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- [Petter] Aircraft accidents

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are always caused
by a combination

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of several factors and the thing

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that gets the sequence rolling

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is often something
simple and mundane.

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But this is the
first time I've ever come

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across a single letter kicking it off.

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- [GPWS] Sink rate. Pull up.

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- Stay tuned.

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When you hear the word Tenerife

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in aviation context,
people almost always think

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of the world's worst aviation disaster,

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the collision between two Boeing 747s

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at Tenerife's Los Rodeos
Airport back in 1977.

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But the island of Tenerife,

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the largest of Spain's Canary Islands,

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actually suffered a string of disasters

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between the 1950s and 1980s,

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who collectively claimed 950 lives

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and that infamous runway collision

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was just the worst one of those.

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So today I will tell you the story of

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the last major
incident to happen there,

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a story that took place on
a rainy spring day back in 1980.

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And this one, I think a lot
fewer of you have ever heard of.

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In the morning of the 25th of April 1980,

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the crew of Dan-Air Flight 1008

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were preparing to depart
from Manchester in England

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on a charter flight,
bringing tourists down

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towards Tenerife North Airport,

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then known as Los Rodeos.

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During the 1970s and '80s,

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Dan-Air was one
of Britain's largest operators

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of inclusive tour flights,
chartered by tour operators

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to transport fixed groups of people

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down to popular holiday destinations

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in Southern Europe and North Africa.

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Among the aircraft types operated

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by Dan-Air was the mighty Boeing 727,

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and Dan-Air were
actually the first British airline

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to import this model,
which had then had

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to undergo several unique modifications

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in order to
meet British safety standards.

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Now it would later turn out

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that the 727s were a
financial disaster for Dan-Air,

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but by 1980, that was
not yet very obvious.

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The aircraft that the
crew were going to operate

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on this day was 14 years old

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in generally good condition

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and could seat a
maximum of 144 passengers.

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So with a total
of 138 passengers booked,

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it was almost completely full.

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The crew consisted
of five flight attendants

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and three pilots, meaning that in total,

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there were going
to be 146 people on board

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once the flight got on the way.

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The pilot in command was a very

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experienced 50-year-old captain

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who had around
15,300 total flight hours,

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which included almost 2,000
on the Boeing 727.

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He had flown this route
down to Tenerife North

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a full 58 times before this flight,

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making him very familiar
with it in general.

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But as we will soon see,

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being familiar with the
destination doesn't mean

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that it can't throw a few surprises.

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His second-in-command
was a 34-year-old first officer

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who, on this day, had
about 3,500 hours in total,

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of which 618
were flown on the 727.

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And the third flight crew member

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was a 34-year-old flight engineer

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whose experience was similar
to that of the first officer.

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Now all of the pilots had been off

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for more than
24 hours before this duty

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and the scheduled departure time

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was at a very civilized hour,

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so there's no reason to believe

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that fatigue played any role

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in what was soon about to happen.

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Now instead the crew were
likely in a quite good mood

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as they completed their
normal pre-flight activities,

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checking weather,
NOTAMs and flight plans,

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which all looked okay.

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It looked like it was going
to be a very pleasant flight

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down towards the Canary Islands.

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So after having boarded everyone

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and completed the pre-flight set up,

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the crew started up their engines

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and taxied out for takeoff
from Manchester at time 9.22 am,

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with the captain as pilot flying

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and the first
officer as pilot monitoring.

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Now the climbout and cruise phases

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of this flight went off without a hitch,

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but the pilots then
likely started preparing

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and briefing for the approach

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a bit earlier
than usual on this day.

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And that was because
they had seen,

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during their pre-flight briefing

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that the approach
they had ahead of them

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was possibly going
to be a little bit unusual.

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You see, in the Canary Islands

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the prevailing winds normally blew

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from the Atlantic Ocean in the west,

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causing most flights to approach

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from the east using Runway 30

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in order to land with a headwind.

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But on this afternoon,
the wind was instead blowing

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from the other direction, from the east,

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forcing inbound aircraft to approach

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the reciprocal Runway 12 instead.

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Now we don't know how
many times the captain

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or the other crew members

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had actually used
Runway 12 in the past,

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but it was likely not something
that they did very often.

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And to make things even worse,
Tenerife North Airport was,

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and still is, notorious for its frequent,

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fast-building fog that can appear
from nowhere within minutes.

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The airport sits at
2,000 feet above sea level

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on a shoulder between two mountains,

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and the marine fog
that forms over the ocean

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frequently collides with
the western slopes of Tenerife

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and then gets funneled

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through the gap
directly over the airfield.

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But like I mentioned before,

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on this day the reported
weather at the airport

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was more or less okay, with
around six kilometers of visibility

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and scattered clouds at 400 feet,

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broken at 800 feet,
and further scattered clouds

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at 1,100 feet with some light drizzle,

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not great for sunbathing,

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but good enough for normal landings.

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But these cloud layers also meant

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that higher up on the mountainsides,

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the fog was extremely thick,

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so thick in fact that a
weather station located

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at a close to 8,000 feet elevation

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on the mountainside
reported nil visibility.

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This meant that the very
high terrain south of the airport

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would be completely obscured,

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including the nearly
12,200-foot Teide Volcano,

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which is the defining
geographical feature on Tenerife.

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Because of that,
the minimum safe altitude

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in the airspace south
of Tenerife North Airport

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was 14,500 feet,
which is worth remembering.

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Anyway, as the flight
near the Canary Islands,

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the first officer made contact

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with the Las Palmas
Area Control Center,

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who soon cleared them
to descend down to 11,000 feet.

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The first officer read this back

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and the crew initiated the descent,

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and after they reached that altitude,

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they contacted the Tenerife
North approach controller

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and reported that they were
now 14 nautical miles

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away from the Tango
Foxrot November VOR beacon,

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and that they were ready

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to receive their approach instructions.

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Before we continue here,

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it's probably worth explaining
a bit more about

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the different approach aids

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that the crew were now going to use

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as well as their procedures.

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A VOR beacon, where VOR stands for:

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Very High Frequency
Omnidirectional Range,

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is a type of radio navigation beacon

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that was very widely used
in the days before GPS

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and is actually still quite common,

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especially here in Europe.

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These VORs emit signals
hat are modulated differently

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depending on the
direction of the emission,

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which allow the VOR
receivers on board aircraft

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to determine the
precise magnetic bearing

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from the VOR to the aircraft.

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This enables the pilots
to navigate using imaginary lines

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or radios defined
by a particular bearing

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from the beacon.

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So, for example, the 270 degree radial

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from the VOR points
due west and so on.

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A lot of airports have VORs installed

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to help pilots locate the airport
before starting to maneuver

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for the approach, and
it can also be used

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to align the aircraft with
the runway as an approach aid

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if an instrument landing system,
ILS, is not available.

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But in this case, the
Tango Foxrot November VOR

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was not actually located at the airport.

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Instead it was sitting on a hilltop,

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a few miles northeast of the airport

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in order to maximize
its detectable range.

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Located at the northeast
end of Runway 12-30,

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there was a less-sophisticated
beacon called an NDB locator

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with the Morse
code identifier Foxrot Papa.

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A non-directional beacon, or NDB,

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is a radio aid that can be tracked

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using an automatic
direction finder, an ADF,

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and this is a very simple
instrument which just points

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in the direction that
a signal is coming from,

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but it doesn't
contain any radial information,

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which makes the NDB navigation less

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precise than navigating using a VOR.

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In this case, because the
Foxrot Papa beacon was used

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to mark the entry point
to the approach procedure

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for Runway 12, it was
also known as a locator

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rather than just an NDB.

