1 00:00:01,525 --> 00:00:02,408 - [Petter] Aircraft accidents 2 00:00:02,408 --> 00:00:04,526 are always caused by a combination 3 00:00:04,526 --> 00:00:06,408 of several factors and the thing 4 00:00:06,408 --> 00:00:07,975 that gets the sequence rolling 5 00:00:07,975 --> 00:00:10,258 is often something simple and mundane. 6 00:00:11,042 --> 00:00:14,358 But this is the first time I've ever come 7 00:00:14,358 --> 00:00:17,193 across a single letter kicking it off. 8 00:00:17,318 --> 00:00:18,968 - [GPWS] Sink rate. Pull up. 9 00:00:19,418 --> 00:00:20,701 - Stay tuned. 10 00:00:28,351 --> 00:00:30,096 Whenever you hear the word Tenerife 11 00:00:30,096 --> 00:00:33,129 in aviation context, people almost always think 12 00:00:33,129 --> 00:00:35,692 of the world's worst aviation disaster, 13 00:00:36,092 --> 00:00:38,193 the collision between two Boeing 747s 14 00:00:38,193 --> 00:00:41,543 at Tenerife's Los Rodeos Airport back in 1977. 15 00:00:42,576 --> 00:00:43,892 But the island of Tenerife, 16 00:00:43,892 --> 00:00:46,009 the largest of Spain's Canary Islands, 17 00:00:46,009 --> 00:00:48,176 actually suffered a string of disasters 18 00:00:48,176 --> 00:00:50,558 between the 1950s and 1980s, 19 00:00:50,558 --> 00:00:53,734 who collectively claimed 950 lives 20 00:00:53,734 --> 00:00:55,301 and that infamous runway collision 21 00:00:55,301 --> 00:00:57,166 was just the worst one of those. 22 00:00:57,833 --> 00:00:59,497 So today, I will tell you the story 23 00:00:59,497 --> 00:01:01,946 of the last major incident to happen there, 24 00:01:01,946 --> 00:01:05,913 a story that took place on a rainy spring day back in 1980. 25 00:01:06,663 --> 00:01:10,279 And this one, I think a lot fewer of you have ever heard of. 26 00:01:11,113 --> 00:01:13,880 In the morning of the 25th of April 1980, 27 00:01:13,880 --> 00:01:16,247 the crew of Dan-Air Flight 1008 28 00:01:16,247 --> 00:01:18,930 were preparing to depart from Manchester in England 29 00:01:18,930 --> 00:01:21,047 on a charter flight, bringing tourists down 30 00:01:21,047 --> 00:01:22,780 towards Tenerife North Airport, 31 00:01:22,780 --> 00:01:24,547 then known as Los Rodeos. 32 00:01:25,030 --> 00:01:26,847 During the 1970s and '80s, 33 00:01:26,847 --> 00:01:29,080 Dan-Air was one of Britain's largest operators 34 00:01:29,080 --> 00:01:32,347 of inclusive tour flights, chartered by tour operators 35 00:01:32,347 --> 00:01:34,597 to transport fixed groups of people 36 00:01:34,597 --> 00:01:36,363 down to popular holiday destinations 37 00:01:36,363 --> 00:01:38,447 in Southern Europe and North Africa. 38 00:01:39,363 --> 00:01:40,848 Among the aircraft types operated 39 00:01:40,848 --> 00:01:43,680 by Dan-Air was the mighty Boeing 727, 40 00:01:43,680 --> 00:01:46,347 and Dan-Air were actually the first British airline 41 00:01:46,347 --> 00:01:48,464 to import this model, which had then had 42 00:01:48,464 --> 00:01:51,297 to undergo several unique modifications 43 00:01:51,297 --> 00:01:53,696 in order to meet British safety standards. 44 00:01:54,446 --> 00:01:55,530 Now it would later turn out 45 00:01:55,530 --> 00:01:58,713 that the 727s were a financial disaster for Dan-Air, 46 00:01:58,713 --> 00:02:01,963 but by 1980, that was not yet very obvious. 47 00:02:03,064 --> 00:02:05,047 The aircraft that the crew were going to operate 48 00:02:05,047 --> 00:02:07,247 on this day was 14 years old 49 00:02:07,247 --> 00:02:08,997 in generally good condition 50 00:02:08,997 --> 00:02:12,148 and could seat a maximum of 144 passengers. 51 00:02:12,980 --> 00:02:15,547 So with a total of 138 passengers booked, 52 00:02:15,547 --> 00:02:17,447 it was almost completely full. 53 00:02:18,197 --> 00:02:20,547 The crew consisted of five flight attendants 54 00:02:20,547 --> 00:02:22,515 and three pilots, meaning that in total, 55 00:02:22,515 --> 00:02:25,332 there were going to be 146 people on board 56 00:02:25,332 --> 00:02:27,081 once the flight got on the way. 57 00:02:27,613 --> 00:02:29,064 The pilot in command was a very 58 00:02:29,064 --> 00:02:31,032 experienced 50-year-old captain 59 00:02:31,032 --> 00:02:33,997 who had around 15,300 total flight hours, 60 00:02:33,997 --> 00:02:37,148 which included almost 2,000 on the Boeing 727. 61 00:02:37,798 --> 00:02:40,164 He had flown this route down to Tenerife North 62 00:02:40,164 --> 00:02:42,896 a full 58 times before this flight, 63 00:02:42,896 --> 00:02:45,347 making him very familiar with it in general. 64 00:02:45,863 --> 00:02:47,497 But as we will soon see, 65 00:02:47,497 --> 00:02:49,848 being familiar with the destination doesn't mean 66 00:02:49,848 --> 00:02:52,265 that it can't throw a few surprises. 67 00:02:53,281 --> 00:02:56,164 His second-in-command was a 34-year-old first officer 68 00:02:56,164 --> 00:02:59,481 who, on this day, had about 3,500 hours in total, 69 00:02:59,481 --> 00:03:02,631 of which 618 were flown on the 727. 70 00:03:03,515 --> 00:03:04,697 And the third flight crew member 71 00:03:04,697 --> 00:03:06,764 was a 34-year-old flight engineer 72 00:03:06,764 --> 00:03:09,498 whose experience was similar to that of the first officer. 73 00:03:10,315 --> 00:03:11,947 Now all of the pilots had been off 74 00:03:11,947 --> 00:03:14,398 for more than 24 hours before this duty 75 00:03:14,398 --> 00:03:15,715 and the scheduled departure time 76 00:03:15,715 --> 00:03:17,298 was at a very civilized hour, 77 00:03:17,298 --> 00:03:19,065 so there's no reason to believe 78 00:03:19,065 --> 00:03:20,730 that fatigue played any role 79 00:03:20,730 --> 00:03:22,447 in what was soon about to happen. 80 00:03:23,380 --> 00:03:26,549 Now instead the crew were likely in a quite good mood 81 00:03:26,549 --> 00:03:29,148 as they completed their normal pre-flight activities, 82 00:03:29,148 --> 00:03:31,649 checking weather, NOTAMs and flight plans, 83 00:03:31,649 --> 00:03:33,481 which all looked okay. 84 00:03:33,882 --> 00:03:36,303 It looked like it was going to be a very pleasant flight 85 00:03:36,303 --> 00:03:38,004 down towards the Canary Islands. 86 00:03:38,671 --> 00:03:39,953 So after having boarded everyone 87 00:03:39,953 --> 00:03:41,637 and completed the pre-flight set up, 88 00:03:41,637 --> 00:03:43,154 the crew started up their engines 89 00:03:43,154 --> 00:03:47,176 and taxied out for takeoff from Manchester at time 9.22 am, 90 00:03:47,176 --> 00:03:48,709 with the captain as pilot flying 91 00:03:48,709 --> 00:03:50,726 and the first officer as pilot monitoring. 92 00:03:51,209 --> 00:03:53,143 Now the climbout and cruise phases 93 00:03:53,143 --> 00:03:54,976 of this flight went off without a hitch, 94 00:03:54,976 --> 00:03:57,052 but the pilots then likely started preparing 95 00:03:57,052 --> 00:03:58,369 and briefing for the approach 96 00:03:58,369 --> 00:04:00,452 a bit earlier than usual on this day. 97 00:04:01,535 --> 00:04:03,019 And that was because they had seen, 98 00:04:03,019 --> 00:04:04,335 during their pre-flight briefing 99 00:04:04,335 --> 00:04:06,169 that the approach they had ahead of them 100 00:04:06,169 --> 00:04:08,686 was possibly going to be a little bit unusual. 101 00:04:09,285 --> 00:04:10,902 You see, in the Canary Islands, 102 00:04:10,902 --> 00:04:13,074 the prevailing winds normally blew 103 00:04:13,074 --> 00:04:15,356 from the Atlantic Ocean in the west, 104 00:04:15,356 --> 00:04:16,905 causing most flights to approach 105 00:04:16,905 --> 00:04:18,939 from the east using Runway 30 106 00:04:18,939 --> 00:04:20,989 in order to land with a headwind. 107 00:04:21,589 --> 00:04:23,822 But on this afternoon, the wind was instead blowing 108 00:04:23,822 --> 00:04:25,761 from the other direction, from the east, 109 00:04:25,761 --> 00:04:27,077 forcing inbound aircraft to approach 110 00:04:27,077 --> 00:04:29,311 the reciprocal Runway 12 instead. 