WEBVTT
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silent 31C3 preroll titles
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applause
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Roger: Okay, hi everybody! I’m Roger
Dingledine, and this is Jake Appelbaum.
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And we’re here to tell you more
about what’s going on with Tor
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over the past year. We actually wanted
to start out asking Laura to give us
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a little bit of context from her
perspective, about Citizenfour,
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and the value of these sorts
of tools to journalists.
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applause
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Laura: So. Am I live? Okay. Roger and Jake
asked me to say a few things about Tor,
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and what does it mean for investigative
journalists. And I can say that certainly
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the work that I’ve done, on working with
disclosures by Edward Snowden, and
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first communicating with him would not
have been possible. Without the work
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that these 2 people do. And that everybody
[does] who contributes to the Tor network.
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So I’m deeply grateful to everyone here.
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applause
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When I was communicating with Snowden
for several months before I met him
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in Hongkong we talked often about the Tor
network, and it’s something that actually
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he feels is vital for online
privacy. And, to sort of
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defeat surveillance. It’s really our
only tool to be able to do that. And
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I just wanted to tell one story about what
happens when journalists don’t use it.
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I can’t go into lots of details, but
there’s a very well known investigative
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journalist who was working on a story.
He had a source. And the source was
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in the Intelligence community. And he had
done some research on his computer,
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not using Tor. And I was with him when
he got a phone call. And on the phone,
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the person was saying: “What the fuck were
you doing looking up this, this and this?”
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And this is an example of what
happens when Intelligence agencies
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target journalists. So without Tor
we literally can’t do the work that
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we need to do. So thank you,
and please support Tor! Thanks!
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applause
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Roger: Well, thank you!
continued applause
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Jacob: So to follow-up on what Laura
has just said: We think it’s important
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to really expand, not just into the
technical world, or to talk about
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the political issues in some abstract
sense. But also to reach out to culture.
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So in this case, this is a picture in the
Reina Sofia which is one of the largest
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museums in Spain. And that in the middle
is Mason Juday, and Trevor Paglen,
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and that’s me on the right. And the only
time you’ll ever find me on the right!
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And so it is the case that this is
a Tor relay. It’s actually 2 Tor relays
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running on the open hardware device
Novena, made by bunny and Sean.
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And it’s actually running as a middle
relay now, but it may in some point
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with one configuration change become
an exit relay. And it is the case that
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the Reina Sofia is hosting this Tor relay.
So, now, if… so we live in capitalism…
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applause
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So it is the case that if the Police wanna
seize this relay they got to buy it
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like every other piece
of art in the museum.
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laughter and applause
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And part of the reason that we’re
doing this kind of stuff – at least
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that piece of art which I did with Trevor
and Mason and Leif Ryge who is also
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in this room, and Aaron Gibson, also in
this room – is because we think that
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culture is important. And we think that
it’s important to tie the issue of anonymity
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not just as an abstract idea but as an
actual thing that is representative
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not only of our culture but of the world
we want to live in, overall. For all the
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cultures of the world. And so, for that
reason we also have quite recently
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been thinking a lot about social norms.
And it is the case that there’s a person
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in our community, and many persons in our
community that have come under attack.
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And have been deeply harassed.
And we think that that sucks!
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And we don’t like that. Even though we
promote anonymity without any question,
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i.e. no backdoors ever, and we’ll
get back to that in a minute,
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it is the case that we really
want to promote ‘being
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excellent to each other’. In the
sort of spirit of Noisebridge!
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applause
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And it’s still a little bit American-centric
but you can get the basic idea.
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It applies to Europe as well. Just replace
‘First Amendment’ with some of your local law.
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Or a local constitutional right. It isn’t
the case that we’re saying that you
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shouldn’t have the right to say things.
But we are saying “Get the fuck out
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of our community if you’re going
to be abusive to women!”
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applause and cheers
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And you’ll note that I used the word
‘Fuck’ to say it. And I’m sorry about that.
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Because the point is we all make mistakes.
And we want to make sure that while
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it’s true that we have transgressions we
want to make sure that we can find
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a place of reconciliation, and we can
work towards conflict resolution.
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And it’s important at the same time to
recognize that there are people who’s
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real lives are harmed by harassment
online. In this case one of the people
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is in this audience. And I hope that they
won’t mind being named. But we want
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to give her a shoutout and say
that we stand behind her 100%.
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Roger: Yeah, so, …
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applause
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So one of our developers on core Tor,
Andrea, has been harassed on Twitter
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and elsewhere, really a lot more
than should happen to anybody.
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And there are a couple of points
to make here. One of them is:
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She’s a woman, and women online
have been harassed for basically
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since ‘online’ has existed. Not just
women, other minorities, pretty much
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all over the place. Especially recently
things have been getting worse.
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The other important point to realize:
she’s not just being attacked because
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she happens to be there. She’s being
attacked because they’re trying to attack
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the Tor project and all the other people
in Tor. So, yes, she may be the focus
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of some of the attacks but we - the rest
of the Tor community, the rest of the
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security community - need to stand up
and take on some of this burden of
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communicating and interacting,
and talking about these issues.
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We can’t just leave it
to her to defend herself.
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applause
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Jacob: And so we want to set a particular
standard which is that there are
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lots of journalists that have a lot of
questions. And we really think that
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there are a lot of legitimate questions to
ask. E.g. I think it sucks that we take
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Department of Defense money, sometimes.
And sometimes I also think it’s good that
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people have the ability to feed
themselves, and have the ability
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to actually have a home and a family. Now,
I don’t have those things, really. I mean
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I can feed myself, but I don’t have a home
or a family in the same way that, say,
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the family people on side of Tor do. And
they need to be paid. It is the case that
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that is true. And that raises questions.
Like I, personally, wouldn’t ever take
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CIA money. And I think that nobody should.
And I don’t think the CIA should exist.
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But we have a diversity…
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applause
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…we have a diversity of funding because
we have a diversity of users. And so that
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raises a lot of questions. And I think
people should ask those questions.
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And Roger, and the rest of the Tor
community feels that way, too. But
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it’s important that we don’t single out
a specific person. And, in particular,
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to single out Andrea, again. She
does not deserve all the heat about
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some of the decisions that the
Tor project as a non-profit makes.
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She is a developer who is integral to
Tor. If it was not for her a significant
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portion of Tor would not exist. It
would not be as bug free as it is.
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And it would not be getting better all the
time. So we want people to reach out
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to this alias, if they actually want
to talk, and have a forum where
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the whole of Tor can really respond, and
think about these things in a positive way,
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and really engage with the press. In a way
that we can manage; because at the moment
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we get, I would say, 5 (on
average) press requests every day.
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That’s really a lot. And it is also the
case that 4 of those requests
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are very well phrased, extremely
reasonable questions. And one of them is,
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you know: “Why to
choose to run Tor?” And
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we should address all of them. We
really should. And at the same time
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we have to recognize that some of these
people that are kind of harassing,
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they might trigger me. That one will
trigger me, and I would probably
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write back with something kind of shitty.
So we want to distribute the work in a way
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where people will be nice. Even to the
people that are unreasonable. Because
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at the core – we need to be held to
account, and we need people to look to us
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about these things, and to ask us these
hard questions. And so this is the address
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to reach out to: [press@torproject.org].
Not harassing Andrea online on Twitter.
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Not coming after individual developers.
Not posting crazy stuff on the mailing list.
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Wait until we’ve actually talked to you,
then post the crazy stuff on the mailing list.
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Or wherever you’re going to post it. And
then hopefully we can actually answer
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the questions in a good faith-, helpful
way. There’s no reason to talk about
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conspiracy theories, we can just
talk about the business plans.
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And into that point wanna make it clear:
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stop being an asshole to people in the
community. But this is not negotiable.
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We’re not saying because we don’t want
you to harass people that we’re going
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to backdoor Tor. That will never happen.
You will find a bullet in the back of my head
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before that happens. And maybe Roger’s,
too. Depending on the order of operations.
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laughter and applause
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Roger: Okay, so we’re going to talk
a little bit about the various things
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we’ve done over the past year. To
give you a very brief introduction to Tor:
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Tor is an anonymity system. You’ve got
Alice, the client over there. She builds
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a path through 3 different relays
around the world. And the idea is
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that somebody watching her local
network connection can’t figure out
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what destination she’s going to. And
somebody watching the destinations
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can’t figure out where she’s coming
from. And we have quite a few relays
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at this point. Here’s a… the red line is
the graph of the number of relays
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we’ve had over the past year. For those
of you who remember ‘Heartbleed’
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you can see the big drop in April when
we removed a bunch of relays that
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had insecure keys. But this is not the
interesting graph. The interesting graph
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is ‘capacity over the past year’. And
we’ve gone from a little over 6 GBps
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of capacity up to more
than 12 GBps of capacity.
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applause
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And as long as we can make the difference
between those 2 lines big enough then
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Tor performance is pretty good. But we rely
on all of you to keep on running relays,
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and make them faster etc. so that we
can handle all the users who need Tor.
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Okay, another topic. Deterministic
builds. Mike Perry and Seth Schoen
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did a great talk a few days ago. So you
should go watch the stream on that!
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The very short version is: We have
a way of building Tor Browser so that
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everybody can build Tor Browser
and produce the same binary.
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And that way you don’t have to worry about
problems on your build machine and you can
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actually check that the program we give
you, really is based on the source code
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that we say that it is.
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Jacob: And this is of course important
because we really don’t want to be
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a focal point where someone comes
after us and says: “You have to produce
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a backdoored version”. So it’s very
important because we do receive
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a lot of pressure, from a lot of different
groups. And we never want to cave.
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And here’s how we think it is the
case that we will never cave:
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Free Software, open specifications,
reproducible builds,
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things that can be verified
with cryptographic signatures.
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That will not only keep us honest
against the – what do you call it –
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the angels of our better nature.
I don’t believe in angels. But anyway.
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The point is that it will keep us honest.
But it will also keep other people at bay.
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From trying to do something harmful to
us. Because when something happens
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you will be able to immediately find it.
And Mike Perry, by the way, is incredible.
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He probably hates that I’m saying his name
right now. Sorry, Mike! Are you here?
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laughter
Bastard! laughs
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But Mike Perry is a machine. He also
has a heart! But he’s a machine.
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And he’s incredible. And he has been
working non-stop on this. And he is really
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ground-breaking in not only doing
this for Firefox but really thinking
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about these hard problems, and
understanding that if he was just building
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this browser by himself, and he was
doing it in a non-verifiable way
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that it would really, actually be
a serious problem. Because we distribute
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this software. And so, I mean
there is a reason that the NSA
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calls Mike Perry a “worthy adversary”.
And it is because he’s amazing!
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applause
So let’s give it up for Mike Perry!
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ongoing applause
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Roger: Not only that, but his work, along
with Bitcoin’s work has pushed Debian
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and Fedora, and other groups to work
on reproducible builds as well. So,
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hopefully the whole security
community will get better!
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applause
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Jacob: And to the point about Citizenfour.
One of the things that’s been happening
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quite recently is that really respectable
nice people like the people at Mozilla
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have decided that they really want
us to work together. Which is great.
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Because we wanted to, and we have
respected their work for a very long time.
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And so Tor is now partnering with Mozilla.
And that means that Mozilla, as a group,
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will be running Tor relays. At first
middle nodes, and then, hopefully,
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we believe, exit relays. And that is
huge because Mozilla is at the forefront
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of doing a lot of work for end users. Just
everyday regular people wanting privacy.
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Things like DoNotTrack e.g.
are a way to try to experiment.
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Things like the Tor Browser a way to
experiment even further. To really bring
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Privacy-by-Design. And it’s amazing
that Mozilla is doing that. And
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we’ve made a partnership with them, and
we’re hopeful, cautiously optimistic even,
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that this is going to produce some very
good results where our communities can
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sort of fuse, and give Privacy-by-Design
software to every person on the planet
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with no exceptions whatsoever.
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applause
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Now we also have a couple of things
that we would like to talk about,
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just generally, that are a little bit
technical. But at the same time
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we wanna keep it accessible because
we think that this talk, well, it’s useful
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to talk about technical details. The most
important thing is somebody who has
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never heard of the Tor community before,
who watches this video, we want them
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to understand some of the
details, and enough, let’s say,
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technical understanding that they’ll be
able to go and look it up if they want to,
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but they’ll also understand we’re not
just glossing over, completely.