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And in order to approach Runway 12,

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a flight inbound from the
northeast like this flight was

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would normally need to fly first

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via the Tango Foxrot November VOR

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and then turn southwest onto Radial 255

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directly towards
the Foxrot Papa NDB.

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After reaching the Foxrot Papa,

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the aircraft should then turn
right onto an outbound heading

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of 302 degrees, which
would take it out over the ocean,

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before making
a teardrop course reversal

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to the left back towards the airport.

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And from that point, the
aircraft would be in a position

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to pick up the instrument landing system,

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which would then guide

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the aircraft the rest of
the way down to the runway.

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Now this was quite
a bit more complicated

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than the more commonly
used Runway 30 approach,

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which just involved flying to
an NDB called Tango X-ray,

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from where the instrument landing system

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could then be 
picked up immediately.

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Now the reason that these procedures

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had to be flown this way

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was that there was no radar
available at Los Rodeos Airport,

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so all approaches
had to be intercepted

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using procedural arrivals.

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But then again,
flying procedural approaches

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would not have been
very uncommon back then,

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and there was nothing in this procedure

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that was particularly out of the ordinary,

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except maybe that high
terrain to the southwest,

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which I mentioned before.

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And when we're on the
subject of things

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that are out of the ordinary,

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have you noticed that some countries

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have now blocked the ability

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to make video calls
from within their borders?

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Well, I have, and that was
a bit of an issue recently

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when I needed to have a group call

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with my team to plan one of my videos.

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266
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267
00:11:08,620 --> 00:11:11,020
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and now where were we?

268
00:11:11,840 --> 00:11:12,360
Yes.

269
00:11:13,320 --> 00:11:15,500
After establishing  
contact at time 13:16,

270
00:11:15,700 --> 00:11:18,368
the Tenerife North
Controller cleared the flight

271
00:11:18,568 --> 00:11:19,980
to descend down to 6,000 feet

272
00:11:19,980 --> 00:11:22,180
in preparation to cross
Tango Foxtrot November

273
00:11:22,180 --> 00:11:24,500
and then to enter
the approach procedure.

274
00:11:25,120 --> 00:11:27,836
The captain dialed in
the new cleared altitude,

275
00:11:28,036 --> 00:11:30,519
the flight engineer reduced
thrust in order to descend,

276
00:11:30,719 --> 00:11:32,100
and the first officer then reported

277
00:11:32,100 --> 00:11:34,100
when the aircraft was
seven nautical miles away

278
00:11:34,100 --> 00:11:35,980
from the Tango Fox November beacon

279
00:11:35,980 --> 00:11:38,140
in order to get further instructions.

280
00:11:38,940 --> 00:11:41,920
At that same time, he
also requested the local air pressure,

281
00:11:42,180 --> 00:11:44,320
QNH, in order to
get the correct reference

282
00:11:44,320 --> 00:11:45,860
to the altitude above the sea,

283
00:11:46,460 --> 00:11:48,540
and also the QFE,
which would give him

284
00:11:48,540 --> 00:11:50,500
the altitude reference
over the airfield.

285
00:11:51,119 --> 00:11:53,821
Once those values
had been received and set,

286
00:11:54,021 --> 00:11:55,540
they were then cross-checked

287
00:11:55,540 --> 00:11:57,960
in accordance with
their standard operating procedures,

288
00:11:58,540 --> 00:11:59,920
and the captain now also suggested

289
00:11:59,920 --> 00:12:01,440
that the first officer should tune

290
00:12:01,440 --> 00:12:04,040
the ILS frequency on
his navigational radio box,

291
00:12:04,540 --> 00:12:06,460
and he also confirmed
that the outbound heading

292
00:12:06,460 --> 00:12:09,320
after Foxtrot Papa
would be 302 degrees.

293
00:12:10,380 --> 00:12:12,780
So at this stage,
everything was completely normal

294
00:12:12,780 --> 00:12:14,840
and the crew seemed
to have a good grasp

295
00:12:14,840 --> 00:12:16,740
of the procedure they
had in front of them.

296
00:12:17,700 --> 00:12:19,900
But just a few miles ahead,

297
00:12:20,260 --> 00:12:22,200
an island-hopping
turboprop belonging

298
00:12:22,200 --> 00:12:25,400
to Spain's flag carrier,
Iberia, was also an approach

299
00:12:25,400 --> 00:12:27,920
to Runway 12, and the crew
on board that aircraft

300
00:12:27,920 --> 00:12:30,240
were communicating with
the controller in Spanish.

301
00:12:31,280 --> 00:12:34,720
Now the pilots of Flight 1008
didn't understand Spanish,

302
00:12:34,840 --> 00:12:36,040
and from their conversations,

303
00:12:36,320 --> 00:12:38,460
it doesn't seem like
they paid much attention

304
00:12:38,460 --> 00:12:40,080
to that aircraft at all.

305
00:12:40,540 --> 00:12:42,885
Instead, they continued to
monitor their position,

306
00:12:43,085 --> 00:12:44,720
relative to the Tango
Fox November VOR,

307
00:12:44,720 --> 00:12:47,980
and at time 13:18:15,

308
00:12:48,200 --> 00:12:50,940
the captain called out,
"Just about to go overhead."

309
00:12:51,600 --> 00:12:53,240
The first officer then reminded

310
00:12:53,240 --> 00:12:54,720
the captain that the procedure called

311
00:12:54,720 --> 00:12:57,960
for them to leave Tango
Fox November on Radial 255.

312
00:12:58,340 --> 00:12:59,760
But as it turns out,

313
00:12:59,940 --> 00:13:03,020
the aircraft actually passed a
little less than a mile east

314
00:13:03,020 --> 00:13:05,340
of the VOR, and after passing abeam it,

315
00:13:05,680 --> 00:13:08,000
they were also slow
to make the right turn,

316
00:13:08,080 --> 00:13:09,040
which meant that they never

317
00:13:09,040 --> 00:13:11,420
actually intercepted that 255 radial.

318
00:13:12,480 --> 00:13:15,860
Now, we can never know
for sure why this happened,

319
00:13:16,120 --> 00:13:18,640
but it was most likely done on purpose.

320
00:13:19,500 --> 00:13:20,160
You see, the distance

321
00:13:20,160 --> 00:13:23,760
between Tango Fox November
and Foxtrot Papa was very short,

322
00:13:24,020 --> 00:13:25,780
and Flight 1008 was traveling

323
00:13:25,780 --> 00:13:27,660
at an airspeed of around 250 knots

324
00:13:27,860 --> 00:13:29,540
when they passed abeam to the VOR.

325
00:13:30,580 --> 00:13:32,491
Today, we wouldn't fly that fast

326
00:13:32,691 --> 00:13:35,000
when starting a tight
procedure like this,

327
00:13:35,020 --> 00:13:37,421
since our aircrafts are now very slippery

328
00:13:37,621 --> 00:13:39,060
 and take time to decelerate.

329
00:13:39,420 --> 00:13:41,392
But older aircraft like the 727

330
00:13:41,592 --> 00:13:43,300
had much less effective wings,

331
00:13:43,300 --> 00:13:46,340
which meant that they could
easily keep the speeds up high

332
00:13:46,340 --> 00:13:49,368
for longer, since the speed
would just rapidly bleed off

333
00:13:49,568 --> 00:13:51,260
when the thrust levers were closed.

334
00:13:52,040 --> 00:13:53,580
This also meant that most jets

335
00:13:53,580 --> 00:13:56,140
approaching Tenerife back then,
including this one,

336
00:13:56,380 --> 00:13:59,200
would normally overshoot
this first turn slightly

337
00:13:59,200 --> 00:14:01,400
before correcting course
in order to be able

338
00:14:01,400 --> 00:14:03,820
to intercept the 302 outbound course

339
00:14:03,820 --> 00:14:07,400
from the NDB at a slightly
more comfortable angle.

