WEBVTT
00:00:00.000 --> 00:00:14.488
34C3 preroll music
00:00:14.488 --> 00:00:19.939
Herald angel: Today two people from privacy
international, one is Eva Blum--Dumontet
00:00:19.939 --> 00:00:25.349
she's a research officer working on data
exploitation especially in the global
00:00:25.349 --> 00:00:34.750
south and Millie Wood who's a lawyer and
is fighting against spy agencies and
00:00:34.750 --> 00:00:41.070
before that she fought seven years against
police cases and they're gonna be talking
00:00:41.070 --> 00:00:46.340
about policing in the the age of data
exploitation. Give them a warm welcome.
00:00:46.340 --> 00:00:55.242
Applause
00:00:55.242 --> 00:00:58.440
Millie Wood: Hi I'm Millie as was just said I've been
00:00:58.440 --> 00:01:02.440
at privacy international for two years
working as a lawyer before that I spent
00:01:02.440 --> 00:01:08.320
seven years bringing cases against the
police and what increasingly concerns me
00:01:08.320 --> 00:01:14.130
based on these experiences is a lack of
understanding of what tactics are being
00:01:14.130 --> 00:01:21.000
used by the police today and what legal
basis they are doing this on. The lack of
00:01:21.000 --> 00:01:26.780
transparency undermines the ability of
activists lawyers and technologists to
00:01:26.780 --> 00:01:31.479
challenge the police tactics and whilst
I'm sure a lot of you have a broad
00:01:31.479 --> 00:01:36.990
awareness of the technology that the
police can use I don't think this is
00:01:36.990 --> 00:01:43.390
enough and we need to know what specific
police forces are using against
00:01:43.390 --> 00:01:50.479
individuals. The reason why is that when
you're arrested you need to know what
00:01:50.479 --> 00:01:56.810
disclosure to ask for in order to prove
your innocence. Your lawyers need to know
00:01:56.810 --> 00:02:03.010
what expert evidence to ask for in order
to defend their client. And increasingly
00:02:03.010 --> 00:02:08.949
as there are invisible ways or seemingly
invisible for the police to monitor a scale
00:02:08.949 --> 00:02:14.010
we need to know that there are effective
legal safeguards. Now those who are
00:02:14.010 --> 00:02:20.720
affected are not just the guilty or those
who understand technology they include
00:02:20.720 --> 00:02:29.730
pensioners such as John Cat a 90 year old
man who's a peace protester and he's a
00:02:29.730 --> 00:02:36.260
law-abiding citizen no criminal record and
yet he is on the UK domestic extremism
00:02:36.260 --> 00:02:42.980
database and listed here are some of the
entries: He took his sketchpad and made
00:02:42.980 --> 00:02:50.220
drawings, he's clean shaven, and he was
holding a board with orange people on it.
00:02:50.220 --> 00:02:56.020
So this is the kind of people that they
are surveilling. John's case exposes
00:02:56.020 --> 00:03:03.800
unlawful actions by the police but these
actions date back to 2005 to 2009 as far
00:03:03.800 --> 00:03:10.170
as I'm aware there are no cases
challenging modern police tactics and
00:03:10.170 --> 00:03:14.879
privacy international in the UK and with
our partners throughout the world are
00:03:14.879 --> 00:03:20.520
increasingly concerned at the pace this is
developing unobstructed because people
00:03:20.520 --> 00:03:28.480
don't know what's going on, and so we've
started in the UK to try and uncover some
00:03:28.480 --> 00:03:34.180
of the police tactics using Freedom of
Information requests. These laws should be
00:03:34.180 --> 00:03:39.480
available throughout Europe and we want to
make similar requests in other countries
00:03:39.480 --> 00:03:44.450
hopefully with some of you. So now I'm
going to hand over to my colleague Eva who
00:03:44.450 --> 00:03:47.860
will talk a bit about privacy
international, some of the tactics we know
00:03:47.860 --> 00:03:52.030
the police are using, and then we'll speak
about some of the things that we found out
00:03:52.030 --> 00:03:54.570
through our initial research.
00:03:54.570 --> 00:03:59.530
Applause
00:03:59.530 --> 00:04:02.919
Thank you so, I'm just going to tell you a
little bit more about Privacy
00:04:02.919 --> 00:04:07.150
International for those of you who don't
know this organization. We are based in
00:04:07.150 --> 00:04:11.470
London and we fight against surveillance
and defend the right to privacy across the
00:04:11.470 --> 00:04:15.519
world. Basically, essentially what we're
doing is that we do litigation, we conduct
00:04:15.519 --> 00:04:21.350
research, and we carry out advocacy
including at the United Nations, we
00:04:21.350 --> 00:04:26.830
develop policies on issues that are
defining modern rights. Now, our work
00:04:26.830 --> 00:04:30.900
ranges from litigations against
intelligence services to a wide range of
00:04:30.900 --> 00:04:36.880
reports on issues such as connected cars,
smart cities, and FinTech. We've recently
00:04:36.880 --> 00:04:41.610
published an investigation on the role of
companies like Cambridge Analytica and
00:04:41.610 --> 00:04:47.990
Harris Media and their role in the latest
Kenyan elections. With our network of
00:04:47.990 --> 00:04:52.471
partner organisations across the world we
advocate for stronger privacy protection
00:04:52.471 --> 00:04:59.161
in the law and technology and stronger
safeguards against surveillance. Now we
00:04:59.161 --> 00:05:04.080
talk about data exploitation and it's
actually the title of the talk so what do
00:05:04.080 --> 00:05:10.380
we mean by that? The concept of data
exploitation emerges from our concerns
00:05:10.380 --> 00:05:15.720
that the industry and governments are
building a world that prioritize the
00:05:15.720 --> 00:05:22.650
exploitation of all data. We observe three
prevailing trends in data exploitation.
00:05:22.650 --> 00:05:28.000
One is the excessive data that's generated
beyond our control. The second one is the
00:05:28.000 --> 00:05:34.139
fact that this data is processed in a way
we cannot understand or influence and the
00:05:34.139 --> 00:05:39.530
lack of transparency around it. The last
one is, that at the moment this data is
00:05:39.530 --> 00:05:44.690
used to disadvantage us the ones who are
producing this data and it's further
00:05:44.690 --> 00:05:51.270
empowering the already powerful. We hardly
control the data anymore that's generated
00:05:51.270 --> 00:05:55.290
from phones or in our computers, but now
in the world we live in data just don't
00:05:55.290 --> 00:06:00.130
come just from our phones or computers. It
comes from the cars we're driving, it
00:06:00.130 --> 00:06:05.970
comes from our payment systems, from the
cities we live in. This is all generating
00:06:05.970 --> 00:06:12.770
data and this data is used by other
entities to make assumptions about us and
00:06:12.770 --> 00:06:18.450
take decisions that eventually influence
our lives. Are we entitled to a loan? Do
00:06:18.450 --> 00:06:25.060
we qualify for affordable insurance?
Should we be sent to jail or set free? Who
00:06:25.060 --> 00:06:31.130
should be arrested? This is at the core of
the world that we're building around data
00:06:31.130 --> 00:06:37.630
exploitation. The question of power
imbalance between those who have the data
00:06:37.630 --> 00:06:42.490
and who gets to make decisions based on
this data and those who are producing the
00:06:42.490 --> 00:06:50.180
data and losing control over it. Now what
is policing have to do with data, what
00:06:50.180 --> 00:06:57.020
does data exploitation have to do with
policing? The police has always been
00:06:57.020 --> 00:07:04.620
actually using data in the past. To give
you one example in 1980 a transit police
00:07:04.620 --> 00:07:10.530
officer named Jack Maple, developed a
project called chart of the future, this
00:07:10.530 --> 00:07:16.479
is how he described it: "I call them the
chart of the future. On 55 feet of wall
00:07:16.479 --> 00:07:20.740
space, I mapped every train station in New
York City and every train. Then I used
00:07:20.740 --> 00:07:25.340
crayons to mark every violent crime,
robbery, and grand larceny that occurred.
00:07:25.340 --> 00:07:33.250
I mapped the solved versus the unsolved".
Now the system was used by the Transit
00:07:33.250 --> 00:07:41.110
Police and it was credited with reducing
felonies by 27% and robberies by 1/3
00:07:41.110 --> 00:07:50.280
between 1990 and 1992. So this generated a
lot of interest in his projects and former
00:07:50.280 --> 00:07:56.039
New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani asked the
New York police department to essentially
00:07:56.039 --> 00:08:02.479
take up chart of the future and develop
their own project. It became CompStat.