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So, pluggable transports are very
important. Right now, the way
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that Tor works is that we connect with an
SSL/TLS connection. The protocol SSL/TLS,
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one of the 2, depending on the client
library, and the server library. And
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that looks like an SSL connection, for
the most part. But as some of you know
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there are people on this planet
they collect SSL and TLS data,
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about everything flowing across the
internet. That’s really a problem.
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It turns out we thought in some cases
that it was just censorship that mattered.
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But it turns out broad classification
of traffic is really, actually, a problem
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not just for blocking but also for later
doing identification of traffic flows.
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So I’ve already lost the non-technical
people in the audience, so, let me
00:15:47.740 --> 00:15:51.580
rephrase that and say: We have these other
ways of connecting to the Tor network.
00:15:51.580 --> 00:15:55.740
And they don’t look just like a secure
banking transaction. They look instead
00:15:55.740 --> 00:16:01.250
like DNS, or HTTP – that is your regular
web browsing or name resolution.
00:16:01.250 --> 00:16:04.990
And we have a lot of different pluggable
transports. And some of them are cool.
00:16:04.990 --> 00:16:08.040
Some of them make it look like you’re
connecting to Google. When in fact you’re
00:16:08.040 --> 00:16:11.180
connecting to the Tor Project. And it’s
because you, in fact, are connecting
00:16:11.180 --> 00:16:16.660
to Google. Leif Ryge, are you
in the room, here? Maybe, no?
00:16:16.660 --> 00:16:19.960
This is really… you guys,
and your anonymity!
00:16:19.960 --> 00:16:23.890
laughter
It is the case…
00:16:23.890 --> 00:16:27.070
he showed this to me, I mentioned this to
some other people and David Fifield,
00:16:27.070 --> 00:16:30.870
I think, either independently rediscovered
it. There’s also the GoAgent people
00:16:30.870 --> 00:16:35.390
that discovered this. You can connect
to Google with an SSL connection,
00:16:35.390 --> 00:16:38.430
and the certificate will say:
dadada.google.com. And you of course
00:16:38.430 --> 00:16:42.740
verify it. And it is of course signed,
probably by Adam Langley, personally.
00:16:42.740 --> 00:16:48.120
And… maybe it’s just the Google
CAs. And then you give it a different
00:16:48.120 --> 00:16:53.270
HTTP host header. So you say: actually
I wanna talk to Appspot. I wanna talk
00:16:53.270 --> 00:16:58.470
to torbridge.appspot.com.
And inside of the TLS connection,
00:16:58.470 --> 00:17:01.149
which looks like it’s a connection to
Google which is one of the most popular
00:17:01.149 --> 00:17:05.119
websites on the internet you then make
essentially an encrypted connection
00:17:05.119 --> 00:17:09.980
through that. And then from there
to the Tor network. Using Google,
00:17:09.980 --> 00:17:13.859
but also Cloudflare – they don’t
just provide you with captchas!
00:17:13.859 --> 00:17:19.329
laughter and applause
laughs
00:17:19.329 --> 00:17:23.170
Poor Cloudflare guy! We were joking
we should stand outside his office
00:17:23.170 --> 00:17:26.009
and make him answer
captchas to get in the door!
00:17:26.009 --> 00:17:30.460
laughter and applause
00:17:30.460 --> 00:17:34.260
All of those people clapping wish you
would solve the Cloudflare captcha issue!
00:17:34.260 --> 00:17:39.810
So it also works with other compute
clusters. And other CDNs.
00:17:39.810 --> 00:17:43.300
And so this is really awesome because
it means that now you can connect
00:17:43.300 --> 00:17:47.280
through those CDNs to the Tor network,
using Meek (?) and other pluggable transports
00:17:47.280 --> 00:17:52.620
like that. So that’s a huge win.
And deploying it by default
00:17:52.620 --> 00:17:54.140
– I think we have another slide for that…
00:17:54.140 --> 00:17:58.270
Roger: Nope, that’s it!
We’ve got a different one, yes.
00:17:58.270 --> 00:18:03.440
So, one of the neat things about Meek (?) is:
because it works on all these different
00:18:03.440 --> 00:18:07.910
sorts of providers – Akamai
and all the CDNs out there –
00:18:07.910 --> 00:18:12.840
a lot of those are still reachable from
places like China. Lots of our pluggable
00:18:12.840 --> 00:18:16.370
transports don’t work so well in China,
but meek does, at this point.
00:18:16.370 --> 00:18:20.200
So there are a lot of happy users.
Here’s a graph of an earlier
00:18:20.200 --> 00:18:24.230
pluggable transport that we had,
called ‘obfs3’. It still works in China,
00:18:24.230 --> 00:18:28.030
and Iran, and Syria and lots
of places around the world.
00:18:28.030 --> 00:18:31.920
But the sort of blue/aqua line is
00:18:31.920 --> 00:18:36.540
how much use we’ve seen of
obfs3. And you can tell exactly
00:18:36.540 --> 00:18:41.590
when we put out the new Tor browser
release that had obfs3 built-in
00:18:41.590 --> 00:18:46.890
and easy-to-use by ordinary people.
So one of the really important pushes
00:18:46.890 --> 00:18:50.850
we’ve been doing is trying to make
– rather than trying to explain
00:18:50.850 --> 00:18:54.090
how pluggable transports work, and
teach you everything – just make them
00:18:54.090 --> 00:18:57.370
really simple. Make them part of Tor
browser, you just click on “My Tor
00:18:57.370 --> 00:19:01.690
isn’t working so I wanna use some
other way to make my Tor work”.
00:19:01.690 --> 00:19:06.260
And we’ve got 10.000 people at this
point who are happily using obfs3.
00:19:06.260 --> 00:19:10.930
I think a lot of them are in
Syria and Iran at this point.
00:19:10.930 --> 00:19:17.640
applause
00:19:17.640 --> 00:19:21.150
Something else we’ve been doing over
the past year is working really hard
00:19:21.150 --> 00:19:26.020
on improving the robustness,
and testing infrastructure,
00:19:26.020 --> 00:19:29.960
and unit tests for the core Tor
source code. So Nick Mathewson
00:19:29.960 --> 00:19:34.230
and Andrea Shepard in particular
have been really working on robustness
00:19:34.230 --> 00:19:39.700
to make this something we can rely
on, as a building block in tails,
00:19:39.700 --> 00:19:43.770
in Tor browser, in all the other
applications that rely on Tor.
00:19:43.770 --> 00:19:47.190
So in the background things were
getting a lot stronger. Hopefully that
00:19:47.190 --> 00:19:51.960
will serve us very well
in the battles to come.
00:19:51.960 --> 00:19:59.220
applause
00:19:59.220 --> 00:20:02.280
Jacob: So this fine gentleman
who was a teen heartthrob
00:20:02.280 --> 00:20:03.980
on Italian television many years ago…
00:20:03.980 --> 00:20:06.530
Arturo: Thank you for doxing me!
Jacob: Sorry.
00:20:06.530 --> 00:20:08.260
both laugh
00:20:08.260 --> 00:20:10.450
If only you’d been using Tor!
00:20:10.450 --> 00:20:16.020
Arturo: Yeah, TV over Tor. So…
A project that we started a couple
00:20:16.020 --> 00:20:23.620
of years ago with Jake is sort of related
I guess to the Tor project’s goals of
00:20:23.620 --> 00:20:29.740
increasing privacy and having a better
understanding on how people’s lives
00:20:29.740 --> 00:20:35.380
are impacted through technology. And this
project is called OONI, or the ‘Open
00:20:35.380 --> 00:20:40.010
Observatory of Network Interference’. And
what it is, before being a piece of software
00:20:40.010 --> 00:20:46.080
is a set of principles, and best practices
and specifications written in English
00:20:46.080 --> 00:20:52.860
for how it is best to conduct network
related measurements. That sort of
00:20:52.860 --> 00:20:57.510
measurements that we’re interested in
running have to do with identifying
00:20:57.510 --> 00:21:04.130
network irregularities. These are symptoms
that can be a sign of presence of
00:21:04.130 --> 00:21:10.710
surveillance or censorship, on the network
that you’re testing. And we use
00:21:10.710 --> 00:21:15.860
a methodology that has been peer-reviewed,
of which we have published a paper.
00:21:15.860 --> 00:21:21.200
It’s implemented using free software. And
all of the data that we collect is made
00:21:21.200 --> 00:21:26.800
available to the public. So that you can
look at it, analyze it and draw your
00:21:26.800 --> 00:21:33.160
own conclusions from it.
applause
00:21:33.160 --> 00:21:37.560
And so we believe that this effort is
something that is helpful and useful
00:21:37.560 --> 00:21:43.179
to people such as journalists, researchers,
activists or just simple citizens that are
00:21:43.179 --> 00:21:48.679
interested in being more aware, and have
a better understanding that is based
00:21:48.679 --> 00:21:55.559
on facts instead of just anecdotes, on
what is the reality of internet censorship
00:21:55.559 --> 00:22:00.059
in their country. And we believe that
historical data is especially important
00:22:00.059 --> 00:22:05.660
because it gives us an understanding of
how these censorship and surveillance
00:22:05.660 --> 00:22:12.670
apparatuses evolve over time. So
I would like to invite you all to run
00:22:12.670 --> 00:22:21.730
Ooniprobe today, if you copy and paste
this command line inside of a Debian-based
00:22:21.730 --> 00:22:26.730
system. Obviously… perhaps you should
read what is inside it before running it.
00:22:26.730 --> 00:22:31.310
applause
00:22:31.310 --> 00:22:34.630
But once you do that you will have
a Ooniprobe setup and you will be
00:22:34.630 --> 00:22:40.570
collecting measurements for your country.
If instead you would like to have
00:22:40.570 --> 00:22:46.890
an actual hardware device we have a very
limited number of them. But if you’re
00:22:46.890 --> 00:22:49.799
from an interesting country and you’re
interested in running Ooniprobe
00:22:49.799 --> 00:22:54.420
we can give you a little Raspberry Pi with
an LCD screen that you can take home,
00:22:54.420 --> 00:23:00.860
connect to your network and adopt
a Ooniprobe in your home network.
00:23:00.860 --> 00:23:09.130
To learn more about this you should come
later today at Noisy Square, at 6 P.M.
00:23:09.130 --> 00:23:11.750
to learn more about it.
00:23:11.750 --> 00:23:13.020
Roger: Thank you!
00:23:13.020 --> 00:23:17.500
applause
00:23:17.500 --> 00:23:20.570
Jacob: And, just to finish up here,
I mean, OONI is a human rights
00:23:20.570 --> 00:23:26.070
observation project which Arturo and
Aaron Gibson – also somewhere in the room,
00:23:26.070 --> 00:23:32.130
I’m sure he won’t stand up so I won’t even
ask him. It’s great! Because we went from
00:23:32.130 --> 00:23:35.400
a world where there was no open
measurement, with only secret tools,
00:23:35.400 --> 00:23:39.110
essentially, where people acted like
secret agents, going in the countries
00:23:39.110 --> 00:23:42.320
to do measurements. There wasn’t really
an understanding of the risks that
00:23:42.320 --> 00:23:45.860
were involved, how the tests function,
where non-technical people could have
00:23:45.860 --> 00:23:50.830
reasonable explanations. And now we have
open measurement tools, we have open data
00:23:50.830 --> 00:23:55.080
standards, we have really like a framework
for understanding this as a human right
00:23:55.080 --> 00:23:59.250
to observe the world around you. And then
also to share that data, and to actually
00:23:59.250 --> 00:24:03.290
discuss that data, what it means. And to
be able to set standards for it.
00:24:03.290 --> 00:24:06.330
And hopefully that means that people have
informed consent when they engage
00:24:06.330 --> 00:24:10.600
in something that could be risky, like running
Ooni in a place like… that is dangerous
00:24:10.600 --> 00:24:13.030
like the United States or Cuba,
or something like China.
