WEBVTT 00:00:01.525 --> 00:00:02.408 - [Petter] Aircraft accidents 00:00:02.408 --> 00:00:04.526 are always caused by a combination 00:00:04.526 --> 00:00:06.408 of several factors and the thing 00:00:06.408 --> 00:00:07.975 that gets the sequence rolling 00:00:07.975 --> 00:00:10.258 is often something simple and mundane. 00:00:11.042 --> 00:00:14.358 But this is the first time I've ever come 00:00:14.358 --> 00:00:17.193 across a single letter kicking it off. 00:00:17.318 --> 00:00:18.968 - [GPWS] Sink rate. Pull up. 00:00:19.418 --> 00:00:20.701 - Stay tuned. 00:00:28.351 --> 00:00:30.096 Whenever you hear the word Tenerife 00:00:30.096 --> 00:00:33.129 in aviation context, people almost always think 00:00:33.129 --> 00:00:35.692 of the world's worst aviation disaster, 00:00:36.092 --> 00:00:38.193 the collision between two Boeing 747s 00:00:38.193 --> 00:00:41.543 at Tenerife's Los Rodeos Airport back in 1977. 00:00:42.576 --> 00:00:43.892 But the island of Tenerife, 00:00:43.892 --> 00:00:46.009 the largest of Spain's Canary Islands, 00:00:46.009 --> 00:00:48.176 actually suffered a string of disasters 00:00:48.176 --> 00:00:50.558 between the 1950s and 1980s, 00:00:50.558 --> 00:00:53.734 who collectively claimed 950 lives 00:00:53.734 --> 00:00:55.301 and that infamous runway collision 00:00:55.301 --> 00:00:57.166 was just the worst one of those. 00:00:57.833 --> 00:00:59.497 So today, I will tell you the story 00:00:59.497 --> 00:01:01.946 of the last major incident to happen there, 00:01:01.946 --> 00:01:05.913 a story that took place on a rainy spring day back in 1980. 00:01:06.663 --> 00:01:10.279 And this one, I think a lot fewer of you have ever heard of. 00:01:11.113 --> 00:01:13.880 In the morning of the 25th of April 1980, 00:01:13.880 --> 00:01:16.247 the crew of Dan-Air Flight 1008 00:01:16.247 --> 00:01:18.930 were preparing to depart from Manchester in England 00:01:18.930 --> 00:01:21.047 on a charter flight, bringing tourists down 00:01:21.047 --> 00:01:22.780 towards Tenerife North Airport, 00:01:22.780 --> 00:01:24.547 then known as Los Rodeos. 00:01:25.030 --> 00:01:26.847 During the 1970s and '80s, 00:01:26.847 --> 00:01:29.080 Dan-Air was one of Britain's largest operators 00:01:29.080 --> 00:01:32.347 of inclusive tour flights, chartered by tour operators 00:01:32.347 --> 00:01:34.597 to transport fixed groups of people 00:01:34.597 --> 00:01:36.363 down to popular holiday destinations 00:01:36.363 --> 00:01:38.447 in Southern Europe and North Africa. 00:01:39.363 --> 00:01:40.848 Among the aircraft types operated 00:01:40.848 --> 00:01:43.680 by Dan-Air was the mighty Boeing 727, 00:01:43.680 --> 00:01:46.347 and Dan-Air were actually the first British airline 00:01:46.347 --> 00:01:48.464 to import this model, which had then had 00:01:48.464 --> 00:01:51.297 to undergo several unique modifications 00:01:51.297 --> 00:01:53.696 in order to meet British safety standards. 00:01:54.446 --> 00:01:55.530 Now it would later turn out 00:01:55.530 --> 00:01:58.713 that the 727s were a financial disaster for Dan-Air, 00:01:58.713 --> 00:02:01.963 but by 1980, that was not yet very obvious. 00:02:03.064 --> 00:02:05.047 The aircraft that the crew were going to operate 00:02:05.047 --> 00:02:07.247 on this day was 14 years old 00:02:07.247 --> 00:02:08.997 in generally good condition 00:02:08.997 --> 00:02:12.148 and could seat a maximum of 144 passengers. 00:02:12.980 --> 00:02:15.547 So with a total of 138 passengers booked, 00:02:15.547 --> 00:02:17.447 it was almost completely full. 00:02:18.197 --> 00:02:20.547 The crew consisted of five flight attendants 00:02:20.547 --> 00:02:22.515 and three pilots, meaning that in total, 00:02:22.515 --> 00:02:25.332 there were going to be 146 people on board 00:02:25.332 --> 00:02:27.081 once the flight got on the way. 00:02:27.613 --> 00:02:29.064 The pilot in command was a very 00:02:29.064 --> 00:02:31.032 experienced 50-year-old captain 00:02:31.032 --> 00:02:33.997 who had around 15,300 total flight hours, 00:02:33.997 --> 00:02:37.148 which included almost 2,000 on the Boeing 727. 00:02:37.798 --> 00:02:40.164 He had flown this route down to Tenerife North 00:02:40.164 --> 00:02:42.896 a full 58 times before this flight, 00:02:42.896 --> 00:02:45.347 making him very familiar with it in general. 00:02:45.863 --> 00:02:47.497 But as we will soon see, 00:02:47.497 --> 00:02:49.848 being familiar with the destination doesn't mean 00:02:49.848 --> 00:02:52.265 that it can't throw a few surprises. 00:02:53.281 --> 00:02:56.164 His second-in-command was a 34-year-old first officer 00:02:56.164 --> 00:02:59.481 who, on this day, had about 3,500 hours in total, 00:02:59.481 --> 00:03:02.631 of which 618 were flown on the 727. 00:03:03.515 --> 00:03:04.697 And the third flight crew member 00:03:04.697 --> 00:03:06.764 was a 34-year-old flight engineer 00:03:06.764 --> 00:03:09.498 whose experience was similar to that of the first officer. 00:03:10.315 --> 00:03:11.947 Now all of the pilots had been off 00:03:11.947 --> 00:03:14.398 for more than 24 hours before this duty 00:03:14.398 --> 00:03:15.715 and the scheduled departure time 00:03:15.715 --> 00:03:17.298 was at a very civilized hour, 00:03:17.298 --> 00:03:19.065 so there's no reason to believe 00:03:19.065 --> 00:03:20.730 that fatigue played any role 00:03:20.730 --> 00:03:22.447 in what was soon about to happen. 00:03:23.380 --> 00:03:26.549 Now instead the crew were likely in a quite good mood 00:03:26.549 --> 00:03:29.148 as they completed their normal pre-flight activities, 00:03:29.148 --> 00:03:31.649 checking weather, NOTAMs and flight plans, 00:03:31.649 --> 00:03:33.481 which all looked okay. 00:03:33.882 --> 00:03:36.303 It looked like it was going to be a very pleasant flight 00:03:36.303 --> 00:03:38.004 down towards the Canary Islands. 00:03:38.671 --> 00:03:39.953 So after having boarded everyone 00:03:39.953 --> 00:03:41.637 and completed the pre-flight set up, 00:03:41.637 --> 00:03:43.154 the crew started up their engines 00:03:43.154 --> 00:03:47.176 and taxied out for takeoff from Manchester at time 9.22 am, 00:03:47.176 --> 00:03:48.709 with the captain as pilot flying 00:03:48.709 --> 00:03:50.726 and the first officer as pilot monitoring. 00:03:51.209 --> 00:03:53.143 Now the climbout and cruise phases 00:03:53.143 --> 00:03:54.976 of this flight went off without a hitch, 00:03:54.976 --> 00:03:57.052 but the pilots then likely started preparing 00:03:57.052 --> 00:03:58.369 and briefing for the approach 00:03:58.369 --> 00:04:00.452 a bit earlier than usual on this day. 00:04:01.535 --> 00:04:03.019 And that was because they had seen, 00:04:03.019 --> 00:04:04.335 during their pre-flight briefing 00:04:04.335 --> 00:04:06.169 that the approach they had ahead of them 00:04:06.169 --> 00:04:08.686 was possibly going to be a little bit unusual. 00:04:09.285 --> 00:04:10.902 You see, in the Canary Islands, 00:04:10.902 --> 00:04:13.074 the prevailing winds normally blew 00:04:13.074 --> 00:04:15.356 from the Atlantic Ocean in the west, 00:04:15.356 --> 00:04:16.905 causing most flights to approach 00:04:16.905 --> 00:04:18.939 from the east using Runway 30 00:04:18.939 --> 00:04:20.989 in order to land with a headwind. 00:04:21.589 --> 00:04:23.822 But on this afternoon, the wind was instead blowing 00:04:23.822 --> 00:04:25.761 from the other direction, from the east, 00:04:25.761 --> 00:04:27.077 forcing inbound aircraft to approach 00:04:27.077 --> 00:04:29.311 the reciprocal Runway 12 instead. 