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Title: 
[Events]
Format: Layer, Start, End, Style, Name, MarginL, MarginR, MarginV, Effect, Text
Dialogue: 0,0:00:00.39,0:00:09.10,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,{\i1}preroll music{\i0}
Dialogue: 0,0:00:09.10,0:00:13.37,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Herald: Good evening, thank\Nyou for joining us tonight,
Dialogue: 0,0:00:13.37,0:00:18.02,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,here at the CCC in Hamburg.\NAnd also thank you for everyone
Dialogue: 0,0:00:18.02,0:00:20.77,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,tuning in around the\Nworld via our livestream.
Dialogue: 0,0:00:20.77,0:00:26.92,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,I'm very, very honored and excited\Nto introduce our new... next guest,
Dialogue: 0,0:00:26.92,0:00:29.44,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Mahsa Alimardani?\N{\i1}laughs{\i0}
Dialogue: 0,0:00:29.44,0:00:34.62,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,- it was my attempt to say the name Mahsa\NAlimardani - she's an Iranian-Canadian
Dialogue: 0,0:00:34.62,0:00:36.99,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,researcher and activist.
Dialogue: 0,0:00:36.99,0:00:42.28,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Mahsa is finishing her master's\Ndegree and is a research assistant
Dialogue: 0,0:00:42.28,0:00:45.73,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,at the Deja Active Lab, both at\Nthe university of Amsterdam,
Dialogue: 0,0:00:45.73,0:00:52.20,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and her focus is on freedom of\Nexpression and access to information
Dialogue: 0,0:00:52.20,0:00:58.59,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,in Iran. She's also the editor\Nof the Global Voices Iran
Dialogue: 0,0:00:58.59,0:01:02.51,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and today she will be sharing some\Nof her research findings with us
Dialogue: 0,0:01:02.51,0:01:08.80,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,about the censorship situation\Nin Iran on mobile platforms.
Dialogue: 0,0:01:08.80,0:01:14.59,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,With that I would like to ask you to\Nhelp me welcome Mahsa Alimardani!
Dialogue: 0,0:01:14.59,0:01:23.38,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,{\i1}applause{\i0}
Dialogue: 0,0:01:23.38,0:01:26.92,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Mahsa Alimardani: Thank you Sonia,\Nfor the nice introduction,
Dialogue: 0,0:01:26.92,0:01:29.76,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and thank you all for\Ncoming to this session,
Dialogue: 0,0:01:29.76,0:01:33.89,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,I know there's a lot of awesome\Ncomputing sessions happening right now.
Dialogue: 0,0:01:33.89,0:01:40.53,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,And, so, just to introduce you a little\Nbit to the Iranian internet ecosystem.
Dialogue: 0,0:01:40.53,0:01:46.95,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,So, there are some realities,\Nyou should know about it.
Dialogue: 0,0:01:46.95,0:01:48.44,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,{\i1}decent laughter{\i0}
Dialogue: 0,0:01:48.44,0:01:53.28,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Yes, if you're thinking of traveling to\NIran I'd tell this to everyone: Do go!
Dialogue: 0,0:01:53.28,0:01:56.22,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,It's awesome, it's amazing,\Nit's a beautiful country.
Dialogue: 0,0:01:56.22,0:01:59.49,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Although, take into consideration\Nthe type of work that you do and
Dialogue: 0,0:01:59.49,0:02:02.11,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the type of public profile\Nyou have when you do go.
Dialogue: 0,0:02:02.11,0:02:05.85,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,If you do go do set up TOR relays\N'cause that's really helpful to people
Dialogue: 0,0:02:05.85,0:02:10.41,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,accessing the internet in Iran.
Dialogue: 0,0:02:10.41,0:02:12.66,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,And one of the things you should\Nknow that the Iranian internet,
Dialogue: 0,0:02:12.66,0:02:16.55,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,it's often known as the Filter Net.
Dialogue: 0,0:02:16.55,0:02:20.62,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,And Filter Net sort of has been the name\Nascribed to the internet
Dialogue: 0,0:02:20.62,0:02:23.21,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,because of the censorship\Nthat happens in Iran.
Dialogue: 0,0:02:23.21,0:02:27.44,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,I think out of the whole\Nworld Iran would come
Dialogue: 0,0:02:27.44,0:02:31.11,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,second after China in the terms\Nof the pervasiveness of censorship
Dialogue: 0,0:02:31.11,0:02:34.57,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and internet controls around the world.
Dialogue: 0,0:02:34.57,0:02:38.12,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Something that you might not know is\Nthat it is also known as the "Kondnet"
Dialogue: 0,0:02:38.12,0:02:41.45,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and "kond" means "slow".
Dialogue: 0,0:02:41.45,0:02:44.97,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,The fact that the internet\Nis often throttled in Iran,
Dialogue: 0,0:02:44.97,0:02:47.50,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and the speeds are very slow,
Dialogue: 0,0:02:47.50,0:02:51.18,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and the fact that it can be very\Nfrustrating sometimes to upload a page
Dialogue: 0,0:02:51.18,0:02:55.02,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,it also has the name of "Kondnet".
Dialogue: 0,0:02:55.02,0:03:01.25,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,So, this talk will sort of describe this,\NI'll talk on Mobile Censorship
Dialogue: 0,0:03:01.25,0:03:05.23,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and how they will focus on that.\NI just wanna take a sort of broader view
Dialogue: 0,0:03:05.23,0:03:11.77,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and to look at more general\Nlook at internet policy in Iran
Dialogue: 0,0:03:11.77,0:03:14.14,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and just before I sort of delve into it...
Dialogue: 0,0:03:14.14,0:03:16.71,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,The reason why I really\Nwanted to get this talk at
Dialogue: 0,0:03:16.71,0:03:21.91,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,a conference like the CCC is\Nbecause I know this is a community
Dialogue: 0,0:03:21.91,0:03:26.03,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,full of lots of different\Nexpertise in terms of
Dialogue: 0,0:03:26.03,0:03:28.05,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Digital Security,\Nin terms of Circumvention.