00:08:02.479 --> 00:08:10.360
CompStat was again essentially about
mapping crime to try and make assumptions
00:08:10.360 --> 00:08:19.360
about where crime wars are happening. So
this kind of shows the building of this
00:08:19.360 --> 00:08:25.570
narrative around this idea that the more
data you have, the more data you generate,
00:08:25.570 --> 00:08:31.780
the better you will be at reducing crime.
Now it becomes interesting in the world we
00:08:31.780 --> 00:08:36.379
live in that we describe, where we are
constantly generating data, often without
00:08:36.379 --> 00:08:42.059
the consent or even the knowledge of those
who are producing this data. So there are
00:08:42.059 --> 00:08:48.339
new questions to be asked: What data is
the police entitled to access? What can
00:08:48.339 --> 00:08:54.490
they do with it? Are we all becoming
suspects by default? One of the key
00:08:54.490 --> 00:09:00.449
elements of the intersection between data
exploitation and policing is the question
00:09:00.449 --> 00:09:06.119
of smart cities. It's worth bearing in
mind that data-driven policing is often
00:09:06.119 --> 00:09:12.029
referred to as smart policing, so obviously
the word smart has been used generally in
00:09:12.029 --> 00:09:17.699
a generic manner by various industry to
kind of describe this trend of using mass
00:09:17.699 --> 00:09:26.689
data collection in order to provide new
services. But there is actually a real and
00:09:26.689 --> 00:09:34.670
genuine connection between smart cities
and data-driven policing. The first reason
00:09:34.670 --> 00:09:43.709
for that is that actually one of the main
reasons for cities to invest in smart city
00:09:43.709 --> 00:09:48.910
infrastructure is actually the question of
security. This is something we've explored
00:09:48.910 --> 00:09:54.320
in our latest report on smart cities and
this is emerging also from the work we're
00:09:54.320 --> 00:10:00.890
doing other organizations including coding
rights in Brazil and DRF in Pakistan. So
00:10:00.890 --> 00:10:06.009
actually Brazil is an interesting example,
because before the mega events they
00:10:06.009 --> 00:10:10.350
started organizing like the football
World Cup and the Olympics they invested
00:10:10.350 --> 00:10:16.850
massively in smart city infrastructure.
Including projects with IBM and precisely
00:10:16.850 --> 00:10:20.250
the purpose of what they were trying to
achieve with their smart city
00:10:20.250 --> 00:10:25.850
infrastructure, was making the city safer
so it was extremely strongly connected
00:10:25.850 --> 00:10:32.420
with the police. So this is a picture for
example of the control room that
00:10:32.420 --> 00:10:39.109
was built to control CCTV cameras and to
create graphs in order to showcase where
00:10:39.109 --> 00:10:45.860
crime was happening and also in a way the
likeliness of natural disasters in some
00:10:45.860 --> 00:10:51.649
areas. In Pakistan there is a whole new
program on investment of smart cities,
00:10:51.649 --> 00:10:58.799
which is actually referred to as the safe
city project. Now companies understand
00:10:58.799 --> 00:11:05.249
that very well and this is actually an
image from an IBM presentation describing
00:11:05.249 --> 00:11:11.189
their vision of smart cities. And as you
see like policing that is very much
00:11:11.189 --> 00:11:16.790
integrated into their vision, their
heavily centralized vision of what smart
00:11:16.790 --> 00:11:22.829
cities are. So that's no wonder that
companies that offer smart city
00:11:22.829 --> 00:11:28.379
infrastructure are actually now also
offering a platform for policing. So those
00:11:28.379 --> 00:11:34.820
companies include IBM as I mentioned but
also Oracle and Microsoft. We see in many
00:11:34.820 --> 00:11:39.600
countries including the UK where we based
some pressure on budgets and budget
00:11:39.600 --> 00:11:44.379
reductions for the police and so there is
a very strong appeal with this narrative,
00:11:44.379 --> 00:11:51.120
that you can purchase platform you can
gather more data that will help you do
00:11:51.120 --> 00:11:58.109
policing in less time and do it more
efficiently. But little thought is given
00:11:58.109 --> 00:12:03.230
to the impact on society, or right to
privacy and what happens if someone
00:12:03.230 --> 00:12:13.439
unexpected take the reins of power. Now
we're gonna briefly explain what data-
00:12:13.439 --> 00:12:20.499
driven policing looks like, and eventually
Millie will look at our findings. So
00:12:20.499 --> 00:12:26.339
the first thing I wanted to discuss is
actually predictive policing, because
00:12:26.339 --> 00:12:30.740
that's often something we think of and
talked about when we think about data-
00:12:30.740 --> 00:12:37.759
driven policing. I mentioned CompStat
before and essentially predictive policing
00:12:37.759 --> 00:12:43.319
works on a similar premise. The idea is
that if you map where crime happens you
00:12:43.319 --> 00:12:50.859
can eventually guess where the next crime
will happen. So the key player in
00:12:50.859 --> 00:12:54.989
predictive policing is this company called
PREDPOL, I mean I think they describe
00:12:54.989 --> 00:12:58.230
pretty much what they do, they use
artificial intelligence to help you
00:12:58.230 --> 00:13:06.249
prevent crime, right, predicting when and
where crime will most likely occur. Now
00:13:06.249 --> 00:13:10.929
PREDPOL and other companies using
something called a Hawkes process that's
00:13:10.929 --> 00:13:17.019
used normally for the prediction of
earthquake tremors, so what Hawkes
00:13:17.019 --> 00:13:23.269
originally did is that he was analyzing
how after an earthquake you have after
00:13:23.269 --> 00:13:28.660
shakes and usually the after shakes tend
to happen where the original earthquake
00:13:28.660 --> 00:13:35.940
happened and in a short period of time
after that. So the Hawkes process basically
00:13:35.940 --> 00:13:40.910
is described as when a certain event
happens, other events of the same kind will
00:13:40.910 --> 00:13:45.470
happen shortly after in the same in the
same location. Now obviously it actually
00:13:45.470 --> 00:13:50.790
works quite well for earthquakes, whether
it works for crime is a lot more
00:13:50.790 --> 00:13:56.290
questionable. But that's actually the
premise on which companies that
00:13:56.290 --> 00:14:02.119
are offering predictive policing services
are relying. So basically applied to
00:14:02.119 --> 00:14:08.730
predictive policing the mantra is
monitoring data on places where crime is
00:14:08.730 --> 00:14:13.309
happening you can identify geographic
hotspots where crime will most likely
00:14:13.309 --> 00:14:20.819
happen again. Now other companies than
PREDPOL are joining in and they are adding
00:14:20.819 --> 00:14:26.259
more data than just simply location of
past crimes. So this data has included
00:14:26.259 --> 00:14:30.629
open source intelligence and we talked a
little bit more about this later on.
