[Script Info]
Title: 
[Events]
Format: Layer, Start, End, Style, Name, MarginL, MarginR, MarginV, Effect, Text
Dialogue: 0,0:00:00.00,0:00:20.31,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,{\i1}36C3 preroll music{\i0}
Dialogue: 0,0:00:20.31,0:00:25.86,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Herald: In the following talk Mr. Bernd\NSieker will speak about the crashes and
Dialogue: 0,0:00:25.86,0:00:33.93,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,what led to the crashes of the most recent\N737 model. He is a flight safety
Dialogue: 0,0:00:33.93,0:00:38.32,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,engineer and he also worked on\Nflight safety and he analyzed the plane
Dialogue: 0,0:00:38.32,0:00:43.94,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,crashes for a lot of time and a long time.\NAnd you have to keep in mind that this
Dialogue: 0,0:00:43.94,0:00:49.62,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,737, although multiple models have been\Nbuilt, can be flown. All models can be
Dialogue: 0,0:00:49.62,0:00:55.95,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,flown with the same type rating since\N1967, which is one of the many root causes
Dialogue: 0,0:00:55.95,0:01:02.21,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,of the issues that led to the disaster\Nthat killed 346 people. Let's listen to a
Dialogue: 0,0:01:02.21,0:01:04.98,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Bernd and he'll enlighten us, what else\Nwent wrong?
Dialogue: 0,0:01:04.98,0:01:13.70,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,{\i1}applause{\i0}
Dialogue: 0,0:01:13.70,0:01:17.02,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Bernd Sieker: Yes, thank you very much for\Nthe introduction. I see they are not quite
Dialogue: 0,0:01:17.02,0:01:22.02,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,as many people as with the Edward Snowden\Ntalk, but I'm not disappointed. Aviation
Dialogue: 0,0:01:22.02,0:01:25.42,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,safety has always been very important to\Nme and I've done a lot of work on it and I
Dialogue: 0,0:01:25.42,0:01:30.90,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,am happy to share my passion with so many\Nof you. Thank you.
Dialogue: 0,0:01:30.90,0:01:36.44,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,{\i1}applause{\i0}\NSo it's basically the outline of what I'm
Dialogue: 0,0:01:36.44,0:01:42.54,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,going to talk about. It's the Boeing 737\NMax or seven thirty seven as some may say.
Dialogue: 0,0:01:42.54,0:01:47.44,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,I will briefly talk about the accidents,\Nwhat we knew at the beginning, what went
Dialogue: 0,0:01:47.44,0:01:53.81,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,wrong and then what came to light. Later\Non I will show our causal analysis method
Dialogue: 0,0:01:53.81,0:02:00.28,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,that we use very shortly, very briefly and\Nthe analysis and overview of the analysis
Dialogue: 0,0:02:00.28,0:02:05.39,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,that I did of these accidents. Then talk\Nabout the infamous MCAS system, the
Dialogue: 0,0:02:05.39,0:02:11.23,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation\NSystem, as it's called, by its full name.
Dialogue: 0,0:02:11.23,0:02:15.48,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Then I'll talk about certification, how\Ncertain aircraft certification works in
Dialogue: 0,0:02:15.48,0:02:18.87,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the United States. It's very similar in\NEurope, although there are some
Dialogue: 0,0:02:18.87,0:02:22.65,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,differences. But I'm not going to talk\Nabout European details in this talk. So
Dialogue: 0,0:02:22.65,0:02:29.54,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,it's mostly about the FAA and aircraft\Ncertification across the pond. Some other
Dialogue: 0,0:02:29.54,0:02:38.67,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,things and an outlook, how it is going to\Ngo on with the Boeing 737 Max. We
Dialogue: 0,0:02:38.67,0:02:42.94,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,currently don't know exactly what's going\Nto happen, but we'll see. And if we have
Dialogue: 0,0:02:42.94,0:02:51.07,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,time, they have a few bonus slides later\Non. So the Boeing 737 Max - the star of
Dialogue: 0,0:02:51.07,0:02:54.92,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the show, as you may say, it's the fourth\Niteration, as the Herald already
Dialogue: 0,0:02:54.92,0:03:02.20,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,indicated, of the world's best selling\Nairliner. I think I looked it up just
Dialogue: 0,0:03:02.20,0:03:07.80,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,recently. I think there are almost 15,000\Norders that have been for the 737 of all
Dialogue: 0,0:03:07.80,0:03:14.45,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the series, the original, the classic, the\NNG and now the Max. And the Max itself is
Dialogue: 0,0:03:14.45,0:03:19.46,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the fastest selling airliner of all time.\NSo within months, it had literally
Dialogue: 0,0:03:19.46,0:03:24.95,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,thousands of orders. It has now almost\N5,000 orders. The 737 Max, and all the
Dialogue: 0,0:03:24.95,0:03:29.29,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,airlines in the world are waiting for the\Ngrounding to be lifted so they can receive
Dialogue: 0,0:03:29.29,0:03:40.02,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and fly the aircraft. So the first\Naccident was last year. It was a Lion Air,
Dialogue: 0,0:03:40.02,0:03:46.03,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,an Indonesian flag carrier. Actually, I\Nthink the second or third largest Boeing
Dialogue: 0,0:03:46.03,0:03:51.54,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,737 Max customer in the world with a\Ncouple of hundred, 250 or something
Dialogue: 0,0:03:51.54,0:04:01.97,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,aircraft and it crashed relatively shortly\Nafter it entered service. And so we've heard
Dialogue: 0,0:04:01.97,0:04:08.84,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,some strange things in the news and on the\Nforums that deal with aviation safety. It
Dialogue: 0,0:04:08.84,0:04:15.55,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,seems that there had been uncommanded nose\Ndown trim. So the tail plane is moved by
Dialogue: 0,0:04:15.55,0:04:21.15,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,an electric motor and it forces the nose\Nof the aircraft down. The pilot can
Dialogue: 0,0:04:21.15,0:04:27.67,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,counter that movement with some switches\Non his control column. And apparently the
Dialogue: 0,0:04:27.67,0:04:32.94,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,stick shaker was active during the flight\Nand there were difficulties in controlling
Dialogue: 0,0:04:32.94,0:04:37.54,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the aircraft. We didn't know at the time\Nexactly what it was. And then for the
Dialogue: 0,0:04:37.54,0:04:46.22,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,first time, the abbreviation MCAS surfaced\Nand even 737 pilots, even 737 Max pilots,
Dialogue: 0,0:04:46.22,0:04:50.88,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,at least some of them said they'd never\Nheard of it. It was a mystery. We later
Dialogue: 0,0:04:50.88,0:04:55.23,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,found that actually in some documentation,\Nit was very briefly mentioned that such a
Dialogue: 0,0:04:55.23,0:05:00.08,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,system existed, but not exactly why it was\Nthere. And I guess Boeing knew and the
Dialogue: 0,0:05:00.08,0:05:05.68,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,certification authorities, as it turned\Nout, sort of knew a bit of the story, but
Dialogue: 0,0:05:05.68,0:05:11.44,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,not the whole story. But especially people\Nin the West, in the US and in other
Dialogue: 0,0:05:11.44,0:05:19.23,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,countries said: Oh, these are just poorly\Ntrained Third World pilots. And we expect
Dialogue: 0,0:05:19.23,0:05:24.60,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,that. And they weren't completely wrong.\NLion Air has a particularly bad safety
Dialogue: 0,0:05:24.60,0:05:29.03,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,record. And it wasn't unknown to aviation\Nsafety investigators. There have been a
Dialogue: 0,0:05:29.03,0:05:36.38,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,number of crashes with Lion Air. So in the\Nbeginning, we thought, OK, maybe it's a
Dialogue: 0,0:05:36.38,0:05:41.51,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,fluke, it's a one off or maybe it's caused\Nby poor maintenance or bad pilots or
Dialogue: 0,0:05:41.51,0:05:47.94,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,whatever. So several people, on the other\Nhand, already began worrying because some
Dialogue: 0,0:05:47.94,0:05:53.60,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,flight data recorder traces became public.\NAnd there was some very strange things
Dialogue: 0,0:05:53.60,0:05:59.83,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,which we will see shortly. And then only a\Nfew months later, the second aircraft of
Dialogue: 0,0:05:59.83,0:06:06.17,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,exactly the same type and the same\Nvariant, Boeing 737 Max 8, also crashed.