Dialogue: 0,0:03:28.05,0:03:31.32,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,So, bringing awareness and sort\Nof knowledge in focus on Iran
Dialogue: 0,0:03:31.32,0:03:34.81,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,I think is kind of exciting\Nin a community like this
Dialogue: 0,0:03:34.81,0:03:39.53,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,'cause a lot of help and\Na lot of aid can go towards
Dialogue: 0,0:03:39.53,0:03:43.42,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,access to internet in Iran\Nfrom a group of people like you.
Dialogue: 0,0:03:43.42,0:03:48.82,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,So: just a broad look at what the internet\Ninfrastructure's like in Iran is.
Dialogue: 0,0:03:48.82,0:03:53.34,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,The Ministry of Information,\NCommunication and Technology (ICT)
Dialogue: 0,0:03:53.34,0:03:55.94,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,runs the Telecommunications\NCompany of Iran
Dialogue: 0,0:03:55.94,0:04:01.15,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and this company is also responsible
Dialogue: 0,0:04:01.15,0:04:05.99,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,for the main ISP of Iran which is the\NData Communication Company of Iran.
Dialogue: 0,0:04:05.99,0:04:11.39,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,So, in effect they control all\Ninternet traffic that goes into Iran
Dialogue: 0,0:04:11.39,0:04:16.27,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and all ISP's both private and\Ngovernment are controlled through
Dialogue: 0,0:04:16.27,0:04:19.63,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the Data Communication Company of Iran.
Dialogue: 0,0:04:19.63,0:04:24.67,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,So this company in effect becomes\Nthe point where filtering can occur
Dialogue: 0,0:04:24.67,0:04:29.59,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and the blocking of pages or\Nthe blacklisting of keywords occurs.
Dialogue: 0,0:04:29.59,0:04:33.16,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Oftentimes the Telecommunications\NCompany uses proxy servers
Dialogue: 0,0:04:33.16,0:04:39.54,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,for surveillance by logging all\Nunencrypted internet traffic that goes on
Dialogue: 0,0:04:39.54,0:04:43.60,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,in Iran which is why it's really important\Nfor pages that are being used
Dialogue: 0,0:04:43.60,0:04:47.13,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,especially by Iranians if not\Neverywhere else in the world
Dialogue: 0,0:04:47.13,0:04:51.44,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,to have https for all\NMobile Applications to be using
Dialogue: 0,0:04:51.44,0:04:54.90,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,encryption technology\Nand things like that.
Dialogue: 0,0:04:54.90,0:04:58.34,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Now, all of these things\Nare really concerning as it is
Dialogue: 0,0:04:58.34,0:05:04.53,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the fact that the government has so\Nmuch access to data over the internet.
Dialogue: 0,0:05:04.53,0:05:08.92,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,What's even more concerning\Nis looking at this chart here.
Dialogue: 0,0:05:08.92,0:05:14.57,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,So this is the overall view\Nof the institutions responsible
Dialogue: 0,0:05:14.57,0:05:17.76,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,for internet policy in Iran.\NAnd you see at the very top
Dialogue: 0,0:05:17.76,0:05:22.07,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,there is the Supreme Leader. Although\NIran does have no active president,
Dialogue: 0,0:05:22.07,0:05:25.69,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,ultimately, the Supreme Leader\Nhas the Veto Power
Dialogue: 0,0:05:25.69,0:05:30.68,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and is in effect really\Nthe official Head Of State.
Dialogue: 0,0:05:30.68,0:05:35.70,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,And so while the ministry of ICT is part\Nof the elected administration
Dialogue: 0,0:05:35.70,0:05:40.19,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the Supreme Leader has ultimate power.\NAnd what is particularly
Dialogue: 0,0:05:40.19,0:05:44.77,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,concerning here is while we have\Nthe ministry of ICT here on the right
Dialogue: 0,0:05:44.77,0:05:48.35,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and then you have the Telecommunications\NCompany. And then you have
Dialogue: 0,0:05:48.35,0:05:53.41,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the ISP provider in Iran. You then\Nhave the Revolutionary Guards
Dialogue: 0,0:05:53.41,0:05:57.27,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,which are a para-military\Norganization in Iran
Dialogue: 0,0:05:57.27,0:06:00.85,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,who are not accountable\Nto the elected government.
Dialogue: 0,0:06:00.85,0:06:04.40,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,They're ultimately only accountable\Nto the Supreme Leader.
Dialogue: 0,0:06:04.40,0:06:09.63,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,They own the largest share of the\NTelecommunications Company of Iran.
Dialogue: 0,0:06:09.63,0:06:14.00,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,This is particularly concerning because\Na group like the Revolutionary Guards
Dialogue: 0,0:06:14.00,0:06:18.35,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,are the ones who are oftentimes\Nresponsible for
Dialogue: 0,0:06:18.35,0:06:23.52,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,various surveillance programs,\Nfor arrests of dissidents.
Dialogue: 0,0:06:23.52,0:06:28.50,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,One of their offshoots, the Basij\Nwere the ones on the streets,
Dialogue: 0,0:06:28.50,0:06:31.81,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,arresting and beating up protesters\Nduring the 2009 Green Movement.
Dialogue: 0,0:06:31.81,0:06:35.91,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,So the fact that they have access to\Nthis kind of data it's very concerning
Dialogue: 0,0:06:35.91,0:06:43.73,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,in why things like digital security are of\Nthe upmost importance in Iran.
Dialogue: 0,0:06:43.73,0:06:47.72,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Just a little brief overview of why
Dialogue: 0,0:06:47.72,0:06:51.39,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,this sort of history started in Iran.\NIt's not always been like this.
Dialogue: 0,0:06:51.39,0:06:57.43,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,This started during the Reformer's era\Nin Iran which were the late 90ies.
