 00:04:37.390 --> 00:04:43.147 so maybe it's the same thing but they are pretending that it's not 00:04:43.486 --> 00:04:45.193 How do you see this? 00:04:45.409 --> 00:04:47.713 [Jacob]: Well I think a couple of things. 00:04:47.794 --> 00:04:53.937 In general I think what happened, not just with this movie but with all of these things 00:04:54.066 --> 00:04:56.073 is that in inspired hope, 00:04:56.073 --> 00:04:57.353 and the hope is very important, 00:04:57.441 --> 00:05:01.151 but hope is not a strategy for survival, or for building alternatives, 00:05:01.279 --> 00:05:03.495 so what it has also done, is that it has allowed us to raise the profile 00:05:03.670 --> 00:05:05.500 of the things which actually do make it better. 00:05:05.587 --> 00:05:08.832 For example ridding ourselves of the chains of proprietary software 00:05:08.961 --> 00:05:12.071 is something that's a serious discussion with people that wouldn't have previously 00:05:12.158 --> 00:05:14.849 talked about Free software because they don't care about liberty, 00:05:14.972 --> 00:05:16.510 they care about security. 00:05:16.679 --> 00:05:18.689 And even though I think those are really simliar things, 00:05:18.774 --> 00:05:21.118 previously they just thought we were just Free software hippies, 00:05:21.251 --> 00:05:22.402 in tie-dye shirts 00:05:22.486 --> 00:05:25.086 and while that may be true on the weekends and evenings 00:05:25.086 --> 00:05:27.581 or with Bdale every day [laughter] 00:05:27.581 --> 00:05:29.541 I think that actually does make it better 00:05:29.671 --> 00:05:32.784 And it also changes the dialogue, in the sense that it's no longer reasonable 00:05:32.878 --> 00:05:37.307 to pretend that mass surveillance and surveillance issues don't matter, 00:05:37.439 --> 00:05:39.145 because if you really go down the rabbit-hole 00:05:39.231 --> 00:05:42.257 of thinking about what some of the security services are trying to do 00:05:42.257 --> 00:05:45.289 it becomes obvious that we want to encrypt everything all the time 00:05:45.289 --> 00:05:48.101 to beat selector-based surveillance and dragnet-based surveillance. 00:05:48.187 --> 00:05:50.276 It doesn't matter if something is authenticated 00:05:50.366 --> 00:05:52.683 You could still trigger some action to take place 00:05:52.762 --> 00:05:54.387 with these kinds of surveillance machines 00:05:54.473 --> 00:05:56.774 that could for example drone strike someone, 00:05:56.905 --> 00:05:58.440 and so it raises that. 00:05:58.524 --> 00:05:59.840 And that gives me a lot of hope too, 00:06:00.008 --> 00:06:03.378 because people understand the root of the problem, 00:06:03.466 --> 00:06:05.002 or the root of many problems 00:06:05.087 --> 00:06:07.090 and the root of some violence in the world, actually. 00:06:07.217 --> 00:06:09.098 And so it helps us to reduce that violence 00:06:09.222 --> 00:06:10.761 by getting people to acknowledge that it's real 00:06:10.848 --> 00:06:12.209 and also that they care about it 00:06:12.294 --> 00:06:14.078 and that we care about each other. 00:06:14.132 --> 00:06:16.861 So that really gives me a lot of hope, and part of that is Snowden 00:06:16.990 --> 00:06:18.483 and part of that is the documents 00:06:18.569 --> 00:06:20.276 but the other part of it is that.. 00:06:20.401 --> 00:06:25.013 I don't want to blow it up and make it sound like we did something 00:06:25.144 --> 00:06:26.630 like a big deal, 00:06:26.758 --> 00:06:29.916 but in a sense, Laura, Glen, myself and a number of other people 00:06:30.001 --> 00:06:32.526 were really not sure we would ever be able to travel home to our country 00:06:32.693 --> 00:06:34.142 that we wouldn't be arrested. 00:06:34.227 --> 00:06:36.487 I actually haven't been home in over two and half years, 00:06:36.618 --> 00:06:38.747 well, two years and three months or something 00:06:38.833 --> 00:06:41.992 I went out on a small business trip that was supposed to last two weeks 00:06:42.075 --> 00:06:43.484 and then this happened 00:06:43.569 --> 00:06:44.893 and I've been hear ever since. 00:06:44.893 --> 00:06:46.516 It's a really long, crazy trip. 00:06:46.644 --> 00:06:50.868 But the point is that that's what was necessary to make some of these changes 00:06:51.035 --> 00:06:53.474 and eventually it will turn around 00:06:53.599 --> 00:06:54.667 and I will be able to go home, 00:06:54.667 --> 00:06:57.096 and Laura and Glen will be able to travel to the US again. 00:06:57.178 --> 00:07:00.062 Obviously, Julian is still stuck in the Ecuadorian embassy 00:07:00.232 --> 00:07:01.807 Sarah lives in exile in Berlin, 00:07:01.807 --> 00:07:03.048 I live in exile in Berlin, 00:07:03.048 --> 00:07:04.539 And Ed is in Moscow 00:07:04.667 --> 00:07:07.528 So we're not finished with some of these things 00:07:07.613 --> 00:07:11.708 and it's also possible that we are, the set of people I mentioned, 00:07:11.836 --> 00:07:15.163 the state we're in, will stay that way forever. 00:07:15.248 --> 00:07:16.918 But what matters is that the rest of the world 00:07:17.043 --> 00:07:19.044 can actually move on and fix some of these problems, 00:07:19.044 --> 00:07:20.920 and I have a lot of hope about that. 00:07:21.007 --> 00:07:24.040 And I see a lot of change, that's the really big part. 00:07:24.128 --> 00:07:29.795 Like I see the reproducible build stuff that Holger and Lunar are working on. 00:07:29.969 --> 00:07:32.872 People really understand the root reason for needing to do that 00:07:32.961 --> 00:07:34.788 and actually seems quite reasonable to people 00:07:34.919 --> 00:07:37.521 who would previously have expended energy against it, 00:07:37.607 --> 00:07:40.722 in support of it, so I think that's really good. 00:07:40.722 --> 00:07:43.026 And there's a lot of other hopeful things. 00:07:43.109 --> 00:07:45.456 So I would try and be as uplifting as possible. 00:07:45.585 --> 00:07:47.588 It's not just the rum! 00:07:50.281 --> 00:07:53.651 [question]: Near the end of the film we saw something about another source. 00:07:53.736 --> 00:07:57.147 I may have been missing some news or something 00:07:57.314 --> 00:08:01.208 but I don't remember anything about that being public. 00:08:01.296 --> 00:08:02.943 Do you know what happened to them? 00:08:03.031 --> 00:08:05.633 [Jacob]: As far as I know any other source that was mentioned in the film 00:08:05.719 --> 00:08:08.364 is still anonymous, and they're still free. 00:08:08.492 --> 00:08:11.221 I'm not exactly sure because I was not involved in that part 00:08:11.390 --> 00:08:13.188 but I also saw the end of the film 00:08:13.309 --> 00:08:16.424 and I've seen a bunch of other reporting which wasn't attributed to anyone in particular 00:08:16.552 --> 00:08:21.375 So the good news... there's an old slogan from the Dutch hacker community, right? 00:08:21.547 --> 00:08:22.956 "Someone you trust is one of us, 00:08:23.038 --> 00:08:25.983 and the leak is higher up in the chain of command than you" 00:08:26.067 --> 00:08:30.718 And I feel like that might be true again, hopefully. 00:08:32.765 --> 00:08:34.856 I think that guy has a question as well. 00:08:34.945 --> 00:08:39.303 [question]: Part of the problem initially was that encryption software 00:08:39.428 --> 00:08:42.285 was not so easy to use, right? 00:08:42.285 --> 00:08:44.211 And I think part of the challenge for everyone 00:08:44.211 --> 00:08:47.744 was to improve on that situation to make it better 00:08:47.917 --> 00:08:52.526 so I'm asking you if you've observed any change and to the rest of the room 00:08:52.654 --> 00:08:56.148 have we done anything to improve on that? 00:08:57.049 --> 00:09:00.714 [Jacob]: I definitely think that there is a lot of free software 00:09:00.843 --> 00:09:02.723 that makes encryption easier to use, 00:09:02.894 --> 00:09:05.620 though not always on free platforms, which really is heart-breaking. 00:09:05.711 --> 00:09:09.078 For example Moxie Marlinspike has done a really good job 00:09:09.165 --> 00:09:10.914 with Signal, Textsecure and Redphone 00:09:10.914 --> 00:09:14.030 and making end-to-end, encrypted calling, texting, sexting, 00:09:14.111 --> 00:09:16.717 and whatever apps, 00:09:17.183 --> 00:09:20.044 sext-secure is what I think it's nicknamed 00:09:20.127 --> 00:09:22.433 and I'm very impressed by that, and it works really well 00:09:22.517 --> 00:09:24.572 and it's something which, especially in the last two years, 00:09:24.663 --> 00:09:27.517 if you have a cell-phone, which I don't recommend 00:09:27.560 --> 00:09:31.100 but if you have a cell-phone, and you put in everyone's phone number, 00:09:31.234 --> 00:09:34.519 a lot of people that I would classify as non-technical people, 00:09:34.599 --> 00:09:37.290 that don't care about Free software as a hobby or as a passion 00:09:37.415 --> 00:09:39.209 or as a profession. 00:09:39.209 --> 00:09:40.446 You see their names in those systems 00:09:40.532 --> 00:09:42.537 often more than some of the Free software people, 00:09:42.709 --> 00:09:44.460 and that's really impressive to me, 00:09:44.582 --> 00:09:48.295 and I think there's been a huge shift just generally about those sorts of things 00:09:48.380 --> 00:09:51.155 also about social responsibility, 00:09:51.374 --> 00:09:53.840 or people understand they have a responsibility to other people 00:09:54.011 --> 00:09:57.557 to encrypt communications, and not to put people in harm's way 00:09:57.685 --> 00:10:01.439 by sending unsafe stuff over unsafe communication lines. 00:10:01.570 --> 00:10:04.937 So I think in my personal view it's better. 00:10:05.068 --> 00:10:07.924 But the original problem wasn't actually that the encryption was hard to use. 00:10:08.053 --> 00:10:10.656 I think the main problem is people didn't understand the reason 00:10:10.782 --> 00:10:12.572 that it needed to be done 00:10:12.700 --> 00:10:16.727 and they believed the lie that is targetted versus mass surveillance. 00:10:16.859 --> 00:10:20.099 And there's a big lie, and the lie is that there is such a thing 00:10:20.187 --> 00:10:22.236 as targeted surveillance. 00:10:22.363 --> 00:10:24.924 In the modern era, most so-called targetted surveillance actually happens 00:10:24.924 --> 00:10:26.455 through mass surveillance. 00:10:26.455 --> 00:10:28.418 They gather everything up, and then they look through the thing 00:10:28.551 --> 00:10:30.211 they've already seized. 00:10:30.211 --> 00:10:32.945 And of course there are targetted, focussed attacks. 00:10:33.073 --> 00:10:36.358 But the main thing is that the abuse of surveillance often happens 00:10:36.443 --> 00:10:37.805 on an individual basis. 00:10:37.894 --> 00:10:39.681 It also has a societal cost. 00:10:39.681 --> 00:10:41.816 I think a lot of people really understand that. 00:10:41.904 --> 00:10:45.961 It's probably because I also live in Germany now for the last two years 00:10:46.040 --> 00:10:49.583 but I feel that German society in particular is extremely aware 00:10:49.751 --> 00:10:52.012 of these abuses in the modern world 00:10:52.099 --> 00:10:55.299 and they have a historical context that allows them to talk about it 00:10:55.388 --> 00:10:58.288 with the rest of the world, where the world doesn't downplay it. 00:10:58.369 --> 00:10:59.948 So this is how other people relate to Germany 00:11:00.081 --> 00:11:02.681 not just about Germans relate to each other. 00:11:02.853 --> 00:11:06.390 And that has also been really good for just meeting regular people 00:11:06.520 --> 00:11:07.885 who really care about it, 00:11:08.058 --> 00:11:09.122 and who really want to do things. 00:11:09.249 --> 00:11:10.875 So people's parents email me, and are like 00:11:10.960 --> 00:11:12.197 "I want to protect my children, 00:11:12.325 --> 00:11:14.971 what's the best way to use crypto with them?" 00:11:15.099 --> 00:11:16.507 You know, things like that. 00:11:16.635 --> 00:11:19.450 And I didn't every receive emails like that in the past 00:11:19.618 --> 00:11:23.504 and that's to me is uplifting and very positive. 00:11:25.041 --> 00:11:27.748 [question]: A quick organisational question. 00:11:27.880 --> 00:11:30.497 Right now we're live-streaming the Q&A. Are you comfortable with that? 00:11:30.668 --> 00:11:31.632 [Jacob]: I don't think in the last three years I've ever had a moment 00:11:31.939 --> 00:11:35.002 that wasn't being recorded. 00:11:36.538 --> 00:11:39.324 [laughter, applause] 00:11:41.095 --> 00:11:43.056 [question]: If you're fine with it, moving on... 00:11:43.726 --> 00:11:47.512 [Jacob]: That's fine, just don't do it when I'm trying to sleep. 00:11:48.148 --> 00:11:51.477 [question]: I was wondering why Laura and you ended up in Germany 00:11:51.610 --> 00:11:54.894 because what you said about people in Germany might be true 00:11:54.981 --> 00:12:00.612 but I'm really ashamed about my Government and how they dealt with ???? 00:12:00.612 --> 00:12:04.153 and they are doing nothing for this. 00:12:04.451 --> 00:12:07.692 [Jacob]: The reason that we ended up in Germany 00:12:07.777 --> 00:12:10.850 is that I'd been attending Chaos Computer Club events 00:12:11.018 --> 00:12:12.728 for many years 00:12:12.810 --> 00:12:15.241 and there are bunch of people that are part of the Chaos Computer Club 00:12:15.371 --> 00:12:17.122 who are really supportive, and good people, 00:12:17.207 --> 00:12:19.299 who have a stable base, and an infrastructure. 