00:04:30.311 --> 00:04:32.456 Now we don't know how many times the captain 00:04:32.456 --> 00:04:33.573 or the other crew members 00:04:33.573 --> 00:04:36.073 had actually used Runway 12 in the past, 00:04:36.073 --> 00:04:39.191 but it was likely not something that they did very often. 00:04:39.789 --> 00:04:42.957 And to make things even worse, Tenerife North Airport was, 00:04:42.957 --> 00:04:46.073 and still is, notorious for its frequent, 00:04:46.073 --> 00:04:49.706 fast-building fog that can appear from nowhere within minutes. 00:04:50.890 --> 00:04:53.357 The airport sits at 2,000 feet above sea level 00:04:53.357 --> 00:04:55.374 on a shoulder between two mountains, 00:04:55.374 --> 00:04:57.808 and the marine fog that forms over the ocean 00:04:57.808 --> 00:05:01.108 frequently collides with the western slopes of Tenerife 00:05:01.108 --> 00:05:02.622 and then gets funneled 00:05:02.622 --> 00:05:05.274 through the gap directly over the airfield. 00:05:06.173 --> 00:05:07.323 But like I mentioned before, 00:05:07.323 --> 00:05:09.324 on this day the reported weather at the airport 00:05:09.324 --> 00:05:13.050 was more or less okay, with around six kilometers of visibility 00:05:13.050 --> 00:05:15.016 and scattered clouds at 400 feet, 00:05:15.016 --> 00:05:17.616 broken at 800 feet, and further scattered clouds 00:05:17.616 --> 00:05:21.033 at 1,100 feet with some light drizzle, 00:05:21.872 --> 00:05:23.157 not great for sunbathing, 00:05:23.157 --> 00:05:25.357 but good enough for normal landings. 00:05:26.189 --> 00:05:28.607 But these cloud layers also meant 00:05:28.607 --> 00:05:30.373 that higher up on the mountainsides, 00:05:30.373 --> 00:05:32.507 the fog was extremely thick, 00:05:32.507 --> 00:05:34.955 so thick, in fact, that a weather station located 00:05:34.955 --> 00:05:37.206 at a close to 8,000 feet elevation 00:05:37.206 --> 00:05:39.957 on the mountainside reported nil visibility. 00:05:40.339 --> 00:05:43.007 This meant that the very high terrain south of the airport 00:05:43.007 --> 00:05:45.074 would be completely obscured, 00:05:45.074 --> 00:05:48.757 including the nearly 12,200-foot Teide Volcano, 00:05:48.757 --> 00:05:52.624 which is the defining geographical feature on Tenerife. 00:05:53.205 --> 00:05:55.140 Because of that, the minimum safe altitude 00:05:55.140 --> 00:05:57.739 in the airspace south of Tenerife North Airport 00:05:57.739 --> 00:06:02.157 was 14,500 feet, which is worth remembering. 00:06:03.173 --> 00:06:05.440 Anyway, as the flight neared the Canary Islands, 00:06:05.440 --> 00:06:07.019 the first officer made contact 00:06:07.019 --> 00:06:09.252 with the Las Palmas Area Control Center, 00:06:09.252 --> 00:06:12.402 who soon cleared them to descend down to 11,000 feet. 00:06:13.451 --> 00:06:14.485 The first officer read this back 00:06:14.485 --> 00:06:16.652 and the crew initiated the descent, 00:06:16.652 --> 00:06:18.719 and after they reached that altitude, 00:06:18.719 --> 00:06:21.304 they contacted the Tenerife North approach controller 00:06:21.304 --> 00:06:23.902 and reported that they were now 14 nautical miles 00:06:23.902 --> 00:06:26.902 away from the Tango Foxrot November VOR beacon, 00:06:27.351 --> 00:06:28.119 and that they were ready 00:06:28.119 --> 00:06:30.035 to receive their approach instructions. 00:06:30.785 --> 00:06:31.902 Before we continue here, 00:06:31.902 --> 00:06:33.685 it's probably worth explaining a bit more about 00:06:33.685 --> 00:06:34.768 the different approach aids 00:06:34.768 --> 00:06:36.185 that the crew were now going to use 00:06:36.185 --> 00:06:37.962 as well as their procedures. 00:06:38.962 --> 00:06:41.213 A VOR beacon, where VOR stands for: 00:06:41.213 --> 00:06:44.414 Very High Frequency Omnidirectional Range, 00:06:44.414 --> 00:06:46.280 is a type of radio navigation beacon 00:06:46.280 --> 00:06:49.647 that was very widely used in the days before GPS 00:06:49.647 --> 00:06:51.196 and is actually still quite common, 00:06:51.196 --> 00:06:52.781 especially here in Europe. 00:06:53.613 --> 00:06:57.147 These VORs emit signals that are modulated differently 00:06:57.147 --> 00:06:59.781 depending on the direction of the emission, 00:06:59.781 --> 00:07:01.965 which allow the VOR receivers on board aircraft 00:07:01.965 --> 00:07:04.614 to determine the precise magnetic bearing 00:07:04.614 --> 00:07:06.664 from the VOR to the aircraft. 00:07:07.564 --> 00:07:11.080 This enables the pilots to navigate using imaginary lines 00:07:11.080 --> 00:07:13.980 or radios defined by a particular bearing 00:07:13.980 --> 00:07:14.981 from the beacon. 00:07:14.981 --> 00:07:17.515 So, for example, the 270 degree radial 00:07:17.515 --> 00:07:20.647 from the VOR points due west and so on. 00:07:21.430 --> 00:07:23.348 A lot of airports have VORs installed 00:07:23.348 --> 00:07:26.382 to help pilots locate the airport before starting to maneuver 00:07:26.382 --> 00:07:28.347 for the approach, and it can also be used 00:07:28.347 --> 00:07:31.031 to align the aircraft with the runway as an approach aid 00:07:31.031 --> 00:07:34.515 if an instrument landing system, ILS, is not available. 00:07:35.581 --> 00:07:38.281 But in this case, the Tango Foxrot November VOR 00:07:38.281 --> 00:07:40.798 was not actually located at the airport. 00:07:41.463 --> 00:07:43.198 Instead it was sitting on a hilltop, 00:07:43.198 --> 00:07:45.115 a few miles northeast of the airport 00:07:45.115 --> 00:07:47.465 in order to maximize its detectable range. 00:07:48.531 --> 00:07:51.932 Located at the northeast end of Runway 12-30, 00:07:51.932 --> 00:07:55.699 there was a less-sophisticated beacon called an NDB locator 00:07:55.699 --> 00:07:58.631 with the Morse code identifier Foxrot Papa. 00:07:59.213 --> 00:08:01.398 A non-directional beacon, or NDB, 00:08:01.398 --> 00:08:02.831 is a radio aid that can be tracked 00:08:02.831 --> 00:08:05.715 using an automatic direction finder, an ADF, 00:08:06.314 --> 00:08:09.097 and this is a very simple instrument which just points 00:08:09.097 --> 00:08:11.887 in the direction that a signal is coming from, 00:08:11.887 --> 00:08:14.304 but it doesn't contain any radial information, 00:08:14.304 --> 00:08:16.555 which makes the NDB navigation less 00:08:16.555 --> 00:08:19.254 precise than navigating using a VOR. 00:08:20.037 --> 00:08:22.838 In this case, because the Foxrot Papa beacon was used 00:08:22.838 --> 00:08:25.188 to mark the entry point to the approach procedure 00:08:25.188 --> 00:08:27.939 for Runway 12, it was also known as a locator 00:08:27.939 --> 00:08:29.855 rather than just an NDB. 00:08:30.921 --> 00:08:32.905 And in order to approach Runway 12, 00:08:32.905 --> 00:08:36.672 a flight inbound from the northeast like this flight was 00:08:36.672 --> 00:08:38.555 would normally need to fly first 00:08:38.555 --> 00:08:41.105 via the Tango Foxrot November VOR 00:08:41.105 --> 00:08:44.255 and then turn southwest onto Radial 255, 00:08:44.255 --> 00:08:46.949 directly towards the Foxrot Papa NDB. 00:08:47.482 --> 00:08:48.950 After reaching the Foxrot Papa, 00:08:48.950 --> 00:08:51.867 the aircraft should then turn right onto an outbound heading 00:08:51.867 --> 00:08:55.284 of 302 degrees, which would take it out over the ocean, 00:08:55.800 --> 00:08:58.067 before making a teardrop course reversal 00:08:58.067 --> 00:09:00.156 to the left back towards the airport. 00:09:00.438 --> 00:09:02.288 And from that point, the aircraft would be in a position 00:09:02.288 --> 00:09:04.356 to pick up the instrument landing system, 00:09:04.356 --> 00:09:05.439 which would then guide 00:09:05.439 --> 00:09:07.906 the aircraft the rest of the way down to the runway. 