00:24:13.030 --> 00:24:18.000
applause
And so, Arturo personally though, is
00:24:18.000 --> 00:24:21.610
the heart and soul of Ooni. And it is
really important that we see that
00:24:21.610 --> 00:24:25.580
the Tor community is huge. It’s really
huge, it’s made up of a lot of people
00:24:25.580 --> 00:24:29.670
doing a lot of different things. And part
of Ooni is Tor. We need Tor to be able
00:24:29.670 --> 00:24:33.929
to have a secure communications channel
back to another system, we need that
00:24:33.929 --> 00:24:38.230
so that people can log into these
Ooniprobes e.g. over Tor Hidden Services.
00:24:38.230 --> 00:24:42.610
That kind of fusion of things where we
have anonymity but at the same time
00:24:42.610 --> 00:24:45.980
we have this data set that is in some
cases identifying, in some cases
00:24:45.980 --> 00:24:49.910
it’s not identifying, depending on the
test. We need an anonymous communications
00:24:49.910 --> 00:24:53.630
channel to do that kind of human rights
observation. And so… just so we can
00:24:53.630 --> 00:24:57.070
make Arturo a little… feel a little
appreciated I just wanna give him
00:24:57.070 --> 00:25:00.500
another round of applause, for making this
human rights observation project.
00:25:00.500 --> 00:25:08.240
applause
Jacob joins the applause
00:25:08.240 --> 00:25:12.990
Roger: So I encourage all of you not only
to run Ooniprobe in interesting places,
00:25:12.990 --> 00:25:17.660
and in boring places because they might
become interesting. But also to help write
00:25:17.660 --> 00:25:22.500
new tests, and work on the design of these
things, so that we can detect and notice
00:25:22.500 --> 00:25:27.289
new problems on the internet more quickly.
Something else we’ve been up to over
00:25:27.289 --> 00:25:32.920
the past year is Tor Weekly News. We were
really excited by Linux Weekly News etc.
00:25:32.920 --> 00:25:37.990
and… so every week there’s a new
blog post and mail that summarizes
00:25:37.990 --> 00:25:41.820
what’s happened over the past week.
We encourage you to look at all these.
00:25:41.820 --> 00:25:45.870
A special shout-out to harmony and
lunar for helping to make this happen
00:25:45.870 --> 00:25:47.950
over the past year. Thank you!
00:25:47.950 --> 00:25:52.679
applause
00:25:52.679 --> 00:25:57.370
Jacob: Finally there’s a Tor list you can
be on, that you really wanna be on!
00:25:57.370 --> 00:26:01.460
Roger: Being on lists is good. One of the
other features we’ve been really excited
00:26:01.460 --> 00:26:06.590
about over the past year: EFF has been
helping with Outreach. EFF ran
00:26:06.590 --> 00:26:10.820
a Tor relay challenge to try to get a lot
of people running relays. And I think
00:26:10.820 --> 00:26:17.150
they have several thousand relays that
signed up because of the relay challenge.
00:26:17.150 --> 00:26:19.549
Pushing a lot of traffic.
So that’s really great!
00:26:19.549 --> 00:26:23.339
applause
00:26:23.339 --> 00:26:27.040
And at the same time not only did they
get a lot of more people running relays
00:26:27.040 --> 00:26:31.750
but they also did some great advocacy
and outreach for getting more exit relays
00:26:31.750 --> 00:26:36.440
in universities, and basically teaching
people why Tor is important. We all need
00:26:36.440 --> 00:26:40.200
to be doing more of that! We’ll
touch on that a little bit more later.
00:26:40.200 --> 00:26:44.190
So you all I hope remember what was
going on in Turkey, earlier this year.
00:26:44.190 --> 00:26:48.419
Here’s a cool graph of Tor use in Turkey
when they started to block Youtube
00:26:48.419 --> 00:26:52.170
and other things. Then people realized,
I need to get some tools to get around
00:26:52.170 --> 00:26:56.830
that censorship. But you probably
weren’t paying attention when Iraq
00:26:56.830 --> 00:27:01.430
filtered Facebook, and suddenly a lot of
people in Iraq needed to get some sort
00:27:01.430 --> 00:27:05.570
of way to get around their censorship. So
there are a bunch of interesting graphs
00:27:05.570 --> 00:27:10.470
like this on the Tor Metrics project, of
what’s been going on over the past year.
00:27:10.470 --> 00:27:13.290
Jacob: And we actually…
– if you could go back, yeah.
00:27:13.290 --> 00:27:17.510
One thing that’s really interesting about
this is: Karsten Loesing who is, I think,
00:27:17.510 --> 00:27:20.530
also not going to stand up, maybe you
will? Are you here? I don’t see you,
00:27:20.530 --> 00:27:25.929
Karsten? No? No, okay. He does all
the metrics, this anonymous, shadowy
00:27:25.929 --> 00:27:29.650
metrics figure. And if you go to
metrics.torproject.org you’ll see
00:27:29.650 --> 00:27:33.830
open data that is properly anonymized
– you would expect that from us –
00:27:33.830 --> 00:27:38.539
as well as actual documents that explain
the anonymity, the counting techniques,
00:27:38.539 --> 00:27:42.140
that explain the privacy conserving
statistics. And you can see these graphs,
00:27:42.140 --> 00:27:46.050
you can generate them based on certain
parameters. If you are interested
00:27:46.050 --> 00:27:50.320
in seeing e.g. geopolitical events,
and how they tie in to the internet,
00:27:50.320 --> 00:27:54.870
this project is part of what inspired
Ooni. This is how we get statistics
00:27:54.870 --> 00:27:58.289
and interesting things about the Tor
network itself. From Tor clients,
00:27:58.289 --> 00:28:02.150
from Tor relays, from Tor bridges.
And it tells you all sorts of things.
00:28:02.150 --> 00:28:08.700
Platform information, version number of
the software, which country someone
00:28:08.700 --> 00:28:13.440
might be connecting from etc. Where
they’re hosted… If you are interested
00:28:13.440 --> 00:28:17.900
looking at this website and finding spikes
like this you may in fact be able to
00:28:17.900 --> 00:28:22.590
find out that there is a censorship event
in that country, and we haven’t noticed it.
00:28:22.590 --> 00:28:26.410
There are a lot of countries in the world
if we split it up by country. And sometimes
00:28:26.410 --> 00:28:31.460
50.000 Tor users fall off the Tor network
because another American company has sold
00:28:31.460 --> 00:28:36.780
that country censorship equipment. We
need help finding these events, and then
00:28:36.780 --> 00:28:41.340
understanding their context. So if in your
country something like that happens
00:28:41.340 --> 00:28:45.830
looking at this data can help us not only
to advocate for anonymity in such a place
00:28:45.830 --> 00:28:48.910
but it can help us to also technically
realize we need to fix a thing,
00:28:48.910 --> 00:28:51.799
change a thing… And it’s through this
data that we can have a dialog
00:28:51.799 --> 00:28:55.550
about those things. So if you have no
technical ability at all but you’re
00:28:55.550 --> 00:28:59.260
interested and understand where you
come from – look at this data set, try
00:28:59.260 --> 00:29:03.450
to understand it, and then reach out to us
and hopefully we can learn about that.
00:29:03.450 --> 00:29:06.289
That’s how we learn about this, that’s how
we learned about the previous thing.
00:29:06.289 --> 00:29:09.860
And many years ago we gave a Tor talk
about how countries and governments
00:29:09.860 --> 00:29:15.470
and corporations try to censor Tor. And
of course, a lot has happened since then.
00:29:15.470 --> 00:29:18.510
There’s a lot of those things, and very
difficult to keep up with them. So
00:29:18.510 --> 00:29:22.820
we really need the community’s help to
contextualize, to explain and define
00:29:22.820 --> 00:29:25.750
these things.
00:29:25.750 --> 00:29:30.970
Roger: Okay. Next section of the talk,
‘things that excited journalists over
00:29:30.970 --> 00:29:35.270
the past year’. That actually turned out
to be not-so-big a deal. And we’re gonna
00:29:35.270 --> 00:29:39.220
try to blow through a lot of them quickly,
so that we can get to the stuff that
00:29:39.220 --> 00:29:45.669
actually was a big deal. So I guess in
August or something there was going to be
00:29:45.669 --> 00:29:50.190
a Blackhat talk about how you can
just totally break Tor, and then
00:29:50.190 --> 00:29:55.080
the Blackhat talk got pulled. Turns out
that it was a group at CMU who were
00:29:55.080 --> 00:30:00.200
doing some research on Tor. And I begged
them for a long time to get a little bit
00:30:00.200 --> 00:30:04.720
of information about what attack they had.
Eventually they sent me a little bit of
00:30:04.720 --> 00:30:08.510
information. And then we were all
thinking about how to fix it. And then
00:30:08.510 --> 00:30:12.280
Nick Mathewson, one of the Tor developers,
said: “Why don’t I just deploy
00:30:12.280 --> 00:30:17.490
a detection thing on the real Tor network,
just in case somebody is doing this?” And
00:30:17.490 --> 00:30:21.210
then it turns out somebody was doing this.
And then I sent mail to the Cert (?) people
00:30:21.210 --> 00:30:25.789
saying: “Hey, are you, like, are you like
running those 100 relays that are doing
00:30:25.789 --> 00:30:31.690
this attack on Tor users right now?” And
I never heard back from them after that.
00:30:31.690 --> 00:30:36.570
So that’s sort of a… this is a sad
story for a lot of different reasons.
00:30:36.570 --> 00:30:41.070
But I guess the good news is we identified
the relays that were doing the attack,
00:30:41.070 --> 00:30:45.020
we cut them out of the network, and we
deployed a defense that will first of all
00:30:45.020 --> 00:30:49.000
make that particular attack not
work anymore. And also detect it
00:30:49.000 --> 00:30:52.010
when somebody else is trying
to do an attack like this.
00:30:52.010 --> 00:30:53.610
Jacob: This, of course, is…
00:30:53.610 --> 00:30:59.720
applause
00:30:59.720 --> 00:31:05.020
This is a hard lesson, for 2 reasons.
The first reason is that that it’s awful
00:31:05.020 --> 00:31:07.750
to do those kinds of attacks on the real
Tor network. And there’s a question about
00:31:07.750 --> 00:31:12.530
responsibility. But the second lesson is
that when these kinds of things happen,
00:31:12.530 --> 00:31:17.179
and we have the ability to actually
understand them we can respond to them.
00:31:17.179 --> 00:31:21.370
It’s really awful that the talk
was pulled, and it is really awful
00:31:21.370 --> 00:31:24.640
that these people were not able to give
us more information. And it’s also really
00:31:24.640 --> 00:31:28.030
awful that they were apparently carrying
out the attack. And there were lots
00:31:28.030 --> 00:31:31.831
of open questions about it. But in general
we believe that we’ve mitigated the attack
00:31:31.831 --> 00:31:36.450
which is important. But we also
advocated for that talk to go forward.
00:31:36.450 --> 00:31:40.549
Because we think that, of course, the
answer to even really frustrating speech
00:31:40.549 --> 00:31:45.710
is more speech! So we wanna know more
about it. It somehow is very disturbing
00:31:45.710 --> 00:31:49.090
that that talk was pulled. And they should
be able to present their research,
00:31:49.090 --> 00:31:52.650
even if there’s anger on our face it’s
important for our users to know as much
00:31:52.650 --> 00:31:57.520
as we can, so that we can move
forward with protecting Tor users.
00:31:57.520 --> 00:32:02.500
Roger: Okay, so, another exciting
topic from a couple of months ago:
00:32:02.500 --> 00:32:04.630
Russia apparently put out
a call-for-research work…
00:32:04.630 --> 00:32:06.990
loud splashing noise from Jake
opening a loaded water bottle
00:32:06.990 --> 00:32:10.580
…to come up with attacks on Tor.
Jacob: It’s another attack on Tor!
00:32:10.580 --> 00:32:14.970
Roger: Enjoy your water, Jake.
I hope that was worth it. laughs
00:32:14.970 --> 00:32:16.530
Jacob: laughs It was really
worth it. Was very thirsty.
00:32:16.530 --> 00:32:19.919
Roger: So Russia put out a
call-for-research proposals
00:32:19.919 --> 00:32:25.930
on attacking Tor. Somebody mistranslated
that phrase from Russian into ‘prize’,
00:32:25.930 --> 00:32:31.200
or ‘bounty’, or ‘contest’. And then we had
all these articles, saying “Russia is
00:32:31.200 --> 00:32:36.080
holding a contest to break Tor” when
actually, no, they just wanted somebody
00:32:36.080 --> 00:32:41.560
to work on research on Tor attacks.