00:14:30.629 --> 00:14:35.699
Weather report, census data, the location
of key landmarks like bars, churches,
00:14:35.699 --> 00:14:40.089
schools, data sporting events, and moon
phases. I'm not quite sure what they're
00:14:40.089 --> 00:14:50.209
doing with moon phases but somehow that's
something they're using. When predictive
00:14:50.209 --> 00:14:56.179
policing first sort of emerged one of the
the key concerns was whether our world was
00:14:56.179 --> 00:15:00.999
going to be turning into a Minority Report
kind of scenario where people are arrested
00:15:00.999 --> 00:15:05.490
before a crime is even committed and
companies like PREDPOL were quick to
00:15:05.490 --> 00:15:10.199
reassure people and say that do not
concern about who will commit crime but
00:15:10.199 --> 00:15:15.800
where crimes are happening. Now that's not
actually true because in fact at the
00:15:15.800 --> 00:15:21.100
moment we see several programs emerging
especially in the US, where police
00:15:21.100 --> 00:15:25.509
departments are concerned not so much with
where crimes are happening, but who's
00:15:25.509 --> 00:15:30.920
committing it.,So I'm gonna talk about two
example of this: One is the Kansas City No
00:15:30.920 --> 00:15:37.850
Violence Alliance, which is a program laid
by the local police to identify who will
00:15:37.850 --> 00:15:42.579
become the next criminal - basically - and
they're using an algorithm that combines
00:15:42.579 --> 00:15:48.189
data from traditional policing as well as
social media intelligence and information
00:15:48.189 --> 00:15:53.569
that they have on drug use, based on this
they create graphics generated using
00:15:53.569 --> 00:16:01.609
predictive policing to show how certain
people are connected to already convicted
00:16:01.609 --> 00:16:06.169
criminals and gang members. Once they've
identified these people they request
00:16:06.169 --> 00:16:11.479
meeting with them whether they've
committed crimes or not in the past. And
00:16:11.479 --> 00:16:16.420
they would have a discussion about their
connection to those convicted criminals
00:16:16.420 --> 00:16:21.910
and gang members and what they tell them
is that they are warned that if a crime
00:16:21.910 --> 00:16:27.109
next happened within their network of
people every person connected to this
00:16:27.109 --> 00:16:33.319
network will be arrested whether or not
they were actually involved in the crime
00:16:33.319 --> 00:16:38.379
being committed. Now there are actually
dozens of police departments that are
00:16:38.379 --> 00:16:46.100
using similar programs. The Chicago Police
Department has an index of the 400 people
00:16:46.100 --> 00:16:50.359
most likely to be involved in violent
crimes. That sounds like a BuzzFeed
00:16:50.359 --> 00:16:56.389
article but actually there is a reality
which is extremely concerning, because
00:16:56.389 --> 00:17:02.069
those people who are in this list are for
the most part not actual criminals, they
00:17:02.069 --> 00:17:08.019
are purely seen to be connected to people
who've committed crime. So if your next-
00:17:08.019 --> 00:17:16.679
door neighbor is a criminal then you may
well find your name on that list. Now
00:17:16.679 --> 00:17:21.480
predictive policing is deceptive and
problematic for several reasons: First of
00:17:21.480 --> 00:17:26.519
all there's the question of the
presumption of innocence. In a world where
00:17:26.519 --> 00:17:32.519
even before you commit a crime you can
find your name on that list or be called
00:17:32.519 --> 00:17:37.899
by the police - you know - what happens to
this very basis of democracy which is the
00:17:37.899 --> 00:17:42.529
presumption of the of innocence. But also
there's the other question of like can we
00:17:42.529 --> 00:17:47.720
really use the math that was originally
designed for earthquakes and apply to
00:17:47.720 --> 00:17:53.049
human beings because human beings don't
work like earthquakes. They have their own
00:17:53.049 --> 00:17:59.870
set of biases and the biases
start with how we collect the data. For
00:17:59.870 --> 00:18:07.640
example, if the police is more likely to
police areas where there is minorities,
00:18:07.640 --> 00:18:11.769
people of color, then obviously the data
they will have will be disproportionately
00:18:11.769 --> 00:18:18.490
higher on persons of color. Likewise if
they are unlikely to investigate white-
00:18:18.490 --> 00:18:24.200
collar crime they will be unlikely to have
data that are reflecting a reality where
00:18:24.200 --> 00:18:29.040
crime also happens in wealthier areas. So
basically we are inputting biased datasets
00:18:29.040 --> 00:18:35.030
that obviously will lead to biased
results. And what these biased results
00:18:35.030 --> 00:18:41.600
mean is that it will continue the already
existing trend of over policing
00:18:41.600 --> 00:18:48.440
communities of color and low-income
communities. I'll leave it to Millie for
00:18:48.440 --> 00:18:55.667
the next box. So, one of the increasingly
popular technologies we're seeing in the
00:18:55.667 --> 00:19:00.586
UK, and is no doubt used around the world
and probably at border points, although we
00:19:00.586 --> 00:19:06.450
need more help with the reasearch to prove
this, is mobile phone extraction. The
00:19:06.450 --> 00:19:10.680
police can extract data from your phone,
your laptop, and other devices which
00:19:10.680 --> 00:19:16.431
results in a memory dump of the extracted
data taken from your device and now held
00:19:16.431 --> 00:19:23.331
in an agency database. So for example all
your photos, all your messages, and all
00:19:23.331 --> 00:19:28.330
those of people who had no idea they would
end up in a police database because
00:19:28.330 --> 00:19:34.549
they're associated with you retained for
as long as the police wish. Now these
00:19:34.549 --> 00:19:38.600
devices are pretty user friendly for the
police and if you're interested you can
00:19:38.600 --> 00:19:42.559
look on YouTube where Cellebrite one of
the big players has lots of videos about
00:19:42.559 --> 00:19:48.929
how you can use them, and so depending on
the device and the operating system some
00:19:48.929 --> 00:19:54.419
of the data this is from a police document
but it lists what they can extract using a
00:19:54.419 --> 00:20:01.820
Cellebrite UFED is what you might expect:
device information, calls, messages,
00:20:01.820 --> 00:20:08.970
emails, social media, and Wi-Fi networks.
But if you look at their website and here
00:20:08.970 --> 00:20:14.750
are a few examples they can also collect:
system and deleted data, they can access
00:20:14.750 --> 00:20:20.580
cloud storage, and inaccessible partitions
of the device. Now this is data that is
00:20:20.580 --> 00:20:26.490
clearly beyond the average users control,
and as the volume of data we hold on our
00:20:26.490 --> 00:20:31.749
phones increases so will this list. And
the companies we know the UK police are
00:20:31.749 --> 00:20:39.059
using, which includes: Cellebrite, Acceso,
Radio Tactics, MSAB, are all aware of how
00:20:39.059 --> 00:20:44.750
valuable this is and as one of them have
stated: "if you've got access to a person
00:20:44.750 --> 00:20:50.500
SIM card, you've got access to the whole
of a person's life". They also go on to
00:20:50.500 --> 00:20:56.070
note: "the sheer amount of data stored on
mobile phones is significantly greater
00:20:56.070 --> 00:21:04.149
today than ever before." There are also no
temporal limits to the extraction of data,
00:21:04.149 --> 00:21:09.149
this is from another police document we
obtained and it shows that if you choose
00:21:09.149 --> 00:21:16.159
to extract to certain data type you will
obtain all data of a particular type, not
00:21:16.159 --> 00:21:21.280
just the data relevant to an
investigation. So all that data on a
00:21:21.280 --> 00:21:28.429
police database, indefinitely and even if
you were asked whether you were happy for
00:21:28.429 --> 00:21:32.789
your data to be extracted during an
investigation I think it's highly unlikely
00:21:32.789 --> 00:21:37.630
you would realize the volume that the
police were going to take. Other targets
00:21:37.630 --> 00:21:44.179
for the police that we know about are:
infotainment systems in cars, Smart TVs,
00:21:44.179 --> 00:21:51.230
and connected devices in the home. This is
an extract from a tech UK report, where
00:21:51.230 --> 00:21:56.700
Mark Stokes head of digital forensics at
the Met Police which the police in London
00:21:56.700 --> 00:22:03.200
stated in January, that the crime scene of
tomorrow will be the Internet of Things
00:22:03.200 --> 00:22:08.450
and detectors of the future will carry a
digital forensics toolkit that will help
00:22:08.450 --> 00:22:15.020
them analyze microchips and download data
at the scene rather than removing devices
00:22:15.020 --> 00:22:20.081
for testing. Now I can imagine that the
evidence storage room is going to get a
00:22:20.081 --> 00:22:24.840
bit full if they start dragging in
connected fridges, hair dryers, hair
00:22:24.840 --> 00:22:32.570
brushes, your Google home, Amazon echo and
whatever else you have. However, their
00:22:32.570 --> 00:22:38.240
plans to walk into your home and download
everything, make no mention of needing a
00:22:38.240 --> 00:22:43.509
specific warrant and so the only
limitations at the moment are the
00:22:43.509 --> 00:22:50.220
protections that may exist on the devices.