340
00:14:08,060 --> 00:14:10,920
There was so little time
between Tango Fox November

341
00:14:10,920 --> 00:14:13,140
and Foxtrot Papa that
they probably wouldn't be able

342
00:14:13,140 --> 00:14:14,560
to intercept the radial anyway.

343
00:14:15,000 --> 00:14:18,096
And on top of that, if they
flew directly over Foxtrot Papa,

344
00:14:18,296 --> 00:14:20,620
they would potentially overshoot
the pattern significantly,

345
00:14:20,980 --> 00:14:22,080
which could take the aircraft

346
00:14:22,080 --> 00:14:24,228
into the area south of the airport

347
00:14:24,428 --> 00:14:27,260
where the minimum
safe altitude was 14,500 feet.

348
00:14:28,200 --> 00:14:31,280
Now, this is obviously not how
this was supposed to be done.

349
00:14:31,600 --> 00:14:34,400
A lower speed would have
solved all of those issues,

350
00:14:34,840 --> 00:14:38,480
but sometimes, procedural
shortcuts like this can start

351
00:14:38,480 --> 00:14:41,700
to creep in due to
pure convenience and time saving.

352
00:14:42,520 --> 00:14:45,300
And if I was to guess, this was likely

353
00:14:45,300 --> 00:14:48,180
the reason that the captain
of this flight flew a bit wide

354
00:14:48,180 --> 00:14:49,820
around the Tango Fox November.

355
00:14:50,740 --> 00:14:52,140
Now, due to some radio chatter

356
00:14:52,140 --> 00:14:53,310
with the Hapag-Lloyd flight

357
00:14:53,510 --> 00:14:55,167
that was taking off from Los Rodeos

358
00:14:55,367 --> 00:14:56,540
plus some other distractions,

359
00:14:56,980 --> 00:14:58,722
the flight crew didn't actually report

360
00:14:58,922 --> 00:14:59,960
crossing Tango Fox November

361
00:14:59,960 --> 00:15:03,180
until 33 seconds after they
had passed abeam hit.

362
00:15:03,800 --> 00:15:05,160
And like I mentioned,

363
00:15:05,580 --> 00:15:08,165
Tenerife North Airport
didn't have radar at the time,

364
00:15:08,365 --> 00:15:09,580
so position reports like this

365
00:15:09,580 --> 00:15:11,439
were the only way for the controller

366
00:15:11,639 --> 00:15:13,660
to determine where
the traffic was located.

367
00:15:14,700 --> 00:15:16,640
As a result, when the crew reported

368
00:15:16,640 --> 00:15:19,080
that they had just
passed Tango Fox November,

369
00:15:19,620 --> 00:15:22,829
the controller realized that
the 727 was traveling so fast

370
00:15:23,029 --> 00:15:24,820
that it would risk getting too close

371
00:15:24,820 --> 00:15:27,807
to the slower Iberia
turboprop in front of them

372
00:15:28,007 --> 00:15:29,460
if he didn't do something.

373
00:15:30,660 --> 00:15:33,860
So he hastily decided
to put Flight 1008

374
00:15:33,860 --> 00:15:35,040
into a holding pattern

375
00:15:35,040 --> 00:15:37,420
in order to ensure
sufficient traffic separation.

376
00:15:38,340 --> 00:15:41,580
At time 13:18:54,

377
00:15:41,820 --> 00:15:44,060
the approach controller
transmitted the following message,

378
00:15:45,020 --> 00:15:47,920
"Roger, the standard
holding overhead Foxtrot Papa

379
00:15:47,920 --> 00:15:49,560
is inbound heading 150,

380
00:15:50,200 --> 00:15:52,420
turn to the left,
call you back shortly."

381
00:15:53,400 --> 00:15:56,240
And this would end
up being the critical moment

382
00:15:56,240 --> 00:15:58,969
that put the accident
sequence into motion.

383
00:15:59,169 --> 00:16:01,380
So let's take a moment to analyze why.

384
00:16:02,460 --> 00:16:03,940
Despite the controller's statement

385
00:16:03,940 --> 00:16:05,520
that this was a standard holding,

386
00:16:05,820 --> 00:16:08,753
there was actually no officially
published holding pattern

387
00:16:08,953 --> 00:16:10,220
around the Foxtrot Papa beacon.

388
00:16:11,240 --> 00:16:12,620
There was a published holding

389
00:16:12,620 --> 00:16:14,085
around Tango Fox November,

390
00:16:14,285 --> 00:16:15,722
as well as around Tango X-ray,

391
00:16:15,922 --> 00:16:18,180
forming part of the go-around
procedure for Runway 12,

392
00:16:18,600 --> 00:16:22,840
but Flight 1008 was not in
a position to enter any of those.

393
00:16:23,620 --> 00:16:25,160
Instead, the controller essentially

394
00:16:25,160 --> 00:16:28,624
invented a holding pattern
based on Foxtrot Papa,

395
00:16:28,824 --> 00:16:30,320
and he did so so quickly

396
00:16:30,320 --> 00:16:32,475
that this was likely not the first time

397
00:16:32,675 --> 00:16:34,740
that he had used
this particular pattern.

398
00:16:35,560 --> 00:16:39,180
Now, it's not wrong or illegal
to make up holding patterns.

399
00:16:39,380 --> 00:16:42,000
In fact, that happens all the time,
and it's perfectly okay

400
00:16:42,000 --> 00:16:43,680
as long as it doesn't cause any issues

401
00:16:43,680 --> 00:16:45,540
with terrain or traffic separation.

402
00:16:46,160 --> 00:16:48,456
But the issue here
was that the controller said

403
00:16:48,656 --> 00:16:49,900
that this was a standard holding,

404
00:16:50,020 --> 00:16:52,240
which would imply that
the holding could be found

405
00:16:52,240 --> 00:16:53,740
in the published approach chart,

406
00:16:53,740 --> 00:16:56,460
and therefore needed to
be verified by the pilots.

407
00:16:57,080 --> 00:16:58,587
On top of that, the entry

408
00:16:58,787 --> 00:17:01,180
into this suddenly-proposed
holding pattern

409
00:17:01,180 --> 00:17:02,820
would not be very simple

410
00:17:02,820 --> 00:17:05,280
from the position that the
aircraft was now coming from.

411
00:17:06,140 --> 00:17:08,165
What the controller
wanted the aircraft to do

412
00:17:08,290 --> 00:17:11,560
was to join a left-hand holding
pattern over Foxtrot Papa

413
00:17:11,560 --> 00:17:14,096
with an inbound course of 150 degrees

414
00:17:14,296 --> 00:17:16,700
and an outbound
course of 330 degrees.

415
00:17:17,680 --> 00:17:19,460
If it was flown that way,

416
00:17:19,720 --> 00:17:22,140
it would keep the airplane
over relatively low terrain.

417
00:17:22,780 --> 00:17:24,424
But to do this, Flight 1008

418
00:17:24,624 --> 00:17:26,860
would have to first fly
over the beacon,

419
00:17:27,200 --> 00:17:29,525
then turn right onto heading of 330,

420
00:17:29,725 --> 00:17:32,720
fly outbound for one minute,
perform a course reversal,

421
00:17:33,160 --> 00:17:34,180
and then proceed inbound

422
00:17:34,180 --> 00:17:36,920
to Foxtrot Papa again
on the requested inbound course.

423
00:17:37,880 --> 00:17:39,458
Quite a complex maneuver to fly

424
00:17:39,658 --> 00:17:41,240
when you're
almost over the beacon.

425
00:17:42,240 --> 00:17:44,340
Now, the pilots might
have eventually figured this out

426
00:17:44,340 --> 00:17:47,700
if not for a tiny slip of
the tongue by the controller,

427
00:17:47,900 --> 00:17:50,380
which changed this
entire course of events.

