0:00:00.700,0:00:02.173 - [Petter] Aircraft accidents 0:00:02.373,0:00:03.900 are always caused[br]by a combination 0:00:03.900,0:00:05.980 of several factors and the thing 0:00:05.980,0:00:07.340 that gets the sequence rolling 0:00:07.340,0:00:09.460 is often something[br]simple and mundane. 0:00:10.260,0:00:13.860 But this is the[br]first time I've ever come 0:00:13.860,0:00:16.500 across a single letter kicking it off. 0:00:16.700,0:00:17.700 - [GPWS] Sink rate. Pull up. 0:00:18.420,0:00:19.320 - Stay tuned. 0:00:27.199,0:00:29.420 When you hear the word Tenerife 0:00:29.420,0:00:32.640 in aviation context,[br]people almost always think 0:00:32.640,0:00:34.620 of the world's worst aviation disaster, 0:00:35.540,0:00:37.740 the collision between two Boeing 747s 0:00:37.740,0:00:40.520 at Tenerife's Los Rodeos[br]Airport back in 1977. 0:00:41.520,0:00:43.191 But the island of Tenerife, 0:00:43.391,0:00:45.440 the largest of Spain's Canary Islands, 0:00:45.440,0:00:47.543 actually suffered a string of disasters 0:00:47.743,0:00:50.027 between the 1950s and 1980s, 0:00:50.227,0:00:52.800 who collectively claimed 950 lives 0:00:52.800,0:00:54.766 and that infamous runway collision 0:00:54.930,0:00:56.240 was just the worst one of those. 0:00:56.940,0:00:59.180 So today I will tell you the story of 0:00:59.180,0:01:01.340 the last major[br]incident to happen there, 0:01:01.460,0:01:05.240 a story that took place on[br]a rainy spring day back in 1980. 0:01:06.060,0:01:09.440 And this one, I think a lot[br]fewer of you have ever heard of. 0:01:10.080,0:01:13.192 In the morning of the 25th of April 1980, 0:01:13.392,0:01:15.620 the crew of Dan-Air Flight 1008 0:01:15.620,0:01:18.080 were preparing to depart[br]from Manchester in England 0:01:18.080,0:01:20.358 on a charter flight,[br]bringing tourists down 0:01:20.558,0:01:22.000 towards Tenerife North Airport, 0:01:22.300,0:01:23.700 then known as Los Rodeos. 0:01:24.300,0:01:26.240 During the 1970s and '80s, 0:01:26.360,0:01:28.480 Dan-Air was one[br]of Britain's largest operators 0:01:28.480,0:01:31.780 of inclusive tour flights,[br]chartered by tour operators 0:01:31.780,0:01:33.840 to transport fixed groups of people 0:01:33.840,0:01:35.460 down to popular holiday destinations 0:01:35.460,0:01:37.680 in Southern Europe and North Africa. 0:01:38.440,0:01:40.300 Among the aircraft types operated 0:01:40.300,0:01:42.800 by Dan-Air was the mighty Boeing 727, 0:01:43.340,0:01:45.740 and Dan-Air were[br]actually the first British airline 0:01:45.740,0:01:47.960 to import this model,[br]which had then had 0:01:47.960,0:01:50.720 to undergo several unique modifications 0:01:50.720,0:01:52.940 in order to[br]meet British safety standards. 0:01:53.920,0:01:55.105 Now it would later turn out 0:01:55.270,0:01:58.606 that the 727s were a[br]financial disaster for Dan-Air, 0:01:58.806,0:02:01.300 but by 1980, that was[br]not yet very obvious. 0:02:02.200,0:02:04.520 The aircraft that the[br]crew were going to operate 0:02:04.520,0:02:06.660 on this day was 14 years old 0:02:06.660,0:02:08.400 in generally good condition 0:02:08.400,0:02:11.400 and could seat a[br]maximum of 144 passengers. 0:02:12.440,0:02:14.760 So with a total[br]of 138 passengers booked, 0:02:15.060,0:02:16.780 it was almost completely full. 0:02:17.640,0:02:20.020 The crew consisted[br]of five flight attendants 0:02:20.020,0:02:21.820 and three pilots, meaning that in total, 0:02:22.020,0:02:24.413 there were going[br]to be 146 people on board 0:02:24.613,0:02:26.180 once the flight got on the way. 0:02:26.960,0:02:28.520 The pilot in command was a very 0:02:28.520,0:02:30.396 experienced 50-year-old captain 0:02:30.596,0:02:33.380 who had around[br]15,300 total flight hours, 0:02:33.680,0:02:36.280 which included almost 2,000[br]on the Boeing 727. 0:02:37.080,0:02:40.232 He had flown this route[br]down to Tenerife North 0:02:40.432,0:02:42.180 a full 58 times before this flight, 0:02:42.340,0:02:44.620 making him very familiar[br]with it in general. 0:02:45.280,0:02:46.897 But as we will soon see, 0:02:47.097,0:02:49.320 being familiar with the[br]destination doesn't mean 0:02:49.320,0:02:51.260 that it can't throw a few surprises. 0:02:52.620,0:02:55.649 His second-in-command[br]was a 34-year-old first officer 0:02:55.810,0:02:59.292 who, on this day, had[br]about 3,500 hours in total, 0:02:59.492,0:03:01.780 of which 618[br]were flown on the 727. 0:03:02.860,0:03:04.526 And the third flight crew member 0:03:04.726,0:03:06.244 was a 34-year-old flight engineer 0:03:06.444,0:03:08.920 whose experience was similar[br]to that of the first officer. 0:03:09.740,0:03:11.631 Now all of the pilots had been off 0:03:11.831,0:03:13.800 for more than[br]24 hours before this duty 0:03:13.800,0:03:15.245 and the scheduled departure time 0:03:15.370,0:03:16.740 was at a very civilized hour, 0:03:16.740,0:03:18.540 so there's no reason to believe 0:03:18.540,0:03:20.260 that fatigue played any role 0:03:20.260,0:03:21.640 in what was soon about to happen. 0:03:22.800,0:03:25.980 Now instead the crew were[br]likely in a quite good mood 0:03:25.980,0:03:28.420 as they completed their[br]normal pre-flight activities, 0:03:28.640,0:03:31.278 checking weather,[br]NOTAMs and flight plans, 0:03:31.478,0:03:32.660 which all looked okay. 0:03:33.260,0:03:35.800 It looked like it was going[br]to be a very pleasant flight 0:03:35.800,0:03:37.220 down towards the Canary Islands. 0:03:38.080,0:03:39.340 So after having boarded everyone 0:03:39.340,0:03:41.120 and completed the pre-flight set up, 0:03:41.120,0:03:42.637 the crew started up their engines 0:03:42.837,0:03:46.300 and taxied out for takeoff[br]from Manchester at time 9.22 am, 0:03:46.720,0:03:48.160 with the captain as pilot flying 0:03:48.160,0:03:49.920 and the first[br]officer as pilot monitoring. 0:03:50.620,0:03:52.347 Now the climbout and cruise phases 0:03:52.547,0:03:54.378 of this flight went off without a hitch, 0:03:54.578,0:03:56.420 but the pilots then[br]likely started preparing 0:03:56.420,0:03:57.940 and briefing for the approach 0:03:58.140,0:03:59.880 a bit earlier[br]than usual on this day. 0:04:00.820,0:04:02.476 And that was because[br]they had seen, 0:04:02.676,0:04:03.888 during their pre-flight briefing 0:04:04.030,0:04:05.793 that the approach[br]they had ahead of them 0:04:05.993,0:04:07.820 was possibly going[br]to be a little bit unusual. 0:04:08.680,0:04:10.360 You see, in the Canary Islands 0:04:10.360,0:04:12.500 the prevailing winds normally blew 0:04:12.500,0:04:14.580 from the Atlantic Ocean in the west, 0:04:14.880,0:04:16.380 causing most flights to approach 0:04:16.380,0:04:18.340 from the east using Runway 30 0:04:18.340,0:04:20.160 in order to land with a headwind. 0:04:20.880,0:04:23.220 But on this afternoon,[br]the wind was instead blowing 0:04:23.220,0:04:24.970 from the other direction, from the east, 0:04:25.170,0:04:26.965 forcing inbound aircraft to approach 0:04:27.165,0:04:28.660 the reciprocal Runway 12 instead. 