The law does not protect us and this needs
00:22:50.220 --> 00:22:59.409
to change. So I'm going to be talking a
little bit about open source intelligence
00:22:59.409 --> 00:23:05.470
and in particular social media
intelligence, because when I talked about
00:23:05.470 --> 00:23:10.830
predictive policing I identified those two
sources as some of the data that's being
00:23:10.830 --> 00:23:17.470
used for predictive policing. Now, open
source intelligence is often thought as,
00:23:17.470 --> 00:23:23.409
or often assumed to be innocuous, and
there is the understanding that if
00:23:23.409 --> 00:23:29.440
information is publicly available then it
should be fair for the police to use. Now
00:23:29.440 --> 00:23:34.270
the problem is that among open source
intelligence there's often social media
00:23:34.270 --> 00:23:40.509
intelligence that we refer to as
documents. Now there are many ways to
00:23:40.509 --> 00:23:45.900
conduct document and it can range from
like the single police officer, who is
00:23:45.900 --> 00:23:54.009
just you know using Facebook or Twitter to
look up the accounts of victims or
00:23:54.009 --> 00:23:58.620
suspected criminals, but there was also
companies that are scrapping the likes of
00:23:58.620 --> 00:24:04.580
Facebook and Twitter to allow the police
to monitor social media. Now social medias
00:24:04.580 --> 00:24:10.580
have like blurred the lines between public
and private, because obviously we are
00:24:10.580 --> 00:24:17.909
broadcasting our views on this platform
and at the moment the police has been
00:24:17.909 --> 00:24:25.059
exploiting this kind of unique space, this
blured line, ithey are accessing this
00:24:25.059 --> 00:24:30.809
content in a completely unregulated
manner, as long as the content is publicly
00:24:30.809 --> 00:24:37.620
available like for example you don't need
to be friend or to have any already
00:24:37.620 --> 00:24:43.470
established connection with the suspected
criminal or the police or the victim
00:24:43.470 --> 00:24:48.610
anything that's available to you it's
completely unregulated there are no rules
00:24:48.610 --> 00:24:56.700
and I mentioned earlier the question of a
budget restriction and so the police is
00:24:56.700 --> 00:25:01.749
benefiting hugely from this because it
doesn't really cost anything to use social
00:25:01.749 --> 00:25:07.019
media so at the moment SOCMINT is kind of
like the first and easy step in a police
00:25:07.019 --> 00:25:14.470
investigation because there is no cost and
because there is no oversight. Now,
00:25:14.470 --> 00:25:19.420
SOCMINT actually isn't so innocent in the
sense that it allows the police to
00:25:19.420 --> 00:25:25.519
identify the locations of people based on
their post, it allows them to establish
00:25:25.519 --> 00:25:30.669
people's connection, their relationships,
their association, it allows the
00:25:30.669 --> 00:25:37.380
monitoring of protest and also to identify
the leaders of various movement, and to
00:25:37.380 --> 00:25:45.880
measure a person's influence. Now, in the
UK what we know is that the police is
00:25:45.880 --> 00:25:52.019
largely using marketing products, so this
is an anonymous quote from a report by
00:25:52.019 --> 00:25:58.029
academics that have been doing research on
SOCMINT and what someone said was that: "A
00:25:58.029 --> 00:26:01.620
lot of stuff came out of marketing because
marketing were using social media to
00:26:01.620 --> 00:26:05.190
understand what people were saying about
their product... We wanted to understand
00:26:05.190 --> 00:26:11.549
what people were saying so it's almost
using it in reverse". Now again, this is
00:26:11.549 --> 00:26:16.350
not considered like surveillance device
this is purely a marketing project that
00:26:16.350 --> 00:26:23.309
they're using and for that reason law
enforcement agencies and security agencies
00:26:23.309 --> 00:26:30.140
are often arguing that SOCMINT has
basically no impact on privacy. But
00:26:30.140 --> 00:26:36.640
actually when your post reveals your
location or when the content of your post
00:26:36.640 --> 00:26:40.080
reveal what used to be considered and is
still considered actually as sensitive
00:26:40.080 --> 00:26:45.090
private information like details about
your sexual life, about your health, about
00:26:45.090 --> 00:26:50.120
your politics, can we really minimize the
impact of the police accessing this
00:26:50.120 --> 00:26:56.190
information. Now obviously we may not have
a problem with the average twitter user or
00:26:56.190 --> 00:27:00.880
with a friend reading this information but
when the ones who are reading the
00:27:00.880 --> 00:27:06.460
information and taking actions on this
information have power over us like the
00:27:06.460 --> 00:27:17.717
police does, you know, what does it
actually mean for our right to privacy?
00:27:17.717 --> 00:27:26.610
That's not to say that people should stop
using social media but rather what kind of
00:27:26.610 --> 00:27:32.960
regulation can we put in place so that
it's not so easy for the police to access.
00:27:32.960 --> 00:27:41.720
The absence of regulations on SOCMINT has
actually already led to abuse in two cases
00:27:41.720 --> 00:27:48.159
both in the US that we've identified: One
is Raza v. the City of New York which is a
00:27:48.159 --> 00:27:55.840
case from the ACLU where we knew that we
found out that the city of New York,
00:27:55.840 --> 00:28:00.179
sorry, the New York Police Department was
systematically gathering intelligence on
00:28:00.179 --> 00:28:04.799
Muslim communities, and one of the ways
they were gathering this intelligence was
00:28:04.799 --> 00:28:11.509
essentially by surveilling social media
accounts of Muslims in New York. The
00:28:11.509 --> 00:28:17.320
second case is a company called ZeroFOX.
So what ZeroFox does is social media
00:28:17.320 --> 00:28:23.150
monitoring. Now, during the the riots that
followed the funeral of Freddie Gray,
00:28:23.150 --> 00:28:30.500
Freddie Gray was a 25 year old black man
who had been shot by the police, so after
00:28:30.500 --> 00:28:36.549
his funeral there had been a series of
riots in the UK and ZeroFOX produced a
00:28:36.549 --> 00:28:41.360
report that they shared with the Baltimore
Police to essentially advertise for their
00:28:41.360 --> 00:28:47.929
social social media monitoring tool and
what the company was doing was again like
00:28:47.929 --> 00:28:52.970
browsing social media and trying to
establish who were the threat actors in
00:28:52.970 --> 00:28:58.659
these riots and among the 19 threat
actors that they identified two of them
00:28:58.659 --> 00:29:04.499
were actually leaders of the black lives
matter movement. Actually at least one of
00:29:04.499 --> 00:29:09.550
them was a woman definitely not a physical
threat but this is how they were
00:29:09.550 --> 00:29:17.570
essentially labeled. So these two examples
actually show that again it's still sort
00:29:17.570 --> 00:29:24.240
of the same targets, it's people of
colors, it's activists, it's people from
00:29:24.240 --> 00:29:30.179
poor income backgrounds, that are singled
out as likely criminals. And it's very
00:29:30.179 --> 00:29:34.029
telling when we realize that SOCMINT is
actually one of the sources of data that's
00:29:34.029 --> 00:29:38.740
eventually used for predictive policing
and then again predictive policing leading
00:29:38.740 --> 00:29:45.409
to people being more surveiled and
potentially exposed to more police
00:29:45.409 --> 00:29:51.169
surveillance based on the fact that they
all singled out as as likely criminal. Now
00:29:51.169 --> 00:29:56.890
social media is a fascinating place
because it's a mix between a private and a
00:29:56.890 --> 00:30:02.210
public space as I said we are broadcasting
our views publicly but then again it's a
00:30:02.210 --> 00:30:07.679
privately owned space where we follow the
rules that is set up by private companies.
