0:00:00.000,0:00:01.388 ... wanted to be able to use 0:00:01.484,0:00:03.114 Thunderbird and GnuPG together with Tor, 0:00:03.279,0:00:04.744 and so we thought: 0:00:04.884,0:00:07.103 oh, it would be really easy, I bet, 0:00:07.164,0:00:09.694 to configure Thunderbird to work with Tor 0:00:09.753,0:00:11.989 - hah - so a new Free software project[br]was born. 0:00:12.758,0:00:15.403 It's a really simple thing, but basically 0:00:15.530,0:00:18.162 it's just a package[br]that hooks it all together. 0:00:18.285,0:00:21.277 So a lot of people were using Thunderbird 0:00:21.361,0:00:23.797 and TorBirdy, and GnuPG, and Tor, 0:00:23.966,0:00:26.031 and Debian, together for email, 0:00:26.100,0:00:30.748 combined with Riseup as an email service. 0:00:30.829,0:00:36.954 So it's a literally a real peer to peer,[br]Free software driven set of things, 0:00:37.679,0:00:41.221 actually, that made it possible. 0:00:48.559,0:00:50.438 [question]:[br]So one thing I never understood about this 0:00:50.610,0:00:53.464 process was exactly how the documents were[br]handled, and maybe that's because nobody 0:00:53.634,0:00:57.561 wants to say, but, you know, did you leave[br]them on a server somewhere and download 0:00:57.690,0:01:00.807 them, hand them over to people, and who[br]took what where, and how do you... 0:01:01.263,0:01:05.069 in case I need to do something really[br]dangerous with a load of documents, 0:01:05.198,0:01:07.764 what's the best way of doing it? 0:01:07.891,0:01:10.879 [laughter] 0:01:12.758,0:01:14.763 [Jacob]: Hmm! 0:01:16.555,0:01:18.859 [audience member]: It's a good thing[br]this isn't being streamed. 0:01:19.498,0:01:21.593 I'm sorry, what? 0:01:21.845,0:01:24.789 There was a voice from god,[br]what did she say? 0:01:25.169,0:01:27.261 [audience]:[br]I said good we aren't streaming tonight. 0:01:27.478,0:01:30.162 Oh yeah, so hello to all of our friends[br] 0:01:30.246,0:01:34.133 in domestic and international[br]surveillance services. 0:01:34.819,0:01:37.458 Well, so I won't answer your question, 0:01:37.587,0:01:40.146 but since you asked the question,[br]it's my turn to talk. 0:01:40.407,0:01:41.600 So what I would say is that... 0:01:41.686,0:01:44.075 if you want to do clandestine activities 0:01:44.198,0:01:46.161 that you fear for your life for, 0:01:46.291,0:01:48.211 you need to really think about[br]the situation that you're in 0:01:48.298,0:01:49.361 very carefully. 0:01:49.447,0:01:52.093 And so a big part of this is[br]operational security 0:01:52.182,0:01:54.272 and a big part of that is[br]compartmentalization. 0:01:54.359,0:01:56.530 So certain people had access[br]to certain things, 0:01:56.699,0:01:58.195 but maybe they couldn't decrypt them, 0:01:58.364,0:02:00.968 and certain things were moved around, 0:02:01.052,0:02:03.487 and that's on a need to know basis, 0:02:03.616,0:02:05.067 and those people who knew, 0:02:05.191,0:02:09.845 which is not me - I don't know anything,[br]I don't know what you're talking about. 0:02:09.845,0:02:11.888 Those people knew, and then you know, 0:02:12.016,0:02:13.427 it'll go with them to their grave. 0:02:13.515,0:02:15.729 So if you're interested in being the next[br]Edward Snowden, 0:02:15.860,0:02:17.225 you need to do your homework 0:02:17.397,0:02:20.341 in finding people that will be able to do[br]the other part of it, let's say. 0:02:20.341,0:02:22.771 But just in general, I mean 0:02:22.858,0:02:24.826 compartmentalization is key, right. 0:02:24.949,0:02:27.163 So it's not just for AppArmor profiles. 0:02:27.294,0:02:30.285 So you need to think about[br]what you want to do. 0:02:30.364,0:02:33.563 And I mean a big part of this[br]is to consider that the network itself 0:02:33.651,0:02:36.935 is the enemy, even though it is useful[br]for communicating. 0:02:37.063,0:02:40.730 So all the metadata that exists[br]on the network 0:02:40.863,0:02:42.871 could have tipped people off,[br]could have caused 0:02:42.997,0:02:44.363 this whole thing to fall apart. 0:02:44.489,0:02:46.789 It really is amazing, I feel like you know 0:02:46.923,0:02:48.157 two and half, three years ago, 0:02:48.240,0:02:49.866 when you talk about Free software, 0:02:49.949,0:02:51.617 and you talk about the idea of[br]Free software, 0:02:51.743,0:02:55.242 and you talk about issues relating to[br]autonomy and privacy, and security 0:02:55.324,0:02:57.803 you have a really different reception now[br]than you did then, 0:02:57.928,0:02:58.997 and that's really what it took 0:02:59.163,0:03:01.596 to turn the world half a degree,[br]or something, 0:03:01.728,0:03:03.899 or a quarter of a degree or something. 0:03:04.881,0:03:08.165 So I'm not going to tell you about[br]detailed plans for conspiracy, 0:03:08.298,0:03:10.943 but I highly encourage you to read about[br]South African history, 0:03:11.028,0:03:13.588 in particular the history of[br]Umkhonto we Sizwe. 0:03:13.718,0:03:17.979 They are the clandestine communications[br]group for MK, 0:03:18.023,0:03:20.881 or rather the operation who lay inside of MK, 0:03:20.881,0:03:22.675 which is Umkhonto we Sizwe, 0:03:22.800,0:03:25.151 and they are sort of with[br]the African National Congress, 0:03:25.360,0:03:28.760 and those people have published so many[br]books about the revolutionary activities 0:03:28.852,0:03:31.239 to overthrow the apartheid state. 0:03:31.366,0:03:33.756 If you read these books, especially[br]the book "Operation Vula" 0:03:33.880,0:03:36.188 and "Armed and Dangerous"[br]by Ronnie Kasrils 0:03:36.272,0:03:38.705 they give you some idea about[br]what you need to do 0:03:38.835,0:03:40.279 which is to compartmentalize, 0:03:40.410,0:03:42.542 how to find people to do various tasks,[br]specific tasks, 0:03:42.719,0:03:45.188 how to work on building trust[br]with each other, what that looks like, 0:03:45.272,0:03:47.196 how to identify political targets, 0:03:47.278,0:03:50.313 how you might use things[br]like communications technology 0:03:50.397,0:03:53.037 to change the political topic on, 0:03:53.129,0:03:55.426 and the discussion in general. 0:03:55.556,0:03:59.523 And I think the best way to learn about[br]these things is to study previous people 0:03:59.609,0:04:01.660 who have tried to do that kind of stuff. 0:04:01.742,0:04:05.241 And the NSA is not the apartheid regime of[br]South Africa, 0:04:05.241,0:04:06.890 but there are still lessons[br]to be learned there, 0:04:06.986,0:04:10.060 so if you really want to know the answer[br]to that, also Che Guevara's manual 0:04:10.184,0:04:12.104 on guerilla warfare is very interesting, 0:04:12.287,0:04:13.774 and there's a lot of other books like that. 0:04:13.854,0:04:15.691 I'd be happy to talk about it[br]with you later. 0:04:15.852,0:04:18.456 And I have nothing to do with anything[br]that we may or may not have done. 0:04:18.547,0:04:20.213 [laughter] 0:04:24.900,0:04:28.280 [question]: Do you think there is a chance[br]that things may get better 0:04:28.725,0:04:33.050 for example I know that publicly,[br]some programs were not extended 0:04:33.950,0:04:37.212 but I don't know what is happening[br]in the background 0:04:37.390,0:04:43.147 so maybe it's the same thing[br]but they are pretending that it's not 0:04:43.486,0:04:45.193 How do you see this? 0:04:45.409,0:04:47.713 [Jacob]: Well I think a couple of things. 0:04:47.794,0:04:53.937 In general I think what happened, not just[br]with this movie but with all of these things 0:04:54.066,0:04:56.073 is that in inspired hope, 0:04:56.073,0:04:57.353 and the hope is very important, 0:04:57.441,0:05:01.151 but hope is not a strategy for survival,[br]or for building alternatives, 0:05:01.279,0:05:03.495 so what it has also done, is that it has[br]allowed us to raise the profile 0:05:03.670,0:05:05.500 of the things which actually do[br]make it better. 0:05:05.587,0:05:08.832 For example ridding ourselves of the[br]chains of proprietary software 0:05:08.961,0:05:12.071 is something that's a serious discussion[br]with people that wouldn't have previously 0:05:12.158,0:05:14.849 talked about Free software[br]because they don't care about liberty, 0:05:14.972,0:05:16.510 they care about security. 0:05:16.679,0:05:18.689 And even though I think those are[br]really simliar things, 0:05:18.774,0:05:21.118 previously they just thought we were just[br]Free software hippies, 0:05:21.251,0:05:22.402 in tie-dye shirts 0:05:22.486,0:05:25.086 and while that may be true on the weekends[br]and evenings 0:05:25.086,0:05:27.581 or with Bdale every day[br][laughter] 0:05:27.581,0:05:29.541 I think that actually does make it better 0:05:29.671,0:05:32.784 And it also changes the dialogue, in[br]the sense that it's no longer reasonable 0:05:32.878,0:05:37.307 to pretend that mass surveillance and[br]surveillance issues don't matter, 0:05:37.439,0:05:39.145 because if you really go down the[br]rabbit-hole 0:05:39.231,0:05:42.257 of thinking about what some of the[br]security services are trying to do 0:05:42.257,0:05:45.289 it becomes obvious that we want to encrypt[br]everything all the time 0:05:45.289,0:05:48.101 to beat selector-based surveillance[br]and dragnet-based surveillance. 0:05:48.187,0:05:50.276 It doesn't matter if something is authenticated 0:05:50.366,0:05:52.683 You could still trigger some action[br]to take place 0:05:52.762,0:05:54.387 with these kinds of surveillance machines 0:05:54.473,0:05:56.774 that could for example drone[br]strike someone, 0:05:56.905,0:05:58.440 and so it raises that. 0:05:58.524,0:05:59.840 And that gives me a lot of hope too, 0:06:00.008,0:06:03.378 because people understand the root[br]of the problem, 0:06:03.466,0:06:05.002 or the root of many problems 0:06:05.087,0:06:07.090 and the root of some violence[br]in the world, actually. 0:06:07.217,0:06:09.098 And so it helps us to reduce that[br]violence 0:06:09.222,0:06:10.761 by getting people to acknowledge[br]that it's real 0:06:10.848,0:06:12.209 and also that they care about it 0:06:12.294,0:06:14.078 and that we care about each other. 0:06:14.132,0:06:16.861 So that really gives me a lot of hope,[br]and part of that is Snowden 0:06:16.990,0:06:18.483 and part of that is the documents 0:06:18.569,0:06:20.276 but the other part of it is that.. 0:06:20.401,0:06:25.013 I don't want to blow it up and make it[br]sound like we did something 0:06:25.144,0:06:26.630 like a big deal, 0:06:26.758,0:06:29.916 but in a sense, Laura, Glen, myself[br]and a number of other people 0:06:30.001,0:06:32.526 were really not sure we would ever be able[br]to travel home to our country 0:06:32.693,0:06:34.142 that we wouldn't be arrested. 0:06:34.227,0:06:36.487 I actually haven't been home[br]in over two and half years, 0:06:36.618,0:06:38.747 well, two years and three months[br]or something 0:06:38.833,0:06:41.992 I went out on a small business trip[br]that was supposed to last two weeks 0:06:42.075,0:06:43.484 and then this happened 0:06:43.569,0:06:44.893 and I've been hear ever since. 0:06:44.893,0:06:46.516 It's a really long, crazy trip. 0:06:46.644,0:06:50.868 But the point is that that's what was[br]necessary to make some of these changes 0:06:51.035,0:06:53.474 and eventually it will turn around 0:06:53.599,0:06:54.667 and I will be able to go home, 0:06:54.667,0:06:57.096 and Laura and Glen will be able to travel[br]to the US again. 0:06:57.178,0:07:00.062 Obviously, Julian is still stuck in the[br]Ecuadorian embassy 0:07:00.232,0:07:01.807 Sarah lives in exile in Berlin, 0:07:01.807,0:07:03.048 I live in exile in Berlin, 0:07:03.048,0:07:04.539 And Ed is in Moscow 0:07:04.667,0:07:07.528 So we're not finished with some of[br]these things 0:07:07.613,0:07:11.708 and it's also possible that we are,[br]the set of people I mentioned, 0:07:11.836,0:07:15.163 the state we're in, will stay that way[br]forever. 0:07:15.248,0:07:16.918 But what matters is that the rest[br]of the world 0:07:17.043,0:07:19.044 can actually move on and fix some of[br]these problems, 0:07:19.044,0:07:20.920 and I have a lot of hope about that. 0:07:21.007,0:07:24.040 And I see a lot of change, that's the[br]really big part. 0:07:24.128,0:07:29.795 Like I see the reproducible build stuff[br]that Holger and Lunar are working on. 0:07:29.969,0:07:32.872 People really understand the root reason[br]for needing to do that 0:07:32.961,0:07:34.788 and actually seems quite reasonable[br]to people 0:07:34.919,0:07:37.521 who would previously have expended energy[br]against it, 0:07:37.607,0:07:40.722 in support of it, so I think that's[br]really good. 0:07:40.722,0:07:43.026 And there's a lot of other hopeful things. 0:07:43.109,0:07:45.456 So I would try and be as uplifting[br]as possible. 0:07:45.585,0:07:47.588 It's not just the rum! 0:07:50.281,0:07:53.651 [question]: Near the end of the film[br]we saw something about another source. 0:07:53.736,0:07:57.147 I may have been missing some news[br]or something 0:07:57.314,0:08:01.208 but I don't remember anything about that[br]being public. 0:08:01.296,0:08:02.943 Do you know what happened to them? 0:08:03.031,0:08:05.633 [Jacob]: As far as I know any other[br]source that was mentioned in the film 0:08:05.719,0:08:08.364 is still anonymous, and they're still free. 0:08:08.492,0:08:11.221 I'm not exactly sure because I was not[br]involved in that part 0:08:11.390,0:08:13.188 but I also saw the end of the film 0:08:13.309,0:08:16.424 and I've seen a bunch of other reporting[br]which wasn't attributed to anyone in particular 0:08:16.552,0:08:21.375 So the good news... there's an old slogan[br]from the Dutch hacker community, right? 0:08:21.547,0:08:22.956 "Someone you trust is one of us, 0:08:23.038,0:08:25.983 and the leak is higher up in the chain of[br]command than you" 0:08:26.067,0:08:30.718 And I feel like that might be true again,[br]hopefully. 0:08:32.765,0:08:34.856 I think that guy has a question as well. 0:08:34.945,0:08:39.303 [question]: Part of the problem initially[br]was that encryption software 0:08:39.428,0:08:42.285 was not so easy to use, right? 