Dialogue: 0,0:06:06.17,0:06:11.56,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,And you can see maybe on the picture on\Nthe left, it left a rather big crater. It
Dialogue: 0,0:06:11.56,0:06:17.93,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,really dove into the earth quite fast. It\Nturned out, I think, about between seven
Dialogue: 0,0:06:17.93,0:06:25.00,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and eight hundred kilometers per hour. So,\Nso really fast and not much left. Not much
Dialogue: 0,0:06:25.00,0:06:30.63,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,was left. I think the biggest parts were\Nabout this size, I guess. So all small
Dialogue: 0,0:06:30.63,0:06:38.54,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,pieces of debris and the engine cores,\Nwhich are a bit bigger. And from that as
Dialogue: 0,0:06:38.54,0:06:45.52,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,well, flight data recorder traces became\Npublic. The recorders had survived at
Dialogue: 0,0:06:45.52,0:06:51.74,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,least the memory in them and were\Nreadable. So we finally found out
Dialogue: 0,0:06:51.74,0:06:57.78,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,something and found some similarities,\Nsome rather disturbing similarities. We
Dialogue: 0,0:06:57.78,0:07:03.21,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,come to that in a moment, but I'll talk a\Nlittle bit about the Boeing 737 family in
Dialogue: 0,0:07:03.21,0:07:08.34,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,general. So there were four, as I said,\Nmodels. That was the original, which had
Dialogue: 0,0:07:08.34,0:07:14.05,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,narrow engines under the wings. Not a lot\Nof room between the ground and the
Dialogue: 0,0:07:14.05,0:07:20.37,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,engines, but it looked quite normal. You\Ncould say it was one of the first short-
Dialogue: 0,0:07:20.37,0:07:27.02,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,haul airliners with under slung engines,\Nunder the wings and then new high bypassed
Dialogue: 0,0:07:27.02,0:07:31.24,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,turbo fire engines entered the market,\Nwhich were much more fuel efficient. We're
Dialogue: 0,0:07:31.24,0:07:36.36,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,talking about maybe some 15 to 20 percent\Nlower fuel consumption. So it was a big
Dialogue: 0,0:07:36.36,0:07:42.61,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,deal. And the Boeing 737 was reengined and\Nbecame known as the classic, bigger
Dialogue: 0,0:07:42.61,0:07:47.05,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,engines, but still mostly analog\Nmechanical instruments. And it was
Dialogue: 0,0:07:47.05,0:07:51.93,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,basically the same as the original,\Ninstead that it had some bigger engines
Dialogue: 0,0:07:51.93,0:07:55.54,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and they had to shape the cowling a little\Ndifferently to accommodate the bigger
Dialogue: 0,0:07:55.54,0:08:02.89,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,engines. But more or less, it worked for a\Nwhile. And then as airlines demanded more
Dialogue: 0,0:08:02.89,0:08:08.34,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,modern avionics, so the cockpit\Nelectronics in aircraft, the next
Dialogue: 0,0:08:08.34,0:08:14.62,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,generation was conceived. It also got a\Nnew wing, new winglets, which again saved
Dialogue: 0,0:08:14.62,0:08:19.59,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,a lot of fuel. It had basically the same\Nengines, except that the engines now were
Dialogue: 0,0:08:19.59,0:08:24.82,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,also computer controlled by what we call\NFADEC full authority, digital engine
Dialogue: 0,0:08:24.82,0:08:31.31,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,control. And Boeing said, well, that's\Nprobably going to be the last one. And in
Dialogue: 0,0:08:31.31,0:08:36.15,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the next few years, we are going to\Ndevelop an all new, short and medium haul
Dialogue: 0,0:08:36.15,0:08:43.12,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,single aisle aircraft which will be all\Nnew and super efficient and super cheap to
Dialogue: 0,0:08:43.12,0:08:49.83,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,operate - all the promises that\Nmanufacturers always make. In the
Dialogue: 0,0:08:49.83,0:08:56.41,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,meantime, Airbus was becoming a major\Nplayer with the A320. It was overall a
Dialogue: 0,0:08:56.41,0:09:00.47,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,much more modern aircraft. It had digital\Nfly by wire. It always had digitally
Dialogue: 0,0:09:00.47,0:09:04.94,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,controlled engines. It had much higher\Nground clearance. So it was no problem to
Dialogue: 0,0:09:04.94,0:09:10.44,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,accommodate the larger engines in the\NA320. And Airbus then announced that it
Dialogue: 0,0:09:10.44,0:09:14.99,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,was going to reengine the A320. And for\Nthe A320, that was the first time it got
Dialogue: 0,0:09:14.99,0:09:19.83,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,new engines. It for a long time it had you\Nhad the choice of two types of engines for
Dialogue: 0,0:09:19.83,0:09:25.41,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the A320 And then they said, we're going\Nto install these new super efficient
Dialogue: 0,0:09:25.41,0:09:32.03,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,engines, which brought with it another\Noptimization of fuel consumption. That was
Dialogue: 0,0:09:32.03,0:09:37.53,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,another 15 percent fuel saved per mile\Ntraveled something on the order of that.
Dialogue: 0,0:09:37.53,0:09:42.91,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,So it was a huge improvement again. And\Nmany Airbus customers immediately ordered
Dialogue: 0,0:09:42.91,0:09:49.05,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the so-called A320neo and some Boeing\Ncustomers also thought, well, this one is
Dialogue: 0,0:09:49.05,0:09:55.67,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,going to consume so much less fuel that we\Nmight consider switching to Airbus, even
Dialogue: 0,0:09:55.67,0:09:59.81,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,though it's a major hassle if you\Nhave fleet entirely consisting of Boeing
Dialogue: 0,0:09:59.81,0:10:03.83,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,aircraft, if you then switch to Airbus,\Nit's a huge hassle and nobody really wants
Dialogue: 0,0:10:03.83,0:10:08.31,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,that unless they're really forced to. But\Nthe promised fuel savings were so big that
Dialogue: 0,0:10:08.31,0:10:13.08,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,companies actually considered this and\Nlots of them. And so Boeing said we need
Dialogue: 0,0:10:13.08,0:10:20.83,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,something very quickly, preferably within\Ntwo years I think. For airline
Dialogue: 0,0:10:20.83,0:10:26.84,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,development, that's very, very, very, very\Nquickly. And they said, well, scrap all
Dialogue: 0,0:10:26.84,0:10:33.55,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the plans about the new small airliner.\NWe're going to change the 737 again. And
Dialogue: 0,0:10:33.55,0:10:38.80,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,now the new engines, were going to be\Nbigger, again. And so actually, there was
Dialogue: 0,0:10:38.80,0:10:45.34,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,no ground clearance to move them in the\Nsame way as on the on the NG. So there to
Dialogue: 0,0:10:45.34,0:10:50.34,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,modify the landing gear, to mount the\Nengines even further forward and higher.
Dialogue: 0,0:10:50.34,0:10:55.41,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,And the engines were bigger. But the\Nengines were, on the whole, they were very
Dialogue: 0,0:10:55.41,0:10:58.73,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,good new development. The same type of\Nengines that you could get for the new
Dialogue: 0,0:10:58.73,0:11:08.48,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Airbus - CFM international. And so\Nwe decided to make the Boeing 737 4th
Dialogue: 0,0:11:08.48,0:11:17.82,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,generation and call it "the Max".So when\Nwe analyze accidents, we use a causal
Dialogue: 0,0:11:17.82,0:11:22.20,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,analysis method called Why-Because\Nanalysis. And we have some counterfactual
Dialogue: 0,0:11:22.20,0:11:26.71,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,tests which determines if something is a\Ncause of something else. We call it a
Dialogue: 0,0:11:26.71,0:11:32.84,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,necessary causal factor. And it's very\Nsimple. A is a causal factor of B, if you
Dialogue: 0,0:11:32.84,0:11:36.99,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,can say had A not happened, then B would\Nnot have happened either. So, I mean, you
Dialogue: 0,0:11:36.99,0:11:41.28,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,need to show for everything that there is\Na causal relationship and that all the
Dialogue: 0,0:11:41.28,0:11:48.45,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,factors that you have found actually\Nsufficient to cause the other event. So
Dialogue: 0,0:11:48.45,0:11:51.82,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,you can probably not read everything of\Nit, but it's not really important. This is
Dialogue: 0,0:11:51.82,0:11:57.96,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,a simplified graph and I will show the\Nrelevant details later.And this is the
Dialogue: 0,0:11:57.96,0:12:02.88,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,analysis that I made of these accidents.\NAnd you can see it's not a simple tree; as
Dialogue: 0,0:12:02.88,0:12:06.59,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,computer scientists, many of you are\Nfamiliar with trees and this is just a
Dialogue: 0,0:12:06.59,0:12:15.11,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,directed graph and it can have branches\Nand so on. And so some things are causal
Dialogue: 0,0:12:15.11,0:12:19.52,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,influence, causal effect of several\Ndifferent things. So some of the factors
Dialogue: 0,0:12:19.52,0:12:24.13,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,actually have an influence on multiple\Nlevels. For example, the airspeed
Dialogue: 0,0:12:24.13,0:12:29.82,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,influences the control forces and it also\Ninfluences the time the crew had to
Dialogue: 0,0:12:29.82,0:12:36.91,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,recover the aircraft before impact with\Nthe ground. So these are some of the
Dialogue: 0,0:12:36.91,0:12:42.83,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,things that I will look at in a bit more\Ndetail. So here is one of them:
Dialogue: 0,0:12:42.83,0:12:47.25,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Uncommanded nose down trim. So what\Nhappened apparently on these accident
Dialogue: 0,0:12:47.25,0:12:54.28,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,flights was that you can see it in the\Nflight data recorder traces. I don't know.
Dialogue: 0,0:12:54.28,0:13:00.34,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Can you see the mouse pointer? Here,\Nthat's the blue line. And that is labeled
Dialogue: 0,0:13:00.34,0:13:06.03,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,trim manual. And there's the orange line\Nthat is labeled Trim Automatic. And if
Dialogue: 0,0:13:06.03,0:13:14.24,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,they have, do displacement to the bottom,\Nthat means that the aircraft is being
Dialogue: 0,0:13:14.24,0:13:20.06,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,trimmed nose down, which means in order to\Ncontinue to fly level, you have to pull
Dialogue: 0,0:13:20.06,0:13:25.31,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the control column with more force towards\Nyou. And what you can see is in the
Dialogue: 0,0:13:25.31,0:13:28.60,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,beginning, there are a few trim, trim\Nmovements. And on this type, they are
Dialogue: 0,0:13:28.60,0:13:33.52,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,expected it has an automatic trim system\Nfor some phases of flight which trims the
Dialogue: 0,0:13:33.52,0:13:41.11,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,aircraft to keep it flying stable. And\Nthen after a while, it started doing many
Dialogue: 0,0:13:41.11,0:13:47.01,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,automatic nose down trim movements. Each\Nof these lasts almost 10 seconds and there
Dialogue: 0,0:13:47.01,0:13:52.34,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,is a pause between them. And in every\Ncase, the pilots counter the nose down
Dialogue: 0,0:13:52.34,0:13:56.65,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,trim movement with the nose up trim\Nmovement on the control yoke. There are
Dialogue: 0,0:13:56.65,0:14:02.72,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,switches that you operate with your thumb\Nand you can trim the aircraft that way and
Dialogue: 0,0:14:02.72,0:14:07.30,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,change the control forces and cause the\Naircraft nose to go up or down. So for a
Dialogue: 0,0:14:07.30,0:14:11.16,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,very long time, this went on: The computer\Ntrimmed the aircraft nose down, the pilots
Dialogue: 0,0:14:11.16,0:14:18.78,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,trimmed the aircraft nose up, and so on.\NUntil at the very end, you can see that
Dialogue: 0,0:14:18.78,0:14:23.31,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the trim, the nose up trim movements that\Nthe pilots made, become shorter and
Dialogue: 0,0:14:23.31,0:14:29.39,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,shorter. And this line here, it says pitch\Ntrim position. That is the resulting
Dialogue: 0,0:14:29.39,0:14:34.31,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,position of the trim control surface,\Nwhich is the entire horizontal stabilizer
Dialogue: 0,0:14:34.31,0:14:39.49,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,on the aircraft. And it moves down and it\Ndoesn't really go up anymore because the
Dialogue: 0,0:14:39.49,0:14:44.01,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,pilot inputs become very short. And that\Nmeans the control forces to keep the
Dialogue: 0,0:14:44.01,0:14:48.46,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,aircraft flying level become extremely\Nhigh. And in the end, it became
Dialogue: 0,0:14:48.46,0:14:55.20,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,uncontrollable and crashed, as you can see\Nhere. So the pilots, for various reasons,
Dialogue: 0,0:14:55.20,0:14:59.76,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,which I will highlight later, the pilots\Nwere unable to trim the aircraft manually
Dialogue: 0,0:14:59.76,0:15:05.100,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and the nose down trim persisted and the\Naircraft crashed. And this is only the
Dialogue: 0,0:15:05.100,0:15:10.66,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,graph of one of the accidents. But the\Nother one is very similar. And so that's
Dialogue: 0,0:15:10.66,0:15:15.99,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,what we see. There is a known system,\Nwhich was already known before on the
Dialogue: 0,0:15:15.99,0:15:21.35,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Boeing 737. I think it's available on\Nall the old versions as well, which is
Dialogue: 0,0:15:21.35,0:15:25.11,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,called the speed trim system, which in\Nsome circumstances trims the aircraft
Dialogue: 0,0:15:25.11,0:15:32.93,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,automatically. But the inputs that we see,\Nthe automatic trim inputs don't really fit
Dialogue: 0,0:15:32.93,0:15:41.74,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the so-called speed trim system. And so\Nfor the first time, we hear the word MCAS.