Dialogue: 0,0:06:57.43,0:07:02.68,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,This was a period where\Nrelative to the Iranian context
Dialogue: 0,0:07:02.68,0:07:08.32,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,which is a Islamic theocracy there was\Nmore progressive politics
Dialogue: 0,0:07:08.32,0:07:12.98,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and the hardline elements which aren't\Noften accountable to the electorate
Dialogue: 0,0:07:12.98,0:07:18.86,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,in Iran kind of clashed with the\NReformer's Government that was in power
Dialogue: 0,0:07:18.86,0:07:22.43,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and so the surge in Reformer's\Njounalists that were
Dialogue: 0,0:07:22.43,0:07:26.22,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,in traditional print media meant\Nthat they could start migrating online
Dialogue: 0,0:07:26.22,0:07:31.35,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,in the early 2000's, late 90ies, when\Nblogging was becoming really popular
Dialogue: 0,0:07:31.35,0:07:36.62,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and the technology to use Persian unicode\Nwas becoming more pervasive.
Dialogue: 0,0:07:36.62,0:07:39.68,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,During this time the government\Nsort of realized that there's
Dialogue: 0,0:07:39.68,0:07:43.37,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,this space that's not\Nbeing controlled at all.
Dialogue: 0,0:07:43.37,0:07:47.46,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,And so filtering of pages\Nstarted early on in 2001
Dialogue: 0,0:07:47.46,0:07:52.42,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,but there was no real systematic\Nprocedure for this filtering.
Dialogue: 0,0:07:52.42,0:07:57.07,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,So they came up with the\NCybercrimes Law in 2006.
Dialogue: 0,0:07:57.07,0:08:01.53,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,But that sort of lay\Nfloating around until 2009
Dialogue: 0,0:08:01.53,0:08:05.36,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,when the internet became\Na really big deal because,
Dialogue: 0,0:08:05.36,0:08:09.44,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,I'm sure some of you have\Nheard of the Twitter Revolution
Dialogue: 0,0:08:09.44,0:08:12.92,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,which sort of came out after 2009\NGreen Movement. And it was at that point
Dialogue: 0,0:08:12.92,0:08:17.39,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,- when Iranians were coming out en masse\Nonto the streets protesting
Dialogue: 0,0:08:17.39,0:08:21.30,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,what they claimed to be a fraudulent\Nelection - that the Iranian Government
Dialogue: 0,0:08:21.30,0:08:25.76,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,shut down the internet. And so\Nafter this period they codified
Dialogue: 0,0:08:25.76,0:08:31.17,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the Cybercrimes Law to sort of ensure\Na more systematic way of filtering
Dialogue: 0,0:08:31.17,0:08:35.78,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,various pages including Twitter\Nand Facebook, that came out of it.
Dialogue: 0,0:08:35.78,0:08:38.96,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,And then following this you\Nhad the Revolutionary Guard's
Dialogue: 0,0:08:38.96,0:08:43.77,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,establishment of Gerdab which is\Na Cyber Command Center
Dialogue: 0,0:08:43.77,0:08:47.96,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,which is now responsible for\Nthe arrest of many different bloggers
Dialogue: 0,0:08:47.96,0:08:52.86,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and activists in Iran. And then in 2011
Dialogue: 0,0:08:52.86,0:08:56.18,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,because there wasn't enough\Ncontrol over the internet
Dialogue: 0,0:08:56.18,0:09:01.32,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,they set up the FATA, a police force,\Nfrom the police forces.
Dialogue: 0,0:09:01.32,0:09:06.02,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,While they do sort of take care\Nof things like cybercrime
Dialogue: 0,0:09:06.02,0:09:10.32,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,in terms of banking, in identity theft,\Nthey also are responsible
Dialogue: 0,0:09:10.32,0:09:15.68,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,for the arrests of various bloggers.\NThere was one popular case in 2012
Dialogue: 0,0:09:15.68,0:09:21.69,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,of Sattar Beheshti, who had public\Ndissident posts against the government.
Dialogue: 0,0:09:21.69,0:09:26.88,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,And then finally in 2012\Nthe Supreme Leader who has
Dialogue: 0,0:09:26.88,0:09:31.58,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,quite a grand name of its own decided\Nto setup a very Sci-fi-esque body
Dialogue: 0,0:09:31.58,0:09:37.11,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,- at least in the English language -\Ncalled the Supreme Council of Cyberspace.
Dialogue: 0,0:09:37.11,0:09:40.15,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,{\i1}audience amused{\i0}
Dialogue: 0,0:09:40.15,0:09:45.69,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,This body basically would be responsible\Nfor all of the Internet Policy
Dialogue: 0,0:09:45.69,0:09:49.92,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,in Iran. And this really marked\Na turning point in Iran where
Dialogue: 0,0:09:49.92,0:09:56.71,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,cyberspace and internet became\Na key issue of National Security;
Dialogue: 0,0:09:56.71,0:09:59.77,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,not only were there concerns\Nof cyber attacks from the United States
Dialogue: 0,0:09:59.77,0:10:04.47,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and Israel, there was also\Nbig concerns of dissidents
Dialogue: 0,0:10:04.47,0:10:08.24,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and various movements that could\Nsort of emerge through Social Media
Dialogue: 0,0:10:08.24,0:10:13.40,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and the blogs. And so all the\Ndecision making would occur through
Dialogue: 0,0:10:13.40,0:10:17.38,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the members that they decided to appoint\Nto this council. And it's a mixed bag
Dialogue: 0,0:10:17.38,0:10:25.61,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,of different ministers as well as\Nunelected officials and experts.
Dialogue: 0,0:10:25.61,0:10:30.08,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Over the years they've had various\Ndifferent programs to try to control
Dialogue: 0,0:10:30.08,0:10:34.61,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the internet and most recently\Nin last March they came up with
Dialogue: 0,0:10:34.61,0:10:39.68,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,another grand sounding\Nprogram called Spider.