0:04:29.700,0:04:32.053 Now we don't know how[br]many times the captain 0:04:32.150,0:04:33.646 or the other crew members 0:04:33.846,0:04:36.038 had actually used[br]Runway 12 in the past, 0:04:36.238,0:04:38.640 but it was likely not something[br]that they did very often. 0:04:39.220,0:04:42.340 And to make things even worse,[br]Tenerife North Airport was, 0:04:42.620,0:04:45.320 and still is, notorious for its frequent, 0:04:45.600,0:04:49.220 fast-building fog that can appear[br]from nowhere within minutes. 0:04:50.080,0:04:52.694 The airport sits at[br]2,000 feet above sea level 0:04:52.894,0:04:54.740 on a shoulder between two mountains, 0:04:54.980,0:04:57.480 and the marine fog[br]that forms over the ocean 0:04:57.680,0:05:00.300 frequently collides with[br]the western slopes of Tenerife 0:05:00.300,0:05:02.200 and then gets funneled 0:05:02.200,0:05:04.540 through the gap[br]directly over the airfield. 0:05:05.520,0:05:06.500 But like I mentioned before, 0:05:06.820,0:05:09.332 on this day the reported[br]weather at the airport 0:05:09.532,0:05:12.220 was more or less okay, with[br]around six kilometers of visibility 0:05:12.220,0:05:14.200 and scattered clouds at 400 feet, 0:05:14.460,0:05:17.120 broken at 800 feet,[br]and further scattered clouds 0:05:17.120,0:05:20.260 at 1,100 feet with some light drizzle, 0:05:21.300,0:05:22.620 not great for sunbathing, 0:05:22.720,0:05:24.380 but good enough for normal landings. 0:05:25.480,0:05:28.040 But these cloud layers also meant 0:05:28.040,0:05:29.760 that higher up on the mountainsides, 0:05:29.760,0:05:31.669 the fog was extremely thick, 0:05:31.869,0:05:34.420 so thick in fact that a[br]weather station located 0:05:34.420,0:05:36.660 at a close to 8,000 feet elevation 0:05:36.660,0:05:39.260 on the mountainside[br]reported nil visibility. 0:05:39.700,0:05:42.540 This meant that the very[br]high terrain south of the airport 0:05:42.540,0:05:44.341 would be completely obscured, 0:05:44.541,0:05:47.920 including the nearly[br]12,200-foot Teide Volcano, 0:05:48.460,0:05:51.880 which is the defining[br]geographical feature on Tenerife. 0:05:52.580,0:05:54.540 Because of that,[br]the minimum safe altitude 0:05:54.540,0:05:57.120 in the airspace south[br]of Tenerife North Airport 0:05:57.120,0:06:01.500 was 14,500 feet,[br]which is worth remembering. 0:06:02.480,0:06:04.920 Anyway, as the flight[br]near the Canary Islands, 0:06:05.060,0:06:06.440 the first officer made contact 0:06:06.440,0:06:10.224 with the Las Palmas[br]Area Control Center, 0:06:10.424,0:06:12.679 who soon cleared them[br]to descend down to 11,000 feet. 0:06:12.879,0:06:14.040 The first officer read this back 0:06:14.040,0:06:16.091 and the crew initiated the descent, 0:06:16.291,0:06:18.140 and after they reached that altitude, 0:06:18.340,0:06:20.780 they contacted the Tenerife[br]North approach controller 0:06:20.780,0:06:23.480 and reported that they were[br]now 14 nautical miles 0:06:23.680,0:06:26.180 away from the Tango[br]Foxrot November VOR beacon, 0:06:26.780,0:06:27.748 and that they were ready 0:06:27.948,0:06:29.320 to receive their approach instructions. 0:06:30.260,0:06:31.360 Before we continue here, 0:06:31.480,0:06:33.200 it's probably worth explaining[br]a bit more about 0:06:33.200,0:06:34.260 the different approach aids 0:06:34.260,0:06:35.882 that the crew were now going to use 0:06:36.082,0:06:37.180 as well as their procedures. 0:06:38.380,0:06:40.707 A VOR beacon, where VOR stands for: 0:06:40.907,0:06:43.500 Very High Frequency[br]Omnidirectional Range, 0:06:43.960,0:06:45.720 is a type of radio navigation beacon 0:06:45.720,0:06:48.880 that was very widely used[br]in the days before GPS 0:06:48.880,0:06:50.705 and is actually still quite common, 0:06:50.905,0:06:52.060 especially here in Europe. 0:06:53.040,0:06:56.426 These VORs emit signals[br]hat are modulated differently 0:06:56.626,0:06:59.010 depending on the[br]direction of the emission, 0:06:59.210,0:07:01.340 which allow the VOR[br]receivers on board aircraft 0:07:01.340,0:07:04.000 to determine the[br]precise magnetic bearing 0:07:04.000,0:07:05.840 from the VOR to the aircraft. 0:07:06.680,0:07:10.520 This enables the pilots[br]to navigate using imaginary lines 0:07:10.520,0:07:13.420 or radios defined[br]by a particular bearing 0:07:13.420,0:07:14.444 from the beacon. 0:07:14.644,0:07:17.392 So, for example, the 270 degree radial 0:07:17.592,0:07:20.140 from the VOR points[br]due west and so on. 0:07:20.860,0:07:22.680 A lot of airports have VORs installed 0:07:22.680,0:07:25.800 to help pilots locate the airport[br]before starting to maneuver 0:07:25.800,0:07:27.860 for the approach, and[br]it can also be used 0:07:27.860,0:07:30.540 to align the aircraft with[br]the runway as an approach aid 0:07:30.540,0:07:33.880 if an instrument landing system,[br]ILS, is not available. 0:07:34.980,0:07:37.760 But in this case, the[br]Tango Foxrot November VOR 0:07:37.960,0:07:40.412 was not actually located at the airport. 0:07:40.612,0:07:42.676 Instead it was sitting on a hilltop, 0:07:42.876,0:07:44.779 a few miles northeast of the airport 0:07:44.979,0:07:47.000 in order to maximize[br]its detectable range. 0:07:48.060,0:07:50.920 Located at the northeast[br]end of Runway 12-30, 0:07:51.500,0:07:55.080 there was a less-sophisticated[br]beacon called an NDB locator 0:07:55.080,0:07:57.860 with the Morse[br]code identifier Foxrot Papa. 0:07:58.640,0:08:00.860 A non-directional beacon, or NDB, 0:08:00.940,0:08:02.640 is a radio aid that can be tracked 0:08:02.840,0:08:05.565 using an automatic[br]direction finder, an ADF, 0:08:05.765,0:08:08.769 and this is a very simple[br]instrument which just points 0:08:08.870,0:08:10.840 in the direction that[br]a signal is coming from, 0:08:11.080,0:08:13.720 but it doesn't[br]contain any radial information, 0:08:13.880,0:08:16.000 which makes the NDB navigation less 0:08:16.000,0:08:18.360 precise than navigating using a VOR. 0:08:19.380,0:08:22.320 In this case, because the[br]Foxrot Papa beacon was used 0:08:22.320,0:08:24.640 to mark the entry point[br]to the approach procedure 0:08:24.640,0:08:27.666 for Runway 12, it was[br]also known as a locator 0:08:27.866,0:08:29.280 rather than just an NDB. 0:08:30.120,0:08:32.040 And in order to approach Runway 12, 0:08:32.420,0:08:35.800 a flight inbound from the[br]northeast like this flight was 0:08:35.800,0:08:37.970 would normally need to fly first 0:08:38.170,0:08:40.140 via the Tango Foxrot November VOR 0:08:40.140,0:08:43.209 and then turn southwest onto Radial 255 0:08:43.409,0:08:46.120 directly towards[br]the Foxrot Papa NDB. 0:08:46.920,0:08:48.200 After reaching the Foxrot Papa, 0:08:48.520,0:08:51.360 the aircraft should then turn[br]right onto an outbound heading 0:08:51.360,0:08:54.892 of 302 degrees, which[br]would take it out over the ocean, 0:08:55.092,0:08:57.460 before making[br]a teardrop course reversal 0:08:57.460,0:08:59.400 to the left back towards the airport. 0:08:59.860,0:09:01.820 And from that point, the[br]aircraft would be in a position 0:09:01.820,0:09:03.800 to pick up the instrument landing system, 0:09:03.980,0:09:04.920 which would then guide 0:09:04.920,0:09:07.180 the aircraft the rest of[br]the way down to the runway. 