Dialogue: 0,0:15:41.74,0:15:47.02,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,And we'll talk a bit more about what made\Nthe Boeing 737 different from all the
Dialogue: 0,0:15:47.02,0:15:52.41,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,previous models. And that is the bigger\Nengines. As I said, the engines were much
Dialogue: 0,0:15:52.41,0:15:57.91,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,bigger. And to achieve the necessary\Nground clearance, they had to be
Dialogue: 0,0:15:57.91,0:16:03.21,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,mounted further forward. And there are\Nalso a lot bigger, which means at high
Dialogue: 0,0:16:03.21,0:16:06.87,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,angles of attack, when the aircraft is\Nflying against the stream of the oncoming
Dialogue: 0,0:16:06.87,0:16:13.08,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,air at a higher angle, these engine cells\Nproduce additional lift in front of the
Dialogue: 0,0:16:13.08,0:16:18.71,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,center of gravity, which creates a pitch\Nup moment. And the certification criteria
Dialogue: 0,0:16:18.71,0:16:25.99,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,are quite strict in that and say \Nexactly what the forces on the
Dialogue: 0,0:16:25.99,0:16:34.13,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,flight controls must be to be certified.\NAnd due to the bigger engines, there was
Dialogue: 0,0:16:34.13,0:16:41.15,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,some phases or some angles of attack at\Nwhich these certification criteria were no
Dialogue: 0,0:16:41.15,0:16:46.63,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,longer met. And so it was decided to\Nintroduce a small piece of software which
Dialogue: 0,0:16:46.63,0:16:51.100,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,would just introduce a small trim movement\Nto bring it in line with certification
Dialogue: 0,0:16:51.100,0:16:59.32,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,criteria again. And one of the reasons\Nthis was done was probably so the aircraft
Dialogue: 0,0:16:59.32,0:17:04.39,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,could retain the same type certificate as\Nwas mentioned in the introduction. So
Dialogue: 0,0:17:04.39,0:17:10.35,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,pilots can change within one airline,\Nbetween the aircraft, between the 737 NG
Dialogue: 0,0:17:10.35,0:17:15.13,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and the 737 Max. They have the same type\Ncertificate. There's a very brief
Dialogue: 0,0:17:15.13,0:17:18.72,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,differences training, but they can switch\Neven in line operations between the
Dialogue: 0,0:17:18.72,0:17:27.95,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,aircraft from day to day. And another\Nreason. No other changes were made. Boeing
Dialogue: 0,0:17:27.95,0:17:32.95,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,could, for example, have made a longer\Nmain landing gear to create additional
Dialogue: 0,0:17:32.95,0:17:38.07,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,ground clearance to move the engines in a\Nmore traditional position, that would have
Dialogue: 0,0:17:38.07,0:17:44.21,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,probably made it more aerodynamically in\Nline with certification criteria. I
Dialogue: 0,0:17:44.21,0:17:49.50,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,hesitate to say the word "to make it more\Nstable" because even as it is, the Boeing
Dialogue: 0,0:17:49.50,0:17:56.64,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,737 Max is not inherently aerodynamically\Nunstable. If all these electronic gimmicks
Dialogue: 0,0:17:56.64,0:18:01.39,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,fail, it will just fly like an airplane\Nand it is probably in the normal flight
Dialogue: 0,0:18:01.39,0:18:09.42,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,envelope easily controllable. But to make\Nbig mechanical changes would have delayed
Dialogue: 0,0:18:09.42,0:18:14.06,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the project a lot and would have required\Nrecertification and what instead could be
Dialogue: 0,0:18:14.06,0:18:18.97,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,done with the airframe essentially the\Nsame. The certification could be what is
Dialogue: 0,0:18:18.97,0:18:26.06,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,known as grandfathered: so it doesn't need\Nto fulfill all the current criteria of
Dialogue: 0,0:18:26.06,0:18:31.83,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,certification, because the aircraft has\Nbeen certified and has been proven in
Dialogue: 0,0:18:31.83,0:18:36.70,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,service. And so only some of the\Nmodifications need to be recertified,
Dialogue: 0,0:18:36.70,0:18:45.09,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,which is much easier and much cheaper and\Nmuch quicker. So this is one of the
Dialogue: 0,0:18:45.09,0:18:50.24,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,certification criteria that must be\Nfulfilled. It's even though I have removed
Dialogue: 0,0:18:50.24,0:18:54.53,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,some of the additional stuff that doesn't\Nreally add anything useful, it's still
Dialogue: 0,0:18:54.53,0:19:00.20,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,rather complicated. It's a procedure that\Nyou have to do where you slow down one
Dialogue: 0,0:19:00.20,0:19:04.55,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,knot per second. And the stick forces need\Nto increase with every knot of speed that
Dialogue: 0,0:19:04.55,0:19:10.25,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,you lose and things like that. And it says\Nit this stick force versus speed curve may
Dialogue: 0,0:19:10.25,0:19:16.51,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,not be less than one pound for each six\Nknots. And it's quite interesting, if you
Dialogue: 0,0:19:16.51,0:19:21.81,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,look at the European certification\Ncriteria, is that they took this exact
Dialogue: 0,0:19:21.81,0:19:28.68,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,paragraph and just translated the US units\Ninto metric units, but really calculated
Dialogue: 0,0:19:28.68,0:19:33.73,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the new value. So the European\Ncertification have now very strange values
Dialogue: 0,0:19:33.73,0:19:41.59,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,like, I don't know, 11.79 kilometers per\Nhour, per second or something like that.
Dialogue: 0,0:19:41.59,0:19:45.12,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,It's really strange. So you can see where\Nit comes from. But they said we can't have
Dialogue: 0,0:19:45.12,0:19:49.91,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,knots even though the entire world except\NRussia and China basically flies in knots,
Dialogue: 0,0:19:49.91,0:19:56.06,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,even Western Europe. But the criteria in\Nthe certification specification need to be
Dialogue: 0,0:19:56.06,0:20:02.27,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,in kilometers per hour. Well, I would have\Nthought that you would even - if you do
Dialogue: 0,0:20:02.27,0:20:06.61,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the conversion, you would use meters per\Nsecond, but it used kilometers per hour
Dialogue: 0,0:20:06.61,0:20:14.13,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,for whatever reason. So due to the\Naerodynamic changes that were made, the
Dialogue: 0,0:20:14.13,0:20:19.76,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Max did not quite fulfill the criteria to\Nthe letter. So something had to be done.
Dialogue: 0,0:20:19.76,0:20:24.08,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,And as I said, mechanical redesign was out\Nof the question because it would have
Dialogue: 0,0:20:24.08,0:20:28.45,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,taken too long, would have been too\Nexpensive, and maybe would have broken the
Dialogue: 0,0:20:28.45,0:20:33.91,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,type certificate commonality. So they\Nintroduced just this little additional
Dialogue: 0,0:20:33.91,0:20:40.18,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,software in a computer that also existed\Nalready. And so it measures angle of
Dialogue: 0,0:20:40.18,0:20:44.89,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,attack, it measures airspeed and a few\Nother parameters, flap configuration, for
Dialogue: 0,0:20:44.89,0:20:52.06,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,example, and then it applies nose down\Npitch trim as it sees fit. But it has a
Dialogue: 0,0:20:52.06,0:20:57.15,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,rather interesting design from a software\Nengineering point of view. Can you read
Dialogue: 0,0:20:57.15,0:21:04.03,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,that? Is that... They are flight control\Ncomputers. And one part of this flight
Dialogue: 0,0:21:04.03,0:21:09.16,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,control computer, one additional piece of\Nsoftware, is called the MCAS, the
Dialogue: 0,0:21:09.16,0:21:12.87,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation\NSystem. And the flight control computer
Dialogue: 0,0:21:12.87,0:21:17.01,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,actually gets input from both angle of\Nattack sensors. It has two, one on each
Dialogue: 0,0:21:17.01,0:21:25.30,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,side for redundancy, but the MCAS\Nalgorithm only uses one of them, at least
Dialogue: 0,0:21:25.30,0:21:29.12,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,in the old version. In the new version, it\Nwill probably use both if it ever gets
Dialogue: 0,0:21:29.12,0:21:36.23,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,recertificated. And then if that angle of\Nattack sensor senses a value that is too
Dialogue: 0,0:21:36.23,0:21:42.95,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,high, then it introduces nose down trim\Nand it may switch between flights between
Dialogue: 0,0:21:42.95,0:21:46.99,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the left and the right sensor. But at any\Ngiven time for any given flight, it only
Dialogue: 0,0:21:46.99,0:21:55.27,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,ever uses one. So what could possibly go\Nwrong here? Here we can see what went
Dialogue: 0,0:21:55.27,0:22:01.83,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,wrong. It's the same graph as before, and\NI may direct your attention to this red
Dialogue: 0,0:22:01.83,0:22:06.71,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,line that says angle of attack indicated\Nleft and the green line which says angle
Dialogue: 0,0:22:06.71,0:22:12.03,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,of attack indicated right. So that is the\Ndata that the computer got from the angle
Dialogue: 0,0:22:12.03,0:22:17.87,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,of attack sensors. Both are recorded in\Nthe data recorder, but only one is
Dialogue: 0,0:22:17.87,0:22:24.13,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,evaluated by the MCAS. And you can see\Nhere's the scale on the right. You can see
Dialogue: 0,0:22:24.13,0:22:30.48,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,that one is indicating relatively normally\Naround zero, a bit above zero, which is to
Dialogue: 0,0:22:30.48,0:22:37.94,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,be expected during takeoff and climb. And\Nthe red value is about 20 degrees higher.
Dialogue: 0,0:22:37.94,0:22:42.98,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,And of course, that is above the threshold\Nat which the MCAS activates. So it
Dialogue: 0,0:22:42.98,0:22:46.91,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,activates. Right. And apparently in the\Nold version of the software, there were no
Dialogue: 0,0:22:46.91,0:22:54.63,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,sanity checks, no cross checks with other\Nair data values like airspeed and altitude
Dialogue: 0,0:22:54.63,0:22:59.58,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,or other things. And it would be\Nrelatively easy to do. Not quite trivial.