428
00:17:51,740 --> 00:17:54,480
Remember that the
controller wanted Flight 1008

429
00:17:54,480 --> 00:17:56,060
to fly counter-clockwise

430
00:17:56,060 --> 00:17:58,560
around the holding pattern,
making left turns?

431
00:17:59,740 --> 00:18:02,436
Well, this meant that what
he wanted to say

432
00:18:02,636 --> 00:18:04,121
was turns to the left,

433
00:18:04,321 --> 00:18:06,644
but what he actually
ended up saying

434
00:18:06,844 --> 00:18:10,280
was, "Turn to the left," which
has a very different meaning.

435
00:18:11,400 --> 00:18:13,560
Turn to the left
is normally interpreted

436
00:18:13,560 --> 00:18:16,317
as a command to turn left, right away,

437
00:18:16,517 --> 00:18:18,551
which was not at
all what the controller

438
00:18:18,751 --> 00:18:19,751
wanted them to do here.

439
00:18:20,420 --> 00:18:21,540
What he attempted to say

440
00:18:21,670 --> 00:18:23,680
was only a description
of the holding pattern,

441
00:18:23,820 --> 00:18:25,520
which is technically just informational,

442
00:18:26,060 --> 00:18:28,435
not an order, and that also made sense,

443
00:18:28,635 --> 00:18:31,000
given that he didn't
have any radar available.

444
00:18:31,820 --> 00:18:33,900
Spanish investigators later used this

445
00:18:33,900 --> 00:18:36,400
to argue that the controller
didn't bear any responsibility

446
00:18:36,400 --> 00:18:38,580
for issuing a non-standard clearance,

447
00:18:38,680 --> 00:18:41,240
but given how his call actually sounded

448
00:18:41,240 --> 00:18:43,520
to the pilots,
that's not completely fair.

449
00:18:44,440 --> 00:18:46,640
Anyway, when the flight
crew received this message

450
00:18:46,640 --> 00:18:48,815
from the controller,
they simply replied,

451
00:18:49,015 --> 00:18:50,554
"Roger," with no further readback

452
00:18:50,754 --> 00:18:51,860
or request for confirmation.

453
00:18:52,980 --> 00:18:54,774
They might have thought at first

454
00:18:54,974 --> 00:18:56,680
that they understood what he said,

455
00:18:56,980 --> 00:18:59,255
but within 10 seconds,
the captain realized

456
00:18:59,455 --> 00:19:00,747
that he wasn't able to picture

457
00:19:00,947 --> 00:19:03,344
what the controller was asking from him,

458
00:19:03,544 --> 00:19:06,340
so he said, that's an odd
sort of one, the runway.

459
00:19:07,580 --> 00:19:08,920
He then interrupted himself

460
00:19:08,920 --> 00:19:11,100
with a confirmation that
they had 1,000 feet

461
00:19:11,100 --> 00:19:13,400
to go to their
cleared altitude of 6,000 feet,

462
00:19:13,840 --> 00:19:15,680
and after that, the first officer said,

463
00:19:16,180 --> 00:19:19,820
"No, I'm not, er...
Supposedit's all right?"

464
00:19:21,040 --> 00:19:24,060
The captain continued with,
"I'll just turn straight round

465
00:19:24,060 --> 00:19:26,560
to the left on the 150
when I go overhead then,"

466
00:19:26,900 --> 00:19:28,580
to which the first
officer seemed to agree.

467
00:19:29,780 --> 00:19:32,730
Now this shows that
the captain clearly believed

468
00:19:32,930 --> 00:19:35,980
that he had been told
to turn left on to heading 150

469
00:19:35,980 --> 00:19:37,840
after crossing Foxtrot Papa,

470
00:19:37,980 --> 00:19:40,820
which again was not at
all what the controller had intended.

471
00:19:41,720 --> 00:19:43,300
A command to turn to the left

472
00:19:43,500 --> 00:19:45,860
was completely incompatible
with an instruction

473
00:19:45,860 --> 00:19:49,040
to fly a holding
pattern inbound on 150 degrees

474
00:19:49,040 --> 00:19:51,940
to Foxtrot Papa since,
like what I said earlier,

475
00:19:52,500 --> 00:19:55,940
that would require a right turn
followed by a course reversal.

476
00:19:56,680 --> 00:19:57,880
So in the captain's mind,

477
00:19:58,120 --> 00:19:59,940
the instructions didn't make sense,

478
00:19:59,940 --> 00:20:02,720
but he had been able
to pick out two elements

479
00:20:02,720 --> 00:20:05,640
in the message which seemed clear to him,

480
00:20:05,840 --> 00:20:07,420
150 and turn to the left.

481
00:20:08,580 --> 00:20:10,280
So with Foxtrot Papa now coming up

482
00:20:10,280 --> 00:20:11,360
in less than one minute,

483
00:20:11,480 --> 00:20:13,480
he didn't have a lot
of time to figure it out.

484
00:20:14,140 --> 00:20:15,440
In a stressful situation,

485
00:20:15,720 --> 00:20:18,280
without fully comprehending
what the controller had said,

486
00:20:18,600 --> 00:20:20,540
he accepted that the best thing to do

487
00:20:20,740 --> 00:20:22,360
was just to execute
the part of the clearance

488
00:20:22,360 --> 00:20:23,080
that he understood,

489
00:20:23,640 --> 00:20:25,920
and then try to
figure out the rest later.

490
00:20:26,640 --> 00:20:28,223
In hindsight, it's easy to say

491
00:20:28,423 --> 00:20:29,700
that he shouldn't have acted

492
00:20:29,700 --> 00:20:32,840
on an incomplete understanding
of those instructions,

493
00:20:32,960 --> 00:20:35,700
but in that moment,
with the sudden time pressure

494
00:20:35,700 --> 00:20:38,100
and the added workload
of the sudden holding clearance,

495
00:20:38,520 --> 00:20:40,060
it would have been a lot harder

496
00:20:40,060 --> 00:20:41,700
to think with that kind of clarity.

497
00:20:42,540 --> 00:20:43,760
And it is also worth remembering

498
00:20:43,760 --> 00:20:46,320
that this all happened
in a 727 cockpit,

499
00:20:46,520 --> 00:20:49,680
with no fancy navigation
displays, only dials.

500
00:20:50,360 --> 00:20:52,380
Besides, this CVR transcript suggests

501
00:20:52,380 --> 00:20:54,552
that both the first officer
and the flight engineer

502
00:20:54,752 --> 00:20:56,620
were looking at the charts
when this all happened,

503
00:20:57,020 --> 00:20:59,553
likely searching for
that standard holding

504
00:20:59,753 --> 00:21:00,880
in order to be able to verify it.

505
00:21:01,440 --> 00:21:04,700
And the first officer had said,
"I suppose it's all right,"

506
00:21:05,040 --> 00:21:07,600
which might have reinforced
the captain's belief

507
00:21:07,600 --> 00:21:09,760
that he had understood
the clearance correctly.

508
00:21:10,840 --> 00:21:13,520
Anyway, seconds later,
having made his decision

509
00:21:13,520 --> 00:21:15,083
on how to fly, the captain focused

510
00:21:15,283 --> 00:21:17,001
his attention on the rapid approach

511
00:21:17,201 --> 00:21:18,201
of the Foxtrot Papa NDB.

512
00:21:18,980 --> 00:21:23,000
He said, "The only thing is,
we're just about to miss it.

513
00:21:23,720 --> 00:21:24,820
(chuckles) It's too close."