0:09:08.180,0:09:10.658 Now this was quite[br]a bit more complicated 0:09:10.858,0:09:13.120 than the more commonly[br]used Runway 30 approach, 0:09:13.280,0:09:16.500 which just involved flying to[br]an NDB called Tango X-ray, 0:09:16.700,0:09:18.460 from where the instrument landing system 0:09:18.660,0:09:19.920 could then be [br]picked up immediately. 0:09:20.680,0:09:22.367 Now the reason that these procedures 0:09:22.567,0:09:23.556 had to be flown this way 0:09:23.670,0:09:26.980 was that there was no radar[br]available at Los Rodeos Airport, 0:09:27.140,0:09:29.516 so all approaches[br]had to be intercepted 0:09:29.716,0:09:31.100 using procedural arrivals. 0:09:31.960,0:09:33.840 But then again,[br]flying procedural approaches 0:09:33.840,0:09:35.980 would not have been[br]very uncommon back then, 0:09:36.080,0:09:38.018 and there was nothing in this procedure 0:09:38.218,0:09:40.724 that was particularly out of the ordinary, 0:09:40.924,0:09:43.249 except maybe that high[br]terrain to the southwest, 0:09:43.449,0:09:44.460 which I mentioned before. 0:09:45.980,0:09:48.045 And when we're on the[br]subject of things 0:09:48.245,0:09:49.556 that are out of the ordinary, 0:09:49.756,0:09:51.362 have you noticed that some countries 0:09:51.530,0:09:52.480 have now blocked the ability 0:09:52.480,0:09:54.500 to make video calls[br]from within their borders? 0:09:55.640,0:09:59.240 Well, I have, and that was[br]a bit of an issue recently 0:09:59.240,0:10:00.720 when I needed to have a group call 0:10:00.720,0:10:02.600 with my team to plan one of my videos. 0:10:03.380,0:10:05.140 But luckily, I had today's sponsor, 0:10:05.420,0:10:07.920 my trusted NordVPN, available to me. 0:10:08.500,0:10:09.300 With the help of Nord, 0:10:09.540,0:10:12.080 I could easily just[br]change my virtual location 0:10:12.080,0:10:14.089 to another country[br]with the click of a button, 0:10:14.210,0:10:17.060 and after that, voila,[br]everything worked perfectly again. 0:10:17.900,0:10:19.398 NordVPN has actually turned 0:10:19.598,0:10:21.817 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0:10:59.766,0:11:01.640 when you sign[br]up for the two-year plan. 0:11:02.120,0:11:04.360 And as always, you[br]don't really risk anything 0:11:04.360,0:11:07.980 since Nord always gives you[br]a 30-day money-back guarantee. 0:11:08.620,0:11:11.020 Thank you Nord,[br]and now where were we? 0:11:11.840,0:11:12.360 Yes. 0:11:13.320,0:11:15.500 After establishing  [br]contact at time 13:16, 0:11:15.700,0:11:18.368 the Tenerife North[br]Controller cleared the flight 0:11:18.568,0:11:19.980 to descend down to 6,000 feet 0:11:19.980,0:11:22.180 in preparation to cross[br]Tango Foxtrot November 0:11:22.180,0:11:24.500 and then to enter[br]the approach procedure. 0:11:25.120,0:11:27.836 The captain dialed in[br]the new cleared altitude, 0:11:28.036,0:11:30.519 the flight engineer reduced[br]thrust in order to descend, 0:11:30.719,0:11:32.100 and the first officer then reported 0:11:32.100,0:11:34.100 when the aircraft was[br]seven nautical miles away 0:11:34.100,0:11:35.980 from the Tango Fox November beacon 0:11:35.980,0:11:38.140 in order to get further instructions. 0:11:38.940,0:11:41.920 At that same time, he[br]also requested the local air pressure, 0:11:42.180,0:11:44.320 QNH, in order to[br]get the correct reference 0:11:44.320,0:11:45.860 to the altitude above the sea, 0:11:46.460,0:11:48.540 and also the QFE,[br]which would give him 0:11:48.540,0:11:50.500 the altitude reference[br]over the airfield. 0:11:51.119,0:11:53.821 Once those values[br]had been received and set, 0:11:54.021,0:11:55.540 they were then cross-checked 0:11:55.540,0:11:57.960 in accordance with[br]their standard operating procedures, 0:11:58.540,0:11:59.920 and the captain now also suggested 0:11:59.920,0:12:01.440 that the first officer should tune 0:12:01.440,0:12:04.040 the ILS frequency on[br]his navigational radio box, 0:12:04.540,0:12:06.460 and he also confirmed[br]that the outbound heading 0:12:06.460,0:12:09.320 after Foxtrot Papa[br]would be 302 degrees. 0:12:10.380,0:12:12.780 So at this stage,[br]everything was completely normal 0:12:12.780,0:12:14.840 and the crew seemed[br]to have a good grasp 0:12:14.840,0:12:16.740 of the procedure they[br]had in front of them. 0:12:17.700,0:12:19.900 But just a few miles ahead, 0:12:20.260,0:12:22.200 an island-hopping[br]turboprop belonging 0:12:22.200,0:12:25.400 to Spain's flag carrier,[br]Iberia, was also an approach 0:12:25.400,0:12:27.920 to Runway 12, and the crew[br]on board that aircraft 0:12:27.920,0:12:30.240 were communicating with[br]the controller in Spanish. 0:12:31.280,0:12:34.720 Now the pilots of Flight 1008[br]didn't understand Spanish, 0:12:34.840,0:12:36.040 and from their conversations, 0:12:36.320,0:12:38.460 it doesn't seem like[br]they paid much attention 0:12:38.460,0:12:40.080 to that aircraft at all. 0:12:40.540,0:12:42.885 Instead, they continued to[br]monitor their position, 0:12:43.085,0:12:44.720 relative to the Tango[br]Fox November VOR, 0:12:44.720,0:12:47.980 and at time 13:18:15, 0:12:48.200,0:12:50.940 the captain called out,[br]"Just about to go overhead." 0:12:51.600,0:12:53.240 The first officer then reminded 0:12:53.240,0:12:54.720 the captain that the procedure called 0:12:54.720,0:12:57.960 for them to leave Tango[br]Fox November on Radial 255. 0:12:58.340,0:12:59.760 But as it turns out, 0:12:59.940,0:13:03.020 the aircraft actually passed a[br]little less than a mile east 0:13:03.020,0:13:05.340 of the VOR, and after passing abeam it, 0:13:05.680,0:13:08.000 they were also slow[br]to make the right turn, 0:13:08.080,0:13:09.040 which meant that they never 0:13:09.040,0:13:11.420 actually intercepted that 255 radial. 0:13:12.480,0:13:15.860 Now, we can never know[br]for sure why this happened, 0:13:16.120,0:13:18.640 but it was most likely done on purpose. 0:13:19.500,0:13:20.160 You see, the distance 0:13:20.160,0:13:23.760 between Tango Fox November[br]and Foxtrot Papa was very short, 0:13:24.020,0:13:25.780 and Flight 1008 was traveling 0:13:25.780,0:13:27.660 at an airspeed of around 250 knots 0:13:27.860,0:13:29.540 when they passed abeam to the VOR. 0:13:30.580,0:13:32.491 Today, we wouldn't fly that fast 0:13:32.691,0:13:35.000 when starting a tight[br]procedure like this, 0:13:35.020,0:13:37.421 since our aircrafts are now very slippery 0:13:37.621,0:13:39.060 and take time to decelerate. 0:13:39.420,0:13:41.392 But older aircraft like the 727 0:13:41.592,0:13:43.300 had much less effective wings, 0:13:43.300,0:13:46.340 which meant that they could[br]easily keep the speeds up high 0:13:46.340,0:13:49.368 for longer, since the speed[br]would just rapidly bleed off 0:13:49.568,0:13:51.260 when the thrust levers were closed. 0:13:52.040,0:13:53.580 This also meant that most jets 0:13:53.580,0:13:56.140 approaching Tenerife back then,[br]including this one, 0:13:56.380,0:13:59.200 would normally overshoot[br]this first turn slightly 0:13:59.200,0:14:01.400 before correcting course[br]in order to be able 0:14:01.400,0:14:03.820 to intercept the 302 outbound course 0:14:03.820,0:14:07.400 from the NDB at a slightly[br]more comfortable angle. 