Dialogue: 0,0:22:59.58,0:23:04.46,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,You have to get it right in these kinds of\Nthings which influence flight controls,
Dialogue: 0,0:23:04.46,0:23:14.11,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,but nothing too fancy. But apparently that\Nwas also not done. So the MCAS became
Dialogue: 0,0:23:14.11,0:23:21.07,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,active. So how could it happen? And it's\Nstill to me, a bit of a mystery how it
Dialogue: 0,0:23:21.07,0:23:27.72,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,could actually get so far that it could be\Ncertified with this kind of system. And
Dialogue: 0,0:23:27.72,0:23:33.65,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the severity of each failure, the possible\Nconsequences have to be evaluated. And the
Dialogue: 0,0:23:33.65,0:23:39.99,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,certification criteria specify five\Nseverities: catastrophic, hazardous,
Dialogue: 0,0:23:39.99,0:23:45.39,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,major, minor and no safety effect, and\Nthat doesn't have to be analyzed any
Dialogue: 0,0:23:45.39,0:23:50.54,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,further, but for catastrophic failures,\Nyou have to do a very, very complex risk
Dialogue: 0,0:23:50.54,0:23:57.14,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,assessment and see what you can do and\Nwhat needs to be done to bring it in line,
Dialogue: 0,0:23:57.14,0:24:02.97,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,to make it either mitigate the\Nconsequences or make it so extremely
Dialogue: 0,0:24:02.97,0:24:10.44,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,improbable that it is not going to happen.\NSo here are the probabilities with which
Dialogue: 0,0:24:10.44,0:24:15.81,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the certification criteria deal and its\Ndifferent orders of magnitude. There are
Dialogue: 0,0:24:15.81,0:24:20.44,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,usually two orders of magnitude between\Nthem. It's from a probability of 1 times
Dialogue: 0,0:24:20.44,0:24:27.81,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,10 to the minus 5 per hour to 1 times 10\Nto the minus 9 for operating hour. And
Dialogue: 0,0:24:27.81,0:24:32.58,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,this is the risk matrix. Many of you are\Nprobably familiar with those. And it
Dialogue: 0,0:24:32.58,0:24:39.13,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,basically says if something is major, then\Nit may not happen with a probability of
Dialogue: 0,0:24:39.13,0:24:44.29,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,probable. And if its catastrophic the only\Nprobability that is allowed for that is
Dialogue: 0,0:24:44.29,0:24:51.78,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,extremely improbable. Which is less than\Nonce in a billion flight hours. Right. And
Dialogue: 0,0:24:51.78,0:24:57.06,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,to put that into perspective, the fleets\Nwith the most flight hours to date, I
Dialogue: 0,0:24:57.06,0:25:01.95,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,think, are in the low hundreds of millions\Nof flight hours combined. So we're still
Dialogue: 0,0:25:01.95,0:25:06.85,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,even for the 737 or the A320. We're still\Nquite far away from a billion flight
Dialogue: 0,0:25:06.85,0:25:16.51,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,hours. So you might have expected perhaps\None of these events because statistical
Dialogue: 0,0:25:16.51,0:25:23.95,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,distribution being what it is, the one\Nevent might happen, of course, and but
Dialogue: 0,0:25:23.95,0:25:32.47,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,certainly not two in less than two years.\NAnd quite obviously, the severity of these
Dialogue: 0,0:25:32.47,0:25:40.09,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,failures was catastrophic. I think there's\Nno - there's no discussion about that. And
Dialogue: 0,0:25:40.09,0:25:43.61,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,here's the relevant part, actually,\Nabout flight controls and the
Dialogue: 0,0:25:43.61,0:25:48.04,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,certification criteria, which was clearly\Nviolated. It says the airplane must be
Dialogue: 0,0:25:48.04,0:25:53.91,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,shown to be capable of continued safe\Nflight for any single failure. Without
Dialogue: 0,0:25:53.91,0:25:59.40,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,further qualification, any single system\Nthat can break must not make the plane
Dialogue: 0,0:25:59.40,0:26:05.84,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,unflyable or any combination of failures\Nnot shown to be extremely improbable - and
Dialogue: 0,0:26:05.84,0:26:12.04,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,extremely improbable is these 10 to the\Nminus 9 per hour. And this hazard
Dialogue: 0,0:26:12.04,0:26:16.83,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,assessment must be performed for all\Nsystems, of course, and severity must be
Dialogue: 0,0:26:16.83,0:26:27.54,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,assigned to all these. And the unintended\NMCAS activation was classified as major.
Dialogue: 0,0:26:27.54,0:26:32.81,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,And let's briefly look at that. What's\Nmajor? Reduction in capability, maybe some
Dialogue: 0,0:26:32.81,0:26:38.30,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,injuries, major damage. So nothing you can\Njust shrug off, but certainly not an
Dialogue: 0,0:26:38.30,0:26:48.07,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,accident with hundreds of dead. So and\Ntherefore, there are some regulations
Dialogue: 0,0:26:48.07,0:26:56.27,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,which say which kinds of specific analysis\Nyou have to do for the various categories.
Dialogue: 0,0:26:56.27,0:27:02.65,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,And for major no big failure modes and\Neffects analysis FMEA, was required. And
Dialogue: 0,0:27:02.65,0:27:07.40,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,these are all findings from the Indonesian\Ninvestigation board. And they're all in
Dialogue: 0,0:27:07.40,0:27:11.70,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the report that is publicly downloadable.\NIn the final version of the slides, I'll
Dialogue: 0,0:27:11.70,0:27:16.72,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,probably put some of the sources and links\Nin there so you can read it for
Dialogue: 0,0:27:16.72,0:27:23.65,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,yourselves. It's quite eye opening. So\Nonly a very small failure in failure
Dialogue: 0,0:27:23.65,0:27:30.37,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,analysis was made, comparatively small. It\Nprobably took a few man hours, but not as
Dialogue: 0,0:27:30.37,0:27:36.53,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,extensive as it should have been for the\Nevent had it been correctly classified as
Dialogue: 0,0:27:36.53,0:27:44.24,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,catastrophic. And some of these things\Nthat could happen were not at all
Dialogue: 0,0:27:44.24,0:27:50.40,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,considered, such as large stabilizer\Ndeflection. So continued trim movement in
Dialogue: 0,0:27:50.40,0:27:55.21,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the same direction or a repeated\Nactivation of the MCAS system, because
Dialogue: 0,0:27:55.21,0:28:05.64,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,apparently the only design of the MCAS\Nsystem that the FAA saw was limited to a
Dialogue: 0,0:28:05.64,0:28:11.60,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,0.6 degree deflection at high speeds and\Nto one single activation only. And that
Dialogue: 0,0:28:11.60,0:28:18.29,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,was changed. And it is still unclear how\Nthat could happen. It was changed to
Dialogue: 0,0:28:18.29,0:28:22.73,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,multiple activations, even at high speed.\NAnd each activation could move the
Dialogue: 0,0:28:22.73,0:28:27.82,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,stabilizer as much as almost 2.5 degrees.\NAnd there was no limit to how often it
Dialogue: 0,0:28:27.82,0:28:35.31,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,could activate. And what was also not\Nconsidered was the effect of the flight
Dialogue: 0,0:28:35.31,0:28:41.08,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,characteristics caused by large movements\Nof the stabilizer or movement of the
Dialogue: 0,0:28:41.08,0:28:47.28,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,stabilizer to the limit of the MCAS\Nauthority. The MCAS doesn't have authority
Dialogue: 0,0:28:47.28,0:28:52.69,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,to move the stabilizer all the way to the\Nmechanical stop, but only a bit short of
Dialogue: 0,0:28:52.69,0:28:57.52,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,that, much more than the manual electric\Ntrim is capable of trimming the airplane
Dialogue: 0,0:28:57.52,0:29:03.19,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,on the aircraft. You can always trim back\Nwith a manual electric trim switches on
Dialogue: 0,0:29:03.19,0:29:09.35,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the yoke, but you cannot trim it nose down\Nas far as MCAS can. So that's quite
Dialogue: 0,0:29:09.35,0:29:15.30,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,interesting. That was not considered. What\Nwas also not considered, at least it
Dialogue: 0,0:29:15.30,0:29:21.13,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,wasn't in the report apparently that the\NIndonesian agency had seen, was that
Dialogue: 0,0:29:21.13,0:29:26.40,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,flight crew workload increases\Ndramatically if you have to pull on the
Dialogue: 0,0:29:26.40,0:29:34.39,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,yoke continuously with about, let's say, a\Nforce equivalent of 40 kilograms of 50
Dialogue: 0,0:29:34.39,0:29:37.81,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,kilograms continuously, otherwise if you\Nlet go, you're going to go into a very
Dialogue: 0,0:29:37.81,0:29:43.38,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,steep nosedive. And at that short, it is\Nat a low altitude that they were they
Dialogue: 0,0:29:43.38,0:29:50.42,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,would not have been able to recover the\Naircraft. And in fact, they weren't. What
Dialogue: 0,0:29:50.42,0:29:54.97,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,was also not considered was an AOA sensor\Nfailure in the way that we have seen it in
Dialogue: 0,0:29:54.97,0:29:59.99,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,these two accidents, although apparently\Nthey those had different causes. The
Dialogue: 0,0:29:59.99,0:30:04.09,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,effect for the MCAS was the same, that one\Nof the sensors showed a value that was
Dialogue: 0,0:30:04.09,0:30:12.31,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,about 22 and a half degrees too high. And\Nthat was not considered in the analysis of
Dialogue: 0,0:30:12.31,0:30:17.49,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the MCAS system. So I hope that is\Nreadable. That is a simplified state
Dialogue: 0,0:30:17.49,0:30:24.33,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,machine of the MCAS system. And what we\Ncan see is that it can indeed activate
Dialogue: 0,0:30:24.33,0:30:32.72,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,repeatedly, but only if the pilot uses the\Nmanual electric trim in between. It will
Dialogue: 0,0:30:32.72,0:30:38.44,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,go into a dormant state if the pilot trims\Nmanually with the hand wheel or if the
Dialogue: 0,0:30:38.44,0:30:42.98,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,pilot doesn't use the trim at all, it will\Ngo dormant after a single activation and