So this would be like the U.S. National
00:32:41.560 --> 00:32:46.730
Science Foundation holds a contest
for Tor research. That’s not actually
00:32:46.730 --> 00:32:50.280
how government funding works.
Mistranslations cause a lot of
00:32:50.280 --> 00:32:55.030
exciting journalist articles but as
far as I can tell it turned out to be
00:32:55.030 --> 00:32:59.850
basically nothing. Also it was basically
‘no money’. So, maybe something
00:32:59.850 --> 00:33:03.069
will come of this, we’ll see. Something
else that’s been bothering me a lot,
00:33:03.069 --> 00:33:08.260
lately: Cryptowall, now called
‘Cryptolocker’. So, there are jerks
00:33:08.260 --> 00:33:12.230
out there who break into your
mobile phone of some sort,
00:33:12.230 --> 00:33:17.159
give you malware, viruses, something
like that. They encrypt your files,
00:33:17.159 --> 00:33:22.050
and then they send you basically a ransom
note saying “We’ve encrypted your file,
00:33:22.050 --> 00:33:27.320
if you want it back send some Bitcoin over
here!” So this is bad, so far. But then
00:33:27.320 --> 00:33:31.320
the part that really upsets me is they
say: “And if you don’t know how to do this
00:33:31.320 --> 00:33:35.960
go to our website torproject.org and
download the Tor Browser in order
00:33:35.960 --> 00:33:42.620
to pay us”. Fuck them! I do not want
people doing this with our software!
00:33:42.620 --> 00:33:49.220
applause
00:33:49.220 --> 00:33:51.890
Jacob: Yeah, fuck them. I mean I don’t
really have a lot to contribute to that.
00:33:51.890 --> 00:33:56.510
I mean it’s really… Hidden Services have
a really bad rap, and it’s frustrating,
00:33:56.510 --> 00:33:59.900
right? There’s a… of course this
quantitative and qualitative analysis
00:33:59.900 --> 00:34:03.890
that we can have here. And the reality
of the situation is that one Globaleaks
00:34:03.890 --> 00:34:08.270
leaking interface is ‘one.onion’ (?), for
example. What is the value of that?
00:34:08.270 --> 00:34:13.540
Versus 10.000 Hidden Services run by these
jerks? And it’s very hard to understand
00:34:13.540 --> 00:34:16.989
the social value of these things, except
to say that we really need things like
00:34:16.989 --> 00:34:21.710
Hidden Services. And jackasses like this
are really making it hard for us to defend
00:34:21.710 --> 00:34:26.199
the right to publish anonymously. And so,
if you know who these people are please
00:34:26.199 --> 00:34:30.549
ask them to stop! I don’t even know
what the ask is there. But they really
00:34:30.549 --> 00:34:33.109
should stop. Or maybe there’s some
interesting things that you can do.
00:34:33.109 --> 00:34:37.159
I don’t know. But we really, really
don’t like that this is someone’s
00:34:37.159 --> 00:34:41.229
first introduction to Tor! That they think
that we’re responsible for this. We
00:34:41.229 --> 00:34:44.549
most certainly are not responsible for
these things. We certainly do not deploy
00:34:44.549 --> 00:34:51.000
malware. And Hidden Services are actually
very important for a lot of people.
00:34:51.000 --> 00:34:53.930
These people are not those people!
00:34:53.930 --> 00:34:59.949
applause
00:34:59.949 --> 00:35:03.539
Roger: Another ‘exciting’ story,
a month or 2 ago, was,
00:35:03.539 --> 00:35:08.289
“81% of Tor users can be de-anonymized…”
and then some more words, depending on
00:35:08.289 --> 00:35:13.210
which article you read. So it turns out
that one of our friends, Sambuddho, who is
00:35:13.210 --> 00:35:19.309
a professor in India now, did some work
on analyzing traffic correlation attacks
00:35:19.309 --> 00:35:24.210
in the lab. He found, in the lab, that
some of his attacks worked sometime,
00:35:24.210 --> 00:35:29.410
great… And then some journalists found it,
and said: “Ah! This must be the reason why
00:35:29.410 --> 00:35:33.849
Tor is insecure today”. So he wrote
an article, it got Slashdot, it got
00:35:33.849 --> 00:35:38.210
all the other news stories. And suddenly
everybody knew that Tor was broken
00:35:38.210 --> 00:35:43.759
because “81% of Tor users…”.
So it turns out that Sambuddho himself
00:35:43.759 --> 00:35:47.699
stood up and said actually: “No, you
misunderstood my article”. But
00:35:47.699 --> 00:35:51.910
that didn’t matter because nobody listened
to the author of the paper at that point.
00:35:51.910 --> 00:35:57.390
So I guess there’s a broader issue that
we’re struggling with here, in terms of
00:35:57.390 --> 00:36:02.430
how to explain the details of these
things because traffic correlation attacks
00:36:02.430 --> 00:36:08.560
are a big deal. They probably do work
if you have enough traffic around
00:36:08.560 --> 00:36:12.079
the internet, and you’re looking at the
right places. You probably can do
00:36:12.079 --> 00:36:17.549
the attack. But that paper did not do the
attack. So I keep finding myself saying:
00:36:17.549 --> 00:36:21.880
“No no no, you’re misunderstanding the
paper, the paper doesn’t tell us anything,
00:36:21.880 --> 00:36:25.749
but the attack is real! But the paper
doesn’t tell us anything”. And this is
00:36:25.749 --> 00:36:30.049
really confusing to journalists because
it sounds like I’m disagreeing with myself
00:36:30.049 --> 00:36:35.059
with these 2 different sentences. So we
need to come up with some way to
00:36:35.059 --> 00:36:39.770
be able to explain: “Here are all of the
real attacks, that are really actually
00:36:39.770 --> 00:36:44.979
worrisome, and it’s great that researchers
are working on them. And they probably
00:36:44.979 --> 00:36:50.839
are a big deal, in some way. But no, that
paper that you’re pointing at right now
00:36:50.839 --> 00:36:55.839
is not the reason why they’re a big
deal”. We also saw this in the context
00:36:55.839 --> 00:36:59.790
of an NSA paper which was published
a couple of days ago, thanks to
00:36:59.790 --> 00:37:02.690
some other folks.
Jacob: Sad, ‘some other folks’!
00:37:02.690 --> 00:37:04.950
Roger: ‘Some other folks’. I won’t specify
00:37:04.950 --> 00:37:10.020
exactly which other folks. And they
similarly had a traffic correlation attack.
00:37:10.020 --> 00:37:15.579
And in the paper it’s really a bad one.
It’s the same as the paper that was
00:37:15.579 --> 00:37:20.140
published in 2003, in the open literature.
There was a much better paper
00:37:20.140 --> 00:37:25.309
published in 2004, in the open literature,
that apparently these folks didn’t read.
00:37:25.309 --> 00:37:29.619
So I don’t wanna say traffic correlation
attacks don’t work, but all these papers
00:37:29.619 --> 00:37:35.609
that we’re looking at don’t show…
aren’t very good papers.
00:37:35.609 --> 00:37:39.120
Jacob: So one of the solutions to a lot
of journalists that don’t understand
00:37:39.120 --> 00:37:42.710
technology is that it’s actually quite
easy to be a journalist by comparison
00:37:42.710 --> 00:37:47.319
to being a technologist. It’s possible
to write about things in a factually
00:37:47.319 --> 00:37:51.359
correct way, sometimes you don’t always
reach the right audiences, that can
00:37:51.359 --> 00:37:55.489
actually be difficult. It depends. So you
have to write for different reading
00:37:55.489 --> 00:37:59.390
comprehension levels, e.g. And we tried
to write for people who understand
00:37:59.390 --> 00:38:03.249
the internet. At least when I write as
a journalist. And so, when I sometimes
00:38:03.249 --> 00:38:07.210
take off my Tor hat I put on my journalistic
hat. And part of the reason is that
00:38:07.210 --> 00:38:10.369
in order to even tell you about some
of the things that we learn, if I don’t
00:38:10.369 --> 00:38:14.599
put on my journalistic hat I get a nice
pair of handcuffs. So it’s very important
00:38:14.599 --> 00:38:17.719
to have journalistic protection so that we
can inform you about these things.
00:38:17.719 --> 00:38:23.430
So e.g. it is the case that XKeyscore
rules – we published some of them.
00:38:23.430 --> 00:38:28.589
Not ‘we’, Tor. But me and this set of
people at the top, of this by-line here.
00:38:28.589 --> 00:38:33.420
In NDR. Some of you know NDR, it’s a very
large German publication. I also publish
00:38:33.420 --> 00:38:37.730
with Der Spiegel, as a journalist. In this
case we published XKeyscore rules.
00:38:37.730 --> 00:38:41.609
Where we specifically learned an important
lesson. And the important lesson was,
00:38:41.609 --> 00:38:44.660
even if you’re a journalist explaining
things exactly technically correctly
00:38:44.660 --> 00:38:47.739
– people will still get it wrong. It’s just
not the journalists that get it wrong.
00:38:47.739 --> 00:38:50.640
It’s the readers. Very frustrating.
00:38:50.640 --> 00:38:55.079
People decided that because the NSA
definitely has XKeyscore rules that is
00:38:55.079 --> 00:38:58.529
rules for surveilling the internet, where
they’re looking at big traffic buffers.
00:38:58.529 --> 00:39:03.890
TEMPORA e.g. the British surveillance
system that is built on XKeyscore.
00:39:03.890 --> 00:39:08.190
With a – probably – week-long buffer of
all internet traffic. That’s a big buffer,
00:39:08.190 --> 00:39:15.249
by the way. Doing these XKeyscore
rules, running across that traffic set,
00:39:15.249 --> 00:39:18.130
they would find that people were
connecting to directory authorities.
00:39:18.130 --> 00:39:20.959
One of those directory authorities is
mine, actually, quite ironically. And
00:39:20.959 --> 00:39:25.760
then Sebastian Hahn, and other people
in this audience. And some people said:
00:39:25.760 --> 00:39:30.839
“Oh, don’t use Tor because the NSA will
be monitoring you!” That is exactly
00:39:30.839 --> 00:39:35.660
the wrong take-away. Because there are
XKeyscore rules on the order of tens of
00:39:35.660 --> 00:39:39.890
thousands, from what we can tell.
So everything you do is going through
00:39:39.890 --> 00:39:43.000
these giant surveillance systems. And
what you’ll learn when you monitor
00:39:43.000 --> 00:39:48.579
someone using Tor is that they’re
using Tor potentially, in that buffer.
00:39:48.579 --> 00:39:51.299
Which is different than ‘they learn
for sure that you were going to
00:39:51.299 --> 00:39:55.769
the Chaos Computer Club’s web site’,
or that you were going to a dating site.
00:39:55.769 --> 00:39:59.430
So it’s the difference between ‘they learn
some keeny (?) bit of information about you’,
00:39:59.430 --> 00:40:02.920
that you’re using an anonymity
system, versus ‘they learned exactly
00:40:02.920 --> 00:40:06.469
what you were doing on the internet’. Now
if there were only a few XKeyscore rules
00:40:06.469 --> 00:40:10.849
at all, and it was just that about Tor
then that conclusion people reach
00:40:10.849 --> 00:40:15.260
would be correct. But it’s exactly not
true. The XKeyscore system is so powerful
00:40:15.260 --> 00:40:18.900
that if you have a logo for a company,
so anyone here that runs a company,
00:40:18.900 --> 00:40:23.440
and you put a logo inside of a document,
the XKeyscore system can find that logo
00:40:23.440 --> 00:40:28.489
in all of the documents flowing across the
internet in real-time. And alert someone
00:40:28.489 --> 00:40:34.079
that someone has sent a .DOC or a PDF with
that image inside of it. And alert them.
00:40:34.079 --> 00:40:38.229
So that they can intercept it. So the
lesson is not “Don’t use Tor because
00:40:38.229 --> 00:40:43.200
XKeyscore may put your metadata into
a database, in the so-called ‘corporate
00:40:43.200 --> 00:40:47.930
repositories’”. The lesson is “Holy shit,
there’s this gigantic buffering system
00:40:47.930 --> 00:40:52.259
which has search capabilities that even
allow you to search inside of documents.