0:14:08.060,0:14:10.920 There was so little time[br]between Tango Fox November 0:14:10.920,0:14:13.140 and Foxtrot Papa that[br]they probably wouldn't be able 0:14:13.140,0:14:14.560 to intercept the radial anyway. 0:14:15.000,0:14:18.096 And on top of that, if they[br]flew directly over Foxtrot Papa, 0:14:18.296,0:14:20.620 they would potentially overshoot[br]the pattern significantly, 0:14:20.980,0:14:22.080 which could take the aircraft 0:14:22.080,0:14:24.228 into the area south of the airport 0:14:24.428,0:14:27.260 where the minimum[br]safe altitude was 14,500 feet. 0:14:28.200,0:14:31.280 Now, this is obviously not how[br]this was supposed to be done. 0:14:31.600,0:14:34.400 A lower speed would have[br]solved all of those issues, 0:14:34.840,0:14:38.480 but sometimes, procedural[br]shortcuts like this can start 0:14:38.480,0:14:41.700 to creep in due to[br]pure convenience and time saving. 0:14:42.520,0:14:45.300 And if I was to guess, this was likely 0:14:45.300,0:14:48.180 the reason that the captain[br]of this flight flew a bit wide 0:14:48.180,0:14:49.820 around the Tango Fox November. 0:14:50.740,0:14:52.140 Now, due to some radio chatter 0:14:52.140,0:14:53.310 with the Hapag-Lloyd flight 0:14:53.510,0:14:55.167 that was taking off from Los Rodeos 0:14:55.367,0:14:56.540 plus some other distractions, 0:14:56.980,0:14:58.722 the flight crew didn't actually report 0:14:58.922,0:14:59.960 crossing Tango Fox November 0:14:59.960,0:15:03.180 until 33 seconds after they[br]had passed abeam hit. 0:15:03.800,0:15:05.160 And like I mentioned, 0:15:05.580,0:15:08.165 Tenerife North Airport[br]didn't have radar at the time, 0:15:08.365,0:15:09.580 so position reports like this 0:15:09.580,0:15:11.439 were the only way for the controller 0:15:11.639,0:15:13.660 to determine where[br]the traffic was located. 0:15:14.700,0:15:16.640 As a result, when the crew reported 0:15:16.640,0:15:19.080 that they had just[br]passed Tango Fox November, 0:15:19.620,0:15:22.829 the controller realized that[br]the 727 was traveling so fast 0:15:23.029,0:15:24.820 that it would risk getting too close 0:15:24.820,0:15:27.807 to the slower Iberia[br]turboprop in front of them 0:15:28.007,0:15:29.460 if he didn't do something. 0:15:30.660,0:15:33.860 So he hastily decided[br]to put Flight 1008 0:15:33.860,0:15:35.040 into a holding pattern 0:15:35.040,0:15:37.420 in order to ensure[br]sufficient traffic separation. 0:15:38.340,0:15:41.580 At time 13:18:54, 0:15:41.820,0:15:44.060 the approach controller[br]transmitted the following message, 0:15:45.020,0:15:47.920 "Roger, the standard[br]holding overhead Foxtrot Papa 0:15:47.920,0:15:49.560 is inbound heading 150, 0:15:50.200,0:15:52.420 turn to the left,[br]call you back shortly." 0:15:53.400,0:15:56.240 And this would end[br]up being the critical moment 0:15:56.240,0:15:58.969 that put the accident[br]sequence into motion. 0:15:59.169,0:16:01.380 So let's take a moment to analyze why. 0:16:02.460,0:16:03.940 Despite the controller's statement 0:16:03.940,0:16:05.520 that this was a standard holding, 0:16:05.820,0:16:08.753 there was actually no officially[br]published holding pattern 0:16:08.953,0:16:10.220 around the Foxtrot Papa beacon. 0:16:11.240,0:16:12.620 There was a published holding 0:16:12.620,0:16:14.085 around Tango Fox November, 0:16:14.285,0:16:15.722 as well as around Tango X-ray, 0:16:15.922,0:16:18.180 forming part of the go-around[br]procedure for Runway 12, 0:16:18.600,0:16:22.840 but Flight 1008 was not in[br]a position to enter any of those. 0:16:23.620,0:16:25.160 Instead, the controller essentially 0:16:25.160,0:16:28.624 invented a holding pattern[br]based on Foxtrot Papa, 0:16:28.824,0:16:30.320 and he did so so quickly 0:16:30.320,0:16:32.475 that this was likely not the first time 0:16:32.675,0:16:34.740 that he had used[br]this particular pattern. 0:16:35.560,0:16:39.180 Now, it's not wrong or illegal[br]to make up holding patterns. 0:16:39.380,0:16:42.000 In fact, that happens all the time,[br]and it's perfectly okay 0:16:42.000,0:16:43.680 as long as it doesn't cause any issues 0:16:43.680,0:16:45.540 with terrain or traffic separation. 0:16:46.160,0:16:48.456 But the issue here[br]was that the controller said 0:16:48.656,0:16:49.900 that this was a standard holding, 0:16:50.020,0:16:52.240 which would imply that[br]the holding could be found 0:16:52.240,0:16:53.740 in the published approach chart, 0:16:53.740,0:16:56.460 and therefore needed to[br]be verified by the pilots. 0:16:57.080,0:16:58.587 On top of that, the entry 0:16:58.787,0:17:01.180 into this suddenly-proposed[br]holding pattern 0:17:01.180,0:17:02.820 would not be very simple 0:17:02.820,0:17:05.280 from the position that the[br]aircraft was now coming from. 0:17:06.140,0:17:08.165 What the controller[br]wanted the aircraft to do 0:17:08.290,0:17:11.560 was to join a left-hand holding[br]pattern over Foxtrot Papa 0:17:11.560,0:17:14.096 with an inbound course of 150 degrees 0:17:14.296,0:17:16.700 and an outbound[br]course of 330 degrees. 0:17:17.680,0:17:19.460 If it was flown that way, 0:17:19.720,0:17:22.140 it would keep the airplane[br]over relatively low terrain. 0:17:22.780,0:17:24.424 But to do this, Flight 1008 0:17:24.624,0:17:26.860 would have to first fly[br]over the beacon, 0:17:27.200,0:17:29.525 then turn right onto heading of 330, 0:17:29.725,0:17:32.720 fly outbound for one minute,[br]perform a course reversal, 0:17:33.160,0:17:34.180 and then proceed inbound 0:17:34.180,0:17:36.920 to Foxtrot Papa again[br]on the requested inbound course. 0:17:37.880,0:17:39.458 Quite a complex maneuver to fly 0:17:39.658,0:17:41.240 when you're[br]almost over the beacon. 0:17:42.240,0:17:44.340 Now, the pilots might[br]have eventually figured this out 0:17:44.340,0:17:47.700 if not for a tiny slip of[br]the tongue by the controller, 0:17:47.900,0:17:50.380 which changed this[br]entire course of events. 0:17:51.740,0:17:54.480 Remember that the[br]controller wanted Flight 1008 0:17:54.480,0:17:56.060 to fly counter-clockwise 0:17:56.060,0:17:58.560 around the holding pattern,[br]making left turns? 0:17:59.740,0:18:02.436 Well, this meant that what[br]he wanted to say 0:18:02.636,0:18:04.121 was turns to the left, 0:18:04.321,0:18:06.644 but what he actually[br]ended up saying 0:18:06.844,0:18:10.280 was, "Turn to the left," which[br]has a very different meaning. 0:18:11.400,0:18:13.560 Turn to the left[br]is normally interpreted 0:18:13.560,0:18:16.317 as a command to turn left, right away, 0:18:16.517,0:18:18.551 which was not at[br]all what the controller 0:18:18.751,0:18:19.751 wanted them to do here. 0:18:20.420,0:18:21.540 What he attempted to say 0:18:21.670,0:18:23.680 was only a description[br]of the holding pattern, 0:18:23.820,0:18:25.520 which is technically just informational, 0:18:26.060,0:18:28.435 not an order, and that also made sense, 0:18:28.635,0:18:31.000 given that he didn't[br]have any radar available. 