514
00:21:25,860 --> 00:21:28,100
At this point, the captain
and the first officer also agreed

515
00:21:28,100 --> 00:21:30,380
to tune both automatic
direction finders

516
00:21:30,380 --> 00:21:32,100
to the frequency of the Foxtrot Papa,

517
00:21:32,420 --> 00:21:34,086
so that they could track it more easily

518
00:21:34,286 --> 00:21:35,286
during the holding pattern.

519
00:21:35,900 --> 00:21:39,320
And finally, at time 13:19:46,

520
00:21:39,480 --> 00:21:41,356
they passed abeam Foxtrot Papa,

521
00:21:41,556 --> 00:21:44,400
slightly to the southeast,
and the captain called it out.

522
00:21:45,380 --> 00:21:47,320
This prompted the
first officer to report

523
00:21:47,320 --> 00:21:49,480
the waypoint passage to the controller,

524
00:21:49,720 --> 00:21:52,060
and he also confirmed that they
were now taking up the hold.

525
00:21:52,800 --> 00:21:55,600
But in reality, they actually
kept flying straight ahead

526
00:21:55,600 --> 00:21:57,240
for another about 20 seconds,

527
00:21:57,360 --> 00:21:58,980
covering around two nautical miles

528
00:21:58,980 --> 00:22:00,720
before beginning the left turn.

529
00:22:01,820 --> 00:22:04,487
Now, the reason for
this delay isn't really known,

530
00:22:04,687 --> 00:22:06,322
but it might have been
because the pilots

531
00:22:06,522 --> 00:22:07,840
were still trying to wrap their heads

532
00:22:07,840 --> 00:22:10,160
around the maneuver that they
now had ahead of them.

533
00:22:10,940 --> 00:22:13,435
In fact, a few seconds
before they began that left turn,

534
00:22:13,635 --> 00:22:16,960
the first officer said,
"Bloody strange hold, isn't it?"

535
00:22:17,260 --> 00:22:19,580
Which indicates that he
was still mentally focused

536
00:22:19,580 --> 00:22:21,200
on the confusing instructions.

537
00:22:22,140 --> 00:22:23,540
In response to that, the captain said,

538
00:22:23,940 --> 00:22:25,080
"Yeah, it doesn't...

539
00:22:25,360 --> 00:22:27,740
Isn't parallel with
the runway or anything."

540
00:22:28,760 --> 00:22:30,923
Now, I just want to
stop here and drive home

541
00:22:31,110 --> 00:22:32,020
what is probably one of

542
00:22:32,020 --> 00:22:34,320
the most important points
of this whole video.

543
00:22:35,360 --> 00:22:38,500
If something seems strange
with a clearance and you get

544
00:22:38,500 --> 00:22:40,180
that pit in the stomach feeling

545
00:22:40,180 --> 00:22:41,500
that something just isn't right,

546
00:22:42,260 --> 00:22:45,220
always speak up and
ask for further clarification.

547
00:22:46,160 --> 00:22:48,800
This goes for all walks
of life and all industries,

548
00:22:49,060 --> 00:22:51,280
but especially if
you're flying an aircraft.

549
00:22:52,340 --> 00:22:55,019
It's always better
to ask one time too many

550
00:22:55,219 --> 00:22:56,420
than one time too few,

551
00:22:56,680 --> 00:22:59,680
and I want every one of
you out there to remember that.

552
00:23:00,420 --> 00:23:03,180
This, by the way, is also exactly
the kind of discussions

553
00:23:03,180 --> 00:23:05,800
that I'm having regularly
on my Zoom hangouts

554
00:23:05,800 --> 00:23:06,740
with my Patreon crew,

555
00:23:07,080 --> 00:23:09,320
and I hope to see
you there as well next time.

556
00:23:09,800 --> 00:23:13,020
Just go to patreon.com/join/mentourpilot

557
00:23:13,020 --> 00:23:14,400
if you think that sounds interesting.

558
00:23:15,380 --> 00:23:18,625
Anyway, at this point, what
the flight crew didn't yet know

559
00:23:18,825 --> 00:23:20,660
was that by overshooting Foxtrot Papa

560
00:23:20,660 --> 00:23:23,577
and then turning left
onto a heading a 150 degrees,

561
00:23:23,777 --> 00:23:26,540
they were now on a track to
overfly the northern shoulder

562
00:23:26,540 --> 00:23:28,136
of La Esperanza, a sub-peak

563
00:23:28,336 --> 00:23:30,561
along the island's central volcanic ridge

564
00:23:30,761 --> 00:23:32,600
that stretched
north from El Teide.

565
00:23:33,280 --> 00:23:35,800
The terrain directly beneath
their projected flight path

566
00:23:35,800 --> 00:23:37,980
actually didn't exceed 5,000 feet,

567
00:23:38,520 --> 00:23:40,791
but it did lie within the sector,

568
00:23:40,991 --> 00:23:43,820
where the minimum safe
altitude was 14,500 feet.

569
00:23:44,700 --> 00:23:45,700
So strictly speaking,

570
00:23:46,040 --> 00:23:48,020
since they weren't
flying a published procedure,

571
00:23:48,240 --> 00:23:50,180
maneuvering at only 6,000 feet

572
00:23:50,180 --> 00:23:52,400
would have been
prohibited in this area.

573
00:23:53,000 --> 00:23:55,240
The final report would
later place some blame

574
00:23:55,240 --> 00:23:57,363
on the flight crew
for flying into this area

575
00:23:57,563 --> 00:23:59,560
without being aware
of the applicable MSA,

576
00:23:59,680 --> 00:24:02,201
but it seems likely
that at this point,

577
00:24:02,401 --> 00:24:04,060
they were still thinking that they

578
00:24:04,060 --> 00:24:05,660
were flying an official procedure,

579
00:24:05,780 --> 00:24:07,900
even though they couldn't
find it on their charts.

580
00:24:08,680 --> 00:24:11,160
At the same time
as Flight 1008 completed

581
00:24:11,160 --> 00:24:13,140
their left turn onto a heading of 150

582
00:24:13,140 --> 00:24:15,146
and started flying
towards the southeast,

583
00:24:15,346 --> 00:24:16,760
the approach controller called up

584
00:24:16,760 --> 00:24:18,671
the Iberia Airlines flight ahead of them

585
00:24:18,871 --> 00:24:22,000
and asked them to verify
when they had left 5,000 feet.

586
00:24:22,960 --> 00:24:25,400
Only seconds later, the
pilot of that aircraft replied

587
00:24:25,400 --> 00:24:27,200
that 5,000 feet was now free

588
00:24:27,200 --> 00:24:28,651
and that they were in the middle

589
00:24:28,851 --> 00:24:30,600
of a procedure turn
to intercept the ILS.

590
00:24:31,080 --> 00:24:33,125
As these calls in
Spanish were happening,

591
00:24:33,325 --> 00:24:34,920
the first officer on Flight Engineer

592
00:24:34,920 --> 00:24:38,600
on board Flight 1008 continued
to compare ATC's instructions

593
00:24:38,600 --> 00:24:41,199
with what was printed on their chart,

594
00:24:41,399 --> 00:24:44,220
saying things like,
"It's that way, isn't it?"

595
00:24:46,140 --> 00:24:47,700
"That's a tree, isn't it?"

596
00:24:47,920 --> 00:24:51,840
And, "Yes, well, the hold is
going to be here, isn't it?"

597
00:24:52,540 --> 00:24:55,150
It's likely that they
were now very skeptical

598
00:24:55,350 --> 00:24:56,980
about the maneuver
that they were flying,

599
00:24:57,360 --> 00:24:59,340
but we can never be 100% sure

600
00:24:59,340 --> 00:25:02,020
since that wasn't formally verbalized.