111 00:04:30,311 --> 00:04:32,456 Now we don't know how many times the captain 112 00:04:32,456 --> 00:04:33,573 or the other crew members 113 00:04:33,573 --> 00:04:36,073 had actually used Runway 12 in the past, 114 00:04:36,073 --> 00:04:39,191 but it was likely not something that they did very often. 115 00:04:39,789 --> 00:04:42,957 And to make things even worse, Tenerife North Airport was, 116 00:04:42,957 --> 00:04:46,073 and still is, notorious for its frequent, 117 00:04:46,073 --> 00:04:49,706 fast-building fog that can appear from nowhere within minutes. 118 00:04:50,890 --> 00:04:53,357 The airport sits at 2,000 feet above sea level 119 00:04:53,357 --> 00:04:55,374 on a shoulder between two mountains, 120 00:04:55,374 --> 00:04:57,808 and the marine fog that forms over the ocean 121 00:04:57,808 --> 00:05:01,108 frequently collides with the western slopes of Tenerife 122 00:05:01,108 --> 00:05:02,622 and then gets funneled 123 00:05:02,622 --> 00:05:05,274 through the gap directly over the airfield. 124 00:05:06,173 --> 00:05:07,323 But like I mentioned before, 125 00:05:07,323 --> 00:05:09,324 on this day the reported weather at the airport 126 00:05:09,324 --> 00:05:13,050 was more or less okay, with around six kilometers of visibility 127 00:05:13,050 --> 00:05:15,016 and scattered clouds at 400 feet, 128 00:05:15,016 --> 00:05:17,616 broken at 800 feet, and further scattered clouds 129 00:05:17,616 --> 00:05:21,033 at 1,100 feet with some light drizzle, 130 00:05:21,872 --> 00:05:23,157 not great for sunbathing, 131 00:05:23,157 --> 00:05:25,357 but good enough for normal landings. 132 00:05:26,189 --> 00:05:28,607 But these cloud layers also meant 133 00:05:28,607 --> 00:05:30,373 that higher up on the mountainsides, 134 00:05:30,373 --> 00:05:32,507 the fog was extremely thick, 135 00:05:32,507 --> 00:05:34,955 so thick, in fact, that a weather station located 136 00:05:34,955 --> 00:05:37,206 at a close to 8,000 feet elevation 137 00:05:37,206 --> 00:05:39,957 on the mountainside reported nil visibility. 138 00:05:40,339 --> 00:05:43,007 This meant that the very high terrain south of the airport 139 00:05:43,007 --> 00:05:45,074 would be completely obscured, 140 00:05:45,074 --> 00:05:48,757 including the nearly 12,200-foot Teide Volcano, 141 00:05:48,757 --> 00:05:52,624 which is the defining geographical feature on Tenerife. 142 00:05:53,205 --> 00:05:55,140 Because of that, the minimum safe altitude 143 00:05:55,140 --> 00:05:57,739 in the airspace south of Tenerife North Airport 144 00:05:57,739 --> 00:06:02,157 was 14,500 feet, which is worth remembering. 145 00:06:03,173 --> 00:06:05,440 Anyway, as the flight neared the Canary Islands, 146 00:06:05,440 --> 00:06:07,019 the first officer made contact 147 00:06:07,019 --> 00:06:09,252 with the Las Palmas Area Control Center, 148 00:06:09,252 --> 00:06:12,402 who soon cleared them to descend down to 11,000 feet. 149 00:06:13,451 --> 00:06:14,485 The first officer read this back 150 00:06:14,485 --> 00:06:16,652 and the crew initiated the descent, 151 00:06:16,652 --> 00:06:18,719 and after they reached that altitude, 152 00:06:18,719 --> 00:06:21,304 they contacted the Tenerife North approach controller 153 00:06:21,304 --> 00:06:23,902 and reported that they were now 14 nautical miles 154 00:06:23,902 --> 00:06:26,902 away from the Tango Foxrot November VOR beacon, 155 00:06:27,351 --> 00:06:28,119 and that they were ready 156 00:06:28,119 --> 00:06:30,035 to receive their approach instructions. 157 00:06:30,785 --> 00:06:31,902 Before we continue here, 158 00:06:31,902 --> 00:06:33,685 it's probably worth explaining a bit more about 159 00:06:33,685 --> 00:06:34,768 the different approach aids 160 00:06:34,768 --> 00:06:36,185 that the crew were now going to use 161 00:06:36,185 --> 00:06:37,962 as well as their procedures. 162 00:06:38,962 --> 00:06:41,213 A VOR beacon, where VOR stands for: 163 00:06:41,213 --> 00:06:44,414 Very High Frequency Omnidirectional Range, 164 00:06:44,414 --> 00:06:46,280 is a type of radio navigation beacon 165 00:06:46,280 --> 00:06:49,647 that was very widely used in the days before GPS 166 00:06:49,647 --> 00:06:51,196 and is actually still quite common, 167 00:06:51,196 --> 00:06:52,781 especially here in Europe. 168 00:06:53,613 --> 00:06:57,147 These VORs emit signals that are modulated differently 169 00:06:57,147 --> 00:06:59,781 depending on the direction of the emission, 170 00:06:59,781 --> 00:07:01,965 which allow the VOR receivers on board aircraft 171 00:07:01,965 --> 00:07:04,614 to determine the precise magnetic bearing 172 00:07:04,614 --> 00:07:06,664 from the VOR to the aircraft. 173 00:07:07,564 --> 00:07:11,080 This enables the pilots to navigate using imaginary lines 174 00:07:11,080 --> 00:07:13,980 or radios defined by a particular bearing 175 00:07:13,980 --> 00:07:14,981 from the beacon. 176 00:07:14,981 --> 00:07:17,515 So, for example, the 270 degree radial 177 00:07:17,515 --> 00:07:20,647 from the VOR points due west and so on. 178 00:07:21,430 --> 00:07:23,348 A lot of airports have VORs installed 179 00:07:23,348 --> 00:07:26,382 to help pilots locate the airport before starting to maneuver 180 00:07:26,382 --> 00:07:28,347 for the approach, and it can also be used 181 00:07:28,347 --> 00:07:31,031 to align the aircraft with the runway as an approach aid 182 00:07:31,031 --> 00:07:34,515 if an instrument landing system, ILS, is not available. 183 00:07:35,581 --> 00:07:38,281 But in this case, the Tango Foxrot November VOR 184 00:07:38,281 --> 00:07:40,798 was not actually located at the airport. 185 00:07:41,463 --> 00:07:43,198 Instead it was sitting on a hilltop, 186 00:07:43,198 --> 00:07:45,115 a few miles northeast of the airport 187 00:07:45,115 --> 00:07:47,465 in order to maximize its detectable range. 188 00:07:48,531 --> 00:07:51,932 Located at the northeast end of Runway 12-30, 189 00:07:51,932 --> 00:07:55,699 there was a less-sophisticated beacon called an NDB locator 190 00:07:55,699 --> 00:07:58,631 with the Morse code identifier Foxrot Papa. 191 00:07:59,213 --> 00:08:01,398 A non-directional beacon, or NDB, 192 00:08:01,398 --> 00:08:02,831 is a radio aid that can be tracked 193 00:08:02,831 --> 00:08:05,715 using an automatic direction finder, an ADF, 194 00:08:06,314 --> 00:08:09,097 and this is a very simple instrument which just points 195 00:08:09,097 --> 00:08:11,887 in the direction that a signal is coming from, 196 00:08:11,887 --> 00:08:14,304 but it doesn't contain any radial information, 197 00:08:14,304 --> 00:08:16,555 which makes the NDB navigation less 198 00:08:16,555 --> 00:08:19,254 precise than navigating using a VOR. 199 00:08:20,037 --> 00:08:22,838 In this case, because the Foxrot Papa beacon was used 200 00:08:22,838 --> 00:08:25,188 to mark the entry point to the approach procedure 201 00:08:25,188 --> 00:08:27,939 for Runway 12, it was also known as a locator 202 00:08:27,939 --> 00:08:29,855 rather than just an NDB. 203 00:08:30,921 --> 00:08:32,905 And in order to approach Runway 12, 204 00:08:32,905 --> 00:08:36,672 a flight inbound from the northeast like this flight was 205 00:08:36,672 --> 00:08:38,555 would normally need to fly first 206 00:08:38,555 --> 00:08:41,105 via the Tango Foxrot November VOR 207 00:08:41,105 --> 00:08:44,255 and then turn southwest onto Radial 255, 208 00:08:44,255 --> 00:08:46,949 directly towards the Foxrot Papa NDB. 209 00:08:47,482 --> 00:08:48,950 After reaching the Foxrot Papa, 210 00:08:48,950 --> 00:08:51,867 the aircraft should then turn right onto an outbound heading 211 00:08:51,867 --> 00:08:55,284 of 302 degrees, which would take it out over the ocean, 212 00:08:55,800 --> 00:08:58,067 before making a teardrop course reversal 213 00:08:58,067 --> 00:09:00,156 to the left back towards the airport. 