00:09:08.955 --> 00:09:11.204 Now this was quite a bit more complicated 00:09:11.204 --> 00:09:13.722 than the more commonly used Runway 30 approach, 00:09:13.722 --> 00:09:17.439 which just involved flying to an NDB called Tango X-ray, 00:09:17.439 --> 00:09:18.922 from where the instrument landing system 00:09:18.922 --> 00:09:20.689 could then be picked up immediately. 00:09:21.156 --> 00:09:22.706 Now the reason that these procedures 00:09:22.706 --> 00:09:23.989 had to be flown this way 00:09:23.989 --> 00:09:27.606 was that there was no radar available at Los Rodeos Airport, 00:09:27.606 --> 00:09:29.784 so all approaches had to be intercepted 00:09:29.784 --> 00:09:31.801 using procedural arrivals. 00:09:32.567 --> 00:09:34.518 But then again, flying procedural approaches 00:09:34.518 --> 00:09:36.518 would not have been very uncommon back then, 00:09:36.518 --> 00:09:38.601 and there was nothing in this procedure 00:09:38.601 --> 00:09:40.533 that was particularly out of the ordinary, 00:09:41.267 --> 00:09:43.917 except maybe that high terrain to the southwest, 00:09:43.917 --> 00:09:45.485 which I mentioned before. 00:09:46.709 --> 00:09:48.592 And when we're on the subject of things 00:09:48.592 --> 00:09:50.142 that are out of the ordinary, 00:09:50.142 --> 00:09:51.809 have you noticed that some countries 00:09:51.809 --> 00:09:53.058 have now blocked the ability 00:09:53.058 --> 00:09:55.359 to make video calls from within their borders? 00:09:55.895 --> 00:09:59.776 Well, I have, and that was a bit of an issue recently 00:09:59.776 --> 00:10:01.191 when I needed to have a group call 00:10:01.191 --> 00:10:03.276 with my team to plan one of my videos. 00:10:03.959 --> 00:10:05.825 But luckily, I had today's sponsor, 00:10:05.825 --> 00:10:08.425 my trusted NordVPN, available to me. 00:10:09.009 --> 00:10:09.975 With the help of Nord, 00:10:09.975 --> 00:10:12.609 I could easily just change my virtual location 00:10:12.609 --> 00:10:14.626 to another country with the click of a button, 00:10:14.626 --> 00:10:17.625 and after that, voila, everything worked perfectly again. 00:10:18.592 --> 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--> 00:10:57.726 Just go to nordvpn.com/pilot 00:10:57.726 --> 00:11:00.460 and you will get four extra months for free 00:11:00.460 --> 00:11:02.555 when you sign up for the two-year plan. 00:11:02.555 --> 00:11:04.922 And as always, you don't really risk anything 00:11:04.922 --> 00:11:08.514 since Nord always gives you a 30-day money-back guarantee. 00:11:09.131 --> 00:11:11.549 Thank you Nord, and now where were we? 00:11:12.731 --> 00:11:13.532 Yes. 00:11:13.897 --> 00:11:16.632 After establishing contact at time 13:16, 00:11:16.632 --> 00:11:18.648 the Tenerife North Controller cleared the flight 00:11:18.648 --> 00:11:20.566 to descend down to 6,000 feet 00:11:20.566 --> 00:11:23.132 in preparation to cross Tango Foxtrot November 00:11:23.132 --> 00:11:25.215 and then to enter the approach procedure. 00:11:26.065 --> 00:11:28.682 The captain dialed in the new cleared altitude, 00:11:28.682 --> 00:11:31.199 the flight engineer reduced thrust in order to descend, 00:11:31.199 --> 00:11:32.649 and the first officer then reported 00:11:32.649 --> 00:11:34.665 when the aircraft was seven nautical miles away 00:11:34.665 --> 00:11:36.847 from the Tango Fox November beacon 00:11:36.847 --> 00:11:38.796 in order to get further instructions. 00:11:39.596 --> 00:11:42.663 At that same time, he also requested the local air pressure, 00:11:42.663 --> 00:11:44.980 QNH, in order to get the correct reference 00:11:44.980 --> 00:11:46.888 to the altitude above the sea, 00:11:46.888 --> 00:11:49.005 and also the QFE, which would give him 00:11:49.005 --> 00:11:51.221 the altitude reference over the airfield. 00:11:52.037 --> 00:11:54.339 Once those values had been received and set, 00:11:54.339 --> 00:11:55.938 they were then cross-checked 00:11:55.938 --> 00:11:59.120 in accordance with their standard operating procedures, 00:11:59.120 --> 00:12:00.503 and the captain now also suggested 00:12:00.503 --> 00:12:01.904 that the first officer should tune 00:12:01.904 --> 00:12:05.103 the ILS frequency on his navigational radio box, 00:12:05.103 --> 00:12:07.070 and he also confirmed that the outbound heading 00:12:07.070 --> 00:12:10.120 after Foxtrot Papa would be 302 degrees. 00:12:11.003 --> 00:12:13.437 So at this stage, everything was completely normal 00:12:13.437 --> 00:12:15.321 and the crew seemed to have a good grasp 00:12:15.321 --> 00:12:17.437 of the procedure they had in front of them. 00:12:18.520 --> 00:12:20.753 But just a few miles ahead, 00:12:20.753 --> 00:12:22.704 an island-hopping turboprop belonging 00:12:22.704 --> 00:12:25.888 to Spain's flag carrier, Iberia, was also on approach 00:12:25.888 --> 00:12:28.450 to Runway 12, and the crew on board that aircraft 00:12:28.450 --> 00:12:30.882 were communicating with the controller in Spanish. 00:12:31.900 --> 00:12:35.267 Now the pilots of Flight 1008 didn't understand Spanish, 00:12:35.267 --> 00:12:36.783 and from their conversations, 00:12:36.783 --> 00:12:39.049 it doesn't seem like they paid much attention 00:12:39.049 --> 00:12:40.751 to that aircraft at all. 00:12:41.167 --> 00:12:43.550 Instead, they continued to monitor their position, 00:12:43.550 --> 00:12:45.700 relative to the Tango Fox November VOR, 00:12:45.700 --> 00:12:48.599 and at time 13:18:15, 00:12:48.599 --> 00:12:51.516 the captain called out, "Just about to go overhead." 00:12:52.600 --> 00:12:53.799 The first officer then reminded 00:12:53.799 --> 00:12:55.167 the captain that the procedure called 00:12:55.167 --> 00:12:58.872 for them to leave Tango Fox November on Radial 255. 00:12:58.872 --> 00:13:00.255 But as it turns out, 00:13:00.255 --> 00:13:03.472 the aircraft actually passed a little less than a mile east 00:13:03.472 --> 00:13:06.173 of the VOR, and after passing abeam it, 00:13:06.173 --> 00:13:08.622 they were also slow to make the right turn, 00:13:08.622 --> 00:13:09.477 which meant that they never 00:13:09.477 --> 00:13:12.061 actually intercepted that 255 radial. 00:13:13.161 --> 00:13:16.394 Now, we can never know for sure why this happened, 00:13:16.394 --> 00:13:19.494 but it was most likely done on purpose. 00:13:20.044 --> 00:13:20.744 You see, the distance 00:13:20.744 --> 00:13:24.344 between Tango Fox November and Foxtrot Papa was very short, 00:13:24.344 --> 00:13:26.359 and Flight 1008 was traveling 00:13:26.359 --> 00:13:28.660 at an airspeed of around 250 knots 00:13:28.660 --> 00:13:30.477 when they passed abeam to the VOR. 00:13:31.243 --> 00:13:33.744 Today, we wouldn't fly that fast 00:13:33.744 --> 00:13:35.527 when starting a tight procedure like this, 00:13:35.527 --> 00:13:37.610 since our aircrafts are now very slippery 00:13:37.610 --> 00:13:39.677 and take time to decelerate. 00:13:40.076 --> 00:13:42.030 But older aircraft like the 727 00:13:42.030 --> 00:13:43.909 had much less effective wings, 00:13:43.909 --> 00:13:46.910 which meant that they could easily keep the speeds up high 00:13:46.910 --> 00:13:50.210 for longer, since the speed would just rapidly bleed off 00:13:50.210 --> 00:13:52.110 when the thrust levers were closed. 00:13:52.727 --> 00:13:54.177 This also meant that most jets 00:13:54.177 --> 00:13:56.843 approaching Tenerife back then, including this one, 00:13:56.843 --> 00:13:59.910 would normally overshoot this first turn slightly 00:13:59.910 --> 00:14:01.860 before correcting course in order to be able 00:14:01.860 --> 00:14:04.367 to intercept the 302 outbound course 00:14:04.367 --> 00:14:08.251 from the NDB at a slightly more comfortable angle. 