00:12:19.427 --> 00:12:24.638 The German hacker scene has this phenomenon which is that 00:12:24.809 --> 00:12:27.071 it's a part of society. 00:12:27.290 --> 00:12:30.487 So there are people in the CCC who will talk with the constitutional court 00:12:30.569 --> 00:12:31.892 for example, 00:12:31.981 --> 00:12:34.488 and that creates a much more stable civil society 00:12:34.580 --> 00:12:36.196 and those people were willing to help us. 00:12:36.285 --> 00:12:38.627 They were willing to hold footage, to hold encrypted data. 00:12:38.716 --> 00:12:41.616 They were willing to help modify hardware. 00:12:41.702 --> 00:12:44.855 There was a huge base of support where people, even if they had fear, 00:12:44.985 --> 00:12:47.070 they did stuff anyway. 00:12:47.121 --> 00:12:49.894 And that support went back a long time. 00:12:49.977 --> 00:12:52.965 And so we knew that it would be safe to store footage for the film here. 00:12:53.051 --> 00:12:56.292 In Berlin, not in Heidelberg, but here in Germany. 00:12:56.464 --> 00:13:00.520 And we knew that, of course, there were people that would be helpful. 00:13:00.598 --> 00:13:03.334 In the US there's a much bigger culture of fear. 00:13:03.421 --> 00:13:06.033 People are afraid of having their houses raided by the police, 00:13:06.198 --> 00:13:08.118 where there's lots of detainments at the borders, 00:13:08.246 --> 00:13:10.081 where there's lots of speculative arrests, 00:13:10.249 --> 00:13:11.866 journalists that are jailed, 00:13:11.913 --> 00:13:15.196 so the situation was not to say that Germany was perfect. 00:13:15.327 --> 00:13:18.994 I revealed in Der Speigel with three other journalists that Merkel was spied on 00:13:19.129 --> 00:13:20.363 by the NSA. 00:13:20.489 --> 00:13:22.193 And it's clear that the Germany government was complicit 00:13:22.281 --> 00:13:23.860 with some of this surveillance. 00:13:23.948 --> 00:13:27.011 But in a sort of pyramid of surveillance there's a sort of colonialism 00:13:27.062 --> 00:13:28.299 that takes place. 00:13:28.426 --> 00:13:30.944 And that the NSA and GCHQ are at the top. 00:13:31.031 --> 00:13:33.374 And the Germans are little bit below that. 00:13:33.458 --> 00:13:37.225 The thing is that there's not a lot you can do about that. 00:13:37.350 --> 00:13:38.850 And so even though we revealed this about Merkel, 00:13:38.972 --> 00:13:40.680 it's not clear what she should do. 00:13:40.853 --> 00:13:42.260 It's not clear what anyone should do. 00:13:42.388 --> 00:13:45.415 But one thing that was clear was that if they wanted to break into our houses 00:13:45.546 --> 00:13:49.513 they would do it in a way that would cost them a lot politically. 00:13:49.594 --> 00:13:50.919 It would be very public. 00:13:51.048 --> 00:13:53.138 The last time someone raided someone working with Der Speigel 00:13:53.264 --> 00:13:55.784 was in 1962 during the Speigel affair, 00:13:55.870 --> 00:13:57.786 and some ministers were kicked out. 00:13:57.876 --> 00:14:00.346 You may have seen recently the Landersverrat thing 00:14:00.346 --> 00:14:01.718 with Netzpolitik. 00:14:01.718 --> 00:14:04.319 The charges against them now have been dropped. 00:14:04.444 --> 00:14:06.537 That would never happen in the United States. 00:14:06.619 --> 00:14:07.944 We would not be safe. 00:14:08.025 --> 00:14:09.815 And I still, for my investigative journalism, 00:14:09.861 --> 00:14:11.436 and my work with Wikileaks, 00:14:11.486 --> 00:14:12.718 and my work with the Tor project, 00:14:12.850 --> 00:14:14.510 I wouldn't even go back to the US, 00:14:14.597 --> 00:14:16.687 because there's no chance that if they wanted to do something to me 00:14:16.817 --> 00:14:20.828 that I would have any constitutional liberties, I think, 00:14:20.956 --> 00:14:22.621 and the same is true of Snowden. 00:14:22.703 --> 00:14:24.457 You just won't get that fair trial. 00:14:24.542 --> 00:14:27.998 And we thought at least here we would have ground to stand and fight on. 00:14:28.126 --> 00:14:30.427 And it's exactly what happened, and we won. 00:14:33.801 --> 00:14:35.887 [question]: This is also about the fear stuff that you talk about 00:14:35.975 --> 00:14:41.947 which is in the very old days we used to put red words in the end of every message 00:14:42.074 --> 00:14:45.915 to make sure that it would be hard to find the actual subversive message 00:14:46.003 --> 00:14:47.912 among all the noise. 00:14:47.962 --> 00:14:49.544 And you can think about the same thing here. 00:14:49.716 --> 00:14:56.344 Should we build our systems so that everything gets encrypted all the time? 00:14:56.430 --> 00:14:59.029 [Jacob]: So I have a lot of radical suggestions for what to do, 00:14:59.119 --> 00:15:01.165 but I'm going to talk about them tomorrow in the keynote mostly. 00:15:01.332 --> 00:15:03.928 But to give you an example, when you install Debian, 00:15:04.013 --> 00:15:06.325 you can give someone the ability to log into the machine 00:15:06.487 --> 00:15:07.899 over a Tor hidden service for free. 00:15:08.027 --> 00:15:12.250 You get a free .onion when you add two lines to a Tor configuration file. 00:15:12.334 --> 00:15:15.538 We should make encryption not only easy to use but out of the box 00:15:15.622 --> 00:15:19.504 we should have it possible to have end-to-end reachability and connectivity, 00:15:19.677 --> 00:15:23.899 and we should reduce the total amount of metadata, to make it harder for people 00:15:24.026 --> 00:15:26.374 who want to break the law, that want to break into computers. 00:15:26.455 --> 00:15:30.724 We should solve the problem of adversarial versus non-adversarial forensics 00:15:30.851 --> 00:15:36.315 so we can verify our systems with open hardware and Free software together. 00:15:36.396 --> 00:15:39.302 And there's a lot to be done, but the main thing to do is to recognise 00:15:39.387 --> 00:15:43.269 that if you have the ability to upload to Debian, 00:15:43.393 --> 00:15:46.167 there are literally intelligence agencies that would like those keys. 00:15:46.296 --> 00:15:49.370 And we have a great responsiblity to humanity as Debian developers 00:15:49.542 --> 00:15:51.585 to do the right thing: to build open systems, 00:15:51.672 --> 00:15:55.258 to build them in a way where users don't need to understand this stuff. 00:15:55.427 --> 00:15:58.071 There are a lot of people in the world that will never see this film. 00:15:58.204 --> 00:16:02.977 And we can solve the problems that this film describes largely with Free software. 00:16:03.156 --> 00:16:04.730 And we can do that without them knowing, 00:16:04.858 --> 00:16:06.778 and they will be safe for us having done that. 00:16:06.949 --> 00:16:10.021 And if we can do that, the world will be a better place, I think. 00:16:10.021 --> 00:16:12.368 And I think the world is a better place because of the efforts that were 00:16:12.452 --> 00:16:15.485 already done in that area, that made this possible. 00:16:15.485 --> 00:16:17.656 The Tails project made it so that a bunch of people 00:16:17.867 --> 00:16:19.573 who were good at investigative journalism, 00:16:19.668 --> 00:16:23.759 but absolutely terrible with computers, were able to pull this off. 00:16:23.933 --> 00:16:27.256 And that is entirely the product, in my opinion, of Free software. 00:16:27.342 --> 00:16:32.677 And a little bit of Laura and Glen, but I'd say a lot of Free software. 00:16:34.302 --> 00:16:36.223 [question]: How many people do you think NSA has 00:16:36.355 --> 00:16:38.995 working within the Debian community? 00:16:39.889 --> 00:16:43.601 [laughter, applause] 00:16:45.309 --> 00:16:49.302 [Jacob]: Well, I looked in the Snowden archive about that actually. 00:16:50.263 --> 00:16:55.527 [laughter, applause] 00:16:56.640 --> 00:17:03.341 Yeah. And as far as I can tell Debian is not a high priority target for them. 00:17:03.685 --> 00:17:05.946 I mean they write exploits for all sort of stuff 00:17:06.077 --> 00:17:10.683 but I never found any systematic attempt to compromise or harm the Debian project. 00:17:10.806 --> 00:17:14.561 But obviously there are people who are paid by the NSA to infiltrate communities, 00:17:14.561 --> 00:17:16.993 and that's why we have to open transparent processes 00:17:16.993 --> 00:17:21.044 so that if those people behave badly, we have an audit trail. 00:17:21.044 --> 00:17:23.211 We won't ever stop that kind of stuff, 00:17:23.211 --> 00:17:25.178 but what matters is that people do good things. 00:17:25.178 --> 00:17:28.587 It doesn't matter who they do bad things for as long as we can correct those things 00:17:28.587 --> 00:17:31.019 and/or catch them and stop them before it happens. 00:17:31.019 --> 00:17:33.111 But as far as I know there are only a couple of people that have ever 00:17:33.111 --> 00:17:36.176 been associated with the NSA in the Debian community. 00:17:36.176 --> 00:17:39.933 But I think we shouldn't get paranoid about it, 00:17:39.933 --> 00:17:41.600 but we should just be prudent about our processes, 00:17:41.600 --> 00:17:43.947 because there are lots of intelligence services around the world 00:17:43.947 --> 00:17:47.147 that do not like the values of a universal operating system, 00:17:47.147 --> 00:17:50.902 so I don't think it's super-important to look, but I did actually look, 00:17:50.902 --> 00:17:54.695 very specifically for a whole bunch of people in the Debian community 00:17:54.695 --> 00:17:58.027 to see if any of them also were being paid by the NSA 00:17:58.027 --> 00:18:01.613 and I didn't find any serious thing that raised concern, 00:18:01.613 --> 00:18:03.783 and if I did, I would have... 00:18:03.783 --> 00:18:07.541 I mean, there were lots of things I found in the archive that I immediately 00:18:07.541 --> 00:18:09.333 notified security teams about. 00:18:09.333 --> 00:18:14.112 Where I worked along with many other people to actually fix those things. 00:18:14.112 --> 00:18:18.546 And one of those things, if we had found them, like infiltrators in Debian, 00:18:18.546 --> 00:18:20.769 I absolutely would have just told people about. 00:18:20.769 --> 00:18:23.408 The problem is that a lot of the journalists don't want to do that 00:18:23.408 --> 00:18:26.263 because there's a ten year felony where you go to prison - 00:18:26.263 --> 00:18:28.185 a federal American prison, for ten years - 00:18:28.322 --> 00:18:30.202 if you reveal the name of an agent. 00:18:30.599 --> 00:18:31.923 So there's a tension there, 00:18:31.923 --> 00:18:34.440 but I think that there's something to be said, 00:18:34.652 --> 00:18:36.655 if they're actually actively harming the community 00:18:36.655 --> 00:18:37.851 and they're committing a crime, 00:18:37.851 --> 00:18:39.470 I think there's something to be said about that. 00:18:39.470 --> 00:18:40.921 So if I found that I think it would be worthwhile, 00:18:40.921 --> 00:18:43.144 but just so you know, there's this high cost. 00:18:43.144 --> 00:18:45.362 So if there were people in the agency now, 00:18:45.362 --> 00:18:48.647 because they say that we used Tails, and Debian, and they wanted to subvert it, 00:18:48.647 --> 00:18:52.015 there's a really really high bar for punishment. 00:18:52.015 --> 00:18:55.132 Which suggests that maybe people won't tell you. 00:18:55.132 --> 00:18:59.055 So we need to sort of bank on the fact that we'll never know, 00:18:59.055 --> 00:19:02.766 but we don't need to know, as long as we have good processes 00:19:02.766 --> 00:19:04.390 that would catch bad behaviour. 00:19:04.390 --> 00:19:06.181 And that's one of the strengths of Debian. 00:19:06.181 --> 00:19:08.739 There are very few operating systems, I think, 00:19:08.739 --> 00:19:10.830 and just in general Free software communities, 00:19:10.830 --> 00:19:14.759 that are as diverse, and committed to the openness and the Free software nature 00:19:14.759 --> 00:19:17.742 of this kind of a project, 00:19:17.742 --> 00:19:20.985 and so it's very important to state that. 00:19:21.922 --> 00:19:24.824 But I do think one of the things that will happen in the future at some point 00:19:24.824 --> 00:19:28.067 is that you'll start to find people in the Debian community that are pressured 00:19:28.067 --> 00:19:29.645 by other people to do bad things 00:19:29.645 --> 00:19:31.866 so we need to set up processes that will stop that, 00:19:31.866 --> 00:19:34.296 to create an incentive for that not happening. 00:19:35.022 --> 00:19:37.240 But it's really tough, 00:19:37.926 --> 00:19:40.274 so I think that openness, transparency and accountability are the ways that 00:19:40.274 --> 00:19:43.772 we can combat that, because otherwise we won't really be able to solve it. 00:19:44.881 --> 00:19:47.182 But don't be paranoid, is the other thing. 00:19:47.309 --> 00:19:49.699 They really are out to get you, so be prepared. 00:19:50.430 --> 00:19:56.487 [laughter, applause] 00:20:00.796 --> 00:20:05.999 [question]: I'm just wondering how trust was established 00:20:05.999 --> 00:20:09.628 because I'm just realizing that this community, 00:20:09.628 --> 00:20:14.532 for you to verify your public key and even fingerprint is like, 00:20:14.532 --> 00:20:16.113 you have you produce your passport, 00:20:16.113 --> 00:20:19.613 so I'm wondering how Laura managed to exchange her keys with Snowden 00:20:19.613 --> 00:20:23.071 and make sure that they were really talking to the right person. 