00:30:07.679 --> 00:30:13.779
Now, if we want to protect this space and
ensure that like free expression and
00:30:13.779 --> 00:30:18.619
political organization can still happen on
the spaces we need to fully understand how
00:30:18.619 --> 00:30:23.460
much the police have been exploiting the
spaces and how we can limit and regulate
00:30:23.460 --> 00:30:29.879
the use of it. Now, I'll talk to Millie
about what we can do next. So I'm going to
00:30:29.879 --> 00:30:33.460
briefly look at some of our initial
findings we've made using Freedom of
00:30:33.460 --> 00:30:39.539
Information requests, broadly: the lack of
awareness by the public, weak legal basis,
00:30:39.539 --> 00:30:45.429
and a lack of oversight. Now, sometimes
the lack of awareness appears intentional
00:30:45.429 --> 00:30:54.740
- we asked the police about their plans to
extract data from connected devices in the
00:30:54.740 --> 00:31:01.679
home and they replied neither confirm nor
deny. Now this is kind of a bizarre
00:31:01.679 --> 00:31:06.659
response given that Mark Stokes who's a
member of the police had already said that
00:31:06.659 --> 00:31:13.509
they plan to do this, in addition the UK
government Home Office replied to us
00:31:13.509 --> 00:31:18.269
saying the Home Office plans to develop
skills and capacity to exploit the
00:31:18.269 --> 00:31:23.929
Internet of Things as part of criminal
investigations. They also said that police
00:31:23.929 --> 00:31:29.920
officers will receive training in relation
to extracting, obtaining, retrieving, data
00:31:29.920 --> 00:31:35.399
from or generated by connected devices. So
we wrote back to every police force in the
00:31:35.399 --> 00:31:40.970
UK had refused to reply to us and
presented the evidence but they maintained
00:31:40.970 --> 00:31:45.679
their stance so we will be bringing a
challenge against them under the Freedom
00:31:45.679 --> 00:31:51.929
of Information Act. Now, Eva has also
identified the huge risks associated with
00:31:51.929 --> 00:31:57.769
predictive policing yet in the UK we've
found out this is set to increase with
00:31:57.769 --> 00:32:02.070
forces either using commercial tools or
in-house ones they've developed or
00:32:02.070 --> 00:32:09.049
planning trials for 2018. There has been
no public consultation, there are no
00:32:09.049 --> 00:32:14.279
safeguards, and there is no oversight. So
when we ask them more questions about the
00:32:14.279 --> 00:32:21.370
plans we were told we were 'vexatious' and
they won't respond to more requests so it
00:32:21.370 --> 00:32:27.299
seems like we have yet another challenge,
and what about mobile phone extraction
00:32:27.299 --> 00:32:32.570
tools here are some of the stats that have
been found out and I would say these
00:32:32.570 --> 00:32:36.821
aren't completely accurate because it
depends on how reliable the police force
00:32:36.821 --> 00:32:42.940
are in responding but roughly I'd say it's
probably more than 93 percent now of UK
00:32:42.940 --> 00:32:48.379
police forces throughout the country are
extracting data from digital devices. We
00:32:48.379 --> 00:32:53.080
know they plan to increase, we've seen in
their documents they plan to train more
00:32:53.080 --> 00:32:58.690
officers, to buy more equipment, and to
see extraction as a standard part of
00:32:58.690 --> 00:33:04.009
arrest, even if the devices had absolutely
nothing to do with the offense and so
00:33:04.009 --> 00:33:09.769
these figures are likely to increase
exponentially, but in the UK not only to
00:33:09.769 --> 00:33:15.610
the police not need a warrant in documents
we've read they do not even need to notify
00:33:15.610 --> 00:33:21.139
the individual that they have extracted
data, for example, from their mobile phone
00:33:21.139 --> 00:33:27.590
or that they're storing it. If this is
being done without people's knowledge how
00:33:27.590 --> 00:33:32.220
on earth can people challenge it, how can
they ask for their data to be removed if
00:33:32.220 --> 00:33:39.590
they're found innocent? Turning to social
media monitoring which the police refer to
00:33:39.590 --> 00:33:44.330
as open source research. This is Jenny
Jones she's a member of the House of Lords
00:33:44.330 --> 00:33:50.730
in the Green Party and next to her photo
is a quote from her entry on the domestic
00:33:50.730 --> 00:33:57.249
extremism database, and so, if a member of
the House of Lords is being subject to
00:33:57.249 --> 00:34:04.659
social media monitoring for attending a
bike ride then I think it's highly likely
00:34:04.659 --> 00:34:08.830
that a large number of people who
legitimately exercise their right to
00:34:08.830 --> 00:34:14.429
protest are being subject to social media
monitoring. Now, this hasn't gone
00:34:14.429 --> 00:34:20.399
unnoticed completely although they're
slightly old these are quotes from two
00:34:20.399 --> 00:34:24.899
officials: the first the UK independent
reviewer of terrorism who notes that the
00:34:24.899 --> 00:34:29.690
extent of the use of social media
monitoring is not public known, and the
00:34:29.690 --> 00:34:33.679
second is the chief surveillance
commissioner who is and this is a very
00:34:33.679 --> 00:34:38.949
strong statement for a commissioner is
saying that basically social media should
00:34:38.949 --> 00:34:47.649
not be treated as fair game by the police.
So now I'll move on to a weak or outdated
00:34:47.649 --> 00:34:52.649
legal basis. For most of the technologies
we've looked at it's very unclear what
00:34:52.649 --> 00:34:58.359
legal basis the police are using even when
we've asked them. This relates to mobile
00:34:58.359 --> 00:35:03.940
phone extraction - so the legislation
they're relying on is over 30 years old
00:35:03.940 --> 00:35:11.310
and is wholly inappropriate for mobile
phone extraction this law was developed to
00:35:11.310 --> 00:35:16.680
deal with standard traditional searches,
the search of a phone can in no way be
00:35:16.680 --> 00:35:22.300
equated to the search of a person, or the
search of a house, and despite the fact
00:35:22.300 --> 00:35:26.901
that we have repeatedly asked for a
warrant this is not the case and we
00:35:26.901 --> 00:35:31.270
believe that there should be a warrant in
place not only in the UK but in the rest
00:35:31.270 --> 00:35:35.550
of the world. So if you think that either
you or your friends have had their data
00:35:35.550 --> 00:35:39.369
extracted when they're arrested or your
phone has been in the possession of the
00:35:39.369 --> 00:35:45.650
authorities you should be asking
questions, and very briefly something on
00:35:45.650 --> 00:35:52.420
lack of oversight, so we reported in
January this year about documents that
00:35:52.420 --> 00:35:58.000
were obtained by The Bristol Cable's
investigation into Cellebrite and one
00:35:58.000 --> 00:36:04.020
report said that in half of the cases
sampled the police noted the police had
00:36:04.020 --> 00:36:10.320
failed to receive authorization internally
for the use of extraction tools. Poor
00:36:10.320 --> 00:36:15.809
training undermined investigations into
serious offences such as murder, and
00:36:15.809 --> 00:36:20.940
inadequate security practices meant that
encryption was not taking place even when
00:36:20.940 --> 00:36:26.849
it was easy to do and they were losing
files containing intimate personal data.
00:36:26.849 --> 00:36:33.490
So why does this matter? Here are some key
points: In relation to information
00:36:33.490 --> 00:36:37.760
asymmetry - it's clear as Eva has
explained that the police can now access
00:36:37.760 --> 00:36:43.670
far more data on our devices than the
average user. In relation to imbalance of
00:36:43.670 --> 00:36:47.420
power - it's clear they can collect and
analyze sources that are beyond our
00:36:47.420 --> 00:36:54.320
control whether it's publicly placed
sensors, cameras, and other devices. There
00:36:54.320 --> 00:36:58.890
is also unequal access and if lawyers
don't know what's being gathered they
00:36:58.890 --> 00:37:03.660
don't know what to ask for from the
police. All in all this puts the
00:37:03.660 --> 00:37:10.410
individual at a huge disadvantage. Another
impact is the chilling effect on political
00:37:10.410 --> 00:37:16.850
expression now I'm sure many of you maybe
think that the police monitor your social
00:37:16.850 --> 00:37:21.859
media but the average person is unlikely
to, and so if they start to know about
00:37:21.859 --> 00:37:27.110
this are they going to think twice about
joining in protesting either physically or
00:37:27.110 --> 00:37:32.380
using a hashtag, and what about who your
friends are? If they know you attend
00:37:32.380 --> 00:37:38.540
protests are they really want to have
their data on your phone if they know that
00:37:38.540 --> 00:37:44.460
potentially that could be extracted and
end up on a police database? It's far
00:37:44.460 --> 00:37:49.380
easier to be anonymous face among many
people than a single isolated person
00:37:49.380 --> 00:37:55.119
standing up to power but these new forms
of policing we have been discussing
00:37:55.119 --> 00:38:00.339
redefine the very act of protesting by
singling out each and every one of us from
00:38:00.339 --> 00:38:08.309
the crowd. So, what can we do? Many of you
will be familiar with these technologies,
00:38:08.309 --> 00:38:12.720
but do you know how to find out what the
police are doing? In the UK we've been
00:38:12.720 --> 00:38:16.610
using Freedom of Information requests, we
want to do this with people throughout
00:38:16.610 --> 00:38:21.910
Europe and you don't need to be a lawyer
so please get in touch. We also want to
00:38:21.910 --> 00:38:26.660
dig into the technology a bit more, I want
someone to use a Cellebrite UFED on my
00:38:26.660 --> 00:38:31.809
phone and show me exactly what can come
out of it, and we want to tell lawyers and
00:38:31.809 --> 00:38:37.329
activists about these new techniques. Many
lawyers I speak to who are experts in
00:38:37.329 --> 00:38:42.210
actions against the police do not know the
police are using these tools. This means
00:38:42.210 --> 00:38:46.700
they don't know the right questions to ask
and so it's fundamental you speak to
00:38:46.700 --> 00:38:50.920
people who are bringing these cases and
tell them about what they can do or what
00:38:50.920 --> 00:38:56.640
questions they should be asking, and
finally we want you to also raise the
00:38:56.640 --> 00:39:18.034
debate, to share our research, and to
critique it, thank you.