00:14:09.001 --> 00:14:11.567 There was so little time between Tango Fox November 00:14:11.567 --> 00:14:13.585 and Foxtrot Papa that they probably wouldn't be able 00:14:13.585 --> 00:14:15.218 to intercept the radial anyway. 00:14:15.534 --> 00:14:18.685 And on top of that, if they flew directly over Foxtrot Papa, 00:14:18.685 --> 00:14:21.435 they would potentially overshoot the pattern significantly, 00:14:21.435 --> 00:14:22.657 which could take the aircraft 00:14:22.657 --> 00:14:24.324 into the area south of the airport 00:14:24.324 --> 00:14:27.823 where the minimum safe altitude was 14,500 feet. 00:14:28.823 --> 00:14:31.823 Now, this is obviously not how this was supposed to be done. 00:14:32.123 --> 00:14:35.190 A lower speed would have solved all of those issues, 00:14:35.190 --> 00:14:38.940 but sometimes, procedural shortcuts like this can start 00:14:38.940 --> 00:14:42.390 to creep in due to pure convenience and time saving. 00:14:42.956 --> 00:14:45.806 And if I was to guess, this was likely 00:14:45.806 --> 00:14:48.940 the reason that the captain of this flight flew a bit wide 00:14:48.940 --> 00:14:50.590 around the Tango Fox November. 00:14:51.506 --> 00:14:52.723 Now, due to some radio chatter 00:14:52.723 --> 00:14:53.897 with the Hapag-Lloyd flight 00:14:53.897 --> 00:14:55.629 that was taking off from Los Rodeos 00:14:55.629 --> 00:14:57.429 plus some other distractions, 00:14:57.429 --> 00:14:59.114 the flight crew didn't actually report 00:14:59.114 --> 00:15:00.630 crossing Tango Fox November 00:15:00.630 --> 00:15:03.780 until 33 seconds after they had passed abeam hit. 00:15:04.563 --> 00:15:05.797 And like I mentioned, 00:15:05.797 --> 00:15:08.547 Tenerife North Airport didn't have radar at the time, 00:15:08.547 --> 00:15:10.096 so position reports like this 00:15:10.096 --> 00:15:11.813 were the only way for the controller 00:15:11.813 --> 00:15:14.213 to determine where the traffic was located. 00:15:15.329 --> 00:15:17.097 As a result, when the crew reported 00:15:17.097 --> 00:15:20.046 that they had just passed Tango Fox November, 00:15:20.046 --> 00:15:23.230 the controller realized that the 727 was traveling so fast 00:15:23.230 --> 00:15:25.313 that it would risk getting too close 00:15:25.313 --> 00:15:28.279 to the slower Iberia turboprop in front of them 00:15:28.279 --> 00:15:30.098 if he didn't do something. 00:15:31.296 --> 00:15:34.380 So he hastily decided to put Flight 1008 00:15:34.380 --> 00:15:35.613 into a holding pattern 00:15:35.613 --> 00:15:38.113 in order to ensure sufficient traffic separation. 00:15:38.996 --> 00:15:42.197 At time 13:18:54, 00:15:42.197 --> 00:15:44.630 the approach controller transmitted the following message, 00:15:45.546 --> 00:15:48.464 "Roger, the standard holding overhead Foxtrot Papa 00:15:48.464 --> 00:15:50.514 is inbound heading 150, 00:15:50.514 --> 00:15:53.047 turn to the left, call you back shortly." 00:15:54.197 --> 00:15:56.797 And this would end up being the critical moment 00:15:56.797 --> 00:15:59.348 that put the accident sequence into motion. 00:15:59.348 --> 00:16:01.981 So let's take a moment to analyze why. 00:16:03.147 --> 00:16:04.514 Despite the controller's statement 00:16:04.514 --> 00:16:06.314 that this was a standard holding, 00:16:06.314 --> 00:16:09.065 there was actually no officially published holding pattern 00:16:09.065 --> 00:16:10.998 around the Foxtrot Papa beacon. 00:16:11.897 --> 00:16:13.097 There was a published holding 00:16:13.097 --> 00:16:14.714 around Tango Fox November, 00:16:14.714 --> 00:16:16.363 as well as around Tango X-ray, 00:16:16.363 --> 00:16:19.159 forming part of the go-around procedure for Runway 12, 00:16:19.159 --> 00:16:23.209 but Flight 1008 was not in a position to enter any of those. 00:16:24.375 --> 00:16:25.693 Instead, the controller essentially 00:16:25.693 --> 00:16:28.742 invented a holding pattern based on Foxtrot Papa, 00:16:28.742 --> 00:16:31.392 and he did so so quickly 00:16:31.392 --> 00:16:33.177 that this was likely not the first time 00:16:33.177 --> 00:16:35.410 that he had used this particular pattern. 00:16:36.160 --> 00:16:39.842 Now, it's not wrong or illegal to make up holding patterns. 00:16:39.842 --> 00:16:42.593 In fact, that happens all the time, and it's perfectly okay 00:16:42.593 --> 00:16:44.227 as long as it doesn't cause any issues 00:16:44.227 --> 00:16:46.260 with terrain or traffic separation. 00:16:46.826 --> 00:16:48.693 But the issue here was that the controller said 00:16:48.693 --> 00:16:50.492 that this was a standard holding, 00:16:50.492 --> 00:16:52.693 which would imply that the holding could be found 00:16:52.693 --> 00:16:54.610 in the published approach charts, 00:16:54.610 --> 00:16:57.011 and therefore needed to be verified by the pilots. 00:16:58.060 --> 00:16:59.661 On top of that, the entry 00:16:59.661 --> 00:17:01.761 into this suddenly-proposed holding pattern 00:17:01.761 --> 00:17:03.445 would not be very simple 00:17:03.445 --> 00:17:05.878 from the position that the aircraft was now coming from. 00:17:06.861 --> 00:17:08.527 What the controller wanted the aircraft to do 00:17:08.527 --> 00:17:12.378 was to join a left-hand holding pattern over Foxtrot Papa 00:17:12.378 --> 00:17:14.778 with an inbound course of 150 degrees 00:17:14.778 --> 00:17:17.294 and an outbound course of 330 degrees. 00:17:18.561 --> 00:17:20.194 If it was flown that way, 00:17:20.194 --> 00:17:22.792 it would keep the airplane over relatively low terrain. 00:17:23.524 --> 00:17:25.224 But to do this, Flight 1008 00:17:25.224 --> 00:17:27.642 would have to first fly over the beacon, 00:17:27.642 --> 00:17:30.057 then turn right onto heading of 330, 00:17:30.057 --> 00:17:33.475 fly outbound for one minute, perform a course reversal, 00:17:33.475 --> 00:17:34.757 and then proceed inbound 00:17:34.757 --> 00:17:37.674 to Foxtrot Papa again on the requested inbound course. 00:17:38.590 --> 00:17:40.225 Quite a complex maneuver to fly 00:17:40.225 --> 00:17:41.942 when you're almost over the beacon. 00:17:42.825 --> 00:17:44.891 Now, the pilots might have eventually figured this out 00:17:44.891 --> 00:17:48.344 if not for a tiny slip of the tongue by the controller, 00:17:48.344 --> 00:17:51.144 which changed this entire course of events. 00:17:52.511 --> 00:17:55.028 Remember that the controller wanted Flight 1008 00:17:55.028 --> 00:17:56.710 to fly counter-clockwise 00:17:56.710 --> 00:17:59.461 around the holding pattern, making left turns? 00:18:00.393 --> 00:18:02.578 Well, this meant that what he wanted to say 00:18:02.578 --> 00:18:05.345 was turns to the left, 00:18:05.345 --> 00:18:06.778 but what he actually ended up saying 00:18:06.778 --> 00:18:10.945 was, "Turn to the left," which has a very different meaning. 00:18:12.077 --> 00:18:14.078 Turn to the left is normally interpreted 00:18:14.078 --> 00:18:16.910 as a command to turn left, right away, 00:18:16.910 --> 00:18:19.011 which was not at all what the controller 00:18:19.011 --> 00:18:20.695 wanted them to do here. 00:18:21.011 --> 00:18:21.995 What he attempted to say 00:18:21.995 --> 00:18:24.261 was only a description of the holding pattern, 00:18:24.261 --> 00:18:26.495 which is technically just informational, 00:18:26.495 --> 00:18:28.878 not an order, and that also made sense, 00:18:28.878 --> 00:18:31.811 given that he didn't have any radar available. 