Dialogue: 0,0:10:39.68,0:10:45.26,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Spider was a project of the Revolutionary\NGuards where they sort of
Dialogue: 0,0:10:45.26,0:10:50.49,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,talked about doing blanket surveillance\Nover all Social Media activities,
Dialogue: 0,0:10:50.49,0:10:53.38,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,activities of Iranians which technically
Dialogue: 0,0:10:53.38,0:10:59.54,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,- if any of you know anything about\Nhow Facebook or how Twitter works -
Dialogue: 0,0:10:59.54,0:11:06.10,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,it's quite hard. If posts are private\Nit's hard to delve into them.
Dialogue: 0,0:11:06.10,0:11:13.07,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Anyways, so what is key to understanding\Nabout the internet climate right now
Dialogue: 0,0:11:13.07,0:11:17.92,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,is that there is a moderate president\NRohani who came into power
Dialogue: 0,0:11:17.92,0:11:21.68,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,on a platform of many\Ndifferent progressive policies
Dialogue: 0,0:11:21.68,0:11:25.14,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,one of which was Internet Freedom.
Dialogue: 0,0:11:25.14,0:11:29.12,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,And so they've had many\Ndifferent progressive moments.
Dialogue: 0,0:11:29.12,0:11:35.35,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,They shut down the hardline judiciary's\Nattempts to block Whatsapp e.g.
Dialogue: 0,0:11:35.35,0:11:40.37,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and they've promised not to really\Nshut down any other platform
Dialogue: 0,0:11:40.37,0:11:44.79,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,or censor anything unless there is\Na legitimate replacement for them
Dialogue: 0,0:11:44.79,0:11:48.18,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and this is a quote by\Nthe minister of ICT.
Dialogue: 0,0:11:48.18,0:11:51.96,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,But at the same time\Nthey've been trying to cater to
Dialogue: 0,0:11:51.96,0:11:55.62,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,some of the hardline elements\Nand try to sort of balance out
Dialogue: 0,0:11:55.62,0:11:59.72,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,their Internet Freedom policies with\Nprograms like intelligent filtering,
Dialogue: 0,0:11:59.72,0:12:04.49,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,which would mean not blocking\Nentire platforms outright but
Dialogue: 0,0:12:04.49,0:12:08.97,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,blocking individual pages.
Dialogue: 0,0:12:08.97,0:12:14.80,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,This program... about 66 Mio. Dollars\Nhas been spent on this program
Dialogue: 0,0:12:14.80,0:12:20.65,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,from the ICT budget. And overall\Nit's been a bit of a failure.
Dialogue: 0,0:12:20.65,0:12:26.01,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,I worked on a piece of research\Nwith Frederic Jacobs that sort of
Dialogue: 0,0:12:26.01,0:12:30.65,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,underlined how the intelligent filtering\Non Instagram, which was
Dialogue: 0,0:12:30.65,0:12:35.32,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the most tangible,\Nresolved of this form of control.
Dialogue: 0,0:12:35.32,0:12:39.06,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,was only occuring because\NInstagram had failed to release
Dialogue: 0,0:12:39.06,0:12:44.98,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the https on the Mobile API.\NSo they were able to enable
Dialogue: 0,0:12:44.98,0:12:50.06,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,intelligent filtering on the mobile\Napplication but not on the browser.
Dialogue: 0,0:12:50.06,0:12:53.36,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Later on people found out that there was\Nstill disruptions and images
Dialogue: 0,0:12:53.36,0:12:58.68,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,weren't loading to Instagram even\Nafter Instagram enabled https
Dialogue: 0,0:12:58.68,0:13:04.00,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,over the Mobile API. And it turned out that\Nthis was just collateral damage
Dialogue: 0,0:13:04.00,0:13:08.02,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,from the fact that some of the\Nimages on Instagram were also hosted
Dialogue: 0,0:13:08.02,0:13:13.63,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,on Facebook which is\Noutright blocked in Iran.
Dialogue: 0,0:13:13.63,0:13:17.54,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,So right now we're about to go\Nup to a election in Iran.
Dialogue: 0,0:13:17.54,0:13:20.87,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,It's in February,\Nit's the Parliamentary Elections.
Dialogue: 0,0:13:20.87,0:13:26.11,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,And typically during these\Nsensitive moments in Iran
Dialogue: 0,0:13:26.11,0:13:29.84,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,they start playing around\Nwith the internet and
Dialogue: 0,0:13:29.84,0:13:32.73,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,this happened in 2013. There was
Dialogue: 0,0:13:32.73,0:13:36.99,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,a significant throttling of the internet\Nleading up to the elections.
Dialogue: 0,0:13:36.99,0:13:40.16,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,And right now there have been\Nsome things spotted although
Dialogue: 0,0:13:40.16,0:13:44.91,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,it's speculation whether or not\Nit's related to the elections at all.
Dialogue: 0,0:13:44.91,0:13:50.60,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Some websites with foreign\NSSL certificates are being blocked.
Dialogue: 0,0:13:50.60,0:13:54.41,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,There was one example of a\Npopular blogger based in Iran
Dialogue: 0,0:13:54.41,0:13:58.91,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,named Jadi who has a\NSSL certificate from Cloudflare
Dialogue: 0,0:13:58.91,0:14:04.72,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and his website was blocked.\NAnd you'll notice that local certificates
Dialogue: 0,0:14:04.72,0:14:08.12,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,won't be blocked because ultimately\Nthey're controlled by the government.
Dialogue: 0,0:14:08.12,0:14:13.44,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,This is a diagram formed by Smallmedia\Nthat sort of explains how
Dialogue: 0,0:14:13.44,0:14:17.20,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the certificate authorities are ultimately\Nin the hands of the government
Dialogue: 0,0:14:17.20,0:14:21.15,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and data could potentially be shared.
Dialogue: 0,0:14:21.15,0:14:26.50,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,There is also throttling of TLS in\NNovember and the best example of this
Dialogue: 0,0:14:26.50,0:14:36.30,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,was over TOR direct connections which,\Nyou see, experienced a significant drop.
Dialogue: 0,0:14:36.30,0:14:41.73,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,The shift towards mobile applications\Nand the fact that Iranians are
Dialogue: 0,0:14:41.73,0:14:45.49,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,increasingly accessing the web through\Ntheir phones means that there's been
Dialogue: 0,0:14:45.49,0:14:50.04,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,sort of a increased focus by\Nthe government on mobile apps.