00:40:52.259 --> 00:40:55.740
Really, really advanced capabilities where
they can select that traffic and put it
00:40:55.740 --> 00:41:00.069
somewhere else”. “Use an anonymity
system!” And also: “Look, they’re
00:41:00.069 --> 00:41:04.789
targeting anonymity systems, even in the
United States, which, at least for the NSA
00:41:04.789 --> 00:41:08.239
they’re not supposed to be doing those
kinds of things”. They literately were
00:41:08.239 --> 00:41:11.369
caught lying here. They’re doing
bulk internet surveillance even
00:41:11.369 --> 00:41:16.109
in the United States. Using these
kinds of systems. That’s really scary.
00:41:16.109 --> 00:41:19.680
But the real big lesson to take away from
that is, actually, that they’re doing this
00:41:19.680 --> 00:41:22.440
for all the protocols that they can
write fingerprints for. And they have
00:41:22.440 --> 00:41:28.770
a generic language where they can actually
describe protocols. And so we published
00:41:28.770 --> 00:41:32.529
a number of those, we = NDR. And I would
really recommend you read and understand
00:41:32.529 --> 00:41:35.749
that. But the lesson, again, is not
“Oh no, they’re going to detect you’re
00:41:35.749 --> 00:41:40.190
using Tor”. We have never said that Tor
can e.g. protect you against someone
00:41:40.190 --> 00:41:45.130
seeing that you’re using it. Especially in
the long term. But rather the point is
00:41:45.130 --> 00:41:49.509
exactly the scariest point. This mass
internet surveillance is real. And
00:41:49.509 --> 00:41:55.579
it is the case that it is real-time.
And it’s a real problem.
00:41:55.579 --> 00:42:02.540
applause
00:42:02.540 --> 00:42:05.910
Roger: If you’re using Tor they see that
you’re using Tor. If you’re not using Tor
00:42:05.910 --> 00:42:09.630
they see exactly where you’re going.
You end up in a list of people who went
00:42:09.630 --> 00:42:13.150
to ‘this’ website, or ‘this’ website,
or used ‘this’ service, or sent
00:42:13.150 --> 00:42:18.589
‘this’ document. And the diversity of
Tor users is part of the safety, where,
00:42:18.589 --> 00:42:21.779
just because they know you’re using
Tor doesn’t tell them that much.
00:42:21.779 --> 00:42:24.890
One of the other things I’ve been
wrestling with after looking at a bunch
00:42:24.890 --> 00:42:29.039
of these documents lately is the whole
‘how do we protect against pervasive
00:42:29.039 --> 00:42:33.079
surveillance’. And this is an entire talk
on its own. We’ve been doing some
00:42:33.079 --> 00:42:39.380
design changes. We pushed out some changes
in Tor that protect you more against
00:42:39.380 --> 00:42:42.980
pervasive surveillance. We – for the
technical people out there – we’ve reduced
00:42:42.980 --> 00:42:47.799
the number of guard relays that you use
by default from 3 to 1. So there are
00:42:47.799 --> 00:42:52.609
fewer places on the internet that get to
see your Tor traffic. That’s a good start.
00:42:52.609 --> 00:42:56.009
One of the other lessons we’ve been
realizing: The internet is more centralized
00:42:56.009 --> 00:43:01.479
than we’d like. So it’s easy to say
“Oh, we just need more exit relays,
00:43:01.479 --> 00:43:05.230
and then we’ll have more protection
against these things”. But if we put
00:43:05.230 --> 00:43:09.450
another exit relay in that same data
sensor (?) in Frankfurt that they’re
00:43:09.450 --> 00:43:13.719
already watching that’s not actually going
to give us more safety against these
00:43:13.719 --> 00:43:18.950
pervasive surveillance adversaries.
Something else I realized: so we used
00:43:18.950 --> 00:43:23.119
to talk about how Tor does these two
different things. We’ve got anonymity,
00:43:23.119 --> 00:43:27.059
we’re trying to protect against somebody
trying to learn what you’re doing, and
00:43:27.059 --> 00:43:30.470
we’ve got circumvention, censorship
circumvention. We’re trying to protect
00:43:30.470 --> 00:43:33.589
against somebody trying to prevent
you from going somewhere.
00:43:33.589 --> 00:43:37.980
But it turns out in the surveillance
case they do deep packet inspection
00:43:37.980 --> 00:43:42.200
to figure out what protocol you’re
doing, to find out what you’re up to.
00:43:42.200 --> 00:43:45.710
And in the censorship case they do
deep packet inspection to figure out
00:43:45.710 --> 00:43:49.730
what protocol you’re using, to decide
whether to block it. So it’s actually…
00:43:49.730 --> 00:43:55.049
these fields are much more related
than we had realized before. And
00:43:55.049 --> 00:43:59.140
it took us a while, I’m really happy that
we have these documents to look at,
00:43:59.140 --> 00:44:03.599
so that we have a better understanding
of how this global surveillance
00:44:03.599 --> 00:44:10.660
and censorship works. Long ago, so in
2007, I ended up doing a talk at the NSA,
00:44:10.660 --> 00:44:14.619
to try to convince them that we were not
the bad guys. And you can read the notes
00:44:14.619 --> 00:44:18.530
that they took about my talk at the
NSA. Because they’re published
00:44:18.530 --> 00:44:22.660
in the Washington Post. So I encourage you
to go read what the NSA thought of my talk
00:44:22.660 --> 00:44:28.440
to them. That same year I ended up going
to GCHQ, to give a talk to them, to try
00:44:28.440 --> 00:44:31.799
to convince them that we were not the
bad people. And I thought to myself:
00:44:31.799 --> 00:44:35.230
“I don’t want to give them anything
useful. I don’t want to talk about
00:44:35.230 --> 00:44:39.599
anonymity, because I know they’re going
to try to break anonymity. So I’m going
00:44:39.599 --> 00:44:43.270
to give them a talk that has nothing to do
with anything that they should care about.
00:44:43.270 --> 00:44:48.359
I’m going to talk about the censorship
arms race in China, and DPI, and stuff
00:44:48.359 --> 00:44:53.509
like that, that they shouldn’t care
about at all”. Boy, were we wrong!
00:44:53.509 --> 00:44:59.420
applause
00:44:59.420 --> 00:45:03.389
So the other thing to think about here,
there are a bunch of different pluggable
00:45:03.389 --> 00:45:08.300
transports that could come in handy
against the surveillance adversary.
00:45:08.300 --> 00:45:12.380
We have, so far, been thinking of
pluggable transports in terms of
00:45:12.380 --> 00:45:16.140
‘there’s somebody trying to censor your
connection, they’re doing DPI, or they’re
00:45:16.140 --> 00:45:20.590
looking for addresses, and they’re trying
to block things’. One of the things
00:45:20.590 --> 00:45:24.680
we learned from this past summer’s
documents: imagine an adversary
00:45:24.680 --> 00:45:29.140
who builds a list of all the public Tor
relays. And then they build a list of
00:45:29.140 --> 00:45:33.059
all of the IP addresses that connect
to those Tor relays. Now they know
00:45:33.059 --> 00:45:36.421
all the bridges, and many of the users.
And now they build a list of all the
00:45:36.421 --> 00:45:41.400
IP addresses that connect to those IP
addresses. And they go a few hops out,
00:45:41.400 --> 00:45:46.610
and now they know all the public relays,
all the bridges, all the users, all of
00:45:46.610 --> 00:45:50.079
the other things that are connected to
Tor. And they can keep track of which ones
00:45:50.079 --> 00:45:55.849
they should log traffic for, for the next
6 months, rather than the next week.
00:45:55.849 --> 00:46:00.599
That’s a really scary adversary. Some of
the pluggable transports we’ve been
00:46:00.599 --> 00:46:06.009
working on could actually come in handy
here. So ‘Flash proxy’ is one of the ones
00:46:06.009 --> 00:46:10.709
you heard about in last year’s talk. The
basic idea of a Flash proxy is to get
00:46:10.709 --> 00:46:16.940
users running web browsers to volunteer
running web-RTC, or something like that
00:46:16.940 --> 00:46:22.150
to basically be a short-lived bridge
between the censored user and
00:46:22.150 --> 00:46:26.979
the Tor Network. So the idea is that you
get millions of people running browsers,
00:46:26.979 --> 00:46:31.450
and then you can proxy from inside China,
or Syria, or America, or wherever
00:46:31.450 --> 00:46:36.650
the problem is, through the browser into
the Tor Network. But from the surveillance
00:46:36.650 --> 00:46:42.170
perspective suddenly they end up with
an enormous list of millions of people
00:46:42.170 --> 00:46:46.209
around the world that are
basically buffering the Tor user
00:46:46.209 --> 00:46:50.089
from the Tor Network. So if they
start with this list of IP addresses,
00:46:50.089 --> 00:46:52.710
and they’re trying to build a list of
everything, now they end up
00:46:52.710 --> 00:46:56.210
with millions of IP addresses
that have nothing to do with Tor.
00:46:56.210 --> 00:46:59.640
And they have to realize, at the time
they’re watching, that they want to go
00:46:59.640 --> 00:47:03.769
one more hop out. So I don’t
know if that will work. But this is
00:47:03.769 --> 00:47:08.680
an interesting research area that more
people need to look at: How can we,
00:47:08.680 --> 00:47:12.880
against an adversary who’s trying to build
a list of everybody who has anything to do
00:47:12.880 --> 00:47:17.749
with Tor, how can we have
Tor users not end up on that list.
00:47:17.749 --> 00:47:22.729
What sort of transports or tunneling
through Google app spot (?),
00:47:22.729 --> 00:47:27.440
or other tools like that can we use
to break that chain, so it’s not as easy
00:47:27.440 --> 00:47:32.709
for them to track down
where all the users are.
00:47:32.709 --> 00:47:36.500
Okay, Silk Road 2, we’ve had a lot
of questions about. I think it’s called
00:47:36.500 --> 00:47:41.099
Operation Onimous (?). I actually talked
to an American law enforcement person
00:47:41.099 --> 00:47:46.250
who was involved in this. And he
told me, from his perspective, exactly
00:47:46.250 --> 00:47:50.720
how it happened. Apparently the
Silk Road 2 guy wrote his name down
00:47:50.720 --> 00:47:54.979
somewhere. So they brought him in,
and started asking him questions. And
00:47:54.979 --> 00:47:58.760
as soon as they started asking him
questions he started naming names.
00:47:58.760 --> 00:48:02.479
And they counted up to 16 names, and
they went and arrested all those people,
00:48:02.479 --> 00:48:05.730
and collected their computers. And then
they put out a press release, saying
00:48:05.730 --> 00:48:10.140
that they had an amazing Tor attack.
00:48:10.140 --> 00:48:13.019
applause
00:48:13.019 --> 00:48:18.069
So there are a couple of lessons here. One
of them is: Yes, it’s another case where
00:48:18.069 --> 00:48:25.250
opsec failed. But the other lesson that
we learn is: These large law enforcement
00:48:25.250 --> 00:48:32.729
adversaries are happy to use press spin
and lies, and whatever else it takes
00:48:32.729 --> 00:48:36.779
to try to scare people away from
having safety on the internet.
00:48:36.779 --> 00:48:40.390
Jacob: This is a really… to me,
especially, if I take off my Tor hat
00:48:40.390 --> 00:48:44.820
and put on my journalistic hat, as if
I can actually take off hats etc., but
00:48:44.820 --> 00:48:49.019
it’s really terrifying that journalists
don’t actually ask hard questions
00:48:49.019 --> 00:48:54.950
about that. You know, the Europol people
that spoke to the press, they talked
00:48:54.950 --> 00:48:59.119
about this as if they had some incredible
attack, they talked about 0-day,
00:48:59.119 --> 00:49:02.999
they talked about how, you know,
they had broken Tor, “You’re not safe
00:49:02.999 --> 00:49:05.750
on the Dark Web”. We don’t even use the
term ‘Dark Web’. That’s how you know
00:49:05.750 --> 00:49:13.509
that they’re full of shit. But it’s…
applause
00:49:13.509 --> 00:49:18.480
That’s sort of like when people have Tor
in all caps (?)(?)(?)(?)(?)(?), dark web,
00:49:18.480 --> 00:49:22.809
that kind of stuff, this is a bad sign. But
the way they talk about it, it was clear
00:49:22.809 --> 00:49:27.230
that they, as far as we can tell, they
don’t have that. But they really hyped it.