Dialogue: 0,0:30:42.98,0:30:49.10,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,stay that way until electric trim is used.\NSo that's the basic upshot of this state
Dialogue: 0,0:30:49.10,0:30:56.19,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,machine. So when the pilot thinks he's\Ndoing something to counter the MCAS and
Dialogue: 0,0:30:56.19,0:31:03.01,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,he's actually making it worse. But this\Nisn't documented in any pilot
Dialogue: 0,0:31:03.01,0:31:07.46,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,documentation anywhere. It will probably\Nbe in the next way. If it's still working
Dialogue: 0,0:31:07.46,0:31:15.73,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,like that. But so far it wasn't. So\NBoeing was under a lot of pressure to try
Dialogue: 0,0:31:15.73,0:31:24.31,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,to sell a new, more fuel efficient version\Nof their 737. And so I can't say for sure
Dialogue: 0,0:31:24.31,0:31:29.48,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,how it was internally between the FAA and\NBoeing, but it's not unreasonable to
Dialogue: 0,0:31:29.48,0:31:33.68,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,assume that they were under a lot of\Npressure from management to accelerate
Dialogue: 0,0:31:33.68,0:31:41.89,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,certification and possibly take shortcuts.\NI can't make any accusations here, but it
Dialogue: 0,0:31:41.89,0:31:47.16,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,looks that not all is well in the\Ncertification department between Boeing
Dialogue: 0,0:31:47.16,0:31:54.52,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and the Federal Aviation Authority. So\Noriginally, the idea, of course, is the
Dialogue: 0,0:31:54.52,0:32:00.27,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,manufacture builds the aircraft, analyzes\Neverything, documents everything, and the
Dialogue: 0,0:32:00.27,0:32:06.73,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,FAA checks all the documentation and maybe\Neven looks at original data and maybe
Dialogue: 0,0:32:06.73,0:32:11.28,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,looks at the physical pieces that are\Nbeing made for the prototype and approves
Dialogue: 0,0:32:11.28,0:32:19.17,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,or rejects the documentation. There is\Nalready a potential conflict that is not
Dialogue: 0,0:32:19.17,0:32:24.05,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,there in most other countries because they\Nhave separate agencies. But the FAA has a
Dialogue: 0,0:32:24.05,0:32:30.84,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,dual mandate. It is supposed to promote\Naviation, to make it more efficient, but
Dialogue: 0,0:32:30.84,0:32:40.00,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,also to ensure aviation safety. And there\Nmay be conflicts of interests, I think. So
Dialogue: 0,0:32:40.00,0:32:47.64,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,here's what this certification has been up\Nuntil not quite sure, 10, 15 years ago. So
Dialogue: 0,0:32:47.64,0:32:57.12,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the FAA, the actual government agency, the\NAviation Authority, appoints a designated
Dialogue: 0,0:32:57.12,0:33:03.24,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,engineering representative. The DER is\Nemployed and paid by Boeing, but is
Dialogue: 0,0:33:03.24,0:33:12.69,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,accountable only to the FAA. And the DER\Nchecks and documents everything that is
Dialogue: 0,0:33:12.69,0:33:20.41,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,being done. There's usually more than one,\Nthatt for simplicity's sake, let's say. And
Dialogue: 0,0:33:20.41,0:33:24.63,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the DER then reports the findings and all\Nthe documentation, all the low level
Dialogue: 0,0:33:24.63,0:33:30.36,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,engineering and analysis documentation\Nthat has been done to the FAA, and the FAA
Dialogue: 0,0:33:30.36,0:33:35.72,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,signs off on that or asks questions and\Nvisits the company and looks at things and
Dialogue: 0,0:33:35.72,0:33:41.63,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,makes audits and everything like that. And\Nso that usually has been working more or
Dialogue: 0,0:33:41.63,0:33:47.09,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,less and has certainly improved the\Noverall safety of airliners that have been
Dialogue: 0,0:33:47.09,0:33:57.52,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,built in the last decades. And this is the\Nnew version. And the person is
Dialogue: 0,0:33:57.52,0:34:03.43,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,now not called DER, but it's called AR,\Nthe authorized representative, is still
Dialogue: 0,0:34:03.43,0:34:08.07,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,employed and paid by Boeing. That hasn't\Nchanged, but is appointed by Boeing
Dialogue: 0,0:34:08.07,0:34:13.42,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,management and reports to Boeing\Nmanagement. And the Boeing management
Dialogue: 0,0:34:13.42,0:34:19.90,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,compiles a report and sends that to the\NFAA and the FAA then signs off on the
Dialogue: 0,0:34:19.90,0:34:25.86,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,report. They hopefully at least read it,\Nbut they don't have all the low level
Dialogue: 0,0:34:25.86,0:34:31.86,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,engineering details readily available and\Nonly rarely speak to the actual engineers.
Dialogue: 0,0:34:31.86,0:34:42.28,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,So anyone seeing a problem here? Well, you\Nhave to say that most aircraft that are
Dialogue: 0,0:34:42.28,0:34:48.42,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,being built have been built in the last\Nyears aren't really terrible. Right. The
Dialogue: 0,0:34:48.42,0:34:55.47,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,787 is a new aircraft. The 777\Nhas been one of the safest aircraft
Dialogue: 0,0:34:55.47,0:35:03.50,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,around, at least looking at the flight\Nhours that it has accumulated. So it's not
Dialogue: 0,0:35:03.50,0:35:11.38,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,all bad, but there's potential for real,\Nreally bad screw ups. I guess. There's
Dialogue: 0,0:35:11.38,0:35:17.56,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,another factor maybe that I've briefly\Nmentioned is that the Boeing 737, even in
Dialogue: 0,0:35:17.56,0:35:21.95,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,its latest version, is not computer\Ncontrolled. It's not fly by wire, although
Dialogue: 0,0:35:21.95,0:35:27.94,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,it has some computers as we have seen,\Nthat can move some control surfaces. But
Dialogue: 0,0:35:27.94,0:35:31.27,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,mostly it's really, it really looks like\Nthat. I think that's an actual photo from
Dialogue: 0,0:35:31.27,0:35:36.91,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,a 737 has some corrosion on it. So it's\Nprobably not a max an older version, but
Dialogue: 0,0:35:36.91,0:35:41.55,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,it's basically the same, which is also why\Nthe grandfathering certification still
Dialogue: 0,0:35:41.55,0:35:47.15,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,works. So it's all cables and pulleys and\Neven if both hydraulic systems fails - so,
Dialogue: 0,0:35:47.15,0:35:51.48,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,yes, it is hydraulically assisted, the\Nflight controls - but if both hydraulic
Dialogue: 0,0:35:51.48,0:35:57.08,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,systems fail with the combined forces of\Nboth pilots, you can you can still fly it
Dialogue: 0,0:35:57.08,0:36:03.71,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and you can still land it. That usually\Nworks, except when it doesn't. And the
Dialogue: 0,0:36:03.71,0:36:11.21,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,cases where it doesn't work are when the\Naircraft is going very fast and has a very
Dialogue: 0,0:36:11.21,0:36:15.70,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,high stabilizer deflection. And this is\Nfrom a video some of you may have seen
Dialogue: 0,0:36:15.70,0:36:21.76,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,there, it's from Mentour Pilot. And he has\Nactually tested that in a full flight
Dialogue: 0,0:36:21.76,0:36:27.66,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,simulator, which represents realistic\Nforces on all flight controls, including
Dialogue: 0,0:36:27.66,0:36:32.96,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the trim wheel. You can be in the center\Nconsole under the thrust levers, there are
Dialogue: 0,0:36:32.96,0:36:37.78,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,these two shiny black wheels and they are\Nthe trim wheels. You can move them
Dialogue: 0,0:36:37.78,0:36:42.50,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,manually in all phases of flight to trim\Nthe aircraft. If electric trim is not
Dialogue: 0,0:36:42.50,0:36:45.42,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,available.\NPilot: in the normal trim system would not
Dialogue: 0,0:36:45.42,0:36:50.95,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,do this. OK. It would require manual\Ntrimming to get it away from this. That's
Dialogue: 0,0:36:50.95,0:36:55.94,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,fine, it's fine, trim it backwards. Trim\Nit backwards again
Dialogue: 0,0:36:55.94,0:37:00.51,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Bernd: So now he is trying to trim it nose\Nup again after he has manually trimmed it
Dialogue: 0,0:37:00.51,0:37:06.17,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,nose down because the normal electric trim\Nsystem cannot trim it so far nose down.
Dialogue: 0,0:37:06.17,0:37:10.13,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,They have to do it manually. And now he is\Ntrying to trim it back nose up from the
Dialogue: 0,0:37:10.13,0:37:15.65,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,position which is known from the flight\Ndata recorder that it was in the
Dialogue: 0,0:37:15.65,0:37:20.75,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,accident flight and is trying to trim it\Nmanually because some people said: "oh,
Dialogue: 0,0:37:20.75,0:37:24.51,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,turn off the electric trim, the electric\Ntrim system and trim it manually. That
Dialogue: 0,0:37:24.51,0:37:27.70,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,will always work." And they're trying to\Ndo that. And it has representative forces
Dialogue: 0,0:37:27.70,0:37:34.54,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,to the real aircraft.\NCopilot: Oh my god.
Dialogue: 0,0:37:34.54,0:37:41.23,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,{\i1}heavy breathing{\i0}\NPilot: Ok, pause the rec...
Dialogue: 0,0:37:41.23,0:37:46.12,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Bernd: and you can see that the pilot on\Nthe left, the captain, can't even help
Dialogue: 0,0:37:46.12,0:37:50.96,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,him. In theory, both could turn the crank\Nat the same time. And they have a handle
Dialogue: 0,0:37:50.96,0:37:56.31,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,on both sides because he has to hold the\Ncontrol column with all his force. So you
Dialogue: 0,0:37:56.31,0:38:00.38,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,can't let go. He must hold it with both\Narms. Otherwise, it would go into a
Dialogue: 0,0:38:00.38,0:38:04.62,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,nosedive immediately. And this is the\Nphysical situation with which the pilots
Dialogue: 0,0:38:04.62,0:38:09.85,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,were confronted in the accident flight.\NAnd he now says: "press the red button in
Dialogue: 0,0:38:09.85,0:38:23.64,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the simulator." So end the simulation\Nbecause it's clear that they're going to crash.