Dialogue: 0,0:14:50.04,0:14:54.78,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,In order to sort of talk to this they've been\Ncoming up with local alternatives
Dialogue: 0,0:14:54.78,0:14:59.07,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,like WeChat has Dialog which sort of\Nyou can see from the interface
Dialogue: 0,0:14:59.07,0:15:07.29,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,that this local version is imitating that\Napplication. Instagram had Lenzor.
Dialogue: 0,0:15:07.29,0:15:11.30,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,But you kind of see that it's not\Nworking as effectively because
Dialogue: 0,0:15:11.30,0:15:15.25,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,if you look at the Cafe Bazaar Stats,\Nwhich is a platform where Iranians
Dialogue: 0,0:15:15.25,0:15:20.43,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,download their apps, Lenzor\Nonly has about 50000 users
Dialogue: 0,0:15:20.43,0:15:24.40,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,while Instagram has\Nmore than 9 Mio.
Dialogue: 0,0:15:24.40,0:15:28.72,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Viber had another imitation\Nout called Salam.
Dialogue: 0,0:15:28.72,0:15:34.47,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Salam was speculated to be\Ndeveloped by the Basij.
Dialogue: 0,0:15:34.47,0:15:40.17,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,So popular apps right now have...\Nthere's Whatsapp and there's Viber
Dialogue: 0,0:15:40.17,0:15:44.41,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and Telegram in terms of\Nchats and communication.
Dialogue: 0,0:15:44.41,0:15:50.18,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Telegram is the most popular right now\Nand that's mainly because
Dialogue: 0,0:15:50.18,0:15:53.61,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Viber has been heavily\Ntampered with and
Dialogue: 0,0:15:53.61,0:15:58.11,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,a lot of people don't trust Viber anymore\Nbecause the media has sort of
Dialogue: 0,0:15:58.11,0:16:02.84,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,disparaged it in connection with Israel\Nand the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF).
Dialogue: 0,0:16:02.84,0:16:07.97,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,And Whatsapp the second most\Npopular app has been experiencing
Dialogue: 0,0:16:07.97,0:16:12.37,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,lots of network disruptions.\NAnd so with this increasing shift
Dialogue: 0,0:16:12.37,0:16:17.18,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,towards Telegram the media\Nhas been focusing on also
Dialogue: 0,0:16:17.18,0:16:21.91,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,highlighting that Telegram is\Na place of moral corruption.
Dialogue: 0,0:16:21.91,0:16:26.03,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,This is a picture from a semi-official\Nnews source, FARS News,
Dialogue: 0,0:16:26.03,0:16:32.33,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,sort of depicting how someone could be\Ndramming in Telegram.
Dialogue: 0,0:16:32.33,0:16:37.25,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,So Telegram in Iran is really\Ncontroversial not only because
Dialogue: 0,0:16:37.25,0:16:40.05,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the government's really\Nconcerned about it but
Dialogue: 0,0:16:40.05,0:16:45.67,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,it had a really confusing\Nand weird relationship with Iran.
Dialogue: 0,0:16:45.67,0:16:50.21,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Starting in August, Bots and Stickers\Nstarted getting censored in Iran.
Dialogue: 0,0:16:50.21,0:16:55.10,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,And the Bots and Stickers are one of the\Nreasons why Telegram is really popular
Dialogue: 0,0:16:55.10,0:16:59.84,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,in Iran because the Bots allowed Iranians\Nto access content on the internet
Dialogue: 0,0:16:59.84,0:17:04.27,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,without using a VPN\Nand the Stickers are oftentimes fun
Dialogue: 0,0:17:04.27,0:17:09.92,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and kind of rude and in Persian\Nwhich not a lot of apps have.
Dialogue: 0,0:17:09.92,0:17:14.08,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,And so it's really popular.\NBut these got censored in August.
Dialogue: 0,0:17:14.08,0:17:16.14,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,And the ministry announced that\Nthe censorship was occuring
Dialogue: 0,0:17:16.14,0:17:21.92,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,because of cooperation with Telegram,\Nbut Telegram was very quick to deny this.
Dialogue: 0,0:17:21.92,0:17:27.93,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Pavel Durov came up and said that they\Nhad not entered in to any agreements.
Dialogue: 0,0:17:27.93,0:17:32.49,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,On top of that there's a respected community\Nof security experts have really
Dialogue: 0,0:17:32.49,0:17:37.27,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,critizised the cryptography and\Nthe security behind Telegram.
Dialogue: 0,0:17:37.27,0:17:40.27,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,And this is especially worrysome\Nwhen you hear things like
Dialogue: 0,0:17:40.27,0:17:45.68,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,30% of Telegram data is now being\Nstored in Iran which was a
Dialogue: 0,0:17:45.68,0:17:49.55,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,announcement by the ministry of ICT\Nin Iran. But then again
Dialogue: 0,0:17:49.55,0:17:55.08,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Telegram was very quick to deny this,\Nagain, saying that this is 100% bullshit.
Dialogue: 0,0:17:55.08,0:18:00.67,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,{\i1}laughter{\i0}\NAnd so the Telegram story continues.
Dialogue: 0,0:18:00.67,0:18:05.55,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,I think it was in late November,
Dialogue: 0,0:18:05.55,0:18:09.83,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Pavel Durov made a announcement\Nsaying that the ministry of ICT
Dialogue: 0,0:18:09.83,0:18:15.82,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,had come to him demanding spying and\Ncensorship capabilities from Telegram
Dialogue: 0,0:18:15.82,0:18:18.85,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,which is really weird because\Nbeforehand they thought they were
Dialogue: 0,0:18:18.85,0:18:22.35,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,working together. And there's all sorts of\Nconspiracy theories about
Dialogue: 0,0:18:22.35,0:18:26.75,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,how Pavel Durov got on a plane and went\Nto Tehran to meet with the minister Vaezi.