00:49:27.230 --> 00:49:32.529
As much as they possibly could. I mean,
it is, effectively, and I think it is even
00:49:32.529 --> 00:49:36.970
technically a psychological operation
against the civilian population. They
00:49:36.970 --> 00:49:41.589
want to scare you into believing that Tor
doesn’t work. Because, in fact, it does work,
00:49:41.589 --> 00:49:45.999
and it is a problem for them. So any time
they can ever have some kind of win-it-all
00:49:45.999 --> 00:49:49.489
they always spin it as if they’re great,
powerful adversaries, and it’s
00:49:49.489 --> 00:49:54.189
us-versus-them. And that’s exactly wrong.
It is not us-versus-them. Because we all
00:49:54.189 --> 00:49:57.900
need anonymity. We all absolutely need
that. And they shouldn’t be treating us
00:49:57.900 --> 00:50:02.819
as adversaries. They, in fact, are also
Tor users, quite ironically. So it is
00:50:02.819 --> 00:50:06.150
interesting though, because they know that
they haven’t done that. But they don’t
00:50:06.150 --> 00:50:09.059
want you to know that they haven’t done
that. In fact, they want you to know
00:50:09.059 --> 00:50:11.529
the opposite. Of course we could be
wrong. They could have some
00:50:11.529 --> 00:50:17.989
super-secret exploit, but as far as we can
tell that just is not the case. So, what’s
00:50:17.989 --> 00:50:20.920
to be learned from this? We used to think
it was just American law enforcement
00:50:20.920 --> 00:50:24.709
that were scary jerks. Now it’s also
European. I don’t know if that’s
00:50:24.709 --> 00:50:28.670
the right buzzing(?). But hopefully some
of you will go and work at Europol,
00:50:28.670 --> 00:50:31.929
and tell us what’s really going on.
00:50:31.929 --> 00:50:37.739
applause
00:50:37.739 --> 00:50:42.799
Roger: Speaking of Hidden Services. We
have a new design in mind, that will have
00:50:42.799 --> 00:50:47.839
some stronger crypto properties, and make
it harder to enumerate Hidden Services.
00:50:47.839 --> 00:50:52.059
It won’t solve some of the big anonymity
questions that are still open research
00:50:52.059 --> 00:50:55.640
questions. But there are a lot of
improvements we’d like to make,
00:50:55.640 --> 00:50:59.789
to make the crypto more secure, and
performance changes etc. And we’d been
00:50:59.789 --> 00:51:04.529
thinking about doing some sort of crowd
funding, kickstarter-like thing, to make
00:51:04.529 --> 00:51:08.630
Hidden Services work better. We’ve got
a funder who cares about understanding
00:51:08.630 --> 00:51:12.790
Hidden Services, but that’s not the same
as actually making them more secure.
00:51:12.790 --> 00:51:17.329
So we’d love to chat with you after this
about how to make one of those
00:51:17.329 --> 00:51:19.839
kickstarters actually work.
00:51:19.839 --> 00:51:25.529
Jacob: Right, so, if you have questions
we have some amount of time for questions.
00:51:25.529 --> 00:51:28.489
And while you line up at the microphone
I’ll tell you a quick story. So if you
00:51:28.489 --> 00:51:31.120
have questions please line up at the
microphone, so we can do this.
00:51:31.120 --> 00:51:34.010
This is a picture of a man who was
assassinated in San Francisco.
00:51:34.010 --> 00:51:36.509
His name is Harvey Milk. Anybody
here – ever hear of Harvey Milk?
00:51:36.509 --> 00:51:38.809
applause
00:51:38.809 --> 00:51:43.319
Great. Harvey Milk was basically the
first out-gay politician in, I think,
00:51:43.319 --> 00:51:47.569
the United States. He was a city council
member in San Francisco. And this was
00:51:47.569 --> 00:51:52.059
during a huge fever pitch apora (?) where…
basically it was the battle between:
00:51:52.059 --> 00:51:56.999
“Are people who are gay people or not?”
And what he said is: Go home and
00:51:56.999 --> 00:52:00.190
tell your brothers, your mothers, your
sisters, your family members and
00:52:00.190 --> 00:52:03.890
your co-workers that you’re gay. Tell
them that, so that when they advocate
00:52:03.890 --> 00:52:08.549
for violence against gay people, when
they advocate for harm against you
00:52:08.549 --> 00:52:13.609
that they know they’re talking about you.
Not an abstract boogieman. But someone
00:52:13.609 --> 00:52:18.790
that they actually know, and that they
love. We need every person in this room,
00:52:18.790 --> 00:52:22.699
every person watching this video later to
go home and talk about how you needed
00:52:22.699 --> 00:52:26.749
anonymity, for 5 or 10 minutes. How you
needed it every day to do your job.
00:52:26.749 --> 00:52:30.949
We need people to reach out. Now that’s
a sad story with Harvey Milk which is
00:52:30.949 --> 00:52:33.760
that he and mayor Moscone of San
Francisco were actually killed by
00:52:33.760 --> 00:52:38.539
a very crazy person, that was also in city
government, in the American traditional
00:52:38.539 --> 00:52:43.549
extreme gun violence. He was shot and
killed. And that person actually got away
00:52:43.549 --> 00:52:48.049
with it. The so-called ‘Twinkie defense’.
So we’re not trying to draw that parallel.
00:52:48.049 --> 00:52:53.220
Just to be clear please don’t shoot us and
kill us! Not even funny, unfortunately.
00:52:53.220 --> 00:52:57.890
But to understand that we are really
under threat, a lot of pressure. There’s
00:52:57.890 --> 00:53:02.410
a lot of pressure. We get pressure from
law enforcement investigation agencies
00:53:02.410 --> 00:53:08.239
to backdoor Tor, and we tell them:
“No”, and that takes a lot of stress
00:53:08.239 --> 00:53:12.079
and dumps it on us. And we need support
from a lot of people, to tell them
00:53:12.079 --> 00:53:16.459
to back off. It can’t just be us that
say that. Or we will lose some day.
00:53:16.459 --> 00:53:20.499
And there are also very scary adversaries
that do not care at all about the law.
00:53:20.499 --> 00:53:25.000
Not that those guys care about the law but
really don’t care about the law at all.
00:53:25.000 --> 00:53:29.430
And we need people to understand how
important anonymity is, and make sure
00:53:29.430 --> 00:53:35.040
that that goes into every conversation.
So really, go home and teach your friends
00:53:35.040 --> 00:53:38.489
and your family members about your
need for anonymity. This lesson
00:53:38.489 --> 00:53:42.299
from Harvey Milk was very useful. It is
the case that now, in California where
00:53:42.299 --> 00:53:46.180
there is a huge fever pitch (?) battle about
this that you can e.g. be gay and be
00:53:46.180 --> 00:53:50.760
a school teacher. That was one of the
battles that Harvey Milk helped win.
00:53:50.760 --> 00:53:58.759
applause
00:53:58.759 --> 00:54:02.520
So, with that I think
that we have time for…
00:54:02.520 --> 00:54:06.200
Herald: Yeah, we have like 10 minutes left
for questions. So, thank you so much
00:54:06.200 --> 00:54:09.689
for the talk! It’s really inspiring.
Thank you for keeping up the work!
00:54:09.689 --> 00:54:17.259
applause
00:54:17.259 --> 00:54:20.233
Really! Although you do this every year
it never gets old. And I think your…
00:54:20.233 --> 00:54:24.119
every year you give people the chance to
leave the Congress with a feeling of hope
00:54:24.119 --> 00:54:26.869
and purpose. So, thank you so much for
everything you do and every minute
00:54:26.869 --> 00:54:30.489
you spend on this project. So we start
with a question from the internet.
00:54:30.489 --> 00:54:32.339
applause
00:54:32.339 --> 00:54:34.739
Jacob: We’d like to take a few questions
from the internet all at once,
00:54:34.739 --> 00:54:36.889
if possible, so we can try to answer
them as quickly as possible.
00:54:36.889 --> 00:54:38.469
Signal Angel: Okay.
Herald: Alright.
00:54:38.469 --> 00:54:41.569
Signal Angel: So, the first one: Yesterday
you said that SSH is broken. So
00:54:41.569 --> 00:54:45.719
what should we use to safely
administrate our Tor relays?
00:54:45.719 --> 00:54:49.950
Jacob: Hah! That’s great. So,
first of all! Next set of questions!
00:54:49.950 --> 00:54:53.259
Signal Angel: So the next one is: How much
money would be needed to get independent
00:54:53.259 --> 00:54:56.170
from Government funding,
and is that even desired?
00:54:56.170 --> 00:54:59.229
Jacob: Ah, do you want me to do both?
Roger: Sure.
00:54:59.229 --> 00:55:00.529
Jacob: Okay.
Signal Angel: Hope so.
00:55:00.529 --> 00:55:05.579
Jacob: Okay. First question: Consider
using a Tor Hidden Service, and then
00:55:05.579 --> 00:55:09.079
SSH’ing into that Tor Hidden Service.
Composition of cryptographic components
00:55:09.079 --> 00:55:15.680
is probably very important. A detail about
SSH: We don’t know what is going on.
00:55:15.680 --> 00:55:19.299
We only know what was claimed in those
documents. That’s a really scary claim.
00:55:19.299 --> 00:55:24.170
This creates a political problem. The U.S.
Congress and other political bodies
00:55:24.170 --> 00:55:27.680
should really be asking the secret
services if they really have a database
00:55:27.680 --> 00:55:31.160
called CAPRI OS where they store
SSH decrypts. And how they populate
00:55:31.160 --> 00:55:35.209
that database. Because that is critical
infrastructure. We can’t solve that problem
00:55:35.209 --> 00:55:39.259
with the knowledge that we have right now.
But we know now: There is a problem.
00:55:39.259 --> 00:55:42.520
What is that problem? So, composition
of those systems: It seems to be,
00:55:42.520 --> 00:55:45.899
the documents say that they haven’t broken
the crypto in Tor Hidden Services. So
00:55:45.899 --> 00:55:51.499
put those two together. And also consider
that cryptography only buys you time.
00:55:51.499 --> 00:55:55.640
It really isn’t the case that all the
crypto we have today is going to be good
00:55:55.640 --> 00:55:59.579
maybe in 150 years. If Sci-Fi quantum
computers ever come out, and they
00:55:59.579 --> 00:56:03.119
actually work, Shor’s algorithm and
other things really seem to suggest
00:56:03.119 --> 00:56:07.160
we have a lot of trouble ahead. And the
second part, about money: Yeah, we would
00:56:07.160 --> 00:56:10.999
love to replace Government funding. I mean
at least I would. But that isn’t to say
00:56:10.999 --> 00:56:14.549
that we don’t respect that there are
people that do fund us to do good things.
00:56:14.549 --> 00:56:20.099
We do take money from agencies who e.g.
the Department of Human Rights and Labor,
00:56:20.099 --> 00:56:22.470
at the State Department. They’re sort of
like the advertising arm for the
00:56:22.470 --> 00:56:26.519
gun-running part of the State Department,
as Julian Assange would say. And they
00:56:26.519 --> 00:56:30.029
actually care about Human Rights. They
care that you have access to anonymity.
00:56:30.029 --> 00:56:35.039
It’s weird because the State Department
– the rest of it – might not care. But,
00:56:35.039 --> 00:56:38.670
we really, really would like to off-set
that money. But we’d like to grow.
00:56:38.670 --> 00:56:42.959
We’d like to be able to hire 100 people
in this room to work on this full-time.
00:56:42.959 --> 00:56:47.999
Because the planet needs anonymity. But
that requires that we find that money.
00:56:47.999 --> 00:56:52.219
And the best place at the moment is by
writing grant proposals. And that is how
00:56:52.219 --> 00:56:55.539
we have in fact done that. And that
allows us also to operate openly.