214 00:09:00,438 --> 00:09:02,288 And from that point, the aircraft would be in a position 215 00:09:02,288 --> 00:09:04,356 to pick up the instrument landing system, 216 00:09:04,356 --> 00:09:05,439 which would then guide 217 00:09:05,439 --> 00:09:07,906 the aircraft the rest of the way down to the runway. 218 00:09:08,955 --> 00:09:11,204 Now this was quite a bit more complicated 219 00:09:11,204 --> 00:09:13,722 than the more commonly used Runway 30 approach, 220 00:09:13,722 --> 00:09:17,439 which just involved flying to an NDB called Tango X-ray, 221 00:09:17,439 --> 00:09:18,922 from where the instrument landing system 222 00:09:18,922 --> 00:09:20,689 could then be picked up immediately. 223 00:09:21,156 --> 00:09:22,706 Now the reason that these procedures 224 00:09:22,706 --> 00:09:23,989 had to be flown this way 225 00:09:23,989 --> 00:09:27,606 was that there was no radar available at Los Rodeos Airport, 226 00:09:27,606 --> 00:09:29,784 so all approaches had to be intercepted 227 00:09:29,784 --> 00:09:31,801 using procedural arrivals. 228 00:09:32,567 --> 00:09:34,518 But then again, flying procedural approaches 229 00:09:34,518 --> 00:09:36,518 would not have been very uncommon back then, 230 00:09:36,518 --> 00:09:38,601 and there was nothing in this procedure 231 00:09:38,601 --> 00:09:40,533 that was particularly out of the ordinary, 232 00:09:41,267 --> 00:09:43,917 except maybe that high terrain to the southwest, 233 00:09:43,917 --> 00:09:45,485 which I mentioned before. 234 00:09:46,709 --> 00:09:48,592 And when we're on the subject of things 235 00:09:48,592 --> 00:09:50,142 that are out of the ordinary, 236 00:09:50,142 --> 00:09:51,809 have you noticed that some countries 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reported 277 00:11:32,649 --> 00:11:34,665 when the aircraft was seven nautical miles away 278 00:11:34,665 --> 00:11:36,847 from the Tango Fox November beacon 279 00:11:36,847 --> 00:11:38,796 in order to get further instructions. 280 00:11:39,596 --> 00:11:42,663 At that same time, he also requested the local air pressure, 281 00:11:42,663 --> 00:11:44,980 QNH, in order to get the correct reference 282 00:11:44,980 --> 00:11:46,888 to the altitude above the sea, 283 00:11:46,888 --> 00:11:49,005 and also the QFE, which would give him 284 00:11:49,005 --> 00:11:51,221 the altitude reference over the airfield. 285 00:11:52,037 --> 00:11:54,339 Once those values had been received and set, 286 00:11:54,339 --> 00:11:55,938 they were then cross-checked 287 00:11:55,938 --> 00:11:59,120 in accordance with their standard operating procedures, 288 00:11:59,120 --> 00:12:00,503 and the captain now also suggested 289 00:12:00,503 --> 00:12:01,904 that the first officer should tune 290 00:12:01,904 --> 00:12:05,103 the ILS frequency on his navigational radio box, 291 00:12:05,103 --> 00:12:07,070 and he also confirmed that the outbound heading 292 00:12:07,070 --> 00:12:10,120 after Foxtrot Papa would be 302 degrees. 293 00:12:11,003 --> 00:12:13,437 So at this stage, everything was completely normal 294 00:12:13,437 --> 00:12:15,321 and the crew seemed to have a good grasp 295 00:12:15,321 --> 00:12:17,437 of the procedure they had in front of them. 296 00:12:18,520 --> 00:12:20,753 But just a few miles ahead, 297 00:12:20,753 --> 00:12:22,704 an island-hopping turboprop belonging 298 00:12:22,704 --> 00:12:25,888 to Spain's flag carrier, Iberia, was also on approach 299 00:12:25,888 --> 00:12:28,450 to Runway 12, and the crew on board that aircraft 300 00:12:28,450 --> 00:12:30,882 were communicating with the controller in Spanish. 301 00:12:31,900 --> 00:12:35,267 Now the pilots of Flight 1008 didn't understand Spanish, 302 00:12:35,267 --> 00:12:36,783 and from their conversations, 303 00:12:36,783 --> 00:12:39,049 it doesn't seem like they paid much attention 304 00:12:39,049 --> 00:12:40,751 to that aircraft at all. 305 00:12:41,167 --> 00:12:43,550 Instead, they continued to monitor their position, 306 00:12:43,550 --> 00:12:45,700 relative to the Tango Fox November VOR, 307 00:12:45,700 --> 00:12:48,599 and at time 13:18:15, 308 00:12:48,599 --> 00:12:51,516 the captain called out, "Just about to go overhead." 309 00:12:52,600 --> 00:12:53,799 The first officer then reminded 310 00:12:53,799 --> 00:12:55,167 the captain that the procedure called 311 00:12:55,167 --> 00:12:58,872 for them to leave Tango Fox November on Radial 255. 312 00:12:58,872 --> 00:13:00,255 But as it turns out, 313 00:13:00,255 --> 00:13:03,472 the aircraft actually passed a little less than a mile east 314 00:13:03,472 --> 00:13:06,173 of the VOR, and after passing abeam it, 315 00:13:06,173 --> 00:13:08,622 they were also slow to make the right turn, 316 00:13:08,622 --> 00:13:09,477 which meant that they never 317 00:13:09,477 --> 00:13:12,061 actually intercepted that 255 radial. 318 00:13:13,161 --> 00:13:16,394 Now, we can never know for sure why this happened, 319 00:13:16,394 --> 00:13:19,494 but it was most likely done on purpose. 320 00:13:20,044 --> 00:13:20,744 You see, the distance 321 00:13:20,744 --> 00:13:24,344 between Tango Fox November and Foxtrot Papa was very short, 322 00:13:24,344 --> 00:13:26,359 and Flight 1008 was traveling 323 00:13:26,359 --> 00:13:28,660 at an airspeed of around 250 knots 324 00:13:28,660 --> 00:13:30,477 when they passed abeam to the VOR. 325 00:13:31,243 --> 00:13:33,744 Today, we wouldn't fly that fast 326 00:13:33,744 --> 00:13:35,527 when starting a tight procedure like this, 327 00:13:35,527 --> 00:13:37,610 since our aircrafts are now very slippery 328 00:13:37,610 --> 00:13:39,677 and take time to decelerate. 329 00:13:40,076 --> 00:13:42,030 But older aircraft like the 727 330 00:13:42,030 --> 00:13:43,909 had much less effective wings, 331 00:13:43,909 --> 00:13:46,910 which meant that they could easily keep the speeds up high 332 00:13:46,910 --> 00:13:50,210 for longer, since the speed would just rapidly bleed off 333 00:13:50,210 --> 00:13:52,110 when the thrust levers were closed. 334 00:13:52,727 --> 00:13:54,177 This also meant that most jets 335 00:13:54,177 --> 00:13:56,843 approaching Tenerife back then, including this one, 336 00:13:56,843 --> 00:13:59,910 would normally overshoot this first turn slightly 337 00:13:59,910 --> 00:14:01,860 before correcting course in order to be able 338 00:14:01,860 --> 00:14:04,367 to intercept the 302 outbound course 339 00:14:04,367 --> 00:14:08,251 from the NDB at a slightly more comfortable angle. 340 00:14:09,001 --> 00:14:11,567 There was so little time between Tango Fox November 341 00:14:11,567 --> 00:14:13,585 and Foxtrot Papa that they probably wouldn't be able 342 00:14:13,585 --> 00:14:15,218 to intercept the radial anyway. 343 00:14:15,534 --> 00:14:18,685 And on top of that, if they flew directly over Foxtrot Papa, 344 00:14:18,685 --> 00:14:21,435 they would potentially overshoot the pattern significantly, 345 00:14:21,435 --> 00:14:22,657 which could take the aircraft 346 00:14:22,657 --> 00:14:24,324 into the area south of the airport 347 00:14:24,324 --> 00:14:27,823 where the minimum safe altitude was 14,500 feet. 348 00:14:28,823 --> 00:14:31,823 Now, this is obviously not how this was supposed to be done. 349 00:14:32,123 --> 00:14:35,190 A lower speed would have solved all of those issues, 350 00:14:35,190 --> 00:14:38,940 but sometimes, procedural shortcuts like this can start 351 00:14:38,940 --> 00:14:42,390 to creep in due to pure convenience and time saving. 352 00:14:42,956 --> 00:14:45,806 And if I was to guess, this was likely 353 00:14:45,806 --> 00:14:48,940 the reason that the captain of this flight flew a bit wide 354 00:14:48,940 --> 00:14:50,590 around the Tango Fox November. 