00:39:18.034 --> 00:39:24.220
Herald: So we've got ample enough time for
Q&A are there any questions in the hall,
00:39:24.220 --> 00:39:28.670
yes, there's one over there.
Question: You mentioned the problem of
00:39:28.670 --> 00:39:33.110
when they do physical extraction from the
Celebrite device it's going to get all of
00:39:33.110 --> 00:39:37.710
the photos, all of the emails, or whatever
maybe rather than just what the
00:39:37.710 --> 00:39:42.059
investigator needs. What is the solution
to that from your eyes is there a
00:39:42.059 --> 00:39:45.740
technical one that these companies are
gonna have to implement - which they're
00:39:45.740 --> 00:39:51.140
not going to - or a legal one, because on
the other side a mobile phone is a crucial
00:39:51.140 --> 00:39:56.890
part in a any criminal investigation in
2017. So what's the workaround or the
00:39:56.890 --> 00:40:00.020
solution to that?
Answer: I think it's both, I think the
00:40:00.020 --> 00:40:04.000
fact that there isn't any law looking at
this and no one's discussing can there be
00:40:04.000 --> 00:40:08.520
a technical solution or does it need to be
one where there's better regulation and
00:40:08.520 --> 00:40:12.660
oversight so you extract everything, can
you keep it for a certain period to see
00:40:12.660 --> 00:40:16.859
what's relevant then do you have to delete
it? The trouble is we don't see any
00:40:16.859 --> 00:40:22.290
deletion practices and the police have
publicly stated in the media that they can
00:40:22.290 --> 00:40:27.280
just keep everything as long as they like.
They like data you can kind of see why but
00:40:27.280 --> 00:40:31.240
that doesn't mean they should keep
everyone's data indefinitely just in case
00:40:31.240 --> 00:40:35.062
it's useful so I think there may be tech
solutions there may be legal ones and I
00:40:35.062 --> 00:40:40.510
think perhaps both together as is one of
the answers. Herald: The next question
00:40:40.510 --> 00:40:45.349
from microphone one please.
Q: I'm just wondering how those laws on
00:40:45.349 --> 00:40:50.280
action and power given to the cops are
being sold to the UK people is it because
00:40:50.280 --> 00:40:56.510
to fight terrorism as I said or to fight
drugs or this kind of stuff, what's the
00:40:56.510 --> 00:41:00.490
argument used by the government to sold
that to the people.
00:41:00.490 --> 00:41:05.170
A: I think actually one thing that's
important is to bear in mind is that I'm
00:41:05.170 --> 00:41:10.630
not sure most of the of the public in the
UK is even aware of it, so I think unlike
00:41:10.630 --> 00:41:15.330
the work of intelligence services an
agency where terrorism is used as the
00:41:15.330 --> 00:41:22.450
excuse for ever more power and especially
laws that have become increasingly
00:41:22.450 --> 00:41:26.130
invasive, actually with policing we don't
even fall in that kind of discourse
00:41:26.130 --> 00:41:30.980
because it's actually hardly talked about
in UK. Yeah, and the mobile phone
00:41:30.980 --> 00:41:34.880
extraction stuff we've been looking at is
low-level crimes, so that's like you
00:41:34.880 --> 00:41:40.750
have, it could be you know a pub fight,
it could be a robbery, which that's more
00:41:40.750 --> 00:41:45.550
serious, it could be an assault, so they
want to use it in every case. For all the
00:41:45.550 --> 00:41:48.170
other techniques we have no idea what
they're using for that's one of the
00:41:48.170 --> 00:41:53.599
problems.
Herald: The next question from the
00:41:53.599 --> 00:41:57.400
internet please.
Q: When you say that there's a lack of
00:41:57.400 --> 00:42:04.460
laws and regulations for police concerning
us in extraction and data from devices are
00:42:04.460 --> 00:42:09.790
you talking just about UK and/or USA or do
you have any examples of other countries
00:42:09.790 --> 00:42:13.500
who do better or worse?
A: I don't know of any country that has a
00:42:13.500 --> 00:42:18.520
regulation on publicly available
information on social media.
00:42:18.520 --> 00:42:25.849
Herald: Microphone number four.
Q: Thank you again for a great talk. In
00:42:25.849 --> 00:42:31.920
terms of data exploitation an element that
I didn't hear you talk about that I'd like
00:42:31.920 --> 00:42:35.940
to hear a little bit more is when there
are questions around who is doing the
00:42:35.940 --> 00:42:40.410
exploitation, I know in the U.S. some FOIA
researchers get around how difficult it is
00:42:40.410 --> 00:42:44.640
to get data from the feds by going after
local and state police departments, is
00:42:44.640 --> 00:42:48.450
that something that you're doing or do you
have a way of addressing confusion when
00:42:48.450 --> 00:42:50.880
people don't know what agency has the
data?
00:42:50.880 --> 00:42:56.580
A: Yeah, I think actually what one of the
things the data exploitation program at
00:42:56.580 --> 00:43:00.330
Privacy International is doing is actually
looking into the connection between the
00:43:00.330 --> 00:43:06.050
private sector and governments because
obviously at the moment there's the whole
00:43:06.050 --> 00:43:09.950
question of data brokers which is an
industry that's hardly regulated at all,
00:43:09.950 --> 00:43:14.130
that people don't necessarily know about,
we don't, the companies that are doing it
00:43:14.130 --> 00:43:19.900
are familiar household name. I'll let
Millie talk a lot more about the
00:43:19.900 --> 00:43:24.920
government aspects of it. I guess the
question is again a country-by-country
00:43:24.920 --> 00:43:29.470
basis, we work in many countries that
don't have any data protection regulations
00:43:29.470 --> 00:43:36.609
at all so there is this first difficulty
as how do we regulate, how do we limit the
00:43:36.609 --> 00:43:40.920
power of the state when you don't even
have the basic legislation around
00:43:40.920 --> 00:43:45.710
data protection? One thing to bear in mind
is like the problem with companies is like
00:43:45.710 --> 00:43:53.220
how do you also hold companies accountable
whereas with the state there is the whole
00:43:53.220 --> 00:43:58.119
challenge of finding the right legal
framework to limit their power, but maybe
00:43:58.119 --> 00:44:02.069
I'll let Millie talk a little bit more
about this. Yeah, with our with our FOIA
00:44:02.069 --> 00:44:06.270
request we tend to go after everyone so
with the example of the Home Office saying
00:44:06.270 --> 00:44:08.990
something that the other police didn't
that was because we went to all the
00:44:08.990 --> 00:44:14.680
different state bodies and I think that
there's a good example in in the states
00:44:14.680 --> 00:44:17.690
where there's far more research done on
what the police are doing, but they're
00:44:17.690 --> 00:44:22.600
using the same product in the UK I think
it's axiom and they're a storage device
00:44:22.600 --> 00:44:29.119
for body-worn camera videos, and a lawyer
in the states said that in order to access
00:44:29.119 --> 00:44:32.799
the video containing his client he had to
agree to the terms and condition on Axioms
00:44:32.799 --> 00:44:38.140
website which basically gave them full use
of his clients video about a crime scene.
00:44:38.140 --> 00:44:42.750
So that's a private company having use of
this video so given that we found they're
00:44:42.750 --> 00:44:47.120
using it in the UK we don't know if those
kind of terms and conditions exist but
00:44:47.120 --> 00:44:54.673
it's a very real problem as they rely
increasingly on private companies.
00:44:54.673 --> 00:44:58.370
Herald: Number two please.
Q: Thank you for your work perhaps you've
00:44:58.370 --> 00:45:03.450
already answered this partially from other
people's questions but it looks like we
00:45:03.450 --> 00:45:08.539
have a great way to start the process and
kind of taking the power back but you know
00:45:08.539 --> 00:45:13.250
the state and the system certainly doesn't
want to give up this much power, how do we
00:45:13.250 --> 00:45:18.190
actually directly, what's kind of the
endgame, what's the strategies for making
00:45:18.190 --> 00:45:24.770
the police or the government's give up and
restore balance, is it a suit, is it
00:45:24.770 --> 00:45:27.859
challenging through Parliament and in the
slow process of democracy, or what do you
00:45:27.859 --> 00:45:32.170
think is the right way of doing it?