0:18:31.820,0:18:33.900 Spanish investigators later used this 0:18:33.900,0:18:36.400 to argue that the controller[br]didn't bear any responsibility 0:18:36.400,0:18:38.580 for issuing a non-standard clearance, 0:18:38.680,0:18:41.240 but given how his call actually sounded 0:18:41.240,0:18:43.520 to the pilots,[br]that's not completely fair. 0:18:44.440,0:18:46.640 Anyway, when the flight[br]crew received this message 0:18:46.640,0:18:48.815 from the controller,[br]they simply replied, 0:18:49.015,0:18:50.554 "Roger," with no further readback 0:18:50.754,0:18:51.860 or request for confirmation. 0:18:52.980,0:18:54.774 They might have thought at first 0:18:54.974,0:18:56.680 that they understood what he said, 0:18:56.980,0:18:59.255 but within 10 seconds,[br]the captain realized 0:18:59.455,0:19:00.747 that he wasn't able to picture 0:19:00.947,0:19:03.344 what the controller was asking from him, 0:19:03.544,0:19:06.340 so he said, that's an odd[br]sort of one, the runway. 0:19:07.580,0:19:08.920 He then interrupted himself 0:19:08.920,0:19:11.100 with a confirmation that[br]they had 1,000 feet 0:19:11.100,0:19:13.400 to go to their[br]cleared altitude of 6,000 feet, 0:19:13.840,0:19:15.680 and after that, the first officer said, 0:19:16.180,0:19:19.820 "No, I'm not, er...[br]Supposedit's all right?" 0:19:21.040,0:19:24.060 The captain continued with,[br]"I'll just turn straight round 0:19:24.060,0:19:26.560 to the left on the 150[br]when I go overhead then," 0:19:26.900,0:19:28.580 to which the first[br]officer seemed to agree. 0:19:29.780,0:19:32.730 Now this shows that[br]the captain clearly believed 0:19:32.930,0:19:35.980 that he had been told[br]to turn left on to heading 150 0:19:35.980,0:19:37.840 after crossing Foxtrot Papa, 0:19:37.980,0:19:40.820 which again was not at[br]all what the controller had intended. 0:19:41.720,0:19:43.300 A command to turn to the left 0:19:43.500,0:19:45.860 was completely incompatible[br]with an instruction 0:19:45.860,0:19:49.040 to fly a holding[br]pattern inbound on 150 degrees 0:19:49.040,0:19:51.940 to Foxtrot Papa since,[br]like what I said earlier, 0:19:52.500,0:19:55.940 that would require a right turn[br]followed by a course reversal. 0:19:56.680,0:19:57.880 So in the captain's mind, 0:19:58.120,0:19:59.940 the instructions didn't make sense, 0:19:59.940,0:20:02.720 but he had been able[br]to pick out two elements 0:20:02.720,0:20:05.640 in the message which seemed clear to him, 0:20:05.840,0:20:07.420 150 and turn to the left. 0:20:08.580,0:20:10.280 So with Foxtrot Papa now coming up 0:20:10.280,0:20:11.360 in less than one minute, 0:20:11.480,0:20:13.480 he didn't have a lot[br]of time to figure it out. 0:20:14.140,0:20:15.440 In a stressful situation, 0:20:15.720,0:20:18.280 without fully comprehending[br]what the controller had said, 0:20:18.600,0:20:20.540 he accepted that the best thing to do 0:20:20.740,0:20:22.360 was just to execute[br]the part of the clearance 0:20:22.360,0:20:23.080 that he understood, 0:20:23.640,0:20:25.920 and then try to[br]figure out the rest later. 0:20:26.640,0:20:28.223 In hindsight, it's easy to say 0:20:28.423,0:20:29.700 that he shouldn't have acted 0:20:29.700,0:20:32.840 on an incomplete understanding[br]of those instructions, 0:20:32.960,0:20:35.700 but in that moment,[br]with the sudden time pressure 0:20:35.700,0:20:38.100 and the added workload[br]of the sudden holding clearance, 0:20:38.520,0:20:40.060 it would have been a lot harder 0:20:40.060,0:20:41.700 to think with that kind of clarity. 0:20:42.540,0:20:43.760 And it is also worth remembering 0:20:43.760,0:20:46.320 that this all happened[br]in a 727 cockpit, 0:20:46.520,0:20:49.680 with no fancy navigation[br]displays, only dials. 0:20:50.360,0:20:52.380 Besides, this CVR transcript suggests 0:20:52.380,0:20:54.552 that both the first officer[br]and the flight engineer 0:20:54.752,0:20:56.620 were looking at the charts[br]when this all happened, 0:20:57.020,0:20:59.553 likely searching for[br]that standard holding 0:20:59.753,0:21:00.880 in order to be able to verify it. 0:21:01.440,0:21:04.700 And the first officer had said,[br]"I suppose it's all right," 0:21:05.040,0:21:07.600 which might have reinforced[br]the captain's belief 0:21:07.600,0:21:09.760 that he had understood[br]the clearance correctly. 0:21:10.840,0:21:13.520 Anyway, seconds later,[br]having made his decision 0:21:13.520,0:21:15.083 on how to fly, the captain focused 0:21:15.283,0:21:17.001 his attention on the rapid approach 0:21:17.201,0:21:18.201 of the Foxtrot Papa NDB. 0:21:18.980,0:21:23.000 He said, "The only thing is,[br]we're just about to miss it. 0:21:23.720,0:21:24.820 (chuckles) It's too close." 0:21:25.860,0:21:28.100 At this point, the captain[br]and the first officer also agreed 0:21:28.100,0:21:30.380 to tune both automatic[br]direction finders 0:21:30.380,0:21:32.100 to the frequency of the Foxtrot Papa, 0:21:32.420,0:21:34.086 so that they could track it more easily 0:21:34.286,0:21:35.286 during the holding pattern. 0:21:35.900,0:21:39.320 And finally, at time 13:19:46, 0:21:39.480,0:21:41.356 they passed abeam Foxtrot Papa, 0:21:41.556,0:21:44.400 slightly to the southeast,[br]and the captain called it out. 0:21:45.380,0:21:47.320 This prompted the[br]first officer to report 0:21:47.320,0:21:49.480 the waypoint passage to the controller, 0:21:49.720,0:21:52.060 and he also confirmed that they[br]were now taking up the hold. 0:21:52.800,0:21:55.600 But in reality, they actually[br]kept flying straight ahead 0:21:55.600,0:21:57.240 for another about 20 seconds, 0:21:57.360,0:21:58.980 covering around two nautical miles 0:21:58.980,0:22:00.720 before beginning the left turn. 0:22:01.820,0:22:04.487 Now, the reason for[br]this delay isn't really known, 0:22:04.687,0:22:06.322 but it might have been[br]because the pilots 0:22:06.522,0:22:07.840 were still trying to wrap their heads 0:22:07.840,0:22:10.160 around the maneuver that they[br]now had ahead of them. 0:22:10.940,0:22:13.435 In fact, a few seconds[br]before they began that left turn, 0:22:13.635,0:22:16.960 the first officer said,[br]"Bloody strange hold, isn't it?" 0:22:17.260,0:22:19.580 Which indicates that he[br]was still mentally focused 0:22:19.580,0:22:21.200 on the confusing instructions. 0:22:22.140,0:22:23.540 In response to that, the captain said, 0:22:23.940,0:22:25.080 "Yeah, it doesn't... 0:22:25.360,0:22:27.740 Isn't parallel with[br]the runway or anything." 0:22:28.760,0:22:30.923 Now, I just want to[br]stop here and drive home 0:22:31.110,0:22:32.020 what is probably one of 0:22:32.020,0:22:34.320 the most important points[br]of this whole video. 0:22:35.360,0:22:38.500 If something seems strange[br]with a clearance and you get 0:22:38.500,0:22:40.180 that pit in the stomach feeling 0:22:40.180,0:22:41.500 that something just isn't right, 0:22:42.260,0:22:45.220 always speak up and[br]ask for further clarification. 0:22:46.160,0:22:48.800 This goes for all walks[br]of life and all industries, 0:22:49.060,0:22:51.280 but especially if[br]you're flying an aircraft. 