0:08:42.285,0:08:44.211 And I think part of the challenge[br]for everyone 0:08:44.211,0:08:47.744 was to improve on that situation[br]to make it better 0:08:47.917,0:08:52.526 so I'm asking you if you've observed[br]any change and to the rest of the room 0:08:52.654,0:08:56.148 have we done anything to improve on that? 0:08:57.049,0:09:00.714 [Jacob]: I definitely think that there is[br]a lot of free software 0:09:00.843,0:09:02.723 that makes encryption easier to use, 0:09:02.894,0:09:05.620 though not always on free platforms,[br]which really is heart-breaking. 0:09:05.711,0:09:09.078 For example Moxie Marlinspike has done[br]a really good job 0:09:09.165,0:09:10.914 with Signal, Textsecure and Redphone 0:09:10.914,0:09:14.030 and making end-to-end, encrypted[br]calling, texting, sexting, 0:09:14.111,0:09:16.717 and whatever apps, 0:09:17.183,0:09:20.044 sext-secure is what I think it's nicknamed 0:09:20.127,0:09:22.433 and I'm very impressed by that,[br]and it works really well 0:09:22.517,0:09:24.572 and it's something which, especially[br]in the last two years, 0:09:24.663,0:09:27.517 if you have a cell-phone,[br]which I don't recommend 0:09:27.560,0:09:31.100 but if you have a cell-phone,[br]and you put in everyone's phone number, 0:09:31.234,0:09:34.519 a lot of people that I would classify as[br]non-technical people, 0:09:34.599,0:09:37.290 that don't care about Free software[br]as a hobby or as a passion 0:09:37.415,0:09:39.209 or as a profession. 0:09:39.209,0:09:40.446 You see their names in those systems 0:09:40.532,0:09:42.537 often more than some of the[br]Free software people, 0:09:42.709,0:09:44.460 and that's really impressive to me, 0:09:44.582,0:09:48.295 and I think there's been a huge shift[br]just generally about those sorts of things 0:09:48.380,0:09:51.155 also about social responsibility, 0:09:51.374,0:09:53.840 or people understand they have a[br]responsibility to other people 0:09:54.011,0:09:57.557 to encrypt communications,[br]and not to put people in harm's way 0:09:57.685,0:10:01.439 by sending unsafe stuff over[br]unsafe communication lines. 0:10:01.570,0:10:04.937 So I think in my personal view it's better. 0:10:05.068,0:10:07.924 But the original problem wasn't actually[br]that the encryption was hard to use. 0:10:08.053,0:10:10.656 I think the main problem is people didn't[br]understand the reason 0:10:10.782,0:10:12.572 that it needed to be done 0:10:12.700,0:10:16.727 and they believed the lie that is[br]targetted versus mass surveillance. 0:10:16.859,0:10:20.099 And there's a big lie, and the lie is[br]that there is such a thing 0:10:20.187,0:10:22.236 as targeted surveillance. 0:10:22.363,0:10:24.924 In the modern era, most so-called[br]targetted surveillance actually happens 0:10:24.924,0:10:26.455 through mass surveillance. 0:10:26.455,0:10:28.418 They gather everything up, and then they[br]look through the thing 0:10:28.551,0:10:30.211 they've already seized. 0:10:30.211,0:10:32.945 And of course there are targetted,[br]focussed attacks. 0:10:33.073,0:10:36.358 But the main thing is that the abuse of[br]surveillance often happens 0:10:36.443,0:10:37.805 on an individual basis. 0:10:37.894,0:10:39.681 It also has a societal cost. 0:10:39.681,0:10:41.816 I think a lot of people really[br]understand that. 0:10:41.904,0:10:45.961 It's probably because I also live in[br]Germany now for the last two years 0:10:46.040,0:10:49.583 but I feel that German society in[br]particular is extremely aware 0:10:49.751,0:10:52.012 of these abuses in the modern world 0:10:52.099,0:10:55.299 and they have a historical context[br]that allows them to talk about it 0:10:55.388,0:10:58.288 with the rest of the world, where the[br]world doesn't downplay it. 0:10:58.369,0:10:59.948 So this is how other people relate to[br]Germany 0:11:00.081,0:11:02.681 not just about Germans relate to[br]each other. 0:11:02.853,0:11:06.390 And that has also been really good[br]for just meeting regular people 0:11:06.520,0:11:07.885 who really care about it, 0:11:08.058,0:11:09.122 and who really want to do things. 0:11:09.249,0:11:10.875 So people's parents email me,[br]and are like 0:11:10.960,0:11:12.197 "I want to protect my children, 0:11:12.325,0:11:14.971 what's the best way to use crypto[br]with them?" 0:11:15.099,0:11:16.507 You know, things like that. 0:11:16.635,0:11:19.450 And I didn't every receive emails like[br]that in the past 0:11:19.618,0:11:23.504 and that's to me is uplifting[br]and very positive. 0:11:25.041,0:11:27.748 [question]: A quick organisational question. 0:11:27.880,0:11:30.497 Right now we're live-streaming the Q&A.[br]Are you comfortable with that? 0:11:30.668,0:11:31.632 [Jacob]: I don't think in the last three[br]years I've ever had a moment 0:11:31.939,0:11:35.002 that wasn't being recorded. 0:11:36.538,0:11:39.324 [laughter, applause] 0:11:41.095,0:11:43.056 [question]: If you're fine with it, moving on... 0:11:43.726,0:11:47.512 [Jacob]: That's fine, just don't do it[br]when I'm trying to sleep. 0:11:48.148,0:11:51.477 [question]: I was wondering why Laura[br]and you ended up in Germany 0:11:51.610,0:11:54.894 because what you said about people in[br]Germany might be true 0:11:54.981,0:12:00.612 but I'm really ashamed about my Government[br]and how they dealt with ???? 0:12:00.612,0:12:04.153 and they are doing nothing for this. 0:12:04.451,0:12:07.692 [Jacob]: The reason that we ended up in[br]Germany 0:12:07.777,0:12:10.850 is that I'd been attending[br]Chaos Computer Club events 0:12:11.018,0:12:12.728 for many years 0:12:12.810,0:12:15.241 and there are bunch of people that are[br]part of the Chaos Computer Club 0:12:15.371,0:12:17.122 who are really supportive,[br]and good people, 0:12:17.207,0:12:19.299 who have a stable base,[br]and an infrastructure. 0:12:19.427,0:12:24.638 The German hacker scene has this[br]phenomenon which is that 0:12:24.809,0:12:27.071 it's a part of society. 0:12:27.290,0:12:30.487 So there are people in the CCC who will[br]talk with the constitutional court 0:12:30.569,0:12:31.892 for example, 0:12:31.981,0:12:34.488 and that creates a much more stable[br]civil society 0:12:34.580,0:12:36.196 and those people were willing to help us. 0:12:36.285,0:12:38.627 They were willing to hold footage,[br]to hold encrypted data. 0:12:38.716,0:12:41.616 They were willing to help modify hardware. 0:12:41.702,0:12:44.855 There was a huge base of support where[br]people, even if they had fear, 0:12:44.985,0:12:47.070 they did stuff anyway. 0:12:47.121,0:12:49.894 And that support went back a long time. 0:12:49.977,0:12:52.965 And so we knew that it would be safe[br]to store footage for the film here. 0:12:53.051,0:12:56.292 In Berlin, not in Heidelberg, but here[br]in Germany. 0:12:56.464,0:13:00.520 And we knew that, of course,[br]there were people that would be helpful. 0:13:00.598,0:13:03.334 In the US there's a much bigger culture[br]of fear. 0:13:03.421,0:13:06.033 People are afraid of having their houses[br]raided by the police, 0:13:06.198,0:13:08.118 where there's lots of detainments at the[br]borders, 0:13:08.246,0:13:10.081 where there's lots of speculative arrests, 0:13:10.249,0:13:11.866 journalists that are jailed, 0:13:11.913,0:13:15.196 so the situation was not to say that[br]Germany was perfect. 0:13:15.327,0:13:18.994 I revealed in Der Speigel with three other[br]journalists that Merkel was spied on 0:13:19.129,0:13:20.363 by the NSA. 0:13:20.489,0:13:22.193 And it's clear that the Germany government[br]was complicit 0:13:22.281,0:13:23.860 with some of this surveillance. 0:13:23.948,0:13:27.011 But in a sort of pyramid of surveillance[br]there's a sort of colonialism 0:13:27.062,0:13:28.299 that takes place. 0:13:28.426,0:13:30.944 And that the NSA and GCHQ are at the top. 0:13:31.031,0:13:33.374 And the Germans are little bit below that. 0:13:33.458,0:13:37.225 The thing is that there's not a lot you[br]can do about that. 0:13:37.350,0:13:38.850 And so even though we revealed this[br]about Merkel, 0:13:38.972,0:13:40.680 it's not clear what she should do. 0:13:40.853,0:13:42.260 It's not clear what anyone should do. 0:13:42.388,0:13:45.415 But one thing that was clear was that[br]if they wanted to break into our houses 0:13:45.546,0:13:49.513 they would do it in a way that would[br]cost them a lot politically. 0:13:49.594,0:13:50.919 It would be very public. 0:13:51.048,0:13:53.138 The last time someone raided someone[br]working with Der Speigel 0:13:53.264,0:13:55.784 was in 1962 during the Speigel affair, 0:13:55.870,0:13:57.786 and some ministers were kicked out. 0:13:57.876,0:14:00.346 You may have seen recently the[br]Landersverrat thing 0:14:00.346,0:14:01.718 with Netzpolitik. 0:14:01.718,0:14:04.319 The charges against them now[br]have been dropped. 0:14:04.444,0:14:06.537 That would never happen in the[br]United States. 0:14:06.619,0:14:07.944 We would not be safe. 0:14:08.025,0:14:09.815 And I still, for my investigative[br]journalism, 0:14:09.861,0:14:11.436 and my work with Wikileaks, 0:14:11.486,0:14:12.718 and my work with the Tor project, 0:14:12.850,0:14:14.510 I wouldn't even go back to the US, 0:14:14.597,0:14:16.687 because there's no chance that if they[br]wanted to do something to me 0:14:16.817,0:14:20.828 that I would have any constitutional[br]liberties, I think, 0:14:20.956,0:14:22.621 and the same is true of Snowden. 0:14:22.703,0:14:24.457 You just won't get that fair trial. 0:14:24.542,0:14:27.998 And we thought at least here we would[br]have ground to stand and fight on. 0:14:28.126,0:14:30.427 And it's exactly what happened,[br]and we won. 0:14:33.801,0:14:35.887 [question]: This is also about the fear[br]stuff that you talk about 0:14:35.975,0:14:41.947 which is in the very old days we used to[br]put red words in the end of every message 0:14:42.074,0:14:45.915 to make sure that it would be hard to find[br]the actual subversive message 0:14:46.003,0:14:47.912 among all the noise. 0:14:47.962,0:14:49.544 And you can think about the same thing[br]here. 0:14:49.716,0:14:56.344 Should we build our systems so that[br]everything gets encrypted all the time? 0:14:56.430,0:14:59.029 [Jacob]: So I have a lot of radical[br]suggestions for what to do, 0:14:59.119,0:15:01.165 but I'm going to talk about them tomorrow[br]in the keynote mostly. 0:15:01.332,0:15:03.928 But to give you an example,[br]when you install Debian, 0:15:04.013,0:15:06.325 you can give someone the ability to log[br]into the machine 0:15:06.487,0:15:07.899 over a Tor hidden service for free. 0:15:08.027,0:15:12.250 You get a free .onion when you add two[br]lines to a Tor configuration file. 0:15:12.334,0:15:15.538 We should make encryption not only easy[br]to use but out of the box 0:15:15.622,0:15:19.504 we should have it possible to have[br]end-to-end reachability and connectivity, 0:15:19.677,0:15:23.899 and we should reduce the total amount[br]of metadata, to make it harder for people 0:15:24.026,0:15:26.374 who want to break the law, that want to[br]break into computers. 0:15:26.455,0:15:30.724 We should solve the problem of adversarial[br]versus non-adversarial forensics 0:15:30.851,0:15:36.315 so we can verify our systems with open[br]hardware and Free software together. 0:15:36.396,0:15:39.302 And there's a lot to be done,[br]but the main thing to do is to recognise 0:15:39.387,0:15:43.269 that if you have the ability to upload[br]to Debian, 0:15:43.393,0:15:46.167 there are literally intelligence agencies[br]that would like those keys. 0:15:46.296,0:15:49.370 And we have a great responsiblity to[br]humanity as Debian developers 0:15:49.542,0:15:51.585 to do the right thing: to build open[br]systems, 0:15:51.672,0:15:55.258 to build them in a way where users don't[br]need to understand this stuff. 0:15:55.427,0:15:58.071 There are a lot of people in the world[br]that will never see this film. 0:15:58.204,0:16:02.977 And we can solve the problems that this[br]film describes largely with Free software. 0:16:03.156,0:16:04.730 And we can do that without them knowing, 0:16:04.858,0:16:06.778 and they will be safe for us having[br]done that. 0:16:06.949,0:16:10.021 And if we can do that, the world will be[br]a better place, I think. 0:16:10.021,0:16:12.368 And I think the world is a better place[br]because of the efforts that were 0:16:12.452,0:16:15.485 already done in that area, that made this[br]possible. 0:16:15.485,0:16:17.656 The Tails project made it so that a bunch[br]of people 0:16:17.867,0:16:19.573 who were good at investigative journalism, 0:16:19.668,0:16:23.759 but absolutely terrible with computers,[br]were able to pull this off. 0:16:23.933,0:16:27.256 And that is entirely the product, in my[br]opinion, of Free software. 0:16:27.342,0:16:32.677 And a little bit of Laura and Glen, but[br]I'd say a lot of Free software. 0:16:34.302,0:16:36.223 [question]: How many people do you think[br]NSA has 0:16:36.355,0:16:38.995 working within the Debian community? 0:16:39.889,0:16:43.601 [laughter, applause] 0:16:45.309,0:16:49.302 [Jacob]: Well, I looked in the Snowden[br]archive about that actually. 0:16:50.263,0:16:55.527 [laughter, applause] 0:16:56.640,0:17:03.341 Yeah. And as far as I can tell Debian is[br]not a high priority target for them. 0:17:03.685,0:17:05.946 I mean they write exploits for all sort[br]of stuff 0:17:06.077,0:17:10.683 but I never found any systematic attempt[br]to compromise or harm the Debian project. 0:17:10.806,0:17:14.561 But obviously there are people who are[br]paid by the NSA to infiltrate communities, 0:17:14.561,0:17:16.993 and that's why we have to open transparent[br]processes 0:17:16.993,0:17:21.044 so that if those people behave badly,[br]we have an audit trail. 0:17:21.044,0:17:23.211 We won't ever stop that kind of stuff, 0:17:23.211,0:17:25.178 but what matters[br]is that people do good things. 0:17:25.178,0:17:28.587 It doesn't matter who they do bad things[br]for as long as we can correct those things 0:17:28.587,0:17:31.019 and/or catch them and stop them before[br]it happens. 0:17:31.019,0:17:33.111 But as far as I know there are only a[br]couple of people that have ever 0:17:33.111,0:17:36.176 been associated with the NSA in the[br]Debian community. 