00:18:32.528 --> 00:18:34.295 Spanish investigators later used this 00:18:34.295 --> 00:18:37.311 to argue that the controller didn't bear any responsibility 00:18:37.311 --> 00:18:39.211 for issuing a non-standard clearance, 00:18:39.211 --> 00:18:41.779 but given how his call actually sounded 00:18:41.779 --> 00:18:44.211 to the pilots, that's not completely fair. 00:18:45.044 --> 00:18:47.145 Anyway, when the flight crew received this message 00:18:47.145 --> 00:18:49.195 from the controller, they simply replied, 00:18:49.195 --> 00:18:50.928 "Roger," with no further readback 00:18:50.928 --> 00:18:52.595 or request for confirmation. 00:18:53.844 --> 00:18:55.029 They might have thought at first 00:18:55.029 --> 00:18:57.511 that they understood what he said, 00:18:57.511 --> 00:18:59.829 but within 10 seconds, the captain realized 00:18:59.829 --> 00:19:01.345 that he wasn't able to picture 00:19:01.345 --> 00:19:02.996 what the controller was asking from him, 00:19:02.996 --> 00:19:07.279 so he said, that's an odd sort of one, the runway. 00:19:08.246 --> 00:19:09.478 He then interrupted himself 00:19:09.478 --> 00:19:11.632 with a confirmation that they had 1,000 feet 00:19:11.632 --> 00:19:14.482 to go to their cleared altitude of 6,000 feet, 00:19:14.482 --> 00:19:17.062 and after that, the first officer said, 00:19:17.062 --> 00:19:20.571 "No, I'm not, er... Suppose it's all right?" 00:19:21.937 --> 00:19:24.555 The captain continued with, "I'll just turn straight round 00:19:24.555 --> 00:19:27.055 to the left on the 150 when I go overhead then," 00:19:27.434 --> 00:19:29.336 to which the first officer seemed to agree. 00:19:30.433 --> 00:19:33.469 Now this shows that the captain clearly believed 00:19:33.469 --> 00:19:36.869 that he had been told to turn left on to heading 150 00:19:36.869 --> 00:19:38.453 after crossing Foxtrot Papa, 00:19:38.453 --> 00:19:41.419 which again was not at all what the controller had intended. 00:19:42.302 --> 00:19:43.886 A command to turn to the left 00:19:43.886 --> 00:19:46.369 was completely incompatible with an instruction 00:19:46.369 --> 00:19:49.602 to fly a holding pattern inbound on 150 degrees 00:19:49.602 --> 00:19:52.557 to Foxtrot Papa since, like what I said earlier, 00:19:52.557 --> 00:19:56.541 that would require a right turn followed by a course reversal. 00:19:57.340 --> 00:19:58.491 So in the captain's mind, 00:19:58.491 --> 00:20:00.557 the instructions didn't make sense, 00:20:00.557 --> 00:20:03.208 but he had been able to pick out two elements 00:20:03.208 --> 00:20:05.041 in the message which seemed clear to him, 00:20:05.524 --> 00:20:08.091 150 and turn to the left. 00:20:09.206 --> 00:20:10.724 So with Foxtrot Papa now coming up 00:20:10.724 --> 00:20:11.957 in less than one minute, 00:20:11.957 --> 00:20:14.041 he didn't have a lot of time to figure it out. 00:20:14.874 --> 00:20:16.208 In a stressful situation, 00:20:16.208 --> 00:20:19.074 without fully comprehending what the controller had said, 00:20:19.074 --> 00:20:21.040 he accepted that the best thing to do 00:20:21.040 --> 00:20:22.925 was just to execute the part of the clearance 00:20:22.925 --> 00:20:24.258 that he understood, 00:20:24.258 --> 00:20:26.557 and then try to figure out the rest later. 00:20:27.324 --> 00:20:28.991 In hindsight, it's easy to say 00:20:28.991 --> 00:20:30.225 that he shouldn't have acted 00:20:30.225 --> 00:20:33.408 on an incomplete understanding of those instructions, 00:20:33.408 --> 00:20:36.208 but in that moment, with the sudden time pressure 00:20:36.208 --> 00:20:38.957 and the added workload of the sudden holding clearance, 00:20:38.957 --> 00:20:40.558 it would have been a lot harder 00:20:40.558 --> 00:20:42.575 to think with that kind of clarity. 00:20:43.224 --> 00:20:44.341 And it is also worth remembering 00:20:44.341 --> 00:20:47.008 that this all happened in a 727 cockpit, 00:20:47.008 --> 00:20:50.175 with no fancy navigation displays, only dials. 00:20:51.041 --> 00:20:52.925 Besides, this CVR transcript suggests 00:20:52.925 --> 00:20:54.941 that both the first officer and the flight engineer 00:20:54.941 --> 00:20:57.441 were looking at the charts when this all happened, 00:20:57.441 --> 00:20:59.475 likely searching for that standard holding 00:20:59.475 --> 00:21:01.508 in order to be able to verify it. 00:21:02.074 --> 00:21:05.407 And the first officer had said, "I suppose it's all right," 00:21:05.407 --> 00:21:08.175 which might have reinforced the captain's belief 00:21:08.175 --> 00:21:10.541 that he had understood the clearance correctly. 00:21:11.375 --> 00:21:14.042 Anyway, seconds later, having made his decision 00:21:14.042 --> 00:21:15.574 on how to fly, the captain focused 00:21:15.574 --> 00:21:17.258 his attention on the rapid approach 00:21:17.258 --> 00:21:18.915 of the Foxtrot Papa NDB. 00:21:19.514 --> 00:21:23.836 He said, "The only thing is, we're just about to miss it. 00:21:23.836 --> 00:21:25.702 (chuckles) It's too close." 00:21:26.520 --> 00:21:28.587 At this point, the captain and the first officer also agreed 00:21:28.587 --> 00:21:30.803 to tune both automatic direction finders 00:21:30.803 --> 00:21:32.853 to the frequency of the Foxtrot Papa, 00:21:32.853 --> 00:21:34.702 so that they could track it more easily 00:21:34.702 --> 00:21:36.203 during the holding pattern. 00:21:36.552 --> 00:21:39.887 And finally, at time 13:19:46, 00:21:39.887 --> 00:21:41.887 they passed abeam Foxtrot Papa, 00:21:41.887 --> 00:21:45.002 slightly to the southeast, and the captain called it out. 00:21:46.037 --> 00:21:47.786 This prompted the first officer to report 00:21:47.786 --> 00:21:50.070 the waypoint passage to the controller, 00:21:50.070 --> 00:21:53.002 and he also confirmed that they were now taking up the hold. 00:21:53.370 --> 00:21:56.153 But in reality, they actually kept flying straight ahead 00:21:56.153 --> 00:21:57.836 for another about 20 seconds, 00:21:57.836 --> 00:21:59.536 covering around two nautical miles 00:21:59.536 --> 00:22:01.637 before beginning the left turn. 00:22:02.419 --> 00:22:04.886 Now, the reason for this delay isn't really known, 00:22:04.886 --> 00:22:06.803 but it might have been because the pilots 00:22:06.803 --> 00:22:08.336 were still trying to wrap their heads 00:22:08.336 --> 00:22:10.736 around the maneuver that they now had ahead of them. 00:22:11.519 --> 00:22:14.154 In fact, a few seconds before they began that left turn, 00:22:14.154 --> 00:22:17.537 the first officer said, "Bloody strange hold, isn't it?" 00:22:17.853 --> 00:22:20.170 Which indicates that he was still mentally focused 00:22:20.170 --> 00:22:22.037 on the confusing instructions. 00:22:22.720 --> 00:22:24.462 In response to that, the captain said, 00:22:24.462 --> 00:22:25.912 "Yeah, it doesn't... 00:22:25.912 --> 00:22:28.379 Isn't parallel with the runway or anything." 00:22:29.412 --> 00:22:31.413 Now, I just want to stop here and drive home 00:22:31.413 --> 00:22:32.396 what is probably one of 00:22:32.396 --> 00:22:34.812 the most important points of this whole video. 00:22:36.228 --> 00:22:38.996 If something seems strange with a clearance and you get 00:22:38.996 --> 00:22:40.696 that pit-in-the-stomach feeling 00:22:40.696 --> 00:22:42.890 that something just isn't right, 00:22:42.890 --> 00:22:46.138 always speak up and ask for further clarification. 00:22:47.022 --> 00:22:49.506 This goes for all walks of life and all industries, 00:22:49.506 --> 00:22:52.139 but especially if you're flying an aircraft. 