Dialogue: 0,0:18:26.75,0:18:30.23,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Noone really knows what happened,\Nall speculations and rumours.
Dialogue: 0,0:18:30.23,0:18:35.23,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Anyways, he comes out with this\Nannouncement and then a few weeks later
Dialogue: 0,0:18:35.23,0:18:40.12,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,it's like: "Oh, that was a fake email",\Nwhich is really odd and concerning
Dialogue: 0,0:18:40.12,0:18:45.74,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and no other internet company has ever\Nhad anything happen like this.
Dialogue: 0,0:18:45.74,0:18:49.96,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,He said that he received the fake email,\Nthe ministry didn't actually contact him.
Dialogue: 0,0:18:49.96,0:18:54.47,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,He never released the email.\NIt's all very strange and it led to
Dialogue: 0,0:18:54.47,0:19:01.15,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,several advocacy organizations asking\Nfor more transparency from Telegram.
Dialogue: 0,0:19:01.15,0:19:06.58,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,But Telegram continues to be one of the\Nmost popular apps in Iran.
Dialogue: 0,0:19:06.58,0:19:09.71,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,What's notable about Telegram is that that\Nsort of sets a precedent for other
Dialogue: 0,0:19:09.71,0:19:14.30,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,internet companies inside of Iran\Nespecially as we move towards the removal
Dialogue: 0,0:19:14.30,0:19:19.74,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,of sanctions. And companies like Facebook\Nand Twitter will be able to do business
Dialogue: 0,0:19:19.74,0:19:24.85,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,with Iran potentially. And so noting these\Nkinds of behaviours and sort of holding
Dialogue: 0,0:19:24.85,0:19:29.89,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,them to account is really important.
Dialogue: 0,0:19:29.89,0:19:33.54,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,One last application that sort of\Ngaining ground in Iran and that
Dialogue: 0,0:19:33.54,0:19:38.04,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,highlights one of the sort\Nof habits of Iranians is
Dialogue: 0,0:19:38.04,0:19:47.03,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Bisphone. Bisphone is this local app and\NSecurity Researcher Kevin Miston
Dialogue: 0,0:19:47.03,0:19:50.25,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,who I don't know if he's here [in the\Nhall] or not, but he's somewhere here
Dialogue: 0,0:19:50.25,0:19:55.38,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,in the venue, has done some really cool\Nwork into looking what exactly Bisphone is
Dialogue: 0,0:19:55.38,0:20:01.98,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,'cause it's sort of this rising app\Nthat's gaining a lot of popularity.
Dialogue: 0,0:20:01.98,0:20:05.58,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,It apparently has connections, the\Ndevelopers are loosely connected to
Dialogue: 0,0:20:05.58,0:20:12.77,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the government. It turns out that the\Nactual data collection over the ISPs is
Dialogue: 0,0:20:12.77,0:20:18.45,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,connected to Iran's Telecommunications\NCompany. Which is very concerning but
Dialogue: 0,0:20:18.45,0:20:25.92,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Smallmedia recently did a report asking\NIranians what they thought about the
Dialogue: 0,0:20:25.92,0:20:30.34,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,security of the apps that they use and the\Ntendency is that they either don't know
Dialogue: 0,0:20:30.34,0:20:34.46,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,or it doesn't really\Nfactor in as a big issue.
Dialogue: 0,0:20:34.46,0:20:40.64,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,So security is a very low\Npriority for Iranians even though
Dialogue: 0,0:20:40.64,0:20:43.76,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,it should be higher on their list.\NThey generally tend to go for
Dialogue: 0,0:20:43.76,0:20:48.74,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,usability and fun features.\NThis kind of brings me
Dialogue: 0,0:20:48.74,0:20:52.50,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,to the take aways of this talk which is:\NInternet control in Iran is
Dialogue: 0,0:20:52.50,0:20:58.66,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,quite pervasive, but it's not as\Nsophisticated as they would like.
Dialogue: 0,0:20:58.66,0:21:00.90,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,It's especially important now\N'cause there's been more arrests
Dialogue: 0,0:21:00.90,0:21:05.66,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,of various bloggers, various people\Nwho work in the Tech industry in Iran.
Dialogue: 0,0:21:05.66,0:21:08.91,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,This might be particularly\Nproblematic as we move towards
Dialogue: 0,0:21:08.91,0:21:13.73,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the Parliamentary Elections.
Dialogue: 0,0:21:13.73,0:21:17.81,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,If you do particular research,\Nif you do any collection of data
Dialogue: 0,0:21:17.81,0:21:23.26,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and circumvention tools I think this is a\Nvery exciting time to be looking at Iran's
Dialogue: 0,0:21:23.26,0:21:27.11,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,internet ecosystem. Thank you!
Dialogue: 0,0:21:27.11,0:21:38.23,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,{\i1}applause{\i0}
Dialogue: 0,0:21:38.23,0:21:42.97,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Herald: Thank you, we have 5\Nminutes now for question/answers.
Dialogue: 0,0:21:42.97,0:21:51.38,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,So if you have questions for Mahsa\Nplease go to one of the 4 microphones.
Dialogue: 0,0:21:51.38,0:21:55.32,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,And I would like to ask you to\Nplease say your question slowly
Dialogue: 0,0:21:55.32,0:21:58.09,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,into the microphone because\Nit's being recorded.
Dialogue: 0,0:21:58.09,0:22:00.39,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,{\i1}audience mumbles amused{\i0}
Dialogue: 0,0:22:00.39,0:22:08.61,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Question: Shall I start?\NH: Ok we'll start with, yes, that microphone.
Dialogue: 0,0:22:08.61,0:22:15.93,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Q: So one thing first as a statement\Nnot a question. If you are in Iran, do not
Dialogue: 0,0:22:15.93,0:22:20.54,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,ever use your banking, whatever banking...\NMahsa: {\i1}whispering{\i0} Who's talking?