355 00:14:51,506 --> 00:14:52,723 Now, due to some radio chatter 356 00:14:52,723 --> 00:14:53,897 with the Hapag-Lloyd flight 357 00:14:53,897 --> 00:14:55,629 that was taking off from Los Rodeos 358 00:14:55,629 --> 00:14:57,429 plus some other distractions, 359 00:14:57,429 --> 00:14:59,114 the flight crew didn't actually report 360 00:14:59,114 --> 00:15:00,630 crossing Tango Fox November 361 00:15:00,630 --> 00:15:03,780 until 33 seconds after they had passed abeam hit. 362 00:15:04,563 --> 00:15:05,797 And like I mentioned, 363 00:15:05,797 --> 00:15:08,547 Tenerife North Airport didn't have radar at the time, 364 00:15:08,547 --> 00:15:10,096 so position reports like this 365 00:15:10,096 --> 00:15:11,813 were the only way for the controller 366 00:15:11,813 --> 00:15:14,213 to determine where the traffic was located. 367 00:15:15,329 --> 00:15:17,097 As a result, when the crew reported 368 00:15:17,097 --> 00:15:20,046 that they had just passed Tango Fox November, 369 00:15:20,046 --> 00:15:23,230 the controller realized that the 727 was traveling so fast 370 00:15:23,230 --> 00:15:25,313 that it would risk getting too close 371 00:15:25,313 --> 00:15:28,279 to the slower Iberia turboprop in front of them 372 00:15:28,279 --> 00:15:30,098 if he didn't do something. 373 00:15:31,296 --> 00:15:34,380 So he hastily decided to put Flight 1008 374 00:15:34,380 --> 00:15:35,613 into a holding pattern 375 00:15:35,613 --> 00:15:38,113 in order to ensure sufficient traffic separation. 376 00:15:38,996 --> 00:15:42,197 At time 13:18:54, 377 00:15:42,197 --> 00:15:44,630 the approach controller transmitted the following message, 378 00:15:45,546 --> 00:15:48,464 "Roger, the standard holding overhead Foxtrot Papa 379 00:15:48,464 --> 00:15:50,514 is inbound heading 150, 380 00:15:50,514 --> 00:15:53,047 turn to the left, call you back shortly." 381 00:15:54,197 --> 00:15:56,797 And this would end up being the critical moment 382 00:15:56,797 --> 00:15:59,348 that put the accident sequence into motion. 383 00:15:59,348 --> 00:16:01,981 So let's take a moment to analyze why. 384 00:16:03,147 --> 00:16:04,514 Despite the controller's statement 385 00:16:04,514 --> 00:16:06,314 that this was a standard holding, 386 00:16:06,314 --> 00:16:09,065 there was actually no officially published holding pattern 387 00:16:09,065 --> 00:16:10,998 around the Foxtrot Papa beacon. 388 00:16:11,897 --> 00:16:13,097 There was a published holding 389 00:16:13,097 --> 00:16:14,714 around Tango Fox November, 390 00:16:14,714 --> 00:16:16,363 as well as around Tango X-ray, 391 00:16:16,363 --> 00:16:19,159 forming part of the go-around procedure for Runway 12, 392 00:16:19,159 --> 00:16:23,209 but Flight 1008 was not in a position to enter any of those. 393 00:16:24,375 --> 00:16:25,693 Instead, the controller essentially 394 00:16:25,693 --> 00:16:28,742 invented a holding pattern based on Foxtrot Papa, 395 00:16:28,742 --> 00:16:31,392 and he did so so quickly 396 00:16:31,392 --> 00:16:33,177 that this was likely not the first time 397 00:16:33,177 --> 00:16:35,410 that he had used this particular pattern. 398 00:16:36,160 --> 00:16:39,842 Now, it's not wrong or illegal to make up holding patterns. 399 00:16:39,842 --> 00:16:42,593 In fact, that happens all the time, and it's perfectly okay 400 00:16:42,593 --> 00:16:44,227 as long as it doesn't cause any issues 401 00:16:44,227 --> 00:16:46,260 with terrain or traffic separation. 402 00:16:46,826 --> 00:16:48,693 But the issue here was that the controller said 403 00:16:48,693 --> 00:16:50,492 that this was a standard holding, 404 00:16:50,492 --> 00:16:52,693 which would imply that the holding could be found 405 00:16:52,693 --> 00:16:54,610 in the published approach charts, 406 00:16:54,610 --> 00:16:57,011 and therefore needed to be verified by the pilots. 407 00:16:58,060 --> 00:16:59,661 On top of that, the entry 408 00:16:59,661 --> 00:17:01,761 into this suddenly-proposed holding pattern 409 00:17:01,761 --> 00:17:03,445 would not be very simple 410 00:17:03,445 --> 00:17:05,878 from the position that the aircraft was now coming from. 411 00:17:06,861 --> 00:17:08,527 What the controller wanted the aircraft to do 412 00:17:08,527 --> 00:17:12,378 was to join a left-hand holding pattern over Foxtrot Papa 413 00:17:12,378 --> 00:17:14,778 with an inbound course of 150 degrees 414 00:17:14,778 --> 00:17:17,294 and an outbound course of 330 degrees. 415 00:17:18,561 --> 00:17:20,194 If it was flown that way, 416 00:17:20,194 --> 00:17:22,792 it would keep the airplane over relatively low terrain. 417 00:17:23,524 --> 00:17:25,224 But to do this, Flight 1008 418 00:17:25,224 --> 00:17:27,642 would have to first fly over the beacon, 419 00:17:27,642 --> 00:17:30,057 then turn right onto heading of 330, 420 00:17:30,057 --> 00:17:33,475 fly outbound for one minute, perform a course reversal, 421 00:17:33,475 --> 00:17:34,757 and then proceed inbound 422 00:17:34,757 --> 00:17:37,674 to Foxtrot Papa again on the requested inbound course. 423 00:17:38,590 --> 00:17:40,225 Quite a complex maneuver to fly 424 00:17:40,225 --> 00:17:41,942 when you're almost over the beacon. 425 00:17:42,825 --> 00:17:44,891 Now, the pilots might have eventually figured this out 426 00:17:44,891 --> 00:17:48,344 if not for a tiny slip of the tongue by the controller, 427 00:17:48,344 --> 00:17:51,144 which changed this entire course of events. 428 00:17:52,511 --> 00:17:55,028 Remember that the controller wanted Flight 1008 429 00:17:55,028 --> 00:17:56,710 to fly counter-clockwise 430 00:17:56,710 --> 00:17:59,461 around the holding pattern, making left turns? 431 00:18:00,393 --> 00:18:02,578 Well, this meant that what he wanted to say 432 00:18:02,578 --> 00:18:05,345 was turns to the left, 433 00:18:05,345 --> 00:18:06,778 but what he actually ended up saying 434 00:18:06,778 --> 00:18:10,945 was, "Turn to the left," which has a very different meaning. 435 00:18:12,077 --> 00:18:14,078 Turn to the left is normally interpreted 436 00:18:14,078 --> 00:18:16,910 as a command to turn left, right away, 437 00:18:16,910 --> 00:18:19,011 which was not at all what the controller 438 00:18:19,011 --> 00:18:20,695 wanted them to do here. 439 00:18:21,011 --> 00:18:21,995 What he attempted to say 440 00:18:21,995 --> 00:18:24,261 was only a description of the holding pattern, 441 00:18:24,261 --> 00:18:26,495 which is technically just informational, 442 00:18:26,495 --> 00:18:28,878 not an order, and that also made sense, 443 00:18:28,878 --> 00:18:31,811 given that he didn't have any radar available. 444 00:18:32,528 --> 00:18:34,295 Spanish investigators later used this 445 00:18:34,295 --> 00:18:37,311 to argue that the controller didn't bear any responsibility 446 00:18:37,311 --> 00:18:39,211 for issuing a non-standard clearance, 447 00:18:39,211 --> 00:18:41,779 but given how his call actually sounded 448 00:18:41,779 --> 00:18:44,211 to the pilots, that's not completely fair. 449 00:18:45,044 --> 00:18:47,145 Anyway, when the flight crew received this message 450 00:18:47,145 --> 00:18:49,195 from the controller, they simply replied, 451 00:18:49,195 --> 00:18:50,928 "Roger," with no further readback 452 00:18:50,928 --> 00:18:52,595 or request for confirmation. 453 00:18:53,844 --> 00:18:55,029 They might have thought at first 454 00:18:55,029 --> 00:18:57,511 that they understood what he said, 455 00:18:57,511 --> 00:18:59,829 but within 10 seconds, the captain realized 456 00:18:59,829 --> 00:19:01,345 that he wasn't able to picture 457 00:19:01,345 --> 00:19:02,996 what the controller was asking from him, 458 00:19:02,996 --> 00:19:07,279 so he said, that's an odd sort of one, the runway. 