Dialogue: 0,0:38:23.64,0:38:28.12,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,So there is another thing that came\Nthat came up after the accidents and 737
Dialogue: 0,0:38:28.12,0:38:33.08,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,pilot said: "oh, it's just a runaway trim,\Nrunaway stabilizer trim, there's a
Dialogue: 0,0:38:33.08,0:38:37.66,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,procedure for that and just do the\Nprocedure and you'll be fine." Well,
Dialogue: 0,0:38:37.66,0:38:43.75,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,runaway stabilizer trim is one of the\Nemergency procedures that is trained ad
Dialogue: 0,0:38:43.75,0:38:49.52,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,infinitum. Right. That's something that\Nevery 737 pilot is aware of because there
Dialogue: 0,0:38:49.52,0:38:55.38,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,are some conditions under which the trim\Nmotor always gets electric current and
Dialogue: 0,0:38:55.38,0:38:59.64,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,doesn't stop running. That just happens\Noccasionally, not very often, but
Dialogue: 0,0:38:59.64,0:39:03.74,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,occasionally. And every pilot is primed to\Nrecognize the symptoms. Oh, this is one of
Dialogue: 0,0:39:03.74,0:39:10.24,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,a runaway stabilizer. And you turn off the\Nelectric motors for the stabilizer trim
Dialogue: 0,0:39:10.24,0:39:16.79,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and trim manually and that'll work. But if\Nyou look at what are the actual symptoms
Dialogue: 0,0:39:16.79,0:39:21.70,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,of runaway stabilizer, it says uncommanded\Nstabilizer trim movement occurs
Dialogue: 0,0:39:21.70,0:39:27.97,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,continuously. And MCAS movement isn't\Ncontinuously, MCAS trim movement is more
Dialogue: 0,0:39:27.97,0:39:34.01,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,like the speed trim system, which occurs\Nintermittently and then stops and then
Dialogue: 0,0:39:34.01,0:39:38.51,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,trims again for a bit and then stops\Nagain. So most pilots wouldn't recognize
Dialogue: 0,0:39:38.51,0:39:42.26,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,this as a runaway trim, because the\Nsymptoms are very different. The
Dialogue: 0,0:39:42.26,0:39:47.11,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,circumstances are different. So I guess\Nsome pilots might have recognized that
Dialogue: 0,0:39:47.11,0:39:51.77,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,there's something going on with the trim\Nthat is not right and will have turned it
Dialogue: 0,0:39:51.77,0:39:57.55,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,off. But some didn't, even though they\Nknow they all know about runaway
Dialogue: 0,0:39:57.55,0:40:07.46,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,stabilizer. And yeah, that's the second\Nfile that I have.
Dialogue: 0,0:40:07.46,0:40:16.40,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,{\i1}loud rattling noise{\i0}\NSo that's the sound. The stick shaker
Dialogue: 0,0:40:16.40,0:40:21.44,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,makes on a Boeing 737. And now imagine\Nflying with that sound all the while
Dialogue: 0,0:40:21.44,0:40:27.83,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,shaking the control column violently,\Nflying with that going on for an hour. And
Dialogue: 0,0:40:27.83,0:40:32.67,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,that's what the crew on the previous\Nflight did. They flew the entire flight of
Dialogue: 0,0:40:32.67,0:40:37.17,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,about an hour with a stick shaker going. I\Nmean, that's quite that's quite
Dialogue: 0,0:40:37.17,0:40:44.46,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,interesting because the stick shaker says\Nyour wing is about to stall. Right. But on
Dialogue: 0,0:40:44.46,0:40:47.65,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the other hand, they knew they were flying\Nlevel. They were flying fast enough.
Dialogue: 0,0:40:47.65,0:40:51.81,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Everything was fine. The aircraft wasn't\Nabout to stall because it was going fast
Dialogue: 0,0:40:51.81,0:40:58.17,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and. Right. So from an aerodynamics\Nperspective, of course, they could fly the
Dialogue: 0,0:40:58.17,0:41:03.31,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,airplane because they knew it was nowhere\Nnear a stall. But still, I think in most
Dialogue: 0,0:41:03.31,0:41:07.03,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,countries and most airlines, they would\Nhave just turned around and landed again
Dialogue: 0,0:41:07.03,0:41:13.42,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and saying the aircraft is broken, please\Nfix it. Something is wrong. But yeah. So
Dialogue: 0,0:41:13.42,0:41:19.36,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the stick shaker is activated by the angle\Nof attack reading on each side and it
Dialogue: 0,0:41:19.36,0:41:24.46,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,sticks out mechanically coupled of both of\Nthem will shake with activation from
Dialogue: 0,0:41:24.46,0:41:31.57,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,either side. So is it going to fly again?\NIt's still somewhat of an open question,
Dialogue: 0,0:41:31.57,0:41:38.22,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,but I suspect that it will because it's\Nit's hard to imagine that letting these
Dialogue: 0,0:41:38.22,0:41:43.87,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,460 airplanes or some something like that\Nthat have been built sometimes sitting
Dialogue: 0,0:41:43.87,0:41:50.24,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,around on an employee parking lots like\Nhere, just letting them be scrapped or
Dialogue: 0,0:41:50.24,0:41:56.21,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,whatever. I don't know. Almost 5000 have\Nbeen ordered. As I said, neither airlines
Dialogue: 0,0:41:56.21,0:42:04.17,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,nor Boeing will be happy. But it's not\Nquite clear. It's not yet being certified
Dialogue: 0,0:42:04.17,0:42:13.11,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,again. So it's still unairworthy. So\Nthere's another little thing,
Dialogue: 0,0:42:13.11,0:42:16.88,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,certification issues with new Boeing\Naircraft. Reminded me of this. Have you
Dialogue: 0,0:42:16.88,0:42:23.83,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,ever seen that? So battery exhaust, which\Nthe aircraft has a battery exhaust? I
Dialogue: 0,0:42:23.83,0:42:31.76,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,mean, what did you do with that? Does\Nanybody know? Yeah, of course some know.
Dialogue: 0,0:42:31.76,0:42:38.07,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Yeah. Boeing 787 Dreamliner. Less than two\Nyears after introduction. Now, after
Dialogue: 0,0:42:38.07,0:42:44.18,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,entering the service, actually had two\Nmajor battery fires. They have two big
Dialogue: 0,0:42:44.18,0:42:51.38,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,lithium ion batteries. Lithium, lithium,\Ncobalt. I think, not sure. The one that
Dialogue: 0,0:42:51.38,0:42:55.81,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,burns the brightest.\N{\i1}laughter{\i0}
Dialogue: 0,0:42:55.81,0:43:00.82,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Bernd: Because they wanted the energy\Ndensity, really, and that wasn't available
Dialogue: 0,0:43:00.82,0:43:06.17,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,in other packages. If they had used nickel\Ncadmium batteries instead, they would have
Dialogue: 0,0:43:06.17,0:43:12.18,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,been like 40 kilograms heavier for two\Nbatteries. That's almost a passenger. So
Dialogue: 0,0:43:12.18,0:43:18.36,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,yeah, they were onboard fires. And if you\Nask pilots what's your worst fear of
Dialogue: 0,0:43:18.36,0:43:25.88,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,something happening in flight, they'll\Nsay: flight control failure and fire. So
Dialogue: 0,0:43:25.88,0:43:32.10,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,you don't want to have a fire in the air,\Nabsolutely not. And one of the fires was
Dialogue: 0,0:43:32.10,0:43:36.33,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,actually in-flight with passengers on\Nboard. One was on the ground shortly after
Dialogue: 0,0:43:36.33,0:43:41.57,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,disembarking and the lithium ion\Nbatteries, because they are unusual and a
Dialogue: 0,0:43:41.57,0:43:45.82,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,novel feature, as it's called, have\Nspecial certification conditions because
Dialogue: 0,0:43:45.82,0:43:52.01,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,they are not covered by the original\Ncertification criteria, and it says here:
Dialogue: 0,0:43:52.01,0:43:55.87,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Safe cell temperatures and pressures must\Nbe maintained during any foreseeable
Dialogue: 0,0:43:55.87,0:44:01.60,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,condition and during any failure of the\Ncharging system, not shown to be extremely
Dialogue: 0,0:44:01.60,0:44:07.57,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,improbable... extremely remote, sorry, and\Nextremely remote is actually two orders of
Dialogue: 0,0:44:07.57,0:44:13.30,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,magnitude more frequent than extremely\Nimprobable. Extremely remote is only less
Dialogue: 0,0:44:13.30,0:44:18.40,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,than once every 10 million flight hours.\NBut I think the combined flight hours for
Dialogue: 0,0:44:18.40,0:44:26.62,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the 787 at that time were, not quite sure,\Nmaybe a few hundred thousand at most. So
Dialogue: 0,0:44:26.62,0:44:32.22,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and also happened two times. There was not\Nreally not really fun. And then it says no
Dialogue: 0,0:44:32.22,0:44:37.61,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,explosive or toxic gases emitted as the\Nresult of any failure may accumulate in
Dialogue: 0,0:44:37.61,0:44:43.14,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,hazardous quantities within the airplane.\NI think they've neatly solved the third
Dialogue: 0,0:44:43.14,0:44:48.13,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,point by putting the battery in a\Nstainless steel box, really thick walls
Dialogue: 0,0:44:48.13,0:44:53.99,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,maybe, I don't know, eight millimeters or\Nsomething like that. And piping them to
Dialogue: 0,0:44:53.99,0:45:00.34,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,this hole in the bottom of the aircraft.\NSo the gases cannot accumulate in the
Dialogue: 0,0:45:00.34,0:45:05.88,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,aircraft, obviously. So, yes. And with\Nthat, I'm at the end of my talk and
Dialogue: 0,0:45:05.88,0:45:12.65,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,there's now, I think quite some time for\Nquestions. Thank you.
Dialogue: 0,0:45:12.65,0:45:22.42,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,{\i1}applause{\i0}
Dialogue: 0,0:45:22.42,0:45:26.41,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Herald: Extremely punctual, I have to say.\NThank you for this interesting talk. We do
Dialogue: 0,0:45:26.41,0:45:31.68,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,have the opportunity for quite some\Nquestions and a healthy discussion. Please
Dialogue: 0,0:45:31.68,0:45:36.53,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,come to the microphones that we have\Ndistributed through the hall. And while
Dialogue: 0,0:45:36.53,0:45:46.09,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,you queue up behind them: Do we have a\Nquestion from the Internet already? Dear
Dialogue: 0,0:45:46.09,0:45:50.30,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,signal Angel. Is your microphone working?\NSignal Angel: No.
Dialogue: 0,0:45:50.30,0:45:53.82,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Herald: Yes.\NSignal Angel: Yes. Do you think extensive
Dialogue: 0,0:45:53.82,0:45:57.45,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,software tests could have solved this\Nsituation?
Dialogue: 0,0:45:57.45,0:46:02.38,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Bernd: Software tests in this case,\Nperhaps? Yes. Although software tests are
Dialogue: 0,0:46:02.38,0:46:09.10,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,really a problematic thing because to test\Nsoftware to these extreme reliability is
Dialogue: 0,0:46:09.10,0:46:13.23,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,required. You really have to test them for\Na very, very, very, very long time indeed.
Dialogue: 0,0:46:13.23,0:46:17.84,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,So to achieve some confidence, they have\N99 percent that a failure will not occur
Dialogue: 0,0:46:17.84,0:46:23.67,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,in, say, 10 million hours, you will have\Nto test it for 45 million hours. Really.