Dialogue: 0,0:22:20.54,0:22:24.48,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Q: ...without VPN. And then... because\Nthey're gonna block it. You're gonna
Dialogue: 0,0:22:24.48,0:22:29.82,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,have to go back to your bank and reopen\Nit. But the question is: Do you know...
Dialogue: 0,0:22:29.82,0:22:33.59,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,how much do you know about the\Nrelationships with other governments like
Dialogue: 0,0:22:33.59,0:22:38.46,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,foreign governments or foreign companies\Non the filters, there were... and like
Dialogue: 0,0:22:38.46,0:22:41.79,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,further developments. Because I know from\NRohde&Schwarz like a year ago,
Dialogue: 0,0:22:41.79,0:22:48.44,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,when I was there, they were talking about\Nthe relationship with the filters in
Dialogue: 0,0:22:48.44,0:22:54.84,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,I-don't-know Syria, maybe. And that they're\Nnot officially related but they were used?
Dialogue: 0,0:22:54.84,0:23:02.48,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Mahsa: Yeah, I'm not a particular expert\Non Syria but I do know that they have
Dialogue: 0,0:23:02.48,0:23:06.39,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,exchanged technology and knowledge with\Nthe Syrian Government 'cause they are
Dialogue: 0,0:23:06.39,0:23:10.21,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,very close with the Assad Regime.
Dialogue: 0,0:23:10.21,0:23:16.11,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Q: I meant more specifically like\Ncompanies in Europe and in the US.
Dialogue: 0,0:23:16.11,0:23:19.93,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,M: Yeah, so because of sanctions\NI know the US don't really...
Dialogue: 0,0:23:19.93,0:23:26.16,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,I do know Europe... is...\Ndoes work, but I know
Dialogue: 0,0:23:26.16,0:23:31.60,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the country that they turn to most for\Ncensorship technology would be China.
Dialogue: 0,0:23:31.60,0:23:36.04,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,And I know that in the past that they\Nheavily relied on Chinese technology
Dialogue: 0,0:23:36.04,0:23:40.46,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,for censorship and surveillance material\Nbut recently they've been shifting towards
Dialogue: 0,0:23:40.46,0:23:45.68,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,local vendors and using more\Nlocally grown technology.
Dialogue: 0,0:23:45.68,0:23:50.18,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Although it's hard to say. I don't have\Ndirect insight into what technology
Dialogue: 0,0:23:50.18,0:23:56.41,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and where it's coming from. Maybe you\Nhave more insight and can tell me.
Dialogue: 0,0:23:56.41,0:24:00.98,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,H: Thank you, next question, please.
Dialogue: 0,0:24:00.98,0:24:05.70,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Q: Thank you to bring us the awareness\Nthat we have to fight for our freedom
Dialogue: 0,0:24:05.70,0:24:08.54,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,in internet or also to fight\Nleaders which try to...
Dialogue: 0,0:24:08.54,0:24:14.40,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,H: Could you get a little closer to\Nthe microphone, please!
Dialogue: 0,0:24:14.40,0:24:19.13,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Q: My question was: When you go back to\NIran, do you have any repression or
Dialogue: 0,0:24:19.13,0:24:20.90,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,problems?\NM: Do I personally?
Dialogue: 0,0:24:20.90,0:24:27.77,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Q: Yes. personally.\NM: I haven't gone back to Iran since 2010
Dialogue: 0,0:24:27.77,0:24:31.07,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,because I do things like come and\Ntalk here on a recorded video
Dialogue: 0,0:24:31.07,0:24:37.43,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,{\i1}audience amused{\i0}\NI generally don...
Dialogue: 0,0:24:37.43,0:24:45.14,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,{\i1}applause{\i0}
Dialogue: 0,0:24:45.14,0:24:50.00,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Q: It was my question exactly, and you\Nshould be aware that it's no democratic
Dialogue: 0,0:24:50.00,0:24:52.81,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,there so if they catch you they do\Nwhatever they want with you.
Dialogue: 0,0:24:52.81,0:24:57.68,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,It's not, like, we control the police...\NM: Yeah, I mean that's also another point
Dialogue: 0,0:24:57.68,0:25:02.82,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,I wanna make: There's a lot of\Nawesome unknown people doing work
Dialogue: 0,0:25:02.82,0:25:08.12,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and doing research and activism on the\NIranian internet that remain anonymous
Dialogue: 0,0:25:08.12,0:25:13.26,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and use pseudonyms and can't do\Nthings like come here and talk, so
Dialogue: 0,0:25:13.26,0:25:16.78,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,that's a decision I've made. There's other\Npeople doing really amazing work that you
Dialogue: 0,0:25:16.78,0:25:21.75,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,probably will never see\Non a platform like this.
Dialogue: 0,0:25:21.75,0:25:28.67,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,{\i1}applause{\i0}
Dialogue: 0,0:25:28.67,0:25:33.53,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,H: Okay, may I ask on the next\Nquestion, please. Thank you.
Dialogue: 0,0:25:33.53,0:25:37.54,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Q: Yeah, thanks for the great talk! I have\Na question about the certificate authorities
Dialogue: 0,0:25:37.54,0:25:43.05,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,there in the Iranian State. You said that\Nforeign certificate authorities are
Dialogue: 0,0:25:43.05,0:25:48.72,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,blocked by the governmental filters.\NWith your demonstration of one site...
Dialogue: 0,0:25:48.72,0:25:55.72,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,of this blogger. Are there any certificate\Nauthorities in Iran not connected to
Dialogue: 0,0:25:55.72,0:26:00.76,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the government, or not... are forced to\Ngiving the private key to the government,
Dialogue: 0,0:26:00.76,0:26:06.33,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,so that maybe foreign sites could just\Nadjust their certificate to an Iranian
Dialogue: 0,0:26:06.33,0:26:12.57,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,free or libre CA and so could do an\Naccess for the people there?