459 00:19:08,246 --> 00:19:09,478 He then interrupted himself 460 00:19:09,478 --> 00:19:11,632 with a confirmation that they had 1,000 feet 461 00:19:11,632 --> 00:19:14,482 to go to their cleared altitude of 6,000 feet, 462 00:19:14,482 --> 00:19:17,062 and after that, the first officer said, 463 00:19:17,062 --> 00:19:20,571 "No, I'm not, er... Suppose it's all right?" 464 00:19:21,937 --> 00:19:24,555 The captain continued with, "I'll just turn straight round 465 00:19:24,555 --> 00:19:27,055 to the left on the 150 when I go overhead then," 466 00:19:27,434 --> 00:19:29,336 to which the first officer seemed to agree. 467 00:19:30,433 --> 00:19:33,469 Now this shows that the captain clearly believed 468 00:19:33,469 --> 00:19:36,869 that he had been told to turn left on to heading 150 469 00:19:36,869 --> 00:19:38,453 after crossing Foxtrot Papa, 470 00:19:38,453 --> 00:19:41,419 which again was not at all what the controller had intended. 471 00:19:42,302 --> 00:19:43,886 A command to turn to the left 472 00:19:43,886 --> 00:19:46,369 was completely incompatible with an instruction 473 00:19:46,369 --> 00:19:49,602 to fly a holding pattern inbound on 150 degrees 474 00:19:49,602 --> 00:19:52,557 to Foxtrot Papa since, like what I said earlier, 475 00:19:52,557 --> 00:19:56,541 that would require a right turn followed by a course reversal. 476 00:19:57,340 --> 00:19:58,491 So in the captain's mind, 477 00:19:58,491 --> 00:20:00,557 the instructions didn't make sense, 478 00:20:00,557 --> 00:20:03,208 but he had been able to pick out two elements 479 00:20:03,208 --> 00:20:05,041 in the message which seemed clear to him, 480 00:20:05,524 --> 00:20:08,091 150 and turn to the left. 481 00:20:09,206 --> 00:20:10,724 So with Foxtrot Papa now coming up 482 00:20:10,724 --> 00:20:11,957 in less than one minute, 483 00:20:11,957 --> 00:20:14,041 he didn't have a lot of time to figure it out. 484 00:20:14,874 --> 00:20:16,208 In a stressful situation, 485 00:20:16,208 --> 00:20:19,074 without fully comprehending what the controller had said, 486 00:20:19,074 --> 00:20:21,040 he accepted that the best thing to do 487 00:20:21,040 --> 00:20:22,925 was just to execute the part of the clearance 488 00:20:22,925 --> 00:20:24,258 that he understood, 489 00:20:24,258 --> 00:20:26,557 and then try to figure out the rest later. 490 00:20:27,324 --> 00:20:28,991 In hindsight, it's easy to say 491 00:20:28,991 --> 00:20:30,225 that he shouldn't have acted 492 00:20:30,225 --> 00:20:33,408 on an incomplete understanding of those instructions, 493 00:20:33,408 --> 00:20:36,208 but in that moment, with the sudden time pressure 494 00:20:36,208 --> 00:20:38,957 and the added workload of the sudden holding clearance, 495 00:20:38,957 --> 00:20:40,558 it would have been a lot harder 496 00:20:40,558 --> 00:20:42,575 to think with that kind of clarity. 497 00:20:43,224 --> 00:20:44,341 And it is also worth remembering 498 00:20:44,341 --> 00:20:47,008 that this all happened in a 727 cockpit, 499 00:20:47,008 --> 00:20:50,175 with no fancy navigation displays, only dials. 500 00:20:51,041 --> 00:20:52,925 Besides, this CVR transcript suggests 501 00:20:52,925 --> 00:20:54,941 that both the first officer and the flight engineer 502 00:20:54,941 --> 00:20:57,441 were looking at the charts when this all happened, 503 00:20:57,441 --> 00:20:59,475 likely searching for that standard holding 504 00:20:59,475 --> 00:21:01,508 in order to be able to verify it. 505 00:21:02,074 --> 00:21:05,407 And the first officer had said, "I suppose it's all right," 506 00:21:05,407 --> 00:21:08,175 which might have reinforced the captain's belief 507 00:21:08,175 --> 00:21:10,541 that he had understood the clearance correctly. 508 00:21:11,375 --> 00:21:14,042 Anyway, seconds later, having made his decision 509 00:21:14,042 --> 00:21:15,574 on how to fly, the captain focused 510 00:21:15,574 --> 00:21:17,258 his attention on the rapid approach 511 00:21:17,258 --> 00:21:18,915 of the Foxtrot Papa NDB. 512 00:21:19,514 --> 00:21:23,836 He said, "The only thing is, we're just about to miss it. 513 00:21:23,836 --> 00:21:25,702 (chuckles) It's too close." 514 00:21:26,520 --> 00:21:28,587 At this point, the captain and the first officer also agreed 515 00:21:28,587 --> 00:21:30,803 to tune both automatic direction finders 516 00:21:30,803 --> 00:21:32,853 to the frequency of the Foxtrot Papa, 517 00:21:32,853 --> 00:21:34,702 so that they could track it more easily 518 00:21:34,702 --> 00:21:36,203 during the holding pattern. 519 00:21:36,552 --> 00:21:39,887 And finally, at time 13:19:46, 520 00:21:39,887 --> 00:21:41,887 they passed abeam Foxtrot Papa, 521 00:21:41,887 --> 00:21:45,002 slightly to the southeast, and the captain called it out. 522 00:21:46,037 --> 00:21:47,786 This prompted the first officer to report 523 00:21:47,786 --> 00:21:50,070 the waypoint passage to the controller, 524 00:21:50,070 --> 00:21:53,002 and he also confirmed that they were now taking up the hold. 525 00:21:53,370 --> 00:21:56,153 But in reality, they actually kept flying straight ahead 526 00:21:56,153 --> 00:21:57,836 for another about 20 seconds, 527 00:21:57,836 --> 00:21:59,536 covering around two nautical miles 528 00:21:59,536 --> 00:22:01,637 before beginning the left turn. 529 00:22:02,419 --> 00:22:04,886 Now, the reason for this delay isn't really known, 530 00:22:04,886 --> 00:22:06,803 but it might have been because the pilots 531 00:22:06,803 --> 00:22:08,336 were still trying to wrap their heads 532 00:22:08,336 --> 00:22:10,736 around the maneuver that they now had ahead of them. 533 00:22:11,519 --> 00:22:14,154 In fact, a few seconds before they began that left turn, 534 00:22:14,154 --> 00:22:17,537 the first officer said, "Bloody strange hold, isn't it?" 535 00:22:17,853 --> 00:22:20,170 Which indicates that he was still mentally focused 536 00:22:20,170 --> 00:22:22,037 on the confusing instructions. 537 00:22:22,720 --> 00:22:24,462 In response to that, the captain said, 538 00:22:24,462 --> 00:22:25,912 "Yeah, it doesn't... 539 00:22:25,912 --> 00:22:28,379 Isn't parallel with the runway or anything." 540 00:22:29,412 --> 00:22:31,413 Now, I just want to stop here and drive home 541 00:22:31,413 --> 00:22:32,396 what is probably one of 542 00:22:32,396 --> 00:22:34,812 the most important points of this whole video. 543 00:22:36,228 --> 00:22:38,996 If something seems strange with a clearance and you get 544 00:22:38,996 --> 00:22:40,696 that pit-in-the-stomach feeling 545 00:22:40,696 --> 00:22:42,890 that something just isn't right, 546 00:22:42,890 --> 00:22:46,138 always speak up and ask for further clarification. 547 00:22:47,022 --> 00:22:49,506 This goes for all walks of life and all industries, 548 00:22:49,506 --> 00:22:52,139 but especially if you're flying an aircraft. 549 00:22:53,188 --> 00:22:55,955 It's always better to ask one time too many 550 00:22:55,955 --> 00:22:57,305 than one time too few, 551 00:22:57,305 --> 00:23:00,422 and I want every one of you out there to remember that. 552 00:23:01,321 --> 00:23:03,856 This, by the way, is also exactly the kind of discussions 553 00:23:03,856 --> 00:23:06,355 that I'm having regularly on my Zoom hangouts 554 00:23:06,355 --> 00:23:07,572 with my Patreon crew, 555 00:23:07,572 --> 00:23:10,372 and I hope to see you there as well next time. 556 00:23:10,372 --> 00:23:13,656 Just go to patreon.com/join/mentourpilot 557 00:23:13,656 --> 00:23:15,323 if you think that sounds interesting. 558 00:23:16,221 --> 00:23:18,989 Anyway, at this point, what the flight crew didn't yet know 559 00:23:18,989 --> 00:23:21,340 was that by overshooting Foxtrot Papa 560 00:23:21,340 --> 00:23:24,473 and then turning left onto a heading a 150 degrees, 561 00:23:24,473 --> 00:23:27,122 they were now on a track to overfly the northern shoulder 562 00:23:27,122 --> 00:23:29,322 of La Esperanza, a sub-peak 563 00:23:29,322 --> 00:23:31,606 along the island's central volcanic ridge 564 00:23:31,606 --> 00:23:33,389 that stretched north from El Teide. 