Dialogue: 0,0:46:23.67,0:46:26.58,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,And you have to test it with the exact\Nconditions that will occur in flight. And
Dialogue: 0,0:46:26.58,0:46:33.93,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,apparently nobody's thought of an angle of\Nattack failure, angle of attack sensor
Dialogue: 0,0:46:33.93,0:46:38.17,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,failure. So maybe testing wouldn't have\Ndone a lot in this case.
Dialogue: 0,0:46:38.17,0:46:44.25,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Herald: Thank you. Microphone number four.\NMic4: Yes. Thank you for the talk. I've
Dialogue: 0,0:46:44.25,0:46:49.81,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,got a question concerning the grounding.\NSo what is your view that the FAA waited
Dialogue: 0,0:46:49.81,0:46:55.97,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,so long until they finally ground the\Naircraft a week after the Chinese started
Dialogue: 0,0:46:55.97,0:46:58.38,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,with grounding.\NBernd: Yes, that's a good point. And I
Dialogue: 0,0:46:58.38,0:47:02.55,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,think it's an absolute disgrace that they\Nwaited so long. Even after the first
Dialogue: 0,0:47:02.55,0:47:06.14,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,crash. They made an internal study and it\Nwas reported in the news some some weeks
Dialogue: 0,0:47:06.14,0:47:13.24,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,ago and estimated that during the lifetime\Nof the 737 max, probably around 15
Dialogue: 0,0:47:13.24,0:47:17.87,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,aircraft would crash. So I say every two\Nto three years, one of them would crash
Dialogue: 0,0:47:17.87,0:47:22.72,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,and they still didn't ground it and waited\Nuntil four days after the second accident.
Dialogue: 0,0:47:22.72,0:47:27.90,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Yes, it's a shame, really.\NHerald: Thank you. Microphone number
Dialogue: 0,0:47:27.90,0:47:31.09,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,seven, please.\NMic7: Thank you for your talk. I have a
Dialogue: 0,0:47:31.09,0:47:38.67,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,question regarding the design decision to\Nonly use one AOA sensor. So I've read that
Dialogue: 0,0:47:38.67,0:47:43.48,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Boeing used the MCAS system before on a\Nmilitary aircraft and that used both
Dialogue: 0,0:47:43.48,0:47:46.55,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,sensors. So why was that decision made to\Ndowngrade?
Dialogue: 0,0:47:46.55,0:47:51.62,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Bernd: Yeah, that's a good question. I'm\Nnot aware of that military system. If that
Dialogue: 0,0:47:51.62,0:47:56.45,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,was really exactly the same. But if that's\Nthe case, yes, that makes it even stranger
Dialogue: 0,0:47:56.45,0:48:00.16,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,that they chose to use only one in this\Ncase. Yes. Thank you.
Dialogue: 0,0:48:00.16,0:48:04.95,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Herald: Okay, Microphone number two,\Nplease.
Dialogue: 0,0:48:04.95,0:48:10.62,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Mic2: Yeah. Thank you for your talk. \NSo how do you actually test these
Dialogue: 0,0:48:10.62,0:48:15.20,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,requirements in practice? So how you\Ndetermine in practice if something is
Dialogue: 0,0:48:15.20,0:48:19.81,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,likely to fail every ten to the minus nine\Nas opposed to every ten to the minus
Dialogue: 0,0:48:19.81,0:48:22.44,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,eight?\NBernd: No, that's that's obviously
Dialogue: 0,0:48:22.44,0:48:27.15,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,practically completely impossible. You\Ncan't. As I said, if you want to have a
Dialogue: 0,0:48:27.15,0:48:31.77,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,reasonable confidence that it's really the\Nerror rate is really so low, you'd have to
Dialogue: 0,0:48:31.77,0:48:37.38,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,test it for four and a half billion hours\Nin operation, which is just impossible.
Dialogue: 0,0:48:37.38,0:48:42.99,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,What instead is done: there are some,\Nindustry standards for aviation that is
Dialogue: 0,0:48:42.99,0:48:49.20,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,DEO178 currently in revision C, and that\Nsays if you have software that if it
Dialogue: 0,0:48:49.20,0:48:53.53,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,fails, may have consequences of\Nthis severity, then you have to use these
Dialogue: 0,0:48:53.53,0:48:59.67,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,very strict, very formal methods for\Ndeveloping the software, like doing very
Dialogue: 0,0:48:59.67,0:49:05.49,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,strict and formal requirements analysis\Nspecification in a formal language,
Dialogue: 0,0:49:05.49,0:49:12.72,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,preferably. And um, if possible, and some\Nsome companies actually do that, formally
Dialogue: 0,0:49:12.72,0:49:16.68,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,prove your source code correct. And in\Nsome languages that can be done. But it's
Dialogue: 0,0:49:16.68,0:49:21.96,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,it's very, it's a lot of effort. And\Nthat's how this should be done. And this
Dialogue: 0,0:49:21.96,0:49:25.77,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,software obviously should have been\Ndeveloped to the highest level according
Dialogue: 0,0:49:25.77,0:49:31.15,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,to the DEO178, which is level A and quite\Nobviously it wasn't.
Dialogue: 0,0:49:31.15,0:49:35.94,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Herald: Thank you. Signal Angel, please.\NThe next question from the Internet.
Dialogue: 0,0:49:35.94,0:49:40.40,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Signal Angel: The talk focused most on\NMCAS, but someone noted that the plane was
Dialogue: 0,0:49:40.40,0:49:45.56,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,actually designed for engines below the\Nwings and the NG model, so the one before,
Dialogue: 0,0:49:45.56,0:49:49.04,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,already had problems of the wing mounts\Nand engine mounts. Do you think there will
Dialogue: 0,0:49:49.04,0:49:53.16,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,be mechanical problems with Max, too?\NBernd: I'm not sure there were really
Dialogue: 0,0:49:53.16,0:49:56.27,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,mechanical problems. There were\Naerodynamic problems. And apparently.
Dialogue: 0,0:49:56.27,0:50:00.57,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Well, I'm sure they have tested the NG to\Nthe same standards, to the same
Dialogue: 0,0:50:00.57,0:50:04.56,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,certification standards, because obviously\Nthere were aerodynamic changes even with
Dialogue: 0,0:50:04.56,0:50:10.07,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the NG. And the NG apparently still\Nfulfilled the formal criteria of the
Dialogue: 0,0:50:10.07,0:50:15.33,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,certification. There are some acceptable\Nmeans of compliance and quite specific
Dialogue: 0,0:50:15.33,0:50:20.67,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,descriptions, how you test these stick\Nforces versus airspeed. And as far as I
Dialogue: 0,0:50:20.67,0:50:25.44,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,know, the NG just fulfilled them. And the\NMax just didn't. So for the Max, something
Dialogue: 0,0:50:25.44,0:50:29.91,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,was required, although even the\Nclassic, which basically at the same
Dialogue: 0,0:50:29.91,0:50:35.16,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,engine as the NG. Even the classic had\Nsome problems there. That's where the
Dialogue: 0,0:50:35.16,0:50:41.41,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,speed trim system was introduced. And so\Nit has a similar system and actually the
Dialogue: 0,0:50:41.41,0:50:45.78,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,MCAS is just another little algorithm in\Nthe computer that also does the speed trim
Dialogue: 0,0:50:45.78,0:50:48.55,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,system.\NHerald: Please stay seated and buckled up
Dialogue: 0,0:50:48.55,0:50:54.10,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,until we reach our parking position. No.\NWe are still in the Q&A phase. Please
Dialogue: 0,0:50:54.10,0:50:59.58,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,stay seated and please be quiet so we can\Nenjoy all of this talk. And if you have to
Dialogue: 0,0:50:59.58,0:51:04.26,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,have to leave, then be super quiet right\Nnow. It is a way too loud in here, please.
Dialogue: 0,0:51:04.26,0:51:07.20,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,The next question from microphone number\None.
Dialogue: 0,0:51:07.20,0:51:13.37,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Mic1: So considering lessons learned from\Nthis accident, has the FAA already changed
Dialogue: 0,0:51:13.37,0:51:17.84,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the certification process or are they\Nabout to change it? Or on what about other
Dialogue: 0,0:51:17.84,0:51:21.43,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,agencies worldwide?\NBernd: The FAA is probably going to move
Dialogue: 0,0:51:21.43,0:51:26.05,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,very slow. And I'm not aware of any\Nspecific changes yet, but I haven't looked
Dialogue: 0,0:51:26.05,0:51:32.87,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,into too much detail in that. Other\Ncertification agencies work somewhat
Dialogue: 0,0:51:32.87,0:51:37.50,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,different. And at least the EASA in Europe\Nand the Chinese authorities have already
Dialogue: 0,0:51:37.50,0:51:41.69,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,indicated that in this case they are not\Ngoing to follow the FAA certification, but
Dialogue: 0,0:51:41.69,0:51:46.84,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,going to do their own. And until now, it\Nwas usually the case that if the FAA
Dialogue: 0,0:51:46.84,0:51:50.97,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,certified the airplane, everybody else in\Nthe world just took that certification and
Dialogue: 0,0:51:50.97,0:51:55.82,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,said what the FAA did is probably fine and\Nvise versa. When the EASA certified a
Dialogue: 0,0:51:55.82,0:52:00.72,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Boeing airplane, then the FAA would also\Ncertify it. And that is probably changing
Dialogue: 0,0:52:00.72,0:52:04.75,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,now.\NHerald: Thank you. Microphone number 3.
Dialogue: 0,0:52:04.75,0:52:11.21,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Mic3: So, hi. Thank you for this talk.\NTwo questions, please. Were you part of an
Dialogue: 0,0:52:11.21,0:52:18.45,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,official investigation or is this your own\Nanalysis of the facts? Here's the other
Dialogue: 0,0:52:18.45,0:52:24.70,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,one. I heard something about this software\Nbeing outsourced to India. Can you comment
Dialogue: 0,0:52:24.70,0:52:27.83,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,on that, please?\NBernd: The first one: no, this is my own
Dialogue: 0,0:52:27.83,0:52:36.04,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,private analysis. I have been doing some\Naccident analysis for a living for a
Dialogue: 0,0:52:36.04,0:52:41.37,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,while, but not for any official agency,\Nbut always for private customers.