00:56:55.539 --> 00:56:59.599
So we don’t have e.g. clearances. And we
try to publish everything we can about it.
00:56:59.599 --> 00:57:03.539
And if you ever write a FOIA we always
tell the agency that has received the
00:57:03.539 --> 00:57:09.480
Freedom Of Information request: Give the
requestor everything. Give it all to them.
00:57:09.480 --> 00:57:13.280
We have nothing to hide about this, we
want you to see that. We want you to see
00:57:13.280 --> 00:57:17.059
that when a government agency has paid
us money that we have done it for THIS
00:57:17.059 --> 00:57:20.700
line item, and THIS line item. And we’ve
done it as well as we could do it, and
00:57:20.700 --> 00:57:24.420
it is in line with the open research, and
we have really done a good thing,
00:57:24.420 --> 00:57:26.250
that helps people.
00:57:26.250 --> 00:57:30.979
Roger: So I’d love to diversify our
funding. I’d love to have foundations,
00:57:30.979 --> 00:57:37.929
I’d love to have the EFF model where
individuals fund because we do great things
00:57:37.929 --> 00:57:42.839
– look at what we did over the past year –
and in fact, right here: Look at what we
00:57:42.839 --> 00:57:46.660
did over the past year. We’ve done so
amazing things, we’re gonna do some more
00:57:46.660 --> 00:57:50.849
amazing things next year. We need your
help to actually make all of this happen.
00:57:50.849 --> 00:57:55.229
Jacob: Anybody here
a Bitcoin millionaire?
00:57:55.229 --> 00:57:57.340
Because we now take Bitcoin!
00:57:57.340 --> 00:58:02.630
applause
00:58:02.630 --> 00:58:05.260
Herald: Alright, let’s take
a question from microphone 1.
00:58:05.260 --> 00:58:09.180
Question: Just a short question:
is there a follow-up on the
00:58:09.180 --> 00:58:14.539
Thomas White tor-talk mailing list thing?
00:58:14.539 --> 00:58:18.579
Roger: So, Thomas White runs a few exit
relays. Some of them are quite large,
00:58:18.579 --> 00:58:24.519
I’m very happy he does that. It is quite
normal for exit relays to come and go.
00:58:24.519 --> 00:58:29.470
He is in England, and as far as I can tell
England is not a very good place to be
00:58:29.470 --> 00:58:36.249
these days. But he’s trying to fix his
country from inside which is really great.
00:58:36.249 --> 00:58:40.920
Basically the short version is: It’s not
a big deal. He runs some exit relays,
00:58:40.920 --> 00:58:45.160
somebody tries to take them down, there
are 6000 relays in the network right now,
00:58:45.160 --> 00:58:48.609
they go up and down, it’s normal.
00:58:48.609 --> 00:58:52.630
Question: Is this related to the Tor
blog post, that Thomas White thing,
00:58:52.630 --> 00:58:55.380
where you said there’s an upcoming…
00:58:55.380 --> 00:58:59.630
Roger: It is unrelated, except for the
fact that everybody was watching.
00:58:59.630 --> 00:59:03.130
So then, when he wrote a tor-talk mail
saying “Hey, I’m concerned about my
00:59:03.130 --> 00:59:06.760
exit relays”, suddenly all the journalists
said: “Oh my god, they must be
00:59:06.760 --> 00:59:09.069
the same thing!” So, no, unrelated!
00:59:09.069 --> 00:59:11.180
Jacob: There are a lot of people that
have been attacking the Tor network.
00:59:11.180 --> 00:59:13.940
You’ve probably seen there’ve been
Denial-of-Service attacks, and things
00:59:13.940 --> 00:59:18.029
like that on the Tor directory
authorities. This is what I was saying
00:59:18.029 --> 00:59:22.319
one or two slides ago when I said “Please
tell people the value of Tor, and that
00:59:22.319 --> 00:59:26.789
you need it”. Because when people do
Denial-of-Service attacks, when they see
00:59:26.789 --> 00:59:30.709
servers, we really need, in a peer2peer
network way, to draw up more relays
00:59:30.709 --> 00:59:34.449
to actually increase the bandwidth
capacity, to increase the exit capacity.
00:59:34.449 --> 00:59:38.609
And it’s very important to do that. Right?
I mean it’s very, very serious that
00:59:38.609 --> 00:59:41.670
those things happen. But it’s also
important that the design of the network
00:59:41.670 --> 00:59:45.099
is designed with the expectation that
thieves will steal computer systems,
00:59:45.099 --> 00:59:50.749
that jerks will denial-of-service them
etc. So if you can run an exit relay,
00:59:50.749 --> 00:59:53.789
thank you! Thank you for doing that.
Next question?
00:59:53.789 --> 00:59:55.869
applause
Herald: Yeah. Let’s take a question
00:59:55.869 --> 00:59:56.890
from microphone 2.
00:59:56.890 --> 01:00:00.979
Question: First of all a quick shoutout to
your Ooni friend. Please don’t ask people
01:00:00.979 --> 01:00:06.299
to run arbitrary code over the internet.
Curl-piper’s age (?) is not good style.
01:00:06.299 --> 01:00:09.829
Roger: There’s a deb (?) that we’re working
on also that should be a lot better.
01:00:09.829 --> 01:00:13.000
Jacob: Yeah, ‘apt-get install ooniprobe’
will also work.
01:00:13.000 --> 01:00:18.510
Question: Do you have any plans
of implementing IPv6, finally?
01:00:18.510 --> 01:00:24.839
Jacob: So there is IPv6, so Linus
Nordberg, one of the finest Tor people
01:00:24.839 --> 01:00:32.029
I’ve ever met, he, in fact, helped add
IPv6 support, initial IPv6 support
01:00:32.029 --> 01:00:36.809
to the Tor network. So, e.g. you can,
in fact, exit through the Tor network
01:00:36.809 --> 01:00:42.660
with IPv4 or IPv6. It is the case that the
Tor relays in the network still all need
01:00:42.660 --> 01:00:48.559
IPv4, not just IPv6. My Tor directory
authority which runs in California,
01:00:48.559 --> 01:00:52.619
it has an IPv4 and an IPv6 address,
so if you have an IPv6 address you can
01:00:52.619 --> 01:00:55.799
bootstrap, you can connect to that.
You could do some interesting
01:00:55.799 --> 01:00:59.469
pluggable-transport stuff as well. So
that is on the road map. This is another
01:00:59.469 --> 01:01:03.460
example of: If you really care about that
issue please send us your Bitcoins!
01:01:03.460 --> 01:01:07.619
And it would be really fantastic because
we really want that! But right now,
01:01:07.619 --> 01:01:12.640
you can use Tor as a v4-v6 gateway.
You really can do that, and we would
01:01:12.640 --> 01:01:15.980
encourage that. It’s another example
of some kind of neat feature of Tor
01:01:15.980 --> 01:01:18.289
which you would never think an
anonymity system would have.
01:01:18.289 --> 01:01:23.079
Roger: And in Iran, right now, where IPv6
is not censored because the soft…
01:01:23.079 --> 01:01:26.931
the censorship stuff they have from
America and Europe didn’t think
01:01:26.931 --> 01:01:30.779
to censor IPv6…
laughter and applause
01:01:30.779 --> 01:01:34.989
applause
01:01:34.989 --> 01:01:41.079
so you can use a bridge right now in Iran
that connects over IPv6. Works great.
01:01:41.079 --> 01:01:43.769
Jacob: Yeah. Next question?
Herald: Alright, microphone 4!
01:01:43.769 --> 01:01:46.869
Question: So we heard lots of really
encouraging success stories about Tor
01:01:46.869 --> 01:01:50.890
working against a global passive
adversary. But we know that Tor
01:01:50.890 --> 01:01:54.819
wasn’t designed for this use case.
The question is: What needs to happen
01:01:54.819 --> 01:01:59.099
in order for Tor to actually being
able to handle this, officially?
01:01:59.099 --> 01:02:01.890
Is this just research, or some
more development work?
01:02:01.890 --> 01:02:06.779
Roger: There’s a lot of really hard open
research questions there. So if you’re…
01:02:06.779 --> 01:02:10.890
so, I get… basically one of the
issues is what we call the
01:02:10.890 --> 01:02:15.190
end-to-end traffic correlation attack. So
if you can see the flow over here coming
01:02:15.190 --> 01:02:18.699
into the Tor network, and you can see the
corresponding flow over here, coming out
01:02:18.699 --> 01:02:23.020
of it, then you do some simple statistics,
and you say: “Hey, wait a minute, these
01:02:23.020 --> 01:02:27.359
line up!” And there are a bunch of
different directions on how to make that
01:02:27.359 --> 01:02:32.680
harder. Basically what you want to
do is drive up the false-positive rate.
01:02:32.680 --> 01:02:37.660
So you see a flow here, and there are
actually 1000 flows that look like they
01:02:37.660 --> 01:02:41.779
sort of match. And maybe you can do
that by adding a little bit of padding,
01:02:41.779 --> 01:02:46.619
or delays, or batching or something. The
research, as we understand it right now,
01:02:46.619 --> 01:02:51.049
means that you have to add hours
of delay, not seconds of delay.
01:02:51.049 --> 01:02:56.739
That’s kind of crummy. So another way
of phrasing that: Imagine a graph,
01:02:56.739 --> 01:03:02.670
the X axis is how much overhead
we’re adding. And the Y axis is
01:03:02.670 --> 01:03:06.739
how much security we get against the
end-to-end correlation attack. We have
01:03:06.739 --> 01:03:13.049
zero data points on that graph. We have
no idea what the curve looks like.
01:03:13.049 --> 01:03:16.249
Jacob: There’s also another point which
is: Roger has an assumption. He says
01:03:16.249 --> 01:03:20.809
if we have a high false-positive rate,
that that’s a good thing. Well, maybe,
01:03:20.809 --> 01:03:23.440
maybe actually, that’s exactly the
wrong thing. Maybe the result is
01:03:23.440 --> 01:03:27.630
that 1000 people get rounded up instead
of 1. The reality is that there is
01:03:27.630 --> 01:03:31.030
no system that – as far as we know –
is actually safer than that. Of course
01:03:31.030 --> 01:03:34.300
we would say that, we work on Tor. But as
an example: One of the XKeyscore things
01:03:34.300 --> 01:03:37.890
that I’ve seen in this research which
we published in the NDR story is that
01:03:37.890 --> 01:03:41.180
they were doing an attack on Hotspot Shield
where they were actually doing
01:03:41.180 --> 01:03:45.299
traffic correlation where they were able
to de-anonymize VPN users because of
01:03:45.299 --> 01:03:49.190
it’s a single hop. And then they were
also able to do Quantuminsert to attack
01:03:49.190 --> 01:03:54.390
specific users using the VPN. We haven’t
seen evidence of them doing that to Tor.
01:03:54.390 --> 01:03:57.680
That also doesn’t mean that every VPN
is broken. It just means that VPN
01:03:57.680 --> 01:04:00.729
has a different threat model. There’s
lot of attacks that are like that, and
01:04:00.729 --> 01:04:05.400
the problem is the internet is a dangerous
place. So, I mean, Banksy said it best:
01:04:05.400 --> 01:04:09.229
He said, in the future people will be
anonymous for 15 minutes. And
01:04:09.229 --> 01:04:13.249
I think he may have over-estimated
that. Depending on the attacker.
01:04:13.249 --> 01:04:17.209
Roger: There’s a conference called the
Privacy Enhancing Technology Symposium,
01:04:17.209 --> 01:04:21.390
petsymposium.org where all of the
Anonymous Communications researchers
01:04:21.390 --> 01:04:26.619
get together each year to consider exactly
these sorts of research questions. So,
01:04:26.619 --> 01:04:30.359
it’s not just an engineering question,
there’s a lot of basic science left
01:04:30.359 --> 01:04:33.199
in terms of how to make
these things harder.
01:04:33.199 --> 01:04:35.219
Herald: Alright, the last question
is one from the internet.
01:04:35.219 --> 01:04:40.259
Signal Angel: Okay, so, does running
a Ooniprobe involve any legal risks?
01:04:40.259 --> 01:04:43.249
Jacob: Okay, so, great! We can take
different questions, cause we’re gonna say
01:04:43.249 --> 01:04:44.519
“Talk to Arturo!”