565 00:23:34,071 --> 00:23:36,389 The terrain directly beneath their projected flight path 566 00:23:36,389 --> 00:23:38,872 actually didn't exceed 5,000 feet, 567 00:23:38,872 --> 00:23:40,990 but it did lie within the sector, 568 00:23:40,990 --> 00:23:44,356 where the minimum safe altitude was 14,500 feet. 569 00:23:45,339 --> 00:23:46,523 So strictly speaking, 570 00:23:46,523 --> 00:23:48,722 since they weren't flying a published procedure, 571 00:23:48,722 --> 00:23:50,740 maneuvering at only 6,000 feet 572 00:23:50,740 --> 00:23:53,055 would have been prohibited in this area. 573 00:23:53,805 --> 00:23:55,822 The final report would later place some blame 574 00:23:55,822 --> 00:23:57,923 on the flight crew for flying into this area 575 00:23:57,923 --> 00:24:00,456 without being aware of the applicable MSA, 576 00:24:00,456 --> 00:24:02,856 but it seems likely that at this point, 577 00:24:02,856 --> 00:24:04,621 they were still thinking that they 578 00:24:04,621 --> 00:24:06,306 were flying an official procedure, 579 00:24:06,306 --> 00:24:08,856 even though they couldn't find it on their charts. 580 00:24:09,473 --> 00:24:11,889 At the same time as Flight 1008 completed 581 00:24:11,889 --> 00:24:14,022 their left turn onto a heading of 150 582 00:24:14,022 --> 00:24:16,106 and started flying towards the southeast, 583 00:24:16,106 --> 00:24:17,355 the approach controller called up 584 00:24:17,355 --> 00:24:19,323 the Iberia Airlines flight ahead of them 585 00:24:19,323 --> 00:24:22,589 and asked them to verify when they had left 5,000 feet. 586 00:24:23,673 --> 00:24:26,005 Only seconds later, the pilot of that aircraft replied 587 00:24:26,005 --> 00:24:27,772 that 5,000 feet was now free 588 00:24:27,772 --> 00:24:29,156 and that they were in the middle 589 00:24:29,156 --> 00:24:31,556 of a procedure turn to intercept the ILS. 590 00:24:32,123 --> 00:24:34,090 As these calls in Spanish were happening, 591 00:24:34,090 --> 00:24:35,590 the first officer and flight engineer 592 00:24:35,590 --> 00:24:39,332 on board Flight 1008 continued to compare ATC's instructions 593 00:24:39,332 --> 00:24:41,432 with what was printed on their chart, 594 00:24:41,432 --> 00:24:44,915 saying things like, "It's that way, isn't it?" 595 00:24:46,169 --> 00:24:48,451 "That's a three, isn't it?" 596 00:24:48,451 --> 00:24:52,424 And, "Yes, well, the hold is going to be here, isn't it?" 597 00:24:53,140 --> 00:24:55,707 It's likely that they were now very skeptical 598 00:24:55,707 --> 00:24:57,841 about the maneuver that they were flying, 599 00:24:57,841 --> 00:24:59,891 but we can never be 100% sure 600 00:24:59,891 --> 00:25:02,623 since that wasn't formally verbalized. 601 00:25:03,672 --> 00:25:05,890 Anyway, as these discussions were taking place, 602 00:25:05,890 --> 00:25:07,240 the controller now called them up 603 00:25:07,240 --> 00:25:09,572 and cleared them to descend down to 5,000 feet 604 00:25:09,572 --> 00:25:12,057 since the Iberia flight had now left that altitude. 605 00:25:12,957 --> 00:25:15,490 And in response, the flight engineer again reduced 606 00:25:15,490 --> 00:25:18,107 the thrust and the captain initiated the descent. 607 00:25:19,457 --> 00:25:22,540 But as they were doing this, the captain suddenly said, 608 00:25:22,540 --> 00:25:26,007 "Hey, did he say it was 1-5-0 inbound?" 609 00:25:26,476 --> 00:25:28,610 likely realizing that his mental picture 610 00:25:28,610 --> 00:25:30,395 of where the controller was sending them 611 00:25:30,395 --> 00:25:32,111 didn't actually make any sense. 612 00:25:32,794 --> 00:25:34,928 The first officer had probably suspected that 613 00:25:34,928 --> 00:25:37,469 from the very start because he now replied, 614 00:25:37,469 --> 00:25:38,968 "Inbound, yeah." 615 00:25:39,369 --> 00:25:41,420 And in response to that, the captain said, 616 00:25:41,420 --> 00:25:43,553 "That's... I don't like that." 617 00:25:44,269 --> 00:25:46,203 The first officer continued by saying, 618 00:25:46,203 --> 00:25:49,086 "They want to keep going more around, don't they?" 619 00:25:49,769 --> 00:25:52,470 It's not completely clear what he meant by that, 620 00:25:52,470 --> 00:25:54,819 but it is possible that the first officer believed 621 00:25:54,819 --> 00:25:57,119 that they were supposed to keep turning left, 622 00:25:57,119 --> 00:25:58,919 making a three quarters turn onto 623 00:25:58,919 --> 00:26:01,136 the outbound leg of the holding pattern, 624 00:26:01,136 --> 00:26:02,636 after which they would come back 625 00:26:02,636 --> 00:26:05,769 to Foxtrot Papa on the inbound heading of 150. 626 00:26:06,919 --> 00:26:08,619 If that was the case, it would mean that 627 00:26:08,619 --> 00:26:10,753 even the first officer had indeed interpreted 628 00:26:10,753 --> 00:26:13,703 the call from the controller as an instruction to turn left. 629 00:26:14,369 --> 00:26:16,653 And that would also explain why he 630 00:26:16,653 --> 00:26:19,170 hadn't spoken up when the turn started. 631 00:26:20,152 --> 00:26:22,270 When I read this part of the report, 632 00:26:22,270 --> 00:26:25,603 I could really feel that cold feeling in my stomach. 633 00:26:25,603 --> 00:26:26,869 You know, that feeling that you get 634 00:26:26,869 --> 00:26:30,120 when you realize that something is really wrong, 635 00:26:30,120 --> 00:26:33,012 but you still can't figure out what or how. 636 00:26:34,060 --> 00:26:35,494 But we don't know if the pilots 637 00:26:35,494 --> 00:26:37,444 had yet realized just how dangerous 638 00:26:37,444 --> 00:26:39,294 their current flight path was. 639 00:26:39,294 --> 00:26:40,811 But the captain's statement of, 640 00:26:40,811 --> 00:26:44,711 "I don't like that," definitely showed some real concern. 641 00:26:45,612 --> 00:26:48,161 Again, make sure you always know what clearance 642 00:26:48,161 --> 00:26:51,078 you have been given, and if in doubt, ask. 643 00:26:51,994 --> 00:26:54,377 Anyway, before the pilots could spend much more time trying 644 00:26:54,377 --> 00:26:56,162 to work out what was wrong, 645 00:26:56,162 --> 00:26:58,127 the ground proximity warning system 646 00:26:58,127 --> 00:27:01,929 suddenly activated at time 13:20:50. 647 00:27:03,078 --> 00:27:04,244 The Boeing 727 was equipped 648 00:27:04,244 --> 00:27:06,578 with a first generation GPWS, 649 00:27:06,578 --> 00:27:08,444 which was state of the art at the time, 650 00:27:08,444 --> 00:27:10,195 but also much less capable 651 00:27:10,195 --> 00:27:12,495 than the enhanced ground proximity warning systems 652 00:27:12,495 --> 00:27:14,711 that we have on board today's aircraft. 653 00:27:15,395 --> 00:27:18,228 Modern EGPWSs compares the position 654 00:27:18,228 --> 00:27:20,212 and projected path of the airplane 655 00:27:20,212 --> 00:27:22,494 to a digital terrain database. 656 00:27:23,028 --> 00:27:25,012 But the original GPSs could only look 657 00:27:25,012 --> 00:27:27,294 at the terrain directly beneath the aircraft 658 00:27:27,294 --> 00:27:28,994 using its radio altimeter. 659 00:27:29,912 --> 00:27:32,336 If the closure rate with the terrain was too high, 660 00:27:32,336 --> 00:27:35,298 it would an issue sink rate or pull up warnings. 661 00:27:35,298 --> 00:27:38,347 But if the terrain ahead of the aircraft was rising steeply, 662 00:27:38,347 --> 00:27:40,064 the system wouldn't know that, 663 00:27:40,064 --> 00:27:42,615 so these warnings could still come too late. 664 00:27:43,648 --> 00:27:44,548 In this case, the airplane 665 00:27:44,548 --> 00:27:46,465 was now passing over the northern shoulder 666 00:27:46,465 --> 00:27:49,514 of the central volcanic ridge while in descent, 667 00:27:49,514 --> 00:27:51,731 and that resulted in a rate of terrain closure 668 00:27:51,731 --> 00:27:53,848 greater than 6,000 feet per minute, 669 00:27:53,848 --> 00:27:55,898 triggering the warning envelope. 