A: I never think one works on its own,
00:45:32.170 --> 00:45:36.670
even though I'm a litigator I often think
litigation is quite a weak tactic,
00:45:36.670 --> 00:45:40.920
particularly if you don't have the public
on side, and then again if you don't have
00:45:40.920 --> 00:45:44.220
Parliament. So we need all of them and
they can all come through different means
00:45:44.220 --> 00:45:49.090
so we wouldn't just focus on one of the
different countries it might be that you
00:45:49.090 --> 00:45:53.540
go down the legal route or the down the
parliamentary route but in the UK we're
00:45:53.540 --> 00:45:57.460
trying all different routes so for example
on mobile phone extraction in the
00:45:57.460 --> 00:46:00.900
beginning of next year we're going to be
doing a video we're going to be doing
00:46:00.900 --> 00:46:04.120
interviewing the public and speaking to
them about it, we're going to be going to
00:46:04.120 --> 00:46:08.960
Parliament, and I've also been speaking to
a lot of lawyers so I'm hoping some cases
00:46:08.960 --> 00:46:15.280
will start because those individual cases
brought by local lawyers are where also
00:46:15.280 --> 00:46:19.859
you see a lot of change like the John Cat
case, that's one lawyer, so I think we
00:46:19.859 --> 00:46:25.901
need all different things to see what
works and what sticks.
00:46:25.901 --> 00:46:31.150
Herald: We haven't had number three yet.
Q: Hi, thanks for the talk, so I have a
00:46:31.150 --> 00:46:39.020
question regarding concerning the solution
side of things because one aspect I was
00:46:39.020 --> 00:46:45.569
missing in your talk was the economics of
the game actually because like you are
00:46:45.569 --> 00:46:51.510
from the UK and the private sector has
like stepped in also and another public
00:46:51.510 --> 00:46:58.799
domain the NHS to help out because funds
are missing and I would like to ask you
00:46:58.799 --> 00:47:03.299
whether or not you think first of all the
logic is the same within the police
00:47:03.299 --> 00:47:12.720
departments because it might also be like
cost driven aspect to limit the salaries
00:47:12.720 --> 00:47:18.589
or because you have the problem with
police force coming in because you have to
00:47:18.589 --> 00:47:24.099
pay their rents and automated things
especially when I'm given to the private
00:47:24.099 --> 00:47:30.779
sector which has another whole logic of
thinking about this stuff is cost saving
00:47:30.779 --> 00:47:43.930
and so maybe it would be a nice thing
whether if you could talk a bit about the,
00:47:43.930 --> 00:47:49.359
I'm sorry, the attempt to maybe like get
economics a bit more into the picture when
00:47:49.359 --> 00:47:56.130
it comes to solutions of the whole thing.
A: So I think yeah, your very right in
00:47:56.130 --> 00:48:02.309
pointing actually the relation, well that
you compare what's happening with the NHS
00:48:02.309 --> 00:48:07.799
and what's happening with the police
because in both the economics of
00:48:07.799 --> 00:48:14.940
companies offering policing services arise
from the same situation there's a need of
00:48:14.940 --> 00:48:23.380
doing more efficient policing because of
budget cuts, so the same way the NHS is
00:48:23.380 --> 00:48:30.079
being essentially privatized due to the
budget cuts and due to the to the needs
00:48:30.079 --> 00:48:34.799
that arise from being limited in your
finance, again there's a similar thing
00:48:34.799 --> 00:48:38.880
with the police when you when you're
understaffed then you're more likely to
00:48:38.880 --> 00:48:44.329
rely on on technologies to help you do
your work more efficiently because
00:48:44.329 --> 00:48:51.210
essentially with predictive policing the
idea behind this is that if you know where
00:48:51.210 --> 00:48:56.380
and when crime will happen then you can
focus the limited resources you have there
00:48:56.380 --> 00:49:02.640
and not sort of look at a more global
larger picture. So I mean I'm not gonna be
00:49:02.640 --> 00:49:06.599
here on stage advocating for more funds
for the police, I'm not gonna do that, but
00:49:06.599 --> 00:49:11.660
I think that there is there is a desperate
need to reframe actually the narrative
00:49:11.660 --> 00:49:19.170
around how we do policing actually and
then definitely also look at a different
00:49:19.170 --> 00:49:22.680
perspective and a different approach to
policing because as I've tried to show
00:49:22.680 --> 00:49:28.010
it's been a really long time since this
narrative has developed of more data leads
00:49:28.010 --> 00:49:32.789
to crime resolution but actually what I
didn't have the time to get into in this
00:49:32.789 --> 00:49:37.490
talk is actually all the research that are
showing that those product actually don't
00:49:37.490 --> 00:49:42.770
work like PREDPOL is actually basically
gaslighting a lot of police officers with
00:49:42.770 --> 00:49:47.650
their figures, the kind of figures that
are pushing and suggesting are just like
00:49:47.650 --> 00:49:53.671
plain inaccurate, it's not accurate to
compare a city on the one year to what a
00:49:53.671 --> 00:49:59.230
city is becoming in another year so it's
not even clear that a lot of this
00:49:59.230 --> 00:50:05.460
project are even like properly functioning
and in a sense I don't want them to
00:50:05.460 --> 00:50:09.250
function I'm not gonna say if we had
better predictive policing then the
00:50:09.250 --> 00:50:14.869
problem will be solved no that is not the
question, the question is how do we have
00:50:14.869 --> 00:50:20.820
regulation that force the police to look
differently into the way they are
00:50:20.820 --> 00:50:25.597
conducting policing.
Herald: Number four please.
00:50:25.597 --> 00:50:31.980
Q: So, thank you for your presentation I
have a question about SOCMINT, my opinion
00:50:31.980 --> 00:50:37.359
SOCMINT might violate the terms of
services of for example Twitter and
00:50:37.359 --> 00:50:41.000
Facebook have you tried to cooperate with
these companies to make them actually
00:50:41.000 --> 00:50:46.360
enforce their TOS?
A: So actually there is two things as I
00:50:46.360 --> 00:50:51.270
said like all companies that are doing
scraping of data and you're right in this
00:50:51.270 --> 00:50:58.700
case they violate the terms of services of
Facebook and Twitter. Now, the other
00:50:58.700 --> 00:51:03.049
problem is that there is already a loop to
this and actually the marketing company I
00:51:03.049 --> 00:51:08.289
was talking about that's being used by the
UK police what they essentially do is that
00:51:08.289 --> 00:51:13.559
they purchase the data from Facebook and
Twitter, so this is why it's interesting
00:51:13.559 --> 00:51:19.900
because when Facebook's say we don't sell
your data, well essentially actually with
00:51:19.900 --> 00:51:25.970
marketing tools that are there to monitor
what people say about products essentially
00:51:25.970 --> 00:51:29.599
what you're doing is selling your data,
they're not selling necessarily like your
00:51:29.599 --> 00:51:34.400
name or your location or things like that
but whatever you're going to be posting
00:51:34.400 --> 00:51:41.109
publicly for example in like groups or
public pages is something that they are
00:51:41.109 --> 00:51:45.329
going to be trying to sell to those
companies. So I think you're right and
00:51:45.329 --> 00:51:50.839
maybe Millie will have more to say about
this. I think those companies have a role
00:51:50.839 --> 00:51:56.260
to play but at the moment I think the
challenge we face is actually this loop
00:51:56.260 --> 00:52:00.960
that we're facing where by purchasing the
data directly from the company they don't
00:52:00.960 --> 00:52:07.420
face any they don't violate the terms of
services. Yeah, we've spoken a bit to the
00:52:07.420 --> 00:52:12.840
some of the social media companies, we've
been told that one of their big focuses is
00:52:12.840 --> 00:52:17.710
the problems of the social media
monitoring at the U.S. border and so
00:52:17.710 --> 00:52:22.609
because there's a lot known about that
they're looking at those issues so I think
00:52:22.609 --> 00:52:27.000
once we show more and more the problems
say in the UK or in other countries I
00:52:27.000 --> 00:52:31.869
think it would be very interesting to look
at what's happened over the Catalan
00:52:31.869 --> 00:52:37.410
independence vote period to see how social
media was used then. I think the companies
00:52:37.410 --> 00:52:42.380
aren't going to react until we make them
although they probably will meet with us.
00:52:42.380 --> 00:52:49.990
A slightly different aspect we revealed in
a different part of our work that the
00:52:49.990 --> 00:52:53.190
intelligence agencies were gathering
social media that's probably not
00:52:53.190 --> 00:52:57.779
groundbreaking news but it was it was
there in plain fact and so they all got a
00:52:57.779 --> 00:53:01.480
bit concerned about how that was
happening, whether some of them knew or
00:53:01.480 --> 00:53:05.950
some of them didn't, so the better our
research the more people speaking about it
00:53:05.950 --> 00:53:11.030
I think they will engage, or we'll find
out are they are the police getting it
00:53:11.030 --> 00:53:17.350
lawfully or unlawfully.