601
00:25:02,960 --> 00:25:05,194
Anyway, as these
discussions were taking place,

602
00:25:05,394 --> 00:25:06,664
the controller now called them up

603
00:25:06,864 --> 00:25:08,960
and cleared them to
descend down to 5,000 feet

604
00:25:08,960 --> 00:25:11,280
since the Iberia flight
had now left that altitude.

605
00:25:12,180 --> 00:25:14,880
And in response, the
flight engineer again reduced

606
00:25:14,880 --> 00:25:17,400
the thrust and the
captain initiated the descent.

607
00:25:18,460 --> 00:25:21,540
But as they were doing this,
the captain suddenly said,

608
00:25:22,040 --> 00:25:25,200
"Hey, did he say it was 1-5-0 inbound?"

609
00:25:25,860 --> 00:25:28,100
likely realizing that
his mental picture

610
00:25:28,100 --> 00:25:29,340
of where the controller was sending

611
00:25:29,340 --> 00:25:31,440
them didn't actually make any sense.

612
00:25:31,900 --> 00:25:34,140
The first officer
had probably suspected

613
00:25:34,140 --> 00:25:36,917
that from the very start
because he now replied,

614
00:25:37,117 --> 00:25:38,020
"Inbound, yeah."

615
00:25:38,660 --> 00:25:40,954
And in response to that,
the captain said,

616
00:25:41,154 --> 00:25:42,780
"That's... I don't like that."

617
00:25:43,580 --> 00:25:45,719
The first officer continued by saying,

618
00:25:45,919 --> 00:25:48,420
"They want to keep
going more around, don't they?"

619
00:25:49,360 --> 00:25:51,731
It's not completely clear
what he meant by that,

620
00:25:51,931 --> 00:25:54,200
but it is possible that
the first officer believed

621
00:25:54,200 --> 00:25:56,612
that they were supposed
to keep turning left,

622
00:25:56,812 --> 00:25:58,380
making a three quarters turn onto

623
00:25:58,380 --> 00:26:00,120
the outbound leg
of the holding pattern,

624
00:26:00,340 --> 00:26:02,100
after which they would come back

625
00:26:02,100 --> 00:26:04,940
to Foxtrot Papa on
the inbound heading of 150.

626
00:26:06,140 --> 00:26:08,120
If that was the case,
it would mean that

627
00:26:08,120 --> 00:26:10,200
even the first
officer had indeed interpreted

628
00:26:10,200 --> 00:26:13,140
the call from the controller
as an instruction to turn left.

629
00:26:13,600 --> 00:26:16,100
And that would also explain why he

630
00:26:16,100 --> 00:26:18,460
hadn't spoken up when the turn started.

631
00:26:19,460 --> 00:26:21,768
When I read this part of the report,

632
00:26:21,968 --> 00:26:24,617
I could really feel that
cold feeling in my stomach.

633
00:26:24,817 --> 00:26:26,420
You know, that feeling that you get

634
00:26:26,620 --> 00:26:29,616
when you realize
that something is really wrong,

635
00:26:29,816 --> 00:26:32,300
but you still can't
figure out what or how.

636
00:26:33,240 --> 00:26:34,968
But we don't know if the pilots

637
00:26:35,168 --> 00:26:36,920
had yet realized just how dangerous

638
00:26:36,920 --> 00:26:38,360
their current flight path was.

639
00:26:38,540 --> 00:26:39,960
But the captain's statement of,

640
00:26:39,960 --> 00:26:43,980
"I don't like that," definitely
showed some real concern.

641
00:26:45,060 --> 00:26:47,720
Again, make sure you
always know what clearance

642
00:26:47,720 --> 00:26:50,360
you have been given,
and if in doubt, ask.

643
00:26:51,400 --> 00:26:53,940
Anyway, before the pilots could
spend much more time trying

644
00:26:53,940 --> 00:26:55,694
to work out what was wrong,

645
00:26:55,894 --> 00:26:57,967
the ground proximity warning system

646
00:26:58,168 --> 00:27:01,100
suddenly activated at time 13:20:50.

647
00:27:02,380 --> 00:27:03,740
The Boeing 727 was equipped

648
00:27:03,740 --> 00:27:05,704
with a first generation GPWS,

649
00:27:05,904 --> 00:27:08,130
which was state of the art at the time,

650
00:27:08,330 --> 00:27:09,691
but also much less capable

651
00:27:09,891 --> 00:27:11,940
than the enhanced ground
proximity warning systems

652
00:27:11,940 --> 00:27:13,820
that we have on board today's aircraft.

653
00:27:15,260 --> 00:27:17,640
Modern EGPWSs compares the position

654
00:27:17,640 --> 00:27:19,808
and projected path of the airplane

655
00:27:20,008 --> 00:27:21,720
to a digital terrain database.

656
00:27:22,320 --> 00:27:24,640
But the original GPSs could only look

657
00:27:24,640 --> 00:27:26,928
at the terrain directly
beneath the aircraft

658
00:27:27,128 --> 00:27:28,280
using its radio altimeter.

659
00:27:29,240 --> 00:27:31,740
If the closure rate with
the terrain was too high,

660
00:27:31,740 --> 00:27:34,260
it would an issue sink rate
or pull up warnings.

661
00:27:34,800 --> 00:27:37,560
But if the terrain ahead
of the aircraft was rising steeply,

662
00:27:37,860 --> 00:27:39,300
the system wouldn't know that,

663
00:27:39,460 --> 00:27:41,840
so these warnings could
still come too late.

664
00:27:43,060 --> 00:27:44,100
In this case, the airplane

665
00:27:44,210 --> 00:27:45,840
was now passing over
the northern shoulder

666
00:27:45,840 --> 00:27:48,580
of the central volcanic
ridge while in descent,

667
00:27:49,060 --> 00:27:51,195
and that resulted in a
rate of terrain closure

668
00:27:51,395 --> 00:27:53,320
greater than 6,000 feet per minute,

669
00:27:53,520 --> 00:27:55,080
triggering the warning envelope.

670
00:27:55,820 --> 00:27:58,218
But the maximum height
of the ridge ahead of them

671
00:27:58,418 --> 00:28:00,830
was actually less than
their current altitude.

672
00:28:01,030 --> 00:28:02,438
So in their present trajectory,

673
00:28:02,610 --> 00:28:05,520
they were not in any
danger of striking the terrain.

674
00:28:06,680 --> 00:28:08,340
But, of course, the
pilots who had now lost

675
00:28:08,340 --> 00:28:10,200
their position situational awareness

676
00:28:10,200 --> 00:28:12,586
and were still flying
inside of the clouds

677
00:28:12,786 --> 00:28:14,120
had no way of knowing this.

678
00:28:14,960 --> 00:28:17,480
So in response to the GPWS warning,

679
00:28:17,760 --> 00:28:19,020
the captain immediately announced,

680
00:28:19,180 --> 00:28:22,600
"Okay, overshoot," which is an
old British term for go around.

681
00:28:23,140 --> 00:28:24,680
As the flight engineer advanced

682
00:28:24,680 --> 00:28:27,120
the thrust levers to
the takeoff go around thrust,

683
00:28:27,380 --> 00:28:29,831
the captain also halted their left turn

684
00:28:30,031 --> 00:28:32,901
and added, "He's taking us
around to the high ground,"

685
00:28:33,050 --> 00:28:35,460
and after stating that,
he continued rolling right

686
00:28:35,460 --> 00:28:38,340
onto a steeper and
steeper right-hand turn.

687
00:28:39,240 --> 00:28:40,780
But what he didn't do was

688
00:28:40,780 --> 00:28:43,420
to raise the nose in
order to initiate the climb.

689
00:28:44,340 --> 00:28:46,000
And why was that then?