0:22:52.340,0:22:55.019 It's always better[br]to ask one time too many 0:22:55.219,0:22:56.420 than one time too few, 0:22:56.680,0:22:59.680 and I want every one of[br]you out there to remember that. 0:23:00.420,0:23:03.180 This, by the way, is also exactly[br]the kind of discussions 0:23:03.180,0:23:05.800 that I'm having regularly[br]on my Zoom hangouts 0:23:05.800,0:23:06.740 with my Patreon crew, 0:23:07.080,0:23:09.320 and I hope to see[br]you there as well next time. 0:23:09.800,0:23:13.020 Just go to patreon.com/join/mentourpilot 0:23:13.020,0:23:14.400 if you think that sounds interesting. 0:23:15.380,0:23:18.625 Anyway, at this point, what[br]the flight crew didn't yet know 0:23:18.825,0:23:20.660 was that by overshooting Foxtrot Papa 0:23:20.660,0:23:23.577 and then turning left[br]onto a heading a 150 degrees, 0:23:23.777,0:23:26.540 they were now on a track to[br]overfly the northern shoulder 0:23:26.540,0:23:28.136 of La Esperanza, a sub-peak 0:23:28.336,0:23:30.561 along the island's central volcanic ridge 0:23:30.761,0:23:32.600 that stretched[br]north from El Teide. 0:23:33.280,0:23:35.800 The terrain directly beneath[br]their projected flight path 0:23:35.800,0:23:37.980 actually didn't exceed 5,000 feet, 0:23:38.520,0:23:40.791 but it did lie within the sector, 0:23:40.991,0:23:43.820 where the minimum safe[br]altitude was 14,500 feet. 0:23:44.700,0:23:45.700 So strictly speaking, 0:23:46.040,0:23:48.020 since they weren't[br]flying a published procedure, 0:23:48.240,0:23:50.180 maneuvering at only 6,000 feet 0:23:50.180,0:23:52.400 would have been[br]prohibited in this area. 0:23:53.000,0:23:55.240 The final report would[br]later place some blame 0:23:55.240,0:23:57.363 on the flight crew[br]for flying into this area 0:23:57.563,0:23:59.560 without being aware[br]of the applicable MSA, 0:23:59.680,0:24:02.201 but it seems likely[br]that at this point, 0:24:02.401,0:24:04.060 they were still thinking that they 0:24:04.060,0:24:05.660 were flying an official procedure, 0:24:05.780,0:24:07.900 even though they couldn't[br]find it on their charts. 0:24:08.680,0:24:11.160 At the same time[br]as Flight 1008 completed 0:24:11.160,0:24:13.140 their left turn onto a heading of 150 0:24:13.140,0:24:15.146 and started flying[br]towards the southeast, 0:24:15.346,0:24:16.760 the approach controller called up 0:24:16.760,0:24:18.671 the Iberia Airlines flight ahead of them 0:24:18.871,0:24:22.000 and asked them to verify[br]when they had left 5,000 feet. 0:24:22.960,0:24:25.400 Only seconds later, the[br]pilot of that aircraft replied 0:24:25.400,0:24:27.200 that 5,000 feet was now free 0:24:27.200,0:24:28.651 and that they were in the middle 0:24:28.851,0:24:30.600 of a procedure turn[br]to intercept the ILS. 0:24:31.080,0:24:33.125 As these calls in[br]Spanish were happening, 0:24:33.325,0:24:34.920 the first officer on Flight Engineer 0:24:34.920,0:24:38.600 on board Flight 1008 continued[br]to compare ATC's instructions 0:24:38.600,0:24:41.199 with what was printed on their chart, 0:24:41.399,0:24:44.220 saying things like,[br]"It's that way, isn't it?" 0:24:46.140,0:24:47.700 "That's a tree, isn't it?" 0:24:47.920,0:24:51.840 And, "Yes, well, the hold is[br]going to be here, isn't it?" 0:24:52.540,0:24:55.150 It's likely that they[br]were now very skeptical 0:24:55.350,0:24:56.980 about the maneuver[br]that they were flying, 0:24:57.360,0:24:59.340 but we can never be 100% sure 0:24:59.340,0:25:02.020 since that wasn't formally verbalized. 0:25:02.960,0:25:05.194 Anyway, as these[br]discussions were taking place, 0:25:05.394,0:25:06.664 the controller now called them up 0:25:06.864,0:25:08.960 and cleared them to[br]descend down to 5,000 feet 0:25:08.960,0:25:11.280 since the Iberia flight[br]had now left that altitude. 0:25:12.180,0:25:14.880 And in response, the[br]flight engineer again reduced 0:25:14.880,0:25:17.400 the thrust and the[br]captain initiated the descent. 0:25:18.460,0:25:21.540 But as they were doing this,[br]the captain suddenly said, 0:25:22.040,0:25:25.200 "Hey, did he say it was 1-5-0 inbound?" 0:25:25.860,0:25:28.100 likely realizing that[br]his mental picture 0:25:28.100,0:25:29.340 of where the controller was sending 0:25:29.340,0:25:31.440 them didn't actually make any sense. 0:25:31.900,0:25:34.140 The first officer[br]had probably suspected 0:25:34.140,0:25:36.917 that from the very start[br]because he now replied, 0:25:37.117,0:25:38.020 "Inbound, yeah." 0:25:38.660,0:25:40.954 And in response to that,[br]the captain said, 0:25:41.154,0:25:42.780 "That's... I don't like that." 0:25:43.580,0:25:45.719 The first officer continued by saying, 0:25:45.919,0:25:48.420 "They want to keep[br]going more around, don't they?" 0:25:49.360,0:25:51.731 It's not completely clear[br]what he meant by that, 0:25:51.931,0:25:54.200 but it is possible that[br]the first officer believed 0:25:54.200,0:25:56.612 that they were supposed[br]to keep turning left, 0:25:56.812,0:25:58.380 making a three quarters turn onto 0:25:58.380,0:26:00.120 the outbound leg[br]of the holding pattern, 0:26:00.340,0:26:02.100 after which they would come back 0:26:02.100,0:26:04.940 to Foxtrot Papa on[br]the inbound heading of 150. 0:26:06.140,0:26:08.120 If that was the case,[br]it would mean that 0:26:08.120,0:26:10.200 even the first[br]officer had indeed interpreted 0:26:10.200,0:26:13.140 the call from the controller[br]as an instruction to turn left. 0:26:13.600,0:26:16.100 And that would also explain why he 0:26:16.100,0:26:18.460 hadn't spoken up when the turn started. 0:26:19.460,0:26:21.768 When I read this part of the report, 0:26:21.968,0:26:24.617 I could really feel that[br]cold feeling in my stomach. 0:26:24.817,0:26:26.420 You know, that feeling that you get 0:26:26.620,0:26:29.616 when you realize[br]that something is really wrong, 0:26:29.816,0:26:32.300 but you still can't[br]figure out what or how. 0:26:33.240,0:26:34.968 But we don't know if the pilots 0:26:35.168,0:26:36.920 had yet realized just how dangerous 0:26:36.920,0:26:38.360 their current flight path was. 0:26:38.540,0:26:39.960 But the captain's statement of, 0:26:39.960,0:26:43.980 "I don't like that," definitely[br]showed some real concern. 0:26:45.060,0:26:47.720 Again, make sure you[br]always know what clearance 0:26:47.720,0:26:50.360 you have been given,[br]and if in doubt, ask. 0:26:51.400,0:26:53.940 Anyway, before the pilots could[br]spend much more time trying 0:26:53.940,0:26:55.694 to work out what was wrong, 0:26:55.894,0:26:57.967 the ground proximity warning system 0:26:58.168,0:27:01.100 suddenly activated at time 13:20:50. 0:27:02.380,0:27:03.740 The Boeing 727 was equipped 0:27:03.740,0:27:05.704 with a first generation GPWS, 0:27:05.904,0:27:08.130 which was state of the art at the time, 0:27:08.330,0:27:09.691 but also much less capable 0:27:09.891,0:27:11.940 than the enhanced ground[br]proximity warning systems 0:27:11.940,0:27:13.820 that we have on board today's aircraft. 0:27:15.260,0:27:17.640 Modern EGPWSs compares the position 0:27:17.640,0:27:19.808 and projected path of the airplane 0:27:20.008,0:27:21.720 to a digital terrain database. 