00:22:53.188 --> 00:22:55.955 It's always better to ask one time too many 00:22:55.955 --> 00:22:57.305 than one time too few, 00:22:57.305 --> 00:23:00.422 and I want every one of you out there to remember that. 00:23:01.321 --> 00:23:03.856 This, by the way, is also exactly the kind of discussions 00:23:03.856 --> 00:23:06.355 that I'm having regularly on my Zoom hangouts 00:23:06.355 --> 00:23:07.572 with my Patreon crew, 00:23:07.572 --> 00:23:10.372 and I hope to see you there as well next time. 00:23:10.372 --> 00:23:13.656 Just go to patreon.com/join/mentourpilot 00:23:13.656 --> 00:23:15.323 if you think that sounds interesting. 00:23:16.221 --> 00:23:18.989 Anyway, at this point, what the flight crew didn't yet know 00:23:18.989 --> 00:23:21.340 was that by overshooting Foxtrot Papa 00:23:21.340 --> 00:23:24.473 and then turning left onto a heading a 150 degrees, 00:23:24.473 --> 00:23:27.122 they were now on a track to overfly the northern shoulder 00:23:27.122 --> 00:23:29.322 of La Esperanza, a sub-peak 00:23:29.322 --> 00:23:31.606 along the island's central volcanic ridge 00:23:31.606 --> 00:23:33.389 that stretched north from El Teide. 00:23:34.071 --> 00:23:36.389 The terrain directly beneath their projected flight path 00:23:36.389 --> 00:23:38.872 actually didn't exceed 5,000 feet, 00:23:38.872 --> 00:23:40.990 but it did lie within the sector, 00:23:40.990 --> 00:23:44.356 where the minimum safe altitude was 14,500 feet. 00:23:45.339 --> 00:23:46.523 So strictly speaking, 00:23:46.523 --> 00:23:48.722 since they weren't flying a published procedure, 00:23:48.722 --> 00:23:50.740 maneuvering at only 6,000 feet 00:23:50.740 --> 00:23:53.055 would have been prohibited in this area. 00:23:53.805 --> 00:23:55.822 The final report would later place some blame 00:23:55.822 --> 00:23:57.923 on the flight crew for flying into this area 00:23:57.923 --> 00:24:00.456 without being aware of the applicable MSA, 00:24:00.456 --> 00:24:02.856 but it seems likely that at this point, 00:24:02.856 --> 00:24:04.621 they were still thinking that they 00:24:04.621 --> 00:24:06.306 were flying an official procedure, 00:24:06.306 --> 00:24:08.856 even though they couldn't find it on their charts. 00:24:09.473 --> 00:24:11.889 At the same time as Flight 1008 completed 00:24:11.889 --> 00:24:14.022 their left turn onto a heading of 150 00:24:14.022 --> 00:24:16.106 and started flying towards the southeast, 00:24:16.106 --> 00:24:17.355 the approach controller called up 00:24:17.355 --> 00:24:19.323 the Iberia Airlines flight ahead of them 00:24:19.323 --> 00:24:22.589 and asked them to verify when they had left 5,000 feet. 00:24:23.673 --> 00:24:26.005 Only seconds later, the pilot of that aircraft replied 00:24:26.005 --> 00:24:27.772 that 5,000 feet was now free 00:24:27.772 --> 00:24:29.156 and that they were in the middle 00:24:29.156 --> 00:24:31.556 of a procedure turn to intercept the ILS. 00:24:32.123 --> 00:24:34.090 As these calls in Spanish were happening, 00:24:34.090 --> 00:24:35.590 the first officer and flight engineer 00:24:35.590 --> 00:24:39.332 on board Flight 1008 continued to compare ATC's instructions 00:24:39.332 --> 00:24:41.432 with what was printed on their chart, 00:24:41.432 --> 00:24:44.915 saying things like, "It's that way, isn't it?" 00:24:46.169 --> 00:24:48.451 "That's a three, isn't it?" 00:24:48.451 --> 00:24:52.424 And, "Yes, well, the hold is going to be here, isn't it?" 00:24:53.140 --> 00:24:55.707 It's likely that they were now very skeptical 00:24:55.707 --> 00:24:57.841 about the maneuver that they were flying, 00:24:57.841 --> 00:24:59.891 but we can never be 100% sure 00:24:59.891 --> 00:25:02.623 since that wasn't formally verbalized. 00:25:03.672 --> 00:25:05.890 Anyway, as these discussions were taking place, 00:25:05.890 --> 00:25:07.240 the controller now called them up 00:25:07.240 --> 00:25:09.572 and cleared them to descend down to 5,000 feet 00:25:09.572 --> 00:25:12.057 since the Iberia flight had now left that altitude. 00:25:12.957 --> 00:25:15.490 And in response, the flight engineer again reduced 00:25:15.490 --> 00:25:18.107 the thrust and the captain initiated the descent. 00:25:19.457 --> 00:25:22.540 But as they were doing this, the captain suddenly said, 00:25:22.540 --> 00:25:26.007 "Hey, did he say it was 1-5-0 inbound?" 00:25:26.476 --> 00:25:28.610 likely realizing that his mental picture 00:25:28.610 --> 00:25:30.395 of where the controller was sending them 00:25:30.395 --> 00:25:32.111 didn't actually make any sense. 00:25:32.794 --> 00:25:34.928 The first officer had probably suspected that 00:25:34.928 --> 00:25:37.469 from the very start because he now replied, 00:25:37.469 --> 00:25:38.968 "Inbound, yeah." 00:25:39.369 --> 00:25:41.420 And in response to that, the captain said, 00:25:41.420 --> 00:25:43.553 "That's... I don't like that." 00:25:44.269 --> 00:25:46.203 The first officer continued by saying, 00:25:46.203 --> 00:25:49.086 "They want to keep going more around, don't they?" 00:25:49.769 --> 00:25:52.470 It's not completely clear what he meant by that, 00:25:52.470 --> 00:25:54.819 but it is possible that the first officer believed 00:25:54.819 --> 00:25:57.119 that they were supposed to keep turning left, 00:25:57.119 --> 00:25:58.919 making a three quarters turn onto 00:25:58.919 --> 00:26:01.136 the outbound leg of the holding pattern, 00:26:01.136 --> 00:26:02.636 after which they would come back 00:26:02.636 --> 00:26:05.769 to Foxtrot Papa on the inbound heading of 150. 00:26:06.919 --> 00:26:08.619 If that was the case, it would mean that 00:26:08.619 --> 00:26:10.753 even the first officer had indeed interpreted 00:26:10.753 --> 00:26:13.703 the call from the controller as an instruction to turn left. 00:26:14.369 --> 00:26:16.653 And that would also explain why he 00:26:16.653 --> 00:26:19.170 hadn't spoken up when the turn started. 00:26:20.152 --> 00:26:22.270 When I read this part of the report, 00:26:22.270 --> 00:26:25.603 I could really feel that cold feeling in my stomach. 00:26:25.603 --> 00:26:26.869 You know, that feeling that you get 00:26:26.869 --> 00:26:30.120 when you realize that something is really wrong, 00:26:30.120 --> 00:26:33.012 but you still can't figure out what or how. 00:26:34.060 --> 00:26:35.494 But we don't know if the pilots 00:26:35.494 --> 00:26:37.444 had yet realized just how dangerous 00:26:37.444 --> 00:26:39.294 their current flight path was. 00:26:39.294 --> 00:26:40.811 But the captain's statement of, 00:26:40.811 --> 00:26:44.711 "I don't like that," definitely showed some real concern. 00:26:45.612 --> 00:26:48.161 Again, make sure you always know what clearance 00:26:48.161 --> 00:26:51.078 you have been given, and if in doubt, ask. 00:26:51.994 --> 00:26:54.377 Anyway, before the pilots could spend much more time trying 00:26:54.377 --> 00:26:56.162 to work out what was wrong, 00:26:56.162 --> 00:26:58.127 the ground proximity warning system 00:26:58.127 --> 00:27:01.929 suddenly activated at time 13:20:50. 00:27:03.078 --> 00:27:04.244 The Boeing 727 was equipped 00:27:04.244 --> 00:27:06.578 with a first generation GPWS, 00:27:06.578 --> 00:27:08.444 which was state of the art at the time, 00:27:08.444 --> 00:27:10.195 but also much less capable 00:27:10.195 --> 00:27:12.495 than the enhanced ground proximity warning systems 00:27:12.495 --> 00:27:14.711 that we have on board today's aircraft. 00:27:15.395 --> 00:27:18.228 Modern EGPWSs compares the position 00:27:18.228 --> 00:27:20.212 and projected path of the airplane 00:27:20.212 --> 00:27:22.494 to a digital terrain database. 