00:20:23.843 --> 00:20:28.019 [Julian]: Well, they had a whole sort of dance for doing key exchange. 00:20:28.019 --> 00:20:32.749 I think it was a little bit luck, and a little bit transitive trust, 00:20:32.749 --> 00:20:35.101 there's a little bit of the web of trust, 00:20:35.101 --> 00:20:36.457 and it worked pretty well. 00:20:36.719 --> 00:20:41.332 I mean, I don't think that the key-signing stuff that Debian does is anything close 00:20:41.332 --> 00:20:42.907 to what they were doing. 00:20:42.907 --> 00:20:45.939 They just wanted to make sure that the keys they had were the right keys, 00:20:45.939 --> 00:20:47.687 and that they weren't compromised, 00:20:47.687 --> 00:20:50.075 and that then they would change things. 00:20:50.075 --> 00:20:51.355 There was a point in the movie where they said: 00:20:51.355 --> 00:20:55.875 "let's disassociate our meta-data one more time" 00:20:55.875 --> 00:20:58.951 And what that means is they changed all of the identifiers that are visible 00:20:58.951 --> 00:21:04.158 to the network, new keys, new email addresses, new Tor circuit, etc 00:21:04.158 --> 00:21:07.611 and this is like a key consistency thing, 00:21:07.611 --> 00:21:11.358 where they had the right key to begin with and the continued to rotate over new keys. 00:21:11.358 --> 00:21:13.411 This is also sometimes called TOFU. 00:21:13.411 --> 00:21:15.848 This is, I think, weaker than the web of trust, 00:21:15.848 --> 00:21:19.345 but a lot easier for people to do, and very easy to explain, 00:21:19.345 --> 00:21:20.841 and it worked out pretty well. 00:21:20.841 --> 00:21:25.190 It doesn't scale really well, but it has a separate good side 00:21:25.190 --> 00:21:28.985 which is the web of trust explicitly names a web of co-conspirators. 00:21:28.985 --> 00:21:31.377 And so you don't want that feature. 00:21:31.377 --> 00:21:33.386 It's useful for something like Debian; 00:21:33.386 --> 00:21:36.067 it's not useful for clandestine conspiracies to commit 00:21:36.067 --> 00:21:37.949 investigative journalism. 00:21:37.949 --> 00:21:39.997 [laughter] 00:21:41.746 --> 00:21:44.137 Lots of questions, this is great. 00:21:44.771 --> 00:21:51.857 [question]: Somebody working on Tails told me that the NSA has a file on every DD. 00:21:52.323 --> 00:21:54.246 Is that true, do you know? 00:21:54.673 --> 00:21:57.101 [Julian]: Okay, so when you balance your check-book, 00:21:57.101 --> 00:21:58.941 just to answer your question in a really strange way, 00:21:58.941 --> 00:22:00.945 when you balance your check-book, or you balance your bank account, 00:22:00.945 --> 00:22:03.630 and you think this is how much my rent is, this is how much food is, 00:22:03.630 --> 00:22:06.401 this is how much I have to spend on some new hardware, 00:22:06.401 --> 00:22:09.688 you think about money in an individual way. 00:22:10.502 --> 00:22:13.187 But if you think about is as a state, the way a state thinks about money. 00:22:13.187 --> 00:22:16.302 They don't balance budgets the same way that you do. 00:22:16.302 --> 00:22:18.225 They think about long-term investments very differently. 00:22:18.225 --> 00:22:19.759 They have other people's money. 00:22:19.759 --> 00:22:21.719 It's a whole different way of managing it. 00:22:21.719 --> 00:22:27.291 And the NSA is not the Stasi. So it's not that you have to worry about 00:22:27.420 --> 00:22:29.784 them having a file on you, or every Debian developer, 00:22:30.197 --> 00:22:32.626 but rather there exist some laws in the United States that say 00:22:32.626 --> 00:22:35.781 for cyber-security purposes, you don't have constitutional rights 00:22:35.781 --> 00:22:37.707 and based on your accent, you weren't an American anyway, 00:22:37.707 --> 00:22:39.753 and you aren't in America, 00:22:39.753 --> 00:22:41.970 so you don't have any rights at all, anyway, according to them. 00:22:41.970 --> 00:22:44.186 They're just allowed to do whatever they want to you, 00:22:44.186 --> 00:22:46.280 up to and including murdering you, with the CIA. 00:22:46.280 --> 00:22:49.180 That's what they do with drones; that was at the very end of the movie. 00:22:49.735 --> 00:22:52.165 So it's not that they have a file on you. 00:22:52.339 --> 00:22:56.179 It's that they have giant databases full of information on all of us, 00:22:56.179 --> 00:22:59.550 and then when they're interested in you, pull up all your data, 00:22:59.550 --> 00:23:01.299 and associative data, 00:23:01.299 --> 00:23:03.348 and then they use that, and sometimes they use it to target you, 00:23:03.348 --> 00:23:06.246 to break into your machines, or to find people to exert pressure on, 00:23:06.246 --> 00:23:08.378 or to do psychological manipulation on. 00:23:08.378 --> 00:23:10.892 All that stuff, they do all of those things. 00:23:10.892 --> 00:23:12.774 And so it's not that they have one file on you. 00:23:12.774 --> 00:23:16.101 Though maybe, it depends, if you work on a critical package like the Linux kernel 00:23:16.101 --> 00:23:20.756 they might be more interested in you than if you work on something else. 00:23:20.756 --> 00:23:25.402 I don't want to denigrate anyone's work, but they have very specific focuses, 00:23:25.402 --> 00:23:29.065 and so they definitely are interested in being able to compromise systems, right? 00:23:29.920 --> 00:23:36.316 And so you may also have file, but it's really the meta list that's the new way 00:23:36.316 --> 00:23:37.470 of thinking about it. 00:23:37.470 --> 00:23:40.755 And in some senses I think that's actually scarier, because they just hoover up 00:23:40.755 --> 00:23:43.019 everything, all across the whole Internet, 00:23:43.019 --> 00:23:46.134 and things that are interesting, then they have them. 00:23:46.134 --> 00:23:49.202 And depending on what interesting things are there, they maybe 00:23:49.202 --> 00:23:51.504 put those in a database that lasts for ever, 00:23:51.504 --> 00:23:53.469 or maybe it's just around for 30 days, 00:23:53.469 --> 00:23:56.889 or maybe its full content for 9 days, or something like that. 00:23:57.608 --> 00:23:59.830 And then of course if you are a person of interest 00:23:59.830 --> 00:24:02.686 they do do the same stuff that the Stasi does, 00:24:02.686 --> 00:24:06.014 they do that Zersetzung stuff, if you're familiar with this German term, 00:24:06.014 --> 00:24:11.050 disintegration, they do that kind of stuff, along with JTRIG, from GHCQ, 00:24:11.050 --> 00:24:16.042 so they harass people, blackmail them, do all sorts of really nasty stuff. 00:24:16.509 --> 00:24:20.005 And they do that also, so both of those things. 00:24:20.651 --> 00:24:23.210 So again, I don't think you should be paranoid, you should encrypt your stuff, 00:24:23.210 --> 00:24:24.747 and help people do the same, 00:24:24.747 --> 00:24:28.966 and know that in a democratic society with a secret political police, 00:24:28.966 --> 00:24:31.953 the right place to be is in their database, right? 00:24:31.953 --> 00:24:34.045 You should be proud of being surveilled by them, 00:24:34.045 --> 00:24:35.665 it means you're doing the right thing. 00:24:36.650 --> 00:24:41.727 [laughter, applause] 00:24:43.174 --> 00:24:44.883 Nonetheless, we should stop them. 00:24:48.895 --> 00:24:53.843 [question]: I'm curious about your views about Snowden actually coming out 00:24:53.843 --> 00:24:55.634 and saying he was the whistleblower, 00:24:55.634 --> 00:24:59.004 because I know, when he came out, I had some fierce discussion 00:24:59.004 --> 00:25:01.613 with friends about it, so I wanted to know what you thought about it. 00:25:01.613 --> 00:25:03.102 [Jacob]: What do you mean came out? 00:25:03.102 --> 00:25:06.516 [question]: He said I'm Edward Snowden, I'm the whistle-blower, here I am, 00:25:06.516 --> 00:25:10.139 instead of just being anonymous the whole way, just sending files to people. 00:25:11.248 --> 00:25:13.680 [Jacob]: Well, I think the main thing is that it's about control of 00:25:13.680 --> 00:25:15.429 your own narrative, right? 00:25:15.429 --> 00:25:19.654 I mean if we could have done everything here anonymous, and gotten away with it, 00:25:19.654 --> 00:25:20.980 would that have made the same impact 00:25:20.980 --> 00:25:24.948 in getting other people to come forward even if they maintain their anonymity? 00:25:24.948 --> 00:25:27.802 So I think that what Snowden did, what's beautiful about it, 00:25:27.832 --> 00:25:30.506 is that he basically did enough, 00:25:31.243 --> 00:25:32.951 where he could then survive. 00:25:33.118 --> 00:25:36.236 Our job now for the most part, a very good friend told me, 00:25:36.236 --> 00:25:39.221 he's a little bit of a fatalist, he said: 00:25:39.221 --> 00:25:43.232 your job, Laura's job, Glen's job, Snowden's job, your job now is 00:25:43.232 --> 00:25:44.897 just to survive. 00:25:44.897 --> 00:25:47.371 That's all that you need to do now. You don't need to do anything else. 00:25:47.371 --> 00:25:51.804 You should go do other things, like drink a glass of wine, relax, be happy, 00:25:51.804 --> 00:25:54.751 have a nice life, but just survive, 00:25:54.929 --> 00:25:58.732 so other people can see that you do the right thing, and even though you could have 00:25:59.156 --> 00:26:02.230 done more, you did enough, and you lived through it. 00:26:02.230 --> 00:26:06.198 And so Snowden coming out and telling us all of these things, I mean, 00:26:06.198 --> 00:26:09.862 there are really powerful people saying he should be assassinated, right, 00:26:09.862 --> 00:26:13.921 hung by the neck until dead, was what one of the CIA people said. 00:26:13.921 --> 00:26:17.244 So he probably could have continued to be anonymous for a while, 00:26:17.244 --> 00:26:20.449 but imagine if the NSA had got to reveal his identity. 00:26:20.449 --> 00:26:23.884 How would that have been framed, what would the first impression have been? 00:26:23.884 --> 00:26:27.719 I think they called him a narcissist, and they called him all these terrible names. 00:26:27.719 --> 00:26:32.974 And it didn't really stick, because he basically said "come at me bro', 00:26:33.396 --> 00:26:37.746 I'm ready, and you can do your worst, but you can't get rid of the facts, 00:26:37.746 --> 00:26:39.155 so let's talk about the facts." 00:26:39.155 --> 00:26:42.403 And I think the timing of how he did that is good, because people really cared 00:26:42.612 --> 00:26:45.853 about the issues, but he also recognized that it was a matter of time, 00:26:45.853 --> 00:26:50.891 the NSA police went to his house, they really bothered his family, 00:26:50.891 --> 00:26:54.777 they've done that with my family as well, other people's families have had trouble. 00:26:55.283 --> 00:26:59.553 So I think think it's tough, because I think he probably would have liked to have 00:26:59.553 --> 00:27:03.198 been able to not have that happen, but there comes a point at which 00:27:03.198 --> 00:27:05.287 you're the person who has access to all that information 00:27:05.287 --> 00:27:06.865 and they're going to figure it out. 00:27:06.865 --> 00:27:11.517 No amount of anonymity, I think, will last forever, but it can buy you time. 00:27:11.517 --> 00:27:14.508 He got exactly the amount of time he needed. 00:27:15.062 --> 00:27:17.663 The really sad part about him coming out in public when he did, though, was that 00:27:17.663 --> 00:27:21.247 he got stuck in Russia, because my government cancelled his passport. 00:27:21.247 --> 00:27:23.681 I think mostly for propaganda reasons. 00:27:23.681 --> 00:27:28.329 Because in the United States, we denigrate all things relating to Russia. 00:27:28.329 --> 00:27:29.781 And there are lots of problems with Russia, 00:27:29.781 --> 00:27:32.256 and especially with Vladimir Putin, 00:27:32.256 --> 00:27:36.695 but at the same time that seems to be the only country that was willing to uphold 00:27:36.695 --> 00:27:38.441 his fundamental liberties. 00:27:38.441 --> 00:27:41.171 I went to the Council of Europe, and to the European Parliament, 00:27:41.171 --> 00:27:44.670 to the German Parliament, to the French, sort of to the French Parliament, 00:27:44.670 --> 00:27:48.297 they didn't really want to meet with me, but also to the Austrian Parliament, 00:27:48.297 --> 00:27:49.963 and to a number of other places, 00:27:49.963 --> 00:27:53.380 and everyone said, oh, we would really live to help anybody who needs help, 00:27:53.380 --> 00:27:55.253 oh it's Edward Snowden, never mind. 00:27:55.975 --> 00:27:57.813 [laughter] 00:27:57.941 --> 00:28:02.527 And so though I have a lot of critiques on Russia, the propaganda aspect of it 00:28:02.527 --> 00:28:04.657 was very damaging for him to be stuck in Russia, 00:28:04.657 --> 00:28:08.242 but on the other hand, he's still alive, and he's still mostly free. 00:28:08.242 --> 00:28:12.300 And they recognized his right to seek and to receive asylum. 