690
00:28:46,600 --> 00:28:49,020
Well, during GPWS response training,

691
00:28:49,140 --> 00:28:50,620
we pilots today are required

692
00:28:50,620 --> 00:28:53,620
to practice a terrain escape
maneuver in the simulator,

693
00:28:53,620 --> 00:28:57,160
which includes disconnecting
the automatic setting,

694
00:28:57,440 --> 00:28:59,720
full thrust pitching up to 20 degrees,

695
00:28:59,840 --> 00:29:02,227
making sure the speed
brake lever is down,

696
00:29:02,427 --> 00:29:04,160
making proper
call outs and so on.

697
00:29:04,880 --> 00:29:07,560
This maneuver is drilled
into everyone flying today

698
00:29:07,560 --> 00:29:09,400
in order to make sure that the response

699
00:29:09,400 --> 00:29:11,140
to a hard GPWS warning

700
00:29:11,140 --> 00:29:15,280
is immediately executed from
memory and without questions.

701
00:29:16,100 --> 00:29:18,947
As it turns out, the captain
and the flight engineer

702
00:29:19,147 --> 00:29:21,184
had also undergone some type

703
00:29:21,384 --> 00:29:23,367
of GPWS training back in 1978,

704
00:29:23,567 --> 00:29:26,780
and Dan-Air did have a
procedure for GPWS response,

705
00:29:27,480 --> 00:29:30,800
but back in those days
GPWS was a very new technology

706
00:29:30,800 --> 00:29:32,140
and there is a possibility

707
00:29:32,140 --> 00:29:34,660
that training had
been only theoretical.

708
00:29:35,460 --> 00:29:38,380
So we don't know exactly what was going

709
00:29:38,380 --> 00:29:41,180
through the captain's head,
but based on his statement

710
00:29:41,180 --> 00:29:43,978
that, "He's taking us
around to the high ground,"

711
00:29:44,178 --> 00:29:47,097
he probably believed
that the controller's instruction

712
00:29:47,297 --> 00:29:48,340
to turn left was faulty

713
00:29:48,340 --> 00:29:50,300
and that the controller had told him

714
00:29:50,300 --> 00:29:52,420
to turn towards an unsafe direction.

715
00:29:53,220 --> 00:29:55,360
Believing that the
GPWS warning occurred

716
00:29:55,360 --> 00:29:58,198
because they were turning
left towards high terrain,

717
00:29:58,398 --> 00:29:59,780
the captain may have reasoned

718
00:29:59,780 --> 00:30:01,896
that the best way
to escape the situation

719
00:30:02,096 --> 00:30:03,600
was to turn to the right instead.

720
00:30:04,440 --> 00:30:06,116
So without having
practiced the maneuver

721
00:30:06,190 --> 00:30:08,577
in the simulator, the
captain's immediate reaction

722
00:30:08,710 --> 00:30:11,040
was to turn rather than to climb,

723
00:30:11,240 --> 00:30:13,440
which sadly would seal their fate.

724
00:30:14,300 --> 00:30:16,550
Because as the right turn now continued,

725
00:30:16,750 --> 00:30:17,900
the aircraft passed over

726
00:30:17,900 --> 00:30:19,815
the top of the ridge
and then over a valley,

727
00:30:20,015 --> 00:30:22,020
causing the radio altitude to increase,

728
00:30:22,560 --> 00:30:24,570
which silenced the GPWS warning,

729
00:30:24,770 --> 00:30:26,580
10 seconds after it had started.

730
00:30:27,620 --> 00:30:29,942
The captain commented,
"Watch my eepers,"

731
00:30:30,142 --> 00:30:32,547
referring to the engine
pressure ratio or EPR,

732
00:30:32,747 --> 00:30:34,838
essentially ensuring
that the flight engineer

733
00:30:35,038 --> 00:30:37,740
maintained TO/GA thrust and
didn't over-boost the engines.

734
00:30:38,940 --> 00:30:40,640
But it also now seems like

735
00:30:40,640 --> 00:30:42,400
the first officer wasn't convinced

736
00:30:42,400 --> 00:30:44,823
that they were now taking
the right course of action.

737
00:30:45,023 --> 00:30:45,939
So he called out,

738
00:30:46,139 --> 00:30:48,303
"I suggest a heading of 1-2-2 actually

739
00:30:48,503 --> 00:30:50,240
and take us through the overshoot."

740
00:30:51,320 --> 00:30:54,365
A heading of 1-2-2 degrees
was the heading prescribed

741
00:30:54,470 --> 00:30:57,120
by the official Runway 12
missed approach procedure,

742
00:30:57,300 --> 00:30:59,638
which would take them
east over the ocean,

743
00:30:59,838 --> 00:31:01,920
so this was a pretty sensible suggestion.

744
00:31:02,980 --> 00:31:05,440
But 1-2-2 degrees was also

745
00:31:05,440 --> 00:31:07,320
to the left of their current heading,

746
00:31:07,460 --> 00:31:09,320
which contradicted
the captain's assumption

747
00:31:09,320 --> 00:31:13,220
that their left turn was
what had caused the GPWS warning.

748
00:31:14,280 --> 00:31:17,960
As a result, he just continued
turning right past due south

749
00:31:17,960 --> 00:31:20,240
and then all the way
around to the southwest,

750
00:31:20,620 --> 00:31:25,520
directly towards the 5,700 foot
high summit of La Esperanza.

751
00:31:26,760 --> 00:31:29,372
Tragically, they might
still have cleared the summit

752
00:31:29,572 --> 00:31:31,180
if they had just maintained altitude

753
00:31:31,180 --> 00:31:33,800
or climbed following
the terrain escape maneuver.

754
00:31:34,640 --> 00:31:37,584
But due to the high bank angle
they were now using,

755
00:31:37,784 --> 00:31:40,243
the plane actually lost
lift during the maneuver,

756
00:31:40,443 --> 00:31:41,900
causing a slight descent instead.

757
00:31:43,080 --> 00:31:46,094
Still flying over the valley,
the flight engineer expressed

758
00:31:46,294 --> 00:31:49,260
his nervousness by commenting,
"Let's get out of here."

759
00:31:49,880 --> 00:31:51,220
But the captain simply repeated,

760
00:31:51,620 --> 00:31:53,440
"He's taking us around
to the high ground."

761
00:31:54,720 --> 00:31:57,637
Moments later, without any
new GPWS warnings,

762
00:31:57,837 --> 00:32:00,333
and believing that he
had corrected the situation,

763
00:32:00,533 --> 00:32:02,380
the captain
called up air traffic control

764
00:32:02,380 --> 00:32:06,100
and reported, "Dan-Air 1008,

765
00:32:06,320 --> 00:32:08,000
we've had a ground proximity warning."

766
00:32:08,880 --> 00:32:10,086
This was then followed

767
00:32:10,286 --> 00:32:13,575
by the flight engineer calling
out twice that their bank angle

768
00:32:13,750 --> 00:32:16,300
was now above the recommended
maximum of 30 degrees.

769
00:32:17,520 --> 00:32:19,576
And his words were
the last ones captured

770
00:32:19,776 --> 00:32:21,080
on the cockpit voice recorder.

771
00:32:21,900 --> 00:32:25,240
With the mountains shrouded in
clouds, the pilots never saw

772
00:32:25,240 --> 00:32:26,720
the danger coming towards them,

773
00:32:26,720 --> 00:32:28,300
and the GPWS never had time

774
00:32:28,300 --> 00:32:31,180
to react to the closure
rate of the steep mountain ahead.

775
00:32:32,300 --> 00:32:38,080
So at time 13:21:18 Dan-Air
Flight 1008 crashed

776
00:32:38,080 --> 00:32:40,626
into the forested
mountainside of La Esperanza

777
00:32:40,826 --> 00:32:42,839
at a speed of 260 knots,

778
00:32:43,039 --> 00:32:46,360
just 38 meters below
the top of the ridge.