0:27:22.320,0:27:24.640 But the original GPSs could only look 0:27:24.640,0:27:26.928 at the terrain directly[br]beneath the aircraft 0:27:27.128,0:27:28.280 using its radio altimeter. 0:27:29.240,0:27:31.740 If the closure rate with[br]the terrain was too high, 0:27:31.740,0:27:34.260 it would an issue sink rate[br]or pull up warnings. 0:27:34.800,0:27:37.560 But if the terrain ahead[br]of the aircraft was rising steeply, 0:27:37.860,0:27:39.300 the system wouldn't know that, 0:27:39.460,0:27:41.840 so these warnings could[br]still come too late. 0:27:43.060,0:27:44.100 In this case, the airplane 0:27:44.210,0:27:45.840 was now passing over[br]the northern shoulder 0:27:45.840,0:27:48.580 of the central volcanic[br]ridge while in descent, 0:27:49.060,0:27:51.195 and that resulted in a[br]rate of terrain closure 0:27:51.395,0:27:53.320 greater than 6,000 feet per minute, 0:27:53.520,0:27:55.080 triggering the warning envelope. 0:27:55.820,0:27:58.218 But the maximum height[br]of the ridge ahead of them 0:27:58.418,0:28:00.830 was actually less than[br]their current altitude. 0:28:01.030,0:28:02.438 So in their present trajectory, 0:28:02.610,0:28:05.520 they were not in any[br]danger of striking the terrain. 0:28:06.680,0:28:08.340 But, of course, the[br]pilots who had now lost 0:28:08.340,0:28:10.200 their position situational awareness 0:28:10.200,0:28:12.586 and were still flying[br]inside of the clouds 0:28:12.786,0:28:14.120 had no way of knowing this. 0:28:14.960,0:28:17.480 So in response to the GPWS warning, 0:28:17.760,0:28:19.020 the captain immediately announced, 0:28:19.180,0:28:22.600 "Okay, overshoot," which is an[br]old British term for go around. 0:28:23.140,0:28:24.680 As the flight engineer advanced 0:28:24.680,0:28:27.120 the thrust levers to[br]the takeoff go around thrust, 0:28:27.380,0:28:29.831 the captain also halted their left turn 0:28:30.031,0:28:32.901 and added, "He's taking us[br]around to the high ground," 0:28:33.050,0:28:35.460 and after stating that,[br]he continued rolling right 0:28:35.460,0:28:38.340 onto a steeper and[br]steeper right-hand turn. 0:28:39.240,0:28:40.780 But what he didn't do was 0:28:40.780,0:28:43.420 to raise the nose in[br]order to initiate the climb. 0:28:44.340,0:28:46.000 And why was that then? 0:28:46.600,0:28:49.020 Well, during GPWS response training, 0:28:49.140,0:28:50.620 we pilots today are required 0:28:50.620,0:28:53.620 to practice a terrain escape[br]maneuver in the simulator, 0:28:53.620,0:28:57.160 which includes disconnecting[br]the automatic setting, 0:28:57.440,0:28:59.720 full thrust pitching up to 20 degrees, 0:28:59.840,0:29:02.227 making sure the speed[br]brake lever is down, 0:29:02.427,0:29:04.160 making proper[br]call outs and so on. 0:29:04.880,0:29:07.560 This maneuver is drilled[br]into everyone flying today 0:29:07.560,0:29:09.400 in order to make sure that the response 0:29:09.400,0:29:11.140 to a hard GPWS warning 0:29:11.140,0:29:15.280 is immediately executed from[br]memory and without questions. 0:29:16.100,0:29:18.947 As it turns out, the captain[br]and the flight engineer 0:29:19.147,0:29:21.184 had also undergone some type 0:29:21.384,0:29:23.367 of GPWS training back in 1978, 0:29:23.567,0:29:26.780 and Dan-Air did have a[br]procedure for GPWS response, 0:29:27.480,0:29:30.800 but back in those days[br]GPWS was a very new technology 0:29:30.800,0:29:32.140 and there is a possibility 0:29:32.140,0:29:34.660 that training had[br]been only theoretical. 0:29:35.460,0:29:38.380 So we don't know exactly what was going 0:29:38.380,0:29:41.180 through the captain's head,[br]but based on his statement 0:29:41.180,0:29:43.978 that, "He's taking us[br]around to the high ground," 0:29:44.178,0:29:47.097 he probably believed[br]that the controller's instruction 0:29:47.297,0:29:48.340 to turn left was faulty 0:29:48.340,0:29:50.300 and that the controller had told him 0:29:50.300,0:29:52.420 to turn towards an unsafe direction. 0:29:53.220,0:29:55.360 Believing that the[br]GPWS warning occurred 0:29:55.360,0:29:58.198 because they were turning[br]left towards high terrain, 0:29:58.398,0:29:59.780 the captain may have reasoned 0:29:59.780,0:30:01.896 that the best way[br]to escape the situation 0:30:02.096,0:30:03.600 was to turn to the right instead. 0:30:04.440,0:30:06.116 So without having[br]practiced the maneuver 0:30:06.190,0:30:08.577 in the simulator, the[br]captain's immediate reaction 0:30:08.710,0:30:11.040 was to turn rather than to climb, 0:30:11.240,0:30:13.440 which sadly would seal their fate. 0:30:14.300,0:30:16.550 Because as the right turn now continued, 0:30:16.750,0:30:17.900 the aircraft passed over 0:30:17.900,0:30:19.815 the top of the ridge[br]and then over a valley, 0:30:20.015,0:30:22.020 causing the radio altitude to increase, 0:30:22.560,0:30:24.570 which silenced the GPWS warning, 0:30:24.770,0:30:26.580 10 seconds after it had started. 0:30:27.620,0:30:29.942 The captain commented,[br]"Watch my eepers," 0:30:30.142,0:30:32.547 referring to the engine[br]pressure ratio or EPR, 0:30:32.747,0:30:34.838 essentially ensuring[br]that the flight engineer 0:30:35.038,0:30:37.740 maintained TO/GA thrust and[br]didn't over-boost the engines. 0:30:38.940,0:30:40.640 But it also now seems like 0:30:40.640,0:30:42.400 the first officer wasn't convinced 0:30:42.400,0:30:44.823 that they were now taking[br]the right course of action. 0:30:45.023,0:30:45.939 So he called out, 0:30:46.139,0:30:48.303 "I suggest a heading of 1-2-2 actually 0:30:48.503,0:30:50.240 and take us through the overshoot." 0:30:51.320,0:30:54.365 A heading of 1-2-2 degrees[br]was the heading prescribed 0:30:54.470,0:30:57.120 by the official Runway 12[br]missed approach procedure, 0:30:57.300,0:30:59.638 which would take them[br]east over the ocean, 0:30:59.838,0:31:01.920 so this was a pretty sensible suggestion. 0:31:02.980,0:31:05.440 But 1-2-2 degrees was also 0:31:05.440,0:31:07.320 to the left of their current heading, 0:31:07.460,0:31:09.320 which contradicted[br]the captain's assumption 0:31:09.320,0:31:13.220 that their left turn was[br]what had caused the GPWS warning. 0:31:14.280,0:31:17.960 As a result, he just continued[br]turning right past due south 0:31:17.960,0:31:20.240 and then all the way[br]around to the southwest, 0:31:20.620,0:31:25.520 directly towards the 5,700 foot[br]high summit of La Esperanza. 0:31:26.760,0:31:29.372 Tragically, they might[br]still have cleared the summit 0:31:29.572,0:31:31.180 if they had just maintained altitude 0:31:31.180,0:31:33.800 or climbed following[br]the terrain escape maneuver. 0:31:34.640,0:31:37.584 But due to the high bank angle[br]they were now using, 0:31:37.784,0:31:40.243 the plane actually lost[br]lift during the maneuver, 0:31:40.443,0:31:41.900 causing a slight descent instead. 0:31:43.080,0:31:46.094 Still flying over the valley,[br]the flight engineer expressed 0:31:46.294,0:31:49.260 his nervousness by commenting,[br]"Let's get out of here." 0:31:49.880,0:31:51.220 But the captain simply repeated, 0:31:51.620,0:31:53.440 "He's taking us around[br]to the high ground." 