0:17:36.176,0:17:39.933 But I think we shouldn't get paranoid[br]about it, 0:17:39.933,0:17:41.600 but we should just be prudent about our[br]processes, 0:17:41.600,0:17:43.947 because there are lots of intelligence[br]services around the world 0:17:43.947,0:17:47.147 that do not like the values of a[br]universal operating system, 0:17:47.147,0:17:50.902 so I don't think it's super-important to[br]look, but I did actually look, 0:17:50.902,0:17:54.695 very specifically for a whole bunch of[br]people in the Debian community 0:17:54.695,0:17:58.027 to see if any of them also were being[br]paid by the NSA 0:17:58.027,0:18:01.613 and I didn't find any serious thing that[br]raised concern, 0:18:01.613,0:18:03.783 and if I did, I would have... 0:18:03.783,0:18:07.541 I mean, there were lots of things I found[br]in the archive that I immediately 0:18:07.541,0:18:09.333 notified security teams about. 0:18:09.333,0:18:14.112 Where I worked along with many other[br]people to actually fix those things. 0:18:14.112,0:18:18.546 And one of those things, if we had found[br]them, like infiltrators in Debian, 0:18:18.546,0:18:20.769 I absolutely would have just told people[br]about. 0:18:20.769,0:18:23.408 The problem is that a lot of the[br]journalists don't want to do that 0:18:23.408,0:18:26.263 because there's a ten year felony[br]where you go to prison - 0:18:26.263,0:18:28.185 a federal American prison, for[br]ten years - 0:18:28.322,0:18:30.202 if you reveal the name of an agent. 0:18:30.599,0:18:31.923 So there's a tension there, 0:18:31.923,0:18:34.440 but I think that there's something[br]to be said, 0:18:34.652,0:18:36.655 if they're actually actively harming the[br]community 0:18:36.655,0:18:37.851 and they're committing a crime, 0:18:37.851,0:18:39.470 I think there's something to be said[br]about that. 0:18:39.470,0:18:40.921 So if I found that I think it would be[br]worthwhile, 0:18:40.921,0:18:43.144 but just so you know, there's this[br]high cost. 0:18:43.144,0:18:45.362 So if there were people in the agency[br]now, 0:18:45.362,0:18:48.647 because they say that we used Tails, and[br]Debian, and they wanted to subvert it, 0:18:48.647,0:18:52.015 there's a really really high bar for[br]punishment. 0:18:52.015,0:18:55.132 Which suggests that maybe people[br]won't tell you. 0:18:55.132,0:18:59.055 So we need to sort of bank on the fact[br]that we'll never know, 0:18:59.055,0:19:02.766 but we don't need to know, as long as we[br]have good processes 0:19:02.766,0:19:04.390 that would catch bad behaviour. 0:19:04.390,0:19:06.181 And that's one of the strengths of Debian. 0:19:06.181,0:19:08.739 There are very few operating systems,[br]I think, 0:19:08.739,0:19:10.830 and just in general Free software[br]communities, 0:19:10.830,0:19:14.759 that are as diverse, and committed to the[br]openness and the Free software nature 0:19:14.759,0:19:17.742 of this kind of a project, 0:19:17.742,0:19:20.985 and so it's very important to state that. 0:19:21.922,0:19:24.824 But I do think one of the things that will[br]happen in the future at some point 0:19:24.824,0:19:28.067 is that you'll start to find people in the[br]Debian community that are pressured 0:19:28.067,0:19:29.645 by other people to do bad things 0:19:29.645,0:19:31.866 so we need to set up processes that will[br]stop that, 0:19:31.866,0:19:34.296 to create an incentive for that[br]not happening. 0:19:35.022,0:19:37.240 But it's really tough, 0:19:37.926,0:19:40.274 so I think that openness, transparency[br]and accountability are the ways that 0:19:40.274,0:19:43.772 we can combat that, because otherwise[br]we won't really be able to solve it. 0:19:44.881,0:19:47.182 But don't be paranoid, is the other thing. 0:19:47.309,0:19:49.699 They really are out to get you,[br]so be prepared. 0:19:50.430,0:19:56.487 [laughter, applause] 0:20:00.796,0:20:05.999 [question]: I'm just wondering how trust[br]was established 0:20:05.999,0:20:09.628 because I'm just realizing that[br]this community, 0:20:09.628,0:20:14.532 for you to verify your public key and even[br]fingerprint is like, 0:20:14.532,0:20:16.113 you have you produce your passport, 0:20:16.113,0:20:19.613 so I'm wondering how Laura managed to[br]exchange her keys with Snowden 0:20:19.613,0:20:23.071 and make sure that they were really[br]talking to the right person. 0:20:23.843,0:20:28.019 [Julian]: Well, they had a whole sort of[br]dance for doing key exchange. 0:20:28.019,0:20:32.749 I think it was a little bit luck, and a[br]little bit transitive trust, 0:20:32.749,0:20:35.101 there's a little bit of the web of trust, 0:20:35.101,0:20:36.457 and it worked pretty well. 0:20:36.719,0:20:41.332 I mean, I don't think that the key-signing[br]stuff that Debian does is anything close 0:20:41.332,0:20:42.907 to what they were doing. 0:20:42.907,0:20:45.939 They just wanted to make sure that the[br]keys they had were the right keys, 0:20:45.939,0:20:47.687 and that they weren't compromised, 0:20:47.687,0:20:50.075 and that then they would change things. 0:20:50.075,0:20:51.355 There was a point in the movie where they[br]said: 0:20:51.355,0:20:55.875 "let's disassociate our meta-data[br]one more time" 0:20:55.875,0:20:58.951 And what that means is they changed all[br]of the identifiers that are visible 0:20:58.951,0:21:04.158 to the network, new keys, new email[br]addresses, new Tor circuit, etc 0:21:04.158,0:21:07.611 and this is like a key consistency thing, 0:21:07.611,0:21:11.358 where they had the right key to begin with[br]and the continued to rotate over new keys. 0:21:11.358,0:21:13.411 This is also sometimes called TOFU. 0:21:13.411,0:21:15.848 This is, I think, weaker than the[br]web of trust, 0:21:15.848,0:21:19.345 but a lot easier for people to do, and[br]very easy to explain, 0:21:19.345,0:21:20.841 and it worked out pretty well. 0:21:20.841,0:21:25.190 It doesn't scale really well, but it has a[br]separate good side 0:21:25.190,0:21:28.985 which is the web of trust explicitly names[br]a web of co-conspirators. 0:21:28.985,0:21:31.377 And so you don't want that feature. 0:21:31.377,0:21:33.386 It's useful for something like Debian; 0:21:33.386,0:21:36.067 it's not useful for clandestine[br]conspiracies to commit 0:21:36.067,0:21:37.949 investigative journalism. 0:21:37.949,0:21:39.997 [laughter] 0:21:41.746,0:21:44.137 Lots of questions, this is great. 0:21:44.771,0:21:51.857 [question]: Somebody working on Tails told[br]me that the NSA has a file on every DD. 0:21:52.323,0:21:54.246 Is that true, do you know? 0:21:54.673,0:21:57.101 [Julian]: Okay, so when you balance your[br]check-book, 0:21:57.101,0:21:58.941 just to answer your question in a really[br]strange way, 0:21:58.941,0:22:00.945 when you balance your check-book,[br]or you balance your bank account, 0:22:00.945,0:22:03.630 and you think this is how much my rent is,[br]this is how much food is, 0:22:03.630,0:22:06.401 this is how much I have to spend on some[br]new hardware, 0:22:06.401,0:22:09.688 you think about money in an[br]individual way. 0:22:10.502,0:22:13.187 But if you think about is as a state, the[br]way a state thinks about money. 0:22:13.187,0:22:16.302 They don't balance budgets the same[br]way that you do. 0:22:16.302,0:22:18.225 They think about long-term investments[br]very differently. 0:22:18.225,0:22:19.759 They have other people's money. 0:22:19.759,0:22:21.719 It's a whole different way of managing it. 0:22:21.719,0:22:27.291 And the NSA is not the Stasi. So it's not[br]that you have to worry about 0:22:27.420,0:22:29.784 them having a file on you, or every Debian[br]developer, 0:22:30.197,0:22:32.626 but rather there exist some laws in the[br]United States that say 0:22:32.626,0:22:35.781 for cyber-security purposes, you don't[br]have constitutional rights 0:22:35.781,0:22:37.707 and based on your accent, you weren't[br]an American anyway, 0:22:37.707,0:22:39.753 and you aren't in America, 0:22:39.753,0:22:41.970 so you don't have any rights at all,[br]anyway, according to them. 0:22:41.970,0:22:44.186 They're just allowed to do whatever they[br]want to you, 0:22:44.186,0:22:46.280 up to and including murdering you, with[br]the CIA. 0:22:46.280,0:22:49.180 That's what they do with drones; that was[br]at the very end of the movie. 0:22:49.735,0:22:52.165 So it's not that they have a file on you. 0:22:52.339,0:22:56.179 It's that they have giant databases full[br]of information on all of us, 0:22:56.179,0:22:59.550 and then when they're interested in you,[br]pull up all your data, 0:22:59.550,0:23:01.299 and associative data, 0:23:01.299,0:23:03.348 and then they use that, and sometimes[br]they use it to target you, 0:23:03.348,0:23:06.246 to break into your machines,[br]or to find people to exert pressure on, 0:23:06.246,0:23:08.378 or to do psychological manipulation on. 0:23:08.378,0:23:10.892 All that stuff, they do all of those[br]things. 0:23:10.892,0:23:12.774 And so it's not that they have one file[br]on you. 0:23:12.774,0:23:16.101 Though maybe, it depends, if you work on[br]a critical package like the Linux kernel[br] 0:23:16.101,0:23:20.756 they might be more interested in you[br]than if you work on something else. 0:23:20.756,0:23:25.402 I don't want to denigrate anyone's work,[br]but they have very specific focuses, 0:23:25.402,0:23:29.065 and so they definitely are interested in[br]being able to compromise systems, right? 0:23:29.920,0:23:36.316 And so you may also have file, but it's[br]really the meta list that's the new way 0:23:36.316,0:23:37.470 of thinking about it. 0:23:37.470,0:23:40.755 And in some senses I think that's actually[br]scarier, because they just hoover up 0:23:40.755,0:23:43.019 everything, all across the whole Internet, 0:23:43.019,0:23:46.134 and things that are interesting, then[br]they have them. 0:23:46.134,0:23:49.202 And depending on what interesting[br]things are there, they maybe 0:23:49.202,0:23:51.504 put those in a database that lasts[br]for ever, 0:23:51.504,0:23:53.469 or maybe it's just around for 30 days, 0:23:53.469,0:23:56.889 or maybe its full content for 9 days,[br]or something like that. 0:23:57.608,0:23:59.830 And then of course if you are a person of[br]interest 0:23:59.830,0:24:02.686 they do do the same stuff that the Stasi[br]does, 0:24:02.686,0:24:06.014 they do that Zersetzung stuff, if you're[br]familiar with this German term, 0:24:06.014,0:24:11.050 disintegration, they do that kind of[br]stuff, along with JTRIG, from GHCQ, 0:24:11.050,0:24:16.042 so they harass people, blackmail them,[br]do all sorts of really nasty stuff. 0:24:16.509,0:24:20.005 And they do that also, so both of those[br]things. 0:24:20.651,0:24:23.210 So again, I don't think you should be[br]paranoid, you should encrypt your stuff, 0:24:23.210,0:24:24.747 and help people do the same, 0:24:24.747,0:24:28.966 and know that in a democratic society with[br]a secret political police, 0:24:28.966,0:24:31.953 the right place to be is in their[br]database, right? 0:24:31.953,0:24:34.045 You should be proud of being surveilled[br]by them, 0:24:34.045,0:24:35.665 it means you're doing the right thing. 0:24:36.650,0:24:41.727 [laughter, applause] 0:24:43.174,0:24:44.883 Nonetheless, we should stop them. 0:24:48.895,0:24:53.843 [question]: I'm curious about your views[br]about Snowden actually coming out 0:24:53.843,0:24:55.634 and saying he was the whistleblower, 0:24:55.634,0:24:59.004 because I know, when he came out,[br]I had some fierce discussion 0:24:59.004,0:25:01.613 with friends about it, so I wanted to know[br]what you thought about it. 0:25:01.613,0:25:03.102 [Jacob]: What do you mean came out? 0:25:03.102,0:25:06.516 [question]: He said I'm Edward Snowden,[br]I'm the whistle-blower, here I am, 0:25:06.516,0:25:10.139 instead of just being anonymous the[br]whole way, just sending files to people. 0:25:11.248,0:25:13.680 [Jacob]: Well, I think the main thing is[br]that it's about control of 0:25:13.680,0:25:15.429 your own narrative, right? 0:25:15.429,0:25:19.654 I mean if we could have done everything[br]here anonymous, and gotten away with it, 0:25:19.654,0:25:20.980 would that have made the same impact 0:25:20.980,0:25:24.948 in getting other people to come forward[br]even if they maintain their anonymity? 0:25:24.948,0:25:27.802 So I think that what Snowden did, what's[br]beautiful about it, 0:25:27.832,0:25:30.506 is that he basically did enough, 0:25:31.243,0:25:32.951 where he could then survive. 0:25:33.118,0:25:36.236 Our job now for the most part, a very[br]good friend told me, 0:25:36.236,0:25:39.221 he's a little bit of a fatalist, he said: 0:25:39.221,0:25:43.232 your job, Laura's job, Glen's job,[br]Snowden's job, your job now is 0:25:43.232,0:25:44.897 just to survive. 0:25:44.897,0:25:47.371 That's all that you need to do now.[br]You don't need to do anything else. 0:25:47.371,0:25:51.804 You should go do other things, like[br]drink a glass of wine, relax, be happy, 0:25:51.804,0:25:54.751 have a nice life, but just survive, 0:25:54.929,0:25:58.732 so other people can see that you do the[br]right thing, and even though you could have 0:25:59.156,0:26:02.230 done more, you did enough,[br]and you lived through it. 0:26:02.230,0:26:06.198 And so Snowden coming out and telling us[br]all of these things, I mean, 0:26:06.198,0:26:09.862 there are really powerful people saying[br]he should be assassinated, right, 0:26:09.862,0:26:13.921 hung by the neck until dead, was what one[br]of the CIA people said. 0:26:13.921,0:26:17.244 So he probably could have continued to be[br]anonymous for a while, 0:26:17.244,0:26:20.449 but imagine if the NSA had got to reveal[br]his identity. 0:26:20.449,0:26:23.884 How would that have been framed, what[br]would the first impression have been? 0:26:23.884,0:26:27.719 I think they called him a narcissist, and[br]they called him all these terrible names. 0:26:27.719,0:26:32.974 And it didn't really stick, because he[br]basically said "come at me bro', 0:26:33.396,0:26:37.746 I'm ready, and you can do your worst,[br]but you can't get rid of the facts, 0:26:37.746,0:26:39.155 so let's talk about the facts." 