00:27:23.028 --> 00:27:25.012 But the original GPSs could only look 00:27:25.012 --> 00:27:27.294 at the terrain directly beneath the aircraft 00:27:27.294 --> 00:27:28.994 using its radio altimeter. 00:27:29.912 --> 00:27:32.336 If the closure rate with the terrain was too high, 00:27:32.336 --> 00:27:35.298 it would an issue sink rate or pull up warnings. 00:27:35.298 --> 00:27:38.347 But if the terrain ahead of the aircraft was rising steeply, 00:27:38.347 --> 00:27:40.064 the system wouldn't know that, 00:27:40.064 --> 00:27:42.615 so these warnings could still come too late. 00:27:43.648 --> 00:27:44.548 In this case, the airplane 00:27:44.548 --> 00:27:46.465 was now passing over the northern shoulder 00:27:46.465 --> 00:27:49.514 of the central volcanic ridge while in descent, 00:27:49.514 --> 00:27:51.731 and that resulted in a rate of terrain closure 00:27:51.731 --> 00:27:53.848 greater than 6,000 feet per minute, 00:27:53.848 --> 00:27:55.898 triggering the warning envelope. 00:27:56.565 --> 00:27:58.581 But the maximum height of the ridge ahead of them 00:27:58.581 --> 00:28:00.882 was actually less than their current altitude. 00:28:00.882 --> 00:28:02.997 So in their present trajectory, 00:28:02.997 --> 00:28:06.181 they were not in any danger of striking the terrain. 00:28:07.298 --> 00:28:08.898 But, of course, the pilots who had now lost 00:28:08.898 --> 00:28:10.898 their position situational awareness 00:28:10.898 --> 00:28:13.097 and were still flying inside of the clouds 00:28:13.097 --> 00:28:14.915 had no way of knowing this. 00:28:15.665 --> 00:28:18.232 So in response to the GPWS warning, 00:28:18.232 --> 00:28:19.714 the captain immediately announced, 00:28:19.714 --> 00:28:23.282 "Okay, overshoot," which is an old British term for go around. 00:28:24.148 --> 00:28:25.198 As the flight engineer advanced 00:28:25.198 --> 00:28:27.854 the thrust levers to the takeoff/go around thrust, 00:28:27.854 --> 00:28:30.003 the captain also halted their left turn 00:28:30.003 --> 00:28:33.474 and added, "He's taking us around to the high ground," 00:28:33.474 --> 00:28:36.124 and after stating that, he continued rolling right 00:28:36.124 --> 00:28:38.924 onto a steeper and steeper right-hand turn. 00:28:40.022 --> 00:28:41.239 But what he didn't do was 00:28:41.239 --> 00:28:44.206 to raise the nose in order to initiate the climb. 00:28:45.073 --> 00:28:46.589 And why was that then? 00:28:47.156 --> 00:28:49.556 Well, during GPWS-response training, 00:28:49.556 --> 00:28:51.206 we pilots today are required 00:28:51.206 --> 00:28:54.524 to practice a terrain-escape maneuver in the simulator, 00:28:54.524 --> 00:28:57.908 which includes disconnecting the automatic setting, 00:28:57.908 --> 00:29:00.250 full thrust, pitching up to 20 degrees, 00:29:00.250 --> 00:29:02.976 making sure the speed brake lever is down, 00:29:02.976 --> 00:29:04.876 making proper call outs and so on. 00:29:05.476 --> 00:29:08.159 This maneuver is drilled into everyone flying today 00:29:08.159 --> 00:29:10.059 in order to make sure that the response 00:29:10.059 --> 00:29:11.710 to a hard GPWS warning 00:29:11.710 --> 00:29:16.158 is immediately executed from memory and without questions. 00:29:17.024 --> 00:29:19.309 As it turns out, the captain and the flight engineer 00:29:19.309 --> 00:29:21.092 had also undergone some type 00:29:21.092 --> 00:29:23.609 of GPWS training back in 1978, 00:29:23.609 --> 00:29:27.836 and Dan-Air did have a procedure for GPWS response, 00:29:27.836 --> 00:29:31.469 but back in those days GPWS was a very new technology 00:29:31.469 --> 00:29:32.769 and there is a possibility 00:29:32.769 --> 00:29:35.452 that training had been only theoretical. 00:29:36.403 --> 00:29:38.887 So we don't know exactly what was going 00:29:38.887 --> 00:29:41.737 through the captain's head, but based on his statement 00:29:41.737 --> 00:29:44.469 that, "He's taking us around to the high ground," 00:29:44.469 --> 00:29:47.069 he probably believed that the controller's instruction 00:29:47.069 --> 00:29:49.203 to turn left was faulty 00:29:49.203 --> 00:29:50.753 and that the controller had told him 00:29:50.753 --> 00:29:53.069 to turn towards an unsafe direction. 00:29:54.020 --> 00:29:55.903 Believing that the GPWS warning occurred 00:29:55.903 --> 00:29:58.886 because they were turning left towards high terrain, 00:29:58.886 --> 00:30:00.186 the captain may have reasoned 00:30:00.186 --> 00:30:02.319 that the best way to escape the situation 00:30:02.319 --> 00:30:04.419 was to turn to the right instead. 00:30:04.985 --> 00:30:06.586 So without having practiced the maneuver 00:30:06.586 --> 00:30:09.054 in the simulator, the captain's immediate reaction 00:30:09.054 --> 00:30:11.797 was to turn rather than to climb, 00:30:11.797 --> 00:30:14.197 which sadly would seal their fate. 00:30:15.212 --> 00:30:17.314 Because as the right turn now continued, 00:30:17.314 --> 00:30:18.396 the aircraft passed over 00:30:18.396 --> 00:30:20.397 the top of the ridge and then over a valley, 00:30:20.397 --> 00:30:23.047 causing the radio altitude to increase, 00:30:23.047 --> 00:30:25.435 which silenced the GPWS warning, 00:30:25.435 --> 00:30:27.201 10 seconds after it had started. 00:30:28.202 --> 00:30:30.369 The captain commented, "Watch my eepers," 00:30:30.369 --> 00:30:33.351 referring to the engine pressure ratio or EPR, 00:30:33.351 --> 00:30:35.067 essentially ensuring that the flight engineer 00:30:35.067 --> 00:30:38.268 maintained TO/GA thrust and didn't over-boost the engines. 00:30:39.651 --> 00:30:41.084 But it also now seems like 00:30:41.084 --> 00:30:42.952 the first officer wasn't convinced 00:30:42.952 --> 00:30:45.135 that they were now taking the right course of action. 00:30:45.135 --> 00:30:47.025 So he called out, 00:30:47.025 --> 00:30:48.942 "I suggest a heading of 1-2-2 actually 00:30:48.942 --> 00:30:51.042 and take us through the overshoot." 00:30:52.226 --> 00:30:54.775 A heading of 1-2-2 degrees was the heading prescribed 00:30:54.775 --> 00:30:57.742 by the official Runway 12 missed-approach procedure, 00:30:57.742 --> 00:31:00.072 which would take them east over the ocean, 00:31:00.072 --> 00:31:02.654 so this was a pretty sensible suggestion. 00:31:03.704 --> 00:31:05.954 But 1-2-2 degrees was also 00:31:05.954 --> 00:31:07.971 to the left of their current heading, 00:31:07.971 --> 00:31:09.921 which contradicted the captain's assumption 00:31:09.921 --> 00:31:13.905 that their left turn was what had caused the GPWS warning. 00:31:14.815 --> 00:31:18.699 As a result, he just continued turning right past due south 00:31:18.699 --> 00:31:21.065 and then all the way around to the southwest, 00:31:21.799 --> 00:31:26.116 directly towards the 5,700 foot high summit of La Esperanza. 00:31:27.432 --> 00:31:29.848 Tragically, they might still have cleared the summit 00:31:29.848 --> 00:31:31.731 if they had just maintained altitude 00:31:31.731 --> 00:31:34.516 or climbed following the terrain-escape maneuver. 00:31:35.208 --> 00:31:38.091 But due to the high bank angle they were now using, 00:31:38.091 --> 00:31:40.558 the plane actually lost lift during the maneuver, 00:31:40.558 --> 00:31:42.726 causing a slight descent instead. 00:31:43.657 --> 00:31:46.459 Still flying over the valley, the flight engineer expressed 00:31:46.459 --> 00:31:49.974 his nervousness by commenting, "Let's get out of here." 00:31:50.476 --> 00:31:52.142 But the captain simply repeated, 00:31:52.142 --> 00:31:54.258 "He's taking us around to the high ground." 