(Cory Doctorow) Thank you very much So I'd like to start with something of a benediction or permission. I am one of nature's fast talkers and many of you are not native English speakers, or maybe not accustomed to my harsh Canadian accent in addition I've just come in from Australia and so like many of you I am horribly jetlagged and have drunkenough coffee this morning to kill a rhino. When I used to be at the United Nations I was known as the scourge of the simultaneous translation core I would stand up and speak as slowly as I could and turn around, and there they would be in their boots doing this (laughter) When I start to speak too fast, this is the universal symbol -- my wife invented it -- for "Cory, you are talking too fast". Please, don't be shy. So, I'm a parent , like many of you and I'm like I'm sure all of you who are parents, parenting takes my ass all the time. And there are many regrets I have about the mere seven and half years that I've been a parent but none ares so keenly felt as my regrets over what's happened when I've been wandering around the house and seen my daughter working on something that was beyond her abilities, that was right at the edge of what she could do and where she was doing something that she didn't have competence in yet and you know it's that amazing thing to see that frowning concentration, tongue stuck out: as a parent, your heart swells with pride and you can't help but go over and sort of peer over their shoulder what they are doing and those of you who are parents know what happens when you look too closely at someone who is working beyond the age of their competence. They go back to doing something they're already good at. You interrupt a moment of genuine learning and you replace it with a kind of embarrassment about what you're good at and what you're not. So, it matters a lot that our schools are increasingly surveilled environments, environments in which everything that our kids do is watched and recorded. Because when you do that, you interfere with those moments of real learning. Our ability to do things that we are not good at yet, that we are not proud of yet, is negatively impacted by that kind of scrutiny. And that scrutiny comes from a strange place. We have decided that there are some programmatic means by which we can find all the web page children shouldn't look at and we will filter our networks to be sure that they don't see them. Anyone who has ever paid attention knows that this doesn't work. There are more web pages that kids shouldn't look at than can ever be cataloged, and any attempt to catalog them will always catch pages that kids must be looking at. Any of you who have ever taught a unit on reproductive health know the frustration of trying to get round a school network. Now, this is done in the name of digital protection but it flies in the face of digital literacy and of real learning. Because the only way to stop kids from looking at web pages they shouldn't be looking at is to take all of the clicks that they make, all of the messages that they send, all of their online activity and offshore it to a firm that has some nonsensically arrived at list of the bad pages. And so, what we are doing is that we're exfiltrating all of our students' data to unknown third parties. Now, most of these firms, their primary business is in serving the education sector. Most of them service the government sector. The primarily service governments in repressive autocratic regimes. They help them make sure that their citizens aren't looking at Amnesty International web pages. They repackage those tools and sell them to our educators. So we are offshoring our children's clicks to war criminals. And what our kids do, we know, is they just get around it, because it's not hard to get around it. You know, never underestimate the power of a kid who is time-rich and cash-poor to get around our technological blockades. But when they do this, they don't acquire the kind of digital literacy that we want them to do, they don't acquire real digital agency and moreover, they risk exclusion and in extreme cases, they risk criminal prosecution. So what if instead, those of us who are trapped in this system of teaching kids where we're required to subject them to this kind of surveillance that flies in the face of their real learning, what if instead, we invented curricular units that made them real first class digital citizens, in charge of trying to influence real digital problems? Like what if we said to them: "We want you to catalog the web pages that this vendor lets through that you shouldn't be seeing. We want you to catalog those pages that you should be seeing, that are blocked. We want you to go and interview every teacher in the school about all those lesson plans that were carefully laid out before lunch with a video and a web page, and over lunch, the unaccountable distance center blocked these critical resources and left them handing out photographed worksheets in the afternoon instead of the unit they prepared. We want you to learn how to do the Freedom of Information Act's requests and find out what your school authority is spending to censor your internet access and surveil your activity. We want you to learn to use the internet to research these companies and we want you to present this to your parent-teacher association, to your school authority, to your local newspaper." Because that's the kind of digital literacy that makes kids into first-class digital citizens, that prepares them for a future in which they can participate fully in a world that's changing. Kids are the beta-testers of the surveillance state. The path of surveillance technology starts with prisoners, moves to asylum seekers, people in mental institutions and then to its first non-incarcerated population: children and then moves to blue-collar workers, government workers and white-collar workers. And so, what we do to kids today is what we did to prisoners yesterday and what we're going to be doing to you tomorrow. And so it matters, what we teach our kids. If you want to see where this goes, this is a kid named Blake Robbins and he attended Lower Merion High School in Lower Merion Pennsylvania outside f Philadelphia. It's the most affluent school district in America, so affluent that all the kids were issued Macbooks at the start of the year and they had to do their homework on their Macbooks, they had to bring them to school every day and bring them home every night. And the Macbooks had been fitted with Laptop Theft Recovery Software, which is fancy word for a rootkit, that let the school administration scovertly (check) operate the cameras and microphones on these computers and harvest files off of their hard drives view all their clicks, and so on. Now Blake Robbins found out that the software existed and how it was being used because he and the head teacher had been knocking heads for years, since he first got into the school, and one day, the head teacher summoned him to his office and said: "Blake, I've got you now." and handed him a print-out of Blake in his bedroom the night before, taking what looked like a pill, and said: "You're taking drugs." And Blake Robbins said: "That's a candy, it's a Mike and Ike candy, I take them -- I eat them when I'm studying. How did you get a picture of me in my bedroom?" This head teacher had taken over 6000 photos of Blake Robbins: awake and asleep, dressed and undressed, in the presence of his family. And in the ensuing lawsuit, the school settled for a large amount of money and promised that they wouldn't do it again without informing the students that it was going on. And increasingly, the practice is now that school administrations hand out laptops, because they're getting cheaper, with exactly the same kind of software, but they let the students know and t hey find that that works even better at curbing the students' behavior, because the students know that they're always on camera. Now, the surveillance state is moving from kids to the rest of the world. It's metastasizing. Our devices are increasingly designed to treat us as attackers, as suspicious parties who can't be trusted because our devices' job is to do things that we don't want them to do. Now that's not because the vendors who make our technology want to spy on us necessarily, but they want to take the ink-jet printer business model and bring it into every other realm of the world. So the ink-jet printer business model is where you sell someone a device and then you get a continuing revenue stream from that device by making sure that competitors can't make consumables or parts or additional features or plugins for that device, without paying rent to the original manufacturer. And that allows you to maintain monopoly margins on your devices. Now, in 1998, the American government passed a law called the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, in 2001 the European Union introduced its own version, the European Union Copyright Directive. And these two laws, along with laws all around the world, in Australia, Canada and elsewhere. These laws prohibit removing digital laws that are used to restrict access to copyrighted works and they were original envisioned as a way of making sure that Europeans didn't bring cheap DVDs in from America, or making sure that Australians didn't mport cheap DVDs from China. And so you have a digital work, a DVD, and it has a lock on it and to unlock it, you have to buy an authorized player and the player checks to make sure you are in region and making your own player that doesn't make that check is illegal because you'd have to remove the digital lock 9:13