779
00:32:47,720 --> 00:32:50,227
Most of the aircraft
disintegrated immediately,

780
00:32:50,427 --> 00:32:51,724
killing everyone on board,

781
00:32:51,924 --> 00:32:53,582
and a large portion
of the aft cabin

782
00:32:53,710 --> 00:32:56,312
was then thrown another
250 meters forward

783
00:32:56,512 --> 00:32:58,980
over the top of the ridge and
then down to the other side.

784
00:32:59,800 --> 00:33:02,736
Down at the airport,
the controller now tried repeatedly

785
00:33:02,936 --> 00:33:04,797
to contact the aircraft
in order to follow up

786
00:33:04,870 --> 00:33:06,300
on their reported GPWS warning,

787
00:33:06,720 --> 00:33:08,260
but when he didn't get any reply,

788
00:33:08,560 --> 00:33:10,620
he soon activated the accident alarm.

789
00:33:11,660 --> 00:33:13,139
The problem was though that

790
00:33:13,339 --> 00:33:15,440
with no radar available
at Tenerife North,

791
00:33:15,820 --> 00:33:18,800
rescuers had no idea
where the aircraft was located,

792
00:33:18,960 --> 00:33:21,100
especially since it had taken a turn

793
00:33:21,100 --> 00:33:23,580
that the controller had
not intended them to take.

794
00:33:24,340 --> 00:33:26,593
This meant that the
wreckage wasn't discovered

795
00:33:26,793 --> 00:33:28,336
until seven hours after the crash,

796
00:33:28,536 --> 00:33:30,060
when a couple of
motorists on the road

797
00:33:30,060 --> 00:33:33,034
to El Teide National Park
saw some debris on the road

798
00:33:33,234 --> 00:33:35,214
and correlated that to the radio report

799
00:33:35,414 --> 00:33:36,414
of a missing aircraft.

800
00:33:37,120 --> 00:33:41,325
This crash was, and actually
still is, the worst loss of life

801
00:33:41,525 --> 00:33:43,600
on board a British airliner ever,

802
00:33:43,820 --> 00:33:47,100
so the investigation received
considerable public attention

803
00:33:48,140 --> 00:33:49,660
especially when the Spanish

804
00:33:49,860 --> 00:33:51,800
and British investigators didn't agree

805
00:33:51,800 --> 00:33:54,340
on how to weigh
the causes of the accident.

806
00:33:54,980 --> 00:33:56,780
The Spanish investigators wrote

807
00:33:56,780 --> 00:33:59,140
that the pilots
were ultimately responsible

808
00:33:59,140 --> 00:34:02,220
for being aware of their position
in a non-radar environment,

809
00:34:02,400 --> 00:34:04,260
and that it was their obligation

810
00:34:04,260 --> 00:34:05,680
to climb to a safe altitude

811
00:34:05,680 --> 00:34:09,100
as soon as they became unsure
of where they actually were.

812
00:34:09,860 --> 00:34:12,920
They also cited the pilot's
failure to request clarification

813
00:34:12,920 --> 00:34:14,500
when they didn't understand

814
00:34:14,500 --> 00:34:16,060
the controller's initial transmission

815
00:34:16,060 --> 00:34:17,700
as a major cause of the accident,

816
00:34:18,140 --> 00:34:21,060
as well as their incorrect
response to the GPWS warning.

817
00:34:22,120 --> 00:34:25,191
They pointed out that if
the pilots had done nothing at all

818
00:34:25,391 --> 00:34:26,440
when the GPWS activated,

819
00:34:27,000 --> 00:34:29,276
they would have passed
safely over the ridge

820
00:34:29,476 --> 00:34:30,880
and continued out over the sea.

821
00:34:31,360 --> 00:34:32,790
So the Spanish investigators argued

822
00:34:32,990 --> 00:34:34,940
 that it was the captain's
decision to turn right

823
00:34:34,940 --> 00:34:37,558
that took them back
around to the high terrain

824
00:34:37,758 --> 00:34:39,380
and ultimately led to the crash.

825
00:34:40,340 --> 00:34:42,480
But the British
investigation team believed

826
00:34:42,480 --> 00:34:45,520
that the controller's use
of an unpublished holding pattern,

827
00:34:45,820 --> 00:34:48,063
one that didn't appear
on the pilot's chart,

828
00:34:48,263 --> 00:34:52,574
as well as its verbal slip-up
saying turn instead of turns,

829
00:34:52,774 --> 00:34:54,620
played a very important role

830
00:34:54,620 --> 00:34:56,880
in the pilots' loss
of situational awareness.

831
00:34:57,900 --> 00:35:00,050
They also noted that
if the holding pattern

832
00:35:00,250 --> 00:35:02,868
had been designed according
to international standards,

833
00:35:03,068 --> 00:35:05,880
the minimum altitude in the hold
would have been 6,000 feet,

834
00:35:06,100 --> 00:35:08,640
which would have
incidentally prevented the crash.

835
00:35:09,620 --> 00:35:12,498
But regardless of who made
the most serious errors here,

836
00:35:12,698 --> 00:35:14,040
the disaster was made possible

837
00:35:14,040 --> 00:35:16,740
by the poor infrastructure
at Tenerife North Airport,

838
00:35:16,860 --> 00:35:18,069
including the lack of radar

839
00:35:18,269 --> 00:35:20,040
and the poorly-designed
approach procedures.

840
00:35:20,840 --> 00:35:22,320
It's also important to remember

841
00:35:22,320 --> 00:35:24,804
that the technology available in 1980

842
00:35:25,004 --> 00:35:27,860
was far less capable than
what we now have available,

843
00:35:28,220 --> 00:35:30,700
and it's exactly because
of accidents like this

844
00:35:30,700 --> 00:35:33,540
that we today have
these vastly improved systems

845
00:35:33,540 --> 00:35:36,540
and that we pilots are
so well trained in using them.

846
00:35:36,540 --> 00:35:38,815
This accident led to recommendations

847
00:35:39,015 --> 00:35:42,800
to always question any clearances
that weren't 100% clear

848
00:35:42,800 --> 00:35:45,520
as well as some
other recommendations as well.

849
00:35:45,920 --> 00:35:48,080
But in the long run,
this accident also led

850
00:35:48,080 --> 00:35:50,740
to better training
around GPWS maneuvers

851
00:35:50,740 --> 00:35:53,780
and therefore, a
significant increase in safety.

852
00:35:54,600 --> 00:35:57,200
Our current fantastic
safety record proves

853
00:35:57,200 --> 00:35:59,840
that accidents like these
today are largely preventable,

854
00:36:00,000 --> 00:36:01,940
but they are only preventable

855
00:36:01,940 --> 00:36:03,380
because of stories like this

856
00:36:03,380 --> 00:36:05,420
and that's why I keep telling them.

857
00:36:06,560 --> 00:36:09,180
Now, please consider
subscribing to the channel

858
00:36:09,180 --> 00:36:10,600
if you found this video interesting

859
00:36:10,600 --> 00:36:13,020
and let me know what
you thought in the comments below.

860
00:36:13,900 --> 00:36:16,780
Watch these videos next and remember

861
00:36:16,780 --> 00:36:17,981
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862
00:36:18,181 --> 00:36:19,786
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863
00:36:19,986 --> 00:36:22,000
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864
00:36:22,680 --> 00:36:25,160
If you want to see my next
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865
00:36:25,580 --> 00:36:28,860
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866
00:36:28,860 --> 00:36:30,280
if you think that sounds interesting.

867
00:36:30,860 --> 00:36:33,520
Have an absolutely fantastic
day wherever you are

868
00:36:33,520 --> 00:36:34,780
and I'll see you next time.

869
00:36:34,980 --> 00:36:35,320
Bye bye.