00:31:55.508 --> 00:31:58.408 Moments later, without any new GPWS warnings, 00:31:58.408 --> 00:32:01.208 and believing that he had corrected the situation, 00:32:01.208 --> 00:32:03.009 the captain called up air traffic control 00:32:03.009 --> 00:32:06.859 and reported, "Dan-Air 1008, 00:32:06.859 --> 00:32:08.908 we've had a ground proximity warning." 00:32:09.441 --> 00:32:10.674 This was then followed 00:32:10.674 --> 00:32:14.042 by the flight engineer calling out twice that their bank angle 00:32:14.042 --> 00:32:17.275 was now above the recommended maximum of 30 degrees. 00:32:18.141 --> 00:32:20.459 And his words were the last ones captured 00:32:20.459 --> 00:32:22.225 on the cockpit voice recorder. 00:32:22.925 --> 00:32:25.741 With the mountains shrouded in clouds, the pilots never saw 00:32:25.741 --> 00:32:27.375 the danger coming towards them, 00:32:27.375 --> 00:32:28.759 and the GPWS never had time 00:32:28.759 --> 00:32:32.025 to react to the closure rate of the steep mountain ahead. 00:32:33.024 --> 00:32:38.639 So at time 13:21:18, Dan-Air Flight 1008 crashed 00:32:38.639 --> 00:32:41.272 into the forested mountainside of La Esperanza 00:32:41.272 --> 00:32:43.639 at a speed of 260 knots, 00:32:44.071 --> 00:32:46.989 just 38 meters below the top of the ridge. 00:32:48.555 --> 00:32:50.722 Most of the aircraft disintegrated immediately, 00:32:50.722 --> 00:32:52.106 killing everyone on board, 00:32:52.106 --> 00:32:54.106 and a large portion of the aft cabin 00:32:54.106 --> 00:32:56.889 was then thrown another 250 meters forward 00:32:56.889 --> 00:32:59.672 over the top of the ridge and then down to the other side. 00:33:00.521 --> 00:33:03.122 Down at the airport, the controller now tried repeatedly 00:33:03.122 --> 00:33:05.173 to contact the aircraft in order to follow up 00:33:05.173 --> 00:33:07.307 on their reported GPWS warning, 00:33:07.307 --> 00:33:09.057 but when he didn't get any reply, 00:33:09.057 --> 00:33:11.437 he soon activated the accident alarm. 00:33:12.622 --> 00:33:14.011 The problem was though that 00:33:14.011 --> 00:33:16.261 with no radar available at Tenerife North, 00:33:16.261 --> 00:33:19.396 rescuers had no idea where the aircraft was located, 00:33:19.396 --> 00:33:21.663 especially since it had taken a turn 00:33:21.663 --> 00:33:24.279 that the controller had not intended them to take. 00:33:24.995 --> 00:33:26.596 This meant that the wreckage wasn't discovered 00:33:26.596 --> 00:33:28.813 until seven hours after the crash, 00:33:28.813 --> 00:33:30.646 when a couple of motorists on the road 00:33:30.646 --> 00:33:33.646 to El Teide National Park saw some debris on the road 00:33:33.646 --> 00:33:35.746 and correlated that to the radio report 00:33:35.746 --> 00:33:37.313 of a missing aircraft. 00:33:38.079 --> 00:33:42.464 This crash was, and actually still is, the worst loss of life 00:33:42.464 --> 00:33:44.267 on board a British airliner ever, 00:33:44.267 --> 00:33:48.841 so the investigation received considerable public attention 00:33:48.841 --> 00:33:50.224 especially when the Spanish 00:33:50.224 --> 00:33:52.358 and British investigators didn't agree 00:33:52.358 --> 00:33:54.908 on how to weigh the causes of the accident. 00:33:56.024 --> 00:33:57.292 The Spanish investigators wrote 00:33:57.292 --> 00:33:59.658 that the pilots were ultimately responsible 00:33:59.658 --> 00:34:02.886 for being aware of their position in a non-radar environment, 00:34:02.886 --> 00:34:04.853 and that it was their obligation 00:34:04.853 --> 00:34:06.254 to climb to a safe altitude 00:34:06.254 --> 00:34:09.587 as soon as they became unsure of where they actually were. 00:34:10.702 --> 00:34:13.703 They also cited the pilot's failure to request clarification 00:34:13.703 --> 00:34:15.086 when they didn't understand 00:34:15.086 --> 00:34:16.687 the controller's initial transmission 00:34:16.687 --> 00:34:18.670 as a major cause of the accident, 00:34:18.670 --> 00:34:21.704 as well as their incorrect response to the GPWS warning. 00:34:22.836 --> 00:34:25.804 They pointed out that if the pilots had done nothing at all 00:34:25.804 --> 00:34:27.453 when the GPWS activated, 00:34:27.453 --> 00:34:29.821 they would have passed safely over the ridge 00:34:29.821 --> 00:34:31.686 and continued out over the sea. 00:34:31.970 --> 00:34:33.254 So the Spanish investigators argued 00:34:33.254 --> 00:34:35.532 that it was the captain's decision to turn right 00:34:35.532 --> 00:34:37.771 that took them back around to the high terrain 00:34:37.771 --> 00:34:39.970 and ultimately led to the crash. 00:34:41.020 --> 00:34:43.054 But the British investigation team believed 00:34:43.054 --> 00:34:46.204 that the controller's use of an unpublished holding pattern, 00:34:46.204 --> 00:34:48.553 one that didn't appear on the pilots' charts, 00:34:48.553 --> 00:34:53.171 as well as its verbal slip-up saying turn instead of turns, 00:34:53.171 --> 00:34:55.138 played a very important role 00:34:55.138 --> 00:34:57.671 in the pilots' loss of situational awareness. 00:34:58.687 --> 00:35:00.804 They also noted that if the holding pattern 00:35:00.804 --> 00:35:03.382 had been designed according to international standards, 00:35:03.382 --> 00:35:06.531 the minimum altitude in the hold would have been 6,000 feet, 00:35:06.531 --> 00:35:09.381 which would have incidentally prevented the crash. 00:35:10.315 --> 00:35:13.315 But regardless of who made the most serious errors here, 00:35:13.315 --> 00:35:14.615 the disaster was made possible 00:35:14.615 --> 00:35:17.316 by the poor infrastructure at Tenerife North Airport, 00:35:17.316 --> 00:35:18.548 including the lack of radar 00:35:18.548 --> 00:35:20.865 and the poorly-designed approach procedures. 00:35:21.781 --> 00:35:22.881 It's also important to remember 00:35:22.881 --> 00:35:25.115 that the technology available in 1980 00:35:25.115 --> 00:35:28.631 was far less capable than what we now have available, 00:35:28.631 --> 00:35:31.415 and it's exactly because of accidents like this 00:35:31.415 --> 00:35:34.193 that we, today, have these vastly-improved systems 00:35:34.193 --> 00:35:37.319 and that we pilots are so well trained in using them. 00:35:37.701 --> 00:35:39.435 This accident led to recommendations 00:35:39.435 --> 00:35:43.436 to always question any clearances that weren't 100% clear 00:35:43.436 --> 00:35:46.360 as well as some other recommendations as well. 00:35:46.360 --> 00:35:48.588 But in the long run, this accident also led 00:35:48.588 --> 00:35:51.339 to better training around GPWS maneuvers 00:35:51.339 --> 00:35:54.588 and therefore, a significant increase in safety. 00:35:55.389 --> 00:35:57.639 Our current fantastic safety record proves 00:35:57.639 --> 00:36:00.618 that accidents like these today are largely preventable, 00:36:00.618 --> 00:36:02.386 but they are only preventable 00:36:02.386 --> 00:36:03.968 because of stories like this 00:36:03.968 --> 00:36:06.152 and that's why I keep telling them. 00:36:07.134 --> 00:36:09.685 Now, please consider subscribing to the channel 00:36:09.685 --> 00:36:11.234 if you found this video interesting 00:36:11.234 --> 00:36:13.818 and let me know what you thought in the comments below. 00:36:14.501 --> 00:36:17.301 Watch these videos next and remember 00:36:17.301 --> 00:36:18.568 to check out my sponsor 00:36:18.568 --> 00:36:20.102 who made this video possible, 00:36:20.102 --> 00:36:22.652 together with my fantastic Patreon crew. 00:36:23.252 --> 00:36:26.012 If you want to see my next 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