Dialogue: 0,0:26:12.57,0:26:17.11,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,M: That's a really good question. I don't\Nthink I have the knowledge or expertise
Dialogue: 0,0:26:17.11,0:26:22.95,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,to fully answer it. But I will point you\Ntowards the Smallmedia report that
Dialogue: 0,0:26:22.95,0:26:27.60,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,really delved into this. They did like\Nmonths of research. I think the person
Dialogue: 0,0:26:27.60,0:26:31.49,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,you would probably wanna talk to\Nwould be Amin Sabeti. I could only
Dialogue: 0,0:26:31.49,0:26:38.04,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,sort of guess and I'm not sure if\Nit's broadly done on every website,
Dialogue: 0,0:26:38.04,0:26:42.08,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,'cause there's obviously a lot of websites\Nusing foreign SSL certificates that
Dialogue: 0,0:26:42.08,0:26:47.02,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,are not blocked, but if it's sensitive\Nit's more likely to get blocked in Iran.
Dialogue: 0,0:26:47.02,0:26:52.09,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Q: Thank you very much.\NH: Thank you, are there any questions
Dialogue: 0,0:26:52.09,0:26:56.53,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,from the internet?\N{\i1}looking out for Signal Angel{\i0}
Dialogue: 0,0:26:56.53,0:27:01.29,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Yes? Aah, ok. The internet, please!\NSignal Angel: So, question.
Dialogue: 0,0:27:01.29,0:27:04.76,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Since there seems to be a lot\Nof trouble politically-wise,
Dialogue: 0,0:27:04.76,0:27:09.52,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,is there a hacker scene in Iran? Like\Nthere is in Europe or in the USA?
Dialogue: 0,0:27:09.52,0:27:15.71,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,M: Yeah, yeah there is a hacker scene\Nand there's a, like an emerging
Dialogue: 0,0:27:15.71,0:27:20.61,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,open source community doing a lot of\Ncool work. Yeah, totally the scene exists.
Dialogue: 0,0:27:20.61,0:27:24.79,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,I'm sure a lot of them would\Nhave loved to have been here.
Dialogue: 0,0:27:24.79,0:27:30.63,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,H: And the internet, again!\NS: A lot of people in Iran, I know,
Dialogue: 0,0:27:30.63,0:27:34.66,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,use VPNs. Have you heard of VPN providers\Ncooperating with the government?
Dialogue: 0,0:27:34.66,0:27:42.43,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,M: Yeah, that's another big security\Nconcern that I didn't cover in this talk,
Dialogue: 0,0:27:42.43,0:27:47.25,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,w hich is like using VPNs is ubiquitous,\Nbasically, in Iran. Even
Dialogue: 0,0:27:47.25,0:27:51.60,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,members of the government use it.\NI think there was even a photo of...
Dialogue: 0,0:27:51.60,0:27:55.73,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,someone in one of the ministries, they\Nhad Psiphon on their desktop and
Dialogue: 0,0:27:55.73,0:27:59.53,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,it was pictured on a famous photo that\Nwent viral. But one of the concerns is
Dialogue: 0,0:27:59.53,0:28:04.09,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,like, the government is actually providing\Ntheir own VPN so they can access data
Dialogue: 0,0:28:04.09,0:28:08.85,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and what people are connecting to\Nthrough their own backdoored VPNs.
Dialogue: 0,0:28:08.85,0:28:16.80,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,H: We have one more question, and that's\Nhere in the back, please. You, yeah.
Dialogue: 0,0:28:16.80,0:28:22.02,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Q: Hi, so I have... I was wondering\Nif you have concrete cases
Dialogue: 0,0:28:22.02,0:28:27.56,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,about government monitoring data or
Dialogue: 0,0:28:27.56,0:28:32.96,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,using that as evidence in court cases.
Dialogue: 0,0:28:32.96,0:28:37.77,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Because we have always been\Nspeculating that these guys
Dialogue: 0,0:28:37.77,0:28:43.35,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,will go through the messages that we send\Nand then they're gonna use it against us.
Dialogue: 0,0:28:43.35,0:28:46.96,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,But we have never been able\Nto prove it. Do you have
Dialogue: 0,0:28:46.96,0:28:50.81,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,any kind of cases study on that?\NM: There is the one really famous one that
Dialogue: 0,0:28:50.81,0:28:56.26,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,I'm sure you've heard of,\Nthe Sony-Ericsson case
Dialogue: 0,0:28:56.26,0:29:00.81,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,- I think I'm getting the company right -\Nback in 2009 where they tracked
Dialogue: 0,0:29:00.81,0:29:05.28,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,through the cell phone company.\NSo that's the most concrete case.
Dialogue: 0,0:29:05.28,0:29:09.42,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,But I suppose there aren't\Nthat many known,
Dialogue: 0,0:29:09.42,0:29:15.99,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and that's one of the problems with\Ninstalling sort of a culture of digital
Dialogue: 0,0:29:15.99,0:29:20.00,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,security in Iran. Because most people\Nare afraid of physical surveillance,
Dialogue: 0,0:29:20.00,0:29:24.21,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,this thing that if they're arrested and\Nthey take their computers physically
Dialogue: 0,0:29:24.21,0:29:30.42,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,- that's the actual concern, not so much\Nusing encrypted email or encrypted chat.
Dialogue: 0,0:29:30.42,0:29:35.50,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,So that might be part of it.\NI'm sure there are. I couldn't
Dialogue: 0,0:29:35.50,0:29:39.34,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,name them to you right now but the most\Nfamous would be from 2009 when they were
Dialogue: 0,0:29:39.34,0:29:45.11,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,working with Ericsson.\NQ: Thank you.
Dialogue: 0,0:29:45.11,0:29:54.20,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,H: Ok, thank you!\N{\i1}applause{\i0}
Dialogue: 0,0:29:54.20,0:29:58.28,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,H: And with that one more warm applause\Nfor Mahsa. Thank you so much for
Dialogue: 0,0:29:58.28,0:30:01.39,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,coming today, Mahsa, thank you!
Dialogue: 0,0:30:01.39,0:30:05.90,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,{\i1}postroll music{\i0}
Dialogue: 0,0:30:05.90,0:30:08.35,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,created by c3subtitles.de in 2016