670 00:27:56,565 --> 00:27:58,581 But the maximum height of the ridge ahead of them 671 00:27:58,581 --> 00:28:00,882 was actually less than their current altitude. 672 00:28:00,882 --> 00:28:02,997 So in their present trajectory, 673 00:28:02,997 --> 00:28:06,181 they were not in any danger of striking the terrain. 674 00:28:07,298 --> 00:28:08,898 But, of course, the pilots who had now lost 675 00:28:08,898 --> 00:28:10,898 their position situational awareness 676 00:28:10,898 --> 00:28:13,097 and were still flying inside of the clouds 677 00:28:13,097 --> 00:28:14,915 had no way of knowing this. 678 00:28:15,665 --> 00:28:18,232 So in response to the GPWS warning, 679 00:28:18,232 --> 00:28:19,714 the captain immediately announced, 680 00:28:19,714 --> 00:28:23,282 "Okay, overshoot," which is an old British term for go around. 681 00:28:24,148 --> 00:28:25,198 As the flight engineer advanced 682 00:28:25,198 --> 00:28:27,854 the thrust levers to the takeoff/go around thrust, 683 00:28:27,854 --> 00:28:30,003 the captain also halted their left turn 684 00:28:30,003 --> 00:28:33,474 and added, "He's taking us around to the high ground," 685 00:28:33,474 --> 00:28:36,124 and after stating that, he continued rolling right 686 00:28:36,124 --> 00:28:38,924 onto a steeper and steeper right-hand turn. 687 00:28:40,022 --> 00:28:41,239 But what he didn't do was 688 00:28:41,239 --> 00:28:44,206 to raise the nose in order to initiate the climb. 689 00:28:45,073 --> 00:28:46,589 And why was that then? 690 00:28:47,156 --> 00:28:49,556 Well, during GPWS-response training, 691 00:28:49,556 --> 00:28:51,206 we pilots today are required 692 00:28:51,206 --> 00:28:54,524 to practice a terrain-escape maneuver in the simulator, 693 00:28:54,524 --> 00:28:57,908 which includes disconnecting the automatic setting, 694 00:28:57,908 --> 00:29:00,250 full thrust, pitching up to 20 degrees, 695 00:29:00,250 --> 00:29:02,976 making sure the speed brake lever is down, 696 00:29:02,976 --> 00:29:04,876 making proper call outs and so on. 697 00:29:05,476 --> 00:29:08,159 This maneuver is drilled into everyone flying today 698 00:29:08,159 --> 00:29:10,059 in order to make sure that the response 699 00:29:10,059 --> 00:29:11,710 to a hard GPWS warning 700 00:29:11,710 --> 00:29:16,158 is immediately executed from memory and without questions. 701 00:29:17,024 --> 00:29:19,309 As it turns out, the captain and the flight engineer 702 00:29:19,309 --> 00:29:21,092 had also undergone some type 703 00:29:21,092 --> 00:29:23,609 of GPWS training back in 1978, 704 00:29:23,609 --> 00:29:27,836 and Dan-Air did have a procedure for GPWS response, 705 00:29:27,836 --> 00:29:31,469 but back in those days GPWS was a very new technology 706 00:29:31,469 --> 00:29:32,769 and there is a possibility 707 00:29:32,769 --> 00:29:35,452 that training had been only theoretical. 708 00:29:36,403 --> 00:29:38,887 So we don't know exactly what was going 709 00:29:38,887 --> 00:29:41,737 through the captain's head, but based on his statement 710 00:29:41,737 --> 00:29:44,469 that, "He's taking us around to the high ground," 711 00:29:44,469 --> 00:29:47,069 he probably believed that the controller's instruction 712 00:29:47,069 --> 00:29:49,203 to turn left was faulty 713 00:29:49,203 --> 00:29:50,753 and that the controller had told him 714 00:29:50,753 --> 00:29:53,069 to turn towards an unsafe direction. 715 00:29:54,020 --> 00:29:55,903 Believing that the GPWS warning occurred 716 00:29:55,903 --> 00:29:58,886 because they were turning left towards high terrain, 717 00:29:58,886 --> 00:30:00,186 the captain may have reasoned 718 00:30:00,186 --> 00:30:02,319 that the best way to escape the situation 719 00:30:02,319 --> 00:30:04,419 was to turn to the right instead. 720 00:30:04,985 --> 00:30:06,586 So without having practiced the maneuver 721 00:30:06,586 --> 00:30:09,054 in the simulator, the captain's immediate reaction 722 00:30:09,054 --> 00:30:11,797 was to turn rather than to climb, 723 00:30:11,797 --> 00:30:14,197 which sadly would seal their fate. 724 00:30:15,212 --> 00:30:17,314 Because as the right turn now continued, 725 00:30:17,314 --> 00:30:18,396 the aircraft passed over 726 00:30:18,396 --> 00:30:20,397 the top of the ridge and then over a valley, 727 00:30:20,397 --> 00:30:23,047 causing the radio altitude to increase, 728 00:30:23,047 --> 00:30:25,435 which silenced the GPWS warning, 729 00:30:25,435 --> 00:30:27,201 10 seconds after it had started. 730 00:30:28,202 --> 00:30:30,369 The captain commented, "Watch my eepers," 731 00:30:30,369 --> 00:30:33,351 referring to the engine pressure ratio or EPR, 732 00:30:33,351 --> 00:30:35,067 essentially ensuring that the flight engineer 733 00:30:35,067 --> 00:30:38,268 maintained TO/GA thrust and didn't over-boost the engines. 734 00:30:39,651 --> 00:30:41,084 But it also now seems like 735 00:30:41,084 --> 00:30:42,952 the first officer wasn't convinced 736 00:30:42,952 --> 00:30:45,135 that they were now taking the right course of action. 737 00:30:45,135 --> 00:30:47,025 So he called out, 738 00:30:47,025 --> 00:30:48,942 "I suggest a heading of 1-2-2 actually 739 00:30:48,942 --> 00:30:51,042 and take us through the overshoot." 740 00:30:52,226 --> 00:30:54,775 A heading of 1-2-2 degrees was the heading prescribed 741 00:30:54,775 --> 00:30:57,742 by the official Runway 12 missed-approach procedure, 742 00:30:57,742 --> 00:31:00,072 which would take them east over the ocean, 743 00:31:00,072 --> 00:31:02,654 so this was a pretty sensible suggestion. 744 00:31:03,704 --> 00:31:05,954 But 1-2-2 degrees was also 745 00:31:05,954 --> 00:31:07,971 to the left of their current heading, 746 00:31:07,971 --> 00:31:09,921 which contradicted the captain's assumption 747 00:31:09,921 --> 00:31:13,905 that their left turn was what had caused the GPWS warning. 748 00:31:14,815 --> 00:31:18,699 As a result, he just continued turning right past due south 749 00:31:18,699 --> 00:31:21,065 and then all the way around to the southwest, 750 00:31:21,799 --> 00:31:26,116 directly towards the 5,700 foot high summit of La Esperanza. 751 00:31:27,432 --> 00:31:29,848 Tragically, they might still have cleared the summit 752 00:31:29,848 --> 00:31:31,731 if they had just maintained altitude 753 00:31:31,731 --> 00:31:34,516 or climbed following the terrain-escape maneuver. 754 00:31:35,208 --> 00:31:38,091 But due to the high bank angle they were now using, 755 00:31:38,091 --> 00:31:40,558 the plane actually lost lift during the maneuver, 756 00:31:40,558 --> 00:31:42,726 causing a slight descent instead. 757 00:31:43,657 --> 00:31:46,459 Still flying over the valley, the flight engineer expressed 758 00:31:46,459 --> 00:31:49,974 his nervousness by commenting, "Let's get out of here." 759 00:31:50,476 --> 00:31:52,142 But the captain simply repeated, 760 00:31:52,142 --> 00:31:54,258 "He's taking us around to the high ground." 761 00:31:55,508 --> 00:31:58,408 Moments later, without any new GPWS warnings, 762 00:31:58,408 --> 00:32:01,208 and believing that he had corrected the situation, 763 00:32:01,208 --> 00:32:03,009 the captain called up air traffic control 764 00:32:03,009 --> 00:32:06,859 and reported, "Dan-Air 1008, 765 00:32:06,859 --> 00:32:08,908 we've had a ground proximity warning." 766 00:32:09,441 --> 00:32:10,674 This was then followed 767 00:32:10,674 --> 00:32:14,042 by the flight engineer calling out twice that their bank angle 768 00:32:14,042 --> 00:32:17,275 was now above the recommended maximum of 30 degrees. 