0:26:39.155,0:26:42.403 And I think the timing of how he did that[br]is good, because people really cared 0:26:42.612,0:26:45.853 about the issues, but he also recognized[br]that it was a matter of time, 0:26:45.853,0:26:50.891 the NSA police went to his house, they[br]really bothered his family, 0:26:50.891,0:26:54.777 they've done that with my family as well,[br]other people's families have had trouble. 0:26:55.283,0:26:59.553 So I think think it's tough, because I[br]think he probably would have liked to have 0:26:59.553,0:27:03.198 been able to not have that happen, but [br]there comes a point at which 0:27:03.198,0:27:05.287 you're the person who has access to all [br]that information 0:27:05.287,0:27:06.865 and they're going to figure it out. 0:27:06.865,0:27:11.517 No amount of anonymity, I think, will[br]last forever, but it can buy you time. 0:27:11.517,0:27:14.508 He got exactly the amount of time[br]he needed. 0:27:15.062,0:27:17.663 The really sad part about him coming out[br]in public when he did, though, was that 0:27:17.663,0:27:21.247 he got stuck in Russia, because my[br]government cancelled his passport. 0:27:21.247,0:27:23.681 I think mostly for propaganda reasons. 0:27:23.681,0:27:28.329 Because in the United States, we denigrate[br]all things relating to Russia. 0:27:28.329,0:27:29.781 And there are lots of problems with[br]Russia, 0:27:29.781,0:27:32.256 and especially with Vladimir Putin, 0:27:32.256,0:27:36.695 but at the same time that seems to be the[br]only country that was willing to uphold 0:27:36.695,0:27:38.441 his fundamental liberties. 0:27:38.441,0:27:41.171 I went to the Council of Europe, and to[br]the European Parliament, 0:27:41.171,0:27:44.670 to the German Parliament, to the French,[br]sort of to the French Parliament, 0:27:44.670,0:27:48.297 they didn't really want to meet with me,[br]but also to the Austrian Parliament, 0:27:48.297,0:27:49.963 and to a number of other places, 0:27:49.963,0:27:53.380 and everyone said, oh, we would really[br]live to help anybody who needs help, 0:27:53.380,0:27:55.253 oh it's Edward Snowden, never mind. 0:27:55.975,0:27:57.813 [laughter] 0:27:57.941,0:28:02.527 And so though I have a lot of critiques[br]on Russia, the propaganda aspect of it 0:28:02.527,0:28:04.657 was very damaging for him to be stuck[br]in Russia, 0:28:04.657,0:28:08.242 but on the other hand, he's still alive,[br]and he's still mostly free. 0:28:08.242,0:28:12.300 And they recognized his right to[br]seek and to receive asylum. 0:28:12.857,0:28:15.331 So there's a lot of trade-offs to think[br]identifying one's self, 0:28:15.331,0:28:17.807 and if you were thinking about being[br]the next Snowden, 0:28:18.300,0:28:19.460 or helping Snowden,[br]or something like that, 0:28:20.384,0:28:22.647 you really have to think that, you really[br]have to think this out many steps ahead, 0:28:22.647,0:28:25.808 and it's easy to stay, oh he should have[br]just stayed anonymous and 0:28:25.808,0:28:27.556 nobody would have figured it out, 0:28:27.556,0:28:31.476 but that's very clearly not planning for[br]the case that they do figure it out, 0:28:31.476,0:28:33.272 and then they're going to be in control[br]of the narrative, 0:28:33.272,0:28:37.750 and in that case, I think you are better[br]off to do what he did, 0:28:37.853,0:28:40.156 and he did so quite reluctantly. 0:28:40.411,0:28:43.481 He's not an egoist, or an narcissist,[br]he's actually a really shy guy 0:28:43.481,0:28:44.762 from what I can tell. 0:28:44.762,0:28:48.644 I don't know exactly what conversation[br]you and your friend had, 0:28:48.644,0:28:52.826 but I would suspect that the notion is[br]that people are more powerful 0:28:52.826,0:28:53.875 when anonymous. 0:28:53.875,0:28:55.966 And that is true sometimes,[br]but not always, 0:28:55.966,0:28:58.484 and it's important to remember that[br]the anonymity technology is there 0:28:58.484,0:29:01.004 so you have a choice, not a requirement. 0:29:01.004,0:29:03.647 And that choice is sometimes[br]counter-intuitive, 0:29:03.647,0:29:06.380 but I think he did the right thing in[br]this way, and I wish that my government 0:29:06.380,0:29:09.022 had done the right thing by him as well,[br]but they did not. 0:29:09.022,0:29:09.833 [question]: So there are lot of questions,[br]do you want to keep going on, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 shall we get in a little Mate? 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [Jacob]: I would love some of that rum. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 I think I have to GRsec, right?[br]GRsec kernel. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And then rum appears. Rum as a service. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [applause] 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 I'm really happy to keep taking questions,[br]because to me, what I want is 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 for every person in this room to feel[br]a part of this, because you really are. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 A lot of the people I've met in this[br]community really inspire me to action, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and it's important to understand that[br]really, it would not have been possible 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 without Debian. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 For example debootstrap - really important[br]tool, right? 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 With weasel's packaging of Tor, it allowed[br]us to have bootstraps of things, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 it allowed us to build things, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and using Free software really was[br]helpful, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 so if you guys have any questions at all, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 really each and every person that helps[br]with Debian should just know 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 that you are a part of that, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and I'm just happy to talk for as long as[br]you want, basically, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 to answer all of your questions,[br] 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 except the ones that put me in prison.[br]Thanks. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [laughter] 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [question]: I just wanted to make a quick[br]note about the question 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 "do they have a file on me?" 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 From all I've read so far, it's just that[br]they're doing the thing 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 that is in the commercial world called[br]"big data". 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [Jacob]: Yep. Absolutely. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 Oh boy. GRsec again? 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [orga]: it's not rum, but it's Bavarian[br]whisky. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [Jacob]: Oh boy. It's going to be a[br]heavy morning tomorrow. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 I saw another couple of hands. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [question]: I was just wondering if[br]that you noticed throughout this 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 that you think we could improve in Debian[br]to make the next people's lives easier. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [Jacob]: Oh my god, I'm so glad you asked[br]that question, that's so fantastic. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 I'm going to talk about that tomorrow[br]in my keynote, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 but let me tell you about one that I have. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 I revealed a specific document about a[br]wifi injection attack system. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 It's a classified document, it's a[br]top secret document, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 for a thing called nightstand, and what[br]nightstand is, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 it's basically like car metasploit,[br]it's a wifi injector... 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 cheers! 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 Danke schön. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 It's a wifi injector device... 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 Whew, jesus! 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [laughter, applause] 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [orga]: Tonight's whisky sponsored by[br]drunc-tank dot org. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [Jacob]: So this wifi injector device,[br]what it does is it basically is able to 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 exploit the kernel of a device by sending[br]malformed data over wifi. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 Now I have a series of photographs, so[br]all of us.. not all of us, but most of us 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 used these speciallly modified X60s where[br]we removed the microphones, soldered?? 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 down things on the PCI bus, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 we removed, like, firewire, really[br]modified it, flashed coreboot onto it, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 flipped the read pin so it was only[br]read-only, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 so you couldn't easily make a BIOS[br]root kit and make it persistent, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 we booted TAILS, did all this stuff, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 often we could boot to RAM so that[br]once the machine was powered off 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 basically it would be done, so if someone[br]kicks down your door, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 you just pull the power out, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and you don't have a battery, and[br]when the power fails you have an 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 instant kill switch. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 So things that are in TAILS that are [br]really useful include this 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 wiping the kernel memory package[br]which I hear is being packaged for Debian 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 soon, which is very exciting. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 Because everyone should have access[br]to that so we can tie it into something 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 like GNU panicd or these other things. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 But one thing I kept having problems with[br]is this wifi injection device, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 I'm pretty sure, was very close to my[br]house. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 There was a white van outside, it was[br]vibrating a bit like there was a guy 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 walking around in it, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and then all of sudden, an X60 here,[br]an X60 here, and an X60 here, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 just booted into TAILS, not doing[br]anything at all, but on the wifi network, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 kernel panic, kernel panic, kernel panic. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 All the same kernel panic, all the[br]same memory offsets, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 in the Appletalk driver of the stock[br]kernel for TAILS. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 I think I filed a bug upstream with TAILS[br]at the time, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 but this is just incredible because[br]it's clear that all the crap 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 in the default Debian kernel that you[br]really want for your 1992 Apple network 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 makes operational security really hard, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and one thing that would be really great[br]would be a GRsec enabled kernel... 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [applause] 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 Yes, have to drink. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 But as an example, we built different[br]custom machines, and one of the things 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 that we did for some people and in some[br]circumstances was 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 to build GRsec enabled kernels. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And I'm not going to drink again. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 So we built those kernels 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [audience]: Which ones? 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [Jacbob]: Yes, exactly, those ones. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And that was work which creates a problem[br]for a bunch of reasons. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 When you build custom kernels, and[br]you only have a few people 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 that can build those kernels, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 you actually build a chain of evidence of[br]who helped who. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And if that was stable, normal package, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 that people could install in a Debian[br]pure blend, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 then it would have been easier to do that. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 We built a lot more sandbox profiles for[br]various different things, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 we built some transparent TOR-ification[br]stuff, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and that required a lot of bespoke[br]knowledge, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and it required a lot of effort that a lot[br]of people did not have, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 because they had a different set of[br]skills, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and it's good to have a division of[br]labour, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 but having that kind of stuff built into[br]Debian by default, making a 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 Debian installer that could do that, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and also verification, would be great,[br]right? 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 So I wrote some custom scripts [br]where I could look at a TAILS disk, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 or a Debian install, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and know if it had been tampered with. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And it would be nice if there was just[br]a disk you could boot that did 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 verification of an installed system 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 very very easily, so easily that[br]Glen Greenwald could use it. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 I love Glen, I saw that very politely, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 but what I means is it needs to be[br]easier than that, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 because Glen at least knows that he[br]he a reason to need it. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And so that was something that we really[br]needed help with. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And we spent a lot of time on that. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And there are lots of other little things[br]like that, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and I'll talk about some of those things[br]tomorrow, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 but one of the really big problems is[br]hardware, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 which is that you cannot buy a modern[br]Intel CPU which doesn't come 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 with a backdoor any more. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And that is a huge problem, and I'm not[br]sure that the answer is to use ARM. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 It seems like the answer is to use ARM. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 But that's only if assume that ARM didn't[br]just add a backdoor that's obvious. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 So we really need to think about how to,[br]in moving forward, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 how to have easy to use, easy to buy[br]on the shelf, Debian hardware, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 available everywhere, all the time, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 so you can just go and buy this thing and[br]verify it in some way 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 with some other machine, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 to know that you would have the right[br]thing. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And to that extent we didn't have X-rays[br]for a lot of the circuit boards, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 so that made it very difficult to know[br]if when you buy something, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 it's been tampered with. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 I'll talk about some of that stuff[br]tomorrow, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 but basically, Debian does a lot of stuff[br]right, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and that is also worth mentioning. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 There's so many things that just work[br]out of the box, that just work perfectly. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 So the main thing is to keep the[br]quality assurance at the level, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 or to exceed where it is right now. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 Because it actually works super super[br]well. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 The exception being for very specific[br]targetted attacks, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 the kernel attack surface is pretty big,[br]and pretty bad, I think. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And also, we rebuilt some binaries in[br]order to.. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 sorry, I'll get to you in a second. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 We rebuilt some binaries to make sure[br]that we had address space randomisation 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and linker hardening, and stack[br]canary stuff, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and for some stuff lately we've been using[br]address space sanitizer, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 so it would be really great if all the[br]hardening stuff was turned in, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 if there was PAX plus GRsec as a kernel. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [audience]: so the specific problem with[br]GR security is that they don't really 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 want to work with distros. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 So we could have a Linux kernel package[br]with GR security applied, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 but it wouldn't have any of the other[br]Debian patches. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [Jacob]: So I talked with Brad Spender[br]about this, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and I'm so glad that you said that, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 because what he said was that, as far[br]as I can tell, he's totally interested in 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 helping Debian with this but thinks that[br]Debian is not interested. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 He actually runs a kernel building[br]service where they actually do 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 individual kernel builds, and I think[br]you'd be interested, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and when I told him we'd love to have[br]this in TAILS, he said 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 what patches do I need to include in GRsec[br]to make sure that it'll work? 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And he offered to do the integration[br]into the GRsec patch if there are not 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 too many things. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 So I think what we should try and do[br]is build a line of communication, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and if it costs money we should find a way[br]to raise that money, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 I'll put in some of my own personal money[br]for this, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and I know other people would too. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [distant audience]: I will. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [Jacob]: Great. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 So securedrop, for example, part of what[br]they do for their leaking platform, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 if you go to the intercepts website,[br]you wan to leak them a document, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 they actually use free software[br]everywhere, but there are a few things[br] 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 they build specially, and one of those[br]things is a GRsec kernel. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 So the people at first look, that helped[br]make this movie, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and that work on securedrop, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 they would probably also, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 I'm not committing them, I don't[br]know that they would actually do this, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 but I think they would really like it if[br]that was in there, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and I think it we could find the community[br]will to do that, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 I know I would volunteer and other people[br]would, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 I know that dkg in the back would love to[br]help with this, I would that ??? 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 who is just totally behind funding this[br]work, right? 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 I thought that you were there to protect[br]my civil liberties, buddy. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 But I really think that it's possible[br]that we could do this, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and I definitely think Brad, the author of[br]GRsec, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 I think he would really love it if Debian[br]shipped GRsec. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And it doesn't need to come by default, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 but if it was possible to just have[br]it all, that would be great. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 Maybe we could have an affinity group[br]where everyone who is interested can 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 meet sometime tomorrow and we could[br]talk about doing this. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 I would love to have that conversation. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 Who are you? 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [audience]: Ben Hutchings. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [Jacob]: Oh, nice to meet you! 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [laughter, applause] 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 That's awkward. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [question]: Hi. Sorry to interrupt the[br]awkwardness, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and replace it with more awkwardness. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 Nice to see you, Jake. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 So, I remember reading the documents[br]in 2013 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and seeing the NSA's internal training[br]guide for how to query their 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 Hadoop data store, aka xkeyscore, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and so I thought I would just ask you[br]if you think Free software net helps us 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 or helps them. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [Jacob]: I'm really glad you asked that[br]question. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 I think that Free software helps everyone[br]on the planet, and I think that 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 purpose-based limitations.. I understand[br]why people want them. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 I think we should try to build a world[br]where we are free, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and so putting in purpose-based[br]limitations is really problematic, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and I think what we should do is try to[br]mitigate the harm that they can do 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 with those systems, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 as opposed to pretending that they care[br]about Free software licensing. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 These guys kill people with flying robots, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 it's illegal to murder people, and they[br]do it. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 Limiting their use with licenses, first[br]of all, that just means they'll spend 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 your tax money to rewrite it if they care[br]about the license, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and you won't get their bug-fixes or their[br]improvements, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and then additionally they're still not[br]going to obey your license anyway, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 because literally some of these people[br]work on assassinating people. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 So it is better that we keep our integrity[br]and take the high road, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and write Free software, and we give it to[br]every single person on the planet 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 without exception, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 It's just better. It's better for all of[br]us, right? 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 So the fact that they have Hadoop, the[br]fact that they, for example, use OpenSSL, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 or maybe they use Tor, or whatever, right? 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 Or they use gdb to debug their exploits. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 I kind of wish that on them. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [laughter, applause] 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 I think it's great, right? 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 So one of the things Che Guevara said[br]in his manual about guerilla warfare, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 in chapter two, is that (oh, it was[br]chapter three) 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 He talks about when you have to arm[br]a guerrilla army, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 this is not exactly related, but it's an[br]analog. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 He says that the most important thing[br]is for the guerrilla army to 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 use the weapons of the people that[br]they're fighting - the oppressor. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And the reason is that it allows you to[br]resupply, essentially. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 When you win a battle, you resupply. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 When we all use the same Free software,[br]and we're working on these things, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 the fact that they have to contribute[br]to the same projects and they often do 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 means there's a net win for us. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 They do have some private things that they[br]don't share, obviously, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 with the exception of nice people like[br]Edward Snowden, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and I think that it is a net positive[br]thing, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and if we think of it as a struggle, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 we are better off to take the high road, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and so I really think we should not[br]pretend that we can stop them, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and instead we should work together[br]to build solutions. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And I think that Debian is doing that,[br]right? 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 I think Debian is much harder to[br]compromise than 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 a lot of other operating systems, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and it's much much harder to coerce[br]people, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and there's a strong ethos that comes[br]with it that it's not just the technical 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 project, there's a social aspect to it. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 I think I was in the New Maintainer[br]queue for 11 years, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 maybe that's a little too long, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 but there's a huge hazing process, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 so anyone who wants to help, really really[br]wants to help, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and if they want to do something wrong[br]there are processes to catch 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 people doing things wrong. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 So we should really stay true to the[br]Free software ethos, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and it really is a net benefit. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [question]: Hi Jake. Thanks a lot for[br]saying so much "GRsec". 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 Just wanted to give a shout out. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 You mentioned possible backdoors in[br]CPUs and so on, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 that ARM might not be the next best thing[br]because it's not so open either. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 You might want to have a look at Power 8. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 It's basically PowerPC 64, so Debian has[br]support for it as far as I know, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and most of the stuff is actually open. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 Not that actually designs that IBM is[br]using, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 but you can have, actually, an FPGA[br]implementation of it, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and if you have the money make your own[br]ASICs for it, without even knowing 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 how to do it, which is pretty good,[br]I think. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [Jacob]: I think there are lots of things[br]we can hack right? 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 I mean I had one of those weird RMS[br]laptops, the Limote, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 or whatever it's called, for a while. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And I was definitely able to get some[br]Free software running on it, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 in theory it was a Free software laptop. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 But getting other people to use this is[br]the problem, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 you need to get everybody to use it,[br]right? 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 There's a sort of old anarchist cliché, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 "None of us are free until all of us are[br]free" 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And that really applies here. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 We really need to have Free software[br]that's usable by everyone, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 otherwise we're sort of bound by the[br]lowest common denominator 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 of Free, or proprietary tools, depending[br]on what people have to use. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 So it'll be great when we have that, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and there's a thing called the Nokimist??? 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 which is a video mixing board that has an[br]FPGA implementing a Free software CPU 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 that you can boot Debian on, or OpenWRT, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and it does work, and I have used it, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and in fact I used to use it as a shell, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and for a long time I used a Debian[br]trick, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 actually I've never talked about that in[br]public, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 let me think about that for a second. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 So I used to use an IRC client that was[br]really buggy, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and I couldn't figure out where all the[br]bugs were, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 but I knew that if I hung out in certain[br]networks that someone else 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 would help me find those bugs by trying[br]to exploit my client. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And I wanted to make it as hard as[br]possible. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 So I ran my IRC client inside of a Debian[br]machine that was running an S390 emulator. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 Who here uses Hercules? Thank you to[br]whoever packaged it. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And so I would use Hercules, it was a[br]very long install process. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 Very slow. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And I would do this, and what I'd always[br]dreamed of doing at some point 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 was using the Nokimist??? and the[br]Hercules together 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 for maximum ridiculously difficult[br]to exploit, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 plus GRsec kernel. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 But that's not a usable thing. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 So what we need to do is take these kinds[br]of prototypes 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 which actually do represent many steps[br]forward, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and we need to make sure that they're[br]produced on a scale where 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 you can go into a store and puchase them[br]anonymously, with cash, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 in a way that you can then verify. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And we're actually really close to that[br]with software defined radios 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and open hardware, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 but we're not quite there yet. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [question]: What I meant is that Power 8[br]is basically getting big, currently, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 on the server market, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and it might get big for other stuff also. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [Jacob]: Hopefully. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [question]: I want to come back to the[br]story about the panic 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 in the Appletalk driver. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 The common approach against this is[br]to compile your own kernel with 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 all this stuff not compiled in, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 but on two of my systems I have a[br]modprobe wrapper which has 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 a whitelist of module which may be[br]loaded, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and I install that wrapper as the thing[br]that the kernel uses for loading modules. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 Do you know if such a thing exists[br]elsewhere, or if not, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 I would be interested in developing it[br]into something which is actually useable 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 for people. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [Jacob]: That would be great. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 In this case we were using Tails. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And so, Tails is very finicky about what[br]it will accept, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and so having that in Debian will make it[br]a lot easier to get it into something 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 like Tails, I think. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 But the main thing is really that we have[br]to think about the attack surface 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 of the kernel very differently. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 The problem is not Appletalk; the problem[br]is the Linux kernel is filled with 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 a lot of code, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and you can autoload, in certain cases,[br]certain things come in, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and certain things get autoloaded, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and I know Bdale loves his[br]ham radio stuff, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 but I never use ham radio on my machine 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 I used for clandestine conspiracies,[br]you know? 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 That's a separate machine. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 It's over here. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 So we just need to find a way to think[br]about that. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And part of that could be kernel stuff,[br]but also part of it could be thinking 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 about solutions like that, where we[br]don't need to change the kernel. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 So if you could package that and develop[br]that, it would be really fantastic. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [Ben]: Actually, some time ago, after[br]I think it was the econet exploits, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 no-one uses econet, it was broken anyway,[br]but you could exploit it, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 because it was autoloaded. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 So I actually went through and turned off[br]autoloading on a few of the more obscure 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 network protocols. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 We could probably go further with that,[br]even in the defaults. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [Jacob]: I think it would be great to[br]change some of the kernel stuff so that 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 at least, I mean, Tails is a special use[br]case, where, I think, it's very important, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and it doesn't work for everyone, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 but we should just consider that there are[br]certainly things which are really great, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and I want to use Debian for it, because[br]Debian is a universal operating system. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 But for a modern desktop system where[br]you're using GNOME, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and you haven't set anything up,[br]Appletalk for example, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 maybe we would ask those people[br]to load that module themselves. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [Ben]: Yeah, for example you could[br]have, a lot of those things are going to 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 have supporting utilities, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 so you could put something in the[br]supporting utilities that loads it 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 at boot time. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And if you don't have those installed,[br]you don't need it. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [Jacob]: Yep, totally. And I think there's[br]lots of ways to do it where 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 the network can't trigger it,[br]and that's important. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [Ben]: Yeah, that puzzled me,[br]I can't understand, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 the protocol module when[br]userland tries to open a socket 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 of that type, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 it shouldn't happen in response to[br]network traffic. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 There are things like, I think if you[br]run ifconfig that can autoload 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 a bunch of things, for example. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [Jacob]: Yeah, I think on either side[br]it should be more explicit, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and in this case with Tails, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 there was a time when you looked at[br]the kernel module list 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and it was pretty amazing, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 like I think there was an X25 thing,[br]an Appletalk, thing, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 wait, this is all about going over Tor,[br]we don't support any of these 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 things at all. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 So it's just the way that things are [br]interdependent, right? 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 It's not a dig at the kernel itself. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 I think the Linux kernel as it works[br]in Debian today works really well 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 for a lot of people, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 but there is definitely a high security[br]use case, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and I, for example, if I were a Debian[br]developer, and I had a development 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 machine where I didn't run a web[br]browser, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and I took a lot of effort. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 It would be really nice if there were[br]a kernel that put in the same 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 threshold of security. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And I think that the GRsec kernel with[br]some stuff changed about it, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 like getting rid of Appletalk and a few[br]other things, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 would be closer to that, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and combined with that guy's tool that[br]he's talking about, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 you could make autoloadable module,[br]that at least even if the system was 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 going to autoload it, you could stop it,[br]in a failing closed sort of way. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And I think there's a lot of stuff,[br]practically, to do on that front, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and there's another project called[br]Subgraph OS, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 which is basically working on becoming[br]in some ways a Debian derivative, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and they're going to do stuff like GRsec[br]kernel, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and they have a whole sandboxing framework[br]which uses apparmor, seccomp 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and xpra, and a few other things, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and I think that they'll make a lot of[br]interesting security decisions, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 which might make sense to adopt in [br]Debian later. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [Ben]: I think Matthew Garrett has an[br]interesting criticism about that and 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 how it wouldn't really work, and Wayland[br]was a better way to go than xpra. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [Jacob]: Yeah, I've heard those[br]criticisms, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 but Matthew Garrett is wrong. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 Not usually, but in this particular case. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 For example, the sandboxing stuff,[br]if you have a GNOME appstore, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 essentially, that's for one set of users,[br]but for a Debian developer 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 writing your own policies,[br]it might be useful, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and if you need Wayland, you might[br]not have a full solution, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 we might want to have both for a while. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And think it'd be great. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And the main thing is we just need to[br]find people who will think about those 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 issues and try to integrate them, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 because most people who write exploits,[br]or who understand how to do offensive 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 security stuff, they don't want to help[br]Free software projects, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 they just want to exploit them. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And so some of the Subgraph guys,[br]what I really like about them 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 is that they're trying to improve the[br]Free software products we all use. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 Even though they may make different[br]design decisions, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 they're making Free software all the same. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [question]: Maybe also, some other thing[br]to keep in mind is actually 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 that there is also a social aspect of this[br]pressure if NSA wants to put anything 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 inside Debian. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 So if we actually also need to make sure[br]that if they put pressure on somebody 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 we have any way to help these people[br]not land in prison. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 So is there also a social aspect of [br]supporting people which get pressure 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 from anyone. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [Jacob]: Yep. I mean, if anyone is ever[br]in that situation one thing I would say 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 is that it's your right to remain silent, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 you have the right to remain silent[br]I think is the phrase the police would say 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 but there are definitely communities[br]of people who will help you. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 There's a group called the Courage[br]foundation, for example, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 which was started by Sarah Harrison, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and the job that the Courage foundation[br]has taken on 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 is essentially to help people who would be[br]sources or who are in harm's way like this 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and if you found yourself in that kind of[br]a position there are people 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 who will try to help you. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 I really don't think that is the next step[br]in this, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 I think that could happen. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 But I thin it's much more likely someone[br]is going to write an exploit for Firefox. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 That's the way they're going to own[br]Debian people in the future, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 for the most part, that's how they own[br]us today. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 Firefox, number one enemy to security[br]on your Debian machine, probably. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And that's not a dig at Firefox, it's just[br]super-complicated software, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and these guys are really good at[br]writing exploits, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and that's an easy target. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 So we, I think, have to do with the social[br]thing, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 but we also should look at some of the[br]technical problems, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and then when and if people have that,[br]you can contact me. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 I'm super happy to put you in touch with[br]people who will help. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And obviously, get a lawyer, get several[br]lawyers if you can. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 Contact the EFF, or the ACLU, depending[br]on where you are. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 At least in Germany, and in the United[br]States, it isn't so bad yet 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 that they can put that kind of pressure [br]on you openly, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 in a Free software project. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 If you write proprietary software you're[br]in a very different situations, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and there are definitely people who are in[br]that situation right now, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and I don't envy them. Their position is[br]actually much harder. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 So actually writing Free software already[br]makes you not at the very beginning 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 of the target list, I think. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 Any other questions? Wow. Where's the rum? 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [question]: How do you deliver the[br]encrypted message without exposing 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 the connection to a third party? 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [Jacob]: Which encrypted message do you[br]mean? 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 Do you mean, like jabber? 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [question]: Email, or jabber, yes. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [Jacob]: For the most part we use systems[br]where Tor hidden services are available 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 to connect to them, so we never even left[br]the Tor anonymity network, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 so they're end-to-end encrypted and[br]anonymized, you connect to a 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 .onion address, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and then using crypto on top of that, so[br]TLS to a Jabber server, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and then OTR on top of that, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 so you have, you could call it a[br]composition of cryptographic systems, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and the core of that is Tor, along with[br]using throwaway machines, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 going to locations where you never go[br]twice, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 using open wifi plus Tor plus TLS plus[br]OTR, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and for email, Riseup offers Tor hidden[br]services, which allows you to do the same 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 thing, essentially, and then using PGP as[br]well. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [question]: I mean, how about metadata,[br]like the delivery address of the target? 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [Jacbob]: In some cases we use a system[br]called Pond, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and Pond is a system that is completely[br]Tor hidden service based, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 pond.imperialviolet.org. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 Adam Langley probably wouldn't want me to[br]say, but I'll say it anyway, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 it would be very useful to package this[br]for Debian, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 because it's a system where once you do[br]key exchange with someone, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 you have an end-to-end encrypted messaging[br]system that's like email, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 you can send files that are encrypted,[br]you can send messages that are encrypted, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 It's delay based. You don't have[br]usernames, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 you just have a public key,[br]and then you have group signatures, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 so that people can send things to your[br]mailbox by proving they are a member 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 of the group but not which member of[br]the group they are. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And there's a lot of stuff like that. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 So we use Jabber, we use email, and we use[br]Pond. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And those three systems together also[br]allowed us to build a clandestine 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 sneakernet. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 So we have the ability to carry USB disks, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and a few of us carried them inside of[br]our bodies, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and if you've never had that experience,[br]lucky you. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 You want to make sure you use post-quantum[br]computer crypto for that, by the way. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 It's more comfortable. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [orga]: Shall we relieve this man from his[br]duties? 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [Jacob]: Any more questions? 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [orga]: One more question. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [question]: Okay, so when the Snowden[br]leaks were first published it created 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 a lot of awareness, and people were[br]talking about it, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and there was a huge media echo, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 Now if some documents leaked, people[br]are saying yeah, all this surveillance, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and we aren't dead yet, and we can still[br]live our lives. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 They basically care less. They still care[br]a bit, but they care much less than 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 when the first documents were published, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 so how can we maintain awareness for[br]this issue in the world population, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 in your opinion? 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [Jacob]: There's a really scary thing[br]that's happening right now. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 There was this idea in the 90s, we had[br]the crypto wars. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 Did any of you remember this idea of the[br]crypto wars? 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 Okay, a few of you do, maybe not all of[br]you do. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 But we had the so-called crypto wars in[br]the 90s, I encourage you to look this up 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 on DuckDuckGo, or whatever your[br]favourite search engine is. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 In theory we're in the second crypto[br]wars now. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 In reality what happened is the first[br]crypto wars never ended. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 We didn't actually win, like we thought[br]we did. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 But there are a bunch of things that are[br]taking place. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 For example, making a stand against[br]backdoors. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 Using end-to-end encrypted[br]communications. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 Actually pushing for that, being quite[br]open about actually hosting 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 those kinds of services, and doing it[br]from a principled perspective, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 from a legal perspective. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 I think you will find that the tension[br]will continue to rise for a while, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and I think that it will continue to be[br]a conversation about public debate, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and an important aspect of this is that[br]now regular journalists that don't 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 understand technology at least understand[br]the importance of these things. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And if they don't do that, they at least[br]perceive that they will be considered 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 unprofessional if they don't care, and[br]think about those things, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 or they'll be somehow negligent. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And I think that will keep some of the[br]discussion going, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and it will allow us to build some[br]breathing room, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and that breathing room will actually[br]allow us to build some alternatives. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 But there are some downsides, right? 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 Some of the things that take place when[br]you reveal security service spying 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 is that it tends to get normalized, to a[br]degree. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 But then in some cases it does get pushed[br]back. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 In the 70s in the United States, it became[br]illegal to do assassinations, for example. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 Because what the CIA were doing was so[br]atrocious that eventually there was 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 political pushback. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 It turns out it only lasted 30 years, and[br]then they started doing it again. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 But there's a saying in my country which[br]is that effectively the price of liberty 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 is eternal vigilance. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And that's what we are engaged in now. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And the liberty starts with software[br]liberty, I think, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 in the case of communications on networks. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And so we have to have Free software,[br]and it has to be responsibly encoding 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 packets and data, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and if we think about it in this sense[br]we'll find a lot of pressure, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and we'll have a lot of discussions[br]about it, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and you'll start to see it be a part of[br]policy debates, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 like one of the presidential candidates[br]in the United States 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 just came out against encryption. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 I hope that sinks his presidential[br]campaign. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 I mean it's weird to be against[br]encryption. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 It's like I'm against prime numbers. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 No modular arithmetic. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [laughter, applause] 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 I just want to say it's important to[br]understand, you are right, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 people will be normalized about it, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 but each and every one of us that[br]understands these issues 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 can actually keep it alive. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And the way we do that is when we[br]communicate with people... 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 I'll give you an example which I[br]like to give. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 I grew up in San Fransisco and in the Bay[br]Area or San Fransisco, and California, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and I did that in the 80s. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And so a lot of people that I knew had[br]HIV and they died of AIDS. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And there was a huge discussion about[br]this, and it was called GRID, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 the Gay Related Immune Deficiency[br]syndrome. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 Before it was called HIV and AIDS. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And lots of people were sick, and lot of[br]people died, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and there was a sort of normalization[br]process where people sort of 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 accepted this as their fate, especially[br]if they were in the gay community. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And still, over years and years and years,[br]people began to build a culture about 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 safe sex, and they started to talk about[br]respecting their partners, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and about talking about these issues,[br]and about getting tested, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and it took a lot of effort, to really go[br]much further. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 A lot of people actually died in that[br]process. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 It was a very sad, serious situation. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And I think we have similar discussions[br]that are taking place now, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and some people don't take it seriously, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and if they happen to be Muslims living [br]in Pakistan, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 they might get a drone strike. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And there's a sort of survival mechanism[br]that takes place there. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And it's an unfortunate parallel, I think, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 but I would really consider that we can[br]change this dialogue 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 by continuing to have it even though[br]it's exhausting, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and by recognizing our responsibility, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and how we can make it better by[br]continuing to do that, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and by building healthy alternatives,[br]and by building new systems, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and by refusing to backdoor any[br]system, ever, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 completely committing to[br]Free software, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and transparency of that software,[br]and also of those processes. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And really really really sharing the[br]knowledge about it, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 to make it impossible to surpress. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And we should not accept the[br]normalization of that. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 We shouldn't make it fun to spy on people,[br]we shouldn't make jokes about it 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 in a way that normalizes it, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and we should respect those people[br]who are victims of surveillance, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and we should recognize that basically[br]everyone here is a victim of surveillance 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 to some degree, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 and we should care about that,[br]and we should continue to be upset, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 but not just upset; to channel that[br]anger into something useful 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 like making Debian better. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [applause] 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [orga]: Thanks Jake for such a long Q&A[br]session, 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 I hope you enjoy the rum. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 And I'm sure Jake's going to ask any more[br]questions if he can still talk. 9:59:59.000,9:59:59.000 [Jacob]: Thanks.