Herald: Number one please.
00:53:17.350 --> 00:53:21.200
Q: Thanks for your talk, I have a question
on predictive policing because German
00:53:21.200 --> 00:53:28.700
authorities in the last two years piloted pre-cops
PREDPOL projects in three states I think
00:53:28.700 --> 00:53:33.630
and they claimed that they would never use
these techniques with data on individuals
00:53:33.630 --> 00:53:38.870
but only aggregate data like the new
repeat stuff you presented and they
00:53:38.870 --> 00:53:42.940
presented as just an additional tool in
their toolbox and that if use responsibly
00:53:42.940 --> 00:53:48.240
can lead to more cost effective policing,
do you buy this argument or would you say
00:53:48.240 --> 00:53:55.020
that there's inevitably slippery slope or
kind of like a path dependency to more
00:53:55.020 --> 00:54:01.010
granular data assessment or evaluation
that would inevitably infringe on privacy
00:54:01.010 --> 00:54:05.319
rights?
A: I think this goes back to the question
00:54:05.319 --> 00:54:08.740
of like you know are we using per
listening to identify where crime is
00:54:08.740 --> 00:54:14.369
happening or who it is who's committing a
crime but actually I think even if we if
00:54:14.369 --> 00:54:18.910
we stick to this even if we stick to
identifying where crime is happening we
00:54:18.910 --> 00:54:23.650
still run into problems we still run into
the fundamental problem of predictive
00:54:23.650 --> 00:54:28.599
policing which is we only have data on
crime that have already been reported ever
00:54:28.599 --> 00:54:35.809
or already been addressed by the police,
and that's by essence already biased data.
00:54:35.809 --> 00:54:41.430
If we have police in some areas then we're
more likely to, you know, further police
00:54:41.430 --> 00:54:51.579
because the solution of those companies of
those algorithm will be leading to more
00:54:51.579 --> 00:54:57.880
suggestions that crime is is happening
more predominantly in those areas. So, as
00:54:57.880 --> 00:55:04.459
we've seen so far is that we fall into
these fundamental problems of just
00:55:04.459 --> 00:55:11.329
overpolicing communities that are already
overpoliced. So in a sense in terms of
00:55:11.329 --> 00:55:18.069
well the right to privacy but also the
question of the presumption of innocence I
00:55:18.069 --> 00:55:23.040
think purely just having trying to
cultivate data on the where crime is
00:55:23.040 --> 00:55:29.660
happening it's not efficient policing
first of all but it's also causing
00:55:29.660 --> 00:55:35.020
challenges for fundamental rights as well.
Yeah, I guess it's not a great comparison
00:55:35.020 --> 00:55:39.481
but what a lot of what they're bringing in
now is a program to assist you with the
00:55:39.481 --> 00:55:43.910
charging decision, so you've got someone
you've arrested do you charge them or not?
00:55:43.910 --> 00:55:48.319
The police say oh well of course it's only
advisory you only have to look at how busy
00:55:48.319 --> 00:55:52.660
a police station is to know how advisory
is that going to be and how much is it
00:55:52.660 --> 00:55:56.740
going to sway your opinion. So the more
you use these tools the more it makes your
00:55:56.740 --> 00:56:01.260
job easier because rather than thinking,
where are we going to go, what areas
00:56:01.260 --> 00:56:04.250
things going to happen, who are we going
to arrest, well the computer told us to do
00:56:04.250 --> 00:56:08.700
this so let's just do that.
Herald: Thank you and microphone number
00:56:08.700 --> 00:56:13.111
three please.
Q: Thank you, do you think that there are
00:56:13.111 --> 00:56:19.940
any credible arguments to be made for
limiting the police's abilities under acts
00:56:19.940 --> 00:56:25.130
in the UK that incorporate EU level
restrictions on privacy data protection
00:56:25.130 --> 00:56:29.650
human rights or fundamental rights and if
so do you anticipate that those arguments
00:56:29.650 --> 00:56:35.140
might change after brexit?
A: Well they they're bringing in GDPR and
00:56:35.140 --> 00:56:39.670
the Law Enforcement Directive now and
they're not going to scrap those once
00:56:39.670 --> 00:56:44.299
brexit comes in. We'll still be part,
hopefully, of the European Court of Human
00:56:44.299 --> 00:56:49.130
Rights, but not the European Court of
Justice. I think there are going to be
00:56:49.130 --> 00:56:51.960
implications it's going to be very
interesting how they play it out they're
00:56:51.960 --> 00:56:57.420
still going to want the data from Europol,
they want to be part of Interpol, policing
00:56:57.420 --> 00:57:02.309
operates at a different level and I think
if they have to comply with certain laws
00:57:02.309 --> 00:57:06.029
so that they can play with the big boys
then they probably will, but they may do
00:57:06.029 --> 00:57:12.160
things behind the scenes, so it depends
where it works for them, but certainly the
00:57:12.160 --> 00:57:16.019
politicians and definitely the police
wanna be part of those groups. So we'll
00:57:16.019 --> 00:57:20.809
have to see, but we will still use them
and we'll still rely on European judgments
00:57:20.809 --> 00:57:26.865
the force they have in a court of law may
be more difficult.
00:57:26.865 --> 00:57:32.319
Herald: Does the internet have any
questions, nope, well then number two
00:57:32.319 --> 00:57:35.839
please.
Q: So you've mentioned that they don't
00:57:35.839 --> 00:57:41.609
have really good operational security and
sometimes some stuff that should not leak
00:57:41.609 --> 00:57:47.869
leaked now within the last year we had
major data leaks all across the world like
00:57:47.869 --> 00:57:54.710
Philippines, South Africa, just to mention
a few, now if the, security, OPSEC is so
00:57:54.710 --> 00:58:00.160
bad in the police in Great Britain it's
not unlikely that something will happen
00:58:00.160 --> 00:58:05.299
in Europe of a similar kind what kind of
impact do you think such a huge data leak
00:58:05.299 --> 00:58:11.750
of private information which the police
legally stored has even if it was not
00:58:11.750 --> 00:58:16.539
leaked by the police and it would be leaked
by a private company that had some way
00:58:16.539 --> 00:58:19.329
access to it?
A: I I guess it depends what it what it
00:58:19.329 --> 00:58:25.340
is, if it's a database with serious
criminals and only the bad people, then
00:58:25.340 --> 00:58:29.480
people will think when it's
good they have that information but they
00:58:29.480 --> 00:58:35.920
need to make it more secure. If
somehow databases which held all sorts of
00:58:35.920 --> 00:58:39.589
information say from people's mobile
phones, innocent people's pictures, all
00:58:39.589 --> 00:58:44.820
that kind of thing then we might see a
much wider public reaction to the tools
00:58:44.820 --> 00:58:51.039
that are used and the safeguards, the
legal safeguards, will come a lot quicker
00:58:51.039 --> 00:58:55.599
than probably we will achieve in the way
we're trying to go now because there'll be
00:58:55.599 --> 00:59:02.030
a bigger public outrage.
Herald: Okay one last and hopefully short
00:59:02.030 --> 00:59:06.619
question from microphone one.
Q: Hi, thanks for the talk was really
00:59:06.619 --> 00:59:10.320
interesting, it's actually quite a short
question how much is a Cellebrite, and can
00:59:10.320 --> 00:59:14.760
we buy one?
A: I did look to buy one, I think there
00:59:14.760 --> 00:59:21.319
were some on eBay but I'm sure if they
were like the right things but a couple of
00:59:21.319 --> 00:59:24.319
thousand pounds, but I think you have to
actually be a police force to get those
00:59:24.319 --> 00:59:30.529
ones, maybe there are other types but
it's expensive but not unobtainable, but
00:59:30.529 --> 00:59:34.779
I'm trying to find universities that might
have them because I think that a lot of
00:59:34.779 --> 00:59:38.369
forensic schools I'm hoping that they
will, I know they do extractions of
00:59:38.369 --> 00:59:41.725
laptops but I haven't found one yet that
does phones but I probably haven't asked
00:59:41.725 --> 00:59:45.808
enough people.
Herald: So thank you very much.
00:59:45.808 --> 00:59:50.990
34C3 Music
00:59:50.990 --> 01:00:07.000
subtitles created by c3subtitles.de
in the year 2020. Join, and help us!