01:04:44.519 --> 01:04:46.899
Herald: Alright, so, microphone 3!
01:04:46.899 --> 01:04:51.549
Question: Okay, as a new
Tor relay operator I’ve got…
01:04:51.549 --> 01:04:57.829
applause
Jacob: Take a bow!
01:04:57.829 --> 01:05:04.209
Question: So, since about 2 months I run
3 relays, rather high bandwidth, and
01:05:04.209 --> 01:05:10.380
on 2 of these I had quite strange things
happen. One case: A kernel crash in the
01:05:10.380 --> 01:05:16.640
Intel e1000 driver, the other one having
the top-of-the-rack switch just reboot,
01:05:16.640 --> 01:05:22.199
which is by the way a Juniper switch.
So I’m kind of concerned about this
01:05:22.199 --> 01:05:26.390
operational security. You
know, could you trust that?
01:05:26.390 --> 01:05:31.779
Jacob: Yeah, absolutely. So the short
version of it is: Agencies like the NSA,
01:05:31.779 --> 01:05:34.920
depending on where you’re located, might
compromise something like your Juniper
01:05:34.920 --> 01:05:38.859
switch upstream. They sit on Zerodays
for critical infrastructure, that includes
01:05:38.859 --> 01:05:44.740
core routers, and switches. But
it may not be such a big thing.
01:05:44.740 --> 01:05:49.670
It really depends on where you’re located.
It could also be that the hardware sucks.
01:05:49.670 --> 01:05:52.790
laughter
And that the software is not good. And
01:05:52.790 --> 01:05:56.839
when you, of course, are pushing,
let’s say gigabits of traffic through it
01:05:56.839 --> 01:06:01.789
it falls over. It’s really hard to know.
That’s a really good question,
01:06:01.789 --> 01:06:07.080
which is very specific, and kind of
hard for us to address without data.
01:06:07.080 --> 01:06:13.070
Question: Sorry, I’m concerned that the
attack, like this, you know, they could,
01:06:13.070 --> 01:06:17.939
actually, compromise the machine without
knowing, or compromise the exact uplink.
01:06:17.939 --> 01:06:21.650
And this would actually be a viable
attack, like very low-key,
01:06:21.650 --> 01:06:24.489
you don’t see it, as [an] operator,
maybe, if you’re not very careful.
01:06:24.489 --> 01:06:28.079
And you can watch all the traffic
going inside, going outside the box.
01:06:28.079 --> 01:06:32.769
Jacob: It would be fantastic
if you can prove that theory.
01:06:32.769 --> 01:06:36.959
Because, of course, if you can, maybe we
can find other information that allows us
01:06:36.959 --> 01:06:41.019
to stop those types of things to
happen, or e.g. can in some way
01:06:41.019 --> 01:06:45.660
allow us to fix the problems that are
being exploited. The reality is that
01:06:45.660 --> 01:06:48.630
general purpose computers
are quite frankly not very secure,
01:06:48.630 --> 01:06:51.759
and special purpose computers
aren’t doing much better.
01:06:51.759 --> 01:06:55.140
Roger: I worry not only about active
attacks like that but about passive attacks
01:06:55.140 --> 01:06:59.269
where they already have some sort of
surveillance device up-stream from you
01:06:59.269 --> 01:07:03.939
in you co-location facility, or something
like that. So, yes. These are all
01:07:03.939 --> 01:07:09.859
really big concerns. One of the defenses
that Tor has is diversity around the world.
01:07:09.859 --> 01:07:14.199
So, hopefully they won’t be able to do
that to all of the relays. But yeah,
01:07:14.199 --> 01:07:16.769
this is a big issue. We should
keep talking about it.
01:07:16.769 --> 01:07:20.589
Herald: Alright, I just wanna come back
to the question before, for a second.
01:07:20.589 --> 01:07:22.719
Because there was a question from the
internet. So the people are not able
01:07:22.719 --> 01:07:27.949
to talk. Ooniprobe guy, hey, could you
maybe answer the question, like,
01:07:27.949 --> 01:07:30.640
right now, or maybe on Twitter,
or post a link or something?
01:07:30.640 --> 01:07:33.390
Because I happen to believe that
it’s a very important question.
01:07:33.390 --> 01:07:35.640
You remember the question?
If there are legal restric…
01:07:35.640 --> 01:07:40.809
Arturo: Yeah well, I mean the thing is
that we don’t really know like what are
01:07:40.809 --> 01:07:43.049
the… who was it that
was asking the question?
01:07:43.049 --> 01:07:46.049
Jacob: The internet?
Arturo: Ah, the internet. Okay.
01:07:46.049 --> 01:07:51.099
laughter and applause
Jacob laughs
01:07:51.099 --> 01:07:58.660
So I guess we can’t know all of the
legal risks involved in every country.
01:07:58.660 --> 01:08:02.609
It is definitely the case that in some
countries you may get in trouble
01:08:02.609 --> 01:08:11.039
for visiting some websites that are
considered illegal. So, I can go
01:08:11.039 --> 01:08:16.189
in more detail into this if you
come later to Noisy Square at 6.
01:08:16.189 --> 01:08:17.670
Herald: The internet can’t
come, that’s the problem!
01:08:17.670 --> 01:08:20.240
Arturo: Ah, the internet can’t come, shit!
Okay! laughter
01:08:20.240 --> 01:08:26.790
So,… laughs
applause
01:08:26.790 --> 01:08:29.440
Jacob: There’re a lot of jokes in that!
01:08:29.440 --> 01:08:33.770
Arturo: The short answer is that you
should look at the test specifications,
01:08:33.770 --> 01:08:38.920
that are written in English, and they have
at the bottom some notes that detail
01:08:38.920 --> 01:08:46.190
what can be some of the risks involved.
But we are not lawyers. So we don’t know
01:08:46.190 --> 01:08:50.939
what are the risks for all of the
countries. So you should probably speak
01:08:50.939 --> 01:08:56.399
to somebody that knows about these things
in your country. And it’s experimental
01:08:56.399 --> 01:09:03.069
software, and there are not many people
that are doing this. So we generally can’t
01:09:03.069 --> 01:09:08.209
say. Hope that answers your question.
Question: Thanks a lot, yeah, thanks.
01:09:08.209 --> 01:09:11.420
Herald: Alright, I guess, just to sum
it up: Be careful whatever you do.
01:09:11.420 --> 01:09:15.719
laughter and applause
Alright, so, Jake was just asking
01:09:15.719 --> 01:09:19.740
if maybe we could just gather a couple
of questions, and then ask about them
01:09:19.740 --> 01:09:21.730
outside. Did I get that right?
Jacob: Yeah, so if everyone who is
01:09:21.730 --> 01:09:25.459
at a microphone, disperse to the correct
microphone, if you could just ask all your
01:09:25.459 --> 01:09:29.080
questions, then everyone else who’s here
that wants to hear the answers will know
01:09:29.080 --> 01:09:32.040
that you should stick around and talk
to us afterwards. We won’t answer
01:09:32.040 --> 01:09:34.660
all these questions unless there’s
a really burning one. But that way
01:09:34.660 --> 01:09:37.000
the guys that are standing at the
microphone, or the gals that are
01:09:37.000 --> 01:09:40.470
standing at the microphone or other, can
actually ask them right now, and if you’re
01:09:40.470 --> 01:09:43.399
interested come and find us right
afterwards. We’re going to probably
01:09:43.399 --> 01:09:46.880
go to the tea house upstairs, or
maybe I shouldn’t have said that.
01:09:46.880 --> 01:09:49.089
laughter
Herald: Alright, so we’re gonna do it
01:09:49.089 --> 01:09:51.449
like this. We’re gonna rush through this.
And we’re just gonna hear a lot of
01:09:51.449 --> 01:09:55.920
interesting questions, but no answers. If
you wanna hear the answers stay tuned
01:09:55.920 --> 01:10:00.090
and don’t switch the channel. So we take
a couple of questions. Microphone 5.
01:10:00.090 --> 01:10:03.600
And be quick about it.
Question: In regards to robustness and
01:10:03.600 --> 01:10:07.190
the Mozilla partnership: Are there any
thoughts about incrementally replacing
01:10:07.190 --> 01:10:10.540
the C++ infrastructure
with Rust? Eventually?
01:10:10.540 --> 01:10:14.680
Herald: Microphone 4!
Is it open, microphone 4?
01:10:14.680 --> 01:10:22.980
Question: Can you compare Tor with JAP
from TU Dresden in aspects of anonymity?
01:10:22.980 --> 01:10:25.790
Herald: Okay, the other
guy at microphone 4!
01:10:25.790 --> 01:10:29.740
Question: To your knowledge has anyone got
into trouble for running a non-exit relay?
01:10:29.740 --> 01:10:32.950
And do you have any tips for people that
wanna help by running a non-exit relay?
01:10:32.950 --> 01:10:34.860
Herald: Okay, microphone 1, 2 guys.
01:10:34.860 --> 01:10:39.020
Question: I have a question, or
a suggestion for the funding problematic.
01:10:39.020 --> 01:10:43.660
Have you… you’re teaming up with Mozilla,
have you ever considered like producing
01:10:43.660 --> 01:10:47.960
own smartphones, because there’s a huge
margin. I also think there’s a problem
01:10:47.960 --> 01:10:55.500
like… why most people don’t use
cryptography is because there’s no
01:10:55.500 --> 01:11:01.010
easy-to-use, out-of-the-box, cool product
that’s like… that goes out and has a story
01:11:01.010 --> 01:11:02.810
or anything, like the marketing on Apple.
01:11:02.810 --> 01:11:05.310
Herald: Alright, the other
guy at microphone 1.
01:11:05.310 --> 01:11:09.900
Question: So a couple of minutes before
the talk started someone did a Sibyl (?)
01:11:09.900 --> 01:11:14.110
attack on Tor. And we should fix that
a.s.a.p. So please don’t disappear
01:11:14.110 --> 01:11:17.450
for the next few hours.
Jacob rages, laughing, theatrically
01:11:17.450 --> 01:11:19.030
Thanks!
01:11:19.030 --> 01:11:21.840
Roger: It never ends.
Jacob: It never ends!
01:11:21.840 --> 01:11:24.320
Herald: Alright. Two questions
from microphone 3.
01:11:24.320 --> 01:11:27.870
Question: So when they took
down Silkroad they took
01:11:27.870 --> 01:11:31.670
a lot of Bitcoins with them. I wonder
what the [U.S.] Government is doing
01:11:31.670 --> 01:11:34.690
with the large amount of anonymized cash.
01:11:34.690 --> 01:11:37.220
Roger: They auctioned it off.
Jacob: They sell it. Next question.
01:11:37.220 --> 01:11:39.240
Question: And I think they
should give it to you.
01:11:39.240 --> 01:11:41.810
Herald: Alright. Last question!
Jacob: I fully agree!
01:11:41.810 --> 01:11:45.810
Question: So to combat against the
‘misinformed journalists’ thing
01:11:45.810 --> 01:11:50.550
why not have a dashboard, very
prominently displayed on the Tor Project
01:11:50.550 --> 01:11:54.730
listing all of the academic, open
like known problems with Tor,
01:11:54.730 --> 01:11:58.290
and always have the journalists go there
first to get the source of information,
01:11:58.290 --> 01:12:00.400
rather than misunderstanding
academic research.
01:12:00.400 --> 01:12:02.760
Jacob: Fantastic, so if you wanna know…
01:12:02.760 --> 01:12:04.790
Herald: Alright, if you found any of these
questions interesting, and you’re also
01:12:04.790 --> 01:12:08.940
interested in the answers stick around, go
to Noisy Square, speak to these two guys,
01:12:08.940 --> 01:12:12.100
and get all your answers. Other than
that, you heard it a Brillion times, but:
01:12:12.100 --> 01:12:15.980
go home, start a relay! My friends and I
did two years ago, after Jake’s keynote.
01:12:15.980 --> 01:12:18.760
It’s really not that hard. You can make
a difference. And thank you so much,
01:12:18.760 --> 01:12:20.300
for Roger and Jake, as every year!
01:12:20.300 --> 01:12:27.500
applause
01:12:27.500 --> 01:12:29.250
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01:12:29.250 --> 01:12:38.826
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