769 00:32:18,141 --> 00:32:20,459 And his words were the last ones captured 770 00:32:20,459 --> 00:32:22,225 on the cockpit voice recorder. 771 00:32:22,925 --> 00:32:25,741 With the mountains shrouded in clouds, the pilots never saw 772 00:32:25,741 --> 00:32:27,375 the danger coming towards them, 773 00:32:27,375 --> 00:32:28,759 and the GPWS never had time 774 00:32:28,759 --> 00:32:32,025 to react to the closure rate of the steep mountain ahead. 775 00:32:33,024 --> 00:32:38,639 So at time 13:21:18, Dan-Air Flight 1008 crashed 776 00:32:38,639 --> 00:32:41,272 into the forested mountainside of La Esperanza 777 00:32:41,272 --> 00:32:43,639 at a speed of 260 knots, 778 00:32:44,071 --> 00:32:46,989 just 38 meters below the top of the ridge. 779 00:32:48,555 --> 00:32:50,722 Most of the aircraft disintegrated immediately, 780 00:32:50,722 --> 00:32:52,106 killing everyone on board, 781 00:32:52,106 --> 00:32:54,106 and a large portion of the aft cabin 782 00:32:54,106 --> 00:32:56,889 was then thrown another 250 meters forward 783 00:32:56,889 --> 00:32:59,672 over the top of the ridge and then down to the other side. 784 00:33:00,521 --> 00:33:03,122 Down at the airport, the controller now tried repeatedly 785 00:33:03,122 --> 00:33:05,173 to contact the aircraft in order to follow up 786 00:33:05,173 --> 00:33:07,307 on their reported GPWS warning, 787 00:33:07,307 --> 00:33:09,057 but when he didn't get any reply, 788 00:33:09,057 --> 00:33:11,437 he soon activated the accident alarm. 789 00:33:12,622 --> 00:33:14,011 The problem was though that 790 00:33:14,011 --> 00:33:16,261 with no radar available at Tenerife North, 791 00:33:16,261 --> 00:33:19,396 rescuers had no idea where the aircraft was located, 792 00:33:19,396 --> 00:33:21,663 especially since it had taken a turn 793 00:33:21,663 --> 00:33:24,279 that the controller had not intended them to take. 794 00:33:24,995 --> 00:33:26,596 This meant that the wreckage wasn't discovered 795 00:33:26,596 --> 00:33:28,813 until seven hours after the crash, 796 00:33:28,813 --> 00:33:30,646 when a couple of motorists on the road 797 00:33:30,646 --> 00:33:33,646 to El Teide National Park saw some debris on the road 798 00:33:33,646 --> 00:33:35,746 and correlated that to the radio report 799 00:33:35,746 --> 00:33:37,313 of a missing aircraft. 800 00:33:38,079 --> 00:33:42,464 This crash was, and actually still is, the worst loss of life 801 00:33:42,464 --> 00:33:44,267 on board a British airliner ever, 802 00:33:44,267 --> 00:33:48,841 so the investigation received considerable public attention 803 00:33:48,841 --> 00:33:50,224 especially when the Spanish 804 00:33:50,224 --> 00:33:52,358 and British investigators didn't agree 805 00:33:52,358 --> 00:33:54,908 on how to weigh the causes of the accident. 806 00:33:56,024 --> 00:33:57,292 The Spanish investigators wrote 807 00:33:57,292 --> 00:33:59,658 that the pilots were ultimately responsible 808 00:33:59,658 --> 00:34:02,886 for being aware of their position in a non-radar environment, 809 00:34:02,886 --> 00:34:04,853 and that it was their obligation 810 00:34:04,853 --> 00:34:06,254 to climb to a safe altitude 811 00:34:06,254 --> 00:34:09,587 as soon as they became unsure of where they actually were. 812 00:34:10,702 --> 00:34:13,703 They also cited the pilot's failure to request clarification 813 00:34:13,703 --> 00:34:15,086 when they didn't understand 814 00:34:15,086 --> 00:34:16,687 the controller's initial transmission 815 00:34:16,687 --> 00:34:18,670 as a major cause of the accident, 816 00:34:18,670 --> 00:34:21,704 as well as their incorrect response to the GPWS warning. 817 00:34:22,836 --> 00:34:25,804 They pointed out that if the pilots had done nothing at all 818 00:34:25,804 --> 00:34:27,453 when the GPWS activated, 819 00:34:27,453 --> 00:34:29,821 they would have passed safely over the ridge 820 00:34:29,821 --> 00:34:31,686 and continued out over the sea. 821 00:34:31,970 --> 00:34:33,254 So the Spanish investigators argued 822 00:34:33,254 --> 00:34:35,532 that it was the captain's decision to turn right 823 00:34:35,532 --> 00:34:37,771 that took them back around to the high terrain 824 00:34:37,771 --> 00:34:39,970 and ultimately led to the crash. 825 00:34:41,020 --> 00:34:43,054 But the British investigation team believed 826 00:34:43,054 --> 00:34:46,204 that the controller's use of an unpublished holding pattern, 827 00:34:46,204 --> 00:34:48,553 one that didn't appear on the pilots' charts, 828 00:34:48,553 --> 00:34:53,171 as well as its verbal slip-up saying turn instead of turns, 829 00:34:53,171 --> 00:34:55,138 played a very important role 830 00:34:55,138 --> 00:34:57,671 in the pilots' loss of situational awareness. 831 00:34:58,687 --> 00:35:00,804 They also noted that if the holding pattern 832 00:35:00,804 --> 00:35:03,382 had been designed according to international standards, 833 00:35:03,382 --> 00:35:06,531 the minimum altitude in the hold would have been 6,000 feet, 834 00:35:06,531 --> 00:35:09,381 which would have incidentally prevented the crash. 835 00:35:10,315 --> 00:35:13,315 But regardless of who made the most serious errors here, 836 00:35:13,315 --> 00:35:14,615 the disaster was made possible 837 00:35:14,615 --> 00:35:17,316 by the poor infrastructure at Tenerife North Airport, 838 00:35:17,316 --> 00:35:18,548 including the lack of radar 839 00:35:18,548 --> 00:35:20,865 and the poorly-designed approach procedures. 840 00:35:21,781 --> 00:35:22,881 It's also important to remember 841 00:35:22,881 --> 00:35:25,115 that the technology available in 1980 842 00:35:25,115 --> 00:35:28,631 was far less capable than what we now have available, 843 00:35:28,631 --> 00:35:31,415 and it's exactly because of accidents like this 844 00:35:31,415 --> 00:35:34,193 that we, today, have these vastly-improved systems 845 00:35:34,193 --> 00:35:37,319 and that we pilots are so well trained in using them. 846 00:35:37,701 --> 00:35:39,435 This accident led to recommendations 847 00:35:39,435 --> 00:35:43,436 to always question any clearances that weren't 100% clear 848 00:35:43,436 --> 00:35:46,360 as well as some other recommendations as well. 849 00:35:46,360 --> 00:35:48,588 But in the long run, this accident also led 850 00:35:48,588 --> 00:35:51,339 to better training around GPWS maneuvers 851 00:35:51,339 --> 00:35:54,588 and therefore, a significant increase in safety. 852 00:35:55,389 --> 00:35:57,639 Our current fantastic safety record proves 853 00:35:57,639 --> 00:36:00,618 that accidents like these today are largely preventable, 854 00:36:00,618 --> 00:36:02,386 but they are only preventable 855 00:36:02,386 --> 00:36:03,968 because of stories like this 856 00:36:03,968 --> 00:36:06,152 and that's why I keep telling them. 857 00:36:07,134 --> 00:36:09,685 Now, please consider subscribing to the channel 858 00:36:09,685 --> 00:36:11,234 if you found this video interesting 859 00:36:11,234 --> 00:36:13,818 and let me know what you thought in the comments below. 860 00:36:14,501 --> 00:36:17,301 Watch these videos next and remember 861 00:36:17,301 --> 00:36:18,568 to check out my sponsor 862 00:36:18,568 --> 00:36:20,102 who made this video possible, 863 00:36:20,102 --> 00:36:22,652 together with my fantastic Patreon crew. 864 00:36:23,252 --> 00:36:26,012 If you want to see my next video before everyone else, 865 00:36:26,012 --> 00:36:29,412 just go to patreon.com/join/mentourpilot 866 00:36:29,412 --> 00:36:31,162 if you think that sounds interesting. 867 00:36:31,595 --> 00:36:34,063 Have an absolutely fantastic day wherever you are 868 00:36:34,063 --> 00:36:35,512 and I'll see you next time. 869 00:36:35,512 --> 00:36:36,001 Bye bye.