00:28:12.857 --> 00:28:15.331 So there's a lot of trade-offs to think identifying one's self, 00:28:15.331 --> 00:28:17.807 and if you were thinking about being the next Snowden, 00:28:18.300 --> 00:28:19.460 or helping Snowden, or something like that, 00:28:20.384 --> 00:28:22.647 you really have to think that, you really have to think this out many steps ahead, 00:28:22.647 --> 00:28:25.808 and it's easy to stay, oh he should have just stayed anonymous and 00:28:25.808 --> 00:28:27.556 nobody would have figured it out, 00:28:27.556 --> 00:28:31.476 but that's very clearly not planning for the case that they do figure it out, 00:28:31.476 --> 00:28:33.272 and then they're going to be in control of the narrative, 00:28:33.272 --> 00:28:37.750 and in that case, I think you are better off to do what he did, 00:28:37.853 --> 00:28:40.156 and he did so quite reluctantly. 00:28:40.411 --> 00:28:43.481 He's not an egoist, or an narcissist, he's actually a really shy guy 00:28:43.481 --> 00:28:44.762 from what I can tell. 00:28:44.762 --> 00:28:48.644 I don't know exactly what conversation you and your friend had, 00:28:48.644 --> 00:28:52.826 but I would suspect that the notion is that people are more powerful 00:28:52.826 --> 00:28:53.875 when anonymous. 00:28:53.875 --> 00:28:55.966 And that is true sometimes, but not always, 00:28:55.966 --> 00:28:58.484 and it's important to remember that the anonymity technology is there 00:28:58.484 --> 00:29:01.004 so you have a choice, not a requirement. 00:29:01.004 --> 00:29:03.647 And that choice is sometimes counter-intuitive, 00:29:03.647 --> 00:29:06.380 but I think he did the right thing in this way, and I wish that my government 00:29:06.380 --> 00:29:09.022 had done the right thing by him as well, but they did not. 00:29:09.022 --> 00:29:09.833 [question]: So there are lot of questions, do you want to keep going on, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 shall we get in a little Mate? 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [Jacob]: I would love some of that rum. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 I think I have to GRsec, right? GRsec kernel. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And then rum appears. Rum as a service. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [applause] 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 I'm really happy to keep taking questions, because to me, what I want is 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 for every person in this room to feel a part of this, because you really are. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 A lot of the people I've met in this community really inspire me to action, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and it's important to understand that really, it would not have been possible 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 without Debian. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 For example debootstrap - really important tool, right? 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 With weasel's packaging of Tor, it allowed us to have bootstraps of things, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 it allowed us to build things, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and using Free software really was helpful, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 so if you guys have any questions at all, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 really each and every person that helps with Debian should just know 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 that you are a part of that, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and I'm just happy to talk for as long as you want, basically, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 to answer all of your questions, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 except the ones that put me in prison. Thanks. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [laughter] 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [question]: I just wanted to make a quick note about the question 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 "do they have a file on me?" 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 From all I've read so far, it's just that they're doing the thing 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 that is in the commercial world called "big data". 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [Jacob]: Yep. Absolutely. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 Oh boy. GRsec again? 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [orga]: it's not rum, but it's Bavarian whisky. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [Jacob]: Oh boy. It's going to be a heavy morning tomorrow. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 I saw another couple of hands. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [question]: I was just wondering if that you noticed throughout this 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 that you think we could improve in Debian to make the next people's lives easier. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [Jacob]: Oh my god, I'm so glad you asked that question, that's so fantastic. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 I'm going to talk about that tomorrow in my keynote, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 but let me tell you about one that I have. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 I revealed a specific document about a wifi injection attack system. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 It's a classified document, it's a top secret document, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 for a thing called nightstand, and what nightstand is, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 it's basically like car metasploit, it's a wifi injector... 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 cheers! 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 Danke schön. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 It's a wifi injector device... 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 Whew, jesus! 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [laughter, applause] 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [orga]: Tonight's whisky sponsored by drunc-tank dot org. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [Jacob]: So this wifi injector device, what it does is it basically is able to 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 exploit the kernel of a device by sending malformed data over wifi. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 Now I have a series of photographs, so all of us.. not all of us, but most of us 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 used these speciallly modified X60s where we removed the microphones, soldered?? 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 down things on the PCI bus, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 we removed, like, firewire, really modified it, flashed coreboot onto it, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 flipped the read pin so it was only read-only, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 so you couldn't easily make a BIOS root kit and make it persistent, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 we booted TAILS, did all this stuff, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 often we could boot to RAM so that once the machine was powered off 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 basically it would be done, so if someone kicks down your door, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 you just pull the power out, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and you don't have a battery, and when the power fails you have an 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 instant kill switch. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 So things that are in TAILS that are really useful include this 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 wiping the kernel memory package which I hear is being packaged for Debian 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 soon, which is very exciting. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 Because everyone should have access to that so we can tie it into something 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 like GNU panicd or these other things. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 But one thing I kept having problems with is this wifi injection device, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 I'm pretty sure, was very close to my house. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 There was a white van outside, it was vibrating a bit like there was a guy 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 walking around in it, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and then all of sudden, an X60 here, an X60 here, and an X60 here, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 just booted into TAILS, not doing anything at all, but on the wifi network, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 kernel panic, kernel panic, kernel panic. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 All the same kernel panic, all the same memory offsets, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 in the Appletalk driver of the stock kernel for TAILS. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 I think I filed a bug upstream with TAILS at the time, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 but this is just incredible because it's clear that all the crap 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 in the default Debian kernel that you really want for your 1992 Apple network 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 makes operational security really hard, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and one thing that would be really great would be a GRsec enabled kernel... 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [applause] 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 Yes, have to drink. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 But as an example, we built different custom machines, and one of the things 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 that we did for some people and in some circumstances was 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 to build GRsec enabled kernels. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And I'm not going to drink again. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 So we built those kernels 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [audience]: Which ones? 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [Jacbob]: Yes, exactly, those ones. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And that was work which creates a problem for a bunch of reasons. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 When you build custom kernels, and you only have a few people 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 that can build those kernels, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 you actually build a chain of evidence of who helped who. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And if that was stable, normal package, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 that people could install in a Debian pure blend, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 then it would have been easier to do that. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 We built a lot more sandbox profiles for various different things, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 we built some transparent TOR-ification stuff, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and that required a lot of bespoke knowledge, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and it required a lot of effort that a lot of people did not have, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 because they had a different set of skills, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and it's good to have a division of labour, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 but having that kind of stuff built into Debian by default, making a 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 Debian installer that could do that, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and also verification, would be great, right? 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 So I wrote some custom scripts where I could look at a TAILS disk, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 or a Debian install, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and know if it had been tampered with. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And it would be nice if there was just a disk you could boot that did 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 verification of an installed system 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 very very easily, so easily that Glen Greenwald could use it. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 I love Glen, I saw that very politely, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 but what I means is it needs to be easier than that, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 because Glen at least knows that he he a reason to need it. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And so that was something that we really needed help with. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And we spent a lot of time on that. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And there are lots of other little things like that, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and I'll talk about some of those things tomorrow, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 but one of the really big problems is hardware, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 which is that you cannot buy a modern Intel CPU which doesn't come 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 with a backdoor any more. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And that is a huge problem, and I'm not sure that the answer is to use ARM. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 It seems like the answer is to use ARM. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 But that's only if assume that ARM didn't just add a backdoor that's obvious. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 So we really need to think about how to, in moving forward, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 how to have easy to use, easy to buy on the shelf, Debian hardware, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 available everywhere, all the time, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 so you can just go and buy this thing and verify it in some way 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 with some other machine, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 to know that you would have the right thing. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And to that extent we didn't have X-rays for a lot of the circuit boards, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 so that made it very difficult to know if when you buy something, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 it's been tampered with. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 I'll talk about some of that stuff tomorrow, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 but basically, Debian does a lot of stuff right, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and that is also worth mentioning. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 There's so many things that just work out of the box, that just work perfectly. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 So the main thing is to keep the quality assurance at the level, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 or to exceed where it is right now. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 Because it actually works super super well. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 The exception being for very specific targetted attacks, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 the kernel attack surface is pretty big, and pretty bad, I think. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And also, we rebuilt some binaries in order to.. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 sorry, I'll get to you in a second. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 We rebuilt some binaries to make sure that we had address space randomisation 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and linker hardening, and stack canary stuff, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and for some stuff lately we've been using address space sanitizer, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 so it would be really great if all the hardening stuff was turned in, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 if there was PAX plus GRsec as a kernel. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [audience]: so the specific problem with GR security is that they don't really 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 want to work with distros. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 So we could have a Linux kernel package with GR security applied, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 but it wouldn't have any of the other Debian patches. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [Jacob]: So I talked with Brad Spender about this, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and I'm so glad that you said that, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 because what he said was that, as far as I can tell, he's totally interested in 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 helping Debian with this but thinks that Debian is not interested. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 He actually runs a kernel building service where they actually do 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 individual kernel builds, and I think you'd be interested, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and when I told him we'd love to have this in TAILS, he said 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 what patches do I need to include in GRsec to make sure that it'll work? 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And he offered to do the integration into the GRsec patch if there are not 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 too many things. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 So I think what we should try and do is build a line of communication, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and if it costs money we should find a way to raise that money, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 I'll put in some of my own personal money for this, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and I know other people would too. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [distant audience]: I will. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [Jacob]: Great. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 So securedrop, for example, part of what they do for their leaking platform, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 if you go to the intercepts website, you wan to leak them a document, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 they actually use free software everywhere, but there are a few things 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 they build specially, and one of those things is a GRsec kernel. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 So the people at first look, that helped make this movie, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and that work on securedrop, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 they would probably also, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 I'm not committing them, I don't know that they would actually do this, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 but I think they would really like it if that was in there, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and I think it we could find the community will to do that, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 I know I would volunteer and other people would, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 I know that dkg in the back would love to help with this, I would that ??? 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 who is just totally behind funding this work, right? 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 I thought that you were there to protect my civil liberties, buddy. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 But I really think that it's possible that we could do this, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and I definitely think Brad, the author of GRsec, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 I think he would really love it if Debian shipped GRsec. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And it doesn't need to come by default, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 but if it was possible to just have it all, that would be great. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 Maybe we could have an affinity group where everyone who is interested can 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 meet sometime tomorrow and we could talk about doing this. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 I would love to have that conversation. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 Who are you? 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [audience]: Ben Hutchings. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [Jacob]: Oh, nice to meet you! 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [laughter, applause] 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 That's awkward. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [question]: Hi. Sorry to interrupt the awkwardness, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and replace it with more awkwardness. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 Nice to see you, Jake. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 So, I remember reading the documents in 2013 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and seeing the NSA's internal training guide for how to query their 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 Hadoop data store, aka xkeyscore, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and so I thought I would just ask you if you think Free software net helps us 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 or helps them. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [Jacob]: I'm really glad you asked that question. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 I think that Free software helps everyone on the planet, and I think that 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 purpose-based limitations.. I understand why people want them. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 I think we should try to build a world where we are free, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and so putting in purpose-based limitations is really problematic, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and I think what we should do is try to mitigate the harm that they can do 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 with those systems, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 as opposed to pretending that they care about Free software licensing. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 These guys kill people with flying robots, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 it's illegal to murder people, and they do it. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 Limiting their use with licenses, first of all, that just means they'll spend 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 your tax money to rewrite it if they care about the license, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and you won't get their bug-fixes or their improvements, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and then additionally they're still not going to obey your license anyway, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 because literally some of these people work on assassinating people. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 So it is better that we keep our integrity and take the high road, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and write Free software, and we give it to every single person on the planet 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 without exception, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 It's just better. It's better for all of us, right? 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 So the fact that they have Hadoop, the fact that they, for example, use OpenSSL, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 or maybe they use Tor, or whatever, right? 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 Or they use gdb to debug their exploits. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 I kind of wish that on them. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [laughter, applause] 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 I think it's great, right? 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 So one of the things Che Guevara said in his manual about guerilla warfare, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 in chapter two, is that (oh, it was chapter three) 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 He talks about when you have to arm a guerrilla army, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 this is not exactly related, but it's an analog. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 He says that the most important thing is for the guerrilla army to 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 use the weapons of the people that they're fighting - the oppressor. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And the reason is that it allows you to resupply, essentially. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 When you win a battle, you resupply. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 When we all use the same Free software, and we're working on these things, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 the fact that they have to contribute to the same projects and they often do 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 means there's a net win for us. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 They do have some private things that they don't share, obviously, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 with the exception of nice people like Edward Snowden, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and I think that it is a net positive thing, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and if we think of it as a struggle, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 we are better off to take the high road, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and so I really think we should not pretend that we can stop them, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and instead we should work together to build solutions. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And I think that Debian is doing that, right? 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 I think Debian is much harder to compromise than 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 a lot of other operating systems, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and it's much much harder to coerce people, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and there's a strong ethos that comes with it that it's not just the technical 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 project, there's a social aspect to it. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 I think I was in the New Maintainer queue for 11 years, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 maybe that's a little too long, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 but there's a huge hazing process, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 so anyone who wants to help, really really wants to help, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and if they want to do something wrong there are processes to catch 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 people doing things wrong. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 So we should really stay true to the Free software ethos, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and it really is a net benefit. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [question]: Hi Jake. Thanks a lot for saying so much "GRsec". 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 Just wanted to give a shout out. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 You mentioned possible backdoors in CPUs and so on, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 that ARM might not be the next best thing because it's not so open either. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 You might want to have a look at Power 8. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 It's basically PowerPC 64, so Debian has support for it as far as I know, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and most of the stuff is actually open. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 Not that actually designs that IBM is using, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 but you can have, actually, an FPGA implementation of it, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and if you have the money make your own ASICs for it, without even knowing 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 how to do it, which is pretty good, I think. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [Jacob]: I think there are lots of things we can hack right? 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 I mean I had one of those weird RMS laptops, the Limote, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 or whatever it's called, for a while. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And I was definitely able to get some Free software running on it, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 in theory it was a Free software laptop. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 But getting other people to use this is the problem, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 you need to get everybody to use it, right? 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 There's a sort of old anarchist cliché, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 "None of us are free until all of us are free" 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And that really applies here. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 We really need to have Free software that's usable by everyone, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 otherwise we're sort of bound by the lowest common denominator 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 of Free, or proprietary tools, depending on what people have to use. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 So it'll be great when we have that, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and there's a thing called the Nokimist??? 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 which is a video mixing board that has an FPGA implementing a Free software CPU 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 that you can boot Debian on, or OpenWRT, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and it does work, and I have used it, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and in fact I used to use it as a shell, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and for a long time I used a Debian trick, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 actually I've never talked about that in public, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 let me think about that for a second. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 So I used to use an IRC client that was really buggy, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and I couldn't figure out where all the bugs were, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 but I knew that if I hung out in certain networks that someone else 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 would help me find those bugs by trying to exploit my client. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And I wanted to make it as hard as possible. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 So I ran my IRC client inside of a Debian machine that was running an S390 emulator. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 Who here uses Hercules? Thank you to whoever packaged it. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And so I would use Hercules, it was a very long install process. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 Very slow. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And I would do this, and what I'd always dreamed of doing at some point 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 was using the Nokimist??? and the Hercules together 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 for maximum ridiculously difficult to exploit, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 plus GRsec kernel. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 But that's not a usable thing. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 So what we need to do is take these kinds of prototypes 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 which actually do represent many steps forward, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and we need to make sure that they're produced on a scale where 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 you can go into a store and puchase them anonymously, with cash, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 in a way that you can then verify. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And we're actually really close to that with software defined radios 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and open hardware, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 but we're not quite there yet. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [question]: What I meant is that Power 8 is basically getting big, currently, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 on the server market, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and it might get big for other stuff also. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [Jacob]: Hopefully. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [question]: I want to come back to the story about the panic 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 in the Appletalk driver. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 The common approach against this is to compile your own kernel with 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 all this stuff not compiled in, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 but on two of my systems I have a modprobe wrapper which has 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 a whitelist of module which may be loaded, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and I install that wrapper as the thing that the kernel uses for loading modules. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 Do you know if such a thing exists elsewhere, or if not, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 I would be interested in developing it into something which is actually useable 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 for people. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [Jacob]: That would be great. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 In this case we were using Tails. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And so, Tails is very finicky about what it will accept, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and so having that in Debian will make it a lot easier to get it into something 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 like Tails, I think. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 But the main thing is really that we have to think about the attack surface 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 of the kernel very differently. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 The problem is not Appletalk; the problem is the Linux kernel is filled with 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 a lot of code, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and you can autoload, in certain cases, certain things come in, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and certain things get autoloaded, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and I know Bdale loves his ham radio stuff, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 but I never use ham radio on my machine 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 I used for clandestine conspiracies, you know? 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 That's a separate machine. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 It's over here. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 So we just need to find a way to think about that. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And part of that could be kernel stuff, but also part of it could be thinking 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 about solutions like that, where we don't need to change the kernel. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 So if you could package that and develop that, it would be really fantastic. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [Ben]: Actually, some time ago, after I think it was the econet exploits, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 no-one uses econet, it was broken anyway, but you could exploit it, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 because it was autoloaded. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 So I actually went through and turned off autoloading on a few of the more obscure 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 network protocols. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 We could probably go further with that, even in the defaults. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [Jacob]: I think it would be great to change some of the kernel stuff so that 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 at least, I mean, Tails is a special use case, where, I think, it's very important, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and it doesn't work for everyone, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 but we should just consider that there are certainly things which are really great, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and I want to use Debian for it, because Debian is a universal operating system. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 But for a modern desktop system where you're using GNOME, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and you haven't set anything up, Appletalk for example, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 maybe we would ask those people to load that module themselves. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [Ben]: Yeah, for example you could have, a lot of those things are going to 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 have supporting utilities, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 so you could put something in the supporting utilities that loads it 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 at boot time. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And if you don't have those installed, you don't need it. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [Jacob]: Yep, totally. And I think there's lots of ways to do it where 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 the network can't trigger it, and that's important. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [Ben]: Yeah, that puzzled me, I can't understand, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 the protocol module when userland tries to open a socket 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 of that type, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 it shouldn't happen in response to network traffic. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 There are things like, I think if you run ifconfig that can autoload 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 a bunch of things, for example. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [Jacob]: Yeah, I think on either side it should be more explicit, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and in this case with Tails, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 there was a time when you looked at the kernel module list 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and it was pretty amazing, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 like I think there was an X25 thing, an Appletalk, thing, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 wait, this is all about going over Tor, we don't support any of these 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 things at all. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 So it's just the way that things are interdependent, right? 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 It's not a dig at the kernel itself. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 I think the Linux kernel as it works in Debian today works really well 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 for a lot of people, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 but there is definitely a high security use case, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and I, for example, if I were a Debian developer, and I had a development 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 machine where I didn't run a web browser, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and I took a lot of effort. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 It would be really nice if there were a kernel that put in the same 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 threshold of security. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And I think that the GRsec kernel with some stuff changed about it, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 like getting rid of Appletalk and a few other things, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 would be closer to that, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and combined with that guy's tool that he's talking about, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 you could make autoloadable module, that at least even if the system was 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 going to autoload it, you could stop it, in a failing closed sort of way. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And I think there's a lot of stuff, practically, to do on that front, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and there's another project called Subgraph OS, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 which is basically working on becoming in some ways a Debian derivative, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and they're going to do stuff like GRsec kernel, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and they have a whole sandboxing framework which uses apparmor, seccomp 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and xpra, and a few other things, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and I think that they'll make a lot of interesting security decisions, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 which might make sense to adopt in Debian later. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [Ben]: I think Matthew Garrett has an interesting criticism about that and 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 how it wouldn't really work, and Wayland was a better way to go than xpra. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [Jacob]: Yeah, I've heard those criticisms, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 but Matthew Garrett is wrong. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 Not usually, but in this particular case. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 For example, the sandboxing stuff, if you have a GNOME appstore, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 essentially, that's for one set of users, but for a Debian developer 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 writing your own policies, it might be useful, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and if you need Wayland, you might not have a full solution, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 we might want to have both for a while. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And think it'd be great. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And the main thing is we just need to find people who will think about those 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 issues and try to integrate them, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 because most people who write exploits, or who understand how to do offensive 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 security stuff, they don't want to help Free software projects, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 they just want to exploit them. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And so some of the Subgraph guys, what I really like about them 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 is that they're trying to improve the Free software products we all use. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 Even though they may make different design decisions, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 they're making Free software all the same. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [question]: Maybe also, some other thing to keep in mind is actually 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 that there is also a social aspect of this pressure if NSA wants to put anything 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 inside Debian. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 So if we actually also need to make sure that if they put pressure on somebody 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 we have any way to help these people not land in prison. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 So is there also a social aspect of supporting people which get pressure 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 from anyone. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [Jacob]: Yep. I mean, if anyone is ever in that situation one thing I would say 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 is that it's your right to remain silent, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 you have the right to remain silent I think is the phrase the police would say 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 but there are definitely communities of people who will help you. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 There's a group called the Courage foundation, for example, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 which was started by Sarah Harrison, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and the job that the Courage foundation has taken on 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 is essentially to help people who would be sources or who are in harm's way like this 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and if you found yourself in that kind of a position there are people 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 who will try to help you. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 I really don't think that is the next step in this, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 I think that could happen. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 But I thin it's much more likely someone is going to write an exploit for Firefox. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 That's the way they're going to own Debian people in the future, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 for the most part, that's how they own us today. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 Firefox, number one enemy to security on your Debian machine, probably. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And that's not a dig at Firefox, it's just super-complicated software, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and these guys are really good at writing exploits, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and that's an easy target. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 So we, I think, have to do with the social thing, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 but we also should look at some of the technical problems, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and then when and if people have that, you can contact me. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 I'm super happy to put you in touch with people who will help. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And obviously, get a lawyer, get several lawyers if you can. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 Contact the EFF, or the ACLU, depending on where you are. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 At least in Germany, and in the United States, it isn't so bad yet 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 that they can put that kind of pressure on you openly, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 in a Free software project. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 If you write proprietary software you're in a very different situations, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and there are definitely people who are in that situation right now, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and I don't envy them. Their position is actually much harder. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 So actually writing Free software already makes you not at the very beginning 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 of the target list, I think. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 Any other questions? Wow. Where's the rum? 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [question]: How do you deliver the encrypted message without exposing 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 the connection to a third party? 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [Jacob]: Which encrypted message do you mean? 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 Do you mean, like jabber? 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [question]: Email, or jabber, yes. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [Jacob]: For the most part we use systems where Tor hidden services are available 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 to connect to them, so we never even left the Tor anonymity network, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 so they're end-to-end encrypted and anonymized, you connect to a 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 .onion address, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and then using crypto on top of that, so TLS to a Jabber server, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and then OTR on top of that, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 so you have, you could call it a composition of cryptographic systems, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and the core of that is Tor, along with using throwaway machines, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 going to locations where you never go twice, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 using open wifi plus Tor plus TLS plus OTR, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and for email, Riseup offers Tor hidden services, which allows you to do the same 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 thing, essentially, and then using PGP as well. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [question]: I mean, how about metadata, like the delivery address of the target? 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [Jacbob]: In some cases we use a system called Pond, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and Pond is a system that is completely Tor hidden service based, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 pond.imperialviolet.org. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 Adam Langley probably wouldn't want me to say, but I'll say it anyway, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 it would be very useful to package this for Debian, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 because it's a system where once you do key exchange with someone, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 you have an end-to-end encrypted messaging system that's like email, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 you can send files that are encrypted, you can send messages that are encrypted, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 It's delay based. You don't have usernames, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 you just have a public key, and then you have group signatures, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 so that people can send things to your mailbox by proving they are a member 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 of the group but not which member of the group they are. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And there's a lot of stuff like that. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 So we use Jabber, we use email, and we use Pond. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And those three systems together also allowed us to build a clandestine 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 sneakernet. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 So we have the ability to carry USB disks, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and a few of us carried them inside of our bodies, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and if you've never had that experience, lucky you. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 You want to make sure you use post-quantum computer crypto for that, by the way. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 It's more comfortable. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [orga]: Shall we relieve this man from his duties? 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [Jacob]: Any more questions? 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [orga]: One more question. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [question]: Okay, so when the Snowden leaks were first published it created 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 a lot of awareness, and people were talking about it, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and there was a huge media echo, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 Now if some documents leaked, people are saying yeah, all this surveillance, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and we aren't dead yet, and we can still live our lives. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 They basically care less. They still care a bit, but they care much less than 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 when the first documents were published, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 so how can we maintain awareness for this issue in the world population, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 in your opinion? 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [Jacob]: There's a really scary thing that's happening right now. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 There was this idea in the 90s, we had the crypto wars. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 Did any of you remember this idea of the crypto wars? 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 Okay, a few of you do, maybe not all of you do. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 But we had the so-called crypto wars in the 90s, I encourage you to look this up 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 on DuckDuckGo, or whatever your favourite search engine is. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 In theory we're in the second crypto wars now. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 In reality what happened is the first crypto wars never ended. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 We didn't actually win, like we thought we did. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 But there are a bunch of things that are taking place. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 For example, making a stand against backdoors. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 Using end-to-end encrypted communications. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 Actually pushing for that, being quite open about actually hosting 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 those kinds of services, and doing it from a principled perspective, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 from a legal perspective. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 I think you will find that the tension will continue to rise for a while, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and I think that it will continue to be a conversation about public debate, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and an important aspect of this is that now regular journalists that don't 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 understand technology at least understand the importance of these things. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And if they don't do that, they at least perceive that they will be considered 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 unprofessional if they don't care, and think about those things, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 or they'll be somehow negligent. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And I think that will keep some of the discussion going, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and it will allow us to build some breathing room, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and that breathing room will actually allow us to build some alternatives. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 But there are some downsides, right? 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 Some of the things that take place when you reveal security service spying 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 is that it tends to get normalized, to a degree. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 But then in some cases it does get pushed back. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 In the 70s in the United States, it became illegal to do assassinations, for example. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 Because what the CIA were doing was so atrocious that eventually there was 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 political pushback. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 It turns out it only lasted 30 years, and then they started doing it again. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 But there's a saying in my country which is that effectively the price of liberty 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 is eternal vigilance. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And that's what we are engaged in now. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And the liberty starts with software liberty, I think, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 in the case of communications on networks. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And so we have to have Free software, and it has to be responsibly encoding 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 packets and data, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and if we think about it in this sense we'll find a lot of pressure, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and we'll have a lot of discussions about it, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and you'll start to see it be a part of policy debates, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 like one of the presidential candidates in the United States 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 just came out against encryption. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 I hope that sinks his presidential campaign. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 I mean it's weird to be against encryption. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 It's like I'm against prime numbers. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 No modular arithmetic. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [laughter, applause] 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 I just want to say it's important to understand, you are right, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 people will be normalized about it, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 but each and every one of us that understands these issues 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 can actually keep it alive. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And the way we do that is when we communicate with people... 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 I'll give you an example which I like to give. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 I grew up in San Fransisco and in the Bay Area or San Fransisco, and California, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and I did that in the 80s. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And so a lot of people that I knew had HIV and they died of AIDS. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And there was a huge discussion about this, and it was called GRID, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 the Gay Related Immune Deficiency syndrome. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 Before it was called HIV and AIDS. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And lots of people were sick, and lot of people died, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and there was a sort of normalization process where people sort of 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 accepted this as their fate, especially if they were in the gay community. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And still, over years and years and years, people began to build a culture about 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 safe sex, and they started to talk about respecting their partners, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and about talking about these issues, and about getting tested, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and it took a lot of effort, to really go much further. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 A lot of people actually died in that process. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 It was a very sad, serious situation. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And I think we have similar discussions that are taking place now, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and some people don't take it seriously, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and if they happen to be Muslims living in Pakistan, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 they might get a drone strike. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And there's a sort of survival mechanism that takes place there. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And it's an unfortunate parallel, I think, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 but I would really consider that we can change this dialogue 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 by continuing to have it even though it's exhausting, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and by recognizing our responsibility, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and how we can make it better by continuing to do that, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and by building healthy alternatives, and by building new systems, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and by refusing to backdoor any system, ever, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 completely committing to Free software, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and transparency of that software, and also of those processes. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And really really really sharing the knowledge about it, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 to make it impossible to surpress. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And we should not accept the normalization of that. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 We shouldn't make it fun to spy on people, we shouldn't make jokes about it 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 in a way that normalizes it, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and we should respect those people who are victims of surveillance, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and we should recognize that basically everyone here is a victim of surveillance 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 to some degree, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 and we should care about that, and we should continue to be upset, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 but not just upset; to channel that anger into something useful 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 like making Debian better. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [applause] 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [orga]: Thanks Jake for such a long Q&A session, 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 I hope you enjoy the rum. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 And I'm sure Jake's going to ask any more questions if he can still talk. 99:59:59.999 --> 99:59:59.999 [Jacob]: Thanks.