0:31:54.720,0:31:57.637 Moments later, without any[br]new GPWS warnings, 0:31:57.837,0:32:00.333 and believing that he[br]had corrected the situation, 0:32:00.533,0:32:02.380 the captain[br]called up air traffic control 0:32:02.380,0:32:06.100 and reported, "Dan-Air 1008, 0:32:06.320,0:32:08.000 we've had a ground proximity warning." 0:32:08.880,0:32:10.086 This was then followed 0:32:10.286,0:32:13.575 by the flight engineer calling[br]out twice that their bank angle 0:32:13.750,0:32:16.300 was now above the recommended[br]maximum of 30 degrees. 0:32:17.520,0:32:19.576 And his words were[br]the last ones captured 0:32:19.776,0:32:21.080 on the cockpit voice recorder. 0:32:21.900,0:32:25.240 With the mountains shrouded in[br]clouds, the pilots never saw 0:32:25.240,0:32:26.720 the danger coming towards them, 0:32:26.720,0:32:28.300 and the GPWS never had time 0:32:28.300,0:32:31.180 to react to the closure[br]rate of the steep mountain ahead. 0:32:32.300,0:32:38.080 So at time 13:21:18 Dan-Air[br]Flight 1008 crashed 0:32:38.080,0:32:40.626 into the forested[br]mountainside of La Esperanza 0:32:40.826,0:32:42.839 at a speed of 260 knots, 0:32:43.039,0:32:46.360 just 38 meters below[br]the top of the ridge. 0:32:47.720,0:32:50.227 Most of the aircraft[br]disintegrated immediately, 0:32:50.427,0:32:51.724 killing everyone on board, 0:32:51.924,0:32:53.582 and a large portion[br]of the aft cabin 0:32:53.710,0:32:56.312 was then thrown another[br]250 meters forward 0:32:56.512,0:32:58.980 over the top of the ridge and[br]then down to the other side. 0:32:59.800,0:33:02.736 Down at the airport,[br]the controller now tried repeatedly 0:33:02.936,0:33:04.797 to contact the aircraft[br]in order to follow up 0:33:04.870,0:33:06.300 on their reported GPWS warning, 0:33:06.720,0:33:08.260 but when he didn't get any reply, 0:33:08.560,0:33:10.620 he soon activated the accident alarm. 0:33:11.660,0:33:13.139 The problem was though that 0:33:13.339,0:33:15.440 with no radar available[br]at Tenerife North, 0:33:15.820,0:33:18.800 rescuers had no idea[br]where the aircraft was located, 0:33:18.960,0:33:21.100 especially since it had taken a turn 0:33:21.100,0:33:23.580 that the controller had[br]not intended them to take. 0:33:24.340,0:33:26.593 This meant that the[br]wreckage wasn't discovered 0:33:26.793,0:33:28.336 until seven hours after the crash, 0:33:28.536,0:33:30.060 when a couple of[br]motorists on the road 0:33:30.060,0:33:33.034 to El Teide National Park[br]saw some debris on the road 0:33:33.234,0:33:35.214 and correlated that to the radio report 0:33:35.414,0:33:36.414 of a missing aircraft. 0:33:37.120,0:33:41.325 This crash was, and actually[br]still is, the worst loss of life 0:33:41.525,0:33:43.600 on board a British airliner ever, 0:33:43.820,0:33:47.100 so the investigation received[br]considerable public attention 0:33:48.140,0:33:49.660 especially when the Spanish 0:33:49.860,0:33:51.800 and British investigators didn't agree 0:33:51.800,0:33:54.340 on how to weigh[br]the causes of the accident. 0:33:54.980,0:33:56.780 The Spanish investigators wrote 0:33:56.780,0:33:59.140 that the pilots[br]were ultimately responsible 0:33:59.140,0:34:02.220 for being aware of their position[br]in a non-radar environment, 0:34:02.400,0:34:04.260 and that it was their obligation 0:34:04.260,0:34:05.680 to climb to a safe altitude 0:34:05.680,0:34:09.100 as soon as they became unsure[br]of where they actually were. 0:34:09.860,0:34:12.920 They also cited the pilot's[br]failure to request clarification 0:34:12.920,0:34:14.500 when they didn't understand 0:34:14.500,0:34:16.060 the controller's initial transmission 0:34:16.060,0:34:17.700 as a major cause of the accident, 0:34:18.140,0:34:21.060 as well as their incorrect[br]response to the GPWS warning. 0:34:22.120,0:34:25.191 They pointed out that if[br]the pilots had done nothing at all 0:34:25.391,0:34:26.440 when the GPWS activated, 0:34:27.000,0:34:29.276 they would have passed[br]safely over the ridge 0:34:29.476,0:34:30.880 and continued out over the sea. 0:34:31.360,0:34:32.790 So the Spanish investigators argued 0:34:32.990,0:34:34.940 that it was the captain's[br]decision to turn right 0:34:34.940,0:34:37.558 that took them back[br]around to the high terrain 0:34:37.758,0:34:39.380 and ultimately led to the crash. 0:34:40.340,0:34:42.480 But the British[br]investigation team believed 0:34:42.480,0:34:45.520 that the controller's use[br]of an unpublished holding pattern, 0:34:45.820,0:34:48.063 one that didn't appear[br]on the pilot's chart, 0:34:48.263,0:34:52.574 as well as its verbal slip-up[br]saying turn instead of turns, 0:34:52.774,0:34:54.620 played a very important role 0:34:54.620,0:34:56.880 in the pilots' loss[br]of situational awareness. 0:34:57.900,0:35:00.050 They also noted that[br]if the holding pattern 0:35:00.250,0:35:02.868 had been designed according[br]to international standards, 0:35:03.068,0:35:05.880 the minimum altitude in the hold[br]would have been 6,000 feet, 0:35:06.100,0:35:08.640 which would have[br]incidentally prevented the crash. 0:35:09.620,0:35:12.498 But regardless of who made[br]the most serious errors here, 0:35:12.698,0:35:14.040 the disaster was made possible 0:35:14.040,0:35:16.740 by the poor infrastructure[br]at Tenerife North Airport, 0:35:16.860,0:35:18.069 including the lack of radar 0:35:18.269,0:35:20.040 and the poorly-designed[br]approach procedures. 0:35:20.840,0:35:22.320 It's also important to remember 0:35:22.320,0:35:24.804 that the technology available in 1980 0:35:25.004,0:35:27.860 was far less capable than[br]what we now have available, 0:35:28.220,0:35:30.700 and it's exactly because[br]of accidents like this 0:35:30.700,0:35:33.540 that we today have[br]these vastly improved systems 0:35:33.540,0:35:36.540 and that we pilots are[br]so well trained in using them. 0:35:36.540,0:35:38.815 This accident led to recommendations 0:35:39.015,0:35:42.800 to always question any clearances[br]that weren't 100% clear 0:35:42.800,0:35:45.520 as well as some[br]other recommendations as well. 0:35:45.920,0:35:48.080 But in the long run,[br]this accident also led 0:35:48.080,0:35:50.740 to better training[br]around GPWS maneuvers 0:35:50.740,0:35:53.780 and therefore, a[br]significant increase in safety. 0:35:54.600,0:35:57.200 Our current fantastic[br]safety record proves 0:35:57.200,0:35:59.840 that accidents like these[br]today are largely preventable, 0:36:00.000,0:36:01.940 but they are only preventable 0:36:01.940,0:36:03.380 because of stories like this 0:36:03.380,0:36:05.420 and that's why I keep telling them. 0:36:06.560,0:36:09.180 Now, please consider[br]subscribing to the channel 0:36:09.180,0:36:10.600 if you found this video interesting 0:36:10.600,0:36:13.020 and let me know what[br]you thought in the comments below. 0:36:13.900,0:36:16.780 Watch these videos next and remember 0:36:16.780,0:36:17.981 to check out my sponsor 0:36:18.181,0:36:19.786 who made this video possible, 0:36:19.986,0:36:22.000 together with my[br]fantastic Patreon crew. 0:36:22.680,0:36:25.160 If you want to see my next[br]video before everyone else, 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