Dialogue: 0,0:52:41.37,0:52:46.81,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,And about outsourcing to India, I'm\Nnot quite sure about that. I've read
Dialogue: 0,0:52:46.81,0:52:51.84,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,something like that. And what I've read is\Nthat it was produced by Honeywell. I
Dialogue: 0,0:52:51.84,0:52:57.45,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,think. I may be wrong about that, but I\Nthink it was Honeywell. And who the actual
Dialogue: 0,0:52:57.45,0:53:04.92,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,programmers were sitting. If it's done\Nproperly, according to the methodologies
Dialogue: 0,0:53:04.92,0:53:09.59,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,prescribed by DO178 and fulfilling all\Nthose requirements, then where the
Dialogue: 0,0:53:09.59,0:53:15.05,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,programmer sit is actually not that\Nimportant. And I don't want to deride
Dialogue: 0,0:53:15.05,0:53:21.14,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Indian programmers, and I think if it's\Ndone according to specification and
Dialogue: 0,0:53:21.14,0:53:27.12,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,analyzed with study code analyses and\Neverything else vis a vis the
Dialogue: 0,0:53:27.12,0:53:31.90,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,specification, then that would also be\Nfine, I guess. But the problem is not so
Dialogue: 0,0:53:31.90,0:53:35.60,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,much really in the implementation, but in\Nthe design of the system, in the
Dialogue: 0,0:53:35.60,0:53:40.06,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,architecture.\NHerald: Thank you. Microphone number 5
Dialogue: 0,0:53:40.06,0:53:45.24,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,please.\NMic5: Hello. I may go to your
Dialogue: 0,0:53:45.24,0:53:50.48,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,presentation wrong, but for me, the real\Nroot cause of the problem is the
Dialogue: 0,0:53:50.48,0:53:58.92,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,competition and high deadline from the\Nmanagement. So the question for you is: is
Dialogue: 0,0:53:58.92,0:54:05.76,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,there any suggestions from you that\Nprocess could be, I dunno, maybe changed
Dialogue: 0,0:54:05.76,0:54:18.78,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,in order to avoid the bugs in the \Nsoftware and have the mission
Dialogue: 0,0:54:18.78,0:54:24.02,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,critical systems saved?\NBernd: Yeah. So we don't normally just
Dialogue: 0,0:54:24.02,0:54:29.07,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,talk about THE cause or THE root cause,\Nbut there are always several causes.
Dialogue: 0,0:54:29.07,0:54:35.34,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Basically you can say depending on where\Nyou stop with the graph - where is it? -
Dialogue: 0,0:54:35.34,0:54:40.98,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,where you stop with the graph all the\Nleaves on the graph are root causes and
Dialogue: 0,0:54:40.98,0:54:46.78,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,but I've stopped relatively early and not\Nnot I'm not gone into any more detail on
Dialogue: 0,0:54:46.78,0:54:51.02,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,that, but yeah. The competition between\NAirbus and Boeing, obviously it was a big
Dialogue: 0,0:54:51.02,0:54:57.94,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,factor in this. And I don't suppose you do\Nsuggest that we abolish competition in the
Dialogue: 0,0:54:57.94,0:55:04.46,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,market. But what needs to be changed, I\Nthink, is the way certification is done.
Dialogue: 0,0:55:04.46,0:55:10.27,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,And that requires the FAA reasserting its\Nauthority much more. And that will
Dialogue: 0,0:55:10.27,0:55:16.71,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,probably require a lot more personnel with\Ngood engineering background, and maybe
Dialogue: 0,0:55:16.71,0:55:22.35,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,that would require the FAA paying better\Nwages. So I don't know, because currently
Dialogue: 0,0:55:22.35,0:55:27.49,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,probably all the good engineers will go to\NBoeing instead of the FAA. But the FAA
Dialogue: 0,0:55:27.49,0:55:31.28,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,dearly needs engineering expertise and\Nlots of it.
Dialogue: 0,0:55:31.28,0:55:35.66,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Herald: Thank you. The next question we\Nhear from microphone number 4.
Dialogue: 0,0:55:35.66,0:55:40.25,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Mic4: Hi. Thank you for the talk. I've\Nheard that there is - I've heard - I've
Dialogue: 0,0:55:40.25,0:55:47.35,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,read that there's a version of the 737 Max\N8 that did allow for a third airway
Dialogue: 0,0:55:47.35,0:55:52.73,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,sensitivity present that served as a\Nbackup for either sensors but that this
Dialogue: 0,0:55:52.73,0:55:56.91,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,was a paid option. And I have not found\Nconfirmation of this. Do you know anything
Dialogue: 0,0:55:56.91,0:56:00.100,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,about this?\NBernd: No, I'm not aware of that
Dialogue: 0,0:56:00.100,0:56:10.09,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,as a paid option. There was something\Nabout an optional feature that was called
Dialogue: 0,0:56:10.09,0:56:13.75,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,a safety feature, but I can't exactly\Nremember what that was. Maybe it was and
Dialogue: 0,0:56:13.75,0:56:18.47,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,angle of attack indicator in the cockpit\Nthat is available as an option, I think,
Dialogue: 0,0:56:18.47,0:56:26.84,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,for this 737 for most models, because the\Nsensor is there anyway. As for a third AOA
Dialogue: 0,0:56:26.84,0:56:31.71,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,sensor, I'd be surprised if that was an\Noption because that is a major change and
Dialogue: 0,0:56:31.71,0:56:36.26,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,requires a major change to all the system\Nlayout. Then you'd need an additional a
Dialogue: 0,0:56:36.26,0:56:41.26,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,data inertial reference unit, which is a\Nbig computer box in the aircraft of which
Dialogue: 0,0:56:41.26,0:56:46.44,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,there are only two. And that would've\Ntaken a long, long time in addition to
Dialogue: 0,0:56:46.44,0:56:51.61,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,develop. So I'm skeptical about that third\Nangle of attack sensor. At least I've not
Dialogue: 0,0:56:51.61,0:56:56.07,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,heard of it.\NHerald: Thank you. Signal angel, do we
Dialogue: 0,0:56:56.07,0:56:58.36,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,have more from the internet? Please one\Nquick one.
Dialogue: 0,0:56:58.36,0:57:03.39,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Signal angel: If you need a quick one,\Nwould you ever fly with a 737 Max again if
Dialogue: 0,0:57:03.39,0:57:05.97,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,it was ever cleared again?\N{\i1}applause{\i0}
Dialogue: 0,0:57:05.97,0:57:10.75,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Bernd: I was expecting that question. And\Nactually I don't have an answer yet for
Dialogue: 0,0:57:10.75,0:57:18.04,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,that. And that maybe would depend on how I\Nsee the FAA and the EASA doing the
Dialogue: 0,0:57:18.04,0:57:23.35,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,certification. I've seen some people\Nsaying that the 737 Max should never be
Dialogue: 0,0:57:23.35,0:57:31.31,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,recertified. I think that it will be. And\NI look at it in some detail, seeing how
Dialogue: 0,0:57:31.31,0:57:37.29,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the FAA develops and how the EASA is\Nhandling it. And then maybe. Yes.
Dialogue: 0,0:57:37.29,0:57:43.26,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Herald: Great. Okay, in that case, we\Nwould take one more very short question
Dialogue: 0,0:57:43.26,0:57:48.77,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,from microphone number 5.\NMic5: Do you know why the important AOA
Dialogue: 0,0:57:48.77,0:57:53.78,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,sensor failed to give the correct values?\NBernd: There are some theories about that, but
Dialogue: 0,0:57:53.78,0:57:58.47,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,I haven't investigated that in any more\Ndetail now. There were some stories that
Dialogue: 0,0:57:58.47,0:58:05.03,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,in the case of the Indonesian, the Lion\NAir, that it was actually mounted or
Dialogue: 0,0:58:05.03,0:58:12.60,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,reassembled incorrectly. That would\Nexplain why there was a constant offset.
Dialogue: 0,0:58:12.60,0:58:17.97,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,It may also have been somebody calculated\Nthat it was actually, exactly - if you
Dialogue: 0,0:58:17.97,0:58:21.39,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,look at the raw data that is being\Ndelivered on the bus -, there was exactly
Dialogue: 0,0:58:21.39,0:58:26.05,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,one flipped bit, which is also a\Npossibility. But I I don't really know.
Dialogue: 0,0:58:26.05,0:58:29.00,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,But there were some implications in the\Nreport. Maybe I have to read that section
Dialogue: 0,0:58:29.00,0:58:34.87,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,again from the Indonesian authorities\Nabout substandard maintenance, as it is
Dialogue: 0,0:58:34.87,0:58:39.40,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,euphemistically called.\NHerald: OK. We have two more minutes. So I
Dialogue: 0,0:58:39.40,0:58:42.11,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,will take another question from microphone\Nnumber 1.
Dialogue: 0,0:58:42.11,0:58:49.51,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Mic1: Hey, I would have expected that\Nmodern aircraft would have some plug,
Dialogue: 0,0:58:49.51,0:58:54.83,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,physical plug, hermetic one that would\Ndisconnect any automated system. Isn't
Dialogue: 0,0:58:54.83,0:58:58.07,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,this something that exist in our planes\Ntoday?
Dialogue: 0,0:58:58.07,0:59:02.39,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Bernd: Now, and especially modern aircraft\Ncan't just disconnect the automatics,
Dialogue: 0,0:59:02.39,0:59:06.88,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,because if you look at modern fly by wire\Naircraft, there is no connection between
Dialogue: 0,0:59:06.88,0:59:11.42,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the flight controls and the control\Nsurfaces. There's only a computer and the
Dialogue: 0,0:59:11.42,0:59:16.45,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,flight controls that the pilots handle are\Nonly inputs to the computer and there's no
Dialogue: 0,0:59:16.45,0:59:23.17,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,direct connection. That is true for every\NAirbus since the A320, for every Boeing
Dialogue: 0,0:59:23.17,0:59:28.95,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,since the triple 7, so the triple 7 and\Nthe 787 are totally 100 percent fly by
Dialogue: 0,0:59:28.95,0:59:33.16,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,wire. Well, I think 95 percent because\Nthere's one control service that is
Dialogue: 0,0:59:33.16,0:59:38.61,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,directly connected, one spoiler on each\Nside. But basically, there's there's no
Dialogue: 0,0:59:38.61,0:59:43.28,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,way. And so you have to make sure that\Nflight control software is developed to
Dialogue: 0,0:59:43.28,0:59:47.74,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,the highest possible standards. Because\Nyou can't turn it off, because that's
Dialogue: 0,0:59:47.74,0:59:53.20,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,everything. That's, Well, let me put it\Nthis way: On the fly by wire aircraft,
Dialogue: 0,0:59:53.20,1:00:00.64,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,only the computer can control the flight,\Nthe flight control surfaces know. So I
Dialogue: 0,1:00:00.64,1:00:03.91,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,just hope that it's good.\NHerald: Think about that when you next
Dialogue: 0,1:00:03.91,1:00:08.84,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,enter a plane. And also, please give a big\Nround of applause for our speaker Bernd.
Dialogue: 0,1:00:08.84,1:00:21.14,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,{\i1}applause{\i0}
Dialogue: 0,1:00:21.14,1:00:31.72,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,{\i1}36c3 postroll music{\i0}
Dialogue: 0,1:00:31.72,1:00:48.00,Default,,0000,0000,0000,,